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**The Ramakrishna Mission
Institute of Culture, Calcutta**

ARYAN PATH

Canst thou destroy divine Compassion? Compassion is no attribute. It is the Law of Laws—eternal Harmony, Alaya's Self; a shoreless universal essence, the light of everlasting right, and fitness of all things, the law of Love eternal. The more thou dost become at one with it, thy being melted in its Being, the more thy Soul unites with that which Is, the more thou wilt become Compassion Absolute. Such is the Arya Path, Path of the Buddhas of perfection. —*The Voice of the Silence*

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Point out the "Way"—however dimly,
and lost among the host—as does the evening
star to those who tread their path in darkness.

—*The Voice of the Silence.*

THE ARYAN PATH

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OUR SIXTH VOLUME

With this issue THE ARYAN PATH enters upon its sixth year. Its fundamental purpose is to advocate the practice of the Noble Life; therefore its appeal is principally to the individual. Nobility consists in a special attitude of mind to the whole of life. Not by birth in any particular family is a man created noble, nor by reason of any outer possession does he attain nobility. All over the world, however, rank, title and worldly possessions, inherited by birth or acquired by efforts, are valued highly, while innate culture counts for little. Birth in a royal family makes even a boor a prince; wealth accumulated even by sharp practice too often raises its possessor to a high place in society. The *Bhagavad-Gita* describes this general phenomenon as typical of the Iron Age, in which "confusion of castes" prevails.

Nor is it noble meekly to follow a political leader, without

knowledge and without discernment. The intelligent everywhere scorn as *ignoble* the blind acceptance of priestly dicta; large numbers have broken that religious fetter forged by the exploiting priest many centuries ago at the time that the ancient and venerable institution of the Guru was destroyed, but failing to seek and find reality these masses are fast encumbering themselves with as ignoble a substitute.

Nor is nobility the complete disregard of Nature and Nature's Laws, in a kind of Bohemian spirit; neither is it to be found in the name of personal freedom, nor in the pursuit of happiness. It is equally clear that nobility does not consist in a mechanical maintenance of the traditions of any house or order.

"Manners not idle, but the fruit
Of loyal nature and of noble mind,"

when robbed of that soul

often become mere gesticulations, however spectacular, or even, perhaps productive of good. The studied manner—what is said, not what is felt or a display of deeds irrespective of motives and thoughts—is often a breeder of hypocrisy, a social vice almost universal. Polished manners often hide a mean or an obtuse soul. The cowl does not make the monk, nor the polished manner a gentleman. Was Jesus a gentleman when he cast out of the temple the money-changers, or when he cursed the barren fig tree? When was Gautama more noble?—when, as prince, he lived in the palace in the happy company of his queen; or when, as sage, he laboured with begging-bowl in hand, followed by his Bhikkhus?

These fictions disposed of, what constitutes Nobility? The same *Bhagavad-Gita*, offers a philosophy of life which would lift the human race into a state of true nobility. Its philosophy may be said to revolve round the word *Sva-dharma*. This is an almost untranslatable term in which numerous ideas are implicit: self-rule, soul-expression, observance of one's own inner religion, performance of one's own duty, obedience to the guidance of one's own inner spiritual being—and

there are other implications also. But in every connotation there is the root-idea of nobility. The base metal in men and women of all lands and all creeds can be transmuted into nobility, as iron and lead into gold. *Sva-dharma* and *Arya-dharma*, religion of the soul and religion of nobility, are synonymous ideas. They present a more exhaustive view of nobility than even the telling phrase, *noblesse oblige*. The latter emphasises the outer aspect of the manner and behaviour of the noble towards others, but does not bring out the concept of inner discipline, the rule of the Self over the self, of soul over mind, of spirit over matter.

The Noble Man is the Superior Man; his mind freed from passions breathes peace, lighted by knowledge radiates sympathy, and made liberal by philosophy spreads good-will. Though poor in possessions he is rich in sacrifices and inspires in others his own courage to face life, his own capacity to fight its obstacles and his own perseverance to attain success.

THE ARYAN PATH puts forward month by month articles which it earnestly hopes will modify and adjust the mind of the reader, thus preparing it for the revolution through which it must pass ere it emerges robed in sacred Nobility.

THE PROPONENT OF UNIVERSAL RELIGION

[In these days when Dictators are rising, one after another, on the political horizon and the very existence of Democracy is seriously threatened, the following article on Asoka, to be published in two parts, will have an illuminating message. Asoka went to the root of the difficulty which is religion. He formulated a Universal Religion based on moral principles, thereby aiming to achieve the Brotherhood of Man. That he succeeded to a very great measure is mainly due to his method—he did not allow the individual to be swamped by the mass of humanity while legislating for the latter. He also succeeded in abolishing war during his reign, not by forced reduction of armaments, but by orientating the national mind into higher values of Truth, Non-Violence, and Spiritual Harmony.]

Radhakumud Mookerji is famous for his deep scholarship and original research. He is the author of several volumes on ancient Hindu culture and has also written authentic biographies of two great ancient Hindu rulers, Asoka and Harsha. In this article Professor Mookerji sets out in outline the golden career of Asoka and shows how he achieved what our boastful age is hoping for.—EDS.]

Asoka may be regarded as India's greatest king. According to H. G. Wells, he is the world's greatest king. The claim to greatness of this Indian ruler of the third century B. C. rests not alone upon his unique administrative genius, but also on his efforts in behalf of a universal religion which would reconcile credal antagonisms and supply a self-compelling basis for right ethics. Coupled with the network of public works of utility which he spread over the whole country to promote the physical well-being of his people, he vigorously prosecuted measures for their spiritual well-being by means of mass-instruction in Dharma or Religion—not any particular religion professed by any sect or community, but Religion which is common and acceptable to all sects and communities as the universal religion of mankind. His position as emperor who had to deal with so many creeds and sects no doubt presented

special problems. The usual policy in such cases is that of strict religious neutrality. But Asoka, on his own principles, could not remain neutral or indifferent in regard to what he believed to be the supreme duty of a king, *viz.*, to achieve the moral progress of his people. Therefore, he was driven, by the necessities of his case, to evolve a religion for purposes of mass instruction which should be above creed, and universally acceptable as the elements (*sāra*) [Rock Edict XII] common to all religions. Asoka thus stands out as a pioneer of universal religion.

The religion that he thus invented for the masses and which was adopted for purposes of state religious instruction consisted of the cardinal principles of morality upon which all can agree, irrespective of caste or creed. It comprised "obedience to father and mother, elders, teachers, seniors in age or standing; respect

for teachers; proper treatment towards relations, servants and dependants, the poor and the needy, towards friends, acquaintances, and companions; gifts to ascetics, friends, comrades and relatives, and to the aged; abstention from slaughter of living beings even for religious purposes; complete non-violence towards all life"; and cultivation of specified virtues such as "*Dayā* (kindness), *Dānam* (charity), *Satyam* (truthfulness), *Śaucham* (outer and inner purity), *Mārdavam* (mildness of temper), *Sādhuta* (goodness), *Bhāva-śuddhi* (purity of heart), *Parikṣa* (self-examination), *Bhaya* (fear of sin), *Utsāha* or *Parākrama* (self-exertion in moral life).*

BASIS LAID IN PURITY OF DOMESTIC LIFE

The idea that is at the root of Asoka's moral scheme is that morality or religion, like charity, must begin at home and be in full evidence primarily in the sphere of a person's domestic life, of his personal and intimate relations, in the inner circle of his daily associates, not excluding even the dumb, domesticated animals which are part of a Hindu's household. In all these spheres, a person must first qualify for the moral life by the cultivation of proper relations as his habit or second nature, and not by any artificial, assumed or forced "rationalisation," so that his whole life, from day to day, in every moment, may be governed by a spirit of innate good-will, justice and an abounding charity that flows out even to servants and the

domestic animals. Asoka thus believed in the purity and perfection of the home as the unit of society. The level of social life depends on that attained in the domestic life in a community.

HIS FOREIGN MISSIONS OF SOCIAL SERVICE

Such a cosmopolitan scheme of morality or religion Asoka could conscientiously and freely propagate among all communities all over the country, and even beyond. He went so far as to organise foreign missions to propagate this new religion in certain Western countries, which are mentioned by him, where his work was already making progress, as stated by him. He says :—

This Dharma-Vijaya or "moral" conquest has been repeatedly won by him both in his dominions, and even among all the frontier peoples up to a limit of 600 *yojanas*, embracing the territories of five Greek Kings, Antiochos [II Theos of Syria, who ruled between 261-296 B. C.], Ptolemy [Ptolemy II Philadelphos of Egypt, 285-247 B. C.], Antigonos [of Macedonia, 278-239 B. C.], Magas [of Cyrene, 300-258 B. C.] and Alexander [of Epirus, 272?-258 B. C.]; and, towards the south, among the Cholas, Pāṇdyas, as far as Tāmraparni (Ceylon)...Everywhere are people following the moral injunctions of His Sacred Majesty [Rock Edict XIII].

ASOKA'S TREATMENT OF COMMUNAL PROBLEMS

Asoka's greatness is further brought out in the way he treated the communal problems of his time, which are the eternal problems of India. He has published a special proclamation on the subject [Rock Edict XII] in words which have

* See p. 69 of my *Asoka*, Gaekwad Lectures (Macmillan, London) for full references,

value even in present times. The religious toleration that he preaches in this Edict was the logical consequence, the natural extension, of his general religious views, on the basis of which he had established his State Religion for adoption by all communities and classes in the country. The Inscription states :—

His Sacred and Gracious Majesty the King shows honour to all sects, and to all classes, ascetics as well as householders ; by gifts and offerings of various kinds is he honouring them. But His Sacred Majesty does not value such gifts or honours as that how there should be the growth of the essential elements (*sāra-vṛiddhi*) of all religions. The growth of this “essence” of all religions is of diverse kinds. But the root of it (*mūlani*) is restraint of speech (*vachā-guṇṭi*), that is, that there should not be thoughtless praise of one's own sect and criticism of others' sects. Such belittling or slighting (*lahukā*) as well as appreciation must be on proper specified grounds. Thus doing, one helps his own sect to grow and benefits the sects of others too. Doing otherwise, one inflicts injury on his own sect and does disservice to the sects of others. For whosoever extols his own sect and condemns the sects of others wholly from a blind devotion to his own sect, *i. e.*, from the thought, “How I may glorify (*dṛṣṭvā*) my own sect,”—one acting thus injures all the more the interests of his own sect. Therefore, it is very desirable that the followers of different sects should be brought together in concord (*samavāya*) that they might know of the doctrines held by others. The King, in fact, desires that all sects should be possessed of wide learning (*bahu-śruta*) and doctrines productive of real good. And to all those who are contentedly established in their respective faiths, the King's message is that he does not so much value the bestowal on them of his many gifts and

other forms of external honour, as that there should be achieved the growth of the “essentials” of all religions and a consequent “breadth” of outlook.

These words show how far ahead of his times was Asoka in his religious ideas. As the apostle of Peace, he naturally tried to find its true basis in religion which he tried to purge of elements that would make for differences. Religion is at once the friend and the enemy of peace. In one of his Edicts [Minor Rock Edict I], he states how “the people of Jambudvīpa, *i. e.*, India, were disunited, along with their gods,” pointing to the strife of gods and their worshippers, the battle of creeds and sects. The various hints and suggestions thrown out by Asoka in the Inscription under notice, if analysed, will form themselves into the following scheme for achieving communal harmony :—

(1) There is a core or kernel of truth in every religion, a body of essential doctrines on which all religions agree and which must be separated from their non-essential elements. A recognition of the unity of all religions in their central truths is the foundation of religious harmony.

(2) A respect for the common truths of all religions should naturally lead to “restraint of speech” (*vachā-guṇṭi*) in dealing with the doctrines of different religions. This does not shut out the freedom of religious discussions which characterised the religious life of ancient India as evidenced, for instance, in the Upanishads. Only, the discussion must not be thoughtless or

malicious, but should be inspired by a genuine thirst for knowledge.

(3) Discussions should be organised in regular religious conferences (called *samavāya*) where the followers of different sects should expound their respective doctrines, which they must learn to appreciate.

(4) Sectarianism will be conquered by a width of learning by which the follower of each sect will acquaint himself with the doctrines of others' sects and become a *Bāhu-Śruta*, i. e., a master of many Śrutis, of the scriptures of different religions. Sectarianism is produced where a sect confines its studies exclusively to its own scriptures, and cultivates ignorance of the scriptures of other sects. This ignorance is the fruitful source of religious intolerance and sectarian strife. The best antidote to religious fanaticism is a comparative study of different religions—in which Asoka was a pioneer and far in advance of his age.

(5) Lastly, out of this "breadth of knowledge" will naturally spring a "breadth" of outlook, a wide-hearted charity and toleration, a spirit of catholicity and cosmopolitanism (*bahukā*), which alone can solve the problem of communalism in this country.

ADMINISTRATIVE PROMOTION OF RELIGIOUS TOLERATION

As usual with him, Asoka makes proper administrative arrangements for the systematic execution of his policy of promoting religious

toleration in the country by means of the measures adumbrated above. This work was entrusted by him to his Ministry of Morals and other suitable bodies of officials, especially those appointed to work among the women (*Stri-Adhyaksha-Dharma-Mahatmatras*) notorious for their religious narrowness and bigotry, and among the masses, especially the way-farers and pilgrims, dealt with by officers called *Vraja-bhūmikas*, lit., "those in charge of the pastures," including highways and rest-houses and other works of public utility executed by Asoka.*

ASOKA'S IDEA OF TRUE CEREMONY

Another point of Asoka's greatness may be found in the doctrine of True Ceremonial which he preaches in one of his Edicts [Rock Edict IX]. Here also Asoka shows himself to be ahead of his age as a thinker and religious leader by distinguishing the essentials of religion from its envelope of formalism, customs and ceremonies which are not of the substance (*sāra*) of religion. He found his people, and especially the women-folk, given too much to rituals, to the performance of "too many, manifold, trivial and worthless ceremonies" connected with ordinary events of life, like illness, marriage, birth, or even a journey, as if mere ceremonies made up religion and a pious life. The undue emphasis laid on ceremonies is still the bane of Hinduism. Asoka shows great freedom of thought and spiritual insight in calling his

* For details and other points, see my *Asoka*.

ritual-ridden people to the true moral life and performance of the "True Ceremonial" (*Dharma-Maṅgalam*) which consisted only in inner purity, in character, in good and moral conduct in all relations of life, and not in some external formal acts.

HIIS PUBLICITY METHOD: ROCK AND PILLAR INSCRIPTIONS

A word may be said in conclusion as to the method of publicity adopted by Asoka in preaching his new religion to the masses in different and distant parts of his vast empire in those pre-mechanical ages which had none of the modern facilities of communication. His first step was to have his words so written "that they may last for all time" [*chira thitika-hotu* in Rock Edict v], just as the pious Job had wished: "O that my words were now written! That they were graven with an iron pen and lead in the rock for ever!" But Asoka had Job's yearning fulfilled to the letter. He did have literally an iron pen with which his scribes [*lipikaras* in Minor Rock Edict II, and also in Rock Edict XIV] inscribed his words on stone as imperishable material. Rocks were chosen at suitable sites to bear these inscriptions, sites that were most populous or frequented, cities or centres of pilgrimage where these "sermons in stone" would be read by the crowds coming there. But sometimes rock and accessibility did not go together. The rocks might be out of the way. Then these were artificially produced to bear the emperor's messages. They were in the shape of huge mono-

lithic pillars of monstrous proportions tapering in form up to a height of fifty feet and weighing about fifty tons. These pillars were produced after a common design, in workshops situated among the modern Chunar hills, the quarries of which supply to this day the particular reddish sandstone used by Asoka as the material of his Pillars. As Asoka himself states:—

This message of morality must be engraved on pillars or slabs of stone so that it may thereby last for ever [Pillar Edict VII].

So far, his Rock-Inscriptions have been discovered in fourteen different places distributed all over India in North, West, East and South, and the Pillar-Inscriptions in ten other places. Two of the Rock-Inscriptions are in the North-West Frontier Province (at Shahbazgarhi and Mansehra), one at Kalsi in Dehra Dun, a fourth at Girnar in Kathiawad, another at Sopara in Bombay Presidency, another at Dhauli in Orissa and a few others in the Deccan and in Mysore. The Pillar Inscriptions are at Delhi, Allahabad, Sanchi, Sarnath, and a few other places in Bihar and Nepal tarai. Thus these nearly forty Inscriptions on stone and pillar were distributed throughout India, marking not merely the limits of Asoka's extensive empire, but also its chief centres of population and culture by which flowed the main currents of public life and civilisation in those days. These centres of civilisation of India under Asoka changed in later times, as the course of civilisation

changed and flowed along new routes.

WAS THERE A *LINGUA FRANCA*
IN INDIA UNDER ASOKA?

Another noteworthy feature of these Inscriptions was that they must have been read by the masses in those days, which, according to the renowned historian, Vincent A. Smith, should indicate the extent of literacy then achieved in the country. They are written in the same script (Brāhmī) all over India, except in the North-West Province, where the local script Kharoshthī is used, and they are also written in the same language, with verbal variations corresponding to those of local dialects. This variety in script and dialect is another proof showing that the inscriptions must have been read by the masses and that, what is more striking, the language in which they were composed must have been the *lingua franca* of India in those days. This raises questions of great importance in the history of Indian languages, Sanskrit and the Prakrits, whether Sanskrit was the language of culture and religion and the Prakrit, as illustrated in Asoka's Inscriptions, was the language of the market-place, of business and secular life, and of the masses. But these linguistic problems are beyond the scope of this paper.

A COMPARATIVE ESTIMATE.

Let me now conclude with a short comparative estimate of Asoka's greatness among kings by citing the following words from my work on Asoka:—

In the annals of kingship, there is scarcely any record comparable to that of Asoka, both as a man and as a ruler. To bring out the chief features of his greatness, historians have instituted comparisons between him and other distinguished monarchs in history, eastern and western, ancient and modern, pagan, Moslem and Christian. In his efforts to establish a Kingdom of righteousness after the highest ideals of a theocracy, he has been likened to David and Solomon of Israel in the days of its greatest glory; in his patronage of Buddhism, which helped to transform a local into a world religion, he has been compared to Constantine in relation to Christianity; in his philosophy and piety he recalls Marcus Aurelius; he was a Charlemagne in the extent of his empire and, to some extent, in the methods of his administration, too, while his Edicts, "rugged, uncouth, involved, full of repetitions" read like the speeches of Oliver Cromwell in their mannerisms [Rhys Davids]. Lastly, he has been compared to Khalif Omar and Emperor Akbar, whom also he resembles in certain respects.

The fact is that there was in Asoka a combination of all that was great and good in other kings, which justifies H. G. Wells's judgment that he was the world's greatest king.

RADHAKUMUD MOOKERJI

THE CONCEPT OF MATTER: ITS DEVELOPMENT

[J. W. N. Sullivan has gained a great reputation as an expounder of modern scientific theories and views. His latest activity is issuing, in collaboration with Walter Grierson, a publication in twenty-four parts entitled "Outlines of Modern Belief". In the first part, the following remarks appear:—

One can say that the old strictly mechanical view of the universe, which was so widely held in the Victorian era, is now dead. (p. 3)

The "stuff" of the world is thus envisaged as immaterial entities instead of material things. (p. 7)

This article narrates the story of the great change since the death of the Victorian materialism; its closing sentence may be described as prophetic. Mind is no more the product of matter; mind is fast assuming its old-world position as the Primary of which matter is but an emanation.—EDS.]

The precise philosophical status of scientific entities is a subject which is still being discussed by philosophers. The old belief that the space, time, and matter of science are the "objective" realities that lie behind the appearances of the perceived world is now regarded, even by the scientific men themselves, as naïve. The relation between these entities and the world of our sense impressions is not to be described as the relation between Reality and Appearance. That there is some correspondence between scientific entities and reality is indisputable. Otherwise science could not be as successful as it is. But the scientific description is concerned only with certain aspects of the real, probably only with its formal, metrical aspects.

The inherent limitations of the scientific method of approach to "reality" is well illustrated by the development of the scientific conception of matter. At the time when Tyndall delivered his Belfast Address the scientific conception of matter differed from the ordinary view chiefly by attributing to

matter an atomic structure. Scientific analysis had discovered that a piece of matter is not really continuous; it is made up of a number of very small particles. These particles were *merely* small particles, that is to say, they were merely little bits of the familiar substantial stuff everybody knew as matter. There were several sorts of these atoms, corresponding to the various kinds of matter, gold, chlorine, mercury, etc. The chief difference between them is in their weights. An atom of oxygen, for example, is sixteen times heavier than an atom of hydrogen. It was surmised that they are probably little hard spheres, and on this assumption their dimensions were worked out.

Implicit in the whole of this analysis was the assumption that matter is an irreducible ultimate. The ordinary conception of matter as an enduring substance was fully supported by this analysis. The doctrine of materialism was neither helped nor hindered by it, for the atomic constitution of matter throws no light on the question of

its independent reality, and does nothing to make more plausible the idea that mind is a product of matter. The philosophic implications of the atomic theory, in this form are completely neutral.

During the 'nineties a brilliant series of experiments showed that this form of the atomic theory is insufficient. Small electrified particles, much smaller than the lightest known atom, the hydrogen atom, were discovered. These particles were found to be of two kinds, one being charged with negative electricity, and the other with positive electricity. They were called electrons and protons. It was immediately surmised that these are the foundation stones of the material universe, that out of these electrified particles all the atoms of matter are built.

Before this idea could be carried through, a radical change had to be made in our conception of matter. For experiment and calculation showed that electrons and protons are wholly electrical—they are disembodied charges of electricity. If, then, all atoms are built up out of these charges, matter must be wholly electrical in constitution. This idea seemed to rob matter of its substantiality, for electricity had been regarded as a "state," not as a substance. However, the mathematicians had shown that an electrically charged body possesses more inertia than does an uncharged body. If inertia can be attributed to an electric charge, then electricity loses some of its "immateriality". For we find that an essential ingredient

in the vague and ill-defined notion of substantiality is precisely this quality of inertia. Since electric charges possess it, they could conceivably play the role of matter. Nevertheless, the notion of matter had now become somewhat more abstract.

The nature of electricity was admittedly unknown. Unlike matter, it was not associated with a rich complex of familiar sense impressions. If matter is really nothing but electricity then our sense impressions, it was felt, are in some way illusory. The external something corresponding to these impressions is evidently very different from what it appears to be, just as light waves in the ether are very different from the colour red that we actually perceive. The electrical theory of matter did, to the general mind, create another gap between appearance and reality. A certain elusiveness now attached, it was realised, to what had formerly been regarded as the most fundamental of entities, namely, matter.

The next step for the scientific men was to find out how electrons and protons combined to form the different kinds of atoms. Lord Rutherford was the first to give a satisfactory model. His experiments indicated that each atom consists of a positive charge at its centre and a number of electrons circulating round it—the so-called "solar system" model. The strength of the positive charge, and the number of circulating electrons, varies for the different sorts of atoms, ranging from one

for hydrogen to ninety-two for uranium. This model had strong experimental support, but the mathematicians found, when they came to examine it, that such an atom could not exist. According to the accepted laws of electrodynamics such an atom would vanish, in a flash of radiation, in a minute fraction of a second. The accepted laws of nature made this theory of matter impossible.

Certain other phenomena were known, however, which were similarly inexplicable on the accepted laws of nature. Experiments on the heat radiated from a hot body, for instance, reached results which flatly contradicted calculation. At the beginning of the present century Max Planck put forward a theory of heat radiation which resolved this contradiction. He showed that the experimental results could be accounted for if we assume that heat is not radiated or absorbed in a continuous manner, but jerkily and disconnectedly—by discrete atoms of energy, in fact. This idea was so strange and revolutionary that it attracted comparatively little attention. But it occurred to the brilliant young Danish physicist, Niels Bohr, that this principle, in a modified form, might be applied to the theory of the atom. The manner in which he did this is curiously interesting. Of the laws of electrodynamics he kept such as suited him, and he replaced the others by laws of his own. There was no logical justification for this procedure. Its justification was that it worked. An atom con-

structed on these principles would persist instead of vanishing instantaneously, and its calculated behaviour agreed with certain striking experimental results which had never been accounted for before. Also, the arbitrary character of the new laws was considerably softened by the fact that they were related to the principle put forth by Planck. The Bohr atom was a great success, and was generally accepted by the scientific world. Thus the atom had changed from the small hard sphere of earlier theory to a complicated structure of electric particles obeying laws of an entirely novel character.

The laws governing radiation and atomic phenomena belong to that great branch of modern scientific knowledge called Quantum Theory. Relativity Theory and Quantum Theory, between them, cover practically the whole of modern physics. The first deals with large-scale phenomena, and the second with the phenomena we encounter when we deal with the ultimate constituents of the material universe. It appears that when we reach these ultimate constituents, atoms and electrons, we encounter an entirely different set of laws from those that govern the behaviour of matter in bulk. We may put the difference briefly by saying that the ordinary laws assume the continuity of natural processes, whereas the quantum laws assume discontinuity. The dominant characteristic of the world, from the point of view of quantum theory, is its atomicity.

Not only matter and electricity, but also energy, are atomic. The ordinary laws of nature are really only statistical laws. In any ordinary phenomenon an immense number of atoms, of matter or energy or both, are involved, and the individual behaviour of these separate atoms is, as it were, averaged out. Thus the quantum laws are the fundamental ones. It should be possible to deduce the laws governing large-scale phenomena from the laws governing individual atoms. The deduction cannot be effected the other way round.

By this time not only had the "matter" of the Victorians been dissolved away, but also their "iron laws" had been given an entirely different status. For the significant thing about the true fundamental laws, the quantum laws, was that they do not present nature as the rigidly determined scheme it had been supposed to be. These laws did not enable us to predict the future from a knowledge of the present. We know nowadays that this is not a temporary limitation. The modern Principle of Indeterminacy states that it is impossible in the nature of things for science to present the world as a rigidly determined whole. So far as scientific evidence goes we have no reason to believe that the behaviour of the ultimate constituents of the material universe is predestined.

For about ten years the conception of the atom developed by Bohr was found satisfactory. But as experiment¹ results accumulated its inadequacy became more appar-

ent, until it became clear that the problem of matter could not be solved on Bohr's lines. It was at this time that De Broglie published his paper on the wave theory of matter. Here for the first time the "particle" conception of matter was attacked. De Broglie put forward the suggestion that matter has a dual constitution, that it has both wave and particle aspects. This notion of a dual constitution was not unprecedented. It had already been attributed to light. In certain experiments light behaves as if it consisted of a stream of corpuscles. In other experiments it just as indubitably behaves as a group of waves. At present we have just to accept this duality. We cannot synthesize these two aspects of light. We can form a compound word out of wave and particle—Eddington has suggested "wavicle"—but we cannot form a compound idea.

The new conception of matter, begun by De Broglie, brings with it similar difficulties. If a shower of electrons be allowed to fall on a specially prepared screen they produce flashes of light irregularly all over it. The electrons behave just as if they were a shower of little particles. If now we fire electrons through a very thin metal sheet on to a photographic plate they produce alternate bright and dark bands on the plate,—clear evidence that a system of waves has passed through the metal sheet.

To conceive an electron as both a wave and a particle is difficult enough, but our difficulties are in-

creased by a more thorough discussion. The mathematicians can represent an electron as a system of waves, but only if each electron is supposed to have a three-dimensional space to itself. It is clear that these waves are not physical waves. It is suggested that they are waves of probability, that when they are plentiful in a region it indicates that an electron is likely to be in that region. Their connection with the waves revealed by experiment is not clear. Matter is, indeed, one of the most mysterious entities known to science. Its scientific formulation, as we have seen, has become steadily more abstract. One familiar image after another has been given up until, at the present time, it is only in terms of mathematical symbols that this mysterious entity can be expressed at all.

We see that the whole development of the scientific conception of matter may be described as the passage from familiar images to the unimaginable. The nature of the reality we try to penetrate is, it would seem, something very alien to us. Our mental equipment, our

notions of space, time, causation, and so on, are quite inappropriate, it has been suggested, to the questions of modern science. The difficulties we experience arise from the way we think about things. The difficulties of modern physics are probably, at bottom, metaphysical difficulties. The new physics will rest on a new metaphysic. Attempts are being made to construct this metaphysic. Sir James Jeans, as we know, has been led to the conclusion that the whole material universe, including its space-time framework, is purely mental. By a somewhat different path, Sir Arthur Eddington has arrived at the belief that everything that exists is "mind-stuff". We need not agree with these points of view, as their authors have stated them, but certainly they are symptomatic. The chief importance of the new science, to the general mind, consists precisely in its new philosophical foundations. The old scientific philosophy which made mind derivative from matter is in process of being replaced by a philosophy that makes matter derivative from mind.

J. W. N. SULLIVAN

WESTERN PHILOSOPHY AND MYSTICISM

[Richard Rothschild is the author of *Paradoxy—The Destiny of Modern Thought* and of *Reality and Illusion*. The preceding article shows how modern science is reaching its fusion point with philosophy. This article speaks of the evolution of philosophy into mysticism.—EDS.]

At the risk of over-simplifying the problem by conceptualizing certain schools of thought dichotomously so that all ideas must fall into one group or the other, we may begin by conceiving of philosophy and mysticism as representing basic opposites.

On the one hand, philosophy represents the attempt to grasp reality through concepts clearly defined, and ultimately to arrive at a unity of things in this way. Thus logic, as the science of relations between limited entities, is clearly the tool of philosophy. Yet a logical process must always start from some point. Hence, although logic (deductive logic) may develop truth, it is not what can fairly be called "new" truth. The process of multiplying one particular 50-digit number by another 50-digit number may yield a number which no individual man has ever considered before. This number, however, was implicit all the while in the decimal number series set up in the first place. In this way all the conclusions of logic may be said to be tautological, in that they are from the start implicit in the definitions (or meaning content) of the premises. Only the premises themselves may be conceived as representing "new" truth, and even these may of course be the conclusions of previous syllogisms

in an indefinite regress back to the original premises from which the process at some point or other starts, and which represent irrational faiths. If there is any certainty in the conclusions of logic, it is merely because they are analytical in nature. Truly synthetic conclusions always have a germ of doubt, though logic may later come along and, by re-defining terms, secure an appearance of absolutism, as in inductive science where an investigator's hypothesis may be confirmed by sufficient selected data so that it assumes the aspect of a theory, and then, by a re-definition of terms through which exceptional cases are accounted for or eliminated, the theory becomes a mathematical law. Certainty is therefore always achieved at the price of substance. Conclusions which are of real consequence, that is, which represent new insights, are not certain.

This is not to deny the value of logic as a means of clarifying one's position and of avoiding muddy thinking; but it would seem that an obscurantism is involved when one puts too great a faith in the reasoning process itself. It may be that all knowledge must be put in the form of logic, if only in order to secure a greater integration of it and to avoid contradictions within any one structure; but this is not

to say that the structure as a whole does not have an irrational basis and that therefore, presumably, other equally valid structures could be built from different premises. A proposition may be derived either deductively (that is, by rationally developing it as an implication of premises), or inductively (that is, through a wilful act whereby vaguely perceived elements are galvanized into an intelligible, unified and clear-cut judgment). In both cases, however, it is the will which "sees" things as definable in such a way as to make certain conclusions logically necessary. On the one hand, deductive propositions are determined by the way in which the will sets up or synthesizes the premises. On the other hand, the will is itself limited, in the synthetic activity of setting up these premises, by the rationally developed deductions previously reached and accepted; in other words, it must set up such premises as may logically serve as the bases of the already recognized world of realities. In both cases the premises represent elements which are grasped intuitively, that is, through mystic insights.

And this brings us to the subject of mysticism. If philosophy represents the attempt to reach reality through the logical relating of concepts, mysticism may be said to represent the attempt to reach reality through direct experience. And because experience involves particulars (however much it may be said to depend on prior concepts in terms of which alone particular experiences are possible), mysticism

is concerned with the unique rather than with the general. This uniqueness of a thing, says the mystic, is something, which eludes all attempts at definition, since to define it would be to apply general terms in its description, and there is always something, over and beyond any adjectives we may ascribe, which we feel constitutes the inner essence or "thereness" of the thing itself. Accordingly the mystic, in his attempt to reach and "know" what he calls ultimate reality, justifies his antagonism to thought processes as such. For if to be conscious of a thing is to classify it with other things, then the only perception of "naked" reality can come in a state of unconsciousness (or superconsciousness) in which the processes of intellect are in abeyance. Hence the mystic arrives at the conclusion that the attitude of wonder should be the attitude of the seer, as in the fairy tale in which a wolf is not merely an animal classifiable with other animals, but a particular animal embodying a witch or goblin, and in which a bird is not merely a sparrow, but the outward aspect of a bewitched princess. It is the magic in them which distinguishes them from all other beings and makes them unique.

In the West, with its activity, its faith in conceptualized knowledge and the worth-whileness of conduct towards specific ends, the mystic attitude has been almost incomprehensible. The Western mind has even tried to conceptualize the mystic experience, to describe it and think about it. Thus there are

those who take seriously experiments purporting to show that "the experience of the mystic could be produced by nitrous oxide anaesthesia," a remark which would be ludicrous were it not so obtuse. For, pursuing this same line of inquiry, one might well find that the scientific attitude of mind itself might be developed in one by some new brand of laughing gas, or that a dose of salts might make one think that two and two were five. Yet, as we have found, Western man, in the very definition of his world, must logically admit his dependence on mystic insights. Every object, generalization or law of nature which he recognizes is the result of a process of synthesis which in itself cannot be described but must constitute an ultimate mystery. Herein, in fact, lies the problem of the reliance of philosophy on words as symbols for concepts—words which are necessarily so encrusted with the connotations of particular insights that it is difficult for the reader to break through to the restricted meanings which they are conceived as having for the writer. Even so-called "clear" definitions fall short in this respect (as witness the various "interpretations" of philosophical conclusions).

Historically, philosophy has concerned itself with much that has not been properly within its sphere. For, in an age which lacked specialization, philosophy pre-empted all fields of knowledge, art, politics and religion. To-day, however, when much of this subject matter has been relegated to

specialists, philosophy can devote itself to its most important work—the synoptic view of the whole. It is of course true that even the specialist must have some such perspective, some sense of values to apply to his data, if he is to arrive at generalizations possessing validity. It remains for philosophy, however, to devote itself specifically to achieving this organic view of things, and accordingly even philosophy must lead eventually to mysticism. Only the ultimate unity may be conceived as possessing full reality. All else is merely approximately, tentatively or hypothetically real, a mere "as if" of experience.

Thus, although realism (as the implied philosophy of Western science) and mysticism appear to be diametrically opposite in every respect, closer analysis reveals a surprising similarity, seldom pointed out, in their respective points of view. Realism assumes that it is possible, through carefully guarded scientific procedures, to discover relationships in a world which is real in the sense of being entirely distinct from all thinking about it. Modern science is therefore Platonic in its insistence that the external world is characterized by universals or Forms independent of human will, and yet that it is possible for science, not perhaps to grasp these ultimate Forms, relations or universals in their purity or absoluteness, but at least to set up mathematical formulae and laws which "approximate" the eternal. Scientific realism thus posits a world of absolutes which

are conceived as the potential elements which, in ordinary experience, come to be actualized. This is the realm of Reason, as contrasted with the reasoning which applies only to the temporal order. It is the realm of ontology as contrasted with that of epistemology, the hard and fast versus the flux. This absolute realm, however, the laws of which science conceives it its purpose to formulate, is a realm of which nothing can be stated excepting *that* it exists as a necessary conditioner of all proximate experience. All attempts to ascribe definite properties to it must fail, inasmuch as such attempts originate of necessity in the temporal order and are therefore determined by the ideas, backgrounds, apperceptions and histories of particular individuals or cultures. Man can never escape from this realm of his own concepts, determined as they are by all the language and art forms constituting his world of relative values. But if the absolute order, that is the realm beyond experience (or, if you will, the realm prior to or underlying experience), can never be known in the form of differentiated parts (just in so far as such differentiations would involve concrete predicates, which, as we have found, are impossible), it must be taken to represent merely an undifferentiated (so far as man is concerned) conditioner or presupposition of thought and experience. Here is what medieval scholastic philosophers called God, and what mystics have called the 'Oneness of All Things.

Nor must it be supposed that this mystic element is postulated by modern science in any supercilious tongue-in-cheek way. For unless science believed that there were such an absolute order, its own formulations of experience could never be given the status of "discoveries". Rather would they be conceived as mere arbitrary or wilful constructions. Accordingly science must insist upon this noumenal (as distinguished from the phenomenal) realm. This much faith it must have; for to doubt this would lead to eventual skepticism. "I do not seek to know in order to believe, but I believe in order to know," said Anselm in the Eleventh Century. And, though they may not like to admit it, all modern scientists must take this stand. Both philosophy and mysticism, therefore, acknowledge the same temporal order. Both are alike in asserting: "That art thou."

It is interesting to note in this connection, not only that Platonism led to the mystic Neoplatonism of Plotinus and Augustine, but that the world of modern physics, with its dependence on mathematical formulations in the realm of the atom, has lost all semblance of substance and has become frankly a world of ideal relationships, which science conceives it its purpose to express in the simplest (that is, the most unified) form.

It has thus become impossible in a dual sense to dissociate philosophy (and logic) from mysticism. For, on the one hand, the elements from which philosophy starts rep-

resent in themselves mystically perceived premises. And, on the other hand, the goal at which philosophy aims is the unification of experience in a oneness which is also ultimately mystic. The struggle for individual maturity, through thought and deed, is therefore a struggle which involves a paradoxical relationship of the individual to the world. In one sense it means a journey through the world of actuality, a process of making decisions in one dilemma after another which the world presents. These decisions, from the simplest acts of cognition to the more difficult problems of life, are through and through worldly, that is, they involve a knowledge of, or insight into, a series of objective realities. Yet the complete spiritual maturity sought in this way would, if ever achieved, be divorced entirely from these worldly elements. It is this fundamental paradox which has marked much of the world's deepest thinking. Spirit and matter, good and evil, the world and the individual—these are merely a few of the many forms which this basic problem assumes.

The mystic, feeling an inner assurance that life itself is a simple matter of direct experience, throws overboard all attempts to arrive at satisfying solutions to problems by the use of reason. It is because of this, as we have found, that the mystic comes to oppose philosophy itself, which endeavours to arrive at answers through the processes of thought. These processes lead, says the

mystic, to a high degree of individualisation, that is, to an individual stuffed, as it were, with artificial concepts which give him a keen and alert self-consciousness, together with a sense of clear-cut differentiation from the remainder of the world. Yet the objective of thought is knowledge synthesized into a supreme unity. It means ultimately the grasping of reality in its entirety, and thus involves an internal state of being which many even identify with unconsciousness, since in such a state there would no longer be a world unabsorbed in the individual and therefore a world to give rise to inner experiences. Accordingly the intellectualist is in a sense destroying himself. Seeking implicitly all knowledge (and therefore mystic unconsciousness, or superconsciousness), he relies on the very process of conceptualizing which *cuts him off* from his goal. Hence the intellect can yield only a negative sort of growth, its expression representing in truth a contraction to a mathematical point, the point of consciousness. The true fulfilment of the individual, maintains the mystic, lies rather in a direct and non-intellectual experience of grasping the infinite without the intervention of perverting concepts. One must storm the fortress of reality barehanded, he maintains, and accordingly he exchanges the tools of knowledge for the exercises or practices which enable him to achieve direct *rapport* with the infinite, his state of Nirvana.

RICHARD ROTHSCILD

IS MAN BOUND OR FREE?

[These two articles do not present opposing views, though one is by a Western man of science whose researches have gained recognition and the second by a Hindu philosopher respected for his clear perception and lucid exposition. **H. Stanley Redgrove, B. Sc., F. I. C.**, examines the elements of chance and choice in the principle of Causation operating in Nature. **Professor M. Hiriyan** carries the reader forward in his excellent study and shows how very practical and helpful is the ancient doctrine of *Karma*. Both the scientist and the philosopher come to the same conclusion—Man is free, because with the aid of his past experience and present endeavour he creates his own future.—Eds.]

I.—FREEDOM

Every morning when the hour hand of my grandfather's clock stands at 7 and the minute hand at 11, the hammer strikes eight times on the bell of the clock, and, at the same moment, unless it is Sunday, Jones issues from the door of his villa to catch the 8-10 to the City. I can tell when it is 8 o'clock equally well by looking at the hands of the clock, waiting for the clock to chime, or watching the doors of Jones's house. Of course, sometimes Jones is laid up ill and does not appear, but then it has also happened on occasions that my clock has failed to function properly, and has needed the attention of an expert.

The case of Brown, who lives next door to Jones, is, however, quite different. I cannot tell the time by watching *his* departure from his abode. He is liable to go out at any time, and there are days when apparently he does not leave the house at all.

I have discussed the difference in the behaviour of Jones and Brown with various mutual acquaintances.

"Well," I am told, "Brown is an

artist. Artists are erratic fellows. You cannot rely upon them." Of Jones, on the other hand, I hear it said: "He is a man of regular habits—as regular as clockwork."

Three things I specially notice here. One is the likening of the behaviour of Jones to that of clockwork. Another is the ascription of his regularity to the formation of habit. The third is the fact that the regularity of Jones's behaviour wins a certain approval which is withheld from the more erratic conduct of Brown. The latter cannot be relied upon.

Smith, who is an old-fashioned materialist, has something more to say on the subject. "Yes," he asserts. "Jones's behaviour is exactly like clockwork, because it is determined by the same laws of Nature. Does he not provide a striking refutation of the nonsense you prattle about the freedom of the will? He must catch this train in order to be in his office by 9 o'clock. He is not free. Nor is Brown. Brown's actions are determined in the same way, only the forces governing them, the desires which impel him, are more complex.

What you call 'freedom' is simply complexity. Analyse this complexity, and so-called 'freedom' vanishes."

I do not argue with Smith. I prefer to observe him as an interesting psychological phenomenon.

There is no doubt about the preference of the human mind for uniformity. If events occur in a certain manner on one occasion, we anticipate their occurrence in the same manner again, and feel a sense of satisfaction when this happens. Is this anything more than a manifestation of the mind's inertia, even if the mind seems tireless in its search to reduce to order the seeming chaos of raw experience? Thought having traversed a certain path tends to traverse the same path again. Uniformity is conservative of mental effort. It can be relied upon.

Seemingly diverse phenomena must be brought into relationship with each other and harmonised. Nothing could seem more dissimilar than Brown's behaviour and that of my grandfather's clock. However, Jones's conduct provides a link between them, and my materialist friend envisages it as enabling him to explain the capriciousness of the former in terms of the uniformities of the latter.

It occurs to me that an attempt the exact reverse of this would provide a hypothesis equally plausible.

Jones has formed a *habit*. Suppose the clock has formed a habit; or, rather, suppose, every material atom of which the clock is

composed has done so. Spirit is free; matter is bound. Materialists who would have us believe that spirit is no more than a phenomenon of matter, are obliged to attempt to explain away the freedom of spirit as a mere illusion. We can, however, retain both freedom and determinism as real characters of different classes of behaviour on the hypothesis that matter is spirit completely constrained by habit.

This is one line of thought. Another is that the seeming regularity of the clock's behaviour is itself an illusion, created by the clock's complexity. This latter line of thought is of particular importance, because it is one which recent research in physical science is gradually compelling thinking minds to accept.

It is remarkable how philosophies in many ways hotly opposed to each other agree in disliking the concept of *chance*. To those which posit the reality of spirit, chance seems repellent because every event is conceived of as being caused by will. Materialism rejects this theory of causation; yet with equal vehemence rejects the concept of chance as well.

It is desirable to emphasise the entire distinction between the concepts of causation held by these opposing schools of thought. The causes of the spiritualist (using this term in its strict and not its popular meaning) are active and efficient causes. Moreover, underlying these active and efficient causes are final causes—the ends in view. It is true that, in the early history

of materialism, physical forces were substitutes for the free wills of spirits as active and efficient causes. But this view has long been obsolete; and causation, from the materialist point of view, means no more than a fixed order in the occurrence of events. It stands for the possibility of prediction.

It is easy to see how chance can find no place in materialist philosophy. But the case is otherwise with those philosophies which posit free-will. From the point of view of an observer, the behaviour of a free spirit has the fundamental character of a series of chance events, *i. e.*, it cannot be predetermined. Those of us, therefore, who believe in freedom must also believe in chance; since chance is no more than the external appearance of freedom.

It will not be denied that there are events which, apparently at any rate, are chance events. The manner in which a penny falls when it is tossed in the air provides a simple case in point. We say it is as likely to come down heads as it is to come down tails. The materialist, of course, would urge that the event is not really a chance one, and that if we had at hand all the data relating to the penny and the way in which it was tossed up we could accurately predict whether it would come down heads or tails. However, we have not this data, and for all practical purposes, the way in which the penny falls is treated as being a purely chance event.

Moreover, mathematics has developed a special calculus for

dealing with events which are, apparently, chance events, without concerning itself with the question whether the events are really chance events or only apparently the product of chance. This is the theory of probability. A most important contribution to this theory was made, many years ago, by Jacques Bernoulli. He proved that "in the long run, all events will tend to occur with a relative frequency proportional to their original probabilities." The full significance of this "law of chance," as it may be called, is only just beginning to be realised. For what Bernoulli really did was to show that chance events observed in the mass would appear to have all the characteristics of a deterministic system.

Consider the case of tossing pennies, and suppose the fall one way or the other to be a purely chance event. That is to say, the probability of the penny coming down heads is exactly one-half. It follows, from Bernoulli's theorem, that if we continue to toss the penny up, the number of times it comes down heads will approximate, more and more closely as we continue the tossing, to the number of times it comes down tails.

The way in which pennies fall when tossed would, to all appearance, be determined by a natural law having the character of rigidity postulated by materialist philosophy, although actually the product of pure chance.

Laws, such as this, are statistical laws. They are not really rigid. It is possible that now and again

the pennies might come down in some other manner, though it is not likely. Actually, most of our conduct is based upon more or less subconscious calculations of probabilities. I go to the station to catch the 9-30 to town. I cannot be certain that it will run; but in view of the fact that it is so scheduled in the time-table, it is highly probable that it will do so.

Moreover, important businesses have been built up on the study and commercial application of statistical laws. What, at first sight, would seem more risky than to sell an individual an annuity for life or to agree, in return for a fixed annual payment from him, to pay his heirs a fixed sum when he dies? Certainly, if one sold a single annuity or granted a single life insurance, the transaction would be extremely risky. It would have the character of a pure gamble. Nevertheless, when numerous annuities are sold and numerous life insurances granted properly, the element of risk becomes practically negligible; and, as is well known, the insurance business is both profitable and secure to those engaged in it.

The question arises: Are statistical laws merely makeshifts because the phenomena involved are so complex that we have not yet been able to unravel the true laws of Nature governing the events; or, alternatively, are all the so-called laws of Nature, which are not mere truisms, really statistical laws?

Modern physical science is being forced to adopt the latter alter-

native; and this means, however hateful the idea may be to those reared in materialist ways of thinking, that the so-called laws of Nature are the product of chance. Let us express it otherwise and say: *Out of freedom emerges order.*

When the work of physical science was restricted to observing the behaviour of matter in the mass, this behaviour appeared to be determined by perfectly rigid laws. The behaviour of my grandfather's clock is a case in point. But it is now known that every tangible piece of matter is an exceedingly complex structure. Even the atom is highly complex. Physical science has passed beyond the atom, and is now concerning itself with the behaviour of electrons, not in the mass, but as individuals. Now the behaviour of an isolated electron is peculiar. It shows a certain capriciousness like that of my friend Brown. You cannot predetermine its conduct exactly. Heisenberg's principle of indeterminacy shows that the more exactly the position of an electron is determined, the more uncertain becomes its velocity, while, on the other hand, the more exactly its velocity is determined, the more uncertain becomes its position. And this lack of determinacy arises, not because we know too little about the electron, but because we know too much. There is no question here of seeming departure from exactitude because of complexity, which further investigation may be hoped to clear up and reduce to order. On the contrary,

the electron exhibits a certain degree of freedom, just because of its simplicity. It is when we turn our attention to the behaviour of myriads of electrons, that is, to matter in the mass, that seemingly exact laws begin to operate: laws, however, which we must now recognise as being essentially statistical laws, concerned with probabilities only, just like the laws on which the insurance companies base the prices they ask for life annuities and the premiums they require for life insurances.

The individual possesses freedom. The group is subject to law. This is the basic truth which modern physical science has, very reluctantly, discovered. Biological science appears to have lagged behind, and to be more completely wedded to materialism than the physical sciences. But the researches of Professor Hans Driesch demonstrate, as he convincingly shows in his contribution to *The Great Design*, which I recently reviewed in these columns, that the same truth underlies biological phenomena. There is design in relation to the whole; but this design is mingled with contingency. Every unit of which the whole consists, whether electron, germ-cell, or spirit, possesses a measure of freedom.

This view of life and Nature is, really, the common-sense view on which every normal person, even the materialist, acts. No one supposes that he can do exactly as he pleases; but everyone is conscious of the possibility of choosing between alternative lines of action.

I am quite certain, for example, that I might have said "Everyone is aware that he can select one out of a number of possible lines of action," instead of expressing my thought in the words used above.

The materialist is only a materialist when he thinks metaphysically. When he acts, he acts as a (more or less) free agent. After he has acted, he may, if he pleases, console himself by reflecting that he has acted in accordance with the "strongest" motive, and that therefore his action was determined. As, however, neither he nor anyone else can tell which is the strongest motive until he has actually acted, this determinism is a purely fictitious one. Moreover, the assumed analogy between motives and physical forces is a bad one. For, if two forces act on a body in different directions, the body does not tend to become accelerated in the direction of a stronger force, but in a direction which deviates from this by a greater or lesser angle, the value of which can be computed, given the necessary data relating to the forces.

Man has freedom—not unlimited freedom, but freedom, nevertheless—because he is an *individual*. His individuality, his self-consciousness, has not been easily won. Time was when he was conscious of himself merely as a member of a group, and group-behaviour is subject to statistical law.

It is remarkable and regrettable that to-day we witness attempts to reduce man once again to his primitive state as a mere group

member. The Communist philosophy of life would have the individual merge his consciousness in that of his class: the Fascist philosophy would have him merge it in that of the nation. Both these

philosophies, as practical creeds of life, may be described as attempts to deprive spirit of its freedom, to convert spirit into matter, and to make of life a meaningless, mechanical affair.

H. S. REDGROVE

II.—KARMA AND FREE-WILL

The doctrine of karma is an essential part of all or nearly all the Indian creeds, and belief in it has always had a profound influence on the life of the people. It extends the principle of causation to the sphere of human conduct and signifies that, as every event in the physical world is determined by its antecedents, so everything that happens in the moral realm is pre-ordained. Critics conclude from this that karma stands for fatalism, and remain content with that conclusion without examining the doctrine any further. We propose to consider here one or two of its other aspects with a view to finding out whether it is really fatalistic or whether it at all leaves room for the exercise of freedom. But before we enter upon this task, it is necessary to be quite clear as to what we mean by "freedom". As it is usually pointed out in modern works on Ethics in discussing the problem of Free-will, freedom does not mean mere caprice. It is not the absence of all determination; rather it is *self-determination*. To be controlled by extraneous factors in what one does is not to be a free

agent, but to be determined by oneself is the very essence of autonomy. When, therefore, we ask whether karma gives any scope for freedom of action, all that we mean is whether it does or does not preclude self-determination.

We have stated that the doctrine extends the principle of causation to the sphere of human action. It does more, for in the case of every act it traces the causes that pre-determine it to the particular individual that acts. Since, however, those causes cannot all be found within the narrow limits of a single life, there arises the need for postulating the theory of *samsāra* or the continued existence of the self (*jīva*) in a succession of lives. Thus the theory of transmigration is a necessary corollary to the doctrine of karma. The fact of moral consciousness, according to Kant, is the guarantee of personal immortality; in a similar way, the law of karma is here our assurance of the truth of transmigration. If now we look at life in this new perspective, the *punya* and *pāpa* (or, to use a single term for both, *karma* *) that explain the present

* *Adrishta* is a more appropriate word but, for the sake of simplicity, we use *karma*.

conduct of a person and the good or evil that follows from it are eventually traceable to his own actions in the past, for destiny or karma—as observed by an old authority*—is only another form of deeds done in a previous birth. There being therefore no external Fate constraining man to act as he does, he is free in the sense referred to above and cannot therefore absolve himself from responsibility for his actions.

Here, no doubt, a question will be asked as to when the responsibility for what one does was *first* incurred. But such a question is really inadmissible, for it takes for granted that there was a time when the self was without karma or, to state the same otherwise, when it was without any moral disposition. Such a view of the self is an abstraction as meaningless as that of mere disposition which characterises no one. "Self" always means a self with a certain stock of dispositions; and this fact is indicated in Indian expositions by describing karma as *anadi* or "beginningless". It means that no matter how far back we trace the moral history of an individual, we shall never arrive at a stage when he was devoid of all character. Thus at all stages, it is self-determination; and the karma doctrine, so far from implying the imposition of any constraint from outside, assures us that every man constitutes his own "fate". So deep is the conviction of some as regards the adequacy of karma to account for the diversity of human conditions that they see no need to

acknowledge the existence of even God, conceived as the creator of the world and as the fountain of all law.

It is clear from what has been stated that the attitude which belief in the karma doctrine engenders is not fatalistic in the sense in which that term is ordinarily understood. But it may be said that, even granting that we alone are in the long run accountable for whatever happens to us now, we are not able to help ourselves in any manner, because we cannot alter the course of our past karma which leads to those happenings. It may be that the constraint is not external; but constraint it is, and there can therefore be no freedom of action. In meeting this objection, it is necessary to draw attention to a point to which we have not so far specifically referred, *viz.*, the idea of moral retribution underlying the karma doctrine. Whatever we knowingly do will, sooner or later, bring us the result we merit; and there is no way of escape from it. What we sow, we must reap. That is, the karma doctrine signifies not merely that the events of our life are determined by their antecedent causes, but also that there is absolute justice in the rewards and punishments that fall to our lot in life. The law of karma accordingly is not a blind mechanical law; it is essentially ethical. It is this conviction that there are in reality no iniquities in life, which explains the absence of any feeling of bitterness—so apt to follow in the wake of pain and

* See *Yajñavalkya-smṛiti*, I. 349.

sorrow—which is noticeable even among common people when any misfortune befalls them. They blame neither God nor their neighbour but only themselves for it. Deussen refers* thus to the case of a blind person whom he met during his Indian tour: "Not knowing that he had been blind from birth, I sympathised with him and asked by what unfortunate accident the loss of sight had come upon him. Immediately and without showing any sign of bitterness, the answer was ready to his lips, 'By some crime committed in a former birth.' " *

The implication of this idea of "retributive justice" is that the karma doctrine is grounded in a moral view of the universe, and that it therefore commits man to the obligations of a true moral life. It points to the truth that there is an ideal of life which it is the first duty of man to pursue and that it can be reached only through incessant striving. In other words, the doctrine presupposes the possibility of moral growth, and the conclusion to be drawn from it is that freedom is not merely compatible with, but is actually demanded by it. If man were only a creature of his congenital impulses—altogether powerless to rise above them—it would be poor comfort for him to know that he was not the victim of any alien Fate. This does not, however, mean that he can avoid the consequences of his past karma. His life, in that respect, is

characterised by the strictest necessity; and he has to submit to all the pleasant and unpleasant experiences to which it may lead. They are pre-destined results from which he can never free himself. So far, karma does imply necessity; but, as stated above, it implies freedom also, *viz.*, in the matter of ethical advance. Only we should not suppose that life's interests will thereby become bifurcated, for ethical advance is, in this view, to be made the sole aim of *all* activities. By thus adopting the betterment of one's moral nature as the goal of all endeavour, one may grow indifferent to what happens in the present as the result of past karma, though unable to avoid it. This is the well-known teaching of the *Gita*† that we should engage ourselves in the activities of life, not for the particular results which they may bring but for the purpose of self-conquest.

We have so far assumed that the necessity involved in karma is absolute; but that is not the only view held about it. Some are of opinion that karma is only *one* of the causes that explain the course of events in a man's life. There are other causes as well, of which the one significant for us here is self-effort or *purusha-kāra*, as it is termed. We cannot dispense with karma altogether for, as it must be within the experience of all, result is not always proportionate to effort; and the discrepancy between the two, if we should ex-

* *Philosophy of the Upanishads* (Eng. Tr.) p. 313.

† The question of human freedom is discussed in this work, though all too briefly, in chapter III, st. 33-43.

clude chance, is necessarily to be accounted for by assuming a cause that operates in an unknown manner. It is just this unknown cause that is karma. This view is explicitly maintained, for example, in the *Law-book* of Yajnavalkya (I. 349-51), where the question is considered with particular reference to the need for initiative on the part of a king in extending his sovereignty; and the solution reached is that, although karma is certainly a factor to be reckoned with in all undertakings, it is not the only factor determining the result. "As a chariot cannot move on a single wheel, so destiny [*i. e.*, in the sense of past karma] cannot accomplish its end until it is aided by human endeavour." It means that karma is only a co-operative

element, and is powerless by itself to bring about any result. "Without present action," as it was stated in the April number of this Journal (p. 202), "past destiny cannot show itself." It is always open for man to help it or hinder it, so that there is scope in this view also for choice between two alternatives. The point that is important for us is that, whichever be the explanation we adopt, the doctrine of karma is not fatalistic, and that it neither excludes personal effort nor destroys the sense of responsibility. Only there is a limit to the exercise of freedom according to the first explanation, in that it restricts it to the pursuit of the higher life; but there is no such limit according to the second.

M. HIRIYANNA

In a great pool lived three fishes: Forethought, Readywit, and Fatalist. One day some fishermen came to the pool and Forethought heard one of them say: "There are plenty of fish in here. To-morrow we will go fishing." On hearing it Forethought reflected: "I will take Readywit and Fatalist and move to another lake." But Readywit thought that he would protect himself by means devised to suit the occasion. And Fatalist said: "Who knows whether the fishermen will come here or not? The proverb says:

Since scamp and sneak and snake
So often undertake
A Plan that does not thrive
The world wags on alive.

Therefore I am determined not to go. What is to be will be."

Forethought alone went to another lake.

The next day the fisherman came and cast the net. But Readywit pretended to be dead and the fishermen therefore laid him on the bank from where he leapt back again in the pool without being detected.

Fatalist stuck his nose in the meshes of the net struggling until they pounded him repeatedly with clubs and so killed him. So,

Forethought and Readywit thrive
Fatalist can't keep alive.

—*The Panchatantra.*

DREAM INTERPRETATION

CHINESE—GREEK—ISLAMIC

[R. L. Mégroz is a poet, biographer and critic with a steadily growing circle of admirers. He has contributed several essays on the subject of Dreams in these pages: "Dreams in the Western World" (March 1931); "Dreams of Future Events" (May, 1932); "Tippoo Sultan's Dreams: A Glance at Moham-medan Oneirocriticism" (January 1934). Our readers will find this particular article of more than ordinary interest.—Eds.]

Oneiromancy or dream interpretation has been as universal as religion; it has, like religion, assumed varying forms according to the traditions and development of its practitioners. Until the comparatively modern era of post-medieval Europe such divination had also been more or less a religious function—more so, for example, in Islam than in China which, as we in the West are apt to forget, had the teachings of Confucius and Lâo-Tsze as well as Buddhism as part of its intellectual and spiritual traditions, when Europe was still a chaos of barbarism and purely local civilisations. The two chief Chinese works, the *Meng Shu*, or Books of Dreams, written during the great T'ang dynasty, which lasted from 618 to 906, and the *Meng Chan I Chih* in Seven Books, written by Ch'en Shih-Yuan in 1562 (in the Ming dynasty), have a modern note of practical observation and of philosophy or ethics rather than the religious mixture of these with inspiration and superstition which strikes one in Islamic and Greek dream interpretation. The "flowery" language, as we speak of it, of the classical Chinese literature, which often

enables us to share something of the meaning of Chinese poems, even through the great barrier of an alien language, is a kind of fossilised dream imagery, showing that poetry had become secular long before it did in the West. Even the religious mythology of the Chinese seems more secular, and it may be that such ideas as that of the Nine Celestial Spheres, into which Heaven is divided, were sources of the similar Greek ideas. In my purely superficial study of these vast subjects I have come across several similarly striking comparisons. Although necessary limitations of space forbid examining or speculating on them now, the reference to such curious parallels points to the need that any student must feel for some common background of philosophy against which to set in perspective the various codes or techniques of dream interpretation that were evolved, so far as we know, almost independently of each other.

This is where, I have come to think, the theosophical system of intuitive thought largely fills up a gap, in the absence of what we call scientific knowledge of man's spiritual activity in sleep or trance.

Nobody questions the fact that dreaming is still a very mysterious activity, which is by no means completely explained as fantasy, imagination, or as irrational thought that is a wish-fulfilment achieved when the waking reason cannot censor it.

"Man is undeniably endowed with a double set [of senses] : with natural or physical senses,—these to be safely left to physiology to deal with; and, with sub-natural or spiritual senses belonging entirely to the province of psychological science," says H. P. Blavatsky (*U. L. T. Pamphlet, No. 11, p. 3*). She goes on to point out that the prefix *sub* in the term sub-natural does not imply something of secondary importance: on the contrary it refers to the spiritual Ego or Self that sounds the fundamental key-note of man's nature—a capricious, uncertain instrument which can thus be tuned to a dominant chord. Whatever degree of importance or "reality" we impute to the outer and inner self of the individual, the assumption of some kind of duality is inevitable unless all the vast literature of dream interpretation is to be rejected as lunatic ravings.

To pass as rapidly as possible over some salient features of this literature, it is especially noteworthy that in both Greek and Islamic oneiromancy, as in the Chinese, we find the broad distinction between true and false dreams. The Greek idea occurs in two forms, one purely poetic, as the Gate of Horn or the Gate of Ivory through which the dream message

came, true dreams passing through the Gate of Horn, false through the Gate of Ivory. The other form, typical of the early Homeric literature, was that the gods, being all too human in their temperamental caprices, sometimes sent true and sometimes false dreams to sleeping heroes. The ghosts of dead men, imprisoned in Hades, could also act as daimons, appearing to the living in dreams. The general tendency of the Greeks was to believe in benignant rather than malignant demons, although they recognised both. One of the curious similarities with the Chinese was their respect for and faith in the demons of the tribe's or the family's ancestors.

According to Tâbir, the Islamic art of divination, dreams that are merely illusions might be suggestions of a Dîv, an agent of Iblîs, the Mohammedan Satan. But false dreams were also attributed to the dreamer's evil disposition, and to wrong eating and drinking.

One of the chief sources of the Arabic writers was the Greek oneirocriticism of Artemidorus, who not only treats of such distinctions but gives highly suggestive examples of the dream imagery of Greek citizens. It was nearly always a God or a Hero who appeared in the dream, and the interpretation depended partly on the character of the spirit that was dreamed of. Thus an amorous dream might be auspicious if Aphrodite figured in it, and an omen of peril if such a dream centred round a chaste goddess like Artemis. Bodily as well as mental health were recognised objects of the Mohammedan

dream interpretations as well as of the Greek oracles. The shrines of the healer Asklepios became the most popular among the Greeks who consulted the oracles and slept in the precincts of the temples to ensure having true dreams. It is interesting to note here that, whatever connection may one day be traced between Greek and Chinese mythology, the Greeks certainly derived some of their ideas from the ancient Egyptians, and Asklepios has been identified as an imitation of the Egyptian I-m-hotep, "scribe of the gods" and healer.

The Egyptian and Greek practice of holy incubation in a temple as a means of acquiring esoteric wisdom was but the expression of the need for purification and self-discipline, a recognition of which also is a common feature of all the oneiromantic literatures. The same idea is finely expressed in the Platonic dialogues, and it is not difficult to see how the discourse of Socrates, on the principle of Love as a means towards knowing the Absolute Good and Beautiful, is a description of the path to wisdom that is always being traced by religion. 29.596

Dreams, whether from disembodied spirits, or from our own mind or the mind of another living person, produce results in us largely according to what we are; and hence, says the African Greek, Synesius, "wisdom is to be used on oneself". In his philosophical superiority to the cruder methods of the dream interpreters—all the mumbo-jumbo practised to induce faith in the unsophisticated—Syne-

sus is even more modern than Plato. His precept is that the individual should observe and record his own dreams. The cultivation of dreaming was advocated by Madame Blavatsky as a means to "clairvoyance," which is an unfortunate word because of its varying implications, but it comes to the same thing. Mme. Blavatsky's insistence upon the importance of dreams and of the *positive* attitude of the dreamer's inner self began with the assumption that the goal was not any dream state at all, but one of illumination beyond the dreaming. The advanced Adept would not dream at all, but would become detached from the external or lower self to enter the spiritual plane of that divine wisdom which we who dream may glimpse through the concrete forms of imagination.

In order to understand the subject better, it is well to consider a little in detail what happens when one falls asleep, has dreams, and then enters Sushupti [the dreamless state]. As his outer senses are dulled the brain begins to throw up images, the reproductions of waking acts and thoughts, and soon he is asleep. He has then entered a plane of experience which is as real as that just quitted, only that it is of a different sort. We may roughly divide this from the waking life by an imaginary partition on the one side, and from Sushupti by another partition on the other. In this region he wanders until he begins to rise beyond it into the higher. There no disturbances come from the brain action, and the being is a partaker to the extent his nature permits of the "banquet of the gods." But he has to return to waking state, and he can get back by no other road than the one he came upon, for, as Sushupti

extends in every direction and Swapna [dreaming] under it also in every direction, there is no possibility of emerging at once from Sushupti into Jagrata [waking]. And this is true even though on returning no memory of any dream is retained.

Now the ordinary non-concentrated man, by reason of the want of focus due to multitudinous and confused thought, has put his Swapna field or state into confusion, and in passing through it the useful and elevating experiences of Sushupti become mixed up and distorted, not resulting in the benefit to him as a waking person which is his right as well as his duty to have. . . . So it appears, then, that what he should try to accomplish is such a clearing up and vivification of Swapna state as shall result in removing the confusion and distortion existing there, in order that upon emerging into waking life he may retain a wider and brighter memory of what occurred in Sushupti. This is done by an increase of concentration upon high thoughts, upon noble purposes, upon all that is best and most spiritual in him while awake. . . . (W. Q. Judge, *U. L. T. Pamphlet No. 11*, pp. 12-13).

That is plain enough, although the quotation is necessarily incomplete. The point that I wish

to conclude with is that this rough outline and the other theosophical tenets on dreaming that I have read in *Transactions of the Blavatsky Lodge* embrace the main ideas that occur in the varied and sometimes vastly complicated and illogical codes of oneiromancy already referred to. They also agree essentially with the more philosophical expressions of ancient wisdom regarding the True, the Good and the Beautiful. And therefore when the theosophical systematisation of Hindu and other religious philosophies covers more esoteric things which are beyond a normal apprehension, there is at least the inference that here too within the rough shell of inadequate language may be wisdom worth trying to understand.

The field has of course been far too big to be methodically covered by this brief survey, but some readers may perhaps find suggestions for study in these discursive observations.

R. L. MÉGROZ

THE ADVANCE OF SCIENCE AND THE LIFE OF THE COMMUNITY

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The Aberdeen meeting of the British Association reflected the mood of the nation. The enthusiasm with which for ten years the government and industrial concerns endowed the search for pure knowledge and supported an army of scientific workers for the purpose of applying knowledge to the service of the nation and Empire has waned, to some extent. This is due to no slackening of effort of the scientific workers themselves, whose post-war achievements in pure and applied science have been remarkable. Indeed, it is due to the spectacular character of those very successes which have come to the world too fast to be absorbed without tearing the whole fabric of civilisation, since political and social institutions have shown no corresponding advance. Added to this, those operating the financial machinery of the world, who exercise a tremendous pressure upon political and social organisms, have altogether failed to grasp the significance of the new discoveries of science. And so while on the one hand science can look with pride on its achievements, on the other it can only contemplate with sorrow the new problems which it has projected into the arena of our political life, because of those achievements.

Science has solved the problem of want. There is now no shortage of any of the material necessities of man. Vast areas which were formerly barren are now due to the work of economic botanists and agriculturalists, capable of producing food crops. There is scarcely one agricultural crop which has not been improved by the efforts of researchers to yield at least fifty per cent more than before the war. Diseases of plants are no longer the menace they were. Insect pests are rapidly coming under the control of the economic entomologist. The rigours of climate have lost their terrors owing to the remarkable results achieved in the selection and acclimatisation of plants. Animal diseases have been studied, and animal breeding and the study of pastures and animal foodstuffs have vastly improved the quality and quantity of the animal foods available for man. Yet the fear of starvation remains with many of the peoples of the world, under-nutrition is a commonplace of the large minority of the individual members of western nations, and the spectre of economic distress haunts the world as a whole. A million or more people starve in China from lack of cereals while the commodities they need are de-

stroyed for want of purchasers. Those habitual coffee-drinkers, the European peoples, are returning to their war-time substitutes for the beverage while Brazilian and African coffee-planters are being subsidised to make bonfires of their crops. Although the world can consume profitably at least twice the amount of textile materials which are produced, the cotton planters of America are being encouraged to plough in a large portion of their crops and to neglect protective measures against the spread of disease. The sugar planters of one part of the Empire, capable of producing the whole Empire's needs of sugar at comparatively low prices, see the British Government spending, in the form of a subsidy to sugar beet growers in Great Britain, a sum greater than the value of the sugar produced. The wheat producer of Canada and other parts of the Empire are probably watching with amazement the attempts of the Home Government to increase wheat production in England by granting a subsidy to the wheat farmers.

In another sphere science has profoundly influenced the life of the community. Physics and chemistry applied to means of communication have completely overcome the geographical barriers which formerly separated peoples. Aeroplanes can fly from one end of the world to another within a few days. Motor tractors can now range over vast deserts without fear of break-down. The spoken word can be radiated to the remot-

est parts of the earth in a fraction of a second. Barriers between nations and barriers between races should no longer exist. The possibilities of mutual co-operation of nation and nation and race and race were never greater. Yet during the past five years following the economic break-down of Europe, the thoughts of statesmen of most nations have been centred upon preparing for the emergency of further wars, and the energies of large sections of the populations of each country have been directed towards supplying munitions of war to those countries which do not possess the necessary resources to produce them for themselves. The relations between countries have been embittered because of the inability of nationally minded politicians, and internationally minded financiers, to resolve their differences of outlook: the relations between races are worse than ever, not because anthropological science has not brought more understanding, but because the differing standards of races, ethical and material, (particularly the latter), remain an irritant to the average individual member of each race: and in the anxiety to secure immediate economic security or political power the individual member or group of one race is prepared to forego the advantages of co-operation based on mutual toleration and sympathy.

This is the mad world which scientists are now beginning to contemplate with some realisation that it is their triumphs in the material field which have been

responsible in large measure for the chaos which exists. For the first time since the efforts of the encyclopædists of France in the eighteenth century, the scientific thinkers of various countries are realising that political and economic thought must be based on the realities of the material world and that the approach to political and economic problems must be scientific, *i.e.*, an impartial and unprejudiced contemplation of the full facts. Some understanding of the problems forced by science on a world which is still governed on irrational lines by irrational thinkers was manifest in many of the addresses which were delivered and the discussions which took place at the Aberdeen meeting of the British Association. The keynote of this new approach of science to life as a whole was struck in the brilliant presidential address of Sir James Jeans.

The realisation of the scientist's responsibility to the community was also evidenced by Professor Fawcett in his paper on the relation between the advance of geographical science and the life of the community. He made a plea for a systematic survey of man in relation to his environment in which all the major activities of man could be set down in a sufficiently precise form to assist anthropologists and geographers in their formulation of the general principles underlying the activities of man,—a mighty task indeed and one which will take many years to complete. A Professor Fawcett said, nearly every further applica-

tion of science to industry produces remarkable changes in the direction and distribution of man's activities in any particular country and very often has far-reaching effects on the life of communities in other countries. Professor Fawcett might have used for illustration the rise of the synthetic indigo industry based upon Perkins' researches in the middle of last century. It was nearly thirty years before Perkins' discovery was commercially applied, but within five years of its commercial application, five million indigo growers of India were either ruined or had to find an alternative crop because the products of their agricultural labours were supplanted by the products of a comparatively small chemical factory. In like manner the clove industry of Zanzibar and Pemba is threatened by the discovery of synthetic vanilin and it is apparently no remote possibility that the rubber growers of the world may be superseded by synthetic rubber-makers.

Professor Fawcett maintained that waste of human and material resources could have been prevented in many instances by wider knowledge of facts made known by geographers, but as yet not systematised. For instance, the efficiency of fisheries and of navigation is reduced owing to inadequate knowledge of tidal and other movements of sea waters, and accurate knowledge of England's freshwater resources might have been of great value in this year's drought.

The need for such a geographical

survey is great, and, because of the rapid changes in the world following the advances of science, the sooner this survey is made, the easier will be the formulation of general principles on the behaviour of man. Many geographical factors are more or less stable, for example, the distribution of the mining areas of the world which may have a considerable influence on the movements of population and the location of industries. These have been more critically surveyed than any other areas but a good deal of detailed work is still to be done. What are the factors, for example, which enable the tinplate industry of South Wales to survive in the face of competition of other countries where the raw materials are more plentiful, no less mutually accessible, and labour is cheap?

Professor Alan Ogilvy, in his address on "The nature and need of co-operative research into the physical and mental environment of the African natives" also made a plea for a wider outlook. Without such study, he maintained, the development of the native might proceed on entirely the wrong lines and administration suffer as it has done in the past, from want of knowledge of the relation of the native to his age-old environment. What we have to do now is to avoid the mistakes which have been made in our dealings with natives of other territories and to prevent too sudden a break with their traditional habits of life and thought and with their ethical standards. Professor Ogilvy might have gone further and em-

phasised that such studies are essential for the happy relations between the white, brown and indigenous populations in such areas.

These ideas were emphasised by Dr. May Mellanby in her contribution to the discussion on "Nutrition and its relation to disease," over which the Minister of Agriculture, Mr. Walter Elliot, presided. Dr. Mellanby gave the results of her work on the causes of dental decay, carried on for many years past and as a result of which she declared that poor teeth were due to faults in diet and in particular to the faulty diets of child-bearing mothers. She quoted the interesting case of the difference between the teeth of the primitive Negro of the tropics and of his descendants in America, attributing the prevalence of disease among the latter to adoption of European clothing and diet. Again, the Eskimos had beautiful teeth; only three per cent were said to suffer from disease while they led the secluded life of their ancestors, but when they came in contact with white man's settlements, and altered their food and general mode of living accordingly, their teeth became susceptible to disease.

Within the compass of a short article it is impossible to do justice to the many brilliant contributions which were made to the meeting. Those selected for notice in this review must be taken as indicative of a definite change of outlook on the part of some of our investigators and exemplified by Sir James Jeans.

M. ALLANSON

NEW BOOKS AND OLD

THE CHANGING WEST AN AMERICAN IMPRESSION

[**Irwin Edman**, Professor of Philosophy at Columbia University, deals with the problem which several European writers of distinction have examined in our pages—what is there worth saving in European civilization, and how? Professor Edman in his closing sentence strikes the same note about the Orient as so many others have—a fact worthy of attention by all Asiatics.—EDS.]

In the light of the acute changes and necessities for change in the United States to-day, our intellectual leaders are being compelled by their own minds and consciences to re-examine not merely the economic assumptions of present-day society but the familiar axioms and assumptions of the nature of life and culture and civilization in the Western world. One outstanding index to this new tendency is a series of articles in the *New York Nation* by Joseph Wood Krutch. These have attracted very considerable attention by virtue of not only their intrinsic competence, but because they hit upon a theme, one might almost say a dilemma, of the educated man throughout the Western world. Mr. Krutch, one of the editors of *The Nation*, is known particularly in this country for a volume entitled *The Modern Temper*, which he published several years ago. In that book he canvassed the mood of disillusion of those who had lost the values of the religious and spiritual traditions of the past and had come to find nothing but nothingness in the high heraldings of the laborator, scientists, and of the naïve devotees of "Progress" in

the nineteenth century. Mr. Krutch saw Science and Social Science revealing nothing but the "dark sea of nothingness, in which all who know may drown" (a quotation drawn from the poet Edwin Arlington Robinson). That book attracted special attention because it was the first semi-popular intellectual expression of the doubts that were coming over the complacency and dogmatism of the materialistic and empirical mind, the self-criticism beginning to overtake the provincial certainties of nineteenth-century science. The writer reviewed the book at the time under the caption, "Heartbreak House". The heartbreak consisted in the discovery of the emptiness of that "reality of matter in motion," of all of the universe, nature, life and experience conceived in exclusively physical and biological terms. Mr. Krutch neatly exploded in successive chapters "The Faith in the Laboratory," "The Faith in Psychology," the hopes for happiness and serenity that had been the Utopian promise of those social philosophers who still cherished as their major faith the Baconian ideal of the enlargement of the empire of man over Nature through physical

investigation and control. Physics, in the broadest sense, had become at once the great dogma and the great hope. Mr. Krutch exposed the pretentiousness of the dogma and the emptiness of the hope. One felt at the time in reading Mr. Krutch's book that one defect and limitation of his thinking was that his own disillusion came from having taken too seriously and too literally the dogmas of the nineteenth-century physio-progressives. And he did not indicate a way out, or a further step. He had apparently no intimations of any other philosophies than those whose emptiness he had so discerningly revealed.

This excursus into the recent past is relevant, for Mr. Krutch's analysis had wide repercussion in this country. His present series of articles is again a study in doubt, if not in disillusion. They were published during the past summer under the striking title, *Was Europe a Success?* What the author means is briefly the following: European civilization, the heritage of our cultural values, has been built up through centuries. It has produced among other things the concepts and the possibility (for a limited class) of personality, individuality, freedom. With the traditional European economy are associated all that, as civilized beings, Western men care about—art, science, the finenesses and nobilities of life. But they were built up—Mr. Krutch admits or insists—at the cost of injustice, inequality, underprivilege for many. A revolutionary change in econom-

ics and politics might destroy precisely the only things that make life, for a civilized being, worth living.

Mr. Krutch's series of essays is important because it calls attention to the dilemma in which a sensitive heir to the culture of the West finds himself. The very changes in society which his intelligence and his sense of justice may lead him to advocate threaten to destroy precisely the culture and freedom which give meaning to his or to any life. But it may be suggested that Mr. Krutch is guilty of gross narrowness and nearsightedness in identifying the tradition, so to put it, of the Spirit of Man with "Europe".

In the series of comments on Mr. Krutch's articles there is one from the well-known and flamboyant pen of Mr. H. L. Mencken which illustrates the same point. Mr. Mencken thinks Europe is worth saving, forsooth, because Europe is in danger of reverting to the "Asiatic," of which he gives Communism and Fascism as illustrations. Mr. Mencken, who has in his day had wide influence here, apparently has never heard of Oriental philosophy or religion.

Mr. Krutch has been called to task for practically identifying all the higher values of civilization with one Continent, by a number of well-known thinkers who comment at some length on his article in a recent issue of *The Nation*. "Europe," writes Mr. Russell, "has been superior to other continents, not in art or morals, but in knowledge [by which Mr. Russell,

also provincial, means "physical science"] and power that comes from knowledge." Mr. Russell questions the "superiority" of Europe on the basis of its art or thought and suggests Chinese art and thought (as he might have suggested Indian) as having elements of value that in some respects Europe has never equalled. These essays on *Was Europe a Success?* (for all their importance as stating the issue for the educated man: the conflict between culture and revolution) are none the less another of the many illustrations one might find in Western writing of how little realization the Western mind has of the richness and variety of Eastern thought and the emphasis and accents on mind and spirit that are always, as it were, a minority report in Western analysis.

These essays of Mr. Krutch and the comments upon them are im-

portant as revealing within what a narrow framework so much of discussion in our Western intellectual setting moves. Our immediate problems are, in all conscience, pressing enough. One might be excused for neglecting Eastern thought in matters of local Western economics, but Plato, the source-book of Western thought, has Eastern sources, and, in modern times, thinkers as different from each other as Schopenhauer and Santayana have turned to the East for correctives to that simple mechanism, that absorption in time and in instrumentalities which has been one of the limitations of the mind of Europe—and America—in recent centuries. Where one begins to discuss the ultimate values of life, the morally and the spiritually real, to neglect or forget the East is to forget half our own culture and half the issues of philosophy.

IRWIN EDMAN

A B C Ethics From Life's Storybook. Written and illustrated by QUAN WING. (The Christopher Publishing House, Boston, U. S. A. \$1.25)

This is a collection of stories for children. They are thoroughly unsectarian, and the writer has a fine philosophical basis on which she has erected a temple of morality not only suitable for the children but understandable by them. Each story, only a page long,

has an illustration on the opposite page, and their aim is directing the children's "inherent imagination along moral lines so that they may see—in the formative period before the age of seven, when the character is most easily impressed—that there is a great adventure and a wonderful lesson hidden in the small, commonplace happenings of every-day-life."

WESTERN VIEWS ON ORIENTAL LORE

A TRIAD

[More and more Western publicists turn to the Eastern doctrines for help and guidance. Below we print three reviews which deal appreciatively with the three distinct fields they embrace. **Hugh Ross Williamson** approves the order of society pictured in the old Code of Manu ; **C. E. M. Joad** values the chastening effect of Indian philosophy on Western readers, and **Claude Houghton** pays a tribute to Eastern Mysticism, so grossly misrepresented in the past.—EDS.]

I.—SOCIAL ORDER *

An eminent Nonconformist divine, anxious about civilization, recently completed a tour of the world. On his return to England he delivered himself of the opinion—given gratis to a Fleet Street organ—that “Western civilisation has less moral authority in the world than it has had for many long years.” He also opined that “the East is waiting for Europe to commit suicide”. If the latter statement, in so far as it might be held to imply a wish, may be doubted, the former is certainly an understatement. The moral authority of the West declined some centuries ago, when, in fact, the Catholic synthesis (which incorporated the wisdom of the Greeks and the practical energy of the Romans) was displaced by an individualism unrelated to tradition. The Nonconformist divine was, in all probability, not thinking of that : he was looking back regretfully, one imagines, to the days of the Good Queen, when her particular portion of the West “led the world” and accepted the admiration due to the mystical morality of Free Trade and the ethical sublimity of *laissez faire*.

The consequences of the fatal disproportion of those times—the elevation of the *vaishya* above the *brahman*, the merchant above the teacher, is at last becoming so plain that it cannot escape the notice of even the most superficial observer. To all observers, superficial or not, the clear exposition contained in this introduction to Manu

may be recommended. For it is a commentary on to-day. Here, in the code of Manu, is the essence of the only social theory which can save civilization. Here conflicting forces are subdued into harmony. By it—allowing for the non-essentials of a particular political situation—our own standards must be judged. It may be fanciful to see with M. Jacolliot the Egyptian Manes, the Cretan Minos, the Hebrew Moses as derivatives of the Sanskrit Manu ; but whether that assumption is baseless or not, we may agree with Mr. Motwani that “Manu may be said to be the father of all social thinkers of the East and the West, the first to have conceived a perfect and well-planned society and to have pointed out the processes of its attainments.”

The author has done a service for contemporary thinkers in stressing the fundamental importance of *dharma*, which, he says, “cannot be translated as a bundle of taboos imposed on the individual by the group in which he is born”. It is rather, “his duty to himself, and to the group, arising out of the intellectual perception of his place in the scale of life”. The Saxon word which would seem the best rendering is “doom,” used in its original and most profound sense. And it is certain that Western society must learn something of this “doom” of Manu, if it wishes to escape another, more colloquial “doom”.

HUGH ROSS WILLIAMSON

II.—PHILOSOPHY *

The philosophy of Bhedabheda means roughly the philosophy of "identity in difference". The world, it is obvious, is in some sense a unity; equally obviously it exhibits diversity. It appears, in short, to be both one and many. Can this appearance be real? Many philosophers have argued that it cannot, and have insisted that the Universe is either a chaotic manifold, the unity being an illusion, or that it is a single one, the "manyness" being an illusion. There are, however, schools which maintain that the appearance truly represents reality, that the Universe, in fact, is *both* one and many, or rather one *in* many, and have employed all the resources of the dialectical intellect to show how the apparently irreconcilable concepts of identity and difference can be mated. Such is the school of Objective Idealism (Hegel, Bradley, Bosanquet) in the West, and of Bhedabheda, (of which Bhaskara is the most prominent exponent) in the East.

These schools base their conclusions in part upon the patent facts of human experience. It is, for example, clear that in one sense I am changing from moment to moment, changing both physically and psychologically. So far as my body is concerned, its material stuff is being continually renewed, so that no part of my physical being is the same as it was a year, or even a moment, ago. My mental life is no less a flux of change. My hopes, desires, thoughts, ambitions, the very stuff and texture of my consciousness, are different in every particular from what they were when I was a young man; the young man's were different from the boy's; the boy's from the baby's. Yet there is a sense in which the baby, the boy, the young man and myself are the same person, so that I can truly say, "I am the man who at the age of twenty fell in love, at the age of twelve obtained a prize, and at the age of

three was spanked by his nurse." I am in fact an enduring "one" throughout the "many" different phases which my personality assumes. I am an example of identity in difference.

As I am, so too, according to the Vedānta, or rather according to Bhaskara's interpretation of it, is the Universe, for as Professor Hirianna in his Foreword points out, there are many interpretations of the Vedantic doctrine, and that of Bhaskara is far from being orthodox. Yet there is good authority for his view. While emphasising the unity of Being, the Upanisads distinguish Brahman from the individual self on the one hand and from the physical universe on the other. Are we, then, to write these off as illusions? The course seems a drastic one, and, Professor Srinivasachari suggests, there is no justification for it in the sacred writings. What remains then but to assign "equal validity to the two teachings" and hold that "the ultimate reality as taught in the Upanisads will be neither a bare unity nor a mere plurality, but a vital synthesis of both". Hence the doctrine which Bhaskara maintained and Professor Srinivasachari sets out to expound.

His book is divided into three sections. In the first, Bhaskara's interpretation of the concept of identity in difference is shown in its application to the various problems of metaphysics. Applied for example to the problem of wholes and parts, it issues in the view that the whole is "not opposed to the parts but constitutes them". Logically prior to the parts, it expresses and differentiates itself through them, without thereby impairing its wholeness:—

Just as the spider weaves its own web and the banyan seed evolves into a mighty tree, Brahman by virtue of His Infinite energy, differentiates Himself into the manifold without being affected thereby.

In the second part other philosophi-

* *The Philosophy of Bhedabheda*. By P. N. SRINIVASACHARI, M. A. (Srinivasa Varadachari & Co., Madras. Rs. 5.

cal expressions of the doctrine of Brahman are examined. The third contains criticism and indicates Western parallels. It is this last section to which the Western reader will turn with the greatest interest. Bosanquet is the European philosopher whose thought is most closely akin to that of Bhaskara. Yet there are important differences. Bhaskara's doctrine derives direct from the sacred writings, and reason is employed only to dot the i's and cross the t's of revelation, while Bosanquet proceeds to the same conclusions exclusively by the method of the dialectical reason. Again, while Bhaskara has no respect for the earthly life, and therefore excludes it from the Absolute, Bosanquet places value upon the "riches of human experience including its errors, evils and other imperfections" and concedes them, transcended and transfigured, a place in Reality itself. Both differences are in the highest degree significant of fundamental differences in method and

valuations between Eastern and Western thought.

An admirable book this, and valuable for its chastening effect upon the Western reader, who discovers once more how many of the ideas which he fondly believed to be the original contributions of the West are embodied in the vast corpus of Indian philosophy.

The book is disfigured by a number of misprints. Its usefulness for English readers is also diminished as is often the case with books on Indian philosophy by the failure to translate Indian philosophical terms into their English equivalents. That there are frequently no exact English equivalents I can well believe, but, where this is the case, it is the writer's business to give the nearest equivalent, explaining in what respects it falls short of the precise meaning of the Indian term, instead of belabouring the English reader with a hail of technical words which bemuse without enlightening him.

C. E. M. JOAD

III.—MYSTICISM

Truth is not intimately associated with the "blurbs" of publishers but, in the case of this book, the publishers' claim that this is "A study of Eastern wisdom which Western minds will appreciate" is a modest statement of fact. Actually, a higher claim is justified.

This book fulfils a double function: it illuminates both ignorance and knowledge. To one knowing nothing of the Upanisads, it will reveal much; to one familiar with the texts, it will reveal more.

As the title proclaims, this book is concerned with Hindu Mysticism in the Upanisads and, before considering its main theme, it is perhaps desirable to state in the simplest terms the essential principle underlying all forms of mysticism. In Carlyle's phrase, most people know God "only by hear-

say". The mystic claims to have met Him. For the mystic, religion is "livingly experienced metaphysic". It is neither a rite nor a refuge. It is a glimpse of Reality.

But in this book, we are concerned with Hindu Mysticism and it is therefore necessary to indicate, however inadequately, the especial quality which seems to differentiate this form of mysticism from others more familiar to Western minds.

It is, perhaps, significant that, in the opening of Chapter I, Professor Sircar states that "self-transcendence is the watchword of the Upanisads and the Vedanta". Significant, because the dominant impression created by the first reading of this book is that the mysticism of the Upanisads is uniquely transcendental. It differs from other forms of mysticism in that the quiet of

transcendence—as taught in the Upanisads—is a state wholly outside the boundaries of finite consciousness. “It is not felt, it is not enjoyed. It is.”

On the broadest possible lines, then, this seems to be the fundamental theme of the book, and it is not surprising therefore that the state which many Western mystics have held to be ultimate felicity—the state of mystic exaltation—is regarded as bondage by the deepest wisdom of the Upanisads. The ultimate is not the cosmic vision by the individual self, it is the cosmic vision by the Cosmic Self. “These texts, it should be remembered, present the absolute truth of identity.”

Owing to space restriction, it has been possible only to suggest, tentatively, the main theme of this book, but attention is particularly invited to the chapters dealing with “Time and Spiritual Life,” “The Five Sheaths,” and

“Rhythm of Life and the States of Consciousness”.

Finally—and this, perhaps, is of particular interest to Western readers—Professor Sircar frequently refers to the belief that Indian systems of mysticism demand a denial of life. According to him, this torturing of life is no part of the teaching of the Upanisads, and is remote from the ideals of the Upanisadic seers. Renunciation is not a *cul-de-sac*: it is a road to a finer, freer, and fuller life.

The fullness of life dawns suddenly upon receptive souls. It can come to him alone who has the proper attitude; and this attitude is nothing but a silent watch of the soul. Constant watchfulness helps the soul to be receptive to the finest expression of life. This watchful silence unties the knots of our psychic being, and makes it responsive to the soul. It also makes it responsive to the currents of life, revealing its divine orientation. The seeker is reborn. This is the great claim of mysticism.

CLAUDE HOUGHTON.

GANDHIJI

[In leaving behind the soul-enervating field of party-politics Gandhiji very probably will not experience prison-life again. Here are two reviews of recent books—each will enable the reader to understand the other better, completing the study of the great man whose political theories spring from his religion and whose religion is coloured by his political programmes.—EDS.]

I. —POLITICIAN*

“What will you do when you retire from your professional work?” was the question put to an eminent reviewer. “Commence to read the books I have reviewed,” was the reply. While many writers would be forced to admit that their knowledge of the books they had reviewed was of the scantiest, I doubt if the reviewers of this volume would come into this category.

The author has given us a deeply interesting biography, a complete review of Mr. Gandhi's life from the time of his birth to the present day. My first reaction on reading this book was one of anger. The story is unfair, for the author is not content with portraying Mr. Gandhi's life and action

but he seeks to find an ulterior motive for the many grave decisions Mr. Gandhi has been called upon to make. He says:—

I cannot associate myself with the hysterical admiration bestowed upon him by people who are in other ways sane and reasonable. Against certain of his doctrines I rebel with all my heart and with all my mind.

How many of us could subscribe to all Mr. Gandhi's doctrines, how many of us are prepared to carry on the instructions of the Teacher in His Sermon on the Mount? Yet the selflessness of Mr. Gandhi cannot be doubted, and it is this denial of his integrity that in my mind is the weakness of this book. If his was the asceticism

**The Tragedy of Gand* By GLORNEY BOLTON. (George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 10s. 6d. London.)

of the moralist who is not an artist, when he ordered the burning of all foreign cloth and committed many priceless treasures to the flames it was because he was seeking to show his followers that human life is of greater importance than beautiful possessions, that the buying of Indian cloth even if artistically less beautiful gives employment to countless millions of starved peasants. The Mahatma does not praise poverty, but as long as starvation is the lot of his people he suffers with them. Mr. Gandhi has achieved the distinction of being the most talked-of man in the world to-day, he has been painted, photographed and written up. Millions have waited breathlessly on his word. Thousands of men and women have faced imprisonment, torture and even death at his command. Yet his greatness lies, not so much in his power over others but in his complete control of self, this very selflessness that the author would deny.

Those who think of Mr. Gandhi only as the Mahatma, the Great Leader, will be interested in this record of his early life, of his difficulty in spelling the word "kettle" when questioned by the Inspector of Schools, of his early interest in the "Untouchables"—that vast army of the outcast about whom Gandhiji wrote on one occasion "untouchability is not a sanction of religion, it is a device of Satan." At the age of thirteen he was married. "Mohandas Gandhi" we read, "was of course delighted at the prospect of matrimony. It meant a holiday from school, presents, and a little girl to be his constant playmate," but within a few days of his marriage his mother sent him back to school where he formed an attachment to an older boy. He admired his friend who could run and jump with such athletic grace; he wished to become equally strong and beautiful. This, his friend assured him, was easy; he had only to eat meat. "How would the English have conquered India if they had not been fiendish meat-eaters? How can the Indians expel them from the mother-

land until they themselves have tasted flesh?... The Herculean tempter was slowly subduing Mohandas to his will." We read that the Gandhi family grew anxious and did their best to end what they believed to be a "wicked" friendship, but Mohandas was obdurate. When he finally tasted meat he was physically sick and spiritually unhappy. For about a year he and his friend met clandestinely to eat meat, but he increased neither in strength nor beauty. As he had a horror of telling lies it became increasingly difficult to conceal his dietary practice from his parents. He finally took a vow not to eat meat again, a vow which he has kept to this day. So strong is his horror of meat-eating he refused to allow beef tea to be given to his wife, though on one occasion she was so ill the doctors said this was the one thing which might save her life.

In 1887 Mohandas paid his first visit to England, where in due course he passed his examinations and was called to the Bar. He returned to India a fully qualified barrister and to the wife whom he had not seen for three years, and if accounts are true the reunion must have been difficult for both of them. "Gandhi was becoming more and more of an ascetic and in married life asceticism is a failure unless it is practised willingly by both parties." When we learn some years later that Mr. Gandhi after consultation with his friend Mr. West took the vow of chastity and "felt immeasurably happier," we search in vain for Mrs. Gandhi's views on the matter. If she was consulted the author does not think it of sufficient importance to mention.

On Mr. Gandhi's work in South Africa there are many interesting chapters. The willing relinquishment of his salary, variously estimated at between £3,000 and £6,000 a year, in order to help his less fortunate brethren, his work in India for the Congress Party, and later his negotiations with the Viceroy and British Government, make as thrilling a story as any one could wish to read.

Mahatma Gandhi has never looked back and while at one time his leadership of the Untouchables was challenged by Dr. Ambedkar I can vouch as one who was in India during the bitter controversy that in the far away villages, miles from town or railway, it was Gandhi's name that was acclaimed as leader. Outside Bombay few had ever heard the name Ambedkar. It is surprising, therefore, to read that the author says that "Dr. Ambedkar's, leadership is actual" while "Mr. Gandhi's leadership is sentimental and assumed".

It would be difficult to refute such a statement in better words than those used by Mr. Bolton himself in closing his story of the life of a very great personality.

He has triumphed and blundered. He has sinned, as a doctor of the Church would have understood sin, as a Greek would have understood "the missing of the mark." But the mark of a saint is not perfection; it is consecration. Who among us is to dispute his claim to the title of Mahatma? He taught his countrymen self-respect. They no longer fear the taunt—the silly taunt—of racial inferiority. He taught them to respect the

individuality of all men, no matter how mean their estate may be. He made himself one with the poorest of the poor. He entered the palaces of kings in the garment worn by millions of India's peasants. So doing, he showed that the peasant with his homely but ancient and deeply rooted philosophy has yet some contribution to make to the wisdom and happiness of his fellow-men. With these achievements, it is less easy to speak of the Tragedy of Gandhi, or to bemoan too deeply the fact that at a fateful Conference he had no acceptable solution to offer. It may be that, even if he had not been born, enlightened Hindus would have recognized the sinfulness of condemning millions of men and women to an unjust condition of Untouchability. Evil does not endure. The spirit of man is ever ready to destroy evil, once it is made aware of the existence of evil. Pious Hindus have condoned Untouchability as in the past pious Christians have condoned slavery. But to Mr. Gandhi belongs in ample measure the credit for having undermined the foundations of Untouchability. He will not live to see its complete disappearance; for the evil is deeply rooted. But he has lit the candle which cannot yet be extinguished. Men will forget the details of the Round Table Conference. They will in time—and with the help of the spirit of *Satyagraha*—forget the animosity they have felt towards Englishmen in India."

To have achieved this much is no mean record in the life of one man—and Gandhi still lives.

MONICA WHATELY

II.—PRISONER*

The title of this book is a little misleading. It suggests the singer behind prison-bars rather than a translator whose work has passed through the emending hands of someone else. Mr. Gandhi made a rough translation of Indian devotional poems and hymns for English friends during his imprisonment in Yeravda Jail, Poona, in 1930. The original matter was taken partly from the Upanishads and other Sanskrit Scriptures and partly from the poets of the *Bhakti* school of thought and devotion, particularly those of the fifteenth, sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. This rough translation has been pre-

pared by Mr. Hoyland for publication in the West. The extent to which he has "worked upon it" cannot be estimated, but he has "thought best to omit certain material, chiefly Indian names and symbolism," has altered some of the phrasing and put the whole into a loose metrical form. This suggests some rather considerable modification and the result makes us wonder whether Mr. Hoyland has not superfluously westernised his material. The English are a practical people and their language is full of concrete imagery. They are very much at home in the world of the five senses, and

**Songs From Prison*: Translations of Indian Lyrics Made in Jail. By M. K. GANDHI. Adapted for the Press by John S. Hoyland. (George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., London. 5s. cloth; 3s. 6d. paper.)

even the mystics among them who have felt the thralldom of sense have used a richly coloured language to invoke the Spirit which is beyond all the divisions of the spectrum. It is natural, therefore, that to Western readers much Eastern devotional poetry should by contrast with their own seem colourless and insufficiently defined, though the few who can read Eastern poetry in the original seldom, we think, feel this. But it is, perhaps, inevitable that an English translation of Sanskrit, for example, however sensitively executed, should leave this impression. For the genius of the one language can hardly be accommodated to that of the other. The metaphysical subtlety, the delicate nuances of emphasis and meaning, of Sanskrit elude the texture of English diction, while the very concrete imagery of English is alien to the finer intimations of the Eastern Spirit. For behind the difference in the language there is, of course, a difference in value and in perception. Eastern poets and mystics have been for the most part far more profoundly convinced than their Western brothers of the necessity of transcending all personal definition in their surrender to the indefinable and changeless One. For them, indeed, to abandon the personal was not to abandon the true self, but to discover it through its identity with the Eternal One. Nanak, a fifteenth century poet, included in this volume, wrote,

As is the fragrance in the flower,
As is the likeness in the mirror,
So is God also everywhere at all times :

Search for him, friend, within thyself :

Give heed to what the sages teach,
That God is both within us and beyond ;

Until thou knowest this,
Until thou knowest him who dwelleth
in thyself,

The dark dank mists of self-delusion
Shall cling around thee still.

This English rendering doubtless gives an approximate idea of the original. Yet its inner meaning, if only by the use of the word "God" (which is employed throughout the volume), is a little distorted. For the

word "God" must have for Western readers definitely monotheistic associations. And the strength and the weakness of Western monotheism lie in its too personal emphasis. The Christian critics of the East who dismiss Hinduism as pessimistic pantheism are curiously blind to the destructive as well as constructive egoism inherent in their own dogmatic monotheism. Nor can they see that there is a creative religion of the Spirit which transcends the mental categories of either pantheism or monotheism. It is this religion, grounded in an ordered surrender of the partial self to an Eternal Being unspeakable, unthinkable, the formless Former of all things, which these Indian poets expressed with calm consistency though with varying emphasis. In their belief the Eternal could only speak and think through them, if in their thoughts it remained unspeakable and unthinkable. They could only grow into It by discarding the formal defences of the mundane mind. And it is this mystery of the wholeness which can only be born out of emptiness which is imperfectly communicated in so Westernised a translation as this. Yet those who realise that these hymns and poems do not offer the kind of satisfaction to be got from passionate or elaborate imagery, but that the very chastity of their idiom reflects a spiritual vision which is beyond the strife of opposites, will find that the collection has much to offer them as a basis for meditation. Mr. Gandhi's choice of poets of the *Bhakti* school is distinctive. There are a few of them such as Surdas in whom the devotional impulse is still rather morbidly constrained by a sense of personal sin. But in most of them, as in Kabir, the sense of the Eternal shines with so serene a radiance that they are alight with charity both for all men and towards themselves. Their ardour is clarified by insight, while to the Source of all Being, which is the continual subject-object of their praise and prayer, they dedicate themselves

in words which reconcile the opposites
that logic would keep apart,—

Thou art in all
And yet—in all thou art not :
Perfect thou art, beyond imagining,

Thou workest secretly, and very wondrously :
Formless thou art, and undefinable,
Master thou art, and servant too. . . .
The Scriptures name thee the Unknowable ;
Yet here thy servants sing thy praise,
For they have known.

HUGH I'A. FAUSSET.

THE YOGA OF THE POET

[L. A. G. Strong's work as poet, novelist, and critic is well known. In this review of the world famous "Q" he quotes, without comment, the view that the poet connects the music within himself with the rhythm of the universe and then wakes "his less sensitive fellows to an apprehension of the harmony beyond and yet within them". In a subsequent issue we will publish an essay on "Poetry and Common Sense" by Mr. Strong himself.—EDS.]

Sir Arthur Quiller-Couch's new collection takes its title from the three addresses with which it opens. To-day, when it is being widely said that the artist must take a back seat, and that there is no room for him in the struggle ahead, this affirmation of the poet's place in the state has a particular value. It would be valuable at any time ; but we conjecture it could never be more sharply needed.

Sir Arthur remains one of the steadiest and most consistent literary personalities of our time. In a turmoil of loud, dogmatic voices his urbane utterance has often been overlooked : yet, when each fashionable outburst dies down, his voice is once more heard, never raised, unhurried, preaching the cause of tolerance and of sane enjoyment. Whatever view be finally taken of "Q's" place as a critic, certain rare virtues must be conceded him. For him, intellect is the whole man expressed in judgment. He actively enjoys literature, a faculty which at once puts him ahead of the majority of contemporary critics. He is catholic in his enjoyment, and widely tolerant. Finally, this tolerance is not the result of loose and vague standards of criticism, but of a critical apparatus so fundamental and humane that no benevolence is needed to stretch it. His practice is a notable corrective to that too prevalent state of mind which can-

not believe anyone to be in earnest about a belief unless he is perpetually losing his temper.

That Sir Arthur's tolerance is not based upon any compromise with belief is shown in the first paper, *The Poet as Citizen*. Here from the start he affirms his faith in the poet's calling. "It is in art," he quotes from E. S. Dallas, "that the history of the world is enshrined, almost in art alone that the far past survives" : and, from Sir William Ridgeway, "Religions pass, theogonies have their day and fashion, but the Muse abides." Poetry, however, is more than the amber in which the spirit of the past is enshrined. It has a contemporary function. In the examination of its claim to greatness, Sir Arthur, himself a poet, will have no unsupported *ex parte* statements :—

The poets themselves, of course, have no doubt whatever concerning the value, present and permanent, of their wares ; and we must listen to them with due reverence, albeit with such reasonable caution as we should use in ordinary life towards persons who write their own testimonials ; as again we must be careful not to confuse their claims for poetry with their claims for themselves.

Far from being a mere dreamer, the poet has an unusually acute insight into the realities of contemporary life. "[Israel's] poets were consciously, intensively, racial : and Israel certainly did not stone the prophets because they wrote bad verse, or because they wrote

* *The Poet as Citizen*, and other Papers. By SIR ARTHUR QUILLER-COUCH (Cambridge Press, 9s.)

good verse, but because what they wrote was politically true and, to the unwise contemporary mob of Israel, politically exasperating."

After warning his readers not to look in poetry for tribal patriotism, still less for any direct ethical doctrine, he advances his own theory, which is in origin Platonic.

Small specks as we are, we belong to the universe, and carry, almost all our time quite unconsciously, its rhythm within us. Indeed as a rule we are conscious of it only when we fall ill, when the heart beats irregularly, when the temperature flies up. But, over and above this corresponding physical rhythm, man has a native emotional impulse to merge himself in the greater harmony and be one with it. . . . If by language he can connect the music within himself with the great rhythm, he has disciplined himself to accord, and at the same time to feel pleasurable that he is in accord, with his Creator's purpose.

That I suggest is where the beneficent and proper function of poetry "comes in". That is why to the Greeks Apollo was equally and at once the god of poetry and the god of medicine; and in that I find, for my part, the duty of the poet as a citizen: by awaking his less sensitive fellows to an apprehension of the harmony beyond and yet within them

The paper ends with certain warnings and a plea for liberty. Next comes *First Aid in Criticising*, a series of addresses. Of these he says:—

The title . . . advertises four of these as elementary: and so of purpose they were. Few can admire more than I the hard thinking, put into their work by some (and notably here in Cambridge) of the new race of "psychological" critics, as I may call them; or hope more of their earnest sincerity. But the vocabulary of their science is not yet determined: they invent new words and locutions as they press along, and in such haste that *B* may too easily mistake what *A* precisely means by this or

that abstract term, even if *A* shall have fixed it to his own mental satisfaction. Further, this concentration on *Æsthetic* tends more and more of late to distract the attention from the essential in any given work to let curiosity play upon (a) the reader, his "resilience" or "awareness" or "sense of immediacy": which at once transfers concern from the thing itself to So-and-So's *ego* and—there being so many of us in the world and our occasions so various—dissipates study; or (b) upon the private life of the author; e.g. of Wordsworth, not upon what he expressly wrote for our advantage in *The Prelude* but upon what someone guesses he set out to conceal.

For these reasons it seemed opportune to remind a youthful audience of some methods which, though elementary, have been observed by critics admittedly not puerile.

The addresses admirably fulfil their object. They are sane, persuasive, humorous, and genially learned. It would be possible here and there to quarrel with the argument. In *The Handicap of Poetry*, for instance, a comparison is made between Poetry and Painting, which is based on a too easy assumption about the latter, and an apparent tendency to forget that the effect of the former depends precisely upon the methods by which we apprehend it. The fact that poetry is compelled to use symbols is not a limitation, but a strength. Elsewhere, it is possible perhaps to feel that Sir Arthur makes too many gestures to conciliate the indifferent listener: but this, if a fault, is a generous one. A just tribute to the writing of Somerville and Ross characteristically concludes the book. If the phrase "a man of letters" has any meaning nowadays, Sir Arthur Quiller-Couch is amply qualified to wear it.

L. A. G. STRONG

Confucianism and Modern China. The Lewis Fry Memorial Lectures 1933-34, delivered at Bristol University. By REGINALD F. JOHNSTON. (Victor Gollancz, Ltd., London. 8s. 6d.)

Since the Chinese revolution of 1911 far-reaching changes have been taking place throughout the length and breadth of China. Old customs and

beliefs are going by the board, and even the time-honoured family system is crumbling. Ancestor-worship is still very generally practised, but the progressive weakening of the family tie makes it doubtful whether even this mainstay of Chinese civilization can long continue to survive. Though not an essential part of Confucianism,

ancestor-worship is closely connected with it in the popular mind, and the question now arises whether Confucianism has not outlived its usefulness, and may not have to be thrown off like a worn-out garment. It had been the State religion of the Manchus, and that was enough to discredit it in the eyes of the early revolutionaries, whose zeal led them hastily to assume that there was nothing valuable in the Confucian system except its antiquity. The aim of Sir Reginald Johnston's book is to show that its tenets are of such an elevated nature and so intimately bound up with the national life that they could not be discarded without grave detriment to the State. Whether or no it is entitled to be called a religion, "it possesses two characteristics which most of us would agree are essential to religion—namely, a sound and workable system of ethics and an acknowledgment of the existence of a divine order." Sir Reginald has no difficulty in proving the excellence of Confucian ethics, even out of the mouth of a missionary who was by no means an indiscriminating admirer of things Chinese; but he seems to admit that Confucius may have laid excessive emphasis on filial piety. This criticism is often heard, but it is not really supported by the facts. The so-called "Classic of Filial Piety," on which the charge is usually based, was a comparatively late production and does not represent the teaching of the Master himself. Any one who has the curiosity to look up the *Lun Yü* or authentic Sayings will be surprised, I think, to find how little there is on the subject. It may be noted, by the way, that the famous saying, "If you do not know about life, what can you know about death?" occurs in the *Lun Yü* and not, as the author says, in the *Chia Yü* (Family Sayings), which is also a late and dubious compilation.

Of the fourteen texts chosen by the present Prime Minister of Manchuria to serve as a summary of Confucian ethics, which form a prelude to this book, all but one are taken

from the same source. The many difficulties they offer to the translator are not always successfully surmounted. Thus, in the third passage, translated "The gentleman is slow of speech, resolute in action," the word *min* is "prompt" rather than "resolute," which does not provide the necessary antithesis. No. 5 is inaccurately rendered "Uprightness belongs to man by virtue of his birth; if he loses that, he is in peril." Actually, the Chinese text says that "if a man loses his natural goodness and yet lives, he is lucky to escape". In No. 8, "the maintenance of a balance between familiarity and reserve" is a cumbrous rendering of *kung*, which simply means courtesy or respect. Finally, in No. 9 there reappears once more Legge's old mistranslation of *shu* as "reciprocity," which I thought I had demolished for good and all nearly thirty years ago. It may be defined as the art, or practical application, of *jen*: disinterested goodness towards one's fellowmen.

Sir Reginald's main strength lies in his reasoning power and the trenchant quality of his arguments, of which he gave so many examples in his earlier book, *An Appeal to Christendom concerning Christian Missions*. Here again his opponents come in for some shrewd knocks, though I cannot help thinking he is unduly kind to the well-known Jesuit writer Père Léon Wieger, whom he calls "one of the wisest and best-equipped students of modern China". Père Wieger is notorious, even among missionaries, as a harsh and intolerant critic of the Chinese and their institutions. A specimen of his style will be found on page 251 of this very book: "Prise en masse, la classe lettrée est inconvertissable, à cause de ses vices honteux, de sa morgue stupide, et de son indifférence blasée." This is surely the language of petty spite, not of wisdom.

I also have a little quarrel with Sir Reginald himself. While defending with justifiable vigour Chinese practices relating to the ancestral cult,

why should he go out of his way to sneer at Western spiritualism, and speculate whether a wooden tablet may not be as effective as "a tea-table or a heart-shaped board, or a professional medium, in attracting the spirits of the departed"? I would remind him that Confucius, agnostic as he is believed to have been, held a high opinion of mediums (called *wu* in ancient China); for we are told that

he approved the saying: "A man without constancy will make neither a medium nor a doctor."

The book as a whole may be thoroughly recommended as a well-written and scholarly production. The chapters are all fully documented, and the numerous works, both Chinese and foreign, quoted or referred to in the notes indicate a wide range of reading.

LIONEL GILES

Liberty To-day, A New Defence of Liberty and Democracy. By C. E. M. JOAD (C. A. Watts. & Co., London 2s. 6d.)

Twenty years ago it seemed safe to assume that the only avowed advocate of the principle of intolerance was the Church of Rome. That august body, true to its medieval tradition taught that intolerance was the duty of every self-respecting Catholic. It promoted to the rank of Cardinal a priest who supported the infallibility of the Pope and who vindicated the Church's sacred right to persecute, and by means of its Index of Prohibited Books and other ways it sought to suppress the opinions of its opponents.

Then in 1917 a new orientation was suddenly given to the principle of intolerance. The Russian revolution placed the Bolsheviks in power and like all true fanatics they promptly proscribed all opinions but their own. They established a strict censorship of the Press and set up their own Index of Prohibited Books. Nothing but Communist views were permitted to be published and Catholic priests were shot for not recognizing the infallibility of Marx and Lenin. The ironical spectacle was witnessed of a Pope protesting against persecution.

Yet a few years more and a fresh extension was given to the principle of intolerance. The Fascists gained control in Italy and proceeded to punish everybody who refused to accept the pure goal of Fascism. "A rising faith," said Signor Mussolini, "must

needs be intolerant." Accordingly opposition newspapers were attacked, their premises and property "scientifically destroyed," their editors beaten, dosed with castor-oil, banished or murdered, until in Mussolini's words: "The body of Liberty was dead and her corpse putrescent."

Germany was the next country to exhibit the same symptoms. Triumphant Hitlerism made short work of a hostile Press. Its spokesman, Dr. Goebbels, has expressly denied the right of anyone to criticize the Government. Literature, art and education have been forced to turn fascist or to disappear. Herr Hitler has undergone a process of deification. "Hitler is lonely," says Dr. Frank, "so is God; Hitler is like God." In a few months, Germany has wiped out the gains of centuries and we are back in the days of the Roman Empire with a deified emperor, a Pretorian guard of S. S. troopers, and the wholesale murder of possible rivals.

The dangers which beset liberty throughout the world by reason of this sudden revival of the principle and practice of intolerance have now been vividly set out by Mr. C. E. M. Joad in this well-written book. Here will be found fully and fairly stated the arguments employed against liberty and democracy, and a clear and temperate statement of the case in their favour. Mr. Joad shows how in England the slowness of parliamentary methods, the growing complexity of modern society and the general unsettlement of religi-

ous and other opinions have combined to produce impatience with democracy. The Socialists and Communists are disinclined to await the gradual attainment of their objects by constitutional means and their left wing partisans preach class-war and revolution. These doctrines have been followed by their natural result, and a Fascist party is on foot ready to repel violence by violence. If such an atmosphere prevails, a clash would mean destructive civil war and a worse ruin of civilization than in Russia.

To both parties Mr. Joad offers thoughtful and cogent reasons in favour of liberty and democracy. Liberty, he shows, is essential to human progress and an age of absolutism has usually been one of stagnation. When democracy is replaced by a dictatorship, liberty disappears, for a dictator is always hostile to liberty and generally distrustful of education. His ideal is one of unity and submission, and to promote this state of mind he relies not on reason but on sentiment. One of the most powerful of sentiments is

patriotism. Hence the praise of nationality by both Hitler and Mussolini, the violent anti-Semitism in Germany and the eulogy of war both by German and Italian Fascists. Nothing unifies sentiment and distracts attention from domestic blunders better than war. Even the most benevolent dictator makes mistakes, but it is difficult for him to retrace his steps without loss of prestige, so he drifts into a policy of repression. The modern exaltation of the State is based on a fallacy; the State exists for the citizen, not the citizen for the State, and no one knows where the shoe pinches except the man who wears it. We should try to remedy the defects in our parliamentary machine, but to scrap it for some form of dictatorship would be a disastrous error. The book is temperate and timely, and if undue prominence is given to occurrences in Germany and too little to similar events in Italy and Russia, that is because the latter tend to be forgotten while Germany's offences are fresh in the memories of all men.

A. G. CARDEW

Zoroastrianism. By JOHN W. WATERHOUSE, B. A., B. D. (Great Religions of the East Series. The Epworth Press, London. 2s. 6d.)

We are afraid no one will be the better or the wiser for reading this latest addition to the "Great Religions of the East" Series. The various volumes are written by Christian clergymen apparently with the object of damning with faint praise non-Christian religions. The present volume, for instance, along with some complimentary things about Zoroaster, contains such balderdash as this:—

Zoroaster had not pondered sufficiently long and deeply over the ultimate purposes of life. (pp. 34-35.)

In his desire to attribute all things to Ahura, Zoroaster had taken a dangerous step in postulating that the deity was limited by his own evil principle. (p. 61)

Many such statements throw an

interesting light on the nature of the author's study of the Zoroastrian religion.

The statement on p. 114 that "there is to-day little dispute in the Parsi community, which abides by the decisions of the Dasturs" will provoke laughter among Parsis, for the Dasturs (*i. e.*, priests) have little influence on educated and cultured Parsis, who have lost faith in the priests whose main function is the performance of rites and ceremonies.

It is now increasingly recognized that the various orthodox religions are hopelessly ill-suited for the requirements of this age. At such a time pedantic, pretentious and ill-informed "studies" of individual religions—of which this book is an illustration—serve no useful purpose.

J. P. W.

Coleridge: Studies by Several Hands on the Hundredth Anniversary of his Death. Edited by EDMUND BLUNDEN AND EARL LESLIE GRIGGS. (Constable & Co. Ltd., LONDON. 10s. 6d.)

Volumes deliberately "centenary" prove too often to be unappetizing fare,—much dough and little individuality; or they are obviously forced, produced to order because it is the 100th anniversary of so-and-so's death, and so-and-so has a name famous enough to sell a centenary volume. This book, however, in which Coleridge is so rightly honoured, is different; and indeed might be set up as an example of what a volume on such an occasion should be. Perhaps it is best described as a Coleridge Scrap Book of material for future biographers to fill in some of the blank spaces in the poet's recorded life, thoughts, and bibliography.

The "Several Hands" have done well, with the possible exception of that which gives us the chapter "Gems of Purest Ray," which reads as if it were written with one eye on the lower classes of an elementary school. Probably what will appeal to the widest circle is the contribution from the Rev. G. H. B. Coleridge of chapters written by his father on Coleridge's life during the period 1796 to 1800. These chapters are from an unfinished "Life," and I think none will read them and not agree with the statement of the author's son that, "It is not filial piety alone which leads me to affirm that no successor of his will be able to write such a life of S. T. C. as his would have been." The other Scraps may not have the wide interest of this first one, but they are written with sincerity, and help us to understand the achievement of Coleridge against the background of his life. Mr. Edmund Blunden writes on Coleridge's school days at Christ's Hospital; Mr. E. L. Griggs contributes a letter from Sara Coleridge about her father's death; and Mr. A. L. Eagleston clears up the mystery of "Wordsworth, Coleridge and the Spy".

Mr. Beeley discusses his political thoughts; and Professor Muirhead, in an essay, "Metaphysician or Mystic?", claims for Coleridge's philosophy, "whatever its defect in detail, that it is in a true sense metaphysical rather than mystical".

Altogether this is an attractive and instructive book about one of whose life it has ever been a difficult task to write with understanding; for his recorded lapses and infirmities, his quarrellings with friends, his continual war with himself, seem to show so different a man from the lovable Coleridge portrayed by his contemporaries: by people such as Charles Lamb, Dorothy Wordsworth, Sarah Hutchinson, whose judgments we must surely accept. By many he was honoured in his lifetime near to "this side idolatry," and he should be held in honour still, this man whose ancestors were humble Devon peasants: this poet who held the true end of poetry to be to give pleasure; this critic, with his subtlety of psychological comment; and this thinker who turned for his philosophy away from the realism of his century to a spiritual and religious interpretation of life.

A man of dreams and self-deception he may have been, but he had that kind of intuition which marks him as a true prophet. Certainly he yielded his will to laudanum and opium, and allowed those drugs to fool him in many ways; but yet from his dream-spun, sensitive imagination sprang the unquenchable flames of "The Ancient Mariner," "Christabel," and "Kubla Khan". He knew his weakness, and out of that knowledge flowered his wonderful sympathy and understanding for the weaknesses of others.

But wherefore, wherefore fall on me?
To be beloved is all I need,
And whom I love, I love indeed.

So he wrote, and so it is best to remember him: and in this book is enshrined much to quicken that memory.

A. R. UBSDELL.

The Katha Upanishad. By J. N. RAWSON (Oxford University Press, London. 12s. 6d.)

This edition of the *Katha Upanishad* consists of (1) an Introduction (rather three Introductions), (2) the text of the Upanishad in Devanagari, (3) a transliteration of the text, (4) a metrical English translation, (5) an English Commentary, (6) Notes of various kinds and (7) Appendices. And yet we are told that the book is incomplete. It seems the author's original intention was to write two concluding chapters—one on the doctrine of God in the *Katha Upanishad* and the other on the whole theistic movement initiated by the *Katha*. But as the whole matter could not be compressed into two chapters it has been withheld for the present. The author says:—

This book therefore remains a preliminary study in the Hindu doctrine of God gathering material which we hope later to develop in more systematic form.

It may be said at once that Mr. Rawson has done his work with amazing thoroughness. He has apparently read all the modern literature on the subject and has studied the classical commentaries of the Hindu Acharyas. He freely quotes from Sankara's Commentary and states the great philosopher's views even when he rejects them as unwarranted by the text. He gives parallel passages not only from the other Upanishads and the *Gita* but also occasionally from Christian gospels and English poets. Principal Dasgupta rightly says of the book in a note on the dust-cover that "it impartially supplies the Sanskrit student with all the material needed for forming an independent judgment on the interpretation proposed."

But one wonders whether all this formidable critical apparatus does not really choke the life of the original poem and whether the translator was wise in choosing a loose metrical form for his translation instead of simple and terse prose. And above all one doubts whether anything is gained by his attempt to prove that the *Katha Upanishad*

is in the line of an imaginary theistic development, "distinguishing more clearly between the Akshara and the Purusha, definitely subordinating the impersonal to the personal"—a development which reached its culmination in the *Gita*. There is no doubt that one of the sources of the *Gita* is the *Katha Upanishad*. On this subject, it may not be out of place to say that the present reviewer has written a small book to which Mr. Rawson pays a handsome compliment on page 48. But it is well known that the Upanishads are not confined to any one philosophical or theological system. Many a system has grown later out of the great spiritual intuitions of the Rishis. Nor does any Upanishad remain constant on a single plane of experience. Mr. Rawson himself observes:—

In particular, the *Katha Upanishad*, though quoting in its second adhyaya from the Brihad aranyaka, and possibly affected in parts by the idealistic monism of Yajnavalkya, is on the whole distinctly theistic.

The fact is that the Upanishadic thought springing from the sacrificial religion of the Brahmanas sweeps within its embrace almost all phases of religious experience and reaches its climax in the absolutism of a Yajnavalkya. There is therefore no hard and fast line anywhere between theism and absolutism in the Upanishads, and least of all is there felt any opposition between the two modes of experience. Even in such an avowedly theistic scripture as the *Gita* there are many expressions and passages that point to absolutism. And even in the teaching of Yajnavalkya, that prince of absolutists, there are many theistic passages. And Sankara, the unwearied apostle of metaphysical monism, was also a man of faith and a passionate writer of hymns. It is as futile to try to explain away the absolutist passages in the Upanishads and the *Gita* as to explain away the theistic passages. Both of them are there and sometimes side by side; and a great majority of Hindus believe that theism with its worship of a personal Iswara is a stepping stone

to absolutism with its absorption into the supra-personal Brahman.

The aim of the Christian missionaries in India has latterly been to isolate the elements of theism in Hindu scriptures and bestow on them their liberal patronage and point to their culmination in Jesus Christ. Christianity is thus argued to be the crown of Hinduism. Mr. Rawson's attempt is in the direct line of this new development in missionary tactics beginning with his teacher, the late Dr. Farquhar. For he says in the Introduction :—

The characteristic teachings of the *Katha Upaniṣad* are just as essential in Christianity and nowhere have they been so powerfully set forth as by Jesus himself followed by St. John and St. Paul. Christian theology also gave in a more developed form the answer of the *Katha* regarding the relation between man and God, though with an even more radical recognition of the essential sin of ego-centrism and an attempt, in the doctrine of atonement, to set forth the historic operation of Divine Grace to overcome it.

We Do Not Die. By SHAW DESMOND, (Arthur Barker Ltd., London, 8s. 6d.)

The value of this book lies in the unconscious picture that it gives of the effect of spiritualistic activities on the mind. The very style reproduces perfectly the heterogeneous character of a spiritualistic séance, its emotional atmosphere, and its continually changing response to different stimuli. The brief chapters, the short flitting sentences, loose inaccuracies, contradictions and repetitions, all help the impression. So do the sudden changes from high-flown "gemmed" speech to slang, and the intermingling of sensational journalese with fragmentary sayings that are excellent.

The book is said to contain daring and illuminating speculations. In reality it reproduces the explanations and theories absorbed by the author from the various movements with which he has come in contact. For despite many

And how far his missionary bias takes the author astray can be seen from the following statement :—

We repeat that the central doctrine of the Upaniṣads "This *Ātman* is that Brahman" means that self-consciousness, our awareness of our own inner selves, is a revelation of the nature of Brahman,—the supreme adorable reality, in that He too is essentially *Ātman*, —the supreme Self. But this is different from saying, as Yajñavalkya and Sankara do, that there is only one knowing Self who is both subject and object, for that involves that the Self is unknowable that the Self-knowledge which the Upaniṣads teach must above all be sought, is really unattainable.

The authors of the Upanishadic Mahavakyas, we are afraid, would turn in their graves if they know that their great sayings about the identity of *Ātman* and Brahman were interpreted to mean only the personality of God; and so would Yajñavalkya and Sankara if they knew that their monism was interpreted to mean only agnosticism.

D. S. SARMA

scathing references to "the occult jargon and... the woolly terminology and grandiloquent thinking of the multitudinous 'osophist' sects who assume a cinch on Satan—if not on God," the author incorporates a very large proportion of the pseudo-theosophical ideas, and even terminology, into his book. He has obviously recognized that the original spiritualistic conception could not explain all the facts. That is so far to the good, but the pseudo-theosophical teachings are themselves perversions of the original truths, and this book merely twists them still a little further into materialism.

Nevertheless the reader will find it an interesting psychological study, *provided* he has sufficient knowledge of the distinction between *nous* and *psyche*, the "individuality" and the "personality," for that knowledge alone will give him a sound basis for judgment.

WINEFRED WHITEMAN

Medicine and Mysticism. By R. O. MOON, M. D., F. R. C. P. (Longmans, Green & Co., Ltd., London. 2s. 6d.)

It is an indication of coming enlightenment in the conservative profession of medicine, that so many of its more successful practitioners are now willing to admit with Dr. Moon, that "No one can shut off the body and the soul in water-tight compartments." So qualified a statement with regard to something that should be obvious need not provoke our scorn, even when it is elaborated by the further submission that "he whose main business is to deal with the weakness and affections of the body must of necessity have his attention drawn at times to the soul and . . . the relation subsisting between the soul and the body." For, hesitating, almost apologetic as this suggestion undoubtedly is, it provides an encouraging sign that in time the realisation of the intimate relations existing between the psyche and the grosser visible organism, may penetrate even into the close corporation of the British Medical Council.

Dr. Moon's little essay, it is under 10,000 words, deals almost exclusively with those older physicians who combined the practice of medicine with mystical or semi-mystical beliefs. The test in this connection relies upon the criterion of unity. "Periods of philosophic dualism," says Dr. Moon, "can never be very favourable to medicine," leading inevitably, as he points out to the making of a "sharp division . . . between the body and soul". But it is probable that none of the historical figures he adduces, with the possible exception of Paracelsus, had a steady conception of matter as a temporary expression of spirit, as being "visible movement," an ephemeral presentation on the spatial, temporal plane of the eternal mind. "Such stuff as dreams are made on." Nor, whatever Dr. Moon's own beliefs may be, can we

conceivably imagine the medical profession in Europe basing their practice on such an assumption. Their training develops inevitably the view of the bodily organism as an intensely complicated machine. They see it thus on the dissecting table, and come to regard it, in the first place, as an arrangement of differentiated cells, adapted to respond to the motive power we call "life" in much the same way as the parts of a locomotive respond to the motive power of electricity. The early practitioners here cited, such as Van Helmont, Galen, or G. E. Stahl,—the last-named came so near the truth as to maintain that "every movement is a non-material and spiritual act"—were saved the initial prejudices inevitably arising from the physiological study of dead bodies, but the dominating age of science regarded all their teachings as the outcome of ignorance and superstition. Science in fact came with a sudden flood of immense energy to teach that no knowledge was valid unless it were founded on, or could be proved by, material experiment, and under that influence the study of medicine tended increasingly to become nothing more than a biochemical theory, with the surgeon as a master mechanic.

But now the age of "Science," as usually defined, is near its end. In medicine, psycho-analysis and other accepted forms of psycho-therapy are based on the belief that functional and even perhaps organic disorders derive from what Paracelsus would have called "the soul". And what scope must be allowed for those cures we speak of as miraculous, if the scientific world is forced to accept the pronouncement of that inspired and highly respected physicist Neils Bohr, who in his recently translated work affirms that if physicists continue to have their theories on spatial, temporal observations they must abandon the principle of mechanical causation.

J. D. BERESFORD.

Transactions of the Bose Research Institute Calcutta. Vol. VIII, Edited by SIR JAGADIS CHUNDER BOSE, (Longmans, Green & Co., Ltd., London. 21s.)

The *Transactions of the Bose Research Institute*, Calcutta, have already won a high opinion in the world of science, and under the ægis of the learned Editor, Sir Jagadis Chunder Bose, have come to be regarded as among the weightier of the many scientific journals. In the present volume, covering the period 1932-1933, the biological and physical researches carried out at the Institute are fully described, while a short introduction by the Editor draws attention to the chief points of importance. Perhaps the principal impression derived from reading the fourteen articles here given is the freshness of outlook that characterizes them. Research tends to run on stereotyped lines, and while progress is admittedly and indeed obviously so made, the history of science shows us very plainly that the great leaps in advance were generally taken by those men who saw old facts in a new light. For this reason, the participation of men of different races in all kinds of scientific research is very much to be desired, and the establishment of research centres in which intellects of varying moulds may be directed upon the innumerable problems of Nature, seems to be a necessity for rapid—and certainly for fundamental—discovery.

As an example of the originality of ideas manifested in this volume, we may select an experiment from Sir J. C. Bose's own paper on *The Possibility of Differential Effects on Certain Fishes by Water Disturbance and by Vegetable Extracts*. The problem that gave rise to the investigation is as follows: "For the supply of edible fishes, the ponds in Bengal are usually stocked with Rohit (*Rohita bengalensis*), Mrigal (*Cirrhina mrigal*), and Katla (*Catla buchannani*), for which there is a great demand. Of these the rate of growth in Katla is considerably quicker, hence it is more profitable to collect them before the others for the market. A

question arises: How are these particular fishes to be preferentially caught in the net?" Sir Jagadis refers to the belief, prevalent among fishermen, that while the fishes in general are frightened away by the throwing of the stones or earth into the pond, the Katla are less affected than the others. The fishermen therefore throw clumps of earth into the water, and then cast a circular net over the centre of disturbance. Now, while the average reader of such a practice would probably regard the alleged habit of the Katla as apocryphal or merely queer, Sir Jagadis sees at once that the matter may be investigated scientifically. He chose a large aquarium containing a considerable number of different varieties of fish, sank in it an electric bell enclosed in a glass trough, and proceeded to observe the effects upon the fish of ringing the bell at intervals. The results were negative, since the fish were apparently neither attracted towards, nor frightened away from, the source of sound; but the mark of the true man of science lay in perceiving that here was a matter that could be subjected to the test of experiment. In point of fact, further experiments give support to the view that, while the actual sound of a heavy body being thrown into water may be unperceived by fish of all kinds, the disturbance of the water so produced has less effect on Katla than on the species with which it is normally associated.

Among the other papers, that of Guru Prasanna Das (on the effect of drugs on the rhythmic tissues of animal and plant) is of importance as showing that certain drugs, very different in source and composition, induce effects that are essentially similar on the pulsatory activity of the heart of the frog and on that of a plant leaflet. Such investigations, though still in their initial state, are clearly of great potential value as likely to throw light on general vital activities. It would, however, be invidious to select one paper for detailed consideration and to omit the others, since all are of the same

high standard and represent real contributions to the advancement of science. We congratulate the Editor and the contributors on their work, and are sure that we speak for all scientific workers when we express the hope

that the Bose Institute may continue to flourish, and that many other similar institutes may be established; for thus India may play her essential part in the interpretation of natural phenomena.

E. J. HOLMYARD

Middleton Murry: A Study in Excellent Normality. BY RAYNER HEPPENSTALL. (Jonathan Cape, London. 5s.)

I have long believed Mr. J. Middleton Murry to be, in the field of essential human (that is, mental and spiritual) development, one of *the* significant figures of our time, at any rate in and for the West. Mr. Heppenstall holds the same belief, but goes beyond faith to works. In this brief volume of succinct summary he seeks—and I think with absolute success—to show Mr. Murry's importance by bringing all his work within a single focus, demonstrating its unity and declaring its nature, and by setting it against a background of contemporary intellectualism. The latter, in a clear, hard, unequivocal but not unfair analysis, is revealed as no better than a tissue of deficiencies, a totally inadequate attempt to rebuild the medieval synthesis of Intelligence and Faith in a world which has "lost the capacity for Faith in that sense," leading in direct consequence to the endeavour to establish Intellect as total dictator. Against this effort Mr. Murry stands in absolute opposition, as a man who in his own deepest experience has "pressed to intolerable conclusiveness the operations of the intellect" and in doing so has perceived "intellect's final impotence," a man who has broken through the limitations of the intellect and found a satisfying knowledge and faith within his total (feeling as well as thinking) being.

If the Faith was born comparatively suddenly, the knowledge was formulated slowly over a period of years and a number of books, self-discovery passing from phase to phase, beginning in simple affirmation of life's ineradicable value, and ending as theory in his book *God* and as practice in a politically active Ethical Communism, both in fact declarations of the organic, dynamic nature of being. Mr. Heppenstall traces this progress with a firm grasp of the essentials of the matter. His book is not the final word on Mr. Murry, but neither does it attempt to be; it appears conceived rather as a tool addressed to the immediate intellectual situation in England to-day. (But not in England only; by implication wherever in the world modern intellectualism spreads its destructive canker.) Some readers may deem its own manner somewhat touched with intellectualism, and they will not be wholly mistaken. Others, less justifiably, may revolt from the bare statement that in Mr. Murry's view "it has to be seen that the human-spiritual is an extension of the purely animal"; yet properly understood, as Mr. Heppenstall himself suggests on the following page, this is not a denial of spirit but rather its wider liberation.

Even those who already know Mr. Murry's work will find clarification in this outline plan. To all others it should serve as excellent introduction. Not to know Mr. Murry's work to-day is to be not merely ignorant but *vitality* ignorant.

GEOFFREY WEST

Nature and Life. By A. N. WHITEHEAD. (Cambridge University Press. 3s. 6d.)

As it is given in his own words this little book is the best introduction to Whitehead's conception of Nature, which, as expounded in his previous works, has baffled and discouraged many students of philosophy who have tried to understand it. It aims at showing that Nature and Life, detached from each other, are vicious abstractions, and that Nature is not opposed to human values.

The book comprises two lectures delivered at the University of Chicago in October 1933. The first is a criticism of the static conception of Nature, which views it as an aggregate of bits of matter existing in empty space. Ordinary crude sense takes the world as sense-perception presents it to be true. The result is the Hume-Newtonian situation in which Nature, conceived as dead, could furnish no reasons. For "all ultimate reasons are in terms of aim at value. A dead Nature aims at nothing" (p. 24). The situation is a *reductio ad absurdum*, and "should not be accepted as the basis for philosophic speculation" (p. 25). "For the modern view, process, activity, change, are matters of fact" (p. 48).

Yet, Nature conceived as mere activity is also an abstraction. For the question arises: "Activity for what, producing what, activity involving what?" (p. 49). And the answer leads to the second lecture, which shows that the content of this activity is supplied by life and mind. "The characteristics of life are absolute self-enjoyment, creative activity, and aim" (p. 62). The activity of Nature is activity for self-enjoyment, it is creative activity, it is activity involving aim. Yet life is not mind, but lies below its level. The latter, that is, "conceptual experience" is the "entertainment of possibilities for the ideal realisation in abstraction from any sheer physical realization" (p. 92). There is no

sharp division between Nature and mind; mind is part of Nature, and is operative in its further advance (p. 71).

This view of Nature as living is not new to philosophy, though it is a very recent achievement of scientific thought. One may well compare it to the philosophy of Nature of Schelling, and its subsequent developments. And it is a welcome sign for humanism that science, which once was so opposed to it, has begun to be humanistic. And in a way Prof. Whitehead's philosophy should prove to be more satisfactory than even Hegel's, in that the former recognises the importance of emotion or feeling in grasping individuality and value. Prof. Whitehead admits even in the earliest of his chief philosophical works, *Science and the Modern World*, (p. 211), that it is impossible to complete the description of an actual occasion by means of concepts. Here one with an Eastern outlook would ask: Does not this admission conflict with Whitehead's idea of "prehension"? Does not the conception of a whole as a "concretion of elements" amount to explaining the higher in terms of the lower? What is the relation between the intuitive or emotional grasp of the individuality of the whole and the understanding of it as a "concretion" or "prehension"? If we explain the higher in terms of the lower, we certainly lose the individuality of the higher. Yet this defect is not peculiar to Prof. Whitehead's philosophy, but lies in the very idea that philosophy is an attempt at systematisation of experience, and that its sole aim is to furnish a synoptic view of the Universe. It is inherent in the very intellectualism of the West.

In spite of this difference of outlook, the book can be strongly recommended to every thoughtful man even of the East whose faith in human values has been badly shaken by the impact of Western intellectualism. A careful reading of it will create a doubt of his very doubt on them.

Adam's Ancestors. By L.S.B. LEAKEY, M. A., Ph. D., (Methuen and Co., Ltd. London. 7s. 6d.)

Dr. L. S. B. Leakey's name will be well known to all readers of THE ARYAN PATH as the discoverer of those human remains in East Africa which have established beyond cavil or dispute the fact that men of our own type existed vastly further back in time than orthodox anthropologists have hitherto allowed. Less than four years ago the prevailing opinion was voiced by Sir Arthur Keith when he stated his conviction that modern man (*Homo Sapiens*) was a comparatively recent evolutionary product, whose earliest activities, in Europe at least, belonged to the Aurignacian period of the late Pleistocene. Sir Arthur attributed all the earlier stone-age cultures to the Neanderthal and other even more primitive types of humanity, while he set aside such discoveries as that of the Galley-Hill skeleton, which seemed to prove the great antiquity of *Homo Sapiens*, as being unproven and intrinsically improbable.

But Dr. Leakey's finds have altered the whole situation. The Kanjera skulls and the Kanam jaw afford incontrovertible proof that our race is at least as old as the oldest of those chinless, heavy-browed races—Neanderthal, Pekin, Rhodesian—which have long since disappeared from the world.

In *Adam's Ancestors*, Dr. Leakey describes in a very clear and interesting manner the present state of our knowledge of ancient man and his works. His chapters on flint industries are peculiarly informative, and those who have carelessly thought of flint implements as being the crude products of rough and unskilled "savages" will be surprised to learn from the true explanations given by Dr. Leakey that considerable skill is required to make even the ruder types, while the manufacture of the more elaborate calls for the most delicate workmanship and for a refined technique, the re-discovery of which long evaded the efforts of archæologists.

The minute study of flint implements has led to the classification of stone-age cultures into a large number of groups and sub-groups. In some cases perhaps this classification may have gone rather in advance of the facts at our disposal, but its broad outlines appear to be definitely established. Of the cultures of the lower Pleistocene our knowledge is immeasurably greater than was the case even ten years ago; and the painstaking researches of Mr. Reid Moir and others in East Anglia have shown that, even before the first (Günz) glaciation, there were at least three well-defined cultural groups among the Englishmen of a million years ago.

At least equal in interest is the section which Dr. Leakey devotes to the skeletal remains of ancient man. He expounds with great clarity the points which distinguish *Homo Sapiens*, or *Neanthropus*, from those other human races, which are collectively known as *Palæoanthropus*. These two great groups Dr. Leakey, with other anthropologists, regards as distinct genera; one of which—*Palæoanthropus*—comprises a number of different species, *e. g.*, Neanderthal, Pekin, Rhodesian. The allocation of these human groups to distinct species seems to signify that they could not interbreed and produce fertile offspring, and is an hypothesis which is naturally incapable of verification since there are no living representatives of them for us to observe. A non-scientific reader might reflect that, if some of the existing races, such as the Mongolian, Negro, and Nordic, were known only from dead specimens, they too, on the ground of their very remarkable physical differences, might be classified as distinct species, whereas we know that they are to be distinguished only as races within a single species. May this not have been the case with ancient groups as it is with modern? Is it not at least permissible to regard humanity, like "*La République*," as One and Indivisible?

R. A. V. M.

REVIVAL OF BUDDHISM IN JAPAN

[**Kanesada Hanazono, M. A.**, is a Professor at Waseda University, Tokyo, and also an editorial writer for the *Tokyo Nichi-Nichi*, of which he was the correspondent at the Washington Conference in 1922. In 1923 he visited India and strengthened his sympathy for the Indian people. He is a Buddhist by birth and upbringing. He is well known in Japan as the translator of Tagore's works. His contributions on the history of Japanese journalism are highly spoken of.—EDS.]

After half a century of sleep, Japanese Buddhism is now experiencing a re-awakening. This is remarkable in the history of Buddhism in Japan. The initial stimulus which led to it was merely the success of broadcasts on Buddhism this summer. Popular lectures on Buddhism were the summer feature of radio this year, as were physical exercises by radio last summer. The people who earnestly yearn for a spiritual message to ease their worldly sufferings seized on these radio talks. Some publishers on the alert for profit did not let this opportunity slip but published many books of these wireless lectures. Such is the summarized history of the revival of Buddhism in Japan.

Within only three months, at least twenty highly successful books on Buddhism have been published in Japan. Even volumes out of print for many years have been re-issued. Several Grand Old Men are now enjoying a second youth as authors, lecturers or preachers. Meetings are being held for the propagation of Buddhism in different cities. Even newspapers which so far had been "heathen" have now come forward to show their sympathy for this old Japanese faith.

The tendency towards a Buddhist revival, though started by a mere chance, has a great significance. First, the utilization of Buddhism as a defence against the further spread of Marxism. In this sense, Buddhism is the right religion since it is comprehensive as the universe. It may serve to divert men's minds from materialistic views, not by a direct method but by its peculiar characteristic of realignment of values. Buddhism has superb doctrines which may be interpreted as containing Marxian ideas or as opposing them. Therefore, Marxists must come to a halt before Buddhist ideology. Scholars who have frequently failed in opposing Marxism with their own ideas have now given place to Buddhism as guardian of the existing status. This is probably one of the reasons why this revival is being supported by the ruling classes. Some new books on Buddhism contain prefaces by the Ex-Premier who is understood to be rather sympathetic to Christianity.

For the last half a century, Buddhism in Japan has been in some sense an object of popular contempt. Buddhists have in most cases been looked down upon by the man in the street. This is the reverse of

the esteem in which they were held by society in the Tokugawa days. After the revolution in 1868, a strong anti-Buddhist movement started, and some big temples even became Shinto shrines, though but temporarily. Buddhist priests at that time had to learn the doctrines of Shintoism and to qualify as Shinto preachers. The reason why Buddhism came to be slighted was the favour shown to the religion by the Tokugawa family, the governing line before the Imperial Restoration in 1868. All the histories of Japan published for many years after the restoration had no sympathy for Buddhism.

Nobody can deny that Japanese Buddhism was the guiding principle of the civilization of old Japan. There were many great Buddhist monks who opened the roads, cut the mountains, built bridges, established hospitals, wrote priceless books of literature, were advisers to the Government, did much in charity, went to China across the high seas for learning, even fought with arms for the religion. But the new Government was merciless against Buddhism; it adopted the policy of letting Buddhist temples go to ruin, but without success. The revival of Buddhism is a thing which could not have been expected in those days when the influence of revolutionists was so strong.

It must be mentioned that seeds

of materialism were sown by the builders of the new civilization after the Imperial Restoration. Much stress was laid upon the study of science. All the religions, especially Buddhism, were ignored. As the result, many young men became splendid scientists! Japan soon became independent in engineering. There lies the origin of industrialization of Japan. The people had entirely forgotten the religious interest, so that they have now come to receive Buddhism as if they had never known it before. All the lectures on Buddhism are new to most of them. Although Buddhism is a family cult to most Japanese, it has been giving no real inspiration to them.

The perusal of the history of Japan teaches us that in every sixty or seventy years the country experiences a change. The ruling classes are doing their best to avoid any change by force. The people who have lost trust in them now have nowhere to turn for salvation but to the Buddhistic faith which they have long forgotten.

This movement is now supported by the rulers of Japan deliberately. Everything which is occurring in Japan must be studied with the consciousness of a coming crisis in 1935, and there can be no reason why it should be otherwise with the revival of Buddhism in Japan in 1934.

KANESADA HANAZONO.

CORRESPONDENCE

REINCARNATION

L. A. G. Strong's "Note Upon Reincarnation" in *THE ARYAN PATH* for August, 1934, raises an interesting philosophical question as to the validity of certain Theosophical concepts. Time, he points out, is not a part of reality but merely one of the forms or media through which reality makes itself known to us. Such being the case, how—he asks—can the theory of reincarnation, which incorporates time as one of its essential elements, have any claim on ultimate truth.

It is true, of course, that space and time are merely—to use Mr. Strong's terms—the conditions under which we apprehend reality. They are not the true forms of things in themselves but merely our interpretation of them. They are the forms of our particular state of consciousness, and other states of consciousness would see things in some other framework than that of space and time.

Once this is realized there is the tendency, which Mr. Strong has evinced, to feel that any time (or space) phenomena can have no significance beyond our state of consciousness. The thing he overlooks, however, is that space and time as forms of our knowledge apply to everything that we can become cognizant of. The most fundamental of absolute truths can appear to our minds only when clothed in time and space.

The theory of reincarnation, therefore, since it is to be apprehended by our intellects must conform to time and space, but this does not mean that the thing which we know under the concept of reincarnation involves time and space in its real essence. We can never know the thing in itself in our present state of consciousness; what we can know is only its translation into terms of time and space. All our concepts of after-death states are but interpretations of various phases of

the absolute in language that can be understood by our consciousness.

To know what the thing we call reincarnation really is, one has to lead the life taught by Theosophy. By doing so he will ultimately attain to a different state of consciousness, one in which he will be able to discern things without the limitations of time and space. Until such a time, however, space and time will remain as the correct terms of our interpretation—the language in which we can most nearly comprehend reality.

New York

PHILIP CHAPIN JONES.

YOGA AND WESTERN PSYCHOLOGY.

In *THE ARYAN PATH* of September (p. 595) there appeared a review of Miss Geraldine Coster's *Yoga and Western Psychology* signed "J. P. W." I must say that in a journal which stands for that which is most noble in East and West it caused me considerable surprise, seeing that it was such a brief and unthinking dismissal of a valuable attempt to find a ground for common agreement between the discoveries of certain Western psychologists and the *Yoga Sutras* of Patanjali.

Your reviewer says that Miss Coster has had the presumption to compare what she miscalls "Yoga" with "Western" Psychology, as understood by her. By "Western Psychology," however, she means only the system of psycho-analysis or what she calls "Analytical therapy" associated with the name of Freud, of whom she appears to be an enthusiastic admirer.

But unless I misread the book, I am certain that it is altogether unfair to say that Miss Coster's conception of Western Psychology is *only* the system of psycho-analysis associated with the name of Freud, for she has by no means confined herself to this one school. On the contrary, Miss Coster's idea of Western Psychology is an altogether admirable synthesis of the viewpoints, not only of Freud, but of Jung, Adler and Groddeck.

As to the allegation that Miss Coster has misunderstood the teachings of Yoga, it is surely absurd to make a statement of this kind without even attempting to show how they have been misunderstood. Indeed, I can find absolutely no disagreement between her interpretation of Yoga and the philosophy set forward in the *Bhagavad-Gita* and in many of Mr. Judge's writings. Her explanation of the Yoga attitude to life shows a keen appreciation of Patanjali's teachings. I will quote one passage from her book in support of this statement.

The true adventurer in the world of spirit, the man who has the courage to insist that there is something behind the painted drop-scene, has to learn the invalidity of every form of exterior support, to achieve security by finding a centre of gravity within himself. When this is found he may work for whatever cause he chooses, but he still continues to travel in a forward direction, because he is free in spirit and not obsessed by any one idea.

London

ALAN W. WATTS.

REJOINDER BY THE REVIEWER

Mr. Watts's letter has not altered my views, and I give below a couple of reasons why Miss Coster's book does not commend itself to careful students of Yoga and Occultism.

On pages 77-78 Miss Coster says that the Yoga Sutras of Patanjali do not "inculcate any form of morality as such"; she speaks of "this non-moral attitude of Yoga" as being "wholly consonant with sound psychological practice in the West," and she thinks it erroneous to hold that Yoga "must of necessity involve a standard of morality". This shows a fundamental lack of knowledge of Patanjali.

If Miss Coster had studied the writings of the greatest western *Yogini*

of modern times, she would have written differently not only about Yoga but also about such movements as Christian Science, New Thought etc., and about "analytical therapy"—the name given by her to the aberration of certain Western "psychologists". In a message to the American Theosophists in 1890, Madame Blavatsky pointed out that there was nothing spiritual or divine about the various healing cults, that the cures effected were due simply to the unconscious exercise of occult powers on the *lower* planes of nature, and that the conflicting theories of all these were based on misunderstood and misapplied metaphysics.

Again in her invaluable essay *Occultism versus the Occult Arts* (see *Raja-Yoga or Occultism*) H. P. B. compares "the diploma-ed 'Hypnotizers' of the Faculties of Medicine" with the Voodoos and the Dugpas—"the only difference between the two classes being that the Voodoos and Dugpas are *conscious*, and the Charcot-Richet crew *unconscious*, Sorcerers." H. P. B. has elaborated these teachings in her writings. Miss Coster, on the other hand, writes appreciatively of Charcot, and more so of Freud who, she points out, followed up and developed the theories of Charcot. Miss Coster has thus put herself out of court with students of true Yoga and true Occultism.

Other points may be mentioned in criticism of Miss Coster's book, but perhaps enough has been said above to show that the review in the September ARYAN PATH was not without justification.

Bombay

J. P. W.

A. R. ORAGE.

We greatly regret to learn of the death of Mr. A. R. Orage, one of our most esteemed contributors, ever very friendly to THE ARYAN PATH and its ideals.—EDS.

ENDS AND SAYINGS

*" . . . ends of verse
And sayings of philosophers."*

HUDIBRAS.

The spirit of tyranny is manifesting itself more and more even among liberty-loving people. In France, as in the U.S.A., the principles of democracy are being disregarded and a regime of autocracy is stealthily coming to the front. In Great Britain the Incitement to Disaffection Bill has made the task of the printers and publishers most difficult. Some important publishers have written to the Press drawing attention to this. They write:—

Publishers are not concerned with politics as such, but they are very much concerned with free expression of opinion, and many of us have felt apprehension . . . During the past week the proofs of a children's annual have been returned to the publisher with a letter from the printer saying that certain marked passages could not safely be printed in view of the fact that the Incitement to Disaffection Bill would already be law by the time the annual appeared. The passages in question undoubtedly contain anti-war propaganda, which it is not for us either to defend or to criticise; but it is clear that the annual itself is written for children and equally clear that it is not addressed to or intended for circulation among members of his Majesty's forces. Yet we feel sure that, in view of the vague wording of the bill, this incident will not be an isolated one and that the result of the bill, as it stands to-day, will be to impose a severe burden on both printers and publishers.

Mr. H. G. Wells, speaking at the Jubilee Dinner of the Society

of Authors, referred to "a veiled threat of ransacking our books and invading our homes".

At the present time the spirit of encroachment is alive and aggressive. This country may remain immune from the attempt to stifle the distribution of writings. Fundamental changes in the material conditions of human life are going on. If these changes are not to overwhelm us in disaster it is imperative that there should be freedom of criticism.

Next we have a protest issued under the signatures of eighty-five scientific workers and teachers in the University of Cambridge:—

We wish to record a protest against the censorship imposed by the B. B. C. on Professor J. B. S. Haldane's talk in the series "The Causes of War." We consider the B. B. C.'s explanation that they expected him to treat the subject from "the scientific point of view" to be inadequate. Further, we believe that the public should have the right to hear the broadcast opinion of such an eminent man on so vital an issue whether the treatment of the subject conform with the preconceived ideas of the B. B. C., or no.

But while eminent men of science are barred from expressing their frank views, Sir Thomas Inskip, the Attorney General, speaking at a dinner of the Young Britons Movement, attacked what he called the "anti-religious effort which cannot be left to work out its own ends". He blamed the "deliberate attempt" by means of "Communist propaganda to draw

the children away from religion," and called upon his country to deal with it or face disaster. We are no sponsors for the religion of the Communist, which makes him persecute the religion of others; but the record of the Churches during the war, and their numerous moves in these days are ominous. Are the opinions of the Churches sacrosanct or are they sufficiently subservient to conservatism and the *status quo*? Whatever be the reasons, we are confronted with the problem: Does the suppression of opinion viewed unfavourably by authority really effect its purpose, or only tend to drive it underground, to emerge later in a more deadly form? The press and publishers may be restricted by law as to what they say; scientists of the calibre of Mr. J. B. S. Haldane may not be allowed to broadcast—but what will it all effect? The only way to check undesirable propaganda is to put forward desirable propaganda. But what, in the opinion of those in authority, is desirable propaganda? Are we to understand that a vigorous anti-war campaign is not wished for? Then why permit the Churches a free voice? Can it be that those in authority do not regard the pronouncements of the Churches of as great weight as the opinions of the Press? Or can it be they think the organised religious bodies will be amenable to diplomatic compromise?

The Appeal of Aleister Crowley against the judgment of Mr. Justice Swift was dismissed by

three Lords Justices. During its hearing once again the difference between Black and White Magic was spoken of. Lord Justice Greer is thus reported :—

So far as I am concerned, I had never heard of the distinction between black magic and white magic until it was explained by the evidence as a technical distinction which is known to those who study magic and study the arts of people who either are or pretend to be magicians, black or white.

This is one more example of ignorance in high places of subjects vital to human welfare and progress. Magic as a Science is the knowledge of the constitution of Nature and of Man and their intimate relationship, and of the way by which the omnipotence of the human Spirit and its control over nature's forces may be acquired by the individual while still in the body. Magic, as an art, is the application of this knowledge in practice. Arcane knowledge misapplied, is sorcery; beneficently used, true magic or wisdom. The corner-stone of magic is an intimate practical knowledge of magnetism and electricity, their qualities, correlations, and potencies. Especially necessary is a familiarity with their effect in and upon the animal kingdom and man. To sum up: magic is spiritual wisdom; nature, the material ally, pupil and servant of the magician. One common vital principle pervades all things, and this is controllable by the perfected human will. The motive colours the quality of the magic and makes it White or Black.



Point out the "Way"—however dimly,
and lost among the host—as does the evening
star to those who tread their path in darkness.
—*The Voice of the Silence.*

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DIVINE DISCIPLINE

Theories of modern psychology, and especially those propounded by psycho-analysts, on the subject of repression, are diametrically opposed to those we find taught in such books of life-discipline as the *Bhagavad-Gita* or the Buddha's *Dhammapada*. Far Eastern Lao Tzu and Confucius and Western adepts like Jesus and St. Paul, dealt with the subject of sense-control and self-discipline in a manner contrary to that which has been brought into vogue by Freud and others. To-day, suppression of evil tendencies, repression of vice, restraint of sense instinct, arrest of sex impulses, are not generally regarded as sound and healthy for they are supposed to do violence to the human system. In the name of science the animal in man is allowed full sway, and therefore man cannot befriend the angel in him. The howling of the wild beast without drowns the still small voice of the angel within,

and in most cases "the songster mute and torpid sits, and of exhaustion dies". Large masses of people neglect to heed their own consciences, and find ways and means to indulge in animalism as natural to man.

Unless a reaction sets in, our civilization is bound to grow more and more corrupt until finally it becomes extinct. But signs are not wanting that such a reaction will set in. Thoughtful people everywhere are beginning to recognize the dangers of overpowering desires, and are advocating the necessity of discipline. The following article by our esteemed contributor, Professor A. R. Wadia of Mysore, makes out an excellent case in favour of discipline. A difficulty arises, however, by reason of the fact that people too often mistake asceticism for discipline. One important constituent of real discipline is avoidance of extremes—the neglect

of the body for the sake of the soul, or vice versa. Strange as it may seem, asceticism is twin to licence, and a man is apt to go from the one to the other. The Indian faquir who tortures his body for the good of his soul suffers from the same disease as the Occidental who indulges the senses believing that there is no soul, or that his consciousness is the product of his brains and blood and evaporates on the death of the body. Both classes suffer from a lack of correct knowledge concerning the make-up of man.

The constitution of man is very clearly explained in Asiatic psychology:—Mind is not only not the product of the brain, but is itself to be distinguished from the Thinker, the Soul, whose tool it is in reality. Thus self-consciousness is regarded as an entity which uses the mind. Similarly, the teaching about the human body and brain is different from that offered by modern physiology and biology. According to ancient Eastern science the body with its senses and organs rests on the foundations of a subtle form called in Sanskrit *Linga Sharira* (which means Design Body), and is so named because it provides the foundation-plan and the model on which the gross body is built. Its existence was recognized by many schools even in the Western world, as its names Doppelgänger, Perisprit, the Double, etc., signify. More generally it is known as the *Lower Body*—but that term has been loosely used in recent years causing confusion to many, among

whom is the novelist, Mr. William Gerhardt, who narrated his experience in the *Sunday Express* (London) a few weeks ago. He need not have been “nauseated” by the term “Astral,” because it does not imply the power to leave this earth and visit distant stars. The substance of which this *Linga Sharira* is composed has a starry luminosity of its own, hence the name “Astral”. Another name given to the *Linga Sharira* is that of the Personal Man, or Personality, since it forms the mask of the self-conscious thinker and of its tool, the mind. It becomes the playground of a double set of forces: (a) impressions received from the Universe *via* the senses and the brain, and (b) impressions received from within, from the self-conscious soul through its vehicle, the mind. Between this pair of duads exists the assemblage of desires, good and bad, which play the part of the angel or the devil in man.

An understanding of these constituents removes confusion and prevents a man from falling into the error either of tortuous asceticism or of sensuous indulgence. Putting the sure finger of knowledge on what is to be disciplined and on who is the disciplinarian, the student of Asiatic psychology seeks the method of discipline and finds important clues; here is such a clue offered by the *Gita*:—

For those enjoyments which arise through the contact of the senses with external objects are wombs of pain, since they have a beginning and an end; O son of Kunti, the wise man delighteth not in these. (V. 22)

Neither the senses nor the objects of sense hinder the attainment of happiness, but their contact—excessive or meagre, defective or disproportioned—does. Discipline does not consist in the torture of the fleshly senses nor in the hatred of worldly objects, but in the treatment of those longings which unite in wedlock incompatible entities, thus producing confusion and pain, leading to divorce. The ascetic blames the senses and starves them, the libertine indulges them; the former looks upon the worldly life as *maya*, the latter thinks it to be the only reality—and both go to excess. The verse from the *Gita* quoted above offers a clue to what is to be disciplined and, read in conjunction with the following verses, the student not only learns

the method of discipline but also learns who the Disciplinarian is.

This divine discipline, Arjuna, is not to be attained by the man who eateth more than enough or too little, nor by him who hath a habit of sleeping much, nor by him who is given to overwatching. The meditation which destroyeth pain is produced in him who is moderate in eating and in recreation, of moderate exertion in his actions, and regulated in sleeping and waking. When the man, so living, centres his heart in the true Self and is exempt from attachment to all desires, he is said to have attained to Yoga. (VI. 16-18)

The tranquillity of an enlightened heart, the peace of a controlled mind, the rhythmic activities of purified senses, are produced in man when he exercises himself according to these instructions, and only then is real happiness experienced.

HAPPINESS—DESIRE vs. DISCIPLINE

[A. R. Wadia, Professor of Philosophy of the Mysore University, is already known to our readers. In this article he deals in a practical manner with the false cult of Hedonism which is flourishing everywhere to-day.—EDS.]

There is a beautiful story of Buddha, in which it is told how a disconsolate mother implored him to bring back to life her dead child. Buddha in his graciousness offered to accede to her request provided she could bring him a mustard seed from a house where no loved one had ever died. It was not long before the mother realised the impossibility of her search, but she also learned something of far greater importance—the moral of the Enlightened One's unspoken parable. She realised,

as every other mortal has realised, that life is not a bed of roses. He who would search for unalloyed happiness is doomed to failure. We all know this, but there seems to be something in us which goads us on to hunt for pleasure. That is why Hedonism presents the paradox of being 'always killed yet ever living. Periods of great religious exaltation find people turning away from the delights of the senses, but a generation or two later finds the pendulum swinging to the other extreme. The eternal

conflict between the spirit of Puritanism and the spirit of Hedonism certainly brings out the fact that the desire for pleasure is an ingrained trait in human nature and it cannot be eradicated at the sweet will of the religious fanatic. Man has a right to pursue happiness. But what is happiness?

The naïve man seeks to be happy in the pursuit of his bodily desires just as naturally as children find it impossible to resist following all their wayward impulses. But man, as he grows, soon begins to realise that the unrestrained satisfaction of desires brings him into conflict with the rival wills of his neighbours; the great social lesson of give-and-take forcibly impresses itself upon him; and he comes to learn that happiness implies a curbing of his desires as much as their satisfaction. The primitive man with his untamed instinct chafes under restrictions, but for that very reason social taboos and the rigidity of customs are made all the stronger, for only through discipline can even a primitive community hope to survive in the struggle for existence against hostile tribes or the brute force of beasts. The primitive man is unable to differentiate between the wheat and the chaff, between what all individuals must be coerced to do and what may be left to the initiative of the individual. That is why primitive life has no distinguishable frontiers of custom, law, morality or religion. All are inextricably mixed up and the individual becomes a machine.

With civilization born free-

dom. Morality comes to be distinguished from, though not necessarily separated from, religion. Law comes to have a sphere of its own, relaxing its hold on morality and religion, while what is merely customary is assigned a place of its own. Thus there is considerable room left for the native genius of an individual to assert itself in science and philosophy, art and religion. None of these could have had their long historic career without the breath of freedom. Freedom is often conceived to be in perpetual opposition to coercion as exercised by the powers that be, and that is why it has become usual with some to talk as if the essence of freedom were to be found in freedom from restraint. But this is only half a truth and like all half-truths it is dangerously misleading. Freedom in this sense comes very soon into conflict with the wills of others, and the thwarted individual begins to feel that he would be happy, if his will could have free play. But this is only a dream, for a man left to himself would soon sink to the level of the lonely beast. The humanity in him can flower only within the fostering bosom of a society, which by its very nature implies a restraint on the individual will. Herein lies the value of discipline. Herein lies the value of the paradox that a man can be his best only by expanding his ego so as to identify itself with the will of his society. Social will is impersonal, in that it is embodied in the old traditions and culture built up by previous generations, and

yet it is personal also, as it lives in the will of its individual members. It is living to the degree to which successive generations live up to its spirit, changing indeed as the needs of changing conditions demand and yet building the new on the old.

It is the iron law of history that only a society which is compact by reason of the loyal allegiance of its members can hold its own in its struggle to live; the society in which the social bond is loose and individualism rampant, is apt to go under. *Prima facie*, this is an argument for conservatism and every society must to a certain extent be conservative, for no man can begin the process of civilization: every man must imbibe all that the past has built up, ready to be used by whosoever has the will and the ability to use it. But mere conservatism has also got its dangers. In its extreme form it leads to a deification of the past. A living society, however, cannot afford to live only in the past. It has to face new situations and it must evolve new thoughts in order to understand new forces, and forge new instruments to succeed in its struggles. A society that fails to adapt itself to new situations is apt to go under.

A good deal of psychology and ethics in the past was vitiated by the fact that a man was looked upon as an entity in himself, whereas the real entity has all along been a society, big or small, of which an individual is merely a fraction. A child is born helpless, he is incomplete but finds comple-

tion to some extent in his parents. As he grows he finds more completion in his school and teachers, in his play-fellows and in the volumes that look down from the library shelves, eager to be read and digested, as selfless as the torch which can pass on its light to endless other torches. As he grows still more, vague yearnings fill him, his heart flutters at the approach of some being, he hungers to touch her and be touched by her, till in course of time they become one. He still grows in her and in course of time there emerges a concrete embodiment of the unity of his spouse and himself. Life becomes serious and makes demands on him for the satisfaction of the crying needs of three or more in one family unit. He has to confront lie and earn his bread, meet disappointments, face injustice, overcome calumny and hammer out life in some shape or other until he can work no more and can but look to the children of his loins to relieve him of his burdens. And finally there comes Yama and—the cycle begins again.

Look back on the whole life of a man. At what stage was he ever independent, independent in the sense that he could do what he liked, ride roughshod over all impediments, brush aside all with a ruthless hand? Not the mightiest man through the ages can claim to have been really independent. Alexander and Cæsar, Timur and Babar would have been helpless without their loyal cohorts. Kings cannot do without the loyalty of their subjects, and democracies

flourish only so long as there is discipline. Man as he grows becomes smaller in himself. Only a child can afford to be self-centred and day-dreaming. Wider interests crowd round him till he feels in himself his own nothingness. He may die an obscure man or admiring crowds may follow his bier, but the worth of his life can be measured only in terms of the question: has he left the world better than he found it in so far as it lay with him to make it better or worse?

Where is happiness? What niche does it occupy in the scheme of life? Carlyle with an almost savage intensity declaimed against the cult of happiness. What right has a man to be happy, he asked, and biology seems to echo his query. Let man live and achieve, and happiness will take care of itself, seems to be its advice. But man does not care to listen. Perhaps he is not so framed as to listen. That is why our contemporary world is lost in its feverish search for happiness. The votary of pleasure assures us it can be found in cocktail parties, in midnight dances, in laughing matrimony out of existence as a creed outworn. America claims to be morally advanced because it can show one divorce for every five marriages, and presumably the acme of perfection will be reached when there are as many divorces as there are marriages. Communistic Russia looks upon marriage as a mere matter of legal formality, which may or may not be gone through as the parties wish. It takes not the slightest

difference. Mr. Maurice Hindus has recorded the case of a Russian daughter describing her father as "a big muzhik with his red goatish beard and his beastly walk". A daughter of conservative India has written in bold print :—

Mensuck the blood of women as capitalists suck the blood of workers. In other words men ruin women by binding them with the chains of marriage. All these brothels are the result of the marriage shackles. If the marriage system is abolished and every man and woman is given freedom, no brothel can exist in the world.

And why this outcry against marriage? Because marriage in these modern days has been dissected by certain intellectual thinkers till nothing of its reality has remained, and ardent young girls and boys find the goal of happiness in a merry carnival of wine and dance. "Ah, take the cash and let the credit go," they seem to be repeating with old Omar. With Omar Khayyam it was a mood, born of shattered hopes and unsolved riddles of life and it just ended in a cry of despair: "Ah, take the cash and let the credit go." With our modern philosophers of happiness a mood has given place to a system nourished within the womb of freedom. But they too may yet have to learn that happiness cannot be so cheaply bought. Free love too has its aches and its disappointments. It too has claimed its toll in broken hopes and found its grave in the oblivion of suicide.

Can there be happiness without restraint? Which page of human history shows that man ever attained to it by doing as he liked?

Whatever freedom modern Russia may give in the realm of marriage, there is no country which is more disciplined so far as the basic principles of the Soviet cult are concerned. No Bolshevik dare indulge in luxuries or in mere gaieties. He cannot drink as much as he likes nor can he gamble, though there is precious little with which he can gamble. If his parents are bourgeois, he has to disown them and even change his name. Verily, this is the apotheosis of freedom, and right or wrong it is only because of this iron discipline that the Soviet Government has managed to hold its own with a ring of capitalistic countries circling it round. How long is this freedom in marriage and divorce to continue? Perhaps it is just a temporary swing of the pendulum, a reaction against the old rigour. In any case it is a bold attempt to grapple with the problem of brothels; but no solution can be real or lasting if they can be abolished only at the cost of converting each home into a brothel,

—and that is what free love implies. A generation surfeited with the excess of love may yet come to learn the elementary lesson of all history, that unadulterated happiness is not meant for man, and that he can hope to achieve some of it only through restraint. The first lesson of all morality, whether in the East or West, is the control of our impulses, *i. e.*, temperance. There can be no success in life except in so far as we subserve social ends, and success comes to those alone who have a disciplined will; and only to this limited extent can we mortals hope to be happy. It is a reward which will not come our way, if we make it the end-all and the be-all of our life. It may fall unsought into our lap through our consciousness that we have done our bit by holding steadfast to what we honestly believe to be right, and doing it in order to lighten the burden of injustice and oppression, to cheer the struggling, and to stand by the righteous.

A. R. WADIA

Do not believe that lust can ever be killed out if gratified or satiated, for this is an abomination inspired by Mara. It is by feeding vice that it expands and waxes strong, like to the worm that fattens on the blossom's heart.

—THE VOICE OF THE SILENCE.

THE CAUSE OF PEACE

MODERN FAILURE : ANCIENT ACHIEVEMENT

[Below we print two articles, the first of which examines the moral causes of the last great war and may well cause a future one. **John Bakeless** is a well-known American journalist who wrote in 1921 *The Economic Causes of Modern War* and in 1926 *The Origin of the Next War* ; in this article he traces the root cause of wars to human passions and recommends the application of old religious formulas to the solution of the most pressing problem of this era. The second article by **Professor Radhakumud Mookerji** demonstrates how lasting peace was established by the great Buddhist Emperor Asoka. Modern statesmen and administrators are puny men compared to this Ruler who succeeded in India, 300 years before the Christian era ; but these men lack the courage and vision, even to copy the example of one whom H. G. Wells called the world's greatest king.—Eds.]

I.—THE MORAL CAUSES OF WAR

To understand the problem which modern war presents, it is necessary to go behind historical superficialities and discern fundamental causes. All the wars of the latter nineteenth and early twentieth centuries have resulted from economic forces. If we analyse the wars of the world from 1878 to 1918, we can trace them all to a series of causes intimately bound up with the industrial revolution. Population expands. Nations seek outlets for their surplus people ; or else they seek raw materials and markets to support the crowded population at home ; or they do both at once. Then they become nervous over the sea-lanes which link colonies and markets to the homeland and which have become vital to the national existence.

Nations proceed to build up their armaments, in quite good faith, for defence alone. But since defensive arms may also be used in attack, other nations take alarm. Armament races follow. A general atmosphere of hatred and suspicion

develops. Statesmen try to supplement the strength of their nations by establishing alliance. Their rivals, in further alarm, form counter-alliances. Each side watches the other with increased distrust, while the armaments makers, who profit from such a situation, help to make it worse. When the spark comes, in the form of some sensational incident which offends national pride, there is plenty of powder lying about.

A somewhat less dangerous cause of discord in the modern world is the existence of national minorities within alien states—Macedonian and Croatian minorities in Yugoslavia ; Hungarian in Roumania ; Italian in the French colony of Tunis ; German in Czechoslovakia. The grievances of these minorities, some of which are cruelly abused by the governments which control them, are hardly to be regarded as fundamental war-causes, but they are fruitful sources of the kind of incidents which precipitate hostili-

ties after the more fundamental economic causes have produced acute international friction. In every case, people of the same blood in the adjacent homeland are stirred by the plight of their brethren on foreign soil and seek to alter the frontiers to bring them inside.

Even if these plans succeed, however, the situation is no better, for then a new national minority has been created. If the Germans in Czechoslovakia were reunited with Germany or Austria, there would then be a Czech minority in Germany. If the Hungarians in Roumania were brought back into Hungary, they would bring their Roumanian neighbours with them, to form a new and equally dissatisfied national minority.

Irredentism is thus a perpetual cause of international friction; but it would probably lead to nothing worse than small wars waged in a limited area, were the evil effects of such friction not extended by the alliances which are due to the economic causes just outlined. If these causes could be controlled, war would not be eliminated, but its destructiveness would be limited; it would not involve the entire world; and the gravest danger of the next world war—economic exhaustion so complete as to destroy civilization by destroying its material basis—would be ended once for all.

The chain of economic forces, then, lies behind the war peril, and if we eliminate that we eliminate the really serious aspect of the whole problem. This ought to be

easy enough, for the effort to end economic difficulties by war is at best not very intelligent. It frequently leads to economic disaster far worse than the situation it was intended to remedy. The aftermath of the World War is sufficient proof of that.

Since the economic dangers in warfare are quite as apparent as the possible economic gains, it seems strange that any statesman should be definitely preparing for war, or should ever even consider it. But though the risks of war are plain enough, the possible gains are equally clear. It is simply not true, as many well-intentioned but ill-informed pacifists maintain, that "war never pays". The implied threat of war—which unless skilfully employed leads to actual war—is often very profitable in diplomatic bargaining; and short, quick, successful wars often pay and pay very well. Almost every foot of American soil, from the Atlantic to the Pacific, was wrested from the American Indians in a series of small wars. The British Empire has been built up by a series of small wars. Similarly, the prosperity of the German Empire before 1914 was due to a series of swift, successful conquests in 1864, 1866 and 1870. If the war in 1914 had gone according to the plans of the German General Staff, it would have been simply a fourth in this series of rapid, easy, and profitable victories, which would have given Germany new iron mines at the expense of France and badly needed ports on the North Sea at the expense

of Holland and Belgium.

No statesman wants a big war. In fact, no statesman wants any war—if he can get what he wants without fighting for it. Neither do the statesmen who oppose him want war. But war breaks out eventually because the time invariably comes when both sides want something that they cannot get without fighting, and neither will yield. When such a disaster occurs, the responsibility of statesmen is fully shared by the people who put them in power and keep them there, for *no government to-day can carry out any policy to which its people are really opposed*. Even when the statesmen are made the tools of corrupt commercial interests, the mass of the people are still morally responsible, for their ignorance or indifference makes such things possible.

The economic forces which to-day produce war cannot be wholly eliminated from modern life; but it ought to be possible to guide and control them so that they cease to be a danger. It ought to be possible to reach by agreement results as satisfactory and infinitely less expensive than those reached by war. The real obstacles to such guidance and control are the evil human passions—greed, fear, distrust, hatred, feelings of national or racial superiority, and megalomania of one kind or another. These are the human forces, psychological forces, moral forces—or, if you prefer, immoral forces—that lie behind the economic forces which in turn lie behind modern war. It is a situation

which an orthodox Christian of the old school might well attribute to original sin; which an orthodox Hindu might ascribe to *maya*; or which an orthodox Buddhist might regard as the evil fruit of Desire. *As usual, the older religious formulas, if broadly interpreted, apply with amazing accuracy to the realities of modern life.*

Greed lies behind the desire for inordinate economic expansion. It lies behind the cut-throat business competition of our times. It drives business houses into programmes of expansion outside national borders, leads them to seek exclusive fields of exploitation in primitive lands, causes them to try to exclude business men of other nations, and induces them to bring pressure upon their home governments to support their commercial ventures with diplomatic, military, or naval aid. One can see this happening in Japanese expansion in Manchuria, in British expansion in many parts of the globe, in American imperialism in Central and South America, although in the latter case it is encouraging to note a distinct change of heart in American diplomacy since the Roosevelt Administration came to power. *Greed as a motive is perhaps clearest of all in the intrigues of the armaments makers who play upon national fears to promote their individual profit, reckless of the fatal results that may follow.*

Fear is a natural corollary of greed. Business houses fear their own inability to maintain themselves in competition with foreign business men in foreign markets

without special favour due to diplomatic or military pressure from their home governments. Hence the shady intrigues for "spheres of influence" which were so marked a characteristic of diplomatic bargaining in the latter nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and which, though less obvious to-day, have by no means disappeared. In the same way, nations fear each other as each watches potentially hostile armaments growing, just across the border.

With such motives naturally goes mutual distrust among the nations, every one of which is to-day busily engaged in espionage on present friend and prospective foe alike. Spies seek out naval, military, and industrial secrets and endeavour to find out whether solemnly signed covenants and treaties are being kept or broken. The Kellogg-Briand Pact, the Covenant of the League of Nations, and all the other peace treaties have not led to any limitation of armaments, because no nation really trusts another's word.

Diplomats have seen too many treaties broken—by the Germans in Belgium, by the Japanese in China and Manchuria, by Americans in their dealings with the Red Indians. They will sign treaties; in most cases they will live up to treaties; but they simply will not trust in the good faith of the other signatories. Hence peace treaties or commercial accords, which might end the worst of the imperialist commercial rivalries, do singularly little good in the long run. The war plans go right on; and

where there is a war plan, sooner or later there is likely to be a war.

All this is complicated by national or racial hatreds which linger on from the bad old days of tribal warfare. Most of the Balkan nations, closely akin in language, religion, race, and culture though they are, have cordially detested each other for generations. The Chinese have little liking for the Japanese. Through a thousand years the French and Germans have been fighting. Even the commercial success of one nation leads others to hate it—one reason for anti-Japanese feeling is the ability of Japanese business men to undersell their European and American competitors. One reason why national minorities are ill-treated, and so stirred up to armed revolt, is the legacy of national hatreds.

Feelings of racial or national superiority are part of this general emotional attitude. Educated Americans know better than to despise Orientals, and have no difficulty in associating with them on friendly terms. But there are not many educated people in any land, and they have a relatively small share in determining the trend of national likes and dislikes. The average American, especially on the Pacific Coast, dislikes the Japanese because their physical appearance and their way of life are definitely unlike his own. He also dislikes their ability to outwork and undersell him. Hence the racial difficulties which would have led to war long since if both governments had not exhibited much good sense in limiting the possibilities of open

racial friction.

Finally, among these individual psychological-moral forces there is the megalomania, the strange admiration for mere bigness which characterizes our age and affects national life precisely as it affects personal life. It is a fault to which Americans are particularly prone, but in which other nations amply share. Nations want to be big for no better reason than to be regarded as Great Powers. It is a curiously foolish attitude. The only rational goal of national policy is the happiness of the nation's people, which certainly does not depend upon their numbers. The happiest nations are not necessarily great powers. More frequently they are small, highly civilized, pacific, well-governed states like Holland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden. Only one of these nations has been at war in more than a century, and then for a few weeks only.

Yet France struggles to keep up the population. Signor Mussolini encourages an already overcrowded Italy to produce more and more Italian babies, while Japan, equally crowded on her little islands, vehemently resists birth control propaganda.

Part of this attitude is due to fear and to the desire of general staffs to have an abundant supply of soldiers in the event of war. Part of it is due to fear of larger populations in adjoining states. But a large measure is simply the unreasonable confusion of bigness with greatness and with national happiness. Such an attitude practi-

cally ensures war, for it sets all nations expanding on a globe where the room for expansion is limited, forcing them into collision with one another.

To all these *we might add a single, all-embracing ethical fault, apparent in almost all modern nations—the sin of laziness as citizens*. We refuse our responsibilities. We refuse to watch over the actions of our governments. We refuse to do our duty as citizens and keep our governments on the path of our own highest interests, which—in the closely linked world of 1934—are in line with the general best interests of the world at large. As nations we long for peace, but we permit special interests to manoeuvre our governments into situations where war is inevitable. The best minds we have devote themselves to private gain or personal intellectual interests, not to the public good.

The war problem, like most human problems, can thus be reduced in the long run to the problem of balancing the good impulses in man's nature against the baser ones. The last World War was undoubtedly due to fifty years of friction due to economic pressures. But the economic pressures arose in the last analysis out of human desires; and it was the baser moral element in these human desires which made the economic problems impossible of solution without violence. In the ultimate analysis, the World War was due to moral faults and flaws in the human stuff which lay be-

hind national policies, including both the statesmen who determined the policies and the people who determined that the statesmen should be permitted to determine.

Signs are only too abundant that there has been little improvement in this respect. The economic pressures still exist and behind them lie the moral pressures. That they are steadily pushing us toward a new world war, it is difficult to deny. That they must necessarily succeed in driving us into war is

not so certain.

The moral reformation of the human race is what Americans call "a large order". The great moral leaders of the race have always failed to affect humanity as a whole and completely. But they have never failed completely. It is impossible to compare the modern world with, say, the Greco-Roman world and still believe that there has been no advance. The only question is whether the advance is coming fast enough to save us.

JOHN BAKELESS

II.—ASOKA, THE PRACTICAL PACIFIST

Asoka's empire extended up to Persia, thanks to his grandfather's conquests, but his greatness did not depend upon the mere extent of his dominion, great as it was, nor upon his services to the cause of universal religion. He ruled over an empire that extended practically from Persia to Southern Mysore. Much of it was his inheritance from his grandfather, Chandragupta Maurya (c. 323-299 B.C.), who achieved the credit of uniting in one empire the valleys of the Indus and other rivers of the Panjab with those of the Ganges and the Jumna. Then by 304 B.C., he achieved the further distinction of extending the boundaries of his Indian Empire up to those of Persia. This was the result of his conquests by which the eastern provinces of the Syrian Empire, then known as Gedrosia (Baluchistan), Aria (Herat), Arachosia (Kanda-

har), and the Paropanisadai (the country of Paropanisus, *i.e.*, Hindu Kush) were ceded to him by a treaty by the defeated emperor, Seleukos. Thus the frontier problems were solved by Chandragupta Maurya by his successful prosecution of a bold forward policy which pushed the limits of India far beyond its present "scientific frontier" or "Durand Line". But his achievements were not confined to this frontier alone. His conquests were pursued far into the interior.

In the words of the only historian of the times, Plutarch, "not long afterwards, Androkottos, who had by that time mounted the throne, presented Seleukos with 500 elephants, and overran and subdued the whole of India with an army of 600,000." One of the most fruitful discoveries in history is that of Sir William Jones (*Asiatic Researches*, iv. 11) in identifying

the Greek name Androkottos with the Indian name, Chandragupta Maurya, mentioned in the Purāṇas. The story of Seleukos invading India to emulate the exploits of Alexander we also owe to foreign sources like Justin (xv. 4) and Appian (Syr. 55). His defeat by the Indian King made him purchase peace by ceding to him the eastern territories which had been his by settlements arrived at on the occasion of the partition of Alexander's empire in 323 and 321 B. C. The passage from Plutarch just quoted shows that Chandragupta Maurya practically carried out a series of three great conquests in the following order: (1) the conquest of the Indo-Gangetic Plains (by overthrowing Greek rule in the Panjab, and the Empire of the Nandas in the Gangetic Plains peopled by what the Greek writers call the Gangaridae and the Prasii, *i. e.*, Prāchyas or Easterns); (2) the conquests, beyond the North-Western Frontiers, of territories now included in Afghanistan and Baluchistan; and (3) the conquest of the south.

ASOKA'S DOCTRINE OF TRUE GLORY FOR A KING

Thus Asoka was not called upon to conquer an empire. He had it as a gift from his father. But, as has been stated, his greatness as a ruler did not depend entirely upon the size of his empire. He himself takes this view, and proclaims it in one of his inscriptions written on stone in imperishable characters which may be read to this day. In that Inscription [Rock Edict x], he is anxious to point out that the

true glory or fame of a king depends upon that of his people in achieving moral and spiritual progress. This is what is called Asoka's doctrine of *True Glory* for a king. There may be a far-flung empire on which the sun never sets, but its success is to be judged by the conditions of progress it can secure to the peoples composing it. A king cannot be viewed apart from his people. Both are bound to each other as organic parts of one corporate whole, the State. Thus the individual greatness of a ruler depends upon the collective greatness of his people.

HIS MEASURES OF MORAL UPLIFT OF HIS PEOPLE

Asoka's moral greatness was not confined to the mere originality and soundness of the views he held or the doctrines that he preached. He was so sincere in his convictions that he at once gave effect to them with all his imperial power and resources. He was terribly in earnest about all that he preached. With him, example always preceded precept. When he felt that he, as a ruler, must be judged by the condition of his people, he at once devoted himself to a vigorous campaign for achieving their moral uplift by the institution of a regular Ministry of Morals with a special staff (called *Dharma-Mahamatras*) entrusted with a wide variety of functions, and a sphere of work that embraced the whole of India. In one of his Edicts [Rock Edict v], he states:—

These Ministers of Morals have been employed among all sects for the establishment and growth of Dharma

(piety or morality) of those inclined to it . . . among the soldiers and their chiefs, ascetics and householders, the destitute and the infirm . . . They are also employed to give relief in suitable cases from judicial punishments or abuses.

He thus undertook the moral improvement of his people on a continental scale.

ASOKA ABOLISHES WAR.

Another striking proof of his greatness was his doctrine of *True Conquest*. We have seen how vast was his empire, yet he was not tainted by any lust for conquests, or "earth-hunger," which impels a conqueror to further conquests. He was not at all filled with the spirit of *dig-vijaya* which led his grandfather to found the Maurya Empire, a militant spirit which is fully approved for a king in the Hindu Sāstras on Polity. These always insist on the ambition and duty of a king to be a king of kings and the sole sovereign of the earth or available space (*samvāt, cka-rāt*, or *sarva-bhauma*). In his early days, following these prevailing and time-honoured ideals of kingship and the example of his ancestors, Asoka indulged in a conquest by which his territories were rounded off in the east, the conquest of Kalinga (Orissa). But the conquest was won ruthlessly and "forcibly" against a brave people fighting for freedom, "not hitherto subdued" (*avijitam*), resulting in colossal carnage and casualties, "150,000 carried off as captives, 100,000 slain, and several hundreds of thousands dead of their wounds". These bloody sights and cruelties,

this extermination of a people's liberty by sheer brute force, for which the king felt himself personally responsible, produced a complete reaction, a revolution, in his mind, which turned at once with a revulsion from a creed of Violence to that of an unqualified Non-Violence (*ahimsa*).

With Asoka, there was no gap between thought and action, theory and practice. He proceeded at once to give effect to this creed of Non-Violence in all spheres of his life and work, personal and public, and to run his kingdom thenceforth as a Kingdom of Righteousness on the basis of a Universal Peace, peace between man and man, and between man and every sentient creature. In his personal life, he turned vegetarian, abolished the daily slaughter of thousands of animals for purposes of the royal kitchen [Rock Edict I], all public amusements and sports connected with cruelties to animals [*Ibid*], hunting and pleasure trips (*vihara-yatras*) in which the kings indulged [Rock Edict VIII]; and finally his activities culminated in the outlawry of war as an unmixed evil. "The chiefest conquest is the conquest of Right and not of Might," declared Asoka [Rock Edict XIII]. The drum of war (*bhcri-ghosha*) was hushed throughout India. Only *dharma-ghosha*, the call to moral life, religious proclamations, could be heard [Rock Edict IV]. Immediately, the emperor's healing message of assurance was sent in all directions: "The king desires that his unsubdued borderers, the peoples

on his frontiers, should not be afraid of him but should trust him, and would receive from him not sorrow but happiness" [Kalinga Rock Edict II]. Even the primitive aboriginal peoples were assured of their freedom: "Even upon the forest folks in his dominions, His Sacred and Gracious Majesty looks kindly" [Rock Edict XIII]. To subjugate them on the plea of civilising them was no part of Asoka's political system. The only condition for their freedom was that they must "turn from their evil ways" that they be not "chastised" [*Ibid.*]. The king was only anxious "to set them moving on the path of piety" [Kalinga Rock Edict II].

HIS MORAL CONQUESTS, BOTH IN INDIA AND ABROAD

Thus Asoka was the first in the world to usher in the reign of law and non-violence, abolishing militarism, conquest by force and bloodshed, which Sanskrit political writers appropriately designate as *Asura-Vijaya*, the conquest that becomes only a demon. He stood for the opposite kind of conquest, what he calls *Dharma-Vijaya*, the conquest that is won by love (*priti*) and results in subjection and paying homage only to Dharma or Morality. Henceforth, he was busy only with these "moral" conquests, which were extended all over the country, and even beyond to foreign countries. Within his dominions, the political map of his empire was dotted over with patches of independent territory which would have been deemed as so many blots on the escutcheons

of other conquerors in history like Akbar or Aurangzeb. The steam-roller of annexation which crushed the independence of so many small States and peoples, and brought a united India under the undisputed sovereignty of his grandfather, Asoka did not permit to roll farther and complete its levelling process by a ruthless fulfilment of the full programme of conquests marked out for him by his predecessors on the throne. He proclaimed his imperial decree: "Thus far and no farther."

But this only released his energies for his scheme of moral conquest. The resources that were released by prescription of war and by disarmament were now devoted to the processes of peace, to a vigorous prosecution of social service and welfare work among the masses all over the country. He began by organising on a continental scale measures of relief of suffering of both man and animal by the establishment of appropriate medical institutions such as provision of medical men, medicines, hospitals, and special botanical gardens for the cultivation of medicinal plants, indigenous or foreign, to supply raw materials for the manufacture of medicines in pharmaceutical works. Says the King in Rock Edict II —

Everywhere have been instituted two kinds of medical treatment, treatment of man and that of cattle (in veterinary hospitals). Medicinal herbs . . . have been caused to be imported and planted in all places wherever they did not exist. Roots also and fruits have been similarly imported and planted everywhere.

Next, he went farther in his scheme of relief by providing supply of water and shade along the highways: "On the roads, wells also have been dug and trees planted for the comfort of men and cattle" [Rock Edict II]. His full scheme of welfare work is thus detailed:—

On the high roads . . . banyan trees were planted by me that they might give shade to cattle and men ; mango-gardens were planted, and wells dug, at each half-kos ; rest houses were built ; and many watering-stations were constructed for comfort of men and cattle [Pillar Edict VII].

A PIONEER OF WORLD-PEACE AND NON-VIOLENCE

It will thus be recognised that Asoka easily takes his place as the Pioneer of Peace in the world, having stood for principles which the League of Nations has been formed to achieve, such as the outlawry of war as an absolute evil ; recognition of the brotherhood of all States and peoples, great or small, in independence and sovereignty ; disarmament, and the like. He was also the first in the world who, without waiting for speculation on his ideals, gave effect to them at once in his own Empire, from which war was excommunicated, and thereby spiritualised Indian politics for the time being. He also tried to bring his neighbouring States in Western Asia and Europe to his way of thinking and to that end he

spent freely from the revenues of India. This is a record in international service in foreign countries financed by the resources of one's own country.

ASOKA'S WORK TOO ADVANCED TO SURVIVE HIM

Unfortunately, his ideals were too far ahead of his age to survive him. The system of politics which he had established in his vast dominion on the basis of non-violence, disarmament, universal peace and international good-will, and which he had tried to introduce to several European countries, practically died with him. There are some unkind critics who even hold him to be liable for the downfall of the Mauryan Empire which his grandfather had built up with so much of military effort and heroism. Asoka's pacifism and non-violence found its nemesis in the installation of the Śunga Empire and the performance by its founder of the ceremony of horse-sacrifice to celebrate that event. The ascent of Man has been a bloody process, as in all other evolution. But it should not be so. Man must work out his evolution in ways that should not be always those of Nature "red in tooth and claw". The only salvation for humanity lies in its realisation of what Asoka had stood for and realised for his country as its ruler.

RADHAKUMUD MOOKERJI

ARYANISM: NEW AND OLD

[**Philip Mairet**, acting Editor of the late Mr. Orage's *New English Weekly*, here demonstrates how the new Aryanism, rampant in Germany to-day, "is as bluntly materialist and nationalist" as the "Indian conception is spiritual and universal". He refers to ancient Aryanism on which the scholarly article of **Professor S. V. Venkateswara** which immediately follows, throws a great deal of light.—Eds.]

I.—CHRISTIANITY AND THE NEW ARYANISM

Recent events in Europe have included, amongst other things strangely reminiscent of the Feudal Ages, a violent persecution of the Jews in Germany. No Western power has staged such a persecution on a national scale for centuries, and it has already produced an extensive literature, of rabid anti-Semitism, of fervid Jewish nationalism, of liberal deprecation and pleas for toleration; and much ink has been spilt in bitterness, angry mendacity and desperation. One would think that all the embers of the age-long hostility between Judaism and Christianity had flared up again in unquenchable wrath. Yet the truth is that this persecution is not the reappearance of that traditional European animosity, but a complete departure from it. This is not a persecution of the Jews as the enemies of Christianity. It is a new feud, waged under a new name: a repression of the Semite as the spiritual enemy of the "Aryan".

This new "Aryan" idealism of the present national movement in Germany is totally different in conception from that which centres around the same word in Indian tradition. To the devout Indian,

the Aryan tradition is of a race of mythological antiquity, which bequeathed to all posterity an universal, human and spiritual culture. It signifies a religion, far more than a physical ancestry; a way of attainment of the Truth of the Self which is open to all beings; and a profoundly aristocratic conception of human society in which the lives of the philosopher, the saint, the administrator, the merchant or craftsman are conceived equally as paths to the attainment of the single goal of human consciousness.

Now, German "Aryanism" is as bluntly materialist and nationalist as this Indian conception is spiritual and universal. It affirms the supremacy of a portion of the white race as a natural, biological aristocracy, and affirms only one—a rather narrowly militaristic—ideal of character. The product of theorists such as Gobineau, Houston Stewart Chamberlain and Lothrop Stoddard, the avowed aim of this doctrine has always been to extend and intensify the imperialism of the pure-blooded "white" race—or sometimes, more explicitly, the "Nordic" race—over all the other peoples of the earth.

The original inventors of this

racial theory actually had in view, if somewhat vaguely, some kind of co-operation between the "white" nations in a world-policy to keep the yellow, brown and black races in due subordination, and to superintend their future development. In passing, it may be said that there was much genuine, and even sound, human idealism in their vision, as well as a very wide, though frankly biassed, knowledge of the world and of history. If their vision had been realised, the most powerful nations of mankind would have devoted their statesmanship to organizing all the races and nations into a hierarchy. At the apex of power they would have placed the "Nordic" nations, immediately followed by the other white races—Latin, Slav and Aryan Indian, probably in that order; descending upon racial strata of darker and darker hues to the ultimate basis of the black races.

The best that can be said for this conception is that it postulated a more conscious administration of the modern world, roughly according to the already existing tendencies of commercial-imperialistic development. But it needs little reflection to realise that as a political vision the whole view was fantastic. Apart from the mixed racial ingredients of all the political entities known as "nations"—which present a difficulty amounting to impossibility in such a nation as the United States, for instance,—this theory left out of account that the very same methods of financial-imperialism

which gave the Western Powers their wide dominion and influence, placed them in opposition to one another and precluded their co-operation. When this was catastrophically proved by the Great War, one would have thought that the "Nordic-Aryan" vision, never very widely entertained, would have vanished altogether. On the contrary, however, it leapt into sudden political notoriety, in a distorted form.

Germany adopted the notion as the basis of an intensified nationalism, both to compensate for the humiliation of her defeated Imperialism, and to heighten her self-regard in the midst of a Europe turning more nationalistic than ever. Baulked of imperial expansion in physical fact, it was as though Germany sought for an emotional supremacy, claiming a new "kingdom of the air" by purely historical rights, (such as her ancient position in the Mediaeval Empire) and founding this claim especially upon her "Aryan" ancestry. And as no such claim could at present be upheld against other nations, it had to be rigorously enforced against the foreign element within Germany's own borders—the Jews. "Semite" being conceived as the very antithesis of "Aryan," Jews were all to be degraded in status or else expelled from the country.

Europe has many times persecuted the Jews, but never before in the naked name of nationality or race. The traditional hostility to the Jew was not contempt for his nation but horror at his religion.

He had rejected the Christian revelation. In one respect, the result was the same, for persecution, whether upon tribal or sectarian grounds, causes the persecuted to unite in closer and more subtle co-operation and in deeper hostility to the State which proves a harsh foster-parent. Yet it is undoubtedly worse to oppress a people as biologically, ancestrally inferior than to excommunicate them as perverse in doctrine. The spiritual injury is graver. It may be true, as we are often told, that the Jews have suffered less actual privation of life, position and property in this German persecution than in earlier times. But the mediæval persecutions, blind and bloody outbreaks of wrath as they often were, did not insult the Israelite's ancestry and origin.

Mediæval Christendom condemned the Jews for their narrow, tribal spirit, and Christendom had a right to do so, for it was not itself national. In its creative period, Christian culture was anti-Imperial and supernational, and regarded the national pride of the Jews as a sin. But far from vilifying the ancestry of Israel, Christendom actually glorified it and popularised the epic of Jewish ancient history more than did the Jews themselves. The error and iniquity of the Jews was to pride *themselves* upon having such forbears; to give themselves the airs and the arrogance of nationality. And that really is iniquitous. It is precisely that arrogance which is the condemnation of Germany's spurious Aryanism.

Like all the most bitter and enduring quarrels, the feud between Jew and Christian has been an opposition based upon a deeper unity. Dispossessed of their own fatherland and dispersed over the world, the Jews generally chose to live, and succeeded best in thriving, in Christian countries. For there, where they suffered ignominy as the race which had crucified its own supreme Teacher, they also enjoyed the prestige of their descent from the intimate actors in the Christ-drama. The presence of Jews in Christendom, far from being an offence to the Christian religion, has always been a living witness to its historical reality; and although the Christian teaching tended to arouse feelings of antipathy against the Jews, the Church consistently protected them. Both their denial of Christ's Divinity and their affirmation of His historical background were of positive advantage to the religion of Europe—an advantage maintained by a guarded toleration, which enabled them to live in their own faith, varied by persecutions which hardened their sectarian spirit.

This paradoxical position of the Jews, as a minority both oppressed and privileged, was due to their strange position as equally friends and foes of Christianity. Yet it did not disappear with the Reformation, the break-down of the Mediæval system and the growth of religious toleration. The new Protestant sects maintained, on the whole, the same attitude towards Jews: and although in recent times a

general religious decline has weakened the ancient antipathy, the growth of nationalism has developed a new antagonism. The privilege of this minority, which prospered with the disintegration of religious barriers, has become more actively resented as national barriers have hardened, for the Jews now take on the appearance of an international nation, with an unwarrantable influence in each separate nation's affairs. That is the root of active "anti-Semitism" in many places to-day, and of the present outbreak in Germany.

This ancient racial question is therefore no nearer solution in the modern West, in spite of the progress and culture of the modern Jews, who have made many valuable contributions to modern civilization. One thing is clear—that persecution only intensifies the problem. So long as the present phase of false nationalism endures, by which all Europe is dominated and Germany almost demented, the Jewish question will increase in difficulty. Even the Zionist solution, of a Jewish national colony in Palestine, whatever merits can be claimed for it upon other grounds, offers no immediate relief, for it tends to stiffen the Jews in their nationalist attitude without removing them from their unique international position.

This problem will be solved only when the present phase of Nationalism is over, and when the Christian religion awakens to the need of a broader basis to its universal Gospel than that of Jewish patriarchalism. The spirit-

ual origin of Christ is not Jewish, and certainly not "Aryan" in the German sense. It is one with the origin of Krishna, of the Buddha, of Lao-tze or of Zoroaster, as well as with that of Moses. That Christianity should continue to teach with a Bible, of which more than three-quarters consists of Hebrew scriptures, but which contains not a word of any other of the older revelations of the human race, is an anomaly in any modern, world-conscious culture.

For that is the heart of the matter. Present European Christianity is not Christianity, but is only Judeo-Christianity, and it is high time this should be reformed. There is no justification in the present world for presenting the Gospel of Christ, which in its true nature is the European aspect of *Loka-Samgraha*, of World-Religion, as if it were merely a kind of neo-Judaism. Can anyone believe that the *Song of Solomon* is of more spiritual inspiration than the *Bhagavad-Gita*, or that *Deuteronomy* is more essential to salvation than the *Tao Tsch King*? By clinging to a mass of Hebrew lore, largely inessential, Christians give to Judaism a prestige in world-religious tradition which is wholly disproportionate; they both intensify the tribal-complex of Judaism and arouse fear and resentment against it. It is very significant that in Soviet Russia, where there is no political differentiation against the Jew at all, either political or religious, Jewish sectarianism is disappearing and the Jewish problem with it.

It was the spirit of Christ which gave to the West an essential culture, which inspired all that was best in the aristocratic order of Mediævalism. That culture, in its many-sided unity, was one with the Aryan tradition of the East. To Aryanism in that sense, which is the culture of the whole world's spiritual heritage, Europe can return only by freeing her religious consciousness from the historic

accident of a preponderant Judaism, and learning to value equally all the great scriptures of the human race. Then, and only then, it will be possible for the Jews and their contribution to be painlessly absorbed. The "Semitic problem" of an anomalous nationalism will disappear. But it will never be forcibly expelled by an "Aryanism" which is itself only a more flamboyant Nationalism.

PHILIP MAIRET.

II.—THE ARYAN PATH

The word "Ārya" appears in the earliest hymns of the *Rg-Veda*. It has been assumed to have an ethnical import, but the significance is cultural rather than racial in most passages. The Ārya is contrasted with Dasyu and Dāsa (e.g. *R. V.* II, 11. 18; VI, 60, 16). He sacrificed to the bright and friendly powers of Nature. He attached much importance to the virtues of chastity and continence. He had well-developed vocal organs, and his utterance was clear, and accentuated. He cooked his own food, and drank what cheered and exhilarated but did not intoxicate. He represented, therefore, a distinct type of culture. Very few Vedic passages show a possibly ethnological sense. The name "Krishna" of a Dasyu chieftain is not necessarily anthropological, though in later times it came to denote a dark complexion. Nor does the epithet *anāsa* demand interpretation as "snub-nosed". It may mean "phonetically imperfect" (*ṁsitavagindriya*) and is so

explained by the scholiasts who have commented on the expression. Much has been made of the expression "Āryam varṇam" in the texts. The term *varṇam* here should not be taken in its later sense of "colour" or "caste". It meant "character" like the analogous word "rūpam". This sense was retained as late as Kalidasa's time: "Rājā prajā ranjana labdha varṇah." (The king gets his character of kingliness by pleasing his subjects.) (*Raghuvamśa* VI. 21). The sense of "complexion" is out of the question in this passage. On the other hand, several hymns emphasise the cultural character of the Āryas—the Āryan moral law (*vṛata*), cosmic law (*ṛta*) and the world of the spirit (*dharma*, *ātma*). The word Ārya is not found as a national name in the *Rg-Veda*.

The derivation of the word has long exercised the minds of scholars. Bopp suggested *Ar* "to go," or *Arch* "to venerate". Max

Müller condemned the former etymology as giving no adequate sense, and the latter as quite impossible. Giles disputes Müller's derivation from *ira*, the earth. Horrovitz has pointed out that there is no connection between *Ārya* and arable land. *Ar* in the sense of "to plough" (Lat., *arare*) is confined to the languages of Europe, and is not a Vedic or Avestan root. Lassen explained it like "Āchārya," but this would not account for the other form *Arya* (with the short *a*). *Arya* and *Arya-patni* are contrasted with *Dasyu* and *Dāsapatni* in the *Rg-Veda*, and *Ārya* is in juxtaposition to *Śūdra* in the *Yajur-Veda* (v. s. xx. 17). Indian grammarians are almost unanimous in deriving *Arya* from *Araṇiya* (= *pūjaniya*, "worthy of respect"). As primary derivations we have the term *Aryamyaṃ*, "the venerable" applied to God Varuṇa, the fountain of Vedic righteousness (in *R. V.* v. 85. 7), and *Arya-man* (*Aryam śreshtam mimita*). *Ārya* and *Arya* seem, therefore, to have an ethical rather than an ethnical sense.

"*Ārya*" had no possibly racial sense at all in post-Vedic times. In the *Rāmāyaṇa* we find the term *Arya miśra* qualified by "good and virtuous people". ("Samrakshan Āryamiśraṇām sādhnām guṇa vartinām": *Aryamisras* who are good and virtuous people.) In the *Mahābhārata* it is in juxtaposition to "greedy and grasping". ("*Āryavratascha Pāncālō na sa rājā dhana priyah*": The king Panchala who was *Arya-vrata* had no greed of wealth. A.

ch. 201.) "Neither learning nor religion but conduct alone is the mark of the *Arya*" ("*Vṛttena hi bhavatyāryo na dharmeṇa na Vidyayā*" U. P. ch. 86). *Manu* has almost the same words and exactly the same definition. The *Rājā*, he says, should protect those who are *Aryavṛttas*, "who do good and refrain from evil". He should punish those who are thorns in the side of society. The deeds of an *Aryan* reveal his character (*Manu* x. 757). Jain texts explain the *Aryan* virtues as devotion to Wisdom, conquest of the lower self of passion, and absolute Truth. The same sense appears in *Kālidāsa*. In the *Śakuntala*, *Dushyanta* makes the heroine out to be marriageable, as his *Arya* mind has been moved by love. ("Yad Āryam asyām abhilāshi me manah": Since my noble mind has desired her.—*Sak.* I. 22). The term here means a mind "free from lust or base passion". In the *Raghuvamśa* the hero is described "as acceptable to the *Āryas*, and contrasted with the lion who is making a harmless cow his prey" ("Tam Āryagrhyam nigrihitadhenuh":—*Raghu.* II. 33). Evidently the way of the *Āryas*. (*brahmacharyam* and *ahimsa*) implied disapproval of lust and of injury. *Māgha* emphasises that "those of *Ārya* disposition could be moved only by sincere regard, and not by considerations of power or pelf" ("*Grahītum Āryān paricharyayā muhuh*"—*Sisūpālavadha*).

Obviously, the racial sense of *Ārya* and a "superiority complex,"

if it ever existed at all, had died out long before the emergence of the Germans in European history. It was a universally accepted Indian principle that "knowledge makes for humility, and thus prepares one for the higher life" (Vidyā dadāti vinayam vinayādyāti pātratam). But this humility did not mean sacrifice of self-respect. It meant a stern regard for one's duty. So says Śrī Kṛṣṇa in the *Gīta*: "Whence this faint heartedness, unworthy of the Ārya (*anārya jushṭam*), opposed alike to worldly glory and welfare after death." *Anārya* in our dramatic literature always means "ignoble," not "base-born".

Aryan or Indo-Irānic culture spread broadcast the value of the higher religious life. There are no common god-names in the Indo-European languages or any term denoting the temple. The Sumerians worshipped Mithra and Sams, and Mitra and Amśa are phases of the sun in the Vedic texts. Sumerian Sin (the moon) has his analogue in Sinīvālī. Worship of these gods presents a later stage in Vedic religion than that of Agni (the Fire-god), and Agni is not worshipped as a god by the Sumerians and Assyrians. Nor is he in the pantheon revealed in the Boghaz-Keui inscriptions. Bagu or Bogū is the name for the supreme deity in the Slavo-Lettic group of languages, and he was worshipped among the Slavs and the Phrygians. The Kassite word for god is *Bagaios*. It is well known that Ahura Mazda is styled Bhaga Bhaganam (God of gods). *Bhaga-*

van is the word for god in Vedic, Sanskrit and Prakrit. That the borrowing is from Aryan or Indo-Iranian is indicated by the Greek *Kadmos* (from Hebrew *quedem*, "the East"), Greek *Theos* "spoken by god" (from Vedic *Asu* breath) and Old High German *alum* (Vedic *ātma*, breath). Sumerian *Martu* and *Mertes* and Latin *Mars* could be derived from Vedic *Maruts*.

The greatest gift of Āryan culture was the gift of the Path. We find it expressed in the *Ramayana*: "Who but honours one that is on the Aryan Path?" (*Mārgam āryam prapannasya nānumanyeta kah pumān.*) "I am his man, for he is noble" (So aham āryeṇa paravān). It is interesting that the term "path" retained the Indo-Irānic sense in English, while the Romans had narrowed its use to bridges (c. Lat. *pontifex*) and the Greeks to the highway of the sea (*pontus*). The pursuit of the Path by the Aryans had its reflection in the political life of India, which struck the Greeks with some measure of surprise. Arrian records (*Indika* IX, 12): "A sense of justice, they say, prevented any Indian king from attempting conquest beyond the limits of India." Peace has her victories no less renowned than those of war.

II

Among the speakers of the Indo-European languages the easternmost spoke Indo-Iranic. They had various words for the *Path*. They used their genius for sublimation in turning the thoughts of human beings from the mechanical and

worldly to the moral and meta-physical.

Panthā was the highroad to the desired destination, whose variant is the Greek *Pons*, *Pontys*, a bridge or ford over a trade-path; It is thus described in a Tourist's hymn:

May the Panthā be free from thorns (anṛkshara) and from the dregs of society who are thorns in the side of the virtuous! May it be straight (ṛjū) and free from perplexing epicyclic windings! May there be a guide on the path (sannetā) like Mitra the friend of the world, Pūshan the nourisher of the strong, and Aryaman the protector of the weak! May the purposeful traveller at his journey's end find his objective ready to fall, like ripe fruit, into his hands!

The term is used in a symbolic and figurative sense in the latest book of the *Rg-Veda*. The *Panthā* of the Fathers is referred to in the *Rg-Veda* (x. 130. 7), and that of the gods (*R. V. x. 2, 3*). That leading to the next world or the world after bodily death is said to be directed by Yama (*R. V. x. 14. 1*). The last is also mentioned in the *Atharva Veda* (18. 1. 49.). Its protectors, preservers, guards and guides are detailed in a later text (*T. A. iv. 2*). The Iranian variant is *Pantlay*, the easy straight path of Asha (*Rta*) and *Vohumana* (good thought) leading to the Paradise or Home of Song (*garo demanu*).

A clearly moral, apart from the mythical and mystical, significance emerges in a passage of the *Rg-Veda* (x. 71. 6) which refers to the *summum bonum* of life as "the Path of Good conduct" (*sukrtasya panthā*). The idea is unfolded in a verse of the *Mahābhārata* (III. 312. 12.)

Dharmasya tattvam nihitam guhāyām mahājano yena gatah sa panthāh.

The *Panthā* is the beaten road always trodden by the great. They derive their light from within: the voice of the conscience calling from the cavity of the heart.

Prapatha denotes the unexplored expanse of the wilderness. The Maruts are in an early text described as providing the traveller with refreshments (*Khādyah*) in the *Prapathas*, an ancient reference obviously to trade along the path of the trade-winds. Indra the god of victory "encompasses the widening field of battle" (*Samatsu prapathintamam Indram*). The moral sense is clear in *R.V. x. 17.6*: "God Pūsha created a pathway in the perplexing expanse of the Infinite" (*Prapathe patham ajanishtha Pūshā*). "Pūsha directs our intellect and activities on every hand" (*dhiyam dhiyam sishadhāti pra Pūshā*). A track or a path into the realm of the unknown was indeed a gift of the gods!

Patha, *Pathi* or *Pathyā* does not seem to mean the same as *Panthā*. Scholars have missed the difference in the denotation of the two words which occur together in one of the earliest passages (*R.V. vii. 44. 5*). —Ā no Dadhikrā pathyām anaktu rtasya panthām anvetavā u ("May God Dadhikra [the Sun] shower blessings on the Path so that it may lead to the Pantha of Righteousness!"). The word *pantha* here clearly indicates the cosmic highway of Nature and her immortal law, while the term *Pathi* refers to a path or by-way cleared or cut for spiritual progress by the heart and

head of the obliging teacher or the aspiring pilgrim. *Pathi* has thus to be distinguished from the highway (*Pantha*) and the unexplored wilderness (*Prapatha*).

This distinction is supported by the association of "espy" or "show" with *Pantha*, and of "make" or "fashion" with *Pathi*. The god of Death is described as "showing the *Pantha* to many" (bahubhuyah panthām anapaspaśānam). "Those of steadfast faith are said to have their gaze fixed on the *Pantha* of the fathers" (Purveshām panthām anudṛśya dhirāh—*R. V.* x. 130. 7). In one early hymn the bard says: "The path of the Gods is visible to me" (*R. V.* vii. 76. 2.), and human objective is explained as reaching the *Panthā* of the Gods (*R. V.* x. 2. 3.). This is contrasted with that of the Fathers (*R. V.* x. 18. 1.). On the other hand, ancient sages are described as "makers of the paths" (*pathi-kṛtah*), and the Gods Agni, Savitā and Pūshā as path-makers, in contradistinction to Yama who is only a path-finder. *Pathikṛt* occurs frequently (*R. V.* ii. 236; vi. 21. 12. ix 106. 5; x 111.3), but I have never come across *Pathakṛt* or *Panthakṛt* in any of the books of the *Rg-Veda*. In Greek *Pathos* is the trodden or beaten track. So in Teutonic where, however, the original is uncertain, and in pre-Teutonic where *bat* suggests the Latin *batuere*, to beat. (W. German *Path*; Old High German *phad*, *phath*, *pfad*, *fad*; Old Frisian *path*, *pad*; W. Frisian *paed*; E. Frisian *pad*, *path*, *fat*; Old Eng. *paeth*; Old Northumbrian *peth*.)

Variants of *pathā* and *pathya* are *padavi*, *padya*, and *padam*. The

supreme *padam* of Vishnu is usually rendered as "abode" in *Tad Vishnoh paramam padam* (that is the supreme abode of Vishnu). But the rendering does not fit in with the next part of the verse: "*Tad viprāso viprayavah jagṛvāmsah samindhate*"—"The wise and religious, always alert and on their guard, stimulate and quicken the *padam* as fuel does the fire." Evidently, it is the way of life that is here meant, which it is the aim of the wisdom-religion to keep jealously against all tempting odds. Vishnu *padam* in this passage is clearly analogous to Brahma *patham* in *Chhandogya Upanishad* (vi. 15. 6.) and to the "right and true paths" that lead the Ahura in the *Yasna* (43. 3). "One going by the paths indeed attains the end" (*A. B.* iv. 17).

Vishnu *padam* is the path of Service and Sacrifice: "*Yajno vai Vishnuh*." So is the supreme *padam* of Brahma explained in the Laws of Manu:—

He who is able to discern, by the pure luminosity of his own self, himself and no other in all the Universe, can identify himself with every being, and reaches unto the path of the supreme Brahma ("*Evam yah sarva bhuteshu paśyatyatmānam ātmanā sa sarvasamatam etya Brahmāpyeti param padam*"—Manu XII, 124).

"Light on this path is shed only by introspection and a searching inquiry on the part of the progressing pilgrim" (*param brahma anveshamānāh*—*Prasna Upd*).

This use of *padam* has survived in all later literature: The *Gita* has evolved a form which acquired a classical use—*prapad*. *Māneva ye*

prapadyante mām etām tarantite, "Those who walk along the path that leadeth unto me, they are freed from the clutches of mām," which I believe is the earliest use of the word *prapatti* or selfless surrender to the path of the Lord famous in the literature of Sri Vaishnavism.

Padavi first appears in the famous Hamsavatī hymn:—

What is the one and indivisible Brahman to the Gods is the source of illumination to seers and the light on the path of those gifted with the inner vision. (Brahmā devānām padaviḥ Kavinām ṛṣhir viprāṇām.)

Late in the sixth century Bhartṛhari uses the word in the same sense: "Anuyāhi Sadhu padvim (follow the path of the Good)". Compare "The path of the Great is to be followed": padam anuvidhyam cha mahatām—*Nīlīsataka* II 77. The emphasis here is on righteousness and good conduct. When *bhakti* or the path of devotion came into prominence, *padavi* was used in that sense. The foremost musician of South India, Theāgarāja Swāmi, begins a quatrain with the musical phrase—*padavi ni haribhakti*: "Devotion to the lord Hari is the supreme way".

Other terms denoting the Path were similarly invested with ethical import. An early word is *gātu*, the "way to go". "Agni the well-intentioned lights the *gātu* for the worshipper" (*R. V.* iv. 4. 6). This path is strait and Soma is requested to widen it to the pilgrim's vision (*urum no gātum Kṛṇu Soma mīddhvah, R. V.* vi. 85. 4). Elsewhere, Mitra is described as shin-

ing on the *gātu* that leads to the Infinite (*urukshayāya gātum vanate. R. V.* v. 65. 4). The texts of the *Yajur Veda* indicate that "all divine beings, being children of light, are knowers of the *gātu*" (*devāḥ gātuvidah—T. S. I.* 1. 12).

Vartana in *R. V.* i. 85. 3 is merely a trade-route. It means a race-course in the Boghaz Keui inscriptions (fifteenth century B. C.—*avea vertenna*) and the Yajur Vedic texts (*āsvasya vivartana*). But we have the expression "*Rudrasya Vartanī*," which would make nonsense unless interpreted as "the path of Rudra". Bhavabhūti (seventh century) uses *Vartana* in the sense of regulated life (*Smarasi cha tad upānteshu āvayor Vartanāni—I.* 26).

A variant of the word is *Vartma* which means conduct in the *Bhagavad Gita*: "Mama Vartmā anuvartante manushyāḥ Pārtha sarvaśah" (O Partha, men mostly follow my Path). Kālidāsa clinches the use of the term when he speaks of the *Vartma* of Manu (*Raghuvamśa* I, 19) which, as we have seen, was described in Vedic texts as the Path of Manu. The stress, however, is on discipline, "the checking of the straying from the Path" (*niyantuh nemi vṛttayah*).

The word *Marga* is not found in the *Rg-Veda*. In the Gupta age (fourth century) it denoted only the most convenient route, of which the knowledge entailed elaborate enquiry (*ainveshāṇa*). It is the word used to denote the route taught of the Cloud Messenger (*Meghadūta—I. v.* 8). But it was used in a clearly ethical sense in

the Buddhist texts which describe the noble eightfold path (e. g., *Dīgha nikāya*, Sutta 22). The *Bhakti* or devotional cults of a Personal God were known as *Mārga* in later Hinduism. The *Viśuddha mārga* of Buddhaghosha is a commentary and corollary to the *Dharmapada* and *Sutta Nipāta*. Kālidāsa uses the expression in the sense of "quest". *Vichāra-mārga-prahitena chetasa*, (By mind on quest with thought. *Ku.* v, 42 and *Rit.* II 72.) So also in the *Bhāṭṭikāvya*, (I. 12) "Varam amargit".

Vayunam was always used in a moral sense. The sun is prayed to as *Vayunāvit* (*R. V.* v. 64. 3) and Agni, likewise, whose "light reveals the relative merits of the perplexing paths and ways" (*Vayunāni Vidvān*). In later hymns Agni is spoken of as like the boat on the waters, helping the pilgrim to ford and taking him across the sweeping flow of "sins and shortcomings" (*durita*). In *Vayuna* we have the original of the *rectum vitae viyam* of the Latin poets, which is concealed from view by the veil of Ignorance (*vayunāni vaste*, a Rg-Vedic expres-

sion which Sankara translates thus: *Sruti bhava Vayunāni evam āchhādayanti* (Thus they conceal the meaning of Shrutis). *Vayuna* is used for the Path or the way frequently in the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* (e. g. VI. 20; X. 8.). In one passage Manu is spoken of as the *Vayuna*, i. e., (the shower of) the Path.

As the Path acquired the moral sense, emphasis shifted to the light on the path, guidance and leadership. Thus we have the Sanskrit word "*hotā*" (Zend, *Zoatar*) Greek "*hodos*" (literally way or road). It is pre-eminently the epithet of Agni the Torch-bearer, (*R. V.* I. 1. 1; I. 15.). "Agni is the Torch-bearer, lighting the road of knowledge, the truth, and the manifold glory of life (*Agnir hotā kavikratuh satyah chitra-sravastamah*). The same sense rings in our ears centuries later and practically the same words are used in St. John's Gospel (XIV. 6) "I am the Way, the Truth and the Life". "I am the Light of the World. He that followeth me shall not walk in darkness, but shall have the light of life."

S. V. VENKATESWARA

No Arhan, O Lanoo, becomes one in that birth when for the first the Soul begins to long for final liberation. Yet, O thou anxious one, no warrior volunteering fight in the fierce strife between the living and the dead, not one recruit can ever be refused the right to enter on the Path that leads toward the field of Battle.

. —THE VOICE OF THE SILENCE

MINDS ARE COLOURED BY CONDITIONS, BUT COLOUR IS ONLY SKIN DEEP

[**Ransome Sutton** is the Science Editor of the *Los Angeles Times*. What he says in praise of science as a moralising force creating universal brotherhood is not altogether true ; *e. g.*, what about scientists selling their discoveries and inventions to the war-mongers ? But even so, it is not difficult to concede that the attitude of science to nature and man is nearer the truth than that of religions. —Eds.]

Bitterly indeed we Americans have learned that war does not pay. As the result of a Civil War among ourselves, antagonisms were created which greatly interfere with our internal welfare. During a war with Spain, we seized the Philippines, raised our flag over 13,000,000 aliens, and have since learned that the seizure was a mistake, morally and politically as well as financially. Then, largely because of gratitude to France and loyalty to England, we squandered our best blood and wealth in the world's worst war and must now pay the piper. And these tragic experiences apply to all nations that have ever made war on other nations.

Until recently, my countrymen thought themselves very religious. Naturally so, because the country was settled by congregations seeking religious freedom—Puritans, Huguenots, Quakers and many other creeds. The toleration they sought, however, was not practised by them. Puritan congregations were tight little packs whose psychology obliged them to hate all other creeds—for the love of God and the hope of heaven. Shooting red men was no violation of the commandment which says:

“Thou shalt not kill,” although it was both law and gospel “thatt the worde of God shall be the onely rule to be attended unto in ordering the affayres of government”.

Other creeds were equally intolerant. They had just enough religion to make them hate, but not enough to make them respect one another. It was the descendants of such peoples that spread across the continent.

My parents were a part of the great migration. In Kansas the parties which brought them together settled, took up homesteads, fenced fields, built a church and school house. In the church, circuit riding ministers flayed the devil and the Pope. We were largely Methodists, and Methodism then was fiercely evangelical. Other Protestant creeds were tolerated, but Catholicism was taboo. In the school, the teachings squared with the preachings in the church. Now fancy our feelings when a family of Roman Catholics settled among us ! Sure, we shunned them—at first. But how could you go on shunning folks who were always doing good ? Just as soon as we became acquainted with these new neighbours, we

learned to like them and to respect their beliefs. And what happened there always happens whenever well-meaning individuals or nations become acquainted with one another. As stated by Jonathan Swift :—

There is nothing wanting to make all rational and disinterested people in the world of one religion, but that they should walk together every day.

In the United States, there are still many hair-splitting creeds, but the devotees touch elbows, and nowhere, save in certain backwoods sections, are neighbours judged by their religious affiliations.

During the last fifty years, I have seen a still more saving grace at work on the mind of man. That serene influence is science. To geographical boundaries it pays no attention. No difference where or by whom a new discovery is made, the whole world rejoices. Its announcements are real revelations. Pack patriotism still builds up tariff walls, battleships and international antagonisms, but already science has done more than all the missionaries to soften the savagery of pack patriotism. Nations yet claim the right to prey upon one another, but no nation nowadays interferes with the inflow or outflow of new knowledge. We do not even think of scientific research in terms of nationality. We think of it as universal, something which belongs by right to everybody regardless of government or local laws, and Langdon-Davies has convinced me that its re-

searches lead through the mazes of all religions toward God indwelling in the universe.

Everywhere sensible men and women are becoming more and more aware of weaknesses in their own theologies. In even the most sacred writings there are conflicting passages, where the hands of inspired writers seem to have slipped, and in these passages largely lurk the implications which sects exaggerate into creeds. Looking beneath man-coined words for fundamental truths, science is surely stripping away the rags of superstition; and the theology that remains is beautifully of one accord.

Recently, I had an opportunity to look through a collection of bibles including the sacred writings upon which all the great religions are founded, and was amazed to find them so fundamentally similar. If you search for concord rather than for discord in these venerable volumes, you find it—find the same golden rules running through them all.

Science has just one aim—to place knowledge in the seat of ignorance. "I am no scientist, although I read your articles with a feeling of great gratitude," a minister who once did a good deal of anathematizing has just written me. "If I had my way every preacher would be compelled to study science along with theology. For facts, both physical and mental, as well as moral, are all intertwined and come together in the spiritual. The more science-minded I become, the more tolerant

I become toward everything and everybody."

Human nature, it seems, is naturally prejudiced against anything one is not up on. In his *Essay on the Human Understanding*, John Locke declared: "New opinions are always suspected, and usually opposed, without any other reason, but because they are not already common."

Science has to face that fact. Acquiring scientific information, however, is like getting acquainted with strangers: the frown of ignorance and prejudice disappears in the presence of understood truth. The white races have recently run to science. Some of its blessings have been given to the world: good roads, horseless carriages, electric lights, refrigerators, telephones, motion pictures, airplanes, radios, life saving methods of treating diseases and labour saving machinery. Such gifts, however, are still viewed with suspicion, particularly by peoples whose minds have specialized in philosophy or other forms of culture. To be able to build telescopes which bring the heavens down to earth may make us feel superior, but I have a feeling that this ability tends toward greater humility. When Sir Edwin Arnold came to California and looked through the then largest telescope, he said to the astronomers: "Your theories do not disturb my philosophies."

According to anthropologists, the races differ less than most of us suppose. They say we all belong to the same genus and species, our differences, both mental and physi-

cal, being mostly due to the conditions under which we live. After a careful study of various types of people in New York City, Dr. Franz Boas of Columbia University, former president of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, concluded:

That the American-born descendants of these types differ from their parents, and that the differences develop in early childhood and persist throughout life. . . The head of the American-born Sicilian becomes rounder. The face becomes narrower, stature and weight increase. . . The American-born Hebrew has a longer and narrower head than the European-born. . . The average ability of the white race is found to the same degree in a large proportion of individuals of all other races. . . There is no reason to suppose that they are unable to reach the same level of civilization represented by the bulk of our own people.

In the public schools of Los Angeles, all the races come together, and the teachers tell me that dark pupils learn just as quickly as white ones. As a result of his studies, Professor Boas expressed the hope "that the data of anthropology may teach us a greater tolerance of forms of civilization different from our own".

No one nation has monopolized the Nobel Prize. It has been awarded to Americans, Austrians, Belgians, Canadians, Dutch, Danes, Englishmen, East Indians, Frenchmen, Germans, Italians, Norwegians, Poles, Russians, Spaniards, Swedes and Swiss. Although India has never made a speciality of science, one of her sons won the prize

in physics four years ago.

As a boy, I shared the white man's belief that jungle peoples are hopelessly ignorant, but a few months experience with jungle Africans cured me of that belief. They play a game called "Bao," which requires more memory, more foresight and more genius than any of the card games played by white people. They tom-tom intelligence across the continent—as, for example, when they drummed the news of the sinking of the Lusitania from Khartoum to Nigeria faster than the news could be relayed by cable. Many things they do are as magical to us as our radio is to them. And those who know them best suspect that their minds, having developed differently from ours, may be deeply wise in their own way.

Down on the Orinoco delta, I

saw a venomous snake strike a white man. No white doctor could have saved him, but a native medicine man did.

No matter how backward people may appear, break bread with them open-mindedly, and you will probably learn to like them and find yourself wondering at their peculiar wisdom, provided they are respected by their own law-abiding folks.

Our changing attitude toward other races represents the most important result of the operation of new scientific knowledge. Since all men are blood cousins, there seems to be no reason why everybody should not help science in its search for everybody's God. Nor does there seem to be any reason why anybody should close his eyes to the light revealed, whether brightly or dimly, by every religion.

RANSOME SUTTON

Atoms are called "Vibrations" in Occultism . . . Atoms fill the immensity of Space, and by their continuous vibration *are* that MOTION which keeps the wheels of Life perpetually going . . . As described by Seers—those who can see the motion of the interstellar shoals, and follow them in their evolution clairvoyantly—they are dazzling, like specks of virgin snow in radiant sunlight. Their velocity is swifter than thought, quicker than any mortal physical eye could follow, and, as well as can be judged from the tremendous rapidity of their course, the motion is circular . . . Standing on an open plain, on a mountain summit especially, and gazing into the vast vault above and the spacial infinitudes around, the whole atmosphere seems ablaze with them, the air soaked through with these dazzling coruscations. At times, the intensity of their motion produces flashes like the Northern lights during the *Aurora Borealis*. The sight is so marvellous, that, as the Seer gazes into this inner world, and feels the scintillating points shoot past him, he is filled with awe at the thought of other, still greater mysteries, that lie beyond, and within, this radiant ocean . . .

—H. P. BLAVATSKY, *The Secret Doctrine*, Vol. I, 633-634.

THE OUTCRY AGAINST COMPARATIVE PHILOSOPHY

[Mr. P. T. Raju, M. A., Sastri, has Specialized in *Nyaya* (Logic) and at present is making a comparative research of the Hegelian and the Vedantic systems under the guidance of Sir S. Radhakrishnan at the Andhra University.—EDS.]

Serious doubts are felt by some people in India as regards the value and reliability of comparative philosophy.* The doubters allege that comparison is not only of no value, but also leads to misrepresentation. In favour of this view, it might perhaps be said that, in comparing our systems with those of the West, we generally tend to test the importance of the former by using the latter as the standard. In so doing, we tacitly or overtly hold the latter in higher esteem. As politically conquered by a Western nation, we regard it and its culture as superior to us and our culture. In comparing our philosophy therefore with that of the West, we help to aggravate our sense of inferiority—which is certainly undesirable.

If it is true that the feeling of inferiority is engendered or intensified by comparative philosophy, then certainly it is to be discouraged. But on the contrary, we find, even in the West, many scholars of the opinion that India has reached the greatest of speculative heights and can be proud of philosophers of the keenest analytical skill. It is true that this opinion as expressed by some Indians is dogmatic rather than a result of

serious consideration. And the unwillingness of some ordinary enthusiasts may be due not only to a want of a thorough and sympathetic grasp of the Western systems, but also to mere prejudice. And this prejudice is ultimately nothing but the fear of being shown its weakness, assumed or real. The Christian is prejudiced against the heathen, the Jew against the Gentile; so is the Hindu against the Mlechchha. In each case the former is nowadays very sensitive to any criticism by the latter. But in this twentieth century, when a rational and sympathetic understanding of all religions and philosophies is nearly accomplished, this sensitiveness is a tacit and unconscious admission of weakness, and the prejudice is practically the fear of its disclosure. If so, it is again the outcome of the sense of inferiority, hidden in the innermost depths of the mind.

As the objectors to comparative philosophy contend, comparison may lead to some misrepresentation. Similarities may occur in very divergent systems with quite opposite standpoints. And this fact may be the source of some misrepresentation and misunderstanding. For example, one may

* The word is used in the very general sense of a comparative study of philosophy.

compare Spinoza's Substance with Sankara's Brahman. But the astonishing and fundamental difference between the two is the difference in their methods. Spinoza's geometrical method never could have been endorsed by Sankara. Spinoza's Substance, like Sankara's Brahman, transcends discursive thought. But the former does not notice the inconsistency in the attempt to deduce the phenomenal world from what transcends our discursive thought. And the importance which Spinoza assigns to the deductive method becomes quite obvious, the moment one opens his *Ethics*. But such a deduction could never have been conceived by Sankara. His method is a consuming dialectic, the principle of which, again, may be compared, without any limitation, to the principle of coherence or non-contradiction of Bradley and Bosanquet. But this again would be a misrepresentation, for the principle has only a negative significance in the metaphysics of Sankara, whereas it is positively significant in the theories of Bradley and Bosanquet. The Absolute of the latter two is a coherent whole, but coherence cannot be attributed to the Brahman of the former, though it is not incoherent. These differences can be traced ultimately to the difference in their standpoints and conceptions of philosophy—which, however, cannot be described here for want of space.

Yet these objections do not

prove that comparison itself would be misleading. They only show that it is difficult, not that it is impossible. *Comparison should be between system and system, but not between concept and concept.* Even comparison between concept and concept, if it is to be thorough, should lead to the comparison of systems—which means that the concepts are taken with all the significance they derive from the peculiar contexts. Only such comparison can have metaphysical value.

This requirement makes the task very difficult. For when two systems are compared, problems may be found in the one which are not at all present in the other. For example, some Western scholars have pointed to the fact that most of our metaphysical systems are indifferent to ethics.* It is true, the ethical problem did not present itself to our ancients as it did to most of the Westerners. To the former the ethical code was subservient to religion, whereas to the latter ethics required an absolute justification for its being. Yet our systems could have formulated a theory of morality, even admitting its subservience to a higher ideal. And there is no reason why we, who inherit them, should not perform the task. In doing this, we may come across very valuable principles, the importance of which might have been so far unrecognised, or we may even find certain inconsistencies that might have been left unnoticed. If attempts

* For example, Prof. McKenzie is of the opinion that Indian ethics are unphilosophical. See Hopkins *Ethics of India*.

are made to remove the inconsistencies, and to develop upon the discovered principles, new roads to progress will certainly be opened.

The view that we should not refer to any Western philosopher in expounding our systems, lest we misinterpret, though it reveals an extremely cautious mind, is not in harmony with the spirit of our times and is indifferent to their needs. This is the time when the peoples of the earth want to understand each other fully without any misapprehension, and this spirit is seen not only in politics but also in every other branch of life. To avoid misunderstanding, to bring home to others that our philosophy is as living as theirs, there could be no better way than comparison. The rationality of our systems and the presence in them of elements of universal interest, could be exhibited best by this method. This would be useful not only in making others understand us but also in finding out what is living and what is dead in our philosophies. The scientific spirit has penetrated our country like many other parts of the globe. Its inquisitive attitude first resulted in calling in question everything ancient and accepted on authority. The first fruit of modern education was a distrust of our dharma, our Vedas, and our philosophies. But later, when Western scholars, like Max Müller, demonstrated their worth through a comparative study, there was a recoil from the extreme of absolute disbelief. Yet to regard Indian philosophy as beyond reach of comparison, and

comparison as compromising its greatness, is to forget the pitiable state out of which it has been lifted, and is the opposite extreme to be avoided. It is only comparative study that has recognised its value, and that can spread its influence and win for it universal recognition. Though every system of philosophy, like poetry, is tinged with the peculiarities of the environment in which it is born, yet, if it is truly rational, it does not fail to contain in it factors which would make it a world-philosophy.

Besides, we have a hoary past, and so possess an individuality that is showing symptoms of becoming inflexible. Nations that have no past, and so no independent culture, are very susceptible to every change, because this individuality is still in the process of formation, and does not yet show signs of ossification. Once formed, it too begins to resist every modification and every incorporation of new elements. And an individuality that is agile and full of life, and therefore progressive, never shows any recalcitrance in assimilating anything new and dropping everything outworn. If our individuality is to continue as a living force it must be able not only to preserve the vital elements of the past, but also to assimilate new elements from outside. To know what is necessary to incorporate from outside, we must completely understand the nature of our individuality. Its peculiarity can never be fully grasped unless we compare it with

others. Our philosophy is its best expression. The value of its comparison, therefore, with other philosophies should not be disputed.

It has been said above that comparison between system and system would occasion new syntheses through the discovery of valuable principles or ignored inconsistencies. This progressive thought will certainly not be a mere colligation of similarities. Nor can all similarities be valuable. The atomism of the Nyaya-Vaisheshika may resemble the atomism of Democritus. But neither can be of scientific value now. And the most important contribution of the Nyaya-Vaisheshika to philosophy, we may say, is its logical theory. But to such an abstract level Democritus could not rise. Only in Plato and Aristotle, who lived long after Democritus, do we find real contributions to logic. So the similarity found in these pluralists cannot enable us to say much about the minds of the philosophers, or about the environments in which the two philosophies were born.

Even a grouping of valuable similarities cannot be a philosophy. For philosophy is a consistent and connected expression, and a mere aggregate of statements cannot lay claim to the title of philosophy. Properly speaking, there is no philosophy which is comparative philosophy, just as there is no religion which is comparative religion. There is only a comparative study of philosophy just like

the comparative study of religion. This progressive thought would therefore be an ever renewing systematisation, which includes all presented facts and yet transcends them. It is claimed by Kant that he has reconciled rationalism with empiricism and transcended both. He could do so only by comparing them. He did not stop with finding out what is true or false in both, but brought together what is valuable in both, and gave the combination a new shape. And in the attempt he brought about what he called the Copernican revolution in philosophy. Such is the nature of every important advance in thought. Every systematisation adds to the facts systematised a new quality which the facts by themselves do not possess. Prof. Radhakrishnan said in the sixth International Congress of Philosophy that the philosopher looks not only backwards, but also forwards, whereas Hegel remarks that the owl of Minerva does not start on its flight until the evening shades of twilight begin to fall. So the former, unlike many philosophers, seems to be more sanguine, for to him philosophy is not merely a systematic survey of what already has been accomplished but also creative.

No attempt is made here to deal in detail with any of the methods and results of comparative philosophy. This paper expresses only the writer's reactions to the attitude of some towards comparative philosophy in India.

P. T. RAJU

THE RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCES OF THE PROPHET OF ISLAM.

[Abnormal experiences are neither miracles, nor are they super-natural. Miracles are but the results of the operation of forces at present unknown to science but not unknowable. There is no super-nature, though there is an invisible aspect to Nature. Man as part of Nature also has an invisible aspect. All phenomena called abnormal or religious or psychical or mystical or occult, or by other similar names, are traceable to that invisible and little known aspect.

In the ancient Oriental Esoteric Philosophy, Psychology occupies an important place. It teaches that all human beings who have abnormal experiences are, in the main, of two types—(1) sub-normal and (2) super-normal. The first class is made up of mediums and sensitives; the second of adepts. Mediumship is the opposite of adeptship; the medium is the passive instrument of foreign influences, the adept actively controls himself and all inferior potencies. To put it in another way: there are two kinds of seership—that of the psyche and that of the Nous. The former is the lower type and there is little of consistency and less of enlightenment in the psychic seer; the Noetic Seer, on the contrary, is master of his faculties, as the astronomer is of his telescope.

Almost every religion contains a record of the psychological experiences of its prophet and patriarchs. Sometimes the followers of a particular creed think it irreverent to study, scan and analyse the recorded experiences of their prophet. We think this unfortunate for the cause of knowledge. We therefore welcome this attempt of **Professor M. Aslam** to examine the religious experiences of the Prophet of Arabia, and no one can take exception to the able handling of the subject by one of His own followers. In H. P. Blavatsky's *Isis Unveiled* the student of the subject will find adequate explanations of the experiences described and commented upon in this article. —Eds.]

By religious experiences I understand experiences which, different from ordinary sensuous and even intuitive experiences, may be said to constitute evidence of contact between the experients and the Divine Being. The modern interest in such experiences as a key to the study of religion seems wholesome; but this interest, to be fruitful, must be directed to the study of those original experients who have founded religious traditions. Muslims believe that religious personalities have a kinship, that they have anticipated and acknowledged one another, and that fundamentally the experiences they have had are of the same order as those of their own

Prophet, who used to say, "The Prophets of God are as sons of the same Father." As Muslims owe this belief to their Founder, the latter's own experiences constitute, for them, the very norm of "religious experience"—so that to acquaint ourselves with the experiences of the Prophet is to acquaint ourselves with the experiences of all Prophets and therefore with the heart of religion, as Muslims view it.

There are various kinds of religious experience as we find them in the Prophet. Says the Quran (42: 51):—

And it is not for any mortal that God should speak to him except by *inspiring, or from behind a veil, or by*

sending a messenger and revealing by His permission what He pleases; surely He is High, Wise.

This verse lays down three different ways in which God communicates to man :—

1. "Inspiration" or *wahy*, which may be described broadly as intuition. No words are transmitted nor any sights seen which have symbolic significance, but only ideas are communicated and these may later be described or made use of by the recipient :

2 "From behind a veil," which would include (a) dreams which come true, (b) visions which are dreams in a waking or a semi-waking state and (c) verbal inspiration, the words of which, however, are heard from nowhere in particular, or are seen written on a paper presented as in a dream, or are uttered by the recipient involuntarily ; and

3. "Revelation" proper, which is recited to the recipient by "an angel" in human form. This form of communication is the rarest in the entire field of religious experience and has been had, according to Islam, by the greatest of religious personalities only, by those called "Prophets" in the Quranic sense.

It is only fair to state that according to Islam all these may be experienced by very ordinary persons, particularly intuitions, true dreams and even visions, but they become signs of divine favour only as they become distinguished by superior quality as well as quantity; as they pertain more and more to matters important to mankind at large; and as they display increasingly the Knowledge, Power and Will of God.

To proceed now to describe the higher forms of the Prophet's experiences—called revelations. Among, what may be called their

objective symptoms we find the following :—

1. Symptoms of fear, such as (a) sweating, (b) flushing of the face, and (c) a general sense of awe.
2. Symptoms of bodily relaxation.
3. Symptoms of sleepiness.

On the subjective symptoms of moments of revelation we have the Prophet's own report :—

Revelation comes to me, at times like the ringing of a bell, and this form of revelation is the hardest for me. The sound withdraws, while I have already secured the words which it brought. At other times I am visited by an angel, in human form, and he recites to me so that I am able to remember later what he recites.

An important point to note here is that while verbal revelation as also the appearance of angels is denied by modernists in theology—both Muslim and others—as being at all possible, in the Muslim, as also in non-Muslim records it is presented as the most important and distinctive form of religious experience.

It is verbal revelation which raises the experiences of great religious personalities above the vagueness of those whose influence is less far-reaching, and it is verbal revelation which renders religious experience measurable and therefore fit material for systematic study and evaluation.

How about the content of those revelations? We may state broadly that they were either prophecies about the future or instructions to the Prophet, such as had the effect of training and strengthening his mind. We find in the records numerous cases of revelation which gave the Prophet peeps, as it were,

into the Unseen and the Unknown. On occasion these were readily proved to be valid and true. For instance, a Jewish woman who hated the Prophet invited him to a feast and served him with a poisoned dish. The Prophet refused to eat it, the dish itself declaring that it was poisoned. Later, one of his companions unwittingly ate of the same dish and died. On another occasion, we are told, two emissaries having come to him on behalf of the King of Persia demanded his surrender in the name of their ruler. The Prophet appointed a day for reply and, when the day arrived, told them that his God had killed their king. The men returned stupefied, only to learn that while they were away on this errand the heir apparent had suddenly dethroned and killed his father. Besides these peeps into the Unknown which were tested immediately, his revelations embodied prophecies about the more distant future. Examples are his prophecies about the ultimate triumph of Islam, the spread of its empire and the destruction of its enemies; and often enough these contained specific and numerous details. Examples may also be found in the Prophet's prophecies about himself. One is embodied in a verse of the Quran which was revealed when he was still at Mecca, alone and unassisted. The verse proclaims Muhammad as a Prophet unto mankind and compares him to Moses. This description turned out to be true, and incidentally was in accord with the Old Testament prophecy contained in Deuter-

onomy, XVIII, 18, which foretells the advent of a Prophet like unto Moses from amongst the brethren of the Israelites, that is, the Ishmaelites who were the ancestors of the Prophet.

Prophecies may also be divided, from another point of view, into those which are mere premonitions and those which are not foretellings merely, but embody the Will as well as the Knowledge and the Power of the Divine Personality. Revelation of this kind, which embodied prophecies about events conditioned by other—not apparently connected—events is the most characteristic amongst the religious experiences of the Prophet. A convincing example of this kind of prophecy relates to the date when the wrath of God was to visit the Meccans who had treated him so cruelly and had derided his claims to being their teacher. The prophecy said that disasters would come to the Meccans as soon as the Prophet went away from amongst them. We know from history that the troubles of the Meccans, which included a severe famine, began with the Hejira, that is, the departure of the Prophet.

If we treat the various classes of experiences so far described as experiences which are only moments in a long life, how are we to have any idea of the life of the Prophet as a whole, manifesting the quality and the degree of the contact which he claimed he had with the Divine Personality? A knowledge of this side of the Prophet's experience is to be had from a study of the Prophet's prayers, also of those mo-

ments, which were very many, during which he showed a terrible certainty about God. It is said that he was God-mad and when he prayed he was so overcome by the Divine Presence that he wept. There are many incidents which show how great and unfailing was his faith in the protection and presence of God. One of the best known is the incident of the Cave Thaur in which he and his bosom companion Abu Bakr were closeted together for three of the most terrible days of his life. At one moment the clatter of his pursuers was heard clearly. Their feet were visible when Abu Bakr, overcome by fear, said "If they but bowed a little they would find us." The Prophet replied, "Stop, O Abu Bakr! You think we are two. We are not two. There is a Third and that is Allah."

Tradition has also recorded, very much as in the case of other religious personalities, certain experiences which appear quite extraordinary and unconvincing. As one notable example, I may mention the *Miraj* or the alleged ascension of the Prophet in the course of a night to the heavens and his return to the place whence he started on his night journey. Popular accounts have greatly exaggerated the original narrative, which clearly states that on the initiation of the "journey" the Prophet's "eye was asleep but his heart [which in Oriental phraseology is frequently equivalent to mind] was awake". The original account also states, between parentheses, that "Prophets while they have their eyes asleep have their heart awake".

The account closes by saying that "when the Prophet awoke he was resting in the Holy Mosque [of Mecca]". The whole account suggests that the so-called "ascension" was only a vision in a semi-waking state. Thus understood, the experience is no longer so very extraordinary—it can be fitted in with the other experiences of the Prophet.

Once, however, we choose to describe the experience as a vision, we raise the important question of how sights seen in visions and dreams are to be interpreted as species of religious experience. It is well known that the religious literature of all peoples includes what may be called books on the interpretation of dreams. How these books have come into being is an interesting question. My own view is that they have grown with the religious experience of man.

I have described the experiences of the Prophet sympathetically, believing that such a description would be important and interesting. It is true, however, that the experiences, even supposing they took place as here described, raise all kinds of questions. The most pressing, and practically the most interesting, questions which they raise are: Are these experiences valid? Are they true? Are they really evidence of contact with God, as they claim to be?

I cannot answer these questions here, but can only suggest the issues raised. The first is: Was the Prophet sincere in reporting his experiences? This is comparatively easy to settle: Did not the

Prophet produce a whole nation of sincere followers? And was he not in his lifetime surrounded by friends who were embodiments of sincerity? And could such a measure of sincerity be produced except as a response to an equal if not greater sincerity in himself?

But, admitting the Prophet to be sincere, the second issue is: Was the Prophet of sound mind while he had such experiences and also when he reported and interpreted them? Were not these experiences delusions with only a subjective significance, none being outside the Prophet's own chain of experiences?

The Prophet seems to have been well aware of the likelihood of such questions on the nature and value of his experiences. We have repeated denials of all possible interpretations other than the one which the Prophet and his followers put on the experiences, *viz.*, that they were communications from God to man. The Divine origin of these was accepted by him and his followers--and they included some of the most critical,

sincere and intelligent of human beings, many of whom had experiences similar to his.

In modern times, though religious experience is being looked upon with increasing deference, there is still an unwillingness to accord it the value which the experients and their followers attach to it. But religious experiences have not been studied in any detail so far, and most of the views—whether of psychologists or others—are coloured by the attempt to find naturalistic explanations of all possible phenomena. If religious experience is not sound, it can only be put down as a form of insanity. And if it is a form of insanity we must answer the question whether any form of insanity is ever correlated—as it was in the case of the Prophet—with an extraordinary power to purify multitudes of human beings, to raise them intellectually, morally and spiritually, to change the course of events in an outstanding way and to foretell events, even the first conditions of which are too distant to be observed.

M. ASLAM

NEW BOOKS AND OLD

SOCIETY AND LITERATURE

[**Dr. Ernst Kohn-Bramstedt** is a German sociologist as well as an historian of literature. His speciality is the social aspects of European literature. He is now preparing a book on "Class-Distinction, as reflected in German Literature of the Nineteenth Century". According to his view the task of the sociology of literature is on the one hand to get information by the analysis of the social problems involved in literature, and on the other to understand literature by a new approach which examines its social implications.

The prospects of literature producing a world-unity may be, as our distinguished author thinks, remote in spite of the fact that different literatures travel round the globe and receive welcome. But surely, if not the many readers, the authors at least are in a position to further the aim of Goethe with whose words the article closes. Such an international organization as The P. E. N., can contribute, indeed is contributing worthily, by bringing together men and women of all climes and races who wield that weapon which is universally acknowledged as mightier than the sword.--EDS.]

The sociology of literature is a young and growing, but very important science. Histories of German, English, American, Indian and other literatures deal only with the special problems of the literature of each nation. But the sociology of literature is a more general science; it is a branch of the sociology of culture, and as such it endeavours to analyse by a comparative method the literature of all nations and of all periods.

What are the chief problems of the sociology of literature? What is its typical approach? The normal history of literature shows a tendency to isolate literature, considering the authors as individuals or discussing the æsthetic content of their writings. The sociology of literature, without denying the claim of *Æsthetics*, stresses the close connection between literature and society.

Æsthetics deals primarily with the æsthetic equipment of man, particularly with his faculty of imagination. It can find from this starting point a way to understand the characteristics of such literary movements as classicism, romanticism, realism, etc. *The sociology of literature* attempts to consider the production and reception of literature as functions of the social process. Therefore its task must be to examine on the one hand the sociological conditions of the writers and of their work, on the other hand to analyse the reading public and its literary needs. The intermediate link between the analysis of the writer and that of the public is the study of the sociological basis of literary taste.

The sociology of taste would have to state the rôle of many different factors which determine the taste, *e. g.*, race, climate, tradition, social position, influence of profes-

sion, of generation, of religion, special tendencies of certain circles, literary modes, etc. Everybody will agree that the literary taste of a missionary in India is different from that of a trade unionist in Wales or from that of a spoiled elegant lady of Society in London. On the other hand it is evident that a courtly "troubadour" of the Middle Ages was influenced by an æsthetic different from that of a naturalistic writer in the age of industrialism and of the nineteenth-century beginnings of mass democracy, or from that of a fascist author of to-day.

In the following short essay we cannot analyse the interesting correlation between social change and changes of taste, nor can we deal with the problems of the reading public.* We must confine ourselves to making some references to the sociology of the writer and to the analysis of the function of literature in different political systems. Finally, we may sketch the process of reception of one national literature by another country or continent.

From the days of the Greeks and Romans up to the Renaissance there were two main alternatives for the social position of the writer and of the artist in Europe. He might belong by birth to the ruling class, that is to the so-called "leisured class". The members of this class, having a good income and letting the slaves or the serfs work for them, sometimes devoted

themselves to science and poetry. That was the case, for example, with Æschylus whose father was a noble landed proprietor, or with Sophocles, the son of a well-to-do entrepreneur who employed slaves in his factory. But very often the poet possessed nothing more than his talent as a weapon in the struggle of life. Then he needed a patron and became dependent on the favour of the powerful. The old German bard, the French "troubadour" of the Middle Ages and the Italian poeta laureatus of the Renaissance were all forced to seek the patronage of the court or of the nobility. If the people in power were generous and conciliatory, the poets overloaded them with eulogies and dedications. But if the patrons were sparing in their gifts or if they refused money, the authors often used the whip of satire, and sometimes libel. The famous Persian poet Firdausi, for example—whose millenary has just been celebrated—complains bitterly in his great poem "Sháhnáma" of his poverty and of the lack of assistance from the court. Instead of the hoped-for pension which, for example, the outstanding German lyricist Walter v. der Vogelweide obtained from his emperor after many disappointments, Firdausi received only an insulting gratuity which in all probability he divided between a steward and a beer-vendor. The poet revenged himself by denouncing the Sultan as son of a slave

* A valuable contribution to the study of the English reading public has been recently made by Au D. LEAVIS, *Fiction and the Reading Public*. But her approach is more that of education of the public than that of sociology.

and as a wretched creature.

The dependence of the poets on the feudal rulers was not without influence on the character of their work. The writers often shared the view of life of the rich and powerful and therefore despised manual labour and did not understand the grievances of the "man in the street".

Art in the sixteenth and seventeenth century was still courtly art and the relation of the artist to the Court remained a vital matter for him. The dependence of the artist on patronage was sometimes a clog on effective writing, but it was on the whole less injurious than the bad effect of the inhibitions of a few poets coming from the ruling class. Goethe with his wonderfully realistic attitude has observed this disturbing influence of high birth on the literary production of Byron.*

In the modern world the publisher has taken the place of the patron. Formerly the author was dependent on the taste of the noble circles, now he often becomes the slave of public opinion which is interpreted by the publisher and by the critic. It is a well-known fact that important books with original ideas and high achievement succeed with much more difficulty than mediocre books. The general idleness of man and the changes of literary fashions favour or hinder the success of books. This is meant by the old Latin proverb: "Habent sua fata libelli." The success of best-sellers and of most popular books brought

about by the propaganda of publishers and Press was delightfully satirised by Arnold Bennett in his novel, *A Great Man*.

There is no doubt that great works, in fiction as well as in non-fiction, need a longer time for elucidating whatever is original in them than ordinary literature. Nobody had any real appreciation of the very fine poems of Hölderlin in the life-time of this unfortunate German. How long had David Hume to wait until he could enjoy the success of his philosophical writings! Similarly, the bulk of the first edition of Schopenhauer's *The World as Will and Idea* in 1818 had to be destroyed by the publisher as a result of the lack of public interest. Only thirty years later, after the disappointment of the German bourgeoisie by the failure of the revolution of 1848, there was suddenly a widespread disposition amongst the intelligentsia towards the pessimistic doctrines of this lonely philosopher.

The public can understand new and advanced thought only by a certain attitude of mind, which depends largely on changes in society. This idea brings us to the relation between political systems and literature. The prevailing political system and the social structure which is its basis are perfectly reflected in the literature of their time. For example, in the era of Absolutism the Court circles wielded not only the political power but determined also very widely the criteria of æsthetic appraisal. For this statement—as I

* P. Eckermann, *Conversations with Goethe* (24th February, 1825.)

have shown elsewhere*—the distinction between Tragedy and Comedy in the French and German criticism of that period is significant. The sphere of Tragedy, according to this opinion, is the sphere of the refined, the sublime and the majestic. Therefore only persons of high birth and rank, who as such possess these qualities, are allowed to figure in a tragedy, and the canon absolutely forbids the introduction of common people. On the other hand Comedy is the true field for the lower classes, particularly the artisans, since the life of this class is identified with the sphere of the comic and the vulgar. This theory, becoming a kind of superstructure of class distinction, is also, perhaps unconsciously, reflected in the double plot of some Shakespearean plays, especially "Midsummer Night's Dream" and "Much Ado about Nothing". But sometimes Shakespeare's genius caused to mingle in his plays people of different classes, and it is very significant that it was for this reason that one of the most recent of absolute rulers, King Frederick the Great, was disgusted with "Hamlet". He disapproved of it because in it porters and grave-diggers stand beside princes and kings and "make speeches which are worthy of them".

While the liberal system favoured individual discretion to such an extent that it seemed necessary for every member of the upper classes to have a pronounced taste

of his own, modern dictatorships determine directly or indirectly the norms of good and bad taste for all people. In the fascist countries such authors whose work has no positive connection with the ideology of the totalitarian state or with the myth of blood and soil have small chance of acknowledgment or of a wide public. From the standpoint of these governments there are three categories of literature; forbidden books, disliked books and favoured books. Such states prefer on the whole to provide themselves with their own national literature and therefore they select only a few congenial foreigners. In Germany to-day, amongst recent English writers, D. H. Lawrence is most approved, because they hold him a forerunner of Fascism and put him just next to Nietzsche, the great philosopher of power. Similarly, the works of the French poet Giono, which show an outspoken tendency to "regionalism" and to the worship of soil, are widespread in the Germany of to-day. On the other side, the books of Jewish authors now banned in Germany—those of Feuchtwanger and Stefan Zweig, for instance—have been for many years widely read in England.

We cannot deal here in detail with the considerable problems of the reception of the literature of one country by another. But we can give only some reflections on the influence of Indian literature on modern European thought.

Roughly speaking we have to

* See my treatise "*Probleme der Literatur-ästhetik*" in "*Neue Jahrbücher für Wissenschaft und Jugendbildung*," Vol. VII, Leipsic, 1931.

distinguish three periods in the process of the recognition of Indian culture in Europe. The first at the beginning of modern history, the second in the first part of the nineteenth century and the third in the twentieth century. At the beginning of modern history the Europeans, both as conquerors and as missionaries, brought home fantastic news of the existence of a strange country with eccentric customs and mad cults, with cruel princes and tempting women. This very distant country had for Europeans the attraction of being strange, but it was not so valuable to them as the home countries with their so-called superior civilisation and religion.

The second period, in the beginning of the nineteenth century, saw a much more profound interpretation of the strange phenomenon of Indian literature and wisdom. The influence of the Christian churches had meanwhile decreased and the intelligentsia had realized that Christian metaphysics was no longer absolute. Fr. Schlegel, Heine, Schopenhauer, etc., had a romantic conception of India with her deep spirituality. They loved and idealised India, just as Classicism idealised ancient Greece. The words of Goethe, versified from the Koran*

God's very own the Orient !
 God's very own the Occident !
 The North land and the Southern land
 Rest in the quiet of his hand

illustrate very well the widening of the outlook on the world which sprang out of the new study of Oriental literature. On the other

hand Schopenhauer, identifying his philosophy so closely with Buddhism, did not realise the great differences between his pessimism and the religion of Buddha.

After these two periods of naïve depreciation and unlimited assimilation, a more critical understanding of Oriental and especially of Indian literature is characteristic of the twentieth century with its world-wide intercourse. While appreciating the value of the alien culture, this period recognizes the similarities as well as the differences between Indian and European thought. In science the comparative method was applied by Max Weber in his famous *Sociology of Religion* and by Rudolf Otto in his valuable work *Mysticism, East and West* (London 1932). The latter, making a shrewd comparison between the doctrines of the Śāṅkara system and of the German mystic, Meister Eckhart (1260-1327), elucidates the general nature of mysticism and its special characteristics in West and East. In his book *The Way to Philosophy*, the German G. Misch attempts the introduction to the system of Śāṅkara with the declared intention of helping the European reader to widen his outlook on life and to purify it. It is intended to force him on the one hand to give up all prejudices and on the other hand to defend truths which he has so far thought self-evident, but of which he now becomes aware through the contrast with foreign ideas.

But in spite of this fine penetra-

* Goethe, *West-Eastern Divan*. Translated by E. Dowden, p. 5.

tion of Oriental thought into modern European philosophy, the European novels which have an Indian background are more or less one-sided up to the present, for in such fiction the interpretation of Indian life and religion is a very European one. That is proved by a reading of *Kim* by Rudyard Kipling or of the German story *Siddharta* by Hermann Hesse. Both writers have been in India. Kipling, more an observer than a thinker, more man of action than philosopher, paints the coloured swarm of Indian life with impressionistic sensitiveness and describes many different Indian types. But the character of the Indians and their wisdom remain indeed strange to him. "My experience is that one can never fathom the Oriental mind." In comparison with this "Poet Laureate of English Imperialism" Hesse is more an introvert, showing in his work the religious development of the noble son of a Brahman priest. Just as the mediæval Parsifal has to go through many wrong paths in the world before being able to see the Holy Grail, Siddharta needs the experience of owning property, of voluptuousness and of despair before finding the right attitude towards the world and mankind. After a meeting with Buddha he realizes that the true wisdom is not transferable and, therefore, everybody must find a path of his own to spiritual welfare. This *leitmotiv* of Siddharta's development seems to me to be a typical mark of European individ-

ualism of the Liberal age. No general doctrine, no Yoga can help the man. Although Hesse creates intuitively and vividly the very atmosphere of Indian religion, his philosophy follows more the European than the Eastern tradition.

I would like to conclude an essay which is of necessity merely suggestive with a brief reference to a notion with which Goethe enriched the sociology of literature. World-literature just as world-trade, Goethe thought, could bring together people of various nations.

But in the present era of nationalism and of national self-sufficiency it would be dangerous to identify the existence of world trade and of world-literature with the existence of a real co-operation and integration of the nations of the world. The unity of mankind is to-day more a matter of easy transport and easy communication than a psychological and political matter. The fact that the literature of different nations and cultural units is read all over the world cannot abolish in our time the economic and psychological factors which are the causes of conflict and opposition between nations. But it will be of great value for the literary and the scientific élites in all countries to bear in mind the realistic words of Goethe:—

It cannot be our aim to bring uniformity into the thought of nations, but to make them study each other, understand each other; and if they do not want to love each other, at least they should be mutually tolerant.

ERNST KOHN-BRAMSTEDT

TRUTH : PERCEIVED AND INCARNATE*

What, I wonder would be the emotions of a Hindu student upon receiving, say from the Editor of *The Hibbert Journal*, a copy of the Revised Version of the English Bible for review? Responsibility and undeserved honour of the same order has, I feel, been conferred upon me by the Editors of THE ARYAN PATH. The *Brihadaranyaka Upanishad* (called *Aranyaka*, as it was taught in the forest—Aranya; and because of its large size, *Brihadaranyaka*) is, in the learned Professor Shastri's words :—

the greatest of the Upanishads . . . not only in extent, but also in respect of its substance and theme. It is the greatest Upanishad in the sense that the illimitable, all-embracing, absolute, self-luminous, blissful reality—the Brhat or Brahman, identical with Atman, constitutes its theme.

Here then we have a book of wisdom whose value to the Eastern mind is only comparable to that which religious experience, history and tradition have given to the Bible in the West.

What is an Upanishad? For the enlightenment of Western ignorance we cannot do better than quote Professor Hiriyanna's explanation as given in his invaluable *Outlines of Indian Philosophy*.

The word generally appears as synonymous with *rahasya* or secret. That should accordingly have been its original meaning. Etymologically the word is equivalent to sitting (*sad*) near by (*upa*) devotedly (*ni*) and in course of time it came to signify the secret instruction imparted at such sittings.

That is perhaps a little more intimate than the definition given by Madame Blavatsky :—

The name "*Upanishads*" is usually translated "esoteric doctrine". These treatises form part of the *Sruti* or "revealed knowledge," *revelation* in short, and are generally attached to the *Brahmana* portion of the Vedas, as their third division.—*The Secret Doctrine*, I. 269-70.

But to complete our understanding, we need the description given by

Shankara himself on the first page of this commentary.

This knowledge of Brahman is called "*Upanishad*" because it entirely removes this relative world together with its cause from those who betake themselves to this study; for the root "*sad*" prefixed by "*upa*" and "*ni*" means that. Books also are called Upanishads as they have the same end in view.

"Sitting near by devotedly." Expressive words. Instantly I am reminded of the words attributed to Jesus: "Where two or three are gathered together in my name, there am I in the midst." There is the same intense, disinterested drawing together of the few who are devoted to the task of *understanding* and who enjoy a spiritual communion in the quest for the truth. Note that in both cases there is a mystery to be revealed. In the one it is personal and embodied; but none the less a mystery: the revelation of truth to those who seek it with the whole heart. In the other it is impersonal and disembodied; but none the less a mystery which only devotion and whole-hearted application will reveal. To both, this understanding is emphatically not something which can be come by through detached inspection and examination of the phenomenal world. According to modern usage, it is emphatically not "scientific" knowledge which is either promised or desired. That can be had more cheaply at the price of brains. This requires consciousness. The very theme and principal enquiry of the *Brihadaranyaka Upanishad* lies outside the realm of what is now called scientific knowledge; for it proposes the enlightenment of that which science cannot objectify: the enquiring self itself. Science, being objective or not science, can obviously tell us nothing about this. It cannot reveal the awareness of the experiencing subject to itself: nothing but actual

* *The Brihadaranyaka Upanishad with the commentary of Shankaracharya*. Translated by SWAMI MADHAVNANDA. Introduction by Prof. S. Kuppaswami Shastri. (Advaita Ashrama, Mayavati, Almora, Hii. ayas. Rs. 6.).

experience can do this. Therefore the philosophy of religion—and all Indian philosophy is primarily religious, that is its glory—is fundamentally the philosophy of religious experience.

We need to make this point quite clear. It is important to do so because without what is fundamentally religious experience, all philosophy—not only Indian, but all philosophy is meaningless. Philosophy is the enquiry into the nature of existence, and unless there be initial consciousness of existence such as raises "obstinate questionings of the creature," neither the partial nor the complete answers of philosophy can be of the smallest interest. That initial enquiry of self-consciousness is the basis of all religion: philosophy is the answer, the mental abstract of experienced consciousness.

Is not the very thought of wise and experienced men being profoundly moved to enquire together upon the fundamental problems of existence like balm and sunshine to the modern mind, obsessed and harassed by the petty and recurring questions of immediate self-interest? In an age when the thoughts of men move, like their bodies, in ever-changing response to external activity which goads them almost to perpetual movement, is it not consoling even to contemplate the great sages: History itself is too young to know when the sublime Sankara meditated upon the sacred writings telling of the earliest and what perhaps remain the most profound conceptions of God and man; but the mystery which revealed itself to him is here, like a pool of limpid water in which we, thousands of years after, can bathe and be cleansed. Time itself has no power to touch the realisation of that Infinite which, at once by its inclusiveness and its exclusiveness, is only to be meditated as "Not this, not this." For purity of conception, there is nothing like it in the West. And to return to such simple profundity is like entering a forest glade from the heat and din of a modern city.

Not that I, child of the West, can

stay there for ever. To me it seems (and here I speak under correction) that there is a new dialectic to be discovered between Eastern wisdom and Western practice. When the West has worn its religious doctrines to the bare bones of personal anthropology, let it go to school in the East. When the figure of God as an old man in the skies, performing tricks with the round globe of the world like a senile child, has finally been rejected: when science has performed its cleansing function of ridding the West of the material incrustations which have grown about the idea of God, let not the West fall into the grossness of materialism, starving its intuitive faculties, vainly seeking, in the pursuit of restless activity and the flight from itself, spiritual forgetfulness. No, let it turn to the East and rediscover those conceptions of the Absolute which in their intellectual purity are untarnishable by anthropomorphic ideas. There it shall find that innermost peace which its soul so deeply needs—that rejuvenation of faith without which its eye grows dim.

And is the East to remain self-content?

That Indian religion is lacking—despite the clarity of its perception, despite an incontestable finality in its philosophic conclusions to which all religious thought must return as to a fountain head—is to me (and here again I speak under correction) most evident. It is lacking because of its bias towards abstraction. It is over-weeningly concerned with the intellectual apprehension of truth. Yet the fact remains that for the purpose of this mortal life, the perception of truth is of itself insufficient. To me it seems that India has yet to learn from the West the meaning of Incarnation. For, unless I embody the truth in word and act, Truth may exist in its sublime perfection, unimpaired and even perceived; yet something is lacking in me. Until this Truth becomes incarnate power, man's existence remains unjustified and unjustifiable. Indeed, only where he *is not* can perfection remain

truly unimpaired ; and hence creep in the perverse doctrines of nihilism. On the other hand, while we shall agree that the perfection of the all-sufficient "Not this, not this" is the great cardinal necessity without which all our ideas must suffer limitation and insufficiency, let us also agree that the acknowledgment *may* be no more than the effort of a detached and abstract mind to postulate what is in essence no more than a mathematical hypothesis. And to such a point of abstraction we shall inevitably be led if we scorn the simple teaching of the heart. Love for this Infinite is needed if its reality is to remain vital even to the mind. And if we admit this love, welcome it and endure its effects in us, something happens. Love is no sooner active than the process of incarnation begins. From this we must not shrink, though the process involve limitation, constriction and departure from perfection. Loss is inevitable ; for the process itself is anthropomorphic in intent. But then, so is life in the physical body ; and, for the purpose of mortal life, truth which is literally unbefitting to a human body is actually irrelevant. As our Western poet Blake has expressed it : "God becomes as we are, that we may be as he is." And again :—

God appears, and God is Light
To those poor souls who dwell in night ;
But does a Human Form display
To those who dwell in realms of day.

The Coming of Karuna. By RANJEE G. SHAHANI, with an Appreciation by Havelock Ellis. ("The Wisdom of the East" Series. John Murray, London. 2s. 6d.)

This is a record of a spiritual adventure. It has its charm and the author is in earnest and is not without scholarship. The book shows how one realm of knowledge melts into the other, and how science and poetry, philosophy and painting, ethics and architecture, mathematics and music, are but the multitudinous expressions

The *statement* of truth is poetry : nothing else is sufficiently inclusive to embrace the truth. So the original Upanishads are poetry in essence : mystic words that await the keys of experience for their unlocking. Their appeal is to experience—not, ultimately to any "philosophic conclusion that may be reached by the proper use of logic and dialectics". Persistently we need to emphasise this, or the rational intellect will drag us from the heights of pure perception to the market square of broiling verbal argument. The reference is always to truth perceived ; for there is no other valid point of reference. Even the great Sankara must be kept in his place as commentator ; for should his exegesis be treated as oracular, error has already begun to creep in. The temptation of philosophy is to pride of intellect. The only humiliator of this pride is continuous experience. Before that, we must be humble. And in our humility, experience will be procreant.

It is completely beyond the scope of my capacity either to praise or to criticise this Book of the Ancient Wisdom. I can only be grateful to the translator, and hope—what I do not know—that the translation is measurably worthy of the original. The preface by Professor Shastri is a model of compact and instructive eulogy.

MAX PLOWMAN

of the one, vast, creative vision of man.

In the chapter "A Theory of Poetry," the author discusses various views. To him poetry is the interpretation of Nature by an intuition of beauty. In the following chapters, especially, "In Communion with the Sphinx" and "Truth and Reality," he traces the history of science and defines its scope. He has also drawn our attention to the barrenness of pragmatism, the futility of reason, and the limitations of the specialists who have only a lop-

sided view of things and are blind to other values and experiences of life. But he has an infinite faith in the power and potency of love and builds his trust on the transcendent intuition of the mystic, an intuition which sees "a world in a grain of sand, and a heaven in a wild flower".

One is tempted to fall into line with his thinking that life is an "interminable" adventure in an ever-widening region of knowledge, and offers endless scope for speculation and exploration. The baffling sense of mystery gives our life savour and significance; else it would be a prison-house from which

there would be absolutely no escape.

The author, however, in his zeal to extol intuition, fulminates against the intellect, and calls it the "Devil himself". But intuition is not opposed to reason; perhaps intuition is the fulfilment of reason in her most exalted mood. Secondly, the innocence of childhood glorified by a Jesus, cannot refer to that of an ordinary child who shares the instinctive life with the rest of the animal kingdom; but can refer only to that of the other childhood reached by man through the travail of a birth in consciousness.

R. S. DESIKAN.

Ask The Spirits: A Symposium. Edited by DAVID GOW. (Rider & Co., London. 5s.)

A book heralded as "a remarkable collection of all the greatest communications which claim to have come from the spirit-world" naturally raises high expectations; and the volume really is so much better than the common run of psychic communications that it chokes the fancy to conceive the cloud of chaff raised by the winnowing. But throughout one feels the lack of synthesis.

There are fewer pious platitudes than one looks for in mediumistic utterances, though many of the communications are marred by emotionalism and sentimentality. Crude and childish notions stand side by side with isolated philosophical views. Orthodoxy rubs shoulders with the repudiation of dogmatism. Some selections have a lofty concept of an impersonal Deity; others as anthropomorphic a God as any the churches portray. Some of the after-death conditions described are little, if any, less material than the orthodox heaven of Muslims and Christians. There is striking lack of agreement about such fundamental questions as whether the soul reincarnates. Some deny it flatly; some profess ignorance; some affirm it positively.

The diction is generally unexceptionable if also undistinguished. There

are a very few bits of writing which would be a credit to a prose anthology, but they are offset by jarring solecisms in other excerpts, which the explanation that the book is meant for popular reading does not quite excuse. From a literary standpoint the symposium as a whole is not quite commonplace, though in quality distinctly below collections that could be compiled from the output of authors in our midst.

Must we assume the average intelligence among departed souls is lower than among the living? If retrogression is the price of soul survival, surely it comes too high. Perchance the dead have been unfortunate in their choice of spokesmen? Or shall we accept the Editor's explanation that "in the course of their evolution they pass at last beyond all mundane interests and attractions into higher states of being where *direct* communication with the people of earth is no longer possible"? (p. 16)

None of these extracts go to prove that the spirit of the departed has returned to give the messages. But to question their source is not to impugn the good faith of the mediums concerned or of those who accept them at face value, but only to suggest that, as to the nature of the communicating intelligences, the Spiritualists have not proved their case.

Ph. D.

The Way and Its Power : A Study of the Tao Tê Ching and Its Place in Chinese Thought. By ARTHUR WALEY. (George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., London. 7s. 6d.)

The *Tao Tê Ching* has suffered more translation, I suppose—and perhaps more *in* translation—by different hands than any work in the world except the Bible. Casting back, I can call to mind no fewer than twenty-eight versions, of which fourteen are English and the rest German, French and Italian. There may be others for aught I know. What is the reason for this spate of translations, and can there be any justification for a new one?

The answer to the first question is that the *Tao Tê Ching* is a short mystical treatise, full of paradoxes and pregnant with thought only half-expressed, written not merely in a language totally devoid of grammatical inflexions but in a style which for sheer terseness surely never had its equal. Such a work, it is clear, must afford scope for great diversity of interpretation; indeed, sometimes one can hardly believe that the various translations derive from one and the same text. A person of keen imagination will read into the words more than they can comfortably bear, while a more matter-of-fact mind may even be inclined to reject as nonsense all but the more practical sayings. Mr. Waley cannot fairly be classed either as an idealist or as a pragmatist, but he thinks that a new translation is needed because the work has never yet been approached from the proper angle. Incidentally, he draws a curious distinction between “historical” and “scriptural” translations. The former “set out to discover what such books meant to start with,” the latter “aim only at telling the reader what such a text means to those who use it to-day”. Of the *Tao Tê Ching* no “historical” translation exists, and this is the gap which his book is intended to fill. The distinction seems to me unsound, not to say meaningless; for surely it is, or

should be, the aim of every translator to tell us what the author had in his mind at the time of writing. He may fall far short of success, but in that case he has produced simply a bad or indifferent, not a “scriptural” translation.

However this may be, Mr. Waley contends that all previous attempts to get at the real meaning of the *Tao Tê Ching* have failed because it was envisaged as a work of the sixth instead of the third century B.C. This is not a new discovery: fifty years ago it was argued at length in the old *China Review* that the book as it stands could not possibly have been written by a philosopher, either Lao Tzu or another, who was born in the year 604 B. C. But it was still generally believed (except by those iconoclasts who would dismiss it as a forgery of the Han dynasty) to have been anterior to the writings of Chung Tzu and Lieh Tzu; such a jumble of disconnected sayings, it was felt, could hardly have been compiled after the appearance of those far more elaborate treatises. But Mr. Waley will have none of this. In his opinion, there is unmistakable internal evidence that the book was produced about 240 B.C. by “an anonymous Quietist”. It is “an extremely polemical work, directed in the main against the Realists, but at the same time siding with them in their condemnation of Confucianism and of the doctrines of Yang Chu.” And again: “It is a controversial work, and the opponents with which it deals did not exist till the 3rd century [B. C.]”. He sees in it “a continual use of phrases, metaphors and topics” derived from contemporary philosophers, and he also cites the linguistic tests recently applied to its verse portions by Professor Karlgren. But it is “above all the point of evolution reached by the ideas alluded to in the book that makes its date certain beyond any doubt”. This is perhaps too strongly put. One of the tests suggested by Mr. Waley really seems to tell against his own theory. The

hsien or "immortals" of later Taoism are foreshadowed in a certain passage of Chuang Tzu, but first actually mentioned in Lieh Tzu, where they are mysterious people who live in a far-off land. It is only in the Han dynasty that the achievement of *hsien*ship becomes the all-absorbing aim of Taoist asceticism. Now, in the *Tao Tê Ching* there is no mention of *hsien* at all. Surely the inference, if any, is that this work belongs to an earlier period than the book of Lieh Tzu, which is now placed in the second half of the third century B. C.

Altogether, Mr. Waley's introduction is so full of stimulating thought and original ideas that he need not have apologized for its taking up more than half the book. I have only room to quote one out of his many penetrating remarks:—

The *Tao Tê Ching* is not in intention (though any one may treat it as such, if he so chooses) a way of life for ordinary people. It is a description of how the Sage through the practice of Tao acquires the power of ruling without being known to rule.

After this brilliant introduction, the translation itself cannot but cause a little disappointment. All the epigrammatic terseness we associate with Lao Tzu has evaporated, and even his famous paradoxes sound rather tame and flat. "That the yielding conquers the resistant and the soft conquers the

hard is a fact known by all men, yet utilized by none." To me, this is by no means an improvement on a much older version: "The soft overcomes the hard; the weak overcomes the strong. There is no one in the world but knows this truth, and no one who can put it into practice." That elegance should be sacrificed to accuracy is excusable; but in too many passages an impossible construction is placed on the Chinese, as in Chapter 2: "The myriad creatures are worked upon by him [the Sage]; he does not disown them." This should be: "All things in Nature come forth, and he does not reject them."

Although the author denies that his book is addressed exclusively to a small class of specialists, its subtler points can only be relished by those who know some Chinese and are familiar with the problems raised by the early schools of Chinese philosophy. In fact, Mr. Waley seems to fall between two stools; for while the general reader may find the discussion of Chinese ethical terms rather dull, the serious student will not be satisfied with the meagre allowance of Chinese characters supplied in the brief Textual Notes. It is the book of a scholar, but lacking the full scholarly apparatus which should have accompanied it.

LIONEL GILES.

The Holy Mountain. By BEAGWAN SHRI HAMSA. Translated by Sri Purohit Swami from the Marathi, with an introduction by W. B. Yeats—and three photographic illustrations. (Faber & Faber, London. 8s. 6d.)

This is a rather disappointing book. It is an account of his travel experiences by the author, a sadhu, who undertook in 1908 a pilgrimage to Lake Manasarovar and Mount Kailash in Tibet. He also tells of a Mahatma he found living without food or clothing in a cave of the sacred mountain and of a vision of the God Dattatreya who materialised in front of him at Gauri-

kunda, a lake near Kailash, and gave him sanyasa.

All this is quite interesting but it is a little difficult to see quite who will profit by the recital. The travel notes, which fill the greater part of the book, are detailed and should be of service to future pilgrims but the supernormal part, the account of the Mahatma and Dattatreya, rather falls between two stools. Those readers who are disposed to be sceptical of such things will not find here any evidence calculated to disturb their scepticism while those, on the other hand, who are aware of the existence of real Mahat-

mas (whether on Kailash or elsewhere is of no importance), are apt to attach more value to their teachings than to mere descriptions of their physical appearance and so will not profit much either, since no effort is made in this book to give any account of the teachings given by either of these personages. The Mahatma, in particular, discoursed on yoga for about six hours but all we are told is that "it is impossible to describe, even meagrely, the nature of our conversations during the three days". Disappointing!

There are one or two inaccuracies. The height of Kailash is given as 30,000 feet but actually it is not more than about 22,000 feet. And who told the publishers the cock and bull story that appears on the dust-cover, namely, that Kailash is visited only by "Hindu adepts who have attained a very high

stage of spiritual development"? The pilgrimage to Kailash is performed by quite a number of people every year, passing within a few miles from this place.* To say nothing of English officials such as Mr. Ruttledge, one of whose excellent photos of Kailash adorns the book, the Maharaja and Maharani of Mysore went there only a year or two ago, and many quite ordinary folk make the pilgrimage every year though the journey is certainly arduous.

There is an introduction by the poet Yeats which, however, does not seem to call for much comment. His very readable small-talk about yoga hardly fills the gap left by the absence of the Mahatma's teachings. Incidentally, "Philaus" on page 40 should surely be "Philolaos".

SRI KRISHNA PREM

The New Testament, Vol. I. Edited by M. R. James, O. M.; assisted by Delia Lyttleton; Engravings by Eric Gill. (J. M. Dent and Sons, Ltd., London. 5s.)

A review of the New Testament obviously would be as impertinent as it would be impossible, so we can only note the scope of this present edition in modern typographical dress. Says the book jacket:—

The text is the Authorized Version, unaltered as to wording, but set in straightforward form: the poetry as poetry, the prose as ordinary prose paragraphs. There are no marginal references; the verse numbers occur only at the top of the page. . . . There is also an appendix containing more accurate translations where those of the Authorized Version are misleading or in error.

We have purposely omitted from this quotation the words "the type is large, clear, and beautiful," because we prefer to say this ourselves as a spontaneous tribute. In this first volume we have the Gospels of St.

Matthew and St. Mark, and three subsequent volumes will complete the work. Dr. James in his introduction tells us that "the present effort is to enlist both artistic skill and scholarship in the service of the scriptures as a whole". The engravings by Mr. Eric Gill are interesting.

The New Testament with the authorized text still unaltered but presented in a more modern dress may reach—we hope it will—many of the younger generation who have not been brought up on the Bible as their elders have been. The Bible, with its chapters, its verses, its marginal references, might alarm—perhaps worse still, might irritate—them. This elegant little volume cannot possibly do that, and therefore its readers may be persuaded to give some ear to the ethical message of the Gospels and, having listened, perchance to put them into practice.

T. L. C.

*The reviewer lives at a high altitude in the Himalayas and is one of the few Englishmen who has become a sannyasi and is esteemed highly for his sincerity and earnestness.—EDS.

Must Philosophers Disagree? and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy. By F. C. S. SCHILLER. (Macmillan and Co., Ltd., London. 12s. 6d.)

Dr. F. C. S. Schiller, the uncrowned prince of the philosophy of Pragmatism, has brought together twenty-four essays in a delightful volume under the intriguing title "Must Philosophers Disagree?"—and the essays relate to educational, historical, and speculative subjects. Dr. Schiller's remarks on "The Psychology of Examinations," intended to "instruct and elevate," neither instruct nor elevate me. Perhaps the fault is mine. Notwithstanding their defects and drawbacks, examinations are bound to continue as a permanent factor of the cosmos as long as human nature continues to be what it is. Sanskritists call examinations "Pareeksha". (Vidya-pareeksha-Vadi-prativadi-samabala-pareeksha, *et hoc*). In the "historical" section Dr. Schiller gives a moving account of his guru, William James, and his Pragmatism, but it is however the "speculative" part which is the most significant in the volume under notice.

Dr. Schiller discusses "Pragmatism, Humanism, and Religion" in the twenty-third chapter (p. 307). It is not at all difficult to understand the pragmatic doctrine that truth is that which is good, useful, and has been tested in the light of the consequences engendered. This view of truth must colour pragmatic morality and religion, ethics and metaphysics. Religion, as Dr. Schiller would have it, is "the soul's aspiration towards an ideal wherewith to rectify and transfigure the actual" (p. 312). The Religion of the Vedanta on the other hand is a rationally rectified attitude to the Supreme Being which is the Author of the Cosmos and Cosmic determinations; prayerful devotion and the fashioning of conduct in relation to one's fellow-men under the dynamic urge of that attitude is practical Ethics. What is the ideal? What sort of rectification or transfiguration is intended by Dr.

Schiller? There is hardly any indication at all. The ideal may be democracy, the era of which according to Dr. Schiller "is ending" (p. 279). The ideal may, on the contrary be the autocracy of Hitler or the dictatorship or autocracy of Mussolini. The methods of rectification or transfiguration may be anywhere between a summary order to quit served on inconvenient individuals and downright shooting. If all such phenomena are to be described as religious and if the objective signified by them as religion, Vedanta and Humanism must for ever remain strangers. While the Vedanta does not at all belittle the value and worth of social service programmes and reconstructive schemes contemplated by the most humanistic of humanistic world-views, there is yet a more spiritually exalted ideal which it seeks to emphasize. Supposing for the sake of argument that by means of a practical application on a cosmic scale of a network of humanistic programmes, every individual is humanized, civilized and enriched, does it mean that one's spiritual destiny is guaranteed? Not at all. Maitreyi made the same query. Yajnyavalkya replied that if the entire universe were filled with wealth, even then no guarantee of immortality could be given (Vitten-amritatvasya-na-aasa-asti).

An exalted spiritual destiny is the birthright of every individual according to the Vedanta. Freedom from the recurring cycles of births and deaths and realization of the immanence of the Supreme Maker constitute *the Ideal*. An aspirant should himself strive to realize that ideal. He or she should endeavour his or her utmost to enable others to realize it; for all are God's children.

The pragmatic or humanistic criterion of utility in the light of which every transaction has to be tested is bound to break down sooner or later. Shooting down of one's opponents has its utility, so also the lynching of Negroes! (During the latest American elections, it is reported that

Negroes who went to record their votes were brutally assaulted.) In fact, provided a certain amount of adroitness and impudence be granted,—there seems to be no course of conduct individual or collective that may not be justified in the light of the utility criterion. A comfortable existence and the membership of ordered civilized society are the motive-forces of Humanism. The goal of an ideal and the rectification of the actual in the light of that ideal are devoid of moral and spiritual sanction, as any ideal could be justified in the light of the utility-criterion. Dr. Schiller's ideals and their rectifications or transfigurations are mere weariness of the flesh so long as humanity is caught up in the meshes of transmigration. The humanistic ideal will pale into insignificance in the lustre of the Vedantic. I do not however expect that Dr. Schiller would readily concede the claims of the Vedanta. It may perhaps interest him to learn that just as the forces of Monism and Absolutism are striving to stifle humanism and pragmatism, in the history of Indian Philosophy the same forces stood arrayed against the radical realism, pluralism, and humanism of Madhva (Purnaprajnya).

Dr. Schiller delivers himself of a delightful disclaimer. He writes:—"Humanism is not a religion, nor even a philosophy of religion . . . nor a metaphysic" (p. 313). James—his guru—on the other hand emphatically implies that humanism is both religion and metaphysics. James says in *The Meaning of Truth*, p. 125: ". . . I myself read humanism *theistically and pluralistically*" (italics mine). Dr. Schiller may perhaps explain this inconsistency away, but I do not see why humanism should be restricted just to theory of knowledge.

I may as well conclude with an

examination of Dr. Schiller's answer to the intriguing query: *Must philosophers disagree?* He seems to think that philosophers must "agree to differ" (p. 14). Sciences methodologically abstract their subject matter for study. This abstraction ensures agreement among scientists. Philosophy on the contrary is a synoptic view of the Whole, the special virtue of which is the toleration of difference. Let me give the Vedantic answer. The answer would be a counter query: Should philosophers agree at all? They need not. As a matter of fact they would not.

The Vedanta is theory as well as practice stern and rigorous. Each philosopher, each system-builder, according to the light vouchsafed him by the Supreme Maker develops a world-view and a programme of conduct fitting with it. Vedanta is grounded on *Adhikara* (fitness or eligibility). The conflict between the fit and the unfit, or mal-fit, or misfit, between the eligible and the ineligible, is a persistent fact of life. Philosophers are the open champions of this conflict. Conflict redounds to the glory of the Lord as much as Harmony. It must be obvious the conflict is only on the academic level. It is confined to doctrine. It does not touch conduct. It does not in the least affect personal spiritual realization. The Vedanta welcomes all conflict and disagreement as a sign of vitality and virility. I am conscious of having exceeded long ago the limit set by the Editors to this notice. If the humanism of William James and Dr. Schiller is administered with a Vedantic re-orientation, and if the revitalized humanism be made the sole guide in daily conduct, war drums would no longer throb and Earth itself would be Paradise. For, the humanistic path is the Vedantic path which is the Aryan Path.

R. NAGA RAJA SARMA.

The Hindu Conception of the Deity.
By BHARATAN KUMARAPPA, Ph. D.
(Luzac & Co., London 12s. 6d.)

This book is divided into two parts, the first dealing with the conception of the Deity before the time of Rāmānuja, and the second devoted to an exposition of Rāmānuja's theistic and philosophical system. In each case, the subject has been dealt with fully and clearly from the following standpoints—The Nature of the Deity, Its Relation to the Material World and to the Finite Self.

It may be conceded that the Upanishads adhere strictly to no single type of thought as ordinarily understood, monistic or pluralistic. But, if the view that they "tend finally to an abstract monism such that of Śaṅkara" is questioned by the author, it is as much open to doubt, if not more so, whether in them one would be able to find with him an evolution from abstract monism which represents an earlier view gradually obtaining "its filling from moral and religious sources till in the end it becomes transformed into monism like that of Rāmānuja's" (Preface). Regarding the doctrines of the *Bhagavad Gītā*, the author's explanation is rather ingenious, namely, that they were mainly derived from Ghora Āṅgīrasa who is mentioned in the *Chhāndogya Upanishad* as the teacher of "Kṛiṣṇa Devakiputra". *Inter alia*, it is doubtful if this pupil is identical with Śrī Kṛiṣṇa. The relationship of the name and deity Nārāyaṇa to Viṣṇu, given on page 91, may also not be acceptable; while the citation of Farquhar's *Outline* on p. 92 is of no value for the chronology of the Purāṇas. The conception of the Deity according to the *Pāñcharātra* and the evolution of the *Vyūhas* are well traced and dealt with in the next chapter; and the succeeding one is devoted to the Alvars to whom the aspects that appealed most were "Devotion" "Self-

Surrender" and "Grace." The "Bride and Bridegroom" relationship met with frequently in their hymns means really the state of "Spiritual Marriage," last of the stages which the Mystic has to pass through before his union or merging with the Infinite.

The second part of the book dealing with Rāmānuja is decidedly a better performance. It is mostly an abridgement of the Āchārya's *Śrī* and *Gītā Bhāṣya*, which inculcate the worship of a personal God conceived as Supreme Perfection, characterised by Love and Bliss and by the six attributes, *jñāna* (wisdom), *aīśvarya* (plenty), *śakti* (power), *bala* (strength), *vīrya* (energy), and *teja* (lustre). In this connection it may be mentioned that statements like the following seem to show overmuch the dovetailing of alien ideas into the Vaiṣṇava system.

"The Deity, then, though transcendent, is not past human grasp." (p. 94)

"The sinner who knows no virtue, and is despised and rejected of men need not fear that he will be rejected by God." (p. 135)

"In spite of the love which the Deity has for the soul, He allows it to do evil, if it so desires." (p. 276)

Throughout the work the wrong idea is repeated, that Śaṅkara's *Māyā-vāda* is opposed to and a bar against ethical and moral progress; that "morality can have no real significance" for Advaitism (p. 284).

The work is based chiefly on translations which, though "accepted," enshrine views some of which could have been revised by a larger and more judicious use of the original texts themselves. References to authorities would have found a better place as foot-notes than in the body of the book. There are several errors in printing and otherwise, but these blemishes notwithstanding, the book of Dr. Kumarappa contains a logical presentation of the relevant texts on religion and philosophy, and makes a useful contribution on the theistic system of Rāmānuja.

The Method of Freedom. By WALTER LIPPMANN. (George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London. 4s. 6d.)

This is "a tract for the times," by an author, whose brilliant and suggestive works are the common possession of students of Political Science. It consists of a diagnosis of the present world malady, suggestions of remedial measures, and an appraisal of their compatibility with the political situation, particularly in the United States of America.

Mr. Lippmann explores for the causes that "are moving men in their public actions" and have created a "generally revolutionary condition". He finds them in the need for privacy and its destruction in the post-war economy. "It is in the countless realms of privacy that civilization is carried on," but the private life of men is no longer intact or secure, and "the whole organization of men's lives is in confusion". This is because of the contradiction between the national political framework and cosmopolitan economy. Even before the war there was a contradiction between the political independence of the Western peoples and their economic dependence, and this contradiction, for a time smothered under State nationalism during the war, came into greater prominence when the unconscious collaboration of the pre-war economy could not be revived. The suffering and the despair of the people, in conjunction with the consciousness of their power, have made the guarantee of the economic security of the people the central task of Governments.

How are Governments to perform this function? Mr. Lippmann argues that the choice is between the principle of "Absolute Collectivism or Directed Economy" and that of "Free Collectivism or Compensated Economy". The former is to be found in operation in the guise of Communism in Russia and of Fascism in Germany and Italy. Its fundamental defect is that it is based on force, and, therefore, it is self-condemned, since it cannot be re-

conciled with Liberty which "is one of the conditions of human progress".

Accordingly the author advocates Compensated Economy, which combines the virtues of collectivism and freedom, since on the one hand "it acknowledges the obligation of the State for the standard of life and the operation of the economic order as a whole," and on the other, "it preserves within very wide limits the liberty of private transactions". It operates by setting up some kind of compensatory mechanism "to redress the liability to error of free individuals," and illustrations of such mechanism are central banking, and long range planning of public works of all kinds.

But "the compensation method of control requires that the State shall act almost continually contrary to the prevailing opinion in the economic world," and "representative government as it has developed under *laissez-faire* in most countries is incompatible with a State which accepts responsibility for the economy as a whole". We have to reckon with the diversity of interests, and the presence of pressure groups, which seek to exploit the resources of the State for promotion of their particular interests. "Paradoxically, the Proletariat and the Plutocracy . . . tend to combine in a dangerous union and to dominate the State." Now, if the State will guarantee the right to remunerative work, and thus "go to the base of those disorders which commonly make democracy irresponsible," economic reconstruction and political democracy are easily reconciled.

The doctrine of the right to work is aggressively socialistic, but Mr. Lippmann makes an ingenious attempt to reconcile it with Private Property, the supreme idol of the middle classes, between whom and the Proletariat he is anxious to establish an alliance. The right to work is argued to be "the moral equivalent of the opportunity to stake out private property in virgin territory". Thus Mr. Lippmann seeks

to present a "Socialism without Terrors" to the middle classes; for even though the Proletariat invade the sacred shrines of the twin deities of

Liberty and Private Property, they do so only to join the ranks of the worshippers in common adoration!

N. S. SUBBA RAO

Mother America. By SUDHINDRA BOSE, Ph. D. (M. S. Bhatt, Raopura Baroda, India. Rs. 5)

Mr. Bose can claim authority to write true sketches on America, having lived and travelled there for over a score of years, lecturing in its universities. A short notice defends this book from being a rejoinder to the notorious work of Miss Mayo on India. Our author refers to her in quoting a distinguished American, Dr. Weatherly:—

An enlightened Hindu might come to the United States and make a study of our social life. His book might begin with the account of the chain gangs which exist in southern States and then continue with a plain story of our county jails. He might next turn his attention to our habits of burning people alive for trivial offences against social customs. His next chapter might deal with those fine examples of corruption and graft in the municipal governments of many of our large cities... These subjects would by no means limit his field of investigation in the spirit of Miss Mayo. Surely he could tell a sordid and nasty story, but such a picture would not be a picture of America as the intelligent Hindu would recognize as quickly as an intelligent American. A so-called fact out of its relations is not a fact. It is just a lie.

He writes without sentimentality on facts. After rapidly surveying the story of the United States he treats such important topics as its customs, progress, good and evil points, and tries to find their cause. He gives not only his own conclusions but those of prominent Americans. One may be cited. We regret the famous barrister Clarence Darrow has never recognized the Wisdom of Ancient India. Else he could never have said: "Man is an animal whose acts and whose thoughts are as irresponsible, as much coerced into being by circumstances, as the claws of the tiger or the thunder of an avalanche." According to Darrow,

the doctrine of free will is "the cruellest superstition that ever afflicted mankind". Dr. Bose continues, speaking of Mr. Darrow's views:—

The so-called sins of men are not crimes, but weaknesses inherent in their being and beyond their power to prevent or overcome. Man cannot separate himself from all the rest of nature. The rules and conditions of his being are fixed and absolute as the revolutions of the planets and the changing seasons of the year... Man has will to be sure; but the will is merely the agency of his heredity and his environment. He has little or no choice. The person that we call criminal is so for the same reason that a lion is ferocious and a horse is docile.

This man who, as Dr. Bose says, practises the religion of humanity would find in the study of ancient Eastern philosophy the doctrines of Karma and Reincarnation explaining that man is not the victim of blind fate, but the maker and steady, albeit slow, fashioner of his own destiny who can curb or readjust his tendencies by strong resolve, right effort, and right thought leading to right action.

Dr. Bose has not been glamourised by the West or its much vaunted civilization. He clearly warns Indians that all is not well with their Western brothers and that much reform and change is needed. He is particularly vigorous in his views on Prohibition, opium-trade, and the failure of Christianity, themselves fruits of this very civilization. Readers both in East and West will find much of interest in these pages, while our Indian readers would do well to listen to Dr. Bose's clear warnings against blind acceptance of all that comes from the West. He upholds the honour of India by his insight and by his sense of fair play. The Hindu's motives and methods in dealing with America are gentlemanly.

S. TOWNSEND.

CORRESPONDENCE

CAN SCIENCE DISCLAIM RESPONSIBILITY?

Would you allow me to make a few remarks on the review of my *Book of Scientific Discovery* which appeared in THE ARYAN PATH of July, 1934, p. 472? Your reviewer states:—

Modern science may appropriately be said to have begun with Roger Bacon, Leonardo, Kepier, Galileo, Harvey, and others. Its method has been as remarkable as its discoveries. But it would be hardly just to claim that these are quite "new," and the past had no idea of them. The past sought the one indivisible Truth through its own approaches while modern science has been seeking it through others.

In the concluding sentence in the passage quoted, the word "science" is surely used in its original meaning of "knowledge," for in its usual meaning nowadays as the systematic study of nature, none of its followers would claim that it seeks the one indivisible Truth. Men of science are content to leave the wider issues to the philosophers while they restrict their field to a description of experience.

Far from claiming any discovery as quite "new," I have been at pains to point out that no scientific discovery is an isolated event but the result of a slow growth having its roots deep in the past. In some cases we have records reaching back through the centuries which enable us to reconstruct the steps leading to a particular discovery. In others, we have no such records and a discovery *so far as our evidence goes* seems to have sprung fully armed from a Jove-like brain. In such instances the historian, though recognizing that the evidence may be incomplete, can work only from the positive records which he can interpret.

As to the question of science and human welfare, surely the results of science, as such, are independent of human values. Whether the results are applied for good, evil or worthless ends depends upon man alone and

hence the very grave responsibility resting upon mankind to-day.

To take a single example. Towards the close of the nineteenth century, chemists succeeded in nitrating phenol and so obtaining picric acid. The method of preparing this substance became part of the equipment of practical chemists all over the world. Then the exploiters of this simple discovery came along. It was found that picric acid could be used as a dye for silk and hence quantities of this compound were produced for the textile trade.

Again, medical men found a solution of picric acid to be a useful reagent for certain physiological tests as well as an invaluable preparation for the treatment of burns and scalds. On the other hand, those whose business in life was destruction rather than healing, found that picric acid was a powerful explosive. Thenceforward picric acid was manufactured on a large scale and used together with other materials for blasting rocks, but far greater quantities were utilized for making explosives for use in war.

Much of what is deplorable about our present-day Western civilization has been due to the greed of the exploiters of scientific discoveries. Our overwhelming need in the West is a re-orientation of thought which shall give an adequate place to those human values which the great leaders in East and West alike have always held before our eyes.

DOROTHY TURNER

Bratislava, Czechoslovakia

REJOINDER BY THE REVIEWER

It is true that the term "Science" is now commonly used in a restricted sense to mean such knowledge as may be amenable to measurement so that any knowledge which does not yet lend itself to measurement has no title to a

domicile in the realm of "Science," though judged by other tests of approved logical worth such knowledge may be quite valid. There are several methods of verification of which the methods of exact measurement harnessed with such remarkable success by the physical sciences, represent a few only. And when it is remembered that the methods of exact science, in proportion as they are expected to yield exactly measurable and calculable results, are applicable to fields of enquiry prepared by "limitation of data" and "paring of irrelevant details" and in accordance with a specially adopted scheme of conventions or "frame of reference" as it is usually called (*e. g.* Space-Time co-ordinates in Relativity Physics); and when it is remembered further that the bases of calculation are found to involve not only some apparently "brute" facts (*e. g.*, Quantum phenomena) but also some undefined and possibly undefinable entities which have to be admitted as postulates, one cannot but hesitate in accepting the orthodox methods of physical investigation as opening the only safe and sure avenue to Truth.

Some of the other approaches may lead to a vision of Truth less conventional, less dependent on the exigencies of theory, on the limits and accidents of physical observation and experiment and on abstract calculations of what are often only probabilities. A concrete truth, a whole and living truth—a Truth which more clearly and directly shows its affinity with the Good and the Beautiful—is unquestionably of higher worth than one which has been described and measured, but which is yet abstract and conventional, isolated and atomistic, not showing its proper place and function in the organism of the Living Whole. If we use the word "Philosophy" for the pursuit of the Living Whole, the term "Science" should not be restricted only to the field of knowledge—mapped and measured, but abstract, conventional and segregated; it should include any body of knowledge or experience,

verified and verifiable, even though verification and demonstration may have been effected through methods other than those called "laboratory" methods.

Of course those who seek truth by laboratory methods should stick to and persevere in them and jealously guard the results obtained through them. A system of results so obtained may even be allowed to make our "science". But it is to be understood firstly, that this is science only in a restricted and fragmentary sense; secondly, that such science has its limitations, both basic and functional; thirdly, that, therefore, it cannot present us with a view of the Living Whole of Truth; fourthly, that, consequently its results have a tendency to be swayed by a kind of centrifugal impulse, losing their proportion, perspective, and inter-relation and being more and more pulverised and atomised; fifthly, that the unity that it is able to achieve is neither abiding nor fundamental, and, lastly, that not seeking "the one indivisible Truth" and, therefore, not caring to interpret and apply its results in the logic of this Truth, such science risks being divorced not only from philosophy but also from ethics and religion, finding itself on the brink of materialism and agnosticism and offering results which, in some cases, prove diabolical in practical application.

Science should be in a position to concede at least the possibility of there being other methods of seeking the Truth which may be free from some of the inherent and incidental defects of the methods of "positive" science, and give us knowledge which, without being less valid or "demonstrated," may be more in touch not only with the one indivisible Truth but with the eternal Values. This latter science may have to be called spiritual science or by some other name, and its methods may in part be "occult," but all the same it is a science—in the sense we have here conceived it—not only of greater and fuller logical, but of truer

and richer cosmic, value.

Once we grant this richer and more vital science and its methods, we grant that some of what is now "newly" discovered by laboratory methods may have been discovered before by the methods of the other science, and that, in many cases, the modern methods are only bringing up complementary or confirmatory evidence on old findings which, however, were not mere "conjectures". What is needed is certainly not a confounding of the two sciences and their methods, but their co-operation and the co-ordination of their results. Each will seek in the other new bases, corroboration and amplification, and new sources of inspiration. That will obviously mean real gain to both. Physical science will then renew her links with both philosophy and religion, that is, with the higher planes and deeper springs of Life. Physical knowledge—as indeed every knowledge—will then cease to be regarded as "neutral" (it is never so in practice), but will be pursued to the extent it is true, good and beautiful. Where under existing moral conditions of the world a given result runs the risk of being more abused than "utilised" (as in the case of the picric acid), its knowledge should be under a ban, the beneficent uses of that discovery being in that case sought to be achieved by ways less open to abuse. Not all forms of knowledge are good for all ages and persons. Science, both theoretical and applied, physical and spiritual, must be cultivated suitably to the spiritual competency of an age or a group of persons. Some forms and tendencies have to be encouraged, some to be banned.

Some ends (*e.g.*, healing) have in certain cases to be achieved by other means. In one word, Wisdom must lead Science and sanction Art.

PRAMATHANATH MUKHOPADHYAYA
Calcutta

INDIAN CHRISTIAN CHURCH

In your December number Dr. J. M. Kumarappa suggests reforms in the Indian Churches. May I draw his attention to the following from the annual report of the Church Missionary Society:—

Never was evangelism more needed than at present and never was opportunity so great as now.

Does not Dr. Kumarappa think that the first necessary reform is the rejection by the Indian Christians of every denomination of proselytizing foreign missions? And referring to the plan of a Jesus Society, how will its members protect themselves against the intrusion of the missionary element? The poet Tagore only recently said in this very city:—

Even the religious ministers sent by the West to the East have in their sectarian pride emphasised and exaggerated these differences more than any other body of men. They have produced the psychology which makes it comfortably easy for the military and mercantile powers of their community to carry on their mission of depredation in alien countries helplessly open to their inroads.

A striking example of this is just reported. In Washington, D. C., Senator Homer Bone described how the Rev. Paul Young, Christian Alliance Missionary, sold munitions in Ecuador, "tambourine in one hand and gas bomb in the other". I should prefer rank atheists to missionaries—false pietists of bewildered soul.

Madras.

J. E.

ENDS AND SAYINGS

" - ends of verse
And sayings of philosophers."

HUDIBRAS.

In *The London Critic* Wilfrid Northfield explains that millionaires are unhappy, and he most truly points out that "it is very difficult for the rich man to prevent his material possessions stealing away and submerging his peace of mind". But he concludes that "it is possible that if King George were to search out his happiest subject, he might still find, as in the fable, that the old fellow hadn't any shirt to his back". Then, are beggars happy? In a country like India where ghastly poverty is perpetual, and where the body is not so much respected as the temple of the soul, as regarded as a fetter and a curse, large numbers of the people choose to be beggars by profession and do not hesitate to maim themselves and their children in order to eke out a better income. Greed is a vice not of the rich only but also of the poor. Mr. Northfield further asserts "that the happiest man has neither too much money, nor too little"—but is this true? Are the middle classes in every country happy? If so, then why are they ever striving to gain promotion from the lower middle to the higher middle class, and so onwards? Neither riches nor poverty are makers of happiness. It is the use we make of riches or poverty, self-chosen or not, which is the deciding factor.

Those who merely give up their wealth hoping to escape the burden and responsibility it entails fail to secure real lasting happiness. When a man turns not beggar, but trustee of all he possesses, and uses his wealth for the uplift of all, then it is that he tastes of the satisfaction which creativeness brings. A hoarder of wealth is but a creator of discontent for himself; he who creates with mind and heart, using money as his tool, feels the joy of the altruist which is superior even to the joy experienced by the artist.

But the man of charity has his own problems. The greatest good of the greatest number is a noble principle, but what constitutes "the greatest good"? Although philanthropic institutions and schemes are being brought forward by good and noble men and women, vice, selfishness, brutality, and the resulting misery seem to grow no less. Prisons, asylums for the outcast and the magdalen, can be filled much faster than it is possible to create them. Widespread education and scientific research have produced their own evils. A millionaire, voluntarily or compelled by circumstances to seek avenues of philanthropy, comes upon unexpected "snags". How many times has he not found

that in trying to do good, he inadvertently did harm, or at least created new problems demanding new solutions? That charity which is cosmopolitan and universal has the right foundation, and when an altruist rises above the limitations of sect and race, his benefactions escape at least one evil aspect. Another important principle which is being re-discovered by the modern world through the efforts of social service organizers is that unless a charity-project helps its beneficiaries to help themselves, it corrodes human nature. And it is also being recognized that large-scale and organized charities are not as humane in action or as beneficent in effects as the charity accompanied with personal attention and interest of the altruist for him who receives it.

Everyone agrees that what is wanted is true knowledge of the spiritual conditions of man, his real aims and his destiny. Where to find such knowledge? We say—it is offered to a reasonable certainty in the old Aryan literature.

The failure of the Psychical Research Society to explain satisfactorily the abnormal phenomena it has been examining for the last fifty years is now fully admitted. On the other hand, the Spiritists and Spiritualists have closed every avenue to knowledge about the innumerable genuine phenomena of which they are witnesses, by their insistence on recognizing one, and only one, type of "spirits," namely, the surviving souls of dead human beings. Of late there have been

signs here and there which are like welcome drops of rain in that, while they do not make a monsoon, they presage one. One such sign appears in an article in the December *Character and Personality*, by J. B. Rhine on "Telepathy and Clairvoyance in the Normal and Trance States of a 'Medium,' " which begins with some hopeful admissions summarized below :—

Numerous able researchers have become convinced that "some parapsychic sensitives have given some information in their responses that they could not have acquired by the recognized means," but a still greater number have expressed doubt about the same "without much effort towards becoming acquainted with the facts at first-hand".

Because of the common belief of the general public, "the great tendency for the student is to make the problem of the survival of personality the immediate and major objective of research". Thus, an examination of "the natural capacities and properties of the sensitive as a personality" is neglected. "It is indeed a strange fact that no systematic examination of a sensitive's ability in super-or extra-sensory perception has been made."

We are not here concerned with Professor Rhine's own methods of investigation save to note that they may eventually lead to the recognition of the central fact of Asiatic psychology that the "embodied spirit " or living man by right training becomes capable not only of demonstrating at will the phenomena but also of explaining the truth underlying them-- which knowledge the Spiritualist, the Psychical Researcher, the Psychologist, and their mediums and sensitives have failed to obtain.



Point out the "Way"—however dimly,
and lost among the host—as does the evening
star to those who tread their path in darkness.
—*The Voice of the Silence.*

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THE MEANING OF REINCARNATION

In these pages several able men have written on the subject of Reincarnation, and in this number we have pleasure in publishing two further contributions. The first is from the pen of Mr. J. D. Beresford, who is already well known to our readers, the second is by Mr. Michael Kaye, M. A., Ph. D., author of *Human Welfare: The Social and Educational Essentials*. What to the average Oriental is a settled conviction, is a matter of scientific and philosophical discussion to the Westerner. We are not now examining the arguments for or against Reincarnation as presented by these writers. But there is a moral appeal which the doctrine makes. This was given voice to in a lecture delivered in Bombay in 1930, from a stenographic report of which we have been permitted to extract the following:—

The central simple idea underlying Reincarnation is that the

Soul in man does not come for the first time into a human body of flesh and blood when it sees the light of day in this life. That Soul was before the birth of the body and it has lived on this earth in other human bodies learning its lessons and garnering its experiences, then at death taking a vacation, a rest, to come back again in a new body and continue its task in this mightiest of all schools. . . .

Each Soul, as you must see, attracts to itself its natural conditions. There is no misfit; healthy or ill body, beautiful or ugly disposition, a noble or mean character, an easy or difficult environment—all, all are attracted by each one of us according to Karma, our past deeds and words and feelings and thoughts. But we attract all these not in a fatalistic way to be drowned and submerged by them. Why then? So that we may learn through them, grow in purity thus

making our environment pure; controlling all that we attract so that those very desire-elementals, the very devil in us, may be transformed into Spiritual energies, may be raised to the stage of Divinity.

Reincarnation means Justice, unerring justice, that is not human justice but Nature's Justice which acts impersonally and universally, and which therefore is also merciful and compassionate.

Reincarnation means Contentment, for what has come to us has come because of our own deeds of body or speech or mind; whatever condition is ours to-day that condition is exactly what we ourselves desired, a difficult concept but a true one.

Reincarnation means Progress. From savagery we have come to where we now are; the saints and sages of to-day were sinners yester-

day; we will become saints and sages to-morrow.

Reincarnation means Effort, for you must have noticed how the Soul goes from one condition to another by self-endeavour. In daily life we see this; he who wants to earn must labour; he who wants to know must learn; he who wants to serve must sacrifice.

Reincarnation means Divinity, for in our innermost nature we are God-like, nay, we are verily Gods, and by effort and knowledge we want the "Father in Heaven" to incarnate fully and wholly in the Temple of the Body. Birth of the body is a miracle, the second birth of the twice-born, the Dwija, is a greater miracle still. By right action, by the true observance of the Law of Fate and Free Will or Karma, we shall attain to that Second Birth.

A REASONABLE DOCTRINE BUT—!

The recent articles by L. A. G. Strong, Clifford Bax and K. R. Srinivasiengar published in THE ARYAN PATH* have left me as uncertain as ever about the theory of Reincarnation.

I must explain in the first instance that on this question I have never been able to obtain any help whatsoever from my own intuitions of truth; and since this fact has what I regard as a significant relevance in this connection, I will attempt a description of how such intuitions come to me.

The primary essential is that my conscious mind shall be fully occupied, and that the subject with which it is concerned shall have a definite relation to the matter on which I am seeking this inner guidance. I may, for instance, be reading the *Bhagavad-Gita* or *The Voice of the Silence*; I may be engaged in thought on some problem of philosophy, or I may be writing such an article as the one upon which I am now engaged. The important condition is that my conscious attention is oriented

* J. V., pp. 483, 421, 425.

in a particular direction and behind it lies the simple desire to know the truth.

To describe the subsequent mental process in detail would occupy far too much space, but the representative phenomenon is the change that sometimes takes place in my thought from induction to deduction. The preliminary conscious mental process is always in the former, more scientific direction. I am attempting to argue *a posteriori* from effect to cause. But when this "inner guidance" manifests itself, it seems as if some one conclusion, out of many perhaps, had been accepted as a premise from which deductions may safely follow.

Now this is in itself a perfectly normal thought process. The mind seeks for a working hypothesis, accepts the most probable, and then tests it by enquiry, *a priori*, from cause to effect. The difference, so far as I am concerned, lies in the manner of the change from one method to the other. When what I recognise as a reliable guiding suggestion comes to me, there is always a hiatus between the two thought processes. I do not deliberately select one of perhaps many possible solutions. It comes to me with an effect of discovery, and I do not recall any instance in which I have been misled. I recognise these intuitions as containing at least the germ of some fundamental truth, though I may err in my subsequent elaboration of it.

Yet, although I have thought long and earnestly on this subject

of Reincarnation, I have never received the least hint of "guidance" in connection with it. If I may assume, therefore, that this guidance does, as I believe, spring from some inner fount of wisdom in the self, then I must conclude either that no element in the totality of my consciousness has any knowledge in this connection, or that such knowledge lies too deep to be reached by the kind of process I have described.

I have entered into this rather long explanation, because I wish it to be clearly understood that anything I may have to say on Reincarnation is no more than the expression of intelligent opinion, that I am only weighing the probabilities and have no personal convictions.

My first doubt with regard to this eminently reasonable and just principle of Reincarnation is as to whether the true ego must in the overwhelming majority of cases, return to this earth? Within historical time the population of the world has increased from at most a few millions to approximately two thousand millions; and if we take the latter figure it becomes evident that on the assumption of a period of 1,500 years between re-births, only one-fifth (to take a safe figure) of those who are alive to-day could have suffered an earlier incarnation in 500 A. D. Nor does the actual period between re-births affect this argument, since the net increase would remain unaccounted for whatever the period between re-births. Wherefore, if we postulate this earth as the

single scene of action, we must infer an enormous number of new souls in each generation, the number increasing in direct ratio to the interval period of reincarnation.

Is it then conceivable to suppose that this earth should not be the only scene of soul progress? In the vast depths of space, there may be countless number of planets upon which similar life-conditions may obtain. And if that be so, all our arithmetical difficulties would be solved by the inference that a right proportion of these planets was in process of depopulation.

If there are, however, theosophical objections to such an explanation as this, we must fall back on the belief that during the historical period a steadily increasing number of young souls has been incarnated, and is now reaching its maximum. So far as I can see this supposition is not incompatible with the principles indicated in Stanza IV of the second volume of *The Secret Doctrine*, nor with the general standard of spiritual development in the world at the present time. But it is not so easily reconcilable with my own belief that we are rapidly approaching an era of new revelation.

The fundamental difficulty here, a difficulty that has other aspects, lies in the concept of individuation. Any theory of reincarnation necessarily posits the development of a differentiated individual progressing towards the stage of perfection at which he will again become merged into the universal

spirit. And in the movement through the limitations of space-time, all such individuals must be reckoned as separate integers. This is the inevitable result of our restricted, three-dimensional habit of thought. We think in terms of differences, and those terms are necessary to all our material conceptions. For example, C. E. M. Joad is quoted by K. R. Srinivas-
iengar, in the article already referred to, as dwelling upon "the sharp distinction between mind and brain, that is, between mind and body, upon which as vitalists we must insist". We have to choose, in fact, between a theory of universal unity or universal duality, and if we adopt the latter we must accept matter as an everlasting element in the universe, a primitive substance that is, in some sort, the antithesis of spirit.

To me that conception has become impossible, but since no intellectual argument can be carried on without postulating that such apparently antithetic concepts as mind and body, organic and inorganic life (or consciousness) and inert matter are different in kind and that a sharp distinction between them must be insisted upon. I accept those terms with the provision that I personally believe all phenomena to be modes of the spirit, and that the distinction between them is not ultimately valid.

Returning now to this question of Reincarnation, I do not find any support for the principle in such reports of supernormal knowledge as that quoted by L. A. G. Strong in his contribution to the August

number of THE ARYAN PATH. I do not dispute the facts. W.B. Yeats's story of the Indian girl who had verifiable knowledge of people and conditions outside her physical experience, does not stand alone. I have heard others of the same kind, and have no reasons to doubt that they are true in their main essentials. But I do not feel inclined to attribute them to soul-memory, that is to say, to memories retained by the true ego of its last or some earlier incarnation.

The objection to this theory, in my opinion, is that it assumes a function of the ego which is not consistent with our general conception of the part it plays in human development. We recognise it as the urgent formative element in character, but below the level of the initiate, the immortal principle is never articulate in the sense that the subconsciousness may be on certain occasions. The true ego represents the non-spatial, non-temporal element in the human being and, until the other elements are integrated by the long discipline of Yoga, cannot speak directly to the conscious mind. Even the great mystics who have travelled so far upon the Way, have not been able to draw upon the inferentially vast experience of earlier lives through the medium of any conscious memory of detail.

A far easier explanation of this apparently supernormal knowledge may be found in the wanderings of the Astral Body. (Quoting from W. Q. Judge's *The Ocean of Theos-*

ophy, K. R. Srinivasiengar inclines to impose very definite limits upon its capabilities, and says that it is "devoid of mind and conscience and spirit, . . . has no independent knowledge of its own real state or surroundings to impart". He is here speaking, however, of the capacities of the astral body (the "shell") after the death of the physical body to which it has belonged; and it seems probable that before death, while the liaison of astral and physical is still unbroken, this astral body may have other capabilities.

In deep sleep, for instance, it may become the vehicle of consciousness and obtain "independent knowledge" of conditions beyond the immediate reach of the sleeper's physical senses. William Gerhardt, the novelist, has recently given a detailed account of a personal experience of this kind in his book *Resurrection*,* and from the assurances he has given me in writing as well as from the internal evidence afforded by his description, I accept that account as being true in all essentials. It is but one of many such, and I have had one similar experience myself, though it was a much slighter one. Moreover, I have found nothing in Madame Blavatsky's works that denies the possibility of this phenomenon.

Is it not then credible, at least, that such information as was obtained by the Indian girl in the story referred to, and in parallel cases, may have been obtained in the course of deep sleep or trance?

* *Resurrection*. By WILLIAM GERHARDT. (Cassell and Co., Ltd., London.)

The memory of the experience is not always forgotten on awaking, and even when it is not thus instantly realised remains in the subconsciousness and may be presented, probably in an altered form, when the psychological conditions are favourable. I am inclined to attribute to this agency, also, those dreams of the future which Mr. J. W. Dunne has so carefully and patiently investigated. In its wanderings, the astral body is not subject to the time limitations of three-dimensional space; and there is no reason, *a priori*, why brief, uncertain visions of past, present or future should not be recorded in the form of these fugitive dreams at the moment when the astral resumes its intimate relations with the physical body, and the vehicle of consciousness is re-transferred from the one to the other.

(I apologise for such terms as "vehicle" and "re-transferred" in this connection, but any other spatial metaphor would be equally misleading. We have not yet sufficient knowledge of the modes of consciousness to permit any description in ordinary language of its relation to matter. Moreover, the idealistic monism I have already professed, necessitates the assumption that consciousness or life is the single basis of that illusion of solid substance which hallucinates

our physical senses in this state of being.)

Finally, after a careful reconsideration of what I have just written, I realise that nothing I have said offers any valid objection against the principle of Reincarnation as such. I have rejected any argument based upon definite "soul-memories" of a previous incarnation lived only a few years, or for the matter of that, a few centuries, earlier. Such memories may, as I have suggested, be ascribable to another source. Moreover I do not think it likely that any argument based on such physical phenomena can have much weight in this connection. But having used and abandoned that test, I can find nothing in my own philosophy that is not consonant with the belief that the immortal principle should re-enter at various intervals the limitations of a space-time world. Such a belief satisfies the reason, the sense of justice, all those higher faculties of mankind which are inspired by this immortal principle with which we are here concerned. The belief is essential to any comprehension of the Law of Karma. And if I have as yet failed to reach that "inner certainty" of which I have spoken, it may well be because I am still so young in knowledge.

J. D. BERESFORD

A PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS

The observation is familiar, though to reason none the less astonishing, that in their racial and political life particularly, and in the face of poverty, failure, disease, and death, men and women can with passion embrace the absurd. Their cry is for a faith by which to persist, a hope by which to be glad, and but rarely do they show prejudice in favour of rational evidence and consistency. Therefore the long history, and the wide extent, of the doctrine of reincarnation, cannot be regarded as sufficient in themselves to establish its truth and permanent value. We have to consider its acceptability in the light of philosophical analysis.

I

Yet bias and postulate are inevitable. Descartes, it is agreed, would have done better had he accepted clear and distinct ideas as sufficient authority in themselves, and not attempted their justification by appealing to Veracious God, who could Himself be known only through a clear and distinct idea. We have to accept as in some way referent to reality the whole of the objects presented to us—objects perceivable, imaginable and thinkable—and we cannot do more than to acknowledge as the most certain revelation of reality the harmonisation of these varied presentations to the satisfaction of thought. If we despise our customary convictions even to the point of refusing them consid-

eration, and if in our doubting we are so heroic as to become sceptical of the reality-references of our reason, we shall find reality disappearing and our search for certainty paralysed. We cannot play the game of rigorous Theory of Knowledge except as we are content to analyse our convictions, and to discover the possibility and the limits of their intellectual reconciliation. It is impossible that we should completely reject and transcend our convictions, however much we may affect modesty by calling them postulates and “categories”.

But do I not immediately “enjoy” my own experiencing? Do I not feel inexpugnably that the reality of my activity of experiencing is *sui generis*, definitely distinguishable from the reality of the objects which I experience? My experiencing is indeed not “extended,” not “material”: it is not to be clutched at; it is to be felt as it is only by myself who am experiencing. This primary certainty with respect to the subjective seems to remain inviolate, notwithstanding any prevailing fashion of concentration on the objective. Our conviction as to the reality of our experiencing does not seem in danger of being shattered by any important proposition or discovery with respect to the physical. Nor is it at all a serious objection here that some people protest a complete lack of such conviction. For the blind are not a refutation of

what others see. The final correction of our convictions can come only from other convictions which are positive, not from such statements as are simply negative. But it is not obvious how there can be anything in our perception or thought of matter which can negative the distinctiveness of our reality as experiencing. Whatever its origin and destiny, whatever in its particular quality its apparent dependence on matter, however much it can be manifest only at a particular stage of organic evolution, our experiencing is indubitable to us as a reality at the moment we do actually experience.

II

But if our experiencing is real once, there are considerations which may seem to suggest its enduring reality.

For there is nothing to convince us that our experiencing, though diversified, is produced by the assembly of bits. It seems to be a unity and a continuity from the start. In any case, since it is not like its perceptual objects extended, how can it be fractured? Nor does this argument completely fail to attract because it is of the old rationalistic kind such as Kant sought to demolish.

But if our experiencing cannot be pulverised and dispersed because it is essentially non-spatial, it may nevertheless cease in so far as it is temporal. Yet we seem to enjoy our experiencing as real not merely momentarily, but continuously. Why, then, in face of its visible continuance, should

we infer the probability and even the certainty of its end?

For notwithstanding the common prejudice to the contrary, the actual cessation of experiencing is definitely not apparent. We observe the decomposition of bodies, but not the extinction of the experiencing which we believe to have been associated with them. To observe experiencing actually terminate is one thing; to be interrupted in one's further observation of experiencing which actually continues, is another. But it is not the first which is true of ourselves. And for all we know, experiencing may continue though no longer manifest to us. Clearly it is not the duration of our own experiencing that we certainly experience; it is the conclusion of another's experiencing which we infer because we suppose its dependence on a visibly behaving body, which in fact visibly perishes. Since, then, our own body likewise visibly deteriorates, and seems to be destined like others for certain to crumble into dust, we infer that there must be similarly correlated the cessation of our own experiencing. But this dependence of another's experiencing on that other's behaving body is merely a familiar supposition—which we find convenient to make for some purposes, and to neglect and even to oppose for others; it is by no means a final conviction. It may well be that another's experiencing does in fact continue even though, because it has ceased to be associated with a visibly continuous body, it should no

longer be apparent to us while we are ourselves embodied.

Nor does it follow that because experiencing has been associated with a body for some time, it has to depend for its immortality on being embodied for all time. The body which in some ways may appear to give it scope—as, for example, by seeming to be the condition of its meeting with sensible beauty—may in other ways confine it—as, for example, by distracting it from the clear contemplation of universals and thinkables. It is conceivable that experiencing should continue very well without a body, and that it should even continue better.

Nevertheless, in so far as disembodied experiencing has never for a certainty been observed by us, it is a fair conclusion that if it is indeed the case that experiencing persists notwithstanding the degradation of its associated body, then it seems very probable that, in some way which we can neither observe nor think, it achieves intimacy with another body. But this body, we may suppose, experiencing either finds or fashions, so that we may regard organic evolution as either the independent and antecedent condition of its successive reincarnations, or the effect of its definite and persistent striving for such reincarnations.

But if experiencing does not cease, it may seem rationally an economic and convenient hypothesis that it never commenced. Experiencing, whatsoever its relations with the material, is reality necessary and inexpugnable. If,

then, there seems presumption that after the loss of its present body, experiencing will cohere with another, there is similar presumption that it possessed a body prior to its present one. Thus its apparent birth involved its death, as its apparent death will involve its birth. But further, if we may suppose that experiencing can suffer at least two bodily deaths, we have no reason to doubt that it can suffer an indefinite number. Hence future existence seems to involve pre-existence, reincarnation reincarnations, and a succession of reincarnations in the future an indefinite succession in the past.

Yet in so far as in our present bodily life we seem oblivious of our past ones, we have no reason for believing that in our future we shall be mindful of our present. Retention and causation do not imply recollection, and there may be continuity of experiencing without continuity of remembering.

III

This, then, is a theory of reincarnation which seems philosophically possible. Though it has not been empirically or apodictically established, it does not seem such as for certain can be overthrown. But suppose the doctrine to be true: what may be said of its ethical worth?

First, then, we may notice the objection that if in our future bodily lives we shall be unable to remember our present, then to us in the present these future lives can be of no practical significance. But surely this does not follow. For I want to live well at each moment

of my life. Even if each moment be completely isolated from all other moments, it is still true that at each moment I want to live vigorously and joyously. And so, imaginatively, I should be able to appreciate the importance of my trying in the present to make each of my future moments satisfactory, even though at each moment I shall be completely oblivious of all that are past.

Accordingly, my anticipation of successive reincarnations should be sufficient to provide an objective to my present life, and to afford it reason for acquiescence in that protracted discipline and preparation necessary for spiritual achievement and enjoyment. Without longevity or immortality or both, it may seem completely foolish that we should forbear from snatching at those primitive bodily pleasures which are actually within our grasp, for the sake of attaining to those higher spiritual satisfactions which in fact our life will prove too short even to approach. No doubt, very often, the race may seem as exhilarating as the victory, the research as deeply satisfying as the contemplation. But it is not always so. And we have to recognise that for many, if there is no certainty that grammar will be utilised in literature, logic in the synopsis which is beauty, protracted and difficult self-control in the personality-harmony which has become inevitable—the drudgery and the self-sacrifice will seem clearly not worth while, and, if persisted in at all, will be motivated by fear or custom or credulous

prejudice, and not at all by rational conviction. Thus without the assurance of prolonged life in the future, though we may find all about us such a sufficiency of lower goods—the goods of appetite and lust, of hatred, but also of spontaneous, though limited affection—as to make us desist from suicide, yet there is the obvious danger that we shall infer the futility of long distance objectives, of immediate self-sacrifice as a means to remote self-realization. We shall continue life, but without enthusiasm for its maximal nobility. If we dare to reflect on the matter at all, we shall be oppressed by our insight that such nobility is clearly not for us. Precisely in our wisdom, then, we may cease to pursue it; here also, as in relation to anything else that is for certain unattainable, the way of wisdom may seem clearly desire-surrender.

At the same time, as McTaggart has urged in his *Human Immortality and Pre-Existence*—to which this article is as a whole much indebted—there is nothing to suggest that we shall be transformed into spiritual perfection in our very next bodily life. Knowledge, love, harmony, blessedness—all these things which are excellent, are as difficult as they are rare; and if they are so now, we have no reason to infer that they will be otherwise in the future. We would do well to conclude that spiritual achievement must always be rather progressive than catastrophic. If we are to enjoy it, we must struggle for it. Become exhausted by the effort in one

body, we may take it up in another. So the disappointments and the weariness of old age may be forgotten, and may give place once more to the aspirations and the energies of infancy and youth. The essential thing is that in our active waking life we should so conduct ourselves as to ensure that after sleep we shall arise refreshed; we should not make ourselves sodden and bloated and stupefied; we should liberate ourselves from envy, and hate, and fear, and from all such provincialism as makes us forget Reality; and we should remember that our death itself is merely a sleep.

But what if our present life is mean and harassed? May it not be expected that we should now view inevitable immortality with horror, that we should be passionate above all to "escape the wheel of birth"? Yet even so there may spread a faith that even the most debased may rise progressively; the capacity for ultimate nobility may be in all even though for the moment it may be dormant and overlaid. But if beings who experience are indeed immortal, then it may indeed be rational to attempt their gradual transformation into spiritual poise and comprehensiveness.

Nor need the doctrine of reincarnation make for spiritual pride and harshness. On the contrary, we have just seen that it may reinforce those who are ambitious

for social reform, and for the universalisation of love and blessedness. For if a man is evil and unhappy now, no doubt this is due to his past. But it is important above all to look to his future. Our concern must be not to blame him, but to help him; not to justify his condemnation, but to effect his regeneration. There is nothing to establish that our life, which is fluent and continuous, is not also incalculably transformable, and that what is too difficult for our present bodily life may not be possible in another. Nor does metaphysical determinism render impossible the empirically unfamiliar. Though it may be certain that the present is as it is because the past was as it was, this does not mean that from our empirical standpoint we can be certain as to the particulars of the future. And this is as well. It means that indeed while there is life there is hope: and that this is true not merely of our present bodily life, but of all our future ones.

Thus if the doctrine of reincarnation is to be welcomed ethically, the reason must be not so much that it may support a theodicy, not that it may be thought to justify a social system which is harsh to sinners and unfortunates; but that it may encourage spiritual ambition, may fortify compassion and charity, and may establish the faith that nobility of life, though difficult and rare, may be progressively and universally possible.

MICHAEL KAYE

CAEDMON

DREAMER AND MONK

[M. Oldfield Howey is the author of *The Horse in Magic and Myth*, *The Encircled Serpent*, and *The Cat in the Mysteries of Religion and Magic*. This article gives a glimpse of Christianity in seventh-century England.—EDS.]

Caedmon is referred to by the twelfth-century historian, Florence of Worcester, as the celebrated monk of St. Hild's Abbey who had received from Heaven the free gift of poetic inspiration. The description appears to be a just one, and the life story of the earliest Anglo-Saxon poet of whom we have any authentic record has a peculiar appeal to the student of occultism. Though most of its details are obscured by the mists of time, the more salient features are yet discernible and will repay perusal. Our only surviving authority for the personal particulars is the *Ecclesiastical History* of Bæda.

From Bæda we learn that Caedmon was born in Northumberland, circa 620, in the month of February, and during his youth was employed as a cowherd by the *villicus* or bailiff of the property owned by the Monastery of Streaneshalch at Whitby, one of the most famous monasteries of the middle ages. But though so early in contact with ecclesiastical influences, Caedmon was of mature years when he became converted to the Christian faith by the devoted Irish missionaries, who, from Iona and Lindisfarne, carried the gospel to Northern England. Caedmon was soon distinguished by his piety and humility yet Bæda informs us that

at this period of his life he was so ignorant he had not *even* learned any poetry. Possibly this was because the sacred songs of the ancient gods had lost their appeal to him, and he had not mastered those of the newer faith. Be this as it may, when after supper he sat in the common hall, and his comrades each took their turn in entertaining the company with song and harp, Caedmon could make no contribution to the evening festivities, but sat mute and silent, or would rise in embarrassment, and retire to his home. On one such occasion he withdrew to the stables, where it was his turn to spend the night in watch. Being weary, he flung himself down to rest, and immediately fell into a deep sleep, and dreamed that a stranger stood beside him, called him by name, and said "Caedmon sing to me". "I cannot sing," replied the unhappy youth. "It was because I cannot sing that I left the hall." Still the stranger persisted: "Nevertheless thou must sing for me, I am sure thou hast something to sing," he urged. "What must I sing?" asked Caedmon. "Sing of the beginning of created beings (*Principium creaturarum*)," replied his visitor. Thus prompted, Caedmon found verses he had never heard

before rise spontaneously to his lips, in praise and glorification of the Great God who created Heaven and Earth for the sake of the children of men. When at length the song came to an end, and Cædmon awoke, the mysterious stranger had vanished, but the poem recited in his dream in response to his visitor's command remained with him, and now new verses suggested themselves, and enabled him to continue the narrative of which the dream poem proved to be but the exordium. Bede has recorded for us the general sense of the poem, but explains that his Latin rendering does not give the order of the words which were to the following effect :—

Now ought we to praise the Founder of the Heavenly Kingdom, the power of the Creator and His wise design; the deeds of the Father of glory; how He, the Eternal God, was the Author of all things wonderful; who first created for the sons of men the heaven for a roof, and afterwards the earth—He the Almighty Guardian of mankind.

Next morning Cædmon related his wonderful experience to the bailiff, who was greatly impressed by the account and conducted him to Saint Hild, the Abbess of Streaneshalch. The lady summoned the monks to hear and judge of the poem that had been so mysteriously inspired, and when Cædmon had recited it, they unanimously pronounced their opinion to be that by the grace of God he had miraculously received the gift of song from Heaven; but to test the matter still further they expounded a Biblical passage to the unlettered herdsman in his

native language, and asked him to versify it. Cædmon went home, but returned on the following day with his task duly accomplished. So excellent was his poem that Abbess Hild and her monks were in ecstasies. In response to their earnest entreaties the poet became a monk, and remained in the monastery until he died. He was never able to master the art of reading, but Hild directed her monks to teach him the history of the Old and New Testaments, and all that he learnt he reproduced in harmonious verse so beautiful "that his teachers were glad to become his hearers".

After he became a monk Cædmon lived a tranquil happy life. He is said to have died in the year 680, following an illness of fourteen days, which was so slight that no one but himself expected a fatal termination. On the night when he died he surprised his attendant by asking to be moved into the chamber reserved for those whose speedy passing was anticipated. His request was granted, and he whiled away the time with pleasant conversation and jest. But after midnight he desired to receive the Eucharist. His companions thought it strange that one so cheerful and light-hearted, who showed no signs of approaching death, should make such a request, but again his wish was granted. Next he asked whether those present were in peace and charity toward him and was assured by them that it was so. Replying to a question from his friends, he said, "My mind is in perfect peace towards all the ser-

vants of God." Then he asked how long it was till the hour when the brethren would be summoned to the nocturnal psalms. On being told that the time was nigh, he answered, "It is well; let us await that hour." He then made the sign of the cross, and laying his head down on the pillow sank into a peaceful sleep from which he never awoke on earth. He was buried in the monastery where he had spent so many years employing his leisure time in cultivating his poetical gift.

Certain of Cædmon's works were printed at Amsterdam in 1635 from a MS. presented by Archbishop Usher to the eminent philologist, Francis Dujon, better known as "Junius," who bequeathed it to the Bodleian Library. In 1832 an edition was edited by Thorpe with a literal English translation accompanying the text.

Students of the occult meanings of names may be interested to consider a few suggestions on the significance and derivation of "Cædmon". This has given rise to much discussion, and many widely differing solutions have been put forward. It bears a striking resemblance to certain Hebrew and Chaldee words, but Kadmon in Hebrew carries a double meaning and may be interpreted as either "eastern" or "ancient". Sir Francis Palgrave therefore inferred (*Archæologia*, xxiv) that the poet might have been an "Eastern visitor," who had arrived in Britain,

but this seems to be a purely fanciful idea without sufficient evidence to support it. With more probability he conjectured that Cædmon might have been so entitled from the Chaldaic name for the Book of Genesis. *Be-Kadmin* (in the beginning) is the first word of the Chaldee Targum on Genesis. Not yet exhausted, he added a third surmise to the effect that the name may have been derived from "Adam Cadmon," the archetypal man of the Kabbalists, who "unites in himself all forms". Although we cannot trace the Kabbalist theorem with any certainty to an earlier period than the ninth century, yet it is possible the word may have been in use in the East at a much earlier time to express a theosophic or philosophic idea. Palgrave will not admit an Anglo-Saxon derivation for the first part of the name, but Sandras and Bouterwek explain *ced* as meaning a boat in Anglo-Saxon, and take the whole word to signify boatman or pirate. Still another authority thinks Cædmon to be an Anglicised form of a common British name *Catumanus* (*catu*—a battle) and says the poet was of Celtic, that is, of Aryan descent.

Among all these possibilities the reader must take his choice, only remembering that names have an esoteric as well as an exoteric interpretation, and that every letter has a numerical value associated by many nations of antiquity with the divination of fate.

M. OLDFIELD HOWEY

THE INFLUENCE OF BUDDHISM

[Below we print two articles on Buddhism as viewed by Westerners. One writes of Buddhist influence on the life of the individual; the other of the light which Buddhist doctrines throw on the present world-chaos. **Lady Hosie, M. A.**, looks at the Buddhist doctrines and ideas through church-made spectacles. Thus the grand concept of the supreme renouncers, the Bodhisattvas and Nirmanakayas, is not fully appreciated by her. A Buddhist might retort: "For one Christ who died and ascended into heaven, there are numerous Bodhisattvas who live on earth and suffer for the sake of mortals, carrying the yoke of embodied existence so that They may serve the race to which They belong." Again, it is a sweeping statement—and a wrong one—which Lady Hosie makes when she claims that Christianity is "the only religion which says that a man can be at one with God, while having a wife, a family," etc. She has only to look at Hindu and Buddhist texts to find out her mistake. She instances Gautama leaving his wife, but once again a Buddhist might point at Jesus's behaviour towards his mother. And Nirvana is not "a blowing-out" but a life in which there is "activity without motion". **A. M. Hocart, M. A.** has had experience of German University life, in addition to Oxford. Since then he has had a varied career which has taken him as far afield as Fiji and Western Polynesia for the purpose of ethnical research. For over ten years he was Archæological Commissioner of Ceylon and now he is Assistant Professor of Sociology in Cairo. He is the author of several books among which are *Kingship* and *Progress of Man*. By reason of his wide travel, his judgment of men and things escapes every tinge of insularity.—EDS.]

I.—WHY I AM NOT A BUDDHIST

IMPRESSIONS OF MAHAYANA BUDDHISM

My "Aunt Kung," in Tientsin, now about seventy years of age, showed me one day her scroll depicting a manifestation of Buddha, her incense burner, her praying-mat; she told her rosary for me and repeated the words "Na-mi-to-fo" till she came to the pink bead when she could stop awhile. "Buddha is a saviour, too; your Jesus is not the only one," she told me.

Not long ago, a young Chinese student sat in our drawing-room here in Oxford beside me on the sofa, his big round spectacles making his round pale face a very moon of quiet completed calm.

"I think Buddhism a higher re-

ligion than Christianity," he said.

"Tell me in what respect," I asked.

"Your ideas of heaven are so material," he replied, to my great surprise. "We should count a place that depended on harps, thrones, jewels, golden floors, as our eighth heaven. Our ninth—the real 'heaven' is far less gross. We of the Zen School pass beyond that eighth even in meditation here."

This was unexpected; I had to think how to answer it and also how to learn by it.

"You are doing to me," I replied "just what I now realize I have done to you. You are reading our

Book of the Revelations literally, as many of our own people have done and thereby lost its high interpretation."

Nowadays few Christians think very much even about the golden floor and pearly gates. These seem the overflowing of the artistic soul, like the illuminations of our missals of mediæval times. When we sing of "lying prostrate before the Throne of God" or of "casting our crowns before His feet," we know to-day that we speak in parable and poetry. Heaven to us is, as with the Chinese, a state of the soul and to be begun while here on earth. But I realized through his speech that I also erred in reading Buddhist Scriptures literally. My mind has often wearied with the pages of description in the sutras, of Buddha on the Lion-throne, with trappings of gold, the air full of the rain of scented flowers, and lengthy descriptions of jewels. Now I, too, must humble myself and perceive that these are but parables.

In comparing religions, we are apt to fall into the snare of comparing the ideal of our own with the practice of another. Practice should be compared with practice, ideal with ideal. It is hard to say which of these is the more important. Martin Luther said that Faith and Works are to each other as Fire and Flame. Where there is no Flame, assuredly the Fire is poor and small. Judged by our Works, we have all failed. Of late, people have much criticized Christians because they have taken up arms and fought throughout the centu-

ries—during the Crusades to win back the tomb of their Saviour! But Buddhists must equally face that criticism, for they too are committed to peace by their faith. Everyone knows how combatant are the monks in Burma; the Buddhists in Japan have fought bitter battles at various times; and there are many fighting monks in Tibet to-day. We can none of us throw stones at each other for our non-pacifism.

Nobody, least of all a Christian—a Protestant and a woman—can be granted such a privilege as an immersion into the luminous faith and thought of Mahayana Buddhism, and not grow into a deep respect for this great Way of Religious Experience, and learn by it. I speak of my impressions rather than my knowledge, for I can only compare myself with a Buddhist woman who has read portions of the Christian Scriptures, conversed a little with Christian friends, and seen the centuries-old effect of their religion upon a nation.

Modern Chinese youth has little use for Buddhism. I read lately of a temple which has been transformed into a bus-garage.

When my father was in China preaching the gospel of Jesus in Chinese to beginners, he always started them on St. John. "In the beginning was the Word," they would read. And they knew what that meant. He was appealing to what was already present in their minds. The Way, the Truth, the Life, —these are terms which the East possesses already deep in its

experience. "I take refuge in the Law," says the Buddhist; and the Christian too says, "God is my refuge and defence."

Why, then, am I not a Buddhist? It may seem a curious kind of appreciation: yet the more I read Mahayana, the brighter the light that seems to shine in and on Jesus. Gautama was a prince, Jesus a carpenter; and it is Jesus who has taught us to see that it is greater to be a carpenter than a prince. This sets aside for ever the idea inherent in Buddhism that high position, wealth and health are the rewards of karma. It would seem as if the disciples of Jesus had this in mind when they asked, "Which did sin, this man or his parents that he was born blind?" And Jesus asked them if they thought that the men who had been crushed beneath a falling tower were sinners above all men; and denied such an idea of the Creator and Father. Similarly, they were perturbed when He said that it was hard for rich men to enter the Kingdom of Heaven. "But who then can be saved?" they asked, evidently thinking that riches are the sign-manual of accumulated virtue. Seeing that Jesus, our Perfect Example, was betrayed and was crucified, we can hardly think that this was the result of His sins in a former existence. To a Christian, it is impossible that a leper should be thought of as cursed of the gods, as is thought in the East. To a Westerner, especially of to-day, the Eastern idea of reincarnation seems to have no foundation whatever, either in human experi-

ence or in reason. We can only surmise that these ideas of reincarnation are a kind of mental preparation for the realities of evolution. These realities are so obvious in the physical world that we feel they are possible, and probable, in the spirit world.

Yet the idea of vicarious suffering is to be found in Mahayana also. The *sravakas*, like little monkeys, cross the stream of truth swimming quickly on the surface; the *pratyeka buddhas* swim more deeply in the stream like horses; but the great *bodhisattvas*, like my lord elephant, walk strongly across the bottom and bear others on their backs. They refuse their Nirvana till they have saved others. These *bodhisattvas* show great charity for the unfortunate; yet one has a feeling that they are primarily occupied in piling up merits for themselves. Now it is never suggested that Jesus went to the Cross to gain merit for Himself: but only for others.

The reader constantly finds likenesses and comparisons between our two religions. When we come to the great central themes, the same root stories appear, yet bearing such differing blossoms. Gautama went into the wilderness, his soul dismayed at the sight of poverty, disease and death—just as the hearts of the young are wrung to-day, and are rightly in revolt against oppressions. Jesus, too, went out into the desert to think: but He went, surrendered in baptism to the will of God, so He heard a different answer from Gautama. He came

back able to feed the multitude and He never required them to retire from this world of desire and emotion. He called women unto Him and spoke willingly and greatly to them; He did not shun them as leading to evil, or regret that they wished to follow Him as Gautama did and said. For Him, it was God who created man and woman, and therefore marriage was good, even though He was unmarried Himself. He called children and blessed them. For Him, all foods too were good. Indeed, His is the only religion which says that a man can be at one with God while having a wife, a family, and eating three meals a day—including flesh. Little is known of Gautama's life, and it may even be, as modern research says, that he did not institute monasticism; but he certainly left his wife and infant son. To him they were hindrances to perfect living.

Jesus uses the word "yoke," which is kin to the word "yoga". If yoked with Him, we shall be unable to withdraw into the Law and soar only upwards into Visions of transcendent bliss. His religion is wide as well as deep, includes mankind as well as heaven. After He had called men to be yoked with Him, He went into the cornfields, plucked the corn, and tried to enlarge the ideas of Law for the Pharisees; then healed a man with

a withered hand, and sat in a boat to teach the multitudes. He gave His heart and life freely to all men, women and children about Him.

So, in the end, every word I read of Buddhism makes Jesus lovelier. The two parables of the prodigal son put it in a nutshell. In the Buddhist version, the father recognizes his erring son, but does not let him know this. He makes him a scavenger—the meaning being that he must scavenge off the trammels of this earthly life and all desire, as if these were bad and unworthy things. It is only when his son is fifty that the father recognises him openly and shares his riches and treasure with him. In Jesus's story, the father runs to meet the son, kisses him though he is in rags, gives him freely a robe and a feast and music, for these are things of a good father's providing and not to be treated as filth. This world to Jesus is a means of grace; He came to assuage and fulfil desire, not to eliminate it, to give us fountains of living water springing up joyously within our souls for ever. The Buddhist seeks invulnerability. Jesus says the Way is through the extreme of vulnerability; the Way is the Cross. The end is not Nirvana, a blowing-out, an Absorption: but Resurrection and fullest living in a Father's home, which is here as well as beyond.

DOROTHEA HOSIE.

II.—THE EXCELLENCE OF BUDDHA'S DOCTRINE IN LONDON I UNDERSTOOD

The glare and business of the day was over. I retired to the cool of my verandah and, picking up an ancient text, began to read :—

What, O monks, is the law of causal genesis? Out of ignorance as cause arise the activities; out of the activities as cause arises consciousness; out of consciousness as cause arise spiritual and material qualities; out of spiritual and material qualities as cause arise the six senses; out of the six senses as cause arises contact; out of contact as cause arises sensation; out of sensation as cause arises desire; out of desire as cause arises attachment to things; out of attachment to things as cause arises becoming; out of becoming as cause arises birth; out of birth as cause arises old age and death, pain, care, grief, sorrow, and despair. In such a manner does the origin of the whole mass of suffering come into being. This, monks, is called its genesis.*

I put down the book and thought and as I thought my gaze wandered across the lake to where the Northern Tope reared its colossal bulk of brick to the glory of the teacher who had spoken these words. Its spire seemed to point heavenward for hope, not despair. Its reflection in the still waters of the evening lake spoke of peace, not conflict. "Can this fair world be really evil as the teacher says?" I asked.

Past the garden gate in single files straggled pilgrims clad in white. Fathers and mothers carried in their arms babies for whom they had come to seek life at the shrines of him who condemned life as but a round of pain. From holy

place to holy place they had trudged all day until they were footsore and weary; yet they endured so that their little ones might grow up, feeling and desiring, to have children of their own, and so perpetuate that round of existence which the sage had taught the way to end.

Were they misguided? Was this lovely world after all but a snare? Were the flaming flowers on the treetops, the flitting birds, the cloudless sky, the rich sunset, and the tinkling temple bells so many fetters binding man to an existence wholly evil?

Night fell and an immense calm pervaded the tropic scene. It felt good to live and to desire. I could not understand.

* * *

"Sir, here are your leave papers." Those foolscap sheets meant green fields, the song of birds, dim northern lights, and blurring mists, and a great desire arose to revisit the old places.

* * *

Home at last. A bustle across the noisy, grimy quay, then off to the great centre of life. I looked out for the green fields. Soon they came into view with their hedges and tall trees and straying cattle. But what are those huge boards punctuating the meadows at intervals and bidding me take Dr. Drug's cure? It is not that Dr. Drug is interested in me and wishes me well; it is my money he

* Samyutta Nikaya XII, 3.

wants, and to get it he is prepared to blot the landscape with his ceaseless iterations. He is not the only one, for as we near town insistent signs multiply, all seeking to awake a desire for pleasure or a fear of evil. They drip, drip, like a corroding acid, on the joy of homing. But here is London, and to-night a play.

* * *

Piccadilly. A blaze of lights of all colours, flashing, turning, shimmering, and below, the crowd is surging to its pleasures. Here is light and life.

The first rapture over, the morning's pain is renewed. After all, those lights are not the expression of a joy in life. Every one of them has been placed there in chaotic confusion by a cold calculating purpose. Each one is designed to make the gaping crowd desire what they never dreamt of desiring before and what they had been perfectly happy not to desire. It is intended to destroy that happiness and take away from the soul its rest until it has satisfied the newborn desire. And why? In order that the inventors may obtain the object of their own desires, gold.

This is no time to philosophize. The play will soon begin.

* * *

It is good to wake up in an English bed and come down to an English breakfast. I pick up the paper. The first page is wholly filled with suggestions that this lovely country I am so pleased to revisit, "this precious stone set in the silv sea," is a place to fly

from, that elsewhere sunshine and romance await me, and all things desirable. I turn over the page and am confronted by a drawing compelling in its hideousness. It is merely set there to decoy my mind into reading how some one's fuel will give me more speed, more miles than I ever had. Next to it an alluring female is posted to divert the eye from matters of state to a suggestion that nature has made women too plump and that they can make themselves look more youthful. Other pictures inspire dreams of more luxurious homes and explain how easily present happiness can be secured by mortgaging the future.

If the reader cannot be enticed he must be scared. Bogies are planted here and there to drive the panic-stricken quarry into the toils of desire; premature wrinkles, uric acid, indigestion, lassitude, night starvation, all the ills that flesh is heir to and many more, are dangled before the eye like spectres.

As I watch desires and fears crowding to this assault on human peace there comes before my mind's eye a scene often illustrated in Buddhist art. The Buddha is sitting on his diamond throne, impassive between terrific forms and alluring females. Both fears and longings assail him to divert him from his fixed purpose of saving the world from their tyranny. But he keeps his course.

But what about the harried millions who have no such army of knowledge against the gadfly of

desire? They are precipitated headlong into a mad chase after the unattainable; because desire is no longer evoked, as in the normal man, by a real need and set at rest by fulfilment: it has become a chronic affliction which even fulfilment cannot still.

Those who are stung cannot keep their madness to themselves. The whole world must be drawn into the vortex, for one man's desires can only be attained by stimulating the desires of others. Since desire has become a bottomless pit it can engulf the whole world, and it would swallow up the moon and the planets if it could. Men must eat more, drink more, and rush about more, not because it is good for them, but because it enriches those who have meat and drink and vehicles to sell. In one column of my paper a business man urges his countrymen to join in making John Chinaman want what they have to sell, not that he loves John Chinaman, but because he loves his own pocket. In another column a savant, discontented with the facts he has spent a lifetime in piling up, thinks he will be happy if he can only get more facts, and wants the world to share his discontent. Here is a politician who appeals for help in disturbing "the pathetic contentment" of Asiatic peasants, and ready to pillory as an inhuman wretch anyone who may wish them to remain contented. Contentment has become a crime, because it opens up no markets for goods

or for doctrines. Woe to the man who does not want more fish, more beer, more art, more science, more education, more speed. Trade has no use for him; politics and science abhor him. The man after their own heart is the one who can make two desires grow where only one grew before. What though he throw to the wind the old-fashioned restraints, the time-honoured virtues? What though he stoop to cringing or insolence, to falsehood, even to corruption? He is hailed as a creative artist, because he has created desire.

Ignorance throws the door wide open to all these suggestions, ignorance of nature, ignorance of self. The quack finds it easy to furnish minds vacant of all knowledge with alarming theories. He readily persuades them that their ills are due to a bent spine, to the wear and tear the body suffers during sleep, or to lack of sunshine. Not understanding themselves men lay the blame for their discontent on externals, on the climate, the government, the lack of pleasures, and the lack of money wherewith to buy pleasures. Thus desires and fears born of ignorance lead them into ceaseless and exhausting activities. These stimulate the senses, which in turn demand more and more stimulation. Thus desire goes on growing till it can no longer be satisfied, and so turns to pain, care, grief, sorrow and despair.

Now I understand.

A. M. HOCART

THE CITIZEN AND THE STATE

THE INDIAN VIEW

[S. V. Viswanatha, M.A., describes the relationship between the citizen and the state in Ancient India. That his description is not fancifully Utopian, but pictures an actual, existing state of things is shown by his citation of the old texts. For the builders of the India of to-day, who are not too glamourised by modern Western "progress," this article should be of especial interest—Eds.]

There has been considerable difference of opinion among sociologists in regard to the extent of interference that may be exercised by the modern state in the affairs of its citizens, ranging from the theory of *laissez faire* through the more humane state-socialism, fascism or middle-class Bolshevism, to anarchist Bolshevism. It is of interest, therefore, to note the principles of political and moral obligation which guided the relations of the state and its citizens in ancient India.

The principle of *laissez faire*, which long swayed Western nations in respect of the attitude of the state to its citizens, is not found applicable to any period of the history of Indian society (See, e.g., *Sukraniti*, I, 587-618). It was held that the social and moral order of the state could best be secured not by individuals being let alone, but by their adhering to the *Dharma* or duties of the community or caste to which they belonged. In fact, the individual was nothing; the order to which he belonged determined his position and functions, his rights and responsibilities. The greatest happiness of the greatest number which, according to Indian law-

givers (*Arthaśāstra*, p. 39), the end of the state, was achieved by the subjects not swerving from the rules of their order; and whoever upheld his duty, ever adhering to the customs of the *Aryas*, and following the rules of the castes and divisions of religious life, was bound to be happy both here and hereafter (*Arthaśāstra*, p. 8).

The interference by a state in the affairs of its citizens may be actuated by various motives. It may use its coercive and supervisory powers only to remove social, political and economic evils, or it may do more constructive work by promoting or fostering what many regard as leading to the general good and happiness of the Commonwealth. In India it was recognised as the duty of the state not only to prevent harm or injury to its citizens, but to enforce discipline and punish breaches thereof, which might lead to the disturbance of the social and moral order of the community. (Government is *Dandanti*). Generally speaking, the state in ancient India interfered in the social and industrial pursuits of the people in order to regulate and protect them. The initiative in all activities leading to the material prosperity of the com-

munity was taken by the subject-citizens and the state was there to protect them, for "that was the very cream of kingly duties". (*Mahābhārata*, Śānti, 58, 1).

This ideal is evident even in the *Rig Veda* (III, 43. 5) where the king is styled *gopatirjanasya*. The government played the part of the good parent and saw that its activities were so regulated that posterity would thrive better in body and in mind (*Manu*, VII. 80; *Yajñavalkya*, I. 334). This protective principle is in evidence in the great care which was bestowed on agriculture by sovereigns in ancient India (*Purāṇatīrṇu*, 18). It was looked upon as the duty of the government to provide facilities for irrigation as will be clear from the questions that Nārada put to Yudhisṭhira in the *Mahābhārata* (Sabhā, V. 81).

Are large tanks and lakes constructed in the country in suitable places and filled with water so that the thirsty fields may not be entirely dependent on the water rained by the heavens?

Larger schemes of irrigation and public works too ambitious for individual enterprise were undertaken by the state, while the cultivators provided the minor ones which they could easily manage to institute themselves. It was also recognised as a governmental obligation to provide for orphans, the aged, the infirm, the poor, and the helpless (*Arthaśāstra*, p. 47). The state found employment for the unemployed who were willing to work but could not find employment. We read that even prisoners

were set to work on crown lands or on the repair of roads (*Sukranīti*, I. 268). Orphans and helpless men were utilized as spies and were given maintenance, in return for the service they rendered to the state (*Arthaśāstra*, p. 20). Large industrial enterprises corresponding to modern workhouses seem also to have been started by the sovereigns, to give work and afford relief to the able-bodied poor (*Arthaśāstra*, p. 115 f.). Poor-relief was thus a responsibility of the state (*Hitopadeśa* I. 14), but those who preferred to live on alms, though able-bodied, were deemed wicked and, therefore, deserving to be expelled from the state. On this ground strong and sturdy beggars were punished, if they would not earn their living by honest occupation (*Sukranīti*, IV. 1. 105 and 107).

Though the relation of the capitalist and the labourer in industry was ordinarily allowed to be fixed by contract—the agreement governing the wages to be paid (*Sukranīti*, II. 392)—the principle was accepted that the wages of the labourer should at least meet "the compulsory charges" and enable him to lead a respectable life. Low wages were deemed a curse—

For people that are paid low wages are enemies by nature of law and order; they live a miserable life, play into the hands of others, to plunder others' riches and become a great plague to the community (*Sukranīti*, II. 400).

State interference for the regulation of liquor traffic was actuated by the same principle of paternal

care. It was held generally that over-indulgence in intoxicants is the cause of much suffering and crime. As Kautilya observes (*Arthaśāstra*, p. 328), the effects of drunkenness are loss of wealth, insanity, absence of consciousness, loss of knowledge, life, wealth and friends, desertion by the virtuous, suffering from pain etc. The Indian lawgivers, both religious and secular, like modern statesmen and legislators, apparently discerned that total prohibition might become futile through the impossibility of enforcing it. The dangers of drunkenness are not likely to leave a society unless the consensus of opinion is that drinking, moderate or excessive, is in itself an evil (See *Sukramti*, I. 116). But the initiative in the direction will have to be taken by the people at large, and especially by those that visit the liquor-shops.

A healthy and happy population is a necessary adjunct of a good state. A commonwealth (*janapada*) should have, among other features, primarily a strong and healthy population of good character. That this was the ideal of ancient India is clear from the great concern which the Indian states seem to have felt for their population. It is in evidence in an institution corresponding to the "census" of modern times in the reign of one of the most remarkable of Indian kings. The third Board of Chandragupta's administrative department was responsible, according to Megasthenes, for the systematic registration of births and deaths, and another department of his

administration was allotted to the treatment of foreigners.

To these they assign lodgings, and keep watch over their modes of life by means of those persons whom they give to them for assistants. They escort them on the way when they leave the country, or in the event of their dying, forward their properties to their relatives. They take care of them when they are sick, and if they die bury them (*Megasthenes*, fr. 34).

Breaches of these regulations were severely dealt with, and officers were taken to task for return of false statements.

The protective interference by the state is in evidence also in the educational activities of the citizens. As regards elementary education, the initiative lay mostly with private enterprise. Education was for the edification of the citizens (*Kural*, 370), and it was the first duty of the latter to undertake the responsibility of elementary and primary education. According to the educational ideas of the Vedic and post-Vedic periods, it was incumbent on the parents to send their children to a teacher variously styled as *Ācharya*, *Guru*, *Upādhyāya*, under whom they sought instruction and were initiated into the arts and sciences. In later times, every Indian village had its own *paṭhśāla* maintained by the villagers for giving instruction in the three R's. But the state always intervened to give encouragement to scholars, to foster the fine arts (*e. g.* *Purāṇanūru*, 69), and to help higher educational enterprise in a variety of ways, besides keeping a general censorial supervision to promote, literacy (*Artha-*

śāstra, p. 125; *Śukranīti*, IV. 3). The academic centres of ancient India, Takshāśīla, Nālanda, Kāśī, Ujjain, Vikramaśīla, Madura and Kāñchīpura appear to have been the result of private enterprise. The state acted in all cases as the protector, and extended the helping hand. The sovereigns patronised learning and culture with their presents to Pandits and learned men, and with royal endowments for the fostering of fine arts and cultural studies (*Arthaśāstra*, p. 125; *Śukranīti*, I. 367 f.).

The life of the state, and the life of the persons that make it, influence each other, and the sovereign state will be strong and effective only when the citizens are ready to subordinate their private interests and to fall in with the general will for the common good. The citizens that participate in the life of the state have interest of two kinds—their personal interests and those of the state of which they are members. Though sometimes the two may not agree in the political organisation, it is the highest duty of the citizen to do such honorary work or render such voluntary aid as should lead to the smooth and vigorous working of the body politic. In normal times the head of the state in ancient India had the right of taking certain revenues from his subjects for the expenditure of the realm in return for the protection he gave them (*Baudhāyana*, I. 10-1). It was generally understood that the relation of the state and the citizens was of a contractual nature

(*Mahābhārata*, Sānti, 71.10). It was the duty of the citizens to help in keeping the public peace and to aid the state police in clearing the roads and highways of thieves and robbers (*Arthaśāstra*, p. 144), to pay taxes to the state for the political and economic security that was assured them, and to observe inviolate the laws and customs laid down in the holy *Śāstras* or proclaimed by the sovereign from time to time. The citizens were taught to keep to the primary rules of sanitation and hygiene.

Whoever throws dirt in the street shall be fined one-eighth of a *pana* and whoever causes water or mire to collect in it, one-fourth of a *pana*. The same offence committed on the royal road entails double the amount of fine (*Arthaśāstra*, p. 145).

In judicial proceedings, it was incumbent on the subjects to give voluntary aid to help the Judiciary.

That wretch of a person who knowing all did not give evidence was visited by the sin and the punishment of a false witness (*Yājñavalkya*, II.79).

Though persons not formally summoned to give evidence were not bound to appear at the law court, anyone who came to the court by accident but knew about the case, if questioned by the judge was bound to give out the truth (*Gautama*, XIII. 3. f.). Similarly, the penalty was very heavy for conscious dereliction of one's honorary duties.

When a person caused a criminal to be let off or supplied him with food, dress, information or plans of escape the penalty was mutilation or a fine of 900 *panas*. (*Arthaśāstra* p. 226 f.)

Similarly, in a village where a house was on fire, any house-owner who did not hasten to help to extinguish the fire was fined twelve *panas*, and one who had taken a house only for rent (*avakrayi*) not proving to be of use in such a calamity, was to suffer the same penalty (*Arthaśāstra*, p. 145). In times of danger, people who neglected opportunities for rescuing themselves, being indolent and idle, were fined by the state (*Arthaśāstra*, p. 207), and thus made to realise the truth of the good and wholesome maxim "Self-help is the best help."

If, in grave emergencies such as famine, it was the duty of the king to provide his subjects with grain and provisions and with other assistance by a variety of measures (*Arthaśāstra*, p. 208), it was the duty of the citizen to volunteer help to his distressed fellows and to promote the commonweal. People who did public and philanthropic work were appreciated and awarded due honours. Those who, being actuated by motives of public welfare, offered their wealth to the government, were honoured with a special rank

at court, a royal umbrella, a precious turban or ornaments in return for their voluntary aid (*Arthaśāstra* p. 244). *Grhasthas* (men in family life), who being incapable of braving the battle of life would shake off the shackles of family and belongings to assume the role of ascetics, were discredited by the state and considered to be fit subjects for severe penalties. We meet with the following wholesome rules (*Arthaśāstra*, p. 47) : When without making provision for the maintenance of his wife and children, any person embraced asceticism, he was punished for the offence. When a capable man or woman neglected to maintain his or her child, mother, father, minor brothers, sisters and widowed girls, a fine of twelve *panas* was levied. Asceticism of women, because they were unable to bear the burden of their family duties though they were strong and capable of earning an honest livelihood, was condemned; and not only were such women fined but also those responsible for their decision to become ascetics (*Sukraniti*, IV. 1. 105). Similar rules are found in many Indian works.

S. V. VISWANATHA

AVASTHATRAYA

THE STATES OF WAKING, DREAMING AND SLEEPING

[In the following article M. A. Venkata Rao of Mysore University examines the subject of the four states of consciousness from a philosophical point of view. We append an important Note entitled "The Four States and Tabernacles," which deals with them from a psychological angle of vision.—EDS.]

The study of sleep and dreams for purposes of metaphysical interpretation is a special feature of Indian philosophy. Distinct points of view emerge as early as the time of the Upanishads. I propose to indicate briefly the two rival systems of interpretation that hold the stage and to suggest their value.

The *Māndūkya Upanishad* sets forth the nature of Brahman as four-fold (चतुष्पात्). There are the three aspects of Brahman—Vaiśvānara, Taijasa, Prājña, revealed respectively in the states of wakefulness, dream and sleep; and the fourth (Chaturth or Turiya) is Brahman Itself, in Its indivisible integrity. The mystic word AUM sums up the significance of this four-fold truth; its component letters, A, U, M, designate the three conditions and the word as a whole symbolises their underlying unity. Vaiśvānara is the waking life of living beings and the theatre of their joys and sorrows. Taijasa is dreaming consciousness, directed inwards, ruminating over impressions left by past experience. Prājña is sleeping consciousness free from the activity of perception and the unrest of desire, both of waking life and of dreams. Consciousness here regathers itself

into its pristine oneness—an amorphous mass shot through and through with bliss. But these states are not the final form, which is Brahman. The fourth is the real Brahman whose nature is described in a few pregnant phrases embodying the quintessence of the noblest mysticism in history. That consciousness is neither inward-looking nor outward-looking; it is not a mass of consciousness nor is it unconsciousness; it is imperceptible and indefinable. An integral homogeneous self-consciousness (एकात्म्य प्रत्ययकार) is its essence; it connotes the stilling of the multiple world, the peace that passeth all understanding and blessed joy (प्रसन्नोपशमम्).

Buddhism apart, the history of Indian philosophy displays two main streams of interpretation of this ancient and venerable teaching, represented by the Advaita School of Gaudapāda and Śaṅkara on the one hand and the Viśiṣṭadvaita and Dvaita Schools of Rāmānuja and Madhva on the other. Prima facie, the Upanishad seems to be a nest of contradictions. If the fourth state is the real, what is the status of the external world and the whole course of human experience and history? The answer of Gaudapāda and Śaṅkara is

decisive. They are unreal. The world of perception is classed with that of dreams and both are dismissed as false imagination. Advaita draws the conclusion that entities that can become objects are unreal, for they vary, and variation is the sign manual of lack of self-dependence and so of unreality. The subject is the sole real. This conclusion is suggested by the variation of wakefulness and dreaming in contrast with the changelessness of deep sleep. Mind is present in waking and dreaming and so is the appearance of multiplicity. The mind is absent in deep sleep and the vision of plurality is likewise absent. "Mind" in Indian thought is not the Self but the inner co-ordinating agency of the same rank as the senses (अन्तःकरण). Whatever is present when something else is present and absent when it is absent, is causally connected with it. Mind is the cause of the appearance of the pluriverse. This is the method of agreement and difference which J. S. Mill claimed to have formulated for the first time as the essence of the scientific method. It has been known for over a thousand years in Indian logic as *anvaya vyatireka*.

By a further application of the same method, the final conclusion is drawn that the Self is the sole reality. It is present in all the three states of waking, dreaming and sleep, while mind and multiplicity are absent in the last. The Self and the world-appearance are not inherently connected and the latter being *sublatable* cannot be

real. Hence the ultimate consciousness is integral and one without a second (अद्वितीयम्). The world is *mithya*, false—not false in the sense of impossible objects like the barren woman's son, rabbit's horns and the lotus growing in the sky; for it appears to consciousness and has a method in its madness, but it is not *true*, for it disappears *totally* on the attainment of *sākṣātkāra* or direct vision of the ultimate reality. The basis is Brahman; when we know it, we see that the world we had imagined in it did not exist in the past, does not exist at the moment, and will not exist in the future.

Rāmānuja holds that the world is unreal if regarded as self-existent, but real as an expression of Brahman (ब्रह्मात्मनोऽप्येव). The school of Madhva holds that corresponding to the three states of the *jiva* or individual soul the Deity reveals Itself in *three levels of apprehension*. In the waking state we apprehend the physical universe through which Brahman gives a real glimpse of Its nature. The cosmos is not a part of Its nature but a condition of Its manifestation. In the dream state, strange fantasies are created out of the stuff of the impressions and traces of past experience in accordance with the universal mechanism of which the Deity is the inspirer (प्रेरक). The affective side of dreams is regarded as having a moral incidence and as being a part of the teleological scheme. In the sleeping state, the mind is not destroyed; it only becomes implicit. Further, Madhva questions the Advaitic application

of the method of agreement and difference. The concomitance of mind and multiplicity does not prove that the mind is the creator of multiplicity. It only proves that it is a necessary condition of manifestation. It is a mechanism for the revelation of what is already there. The full value of the mystic experience of the *turiya* is sought to be preserved in a more inclusive way. It is suggested that Brahman's nature as *ekatma-pratyayasāra*, unity of self-consciousness, is Its deeper aspect in which It is *akhanda*, impartible, but that It also includes and sustains a real universe of infinite multiplicity as a condition of Its manifestation (अभिव्यक्त्यात्र). The mystic experience is an experience of the circumambient consciousness which is over all. But the Deity limits Itself as a condition of creativity and of the reign of law (नियम). In a word, an experience of the *supremacy* (प्रधान) of the One in the many is the fourth state, which does not *annul* the individual being of the self but carries it into perfection of self-realisation (स्वरूपानन्दविभाव) as in the union of perfect love. Then occurs *prapanchopasamam* indeed — not the destruction of the world but the quiescence of the fret and fever of the world; the world that is usually too much with us is not annihilated but seen in the light of eternity.

It may seem a strange proceeding to draw conclusions of such moment from the common experi-

ences of dreams and sleep. It sounds wrong-headed to infer objective value of the external world through an inspection of inner experience. But the subjective aspect is inescapable, for we cannot think of the external world except through the mechanism of our minds. Indian philosophy makes use of the experience of dreams to point to this inescapable role of the Self in Reality. Dreams reveal the self-luminous creative activity of its character (स्वप्रकाशत्व). For Advaita, the self-luminous self is the sole reality. For Dvaita, it is the supreme reality illumining a subordinate universe steeped in it.*

Further, philosophy requires some kind of verification for its ultimate theories. If the mystic vision (it is also the essence of religion) is to be rendered in a system of symbols, it can only be achieved on the basis of typical experiences of a simpler variety. Absolute Idealists in the West, from Plato and Plotinus to F. H. Bradley, have thought of various symbols for suggesting the mystery of the One and the many. Indian philosophers have unanimously pointed to the experience of sleep for the purpose. Here is a condition of consciousness in which the One and the many are dissolved into a single undifferentiated mass, the same in all dimensions (*ekarasa*).

Bradley neglects such an obvious example and tries in vain to rehabilitate some vague state of

1 cf. B. Bosanquet, *Logic*, Vol. II, p. 312.

immediacy which he calls "feeling". He assumes an unanalysed whole of awareness at the back of all activity of knowing. He wants a unitary state in ordinary life so that the final inclusive unity of the Absolute Experience may be thinkable. Sleep would have served his purpose better. Sleep is the lower immediacy, the oneness before analysis.* Bradley is led to postulate a Higher Immediacy including and transmuting the whole wealth of reality in all its myriad dimensions.† But he wavers in affirming that it also is a matter

of immediate experience for us. He plays with the idea of æsthetic emotion but slips back to the conclusion that for us finite individuals a foretaste of that higher integral experience is impossible. Indian philosophers of both the dominant types of Vedānta are agreed that the *turiya* is such a higher immediacy, *sākshatkāra* or *aparoksha jñāna*, and that it is attainable. This seems to be the philosophic importance of the interpretation of *avasthātṛaya* which occupies so central a place in Indian philosophy and spiritual culture.

M. A. VENKATA RAO

THE FOUR STATES AND TABERNACLES

A NOTE ON THE ABOVE

[The following is a remarkable and thought-provoking extract taken from *The Dream of Ravan* which originally appeared as a series of articles in *The Dublin University Magazine* of 1853-54. The name of the writer is not disclosed.—EDS.]

In the *Tattva Bodha*, and many other works, the idea is further expanded: man is there represented as a prismatic trinity, veiling and looked through by a primordial unity of light—gross outward body; subtle internal body or soul; a being neither body nor soul, but

absolute self-forgetfulness, called the *cause-body*, because it is the original sin of ignorance of his true nature which precipitates him from the spirit into the life-condition. These three bodies, existing in the waking, dreaming, sleeping states are all known, witnessed

* " . . . In mere feeling, or immediate presentation, we have the experience of a whole. This whole contains diversity, and on the other hand, is not parted by relations . . . But it serves to suggest to us the general idea of a total experience, where will and thought and feeling may all once more be one." *Appearance and Reality*, pp. 159-160 (8th Impression, 1925).

† " It would be experience entire, containing all elements in harmony. Thought would be present as a higher intuition . . . Every flame of passion, chaste or carnal, would still burn in the Absolute unquenched and unabridged, a note absorbed in the harmony of its higher bliss" (*Ibid.*, p. 172).

and watched, by the spirit which standeth behind and apart from them, in the unwinking vigilance of ecstasy, or spirit-waking.

This prepares us for, and conducts us to, the complete and fully-developed view of man as a quaternity, in explaining which we must retread the same ground we have already gone over, but with more care and deliberation.

There are four spheres of existence, one enfolding the other—the inmost sphere of Turya, in which the individualised spirit lives the ecstatic life; the sphere of transition, or Lethe, in which the spirit, plunged in the ocean of Adnyana, or total unconsciousness, and utterly forgetting its real self, undergoes a change of gnostic tendency [polarity?]; and from not knowing at all, or absolute unconsciousness, emerges on the hither side of that Lethean boundary to a false or reversed knowledge of things (*viparita dnyana*), under the influence of an illusive *Pradnya*, or belief in, and tendency to, knowledge outward from itself, in which delusion it thoroughly believes, and now endeavours to realise:—whereas the true knowledge which it had in the state of Turya, or the ecstatic life, was all within itself, in which it intuitively knew and experienced all things. And from the sphere of *Pradnya*, or out-knowing,—this struggle to reach and recover outside itself all that it once possessed within itself, and lost,—to regain for the lost intuition an objective perception through the senses and understand-

ing,—in which the spirit became an intelligence,—it merges into the third sphere, which is the sphere of dreams, where it believes in a universe of light and shade, and where all existence is in the way of *Abhasa*, or phantasm. There it imagines itself into the *Linga-deha* (*Psyche*), or subtle, semi-material, ethereal soul, composed of a vibrating or knowing pentad, and a breathing or undulating pentad. The vibrating or knowing pentad consists of simple consciousness, radiating into four different forms of knowledge—the egoity or consciousness of self; the ever-changing, devising, wishing mind, imagination, or fancy; the thinking, reflecting, remembering faculty; and the apprehending and determining understanding or judgment. The breathing or undulating pentad contains the five vital auræ—namely, the breath of life, and the four nervous ethers that produce sensation, motion, and the other vital phenomena.

From this subtle personification and phantasmal sphere, in due time, it progresses into the fourth or outermost sphere, where matter and sense are triumphant; where the universe is believed a solid reality; where all things exist in the mode of *Akara*, or substantial form; and where that, which successively forgot itself from spirit into absolute unconsciousness, and awoke on this side of that boundary of oblivion into an intelligence struggling outward, and from this outward struggling intelligence imagined itself into a

conscious, feeling, breathing nervous soul, prepared for further clothing, now out-realises itself from soul into a body, with five senses or organs of perception, and five organs of action, to suit it for knowing and acting in the external world, which it once held within, but now has wrought out of itself. The first or spiritual state was ecstasy ; and from ecstasy it forgot itself into deep sleep ; from profound sleep it awoke out of unconsciousness, but still within itself, into the internal world of dreams ; from dreaming it passed finally into the thoroughly waking state, and the outer world of sense. Each state has an embodiment of ideas or language of its own. The universal, eternal ever-present intuitions that be eternally with the spirit in the first, are in the second utterly forgotten for a time and then emerge reversed, limited and translated into divided successive intellections, or gropings, rather, of a struggling and yet unorganised intelligence, having reference to place and time, and an external historical world, which it seeks, but cannot all at once realise

outside itself. In the third they become pictured by a creative fantasy into phantasms of persons, things, and events, in a world of light and shade within us, which is visible even when the eyes are sealed in dreaming slumber, and is a prophecy and forecast shadow of the solid world which is coming. In the fourth the out-forming or objectivity is complete. They are embodied by the senses into hard, external realities in a world without us. That ancient seer [Kavi Purana] which the Gita and the Mahabharata mention as abiding in the breast of each, is first a prophet and poet ; then he falls asleep, and awakes as a blindfold logician and historian, without materials for reasoning, or a world for events, but groping towards them ; next a painter, with an ear for inward phantasmal music too ; at last a sculptor carving out hard, palpable solidities. Hence the events destined to occur in this outer world can never be either foreshown or represented with complete exactitude in the sphere of dreams, but must be translated into its pictorial and fantastical language.

THOREAU AND ORIENTAL ASCETICISM

[**Arthur Christy** is an authority in a special field: he has studied the influence of Oriental thought on American writers. His previous articles on Whittier, Emerson and Sidney Lanier have evoked great interest.—EDS.]

I

To study the rise of Oriental cults in America on the basis of the careers and work of eminent swamis alone is to ignore the previously harrowed ground in which they sowed. There is no better evidence of this fact than even a brief examination of the Orientalism of Henry David Thoreau. American scholarship has been singularly myopic and home-keeping in the past, else how explain the fact that it has been only of late that serious attention was given to such sentences from Thoreau's pen as the following?

Depend upon it that, rude and careless as I am, I would fain practise the yoga, faithfully To some extent and at rare intervals, even I am a yogi.

The "Laws of Manu" are a manual of private devotion, so private and domestic and yet so public and universal a word as is not spoken in the parlour or pulpit in these days It goes with us into the yard and into the chamber, and is yet later spoken than the advice of our mother and sisters.

These sentences are only samples of scores like them to be found scattered throughout Thoreau's work. Considering the large number and diversity of his admirers, time need not be given to a defence of the thesis that Thoreau was a potent force in preparing America for the swami who began teaching in the latter half of the nineteenth century.

My purpose in this essay is to present the results of an examination of several hundred pages of unpublished, manuscript material which will indicate how absorbed Thoreau was in Manu's famous work and in Oriental asceticism. This manuscript material is composed largely of commonplace books which William Ellery Channing described in the study of his friend, *Thoreau the Poet-Naturalist*. "His reading," wrote Channing, "was done with a pen in hand: he made what he called 'Fact-books,'—citations which concern his studies." Most of these fact-books are in the Harvard College and the Morgan Libraries.

Perhaps the most significant sentence in a volume entitled *Paragraphs Mostly Original* is the following:—

If the Roman, the Greek, and the Jew have a character in history—so has the Hindoo. He may help to balance Asia, which is all too one sided with its Palestine.

Here is perhaps the clearest statement of Thoreau's reasons for turning Eastward that can be found. But there were other pregnant passages in the volume, a few of which later found their way into published pages. There were such enthusiastic outbursts as:—

I cannot read a sentence in the book of the Hindoos without being elevated as upon the table-land of the Ghauts. It has such a rhythm as the winds of

the desert, such a tide as the Ganges, and seems as superior to criticism as the Himmaleh Mounts.

Another unusual sentence was :—

The Laws of Manu. . . are the laws of you and me, a fragrance wafted down from those old times, and no more to be refuted than the wind.

Some interesting facts may be noted about the twenty-five manuscript pages which contained Thoreau's extracts from Sir William Jones's translation of Manu. Every one of Manu's twelve chapters were quoted from with the exception of the tenth and twelfth, which dealt with the mixed classes and with penance and expiation. The second chapter seems to have received his closest attention, thirty-nine verses culled for the fact-book. It is also interesting to note that with the quotations from the seventh chapter Thoreau wrote :—"A Brahman could not be taxed,"—as though Manu had endorsed his own refusal to be taxed by a corrupt state. And following the long series of extracts from the second chapter appears the following, which I quote in entirety as a significant Thoreauvian commitment :—

We seem to be dabbling in the very elements of a present conventional, or actual and visible life. Here is a *history* of the *forms* which humanity has in all ages assumed. We forget that our whole outward life is but a convention and it is salutary thus to be reminded of it. The old lawgiver seems to have foreseen all the possible relations of men, and provided that they be maintained with adequate dignity. This book could afford a maxim applicable to any condition in which a man may be found.

If we assume—and in Thoreau

the assumption is justified—that the selection of a passage for preservation in a fact-book meant substantial agreement with Manu, the broad parallels that lay between Thoreauvian Transcendentalism and the Vedanta can be readily indicated. Consider first, then, the essential nature of the universe and its source. From the twelfth chapter Thoreau took three suggestive verses :—

Let every Brahman [*sic*] with fixed attention consider all nature, both visible and invisible, as existing in the divine spirit; for, when he contemplates the boundless universe existing in the divine spirit, he cannot give his heart to iniquity (XII, 118).

The divine spirit [alone] is the whole assemblage of gods; all worlds are seated in the divine spirit and the divine spirit, no doubt produces, *by a chain of causes and effects consistent with free will*, the connected series of acts performed by imbodyed souls (XII, 119).

Thus the man, who perceives in his own soul the supreme soul present in all creatures, acquires equanimity toward them all, and shall be absorbed at last in the highest essence, even that of the Almighty himself (XII, 123).

Thoreau was fundamentally not a metaphysician. Emerson, equally interested in the Vedantic conception of the universe, went on and gave considerable attention to the doctrine of Maya. Not so Thoreau. Very little appears in his writing that can be construed as metaphysical concern with the relations of the noumenon and the phenomenon. He was however interested in the doctrine of Karma and its moral implications. Witness the following extracts from the fourth chapter :—

Iniquity, committed in this world, produces not fruit immediately, *but*, like the earth, *in due season*; and, advancing by little and little, it eradicates the man, who committed it. (iv, 172).

Yes; iniquity, once committed, fails not of producing fruit to him who wrought it . . . (iv, 178).

The doctrine of Karma found adequate expression in Emerson's essay "Compensation". The Transcendentalists preferred it as a doctrine of moral requital to any they had inherited from the Calvinistic tradition.

Thoreau never formulated a complete eschatology. It is difficult, therefore, to state definitely whether he believed in Transmigration. If he did, it was in a very general way. His eschatology is perhaps best suggested by two passages which he culled from the fourth and sixth chapters of Manu:—

Single is each man born; single he dies; single he receives the reward of his good, and single the punishment of his evil deeds (iv, 240).

Let him not wish for death; let him not wish for life; let him expect his appointed time, as a hired servant expects his wages (vi, 45).

Death was for Thoreau a return to the Original Source, a dying down to the roots, as grass dies down in winter. His belief in the diverse mutations of the cycle of rebirth is uncertain. He probably accepted much of the basic Hindu idea, but it must have been tempered by his heritage and environment.

Consider now other extracted passages in the light of the *summum bonum* of life. How different from the usual Yankee concept of success is the following verse:—

Greatness is not conferred by years, not by gray hairs, not by wealth, not by powerful kindred: the divine sages have established this rule: "Whoever has read the *Vedas* and their *Angas*, he among us is great" (ii, 154).

Substitute for the *Vedas* the concept of nature as the open book of God, and the complete Thoreauvian idea appears.

Despite the profound implications of the foregoing extracts, there are others even more significant. As has already been suggested, Thoreau is not known to posterity for the system of philosophy he developed; he is primarily known for the way he lived; he will ever be the recluse of Walden. His interest in the ascetic life led him to extract numerous passages from Manu which dealt with its practice. These passages are also unique in that they state clearly the reasons for the mystic's way of life. The following are from the second chapter:—

The organs, being strongly attached to sensual delights, cannot so effectually be restrained by avoiding incentives to pleasure, as by constant pursuit of divine knowledge (ii, 96).

A Brahman should constantly shun worldly honour, as he would shun poison; and rather constantly seek disrespect, as he would seek nectar (ii, 162).

The more specific instructions of the fourth chapter as to space were also noted:—

Alone, in some solitary place, let him constantly meditate on the divine nature of the soul, for by such meditation he will attain happiness (iv, 258).

The rewards of the meditative life were described in chapter six.

Thoreau did not fail to notice them:—

A Brahman, having shuffled of his body by any of those modes, which great sages practised, and becoming void of sorrow and fear, rises to exaltation in the divine essence (vi, 32).

Thus, having gradually abandoned all earthly attachments, and indifferent to all pairs of opposite things, *as honour and dishonour, and the like*, he remains absorbed in the divine essence (vi. 81).

Thus Thoreau proceeded to balance Asia, too one sided in its Hebraism. The Philistinism against which he revolted had much in common with that denounced by Matthew Arnold. But whereas Arnold turned to Greece for a corrective, Thoreau turned to India. And in belief and practice he followed the injunctions of Manu with amazing fidelity. A closer study of Thoreau's life and writings will convince the most sceptical of this fact.

II

Thoreau's natural asceticism sprang neither from any self-punishing Puritanism, nor from a love of asceticism for its own sake. It was neither the result of conversion to a system of practice, nor the effect of any foreign influence of men or books; it was consistently spontaneous and unaffected. This is true despite the fact that the scriptures of the East formed the bulk of his reading in sacred literature. A close student of Thoreau's mind will come to one conclusion: he read the Orientals because he recognized his spiritual kinship with them. He read the Hindus in particular be-

cause in them he found the closest affinity. It is indeed amazing that a shrewd Yankee should have cherished so un-Yankee an objective as the Yoga. Yet Thoreau saw nothing strange in this. "The early and the latter saints are separated by no eternal interval," he wrote in the diary of 1841.

The evidences of Thoreau's interest in Oriental asceticism are to be found throughout his work, published and unpublished.

There is an undertone of Orient-tinted other-worldliness in Thoreau's contributions to the "Ethnical Scriptures" feature of the *Dial*. This is true even of the Confucian extracts. Note these samples: "Perfection (or sincerity) is the way of heaven, and to wish for perfection is the duty of man." "He who offends heaven has none to whom he can pray." But the outstanding illustration will be found in the January, 1844, number which contains ten pages of excerpts from Eugene Burnouf's *Le Lotus de la bonne loi*. The entire selection is in exposition of Buddhist abnegation. Thoreau quoted:—

Then this man speaks thus to the Sages: What means must I employ, or what good work must I do to acquire an equal wisdom? . . . Then these Sages say thus to the man: If thou desirest wisdom, contemplate the law, seated in the desert, or in the forest, or in the caverns of the mountains, and free thyself from the corruption of evil. Then endowed with purified qualities, thou shalt obtain supernatural knowledge.

The significance of these selections will be more clearly under-

stood when one realizes that the "Ethnical Scriptures" were chosen for the purpose of introducing uninformed Americans to the best in the Oriental bibles.

Were there space for them, scores of comments and quotations from the *Bhagavadgita*, the *Harivansa*, and the *Sankhya Karika* could be offered here in elucidation of Thoreau's idealism and asceticism. These may easily be found in the *Week* and the *Journals*. Our present interest is in the reason they appeared there. "Like some other preachers," Thoreau once wrote in explanation, "I have added my texts—derived from the Chinese and Hindoo scriptures—long after my discourse was written." Since the belatedly selected text so appropriately fits the sermon, there can be but one conclusion regarding the sermon itself.

But our study of Thoreau's Oriental asceticism would be far from complete if we fail to mention revealing passages in his correspondence and diaries. In a letter written to Isaac Hecker on August 14, 1844, appear these sentences:—

But the fact is, I cannot so decidedly postpone exploring the *Further Indies*, which are to be reached, you know, by other routes and other methods of travel. I mean that I constantly return from every external enterprise with disgust, to fresh faith in a kind of Brahminical, Artesian Inner Temple life. All my experience, as yours probably, proves only this reality.

These words were written less than a year before his ascetic retreat to Walden pond, and yet, so far as I am aware, they are now

for the first time advanced as the reason for the gesture which shocked Thoreau's contemporaries and which has puzzled his countrymen ever since.

And if this was the reason he went to his retreat, we have an equally revealing description of his conduct there:—

Sometimes, in a summer morning, having taken my accustomed bath, I sat in my sunny doorway from sunrise till noon, rapt in revery. . . . in undisturbed solitude and stillness. . . until by the sun falling in at my west window, or the noise of some traveller's wagon on the distant highway, I was reminded of the lapse of time. I grew in those seasons like corn in the night. . . . I realized what the Orientals mean by contemplation and the forsaking of works. . . . This was sheer idleness, to my fellow-townsmen, no doubt; but if the birds and the flowers had tried me by their standard, I should not have been found wanting.

To ask whether Thoreau practised the true Yoga, tutored and with full benefit of rishi, would be to quibble. The fact is he thought he did, following the injunctions of the Oriental sages whose books he read. "I would fain practise the yoga faithfully," he wrote to H. G. O. Blake, his life-long friend and literary executor. Furthermore, as early as June, 1840, Thoreau had written in conscious indication of what he conceived to be the Oriental temper in his retired life:—

I will have nothing to do; I will tell fortune that I play no game with her; and she may reach me in *my Asia of serenity* and indolence if she can.

Fully aware that his gestures were open to misinterpretation, he never failed to emphasize through

word and conduct that true mystics lived in a "repose without rust". And it may be recalled that James Russel Lowell objected to Thoreau's taste for Oriental philosophy, "which would seem admirably suited to men if men were only oysters". One can distil from Thoreau's writings his effective answer to all such criticism: "Yes, but are men mosquitoes, destined only for an ephemeral and inconsequential buzzing?"

What, then, were the results of Thoreau's ascetic way of life? And if he turned from Occidental modes of reasoning and science in his intellectual life, did he find something to take their place? Here is his answer :—

Science is often like the grub which, though it may have nestled in the germ of a fruit, has merely blighted and consumed it and never truly tasted it. Only that intellect makes any progress toward conceiving of the essence which at the same time perceives the effluence.

And again :—

Reason will be but a pale cloud, like the moon, when one ray of divine light comes to illumine the soul.

These sentences assuredly indicate his affinity with the seers who wrote the Upanishads. But the words which reveal most definitely the Oriental results of Thoreau's life are in *Walden*; they describe his passage over invisible boundaries into a region where the most liberal of laws prevail, where

one lives with the licence of a higher order of beings, where the universe loses all its complexity, and where "solitude will not be solitude, nor poverty poverty, nor weakness weakness". Nowhere in all Occidental literature will be found words that more appropriately describe the dispelling of the fogs of Maya.

In conclusion, it may be appropriate to take note of Thoreau's penetrating thrust at the materialism of his time. The stricture is even more apposite for the twentieth century.

We hear a good deal said about moonshine by so-called practical people, and the next day, perchance, we hear of their failure, they having been dealing in fancy stocks; but there really never is any moonshine of this kind in the practice of poets and philosophers; there never are any hard times or failures with them, for they deal with permanent values.

Thus Thoreau's real life was in the ideal world, completely unexplored by the majority of his countrymen. This was the reason they never understood him. They were like the ideal-doubting materialists whom a Chinese sage once castigated as summer insects that denied the existence of ice. Furthermore, they had not transcended the arbitrary distinctions which meant nothing to Thoreau, whose sympathies were catholic and embraced all mystics, both Occidental and Oriental.

ARTHUR CHRISTY

THE FEELING OF INFERIORITY

[Miss Florence Surfleet, author of *The Child in Home and School*, has specialized in child psychology and education. The practical problem which she discusses understandingly in the following article, however, is as important to the successful orientation of the adult as of the child. It is a real problem for many who lack the clue to an understanding of man's true nature.—EDS.]

I suppose there is not one of us who has not at some time or other had the inferiority feeling, so from our own experience we know something about the way it works. When we have had to face a difficult interview, we have held the door knob in our hands maybe longer than was necessary for opening the door so that we might screw up our courage to enter, or we may have rushed into the room with an appearance of confidence which strangely belied our true feelings.

We can probably all remember times when the inferiority feeling has made us decline to take responsibility, when it has made us flabby and nervous, causing us to seem more stupid and slow moving than we actually were, and other times when it has made us blurt out our opinions aggressively, in a way quite different from the one we would have chosen.

Another thing about the inferiority feeling which appears contradictory and difficult to understand is that it is so often found in patches. A mother may feel quite capable in every branch of her housekeeping, and yet may have an inferiority feeling in the bringing up of her children which makes it difficult for her to trust her own judgment in anything that concerns

them. Sometimes people have just one little patch of diffidence in the daily routine of business or home which may or may not be due to any actual lack of ability. I have known business men who dreaded interviews with awkward clients so much that they would make any excuse to get out of the office to avoid them. I have known others who felt special uneasiness and nervousness in giving instructions to those working under them, and yet who caused a great deal of dissatisfaction amongst the staff because they seemed to be so aggressive and domineering.

I suppose an inferiority feeling is caused either by a real or by an imagined difficulty in doing this or that, in facing this or that; but any actual difficulty is always magnified very much beyond real proportions and the feeling of inferiority is always one which exists entirely in the mind. However handicapped people are, it is always possible for them to get a feeling of achievement in something—witness Helen Keller—and this removes the feeling of inferiority.

Very many of the special difficulties which we experience as adult people we can trace back to childhood, and it is useful to do this because then we can see how very much the difficulty has grown

in our mind, and can often bring ourselves to begin again with a new feeling of hope and confidence in our power as ordinary people to achieve the thing which has caused us trouble for so long. When we realise that we are not different from others, we must admit there is no physical reason why, for example, we cannot swim, no insurmountable difficulty to our learning to swim except in our own minds; and when that has been removed we can set to work with a new determination to do the thing, or else we can decide *not* to do it because it is too much trouble and we don't want to bother, but we cannot any longer screen ourselves behind the thought that we are different from others and it is therefore impossible for us.

In just the same way we must help our children to look at the things that seem to give them special trouble, encouraging them gradually to make a new start. Modern psychology with its insistence on the power of the individual of any age to change, gives hope to every one of us, children and adults alike; for it shows us that by facing the difficulties which have grown up in our minds and by deliberately making a fresh effort to master the problem, we can overcome every kind of inferiority feeling in the course of time.

Since a feeling of inferiority is something which can exist only in the mind, it follows that, by whatever means it has been caused, it can always be removed as soon as the person can begin to gain confi-

dence. Even though the confidence exists first of all in some quite different department of her life, it can gradually spread until it finally gives the person power to get rid even of some deep-seated feeling of inferiority, for she who is achieving does not need to feel inferior, and can eventually prevent herself from doing so.

No arguments, however wise, can remove diffidence or anxiety, though they can demonstrate their unreasonableness and set the person's own thought to work on the problem. It often happens that people think they are being modest when they say they are unable to do this or the other, but in reality they are fostering the inferiority feeling. They can eventually understand that, as the sense of inferiority interferes with achievement, spoils their lives and the lives of their friends, often making them gloomy and pessimistic, it is important that they should try to face it squarely and track it down to its cause. They often feel at first that they cannot change, but they can be helped to understand that change is possible for everybody, and they are often willing then to begin again with a new confidence in their power ultimately to get rid of the inferiority by building up the skill, or the strength, or the courage which has for so long been lacking in that one part of their lives. Otherwise, if that is impossible, for physical reasons, they will get rid of the inferiority by achieving along another line and by accepting their handicap. It is frequently the very people who

feel inadequate and disappointed who are particularly gifted, and by holding back, their gifts are often wasted and the community is the poorer.

We are not complete people if, though we are courageous in physical danger, we cannot bear to face emotional conflict, or if, though we are at ease with our women friends, we feel a sense of diffidence or uneasiness in all our contacts with men, and we must sooner or later seek to adjust these weaknesses in our development.

Our own experience will make us very tolerant of others, even when their diffidence looks like aggressiveness, as it is particularly likely to do, when they are first becoming conscious of its existence and are trying to tackle it. The diffident person, who feels a general sense of inadequacy, a kind of

inferiority towards everything in life, is very liable to think she is different from everybody else and may even glory in her differences. Her first awakening to the existence of others with feelings very similar to her own shatters her isolation and separateness, and from being particularly shy and retiring she may become at first bombastically and aggressively certain of herself, of the rightness of her judgments and her ability.

Then as the real skill, judgment and ability gradually come through and find their direction, the person no longer needs the shelter and protection of aggressiveness, and becomes once more quiet and unassuming, but with a big difference in attitude the difference between uncertainty and certainty, between diffidence and confidence.

FLORENCE M. SURFLEET

NEW BOOKS AND OLD

TWO HEROES—A MAN AND A MAGICIAN*

When the first part of Mr. Arthur Waley's translation of the Lady Murasaki's *Genji Monogatari* was published in 1925 critics were unrestrained in their admiration. They almost tumbled over each other in their eagerness to discover arresting superlatives, glowing phrases of adulation. Something beautiful and exotic had come from Japan. It was written in obsolete Japanese a thousand years ago, and Mr. Waley essayed the task of translating into English a work said to contain 800 characters and over 4,000 pages in the Kogetsusho edition, as if he were endowed with the magic of a Kobo Daishi. There seemed to be no diminution, no clouding effect, in the difficult process of transmutation. The work was so unexpected, so compact of beauty, so distinct from any other translation of oriental literature that it is not surprising that reviewers were delighted and puzzled. Unfortunately, in their excess of joy, they gibbered a little, became "precious" and high faluting. They drove in literary pegs by comparing Murasaki with such varied writers as Shakespeare, Mallory, Jane Austen, Proust, Tolstoy and George Moore. The pegs stood out like tombstones marking the graves of futile criticism. These staggered English critics were prob-

ably reading the first novel written by a woman: possibly the first novel in the world, and the opening instalment was so remarkable that it went to their hearts rather than to their heads. Instead of floundering in useless comparisons they would have been better employed if they had studied the Heian period when this romance was written and with which it was concerned. Even a glance at Murasaki's *Diary*† would have been sufficient to make them realise that while in England during the tenth and eleventh centuries we were in certain respects little better than barbarians, Japanese Court life, with which Murasaki was associated as a lady-in-waiting, had reached a high state of culture and refinement. Rich material was there in abundance to be drawn upon by a skilful writer who was observant, sensitive to beauty and wise in a knowledge of human nature. Murasaki possessed those gifts, and in addition imagination and a fine style. Perhaps her novel is a little too long. There are passages that are tedious, pages, especially in the early part of *The Bridge of Dreams*, where the writer's interest seems to flag, and the reader's also. The Japanese excel in little things: in exquisite poems no longer than it takes a plum petal to flutter to the

* *The Tale of Genji*. By the LADY MURASAKI. Translated by ARTHUR WALEY. In six Volumes. (Allen and Unwin, London, 10s. 6d. each)

† See *Diaries of Court Ladies of Japan*. Translated by Annie Shepley Omory and Kochi Doi

ground: in sword guards rich with lovely designs. But while admitting faults in *The Tale of Genji*, it will always remain one of the great novels of the world.

The first four parts of *The Tale* are primarily concerned with the adventures, mostly of an amorous kind, of Prince Genji, the Shining One. Let it be said at once that he is a most attractive hero: handsome, chivalrous, brave, tender, accomplished. He certainly possessed an effulgent quality capable of illuminating those with whom he came in contact. He did all things well, whether it was writing many letters and poems, the playing of musical instruments, or in feats of strength and skill. He shone conspicuously wherever he went and in whatever he did with that light of high romance which is considerably brighter than life itself. No Puritan gloom hung over the Japanese Court in those days. To be accomplished and refined: to be able to compose a witty and elegant poem in reply to another no less pleasing: to be able to recognise a perfume: to discover beauty, and in recording add something to its loveliness, almost sufficed for those leisurely and secluded days. There was intricate Court etiquette that must be strictly observed, elaborate religious rituals and a degree of politeness which would have frightened Mr. Turveydrop. Court ladies had their screens of honour, their fans, the pretty painted barriers they set up, with which to conceal their feelings. But human

nature was as warm and potent beneath the shadow of an austere Buddha, the majesty of an Emperor, direct descendant of the Japanese Sun Goddess, as in any tale told by Boccaccio or Casanova. We may call it love or lust: what we will. It runs through the whole of *The Tale of Genji*, a laughing and weeping stream that supports the Shining One for a time and for a brief spell Ukifune, the Lady of the Boat. It is not Arthurian, with Round Table humbug, but frankly promiscuous and utilitarian. Murasaki was a Buddhist, and though she had little sympathy with priestcraft, she had the wisdom to perceive the folly of a life devoted to the gratification of the senses. She understood women far more deeply than men, and was sorry for them. She was too great an artist to moralise, but though she described the countless clandestine meetings of Genji, he will be an insensitive reader who fails to perceive the undertone of poignant sorrow that gives to this book a touch of spiritual beauty. In Murasaki's Diary we read: "You feel weary of life: please look into my life, also weary." In *The Tale* there is comic relief, some quickly perceived beauty and flaming passion only polite on the surface. Beneath these things there is the constant suggestion, implied if not always directly stated, that life is sad. More than once it has reminded me of the breaking sea wave of Hokusai.

Prince Genji's main object in life was the pursuit and capture of some woman who took his fancy

and it mattered not whether she was of noble or humble origin, whether she was to be found in the palace of Kioto or in some desolate and dilapidated dwelling. The more elusive the quest the more it fascinated him. On one occasion he was gallant enough to accept the advances of an elderly lady with a red nose as big as an elephant's trunk, but such encounters were happily exceptional. Of the many women he loved, Murasaki ("Purple") was probably his ideal. When she was a child he had taken her on his knee and played with her toys. In a dramatic moment, most vividly described in the first part of this work, he changed from playmate to lover. In *Blue Trousers* there is a description of her death.

Never, thought Genji, had her beauty seemed so flawless as now, when the eye could rest upon it undistracted by any ripple of sound or motion (p. 316).

At that time his thoughts turned to Amida's Paradise where he desired that "the same lotus would be their throne". He did not long survive the passing of this lady and may be said to have died with a word or two of melancholy poetry and a touch of Buddhist piety, no more, perhaps, than a weary gesture when the fires of earthly love had faded out.

The last two parts, *The Lady of the Boat* and *The Bridge of Dreams*, known as the "Uji chapters," form a pendant to *The Tale of Genji*, and may be read apart from the preceding volumes. They lose considerably in interest and vitality

because they no longer portray the Shining One, save in a few stray references to his departed glory. It was Genji who gave perfume to the flower, delight to the song, pleasure to the wooing. Here the main theme is Ukifune and her lovers—Niou and Kaoru—one bold, the other diffident. It ends neither in happiness nor tragedy but in uncertainty and suspense. "The story fades out," writes Mr. Waley, "like a Chinese landscape-roll. The Bridge of Dreams leads nowhere—breaks off like the tattered edge of a cloud."

Lady Murasaki wrote in her *Diary*: "Whenever I hear delightful or interesting things my yearning for a religious life grows stronger." While conscious of the futility of earthly existence, the essential emptiness of Japanese Court life, her longing for things spiritual was fitful and uncertain. It seems to infect her characters, for the Shining One does no more than dally with a religious life. No more than a lock or two were cut from Murasaki's hair and five of the Ten Vows administered, while Ukifune makes but a shifting nun. The book is not, as Mr. Waley points out, "a tale crammed with ogres and divinities". It deals with real men and women who are more moved by material beauty than by a desire to seek and find true wisdom. If there is no deep spiritual insight in this book, it is not entirely free from the supernatural. There is more than one example of possession by evil spirits and attempts to exorcise them by priests and mag-

icians. Particularly interesting is the case of the dying Murasaki. Reference is made to a boy medium who speaks with "the proud passionate voice of Rokujo" in the spirit world. She had been Genji's mistress, and torn by jealousy and anger possessed Genji's wife Murasaki and his previous spouse Aoi. It is a dramatic and moving scene, for the spirit of Rokujo, having made bitter complaint, implores the miracle workers and priests in the room to cease their incantations and pray for her soul's release. Through the voice of the medium she cries: "Back I shall come and back again, till in your liturgies I hear some word of comfort for my own soul. Say masses for me, read them night and day" (Pt. 4, p. 207). Here is a hint of the power of karma. More than that, an awareness, however slight, of the spirit world breaking in upon a life almost entirely concerned with earthly pleasure and polite accomplishment.

The Tale of Genji is something more than a romance, more than a crowded pageant of Japanese life during the Heian period. Certain characters, certain incidents, stand out clearly in one's memory and will be slow to fade, but the most abiding quality is its beauty, tenderness, sadness, its sudden revelation of the human heart that seems to defeat life that is leisurely, cultured and refined. And when love is lifted up above the physical and has a fragrance of its own, it lasts no longer than a flower about

which some Japanese lady has written a poem. We cannot escape in this work a sense of the futility and impermanence of life. Whether it be due to the presence of the Lord Buddha or to sorrow in Murasaki's heart I do not know. Genji, the Shining One, is less than the Light that seems to stream through this book, touching, but not dispersing, the Wreath of Cloud which is despair and loneliness. Kenko wrote in the *Tsurezuregusa*: "There is no greater pleasure than alone, by the light of a lamp, to make the men of the unseen world our companions." When that book is *The Tale of Genji*, so finely translated by Mr. Arthur Waley, I know of no other romance that has moved me so much by its exquisite beauty.

No such pleasure is to be found in the *Gesar Epic*,* for in that account of a Tibetan hero we pass from an era of culture and refinement, from a life coloured by romance and adventure as it existed during the Heian period in Japan, to a wonder world of disconcerting violence and fantastic happenings. We pass from a classic, restrained and beautiful, to a Tibetan Saga which, about twelve centuries ago, probably consisted of only two or three songs upon which were based the lengthy versions we know to-day. It is the Kham Saga, recognised in Lhasa and Tibet generally as the official version from which Madame Alexandra David-Neel and the Lama Yongden have

* *The Supernatural Life of Gesar of Ling*. (Rider and Co., London. 18s.)

prepared the present rendering. It is not known definitely who Gesar was, and until a vast amount of material has been translated and carefully studied, it would be unwise to express an opinion as to his origin. It seems probable that he was an historical character, but whether a king who reigned in China, as Sarat Chandra Dass suggests, or a victorious Tibetan general, none at present can decide.

Genji and Gesar were both heroes, but with so marked a difference between them that an attempt at comparison is hopeless. Genji was a cultured philanderer. He had no magic except the charm of his personality. He was essentially a human being. Gesar was not. He was superhuman. As the "avatar of the divine Thubpa" he was miraculously born. When a child he performed miracles, and he went on performing them until, after a period of meditation and resort to a certain tantric practice, he ascended from a rocky terrace and left his empty robe, "aureoled in light," behind him. He came into the world to conquer those who were opposed to true religion, but his method of conquest would shock a disciple of Buddha. Gesar was often diabolically cruel and repulsively cunning. We can neither like nor respect one who caused a child to be crushed to death beneath a pillar, who on one occasion became a metal that entered and tortured an adversary. His only clemency was that, without exception, he sent the spirits

of his enemies to the Paradise of the Great Beatitude.

How can we judge one who is hidden behind interminable legends, who never acts on his own initiative but is constantly helped in times of danger by such divine beings as Padma Sambhava and Manene? Even as a lover he does not remotely resemble Genji. When Gesar lingered so long with slain Lutzen's wife, he did so only as "a magic emanation". When Metog Lha-dze flung herself from an upper window, she "dropped, light as a leaf, on the Hero's knees". He was hedged about by magic at every turn. We cannot see Gesar for the magician in him.

Although our credulity is taxed, and occasionally our patience, this much is certain: the Tibetans believe in him. To them he was not only a wonder hero who slaughtered Lutzen, the Kings of Hor and Jang, and Shingti of the South, but one who will come again. "For the time being we may rest in peace" said Gesar, "but we shall have to return to this world to preach the Good Law in the Western lands. . . . The wars that we have undertaken were little wars, the one that will come will be a great war." A Tibetan with whom Madame David-Neel spoke on the subject was convinced that Gesar would be reborn and lead a great army to the West. "Do you believe it?" inquired the Lama. And Madame David-Neel discreetly answered, perhaps with the timidity of many readers of this book: "All is possible."

HADLAND DAVIS

ANCIENT INDIA THROUGH FRENCH SPECTACLES*

From Indian Histories planned and projected under the urge of national or pseudo-national self-esteem grounded on sentimentalism, and from Indian Histories conceived and constructed under the urge of Imperialistic inspiration of Europeans which prevents a proper reconstruction of the history of ancient Indian Civilization, acting in concert with the belief that a Nation economically, industrially, and politically unprogressive could never have had any brilliant cultural past, it is a pleasure to turn to the work of Paul Masson-Oursel, *Ancient India and Indian Civilization*, in which an honest and sincere attempt is made sympathetically to understand and to present precisely and accurately the cultural achievements of ancient India. A preliminary account of the country and population, a historical sketch from the pre-historic times down to the age of Harsha, 650 A. D., a description of the Indian family life, social, economic, and political structures, a running survey of the spiritual life, religions, and philosophy, a summing up of the literature of that period differentiated into Vedic and post-Vedic, epic, Kavyas, drama, and narrative types and a separate treatment of the Aesthetics and Art of India—form the features of the work under notice.

The pre-eminent purpose of Masson-Oursel has been to isolate and exhibit the *differentium* of the Indian genius, and both Henri Berr who has contributed the Foreword and Masson-Oursel have identified the *differentium* or the distinctive element, the vital constituent of the Indian genius, in the psychological conception of the "Mind" which is so unlike the European. It is a dynamic conception of the mind. I shall cite only two typical remarks. "Life is of conse-

quence only in the mind, by the liberating power of the mind" (Henri Berr, Foreword xxiii.). "The only real slavery in Indian opinion lies in not knowing the true nature of the mind" (p. 211). "The highest faculty is *buddhi*." "The mind only knows by doing, and then it makes itself" (p. 214 Masson-Oursel). I feel happy to admit that Masson-Oursel has with unerring vision proclaimed that the lesson taught by the dynamic psychology of the Mind, i. e. the Indian psychology of the Mind, is "to understand better is to free oneself" (p. 214.). This view is as old as the Upanishads. The dynamic conception of the Mind is beautifully and strikingly emphasised by the Brihadaranyaka-Upanishad. The text runs thus. "Kamah—sankalpe—vichikitsa—sraddha—asraddha—dhritih—adhrutih—hrech—dheeh—bheeh—iti—etat-sarvam—mana—eva". (1-5-3). Desire, planning and projecting, eagerness to know and discuss, devoted application, indifference, boldness and endurance, cowardice, shyness, knowledge, fear, and all this is simply the Mind. In my contributions to *The Hindu* on "Indian Psychology" some of which are noticed in the "Psychological Abstracts," Princeton, N. J., I have explained and elucidated the fact that while Western Psychology has been coquetting with the concept of consciousness, the peculiarity of Indian Psychology consists in the recognition of the independent entity of the Mind. The Mind is the "Antah-karana". It is differentiated into four aspects, *Manas*, *Buddhi*, *Ahamikara*, and *Chitta*. It is the Mind that enslaves, and it is the Mind that enfranchises. Pursuits of the empirical and the transcendental alike are determined, controlled, directed by the Mind. (Man-eva-manushyanam karanam-bandha mokshayoh—Mausa badhyat—jan tuh-manasaiva-vimuchyate.)

* *Ancient India and Indian Civilization* By PAUL MASSON-OURSSEL. HELENA WILLIAM-GRA-BOWSKA, and PHILIPPE STERN; trs. from the French by M. R. Dobie (Kegan Paul, Trench Trübner & Co., Ltd., London. 21s.)

Provided there is genuine desire to study and understand things in the right perspective, foreigners cannot fail correctly to evaluate the ancient Indian cultural achievements—is the truth best illustrated in Masson-Oursel's acute analysis of the Indian psychology of "Mind," but, at the same time, his account furnishes (the fact has to be stated) incontrovertible evidence in support of the persistent contention that notwithstanding the strongest possible will in the world and the keenest desire withal, an outsider may not feel fully and perfectly the force of the Indian genius. For instance, Masson-Oursel observes "India knows no 'states' of consciousness". (p. 212.) This is hardly accurate. The dynamic nature of the Mind is neither compromised nor stultified by the differentiation of the states of consciousness, each state being assigned psychologically a local habitation and a name. The Mandookya-Upanishad to which Masson-Oursel has made reference is specially devoted to a doctrine of *four* states of consciousness, namely, Jagrat (waking), Svapna (dreaming), Sushupti (dreamless sleeping), and the Tureeya (fourth), while other Upanishadic texts mention a *fifth* as well. The Mahopanishad enumerates *seven* states, Beeja-jagrat, Jagrat, Maha-jagrat, Jagrat-svapna, Svapna, Svapna-jagrat, and Sushupti, a psychological account of which is attempted by me in a paper accepted by the Copenhagen session of the International Congress of Psychology. The states themselves are caught in a perpetual flux and the dynamism of the Mind or mental dynamism does not destroy the psychological independence and individuality of those states. (2) On page 196, "Pramana" which is a "correct" "mode of knowledge" develops into "*a priori* canons" (Pramanas) on page 211, and leads on to certain images of *Pramana* on page 213. In all this Masson-Oursel is employing needlessly mystifying terminology. "Kevala-pramana" and "Anu-ramana" are spoken of. The

former is knowledge itself. An object *qua* known becomes *pro tanto* measured as it were. The latter would be means, sources, and guarantors of valid knowledge. (3) Masson-Oursel's account of Monism, complete Monism, is again misleading. Monistic deliverance according to him "consists in seeing the absolute in everything and so far as it is possible, *in being equal to it oneself*" (*italics mine*). That is exactly what deliverance is *not* in Monism. Deliverance is a realization of the fundamental and foundational *identity* between the seemingly different entities (p. 198). (4) It is further a downright error to say that in the Bhagavadgita, Krishna assumed the "aspect of a devouring monster" (p. 121). If Masson-Oursel refers to the "Visvarupa," he should know that the Lord exhibited for the benefit of the doubting Thomas—Arjuna—His Cosmic Omnipenetrative Form which includes in its relentlessly comprehensive Immanentism the devouring monster and the surly saints. (5) The second boon asked for by Nachiketas is *not* "to be happy himself". The boon relates to the nature of sacrificial fire (p. 242). The Katha text "Yesha-te-agnih-nachiketa-svargyoyamavrineetha-dviteyena-varena" (1-19), makes the character of the second boon perfectly clear. (6) The son of the author of *Kadambari* who completed his father's work was Bhushana. His name is spelt comically on page 338. There are other inaccuracies as well.

But none of these would touch the general excellence and brilliance of the work of Masson-Oursel and his collaborators. Three outstanding facts deserve emphasis by way of conclusion of this notice. (1) Masson-Oursel's historical narrative is up-to-date touching Harappa and Mohenjo-Daro. (2) History is not an assemblage of dry-astute details and dates, but the only genuine history is *psychological* history. (3) Indian idiosyncrasies and characteristics were what they were and continue to be what they are on account of the dynamic conception of

Mind developed by Indian Psychology. The Indian Mind operates even when it seeks to know (p. 400.). An impartial commentary and critique of contemporary European and American Civilization would be—"The Mind enslaves." Masson-Oursel's work contains an implicit call "Turn to the Eastern, Indian Philosophy," according

to which "the Mind enfranchises". Ancient Indian Civilization through French spectacles looks charming. India should feel grateful to Masson-Oursel for his charming history of her ancient civilization which is also a vindication of the peculiar psychology of the Mind developed by her.

R. NAGA RAJA SARMA

"LONG, LONG THOUGHTS"

Mr. Geoffrey West's *Calling All Countries* is a highly symptomatic book. In its general plan or lack of plan, in the broad ground which it covers, and above all in what it denies, it is, I feel, the sort of book which many thousands of men and women less articulate than Mr. West might write if they were capable of writing a book at all. It expresses just that sense of bewilderment in face of a world whose current values seem to have turned to dust and ashes—just that sense that somehow or other a world facing an utterly new situation must find for itself a new set of values that will enable it to seek with some guiding light solutions for its own problems—just that sense that nobody at all seems to have gone any distance towards the discovery of these new values—that mark a good deal of the writing and still more of the talking and thinking of those who have grown up to manhood since the Great War ended in 1918. Mr. West begins by recording frankly his own bewilderment, and his book is a day's Odyssey in the search for light. At the end he seems to think that he has found it: that presumably is why he is able to call his book "A Post-War Credo". But one reader at least must confess to a doubt whether Mr. West is so near to having seen the new light as in the moment of exaltation which he records in his closing chapters he appears to suppose. Perhaps by now

when he reads his own book in cold print, he wonders whether that moment of enlightenment that came to him at the end of a crowded day was quite so enlightening as it then seemed.

One reader at least began reading his book with very strong feelings of sympathy, for Mr. West was setting down broadly, though not of course quite in the same perspective, just the same bewilderment as any decent man who has not found comfort in an inescapable dogma is bound to feel in the world of to-day—if he is capable of feeling anything at all. Many people, of course, are not capable of feeling anything about the world as a whole. Many of them have shaken down into a jog-trot of daily routine which involves for them the unquestioning acceptance of a large number of ideas and institutions which make part of their daily environment. They do not so much affirm that these ideas and institutions are good, as treat them as axiomatic and react violently against anyone who proposes that they shall be subjected to critical examination. This state of mind is highly characteristic of older people, who have come to believe that, though the world may change, it is most unlikely to be changed for the better by any conscious striving of mankind. But there is an analogous attitude which arises among younger people too, when, finding that the world presents an appearance of an inextricable tangle

* *Calling All Countries: A Post-War Credo.* By GEOFFREY WEST. (George Routledge and Sons, Ltd., London.)

of contradictions and inconsistencies, they simply give up the attempt to make a personal interpretation and decide to live as best they can in their own microcosm without bothering their heads about the larger issues.

Of course there were always plenty of people who refused to be bothered about the major problems of common living, and sought only to reach a tolerable compromise with their own immediate environment. But usually in earlier generations, at any rate in Great Britain, those who took up this attitude accepted passively the current valuations of society upon those matters which fell outside their immediate personal concern. Nowadays, however, this is no longer true. Even those who are most determined to live their own lives and let the rest of the world look after itself are apt to be sceptical about the world's values, and to say not merely that the greater problems did not concern them, but in addition that these greater problems mean nothing at all.

Mr. West belongs to that growing body of people, mostly under forty, who, having felt to the full the impact of contemporary disillusionment, are wholly unable to rest content with a purely negative attitude towards the major problems of society. They feel that the old values have crumbled away, but that there must be a new set of values capable of taking their place, and that the discovery of these new values—which must be social values—is indispensable if the whole civilisation in which we are living is not to go up in smoke. Yet at the same time they feel strongly that the social values which they are seeking must be personal values as well, and that the regeneration of society from its present plight cannot be merely or mainly a matter of devising right social politics for collective action, but must be also a matter of the consciousness of the individual. A man must live himself according to the new values, realising them in his own consciousness and existence before there can be any hope

of his acting with effect towards making them real on the collective plane.

Thus far Mr. West has undoubtedly a "Credo" to offer. He records very frankly his own personal development towards this attitude. In the early stages H. G. Wells influenced him more than anyone else, and the Wells influence is still very apparent in everything that he writes. But he has come to regard Wells as definitely too mechanistic in his ideas, as basing his thought too much on the older mechanistic appeal of science, and as thinking of the problems of world-regeneration too much in terms of cosmopolitan machinery. Mr. West's later development comes far more from D. H. Lawrence *via* John Middleton Murry; and the "Credo" with which his book ends is in effect only a variant upon the doctrines which John Middleton Murry has consistently preached for a good many years past. Murry now puts forward that doctrine in the form of an "ethical Marxism" in which the class action of the Marxian philosophy reappears transmuted into an individual sacrifice. Men are to act for the building of the new society not because they are members of a particular class but because, in sacrificing their individualities and identifying themselves through this sacrifice with the struggle of a class, they can give to their action a validity which it could never possess if it were the mere product of material forces upon the material plane. So much of Middleton Murry's doctrine is clearly expressed in this book of Mr. West's, but what I personally fail to find in it is any advance beyond this expression of a new twentieth-century way of approach towards filling in the affirmation of the need for personal sacrifice with a positive content.

For when we come to consider Mr. West's attitude towards the problems which demand collective action, what he has to tell us is too largely negative. He has a deeply rooted distrust in all forms of dictatorship and violence. He does not believe that anything that is

worth while can be won by the use of force, because he holds that victories won in this way will inevitably turn bad in the hands of those who have won them. He sees in personal regeneration the means of winning all victories without violence or dictatorship. But can this personal regeneration arise out of a repudiation of current values, or must it involve some clear vision of the new values that are to take the place of the old—I mean something more than the mere affirmation that in order to gain his soul a man must lose it?

I should agree with Mr. West that in the policies of all the political parties and of the major movements of our time there is no sufficient sign of a realisation of the need for new values in life as well as in social organisation, and that these two things are inseparable if social policies are to lead anywhere except into the desert. The Communists in Russia seem naturally enough too much under the spell of machinery, too disposed to believe that everything can be accomplished by turning Russia into an industrialised country under Communist control, and so expanding the standard of living of the Russian people while still preserving the equalitarian basis of Communist society. Our own political parties of the left seem for the most part too much concerned with mere adjustments of the existing order through changes in ownership and control, and too little disposed to question the values upon which this order has been built up. It seems in fact as if the change from Capitalism to Socialism were envisaged by most people rather as a change in the use of the machine and in the forces controlling it than as a change in the fundamental values of living. It is a question rather of re-

distributing than of altering these values in most people's minds. This, however, is a fatal limitation upon policy; for projects for the redistribution of values, while they may be capable of commanding support, fail to rouse that enthusiasm of the whole man which comes only as a response to the appeal to live in a new way.

Mr. West retains from his devotion to H. G. Wells at least this faith in a cosmopolitan ideal. There is for him no ultimate stopping-point, or focus of ultimate loyalty, between the individual and all mankind; and the individual in achieving his personal regeneration does so by an act of identification with the entire cause of humanity. That is where his "Credo" is also, I believe, the credo of a great mass of people in the world to-day, who have so far failed to find in any political movement an effective rallying point. The organised world, the world of parties and societies, of States and associative machinery of every sort, is organised so much and so inevitably into separate national groups that the groping loyalty to mankind as a whole can find no peg on which to hang. Those who feel like Mr. West—and there are many thousands of them—are still left groping. They will discover in his book an expression of their own plight, and a sense of hope and faith that a way of escape from it may be found. But I think that they will turn its last page with a sense perhaps of encouragement to go on hunting more manfully for the means of making their dreams come true, but without any assured confidence that Mr. West will be able to guide them any further along this dark and difficult road than they have travelled already in their own bewildered thought.

G. D. H. COLE

HUMAN ENERGY AND SOCIAL CULTURE *

Social anthropology, the study of human culture, seems to be the only branch of modern science that has retained undisturbed the basic assumption adopted in the nineteenth century. All other departments of research have been radically affected by new experimental knowledge which, for over thirty years, has been slowly disintegrating the theories, working hypotheses and other mental pictures of the ways of Nature formed during the last century. These destructive periods in the cyclic process of scientific progress are inevitable and are an essential prelude to the birth of new generalisations and working hypotheses. But as yet no new idols of the minds have been erected which science unanimously agrees to worship.

In the morphological sciences difficulty arises when increased differentiations of collected specimens put a strain on old systems of classification. To-day anthropologists and ethnologists are as uneasy concerning the physical "descent of man" as some physicists were regarding the "conservation of energy" shortly after radioactivity was discovered. The fallacy of this "law" is now generally acknowledged.

Knowledge is acquired by comparison. Measurement of objective effects is the means of comparison in experimental research. Social anthropology, like academic philosophy, has been neither an experimental nor morphological science. It attempts to record the beliefs and conceptions of primitive and uncivilized peoples, ancient and modern. Its standards of comparison have been subjective, and were erected by the aid of Christian theologians. They were formed by a combination of religious preconceptions and the theory of biological evolution. Human races are said to evolve culturally from some unknown primitive state through various stages of animism and magic.

Until recently the amalgam of this ethnological scientific idol has defied the assaults of iconoclasts. During the past year or two, however, the presumption that Western civilization is to complete the evolution of existing backward races has been challenged from several directions. Problems arising from the effects of modern education on African natives have been discussed for some time by physicians and men of science in scientific journals, and recently became a subject of correspondence in *The Times*. Several books have appeared which dispute the view that human races evolve socially in a straight line from the "primitive state" of a human-like animal through progressive stages of hunters, pastoralists, cultivators, craftsmen. Prof. Daryll Ford's investigations disclose that these are not mutually exclusive types of society and in his *Habitat, Economy and Society* demonstrates the inherent complexity of the most simple of societies. Last year the abstract of Dr. J. D. Unwin's researches, *Sexual Regulations and Human Behaviour*, was published, and now the fuller treatise has been issued.

This work is a study of social science from a new point of view. It is an analysis and classification of cultural states based on objective evidences of social activities. "By their rites we shall know them." Beliefs tell us little beyond our own preconceptions; and perhaps the most valuable section of the book deals with the facile interpretation of native words in anthropological literature, the lack of careful definition of terms, the contradictory connotations and the mistranslations and preconceptions of translators.

As his investigation extended Dr. Unwin was also compelled to reject the assumptions that the evolution of human culture is an orderly progression :—

* *Sex and Culture* by J. D. UNWIN, M. C., Ph. D. (Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford London. 36s.)

Employed in this sense the word "evolution" is the bugbear of social anthropology. . . We do not know anything about the culture of primitive man . . . All we can say definitely is that human culture can be divided into certain patterns. These patterns do not follow one another in any determined order; they merely repeat themselves in history and in uncivilized life. The change from one pattern to another is the result of a change in ideas (p. 86).

Dr. Unwin began his researches ten years ago, not in order to prove a thesis but—

To test, by a reference to human records, a . . . conjecture of analytical psychologists . . . that, if social regulations forbid direct satisfaction of the sexual impulses, the emotional conflict is expressed in another way, and that what we call "civilization" has always been built up by compulsory sacrifices in the gratification of innate desires (p. vii).

The method adopted, therefore, is comparative statistics. In one set are data of social activities, building, crafts etc.; in the other the regulations observed by the same society at the same period regarding pre-nuptial and post-nuptial relations of the sexes.

The section on historical peoples is extremely interesting although brief, since only such records as can be relied on for inductive reasoning were used. Those disquieted by the attitude of present day authorities—scientific, religious and legal—toward "personal rights," "sexual freedom" and artificial birth-control will doubtless find the conclusion satisfactory.

In the records of history there is no example of a society displaying great energy for any appreciable period unless it has been absolutely monogamous. . . In the past different societies have risen up in different parts of the earth, flourished greatly, and then declined. In every case the society started its historical career in a state of absolute monogamy, manifested great energy while it preserved its austere regulations, and relaxed after a less vigorous tradition had been inherited by a complete new generation. Moreover, the political organization which it adopted from time to time reflected the relative energy displayed by the various social strata of which it was composed. Each society began as a monarchy; and any subsequent change in the identity of those which possessed the sovereign power was due to the changes in the sexual opportunity of the ruling clan or of its subjects (p. 369).

The bulk of this large volume, however, consists of an examination of the vast mass of field-researches that has been published during the last sixty years or so by anthropologists and travellers amongst existing uncivilized peoples. The results are summarized in two charts where the social and mental activities are shown to increase in accordance with the stringency of regulations relating to sexual behaviour. And Dr. Unwin enunciates his "Primary Law"—

The cultural condition of any society in any geographical environment is conditioned by its past and present methods of regulating the relations between the sexes (p. 340).

Nevertheless, psychologists who regard mental energy as a transformation or transmutation of procreative animal energy, will find no scientific proof of their views in this work. The characteristic human energy is specific and is the power to reason, create and reflect upon itself; and the cultural process is "the series of events for which these powers are responsible" (p. 417). Dr. Unwin does not claim to have demonstrated a real causal connection between the limitation of sexual opportunity and culture; merely that the former is the "immediate" cause, an indispensable contributory factor to social energy. He assumes, however, that the "ultimate" cause of mental energy is inherent in the human organism and potential in all human organisms, "although it may be true that some varieties of the human species may not have been so equipped". He finds it remarkable that science has not yet found "where in the organic structure the seat of self-consciousness and reason lies".

There is another point of view. It is probable, on biological grounds, that some human organisms are more highly differentiated in inner states, as yet imperceptible to science, than the majority; that there are human organisms so slightly differentiated or evolved, especially in certain cranial and volitional areas, that the organism

can interact only very slightly to the vibrations of thoughts and ideas; and that the energy for concentration and reasoning is limited by the "capacity" of its organ to induce the necessary will-power.

The most highly developed organically are those through which Genius can function, and doubtless they are those in every age who inaugurate new cycles of civilization and formulate the original Codes and Laws which in all lands are similar in essentials. These social codes are not necessary for animals whose procreative activities are regulated automatically by the periodicities of Nature.

Animal desires constitute the subjective consciousness of animals and are objective to human consciousness which retains its identity amidst sensational

and mental activities. And the functioning of the mental power of imagination can interfere with the rhythm of natural instincts. If this essentially human power is exercised socially and practically, the organs of reason and will are developed; if exercised to stimulate animal desires, the organs' involuntary activities in the posterior brain are abnormally developed, and the volitional organs must deteriorate and atrophy in successive generations. The evolution of human races and the evolution of mental beings appear to be interdependent processes.

The origin of civilization is involved with the origin of Genius; and although Dr. Unwin has solved neither enigma, he has made a great clearing for a new hypotheses concerning primitive man and future man.

W. W. L.

The Living Teaching of Vedānta. By DR. K. C. VARADACHARI. (The Modern Book Mart, Madras. As. 12)

The author of this valuable brochure claims in his preface that "the essay is a thorough-going attempt to view the several systems of Vedānta as forming a synthetic movement of Spirit". Though some may dispute its "thorough-going" character the attempt is certainly creditable. Somehow Dr. Varadachari's synthesis of different Vedantic schools fails to make any emphatic appeal. This may perhaps be due to his extreme preciseness in analysing the conflicting issues, which has thrown too prominently into relief the distinctive outlines. The book therefore does not seem to argue in its own interest.

Some intricate aspects of Vedānta like the three states of consciousness, the inner ruler (*Anāryamī*), the monadic urge of the self expressive Spirit, and the fifth state of consciousness (*Turiyateet*) have been lucidly explained. Now and again we also meet with illuminating comparisons between Vedantic and Western thoughts. Other schools of Hindu

philosophy like the Sankhya, the Pancharatra, and the Yoga have been relevantly drawn into discussion; in the case of the Sankhya school, however, the author seems a little prejudiced for he calls the Sankhya Absolute (*Keralatra*), "a state of passivity" and "thinly veiled abstraction". Dr. Varadachari is obviously well informed in Darshanic lore and stands in little need of being told that the Absolute as enunciated by Kapila, of the Sankhya School, if faithfully interpreted, is as dynamic as the Vedantic Parabrahman. In this reference it is necessary to point out that all the six schools of Hindu Philosophy have an underlying, basic unity which synthesizes them all and forms the seventh school of Gupta Vidya — Esoteric Philosophy. The very term Darshana is significant and literally means a particular perspective. Realization of the highest object is possible only when all available perspectives have been unified in a supreme synthesis. This is why any one Darshana is unable by itself to meet all the needs of the aspirant.

D. G. V.

Philosophical Studies. A. E. TAYLOR. (Macmillan & Co., Ltd., London. 15s.)

This is a collection of some eleven papers written at different times. Those which are most likely to interest the general reader are "The Philosophy of Proclus," "St Thomas Aquinas as a Philosopher," "Francis Bacon" and "Is Goodness a Quality?". These papers do not necessarily represent the author's most up-to-date views; still they are instructive.

The author very often presents ancient thought in the light of modern speculation, and makes us feel that a good philosophy never becomes really old. It is ever fresh for those who can enter into its real spirit and recreate for themselves the insight of the original philosopher.

The Neo-Platonic philosophy presented to us in "The Philosophy of Proclus" can be seen to have much in common with Indian thought. Its theory of causality, for example, agrees in many respects with the *Saṃkhya* view on the subject. Creation or emanation is for both a process of descent. The cause must be more real than the effect. "Whatever produces anything other than itself is superior in kind to that which is produced." The cause lends itself to the effect and thereby loses some of its freedom and so causality. Lastly, the emanation is not itself a temporal process; for the causal relation is not a relation between events, but a relation between substantial entities; what is produced is a real something, and not a shadow.

Neo-Platonism has also something in common with the Vedānta in its conception of the One or the Absolute. The One represents the highest value and is therefore called the Supreme Good; and because it is what all beings strive to obtain, it must transcend being. It is also simple. No categories can be predicated of it. Its perfections are not its distinct qualities. Each expresses the whole being of God. Thus the being of God is its Goodness. This reminds us of the Vedāntic view that Brahman is being, intelligence and bliss

all at once, and that these are not its distinct attributes. It is also interesting in this connection to note that there is an agnostic side to the Neo-Platonic doctrine. The higher is not fully fathomable by anything that stands lower in the universal hierarchy than itself. It is something of a mystery to the latter. Thus in a sense, the One is unknowable. The mind can only know feebly by the reflection which the One has stamped upon it of itself. It differs from Vedānta principally in its account of creation and in the supposition that the finite individual ever remains finite. On this matter, it agrees with Christianity.

In the essay on "Francis Bacon," Prof. Taylor criticises the Kinematic view of modern science, according to which "the sensible qualities of bodies, . . . all that is of primary importance for the life of animal organisms, must be simply unreal, fabricated by the mind as an unauthorised comment on nature's text" (p. 275). This view of nature is clearly inapplicable when we proceed to the organic sciences. The mechanistic view falls down in biology. He therefore suggests that a true philosophy of nature must be sought by trying to follow the categories of the organic sciences downward into the realm of the inorganic, not *vice versa*. While this is true, it is evidently not the business of science to construct a philosophy of nature. The subject-matter of science precludes all mere speculation. The exact sciences, by their very nature, have to sacrifice everything which is uncertain, incapable of measurement, and quite personal. The sensible qualities of things fall within this sphere. Science therefore cannot take note of them. Science is bound to mathematise nature. It is for philosophy to take a wider view of things, and interpret them in all their concreteness as facts of experience of an intelligent self, having an ultimate meaning that does not change.

Philosophy goes beyond all empirical and non-empirical sciences. The author has truly shown that the material

of its interpretation is supplied not only by these, but also and principally by the whole history of man with his ideals, hopes, fears etc. "It is a response of thought to the full concrete reality in which our life is set." What, however, defines this response is not merely the wide field of its material. It is rather the higher standpoint from which this material is regarded. While each special science is concerned to study the data as they present themselves to us and without any reference to the self to which they are presented, philosophy deals with the data only in this reference. It is thus that we can take a final and comprehensive view of things that is not at the mercy of every new scientific theory or change of method. A true metaphysic is only possible when we have freed ourselves from the engrossments of the merely given, and risen to a standpoint from where we can contemplate everything with reference to our self and its ultimate meaning

for us. Prof. Taylor therefore rightly says in his paper on "Hume and the Miraculous."—"Specialism is an obstacle. If some great social and economic change should simplify this intellectual problem by leading to the destruction of the masses of accumulated mis-applied erudition which are our nightmare," we should contemplate reality more serenely in the true philosophical spirit.

There are many interesting points which the author has brought out, such as that all knowledge which is not mere belief is of the nature of vision or direct intuition, that God knows everything but does not think, that in so far as all created things "mean to be" something which they never quite succeed in being they are never identical with their own goodness, that God alone is His own goodness, etc. The book touches upon various subjects of different character and shows the author's wide range of interest.

G. R. MALKANI

Orphism. By J. R. WATMOUGH. (Cambridge University Press. 3s. 6d.)

Yesterday is never far removed from to-day. We may delight to delude ourselves into believing that things are different now from what they have been, that the thought of yesterday differs from that of now, but there comes every now and then a forceful reminder of the truth of the old saying, "the old is new; the new is old".

Mr. Watmough's brief study, *Orphism*, is a case in point. Its purpose is to demonstrate—firstly, that the tradition of mysticism, reform and subjective morality associated with the name of Orpheus is no less characteristic of Greek thought than is the cult of the Olympian gods; secondly, to draw the analogy between ancient Orphism and modern Protestantism.

The place of Orpheus in history has been always the matter of specula-

tion. Some scholars, notably Miss J. Harrison, have set out to show that he was a reformer who lived in Thrace in the sixth century B. C., and who sought to sublimate the barbarism of Bacchic revelry. Payne Knight says:—

The history of Orpheus is so confused and so obscured by fable that it is impossible to obtain any certain information regarding him. He appears to have been a Thracian, and to have introduced philosophy and religion into Greece; the plurality of worlds, and the true solar system. Nor could he have gained this knowledge from any people of which history has preserved any memorial; for we know of none among whom science had made such a progress, that a truth so remote from common observation and so contradictory to the evidence of unimproved science, would not have been rejected, as it was by all Greek philosophers, except the Pythagoreans, who rather revered it as an article of faith, than understood it as a discovery of science. Thrace was certainly inhabited by a civilised nation, at some remote period; for when Philip of Macedon opened the gold mines in that country, he found that they had been worked before with great expense and in-

genuity by a people well versed in mechanics of whom no memorials are extant.

Other scholars have rejected the historical idea and have asserted that Orpheus was but a semi-mythical figure and that the Orphic movement was not the outcome of the mission of a historical person but a spontaneous and indigenous growth in religious evolution.

It is to this view that Mr Watmough is himself inclined. He considers it a waste of time and energy to debate whether Orpheus was a historical personality. His chief concern is with the teachings associated with the name. In this connection, Mr. Watmough is similarly not too impressed with the arguments that because of similarity of customs and religious beliefs in various countries, it may be presumed that in almost prehistoric times a cult of religious reform and mysticism should have been communicated from a single source over a wide area as Thrace in the North, Crete and Egypt in the South and India in the extreme East. He does not deny it, but he finds it difficult to acquiesce in this view.

All the same, to theosophists and other students of comparative religion it is in this direction that the study of Orphism has the major interest and what such writers as Payne Knight, Godfrey Higgins, Madame Blavatsky, Sir James Frazer, and others have written on this subject cannot be quickly dismissed.

Orphism was essentially a movement of reform. Its adherents asserted that religion was a relation between the individual soul and God, an escaping from this world's things to the things of eternity. They regarded the establishment of a religious brotherhood as the essential means of achieving this, and not the State. Thus they organised their communities like to the monastic houses of the Brahmins.

Mr. Watmough draws interesting analogies between Orphism and modern Protestantism. He discovers that the Protestant Fundamentalist and the Salvation Army have their counterpart in Ancient Greece. Now, as then, he argues that movements of reform appeal to three types of mind; to the philosophic, because reform leads mankind near to truth, because it leads from darkness to the light; to the middle classes, because of their love of respectability and because there is always something respectable about reform movements; and to the poor and simple folk who are captivated by talk of the golden age.

Mr. Watmough opens up other avenues of thought and draws parallels between the thought of yesterday and to-day. In his final remarks he comes to the question "What profit is there in a religion dead and gone"?—"What relation can it conceivably have to the ever changing stream of modern thought?"

One might quarrel with him here and urge that no religion is dead and gone. That *religious idealism has been similar through all ages and that in fact there is but one religion*. One might wonder too whether there is such a thing as "new thought"? But to do this would be to open up fields of discussion which, while being interesting and important, would only lead away from the subject of the present book. This much must be admitted, whatever our other views may be: within the teachings of Orpheus there is much that is worthy of preservation just as there is much worthy of preservation in all religious teachings. Our task is to seek for the best and to give to others even as we receive. Mr. Watmough's little book, which won the Cromer Essay Prize, is useful because of the searchlight it sheds on ancient Greek philosophy and will open up a field of interesting study for all into whose hands it may come.

W. ARTHUR PEACOCK

Freedom and Organisation 1814-1914. By BERTRAND RUSSELL. (George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London. 15s.)

Bertrand Russell is beyond doubt one of the most impressive intellects in the West now. Perhaps that is his misfortune; he is unaware of the point beyond which intellect cannot pass. D. H. Lawrence said of him, in 1915:—

I do want him to work in the knowledge of the Absolute, in the knowledge of eternity. He *will*—apart from philosophical mathematics—be so temporal, so immediate. He won't let go, he won't act in the eternal things, when it comes to men and life.

And that verdict remains broadly true: Bertrand Russell's logic is clean, hard, penetrating, but this new book, for all its breadth and power, concludes, tamely enough, only that "It is not by pacifist sentiment, but by world-wide economic organisation that civilised mankind is to be saved from collective suicide." Which is doubtless true, as such comprehensive generalisations go; but it is certain that a great deal of sentiment, pacifist and other, will need to be leashed and brought into operation before any "world-wide economic organisation" is made possible. And only then will intellect be sufficient.

By this very intellectualism, indeed, Bertrand Russell is found impaled on a dilemma before his thesis is properly begun. After announcing that "This book is an attempt to trace the main causes of political change during the hundred years from 1814 to 1914," and after declaring that these causes are of three kinds—"economic technique, political theory, and important individuals"—he reaches, on his second page, the conclusion that "History, in short, is not yet a science and can only be made to seem scientific by falsification and omission". Which, again, is doubtless as true as any such comprehensive generalisation can be; but it is impossible, surely, to preach, in that knowledge, a purely scientific issue to History's present

phase! And it is, I think, precisely out of the dimly understood discomfort of the author's position on this dilemma that *Freedom and Organisation* proceeds.

For it is a bitter book. There is a tartness and a crudity of tone in it which are not found in Bertrand Russell's previous work. The chapter on Malthus, for instance, begins thus:—

Thinking is not one of the natural activities of man; it is a product of disease. like a high temperature in illness. In France before the Revolution, and in England in the early nineteenth century, the disease in the body politic caused certain men to think important thoughts, which developed into the science of political economy They were a curious set of man; rather uninteresting, quite without what is called "vision," prudent, rational, arguing carefully from premises which were largely false to conclusions which were in harmony with the interests of the middle class.

And though this is resolute incisive prose, one feels that it is just a little too clever, too glib, that it is the utterance of a man turning in hate from habits of thought which he has once loved. Bertrand Russell himself has been notably "prudent, rational, arguing carefully . . . to conclusions which were in harmony with"—what?

For the moment, Bertrand Russell himself does not seem to know; the motive force of his book is largely disillusion. With a rare learning and a rare logic he attacks every phase of thought and life (on the basic social plane) during his chosen hundred years and, slashing vigorously to right and left, leaves nobody unquelled, except perhaps Bismarck. Metternich, on the one hand, a great statesman when all is said and one who might have earned commendation from Bertrand Russell for resisting that bourgeois upsurge which he himself abominates, is dismissed with a "special brand of pompous priggery". And Marx, at the other extreme, is considered invalidated by the fact that Bertrand Russell can neither accept the labour theory of value (inherited from Ricardo) nor be sure that the primacy

of matter is absolutely proven! Our author might read in his copy of Keats's letters that "Axioms in philosophy are not axioms until they are proved upon our pulses." And there are many millions of pulses on which the truth of Marx's axioms is daily proved.

But the fact that I personally find it impossible to agree with the bulk of its

major conclusions should not be allowed to suggest that *Freedom and Organisation* is anything other than a brilliant, suggestive and profoundly stimulating piece of work. It is history and political philosophy of a quality seldom met; and it is precisely the strength and provocative coherence of the book that make it worth such violent disagreement.

RAYNER HEPPENSTALL

The Śāktas. By ERNEST A. PAYNE. (Religious Life of India Series. Humphrey Milford, London, Calcutta. Rs. 3 8 As.)

This book is a curious combination of History, Philosophy and Mysticism. It is a book on the Tantras. The author is evidently anxious to educate the Westerns in Tantricism, to which Europe has been attracted ever since the labours of Sir John Woodroffe in the field. The book is written to combat Woodroffe's ideas regarding Tantricism and to convey the impression that the Tantras, whatever their philosophy and spirituality may be, go in for questionable religious ceremonies and more often excite sex impulses. The author finds fault with the Tantric method of invocation of spiritual powers and considers that the elements of terror and destruction are symbolised in Kali-worship, quoting Swami Vivekananda to illustrate his points (Hymn of Death, p. 110).

The author has singularly failed in understanding Tantricism, which is neither Vedānta nor Sāṃkhya, though it may contain elements of both these systems, for want of intellectual and intuitive sympathy which is greatly needed properly to evaluate the concepts and the ideas of a different race. The author is intellectually and spiritually incapable of properly envisaging the dignity of Tantric symbolism and discipline. The Western mind is so much habituated to the "gentler" conceptions of spiritual life that it simply shudders at the image of Kali

with all its fierceness. But need it be pointed out that Kali represents the symbol of God as Wisdom, God as Love, and God as Power? The Hindu is accustomed to see the Divine in the rhythm of creation as well as in the confusion of death. There is a music in Kali's dance of death which the heroic soul untouched by the earthly ties can feel and enjoy. The too-much emphasis on personality really confines our spiritual outlook to the joys of creation, but a relaxation from it can alone open to us the unfathomable delight hidden in the impersonal divine.

The author says "The *yoga* practice is built up on what seems to a Westerner a phantastic physiology" (p. 20). Evidently he attacks the *Sat-chakra* system. The Tantras take the man in his complete physical, vital, intellectual and spiritual make-up and boldly point out that before the vital and the physical claims or insistences are satisfied, the aspirant cannot hope to enjoy the graces of the Soul.

The Tantric discipline divines our nature, not by refusing the vital aspect of our being, but by gradually spiritualising it. And this spiritualising of the vital nature is the most interesting part of the Tantric discipline. Practical Tantricism is most interesting, and modern psychology can be enriched if the method of localisation taught can be fully utilised.

The author exhibits lamentable ignorance of the scientific importance of the system in its theoretical and practical aspects.

MAHENDRANATH SIRCAR

The Book of Chilam Balam of Chumayel. By RALPH L. ROYS. (Carnegie Institution of Washington, Publication No. 438.)

The word *chilam*, or *chilan*, we are told by the author of this volume, signifies "mouth-piece or interpreter of the gods. Balam means jaguar, but it is also a common family name in Yucatan, so the title of the present work could well be translated as the Book of the Prophet Balam." Down to the nineteenth century many towns and villages of Northern Yucatan possessed Books of Chilam Balam, the title in each case being supplemented by the name of the town to which the book belonged. "Thus the Book of Chilam Balam of Chumayel is named for a village in the district of Tekax, a short distance northwest of the well-known town of Teabo."

The volume under review is a translation from a photographic reproduction of the original, now extinct, Book of Chilam Balam of Chumayel. The original manuscript, actually a compilation from various earlier works, dates from the year 1782, though the prophet Balam lived not later than the first decade of the sixteenth century. Consequently, what comes down to us to-day as the Book of Chilam Balam of Chumayel is a re-interpreted work, weighted unavoidably with intrusive European material, interpolations, and textual corruptions. These factors, augmented by the obsolescence of many of the Mayan words and phrases used (the manuscript, however, being written in European script*), render the task of clear and accurate translation a difficult one indeed. Yet Dr. Roys' production is manifestly an achievement in scholarship of the first rank, and is a worthy associate of the other unfailingly praiseworthy, scholarly publications of the Carnegie Institution.

This book, like the others of Chilam Balam, contains an almost bewildering variety of material. In addition to the numerous prophecies it contains sketchy historical narratives, chronicles, brief accounts of Mayan mythology, ritual and religion, and a number of discourses on astronomy, native government, and other fields, as well as some resentful reference to the Spanish conquerors. All in all, it constitutes an unpretty portrait of a race long past its zenith. Accounts of superstitious beliefs and rites, of internal struggles, of priestcraft abound in the pages of *Chilam Balam*. Here and there, however, one perceives glimmers of ancient wisdom—as, for example, the belief of the Maya in the four cardinal points of the universe, with "four gods" presiding over them, and their belief in the deluge and in the idea that "the present order was preceded by other worlds which had been destroyed" but these are almost wholly obscured by a melange of superstition, both Mayan and Christian, and unintelligible symbolism. As the author indicates, the chief value of such a work is that it supplies a record of the reactions of the native mind to the European culture and contains much of what the Indians remembered of their old culture after the Spanish conquest. This reaction is interestingly illustrated by the Mayan religion which, as shown by *Chilam Balam*, fused with Romanism to produce a most curious admixture, aptly termed the Americanization of Christianity.

Abundantly annotated, completely indexed, and supplemented with illuminating appendices and a full bibliography, the book is admirably suited to the needs of the specialist and the research worker in the field of Mayan ethnology, philology, or history.

DAVID B. ROSENBERG

*"The ability of the Maya to write their own language in Euroscript was due," the translator points out (p. 4) "to the educational policy of the Spanish missionaries. . . . The Indians had a great reverence for their hieroglyphic writing which was permeated with the symbols of their old religion, and the friars felt that if they could wipe out this knowledge and substitute for it the European system of writing, it would be an effective means for the complete Christianization of the native population."

Mysticism and Poetry, By A. ALLEN BROCKINGTON, M. A., Ph. D., with a Foreword by Sir A. Eddington, F. R. S. (Chapman and Hall, Ltd., London. 7s. 6d.)

This book is more a series of notes than a definite work on Mysticism and Poetry.

I began this piece of writing with the notion that there was a mystical element of poetry and that this element could be studied adequately in some English poems.

That is the first sentence of the book and—in phrasing and atmosphere—it is representative of the whole. In fact, it would be difficult to state the essential theme of this book with any precision though, possibly, this difficulty is magnified by the author's choice of words. The use of the word, "notion," in the sentence quoted above, is one example. Another is furnished by the following statement which appears on page 204. "When we come to the supreme experience we find men returning to the childish way." It may seem a splitting of hairs but, to one reader, the use of the word "childish," instead of "child-like," robs the statement of any significance. Also to refer to Blake's:—

God appears and God is light
To those poor Souls who dwell in Night.
But does a Human Form display
To those who Dwell in Realms of day—
as a "great thing" somehow destroys the effect of the quotation.

But if the fundamental theme is difficult to discover, the form of the book is definite. The Introduction records certain of the author's experiences: the effect created by listening to a reading of Coleridge's *Ancient Mariner*: a Vision seen when kneeling at the altar rail; the Hearing of Voices, notably during the battle of the Somme.

The author's "inquiry" is based on these experiences. The second section of the book is headed Vision and contains an account of the visions seen by a number of English mystics and poets. Section III is headed The Spiritual Imperative, which is the author's phrase for the Hearing of Voices, and narrates the experiences of St. Joan of

Arc, George Fox, Marshal Foch, William Blake, etc. Section IV deals with Intuition, and consists almost entirely of quotations. The remaining sections are entitled The Traditional View of Mysticism and The Mystical Outlook.

Dr. Brockington sums up the result of his inquiry as follows (after an "urgent reminder" that Intuition is complementary to whatever is properly called "common sense" in religion and life).

1. The mode of apprehension necessary to the mystical life is Intuition, of which Vision and the Spiritual Imperative are more or less supernatural forms.

2. Mysticism, in the traditional view, is a way of praying, and the mystical experience is the intuition of God as present.

3. Mysticism, considered as an outlook, is a way of seeing the great things in the small things, and the "mystical experience" is the intuitive knowledge of the Great Thing.

4. There is a mystical element of poetry, though the poet, as such, is not a mystic, in the traditional sense. In that sense he is, as Bremond calls him, a *mystique manqué*. The true poet, however, has always the mystical outlook; and so has everyone who recognizes the poetry of existence.

What seems lacking in that summary, and in the book, is the *implications* of the mysteries discussed. Vision . . . the Hearing of Voices . . . Intuition . . . Are these intimations of the spiritual world—hints of Reality? Blake defines vision as a representation of what actually exists, really and unchangeably. Well, that tells us something. It tells us that Vision is a glimpse of Reality, and, by implication, it tells us that the "common sense" world is illusory. But what, exactly, does it tell us about Vision when it is defined as a more or less supernatural form of Intuition? And is "traditional" mysticism no more than "a way of praying"? Is that phrase an adequate description of Swedenborg or Boehme.

(But perhaps they are not "traditional" mystics). And can mysticism be regarded as an "outlook"? Is not a mystic one who is in love with God?

Also, even in the "traditional" sense, is every poet a *mystique manqué*? The phrase is an illuminating one when applied, say, to Baudelaire, but, surely, it is wholly inapplicable to Shakespeare. It is the *order* of imagination which determines the category to which a poet belongs. Dante is the superlative

example of a mystical poet because his imagination lives, moves, and has its being in the spiritual world. Shakespeare's does not. His imagination illuminates the natural world not the spiritual. He was not a mystic in any sense of that celebrated word. The interest of this book is twofold:—It is based on personal experience, and it contains a number of illuminating quotations,

CLAUDE HOUGHTON

Kabir and the Bhagti Movement. By MOHAN SINGH, M.A., Ph. D., D. Litt. (Atma Ram & Sons, Lahore. Rs. 2.)

This is an "attempt to re-create and re-interpret Kabir along desirable lines of historical exactness and analytical and comparative study". The author would have us think of Kabir, as not an extraordinary man though an independent thinker who had evolved his own philosophy of life. The legends of Kabir's virgin birth, his reputed discipleship under Ramanand, his attributed influence over Guru Nanak of the Sikhs, the legendary character of the poet's death, etc., are all stripped of their symbolic value and laid bare upon the author's surgical table. But the scalpel, be it never so keen, will not reveal the soul which formerly animated the lifeless form.

The book's value lies in the useful amount of material which the author's scholarship makes available in condensed form, and not in the conclusions and inferences drawn. Considerable space, for instance, is devoted to showing that Kabir had no personal *Guru*, and the following quite remarkable axiom is laid down: "We must, therefore conclude that where there is no mention of a name as that of the Guru, we are to take that fact as the non-existence of a personal teacher." Even in India, the need for secrecy in spiritual matters has almost been forgotten, but surely the relationship between Guru and disciple is nothing

if not a spiritual tie. Silence upon the subject does not prove that no such tie exists.

The author intends to bring out in 1937 two additional volumes on Kabir. They will cover an appraisal of the language and the poetic graces, and a comparative study of the esoteric teachings of Kabir. He asks for a frank and full opinion of the present work and so we venture to suggest that a comparative study of religions and their Founders' teachings would be useful for the future work in hand. Reference is made to the similarity between the legends surrounding the lives of Jesus and Kabir—for example, the virgin birth of both. Similar legends surround the lives of other Teachers of mankind, and long anterior records can be found in Egypt, in Greece and even in the far off Mexico. Under the garb of myth and symbol, spiritual truths are taught by poets and sages. If he is honest and earnest in his pursuit of Truth our author will realize that throughout the world there have appeared from time to time teachers of varying degree who have preached and practised the same eternal truths in a phrasology and by a method best suited to impress the generation to which they came. Then let him return to his task of translation and interpretation with the humbleness required to understand the grandeur of simplicity, and the figure of Kabir should become more living and more real.

B. T.

Shintoism: The Indigenous Religion of Japan. By A. C. UNDERWOOD, M.A., D. D. (Great Religions of the East Series. The Epworth Press, London. 2s. 6d.)

After living for fifteen years in Japan I have not the least doubt that the power and prestige of the people, as contrasted with their charm and humanity, are greatly owing to Shinto, a cult of intense sincerity and solemnity, alike a concentration and a consecration.

But it is not the Shinto of this admirably compiled *résumé* of existing works, significantly entitled *Shintoism*, a thing which never existed of course, being a mere abstraction for the sake of convenience, the result of which would be that any one reading this book before visiting Japan would know a good deal about what students of Comparative Religion have written about Shinto, but very little about the venerable thing itself.

As one who has visited hundreds of shrines in Japan, with Japanese of the highest and the lowest social rank, and been a spectator of rites and treasures and many human experiences of deeply moving kinds, I cannot help feeling that, however desirable and interesting such books as this of Dr. Underwood are, far more desirable are personal utterances from the inside. In the case of Japan they would be difficult to obtain, of course, for a Japanese can only speak to us in our own language, in which, since the days of Cynewulf, there has been so little of emotional reaction to the sterner aspects of Nature.

The power of Shinto and largely that of Japan, lies in the common people, with their simple devotion. The solemn rites, even those of military dedication, are incalculably strengthened by the ancestral sense of oneness with Nature. I have never known such strange depths of feeling as those induced by the loneliness of Shinto shrines, most of which are in very solitary mountain glens,—a feeling that is entirely unrelieved by per-

sonal utterances of choral singing such as we are familiar with in Christian or Buddhist ritual.

It is in this entirely emotional transformation,—the translation of a soul to a state of the deepest self-realization as one with the deeper self of all life,—that the essence and meaning of Shinto lie.

Shinto cannot be understood in any way but by participation, which means a stay of some length in Japan, isolation from Western influence, and a knowledge of the Japanese language. It is only a very dim shadow of Shinto we can experience by association out of Japan with scholarly Japanese.

Shinto has preserved, by its association with wild Nature, something that civilization has thrown back into oblivion. It has nothing whatever to do with scholastic formulation, and little intrinsically with political or national propaganda in Japan of the last century. It cannot be classified. If we are to view things and write of them in relation to the developing consciousness of man and its selective tendencies, then we can say that *thought about Shinto* shows an advance from animism to monotheism; but a statement of this kind is merely scholastic, representing an incurable tendency to draw alien things into our own favourite circle of ideas.

It is really gratuitous to speak of inherent defects of Ancient Shinto, or as Revon is here quoted: "What the text never mentions is the intimate individual prayer in the inner chamber which the Gospel recommends." And particularly uncalled for are such criticisms as this of Dr. Underwood:—

It is noteworthy that the *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics* has not been able to include articles on Shinto's contribution to such doctrines as Salvation, Righteousness, Grace, Atonement. The positive defects of Shinto are as glaring as its deficiencies.

Shinto is not a religion of doctrines, and intellectual treatment of it entirely fails to give us the poetry of Japanese life, by which I mean the relation of the human spirit to the Nature around.

Japanese pluralism—forgive the term—always resents the approach to being swallowed up in any monotheism, or any “ism” whatever, and is intimately associated with Japanese common sense and dislike of abstraction.

To take part in the simple ceremonies of Shinto along with the true-hearted people of Japan is to wash away the hot bed-sickness of thought and to reach levels of something the world, with its feverish love of publicity, is losing, to its irretrievable misfortune.

Dr Underwood earns our gratitude for his longest quotation, one from Prof. G. W. Knox, in which these wise and true words occur:—

Shinto will survive—not in its dates, nor its genealogies, nor its theory of the descent

of its sovereign from Amaterasu, nor in its legends and cosmology, but in the affections of the people, their trust in the national powers and destiny, and their confidence that there is a something more than their present strength and wisdom which directs and aids and on which they may rely. The “something more” may receive new names, but the faith will abide while Japan works out a future greater and more glorious than the fabled Age of the Gods.

In a new edition it would be well to have the long vowel *ō* indicated—in such words as *Shintō*, *Kōbō*, *Shōtoku*. This is a more important matter than it may seem. Also Aston’s spelling of certain Japanese syllables should not be followed. It is pedantic and deceptive. It is not *Oho-harahi* or *Susa no uo* or *toriwi* that Japanese people say, but *O-harai*, *Susa-no-o* and *tori*.

E. E. SPEIGHT.

Russian Sociology. By J. F. HECKER, Ph. D. (Chapman and Hall, Ltd., London. 8s. 6d.)

“Sociology,” Dr. Hecker remarks, “in common with all other social sciences, is not a pure science; it is a generalisation largely conditioned by the social struggles under which it develops.” He has sought to show how sociological theory in Russia has been moulded by the economic, social, and political conditions of the country. It is a learned and painstaking work, but as Mr. Sidney Webb has pointed out in his introduction, the title is slightly misleading, since “Sociology must include also the objective study of the phenomena themselves of which it deals, the grouping of men which we call social institution.”

After sketching briefly the sociopolitical background against which sociological theory has developed in Russia, the author reviews the leading doctrines of the several schools of thought, starting with the Slavophiles and closing with the theories that have supplied the “working hypothesis for the making of a new social type” being evolved at the present time.

The reaction of the theory to the so-

cial environment has been sometimes acquiescent and apologetic, at other times critical and rebellious. The Slavophiles represent the first type of reaction. In their anxiety to discover “something peculiarly Russian upon which they could establish the new type of civilisation which was to redeem humanity,” they glorified the Greek Orthodox Church, the Autocracy, and the Land Commune of the peasantry. The first was a “living organism of life and truth”. “The Russian Autocracy was created by the free will of its citizens . . . the sovereign wishes but the good of the people, and this makes parliamentary rule superfluous.” The Land-commune was “the corner-stone of all Russian institutions,” and realised “the Utopian dreams of Western Socialists”. That way lay the path of reactionaries, the most famous of whom, Polyedonov, influenced the policies of Government in the early years of the present century, and watched with bitter contempt the rise of the Duma.

While the reactionaries were holding the fortress of authority and buttressing it with comforting theories, the forces of revolution were organising

themselves underground. As industrialisation went on in Russia, an industrial proletariat made its appearance, and its importance for the future was soon realised by the Socialist school of thought. Thinkers like Plekhanov and Lenin "advocated the idea of the hegemony of the working class, in which the revolutionary intellectuals and the peasants should be an important but still an auxiliary part". They wanted to overthrow not merely

Tsarism but also the bourgeoisie. How they struggled and with what success they met are described in the great work of Trotsky. Communist Sociology is not only a revolt in thought from the social and political implications of Tsarist regime, but its protagonists have also seized the reins of power, and with the civilised world for spectators, are busy reconstructing Russia.

N. S. SUBBA RAO

The White Monk of Timbuctoo. By WILLIAM SEABROOK. (George G. Harrap and Co., Ltd., London. 8s. 6d.)

Mr. Seabrook gave a short account of Père Yakouba in *Jungle Ways*. Having now devoted a whole book to him he wholly succeeds in convincing us that it wasn't worth it. A paragraph, or a few pages on him—by a real writer—would certainly be worth while; but a rambling book by a journalist who obviously found the material too difficult to mould into any sort of shape, has no reason for existence. The following are the facts about Yakouba. Born of French peasant parents he was made a Catholic priest against his will, but his passions were too strong for him to conform with the requirements of the Church. He became a missionary monk and followed the first French military column which penetrated to Timbuctoo in 1895. For several years, as Superior, he did great service for the Church and for the French Government, making long journeys to distant parts of the Sahara and the Niger valley. His prestige among the natives was such that he was marked for appointment as Bishop of the Sudan. But he did not want to be bishop, and one day he abandoned his robes and threw off European customs. He married a black woman and became the father of a small tribe—thirty children; and he is now Director of

Schools, chief Agent of native affairs, interpreter-general, and in fact a highly important official in Africa. "The inside story of his life," we are told, "is one of conflict, leading to his tremendous decision to renounce the honours of Western Civilisation and 'go native'".

It sounds not uninteresting, but Mr. Seabrook manages to make it tedious and flat. He may not be wholly to blame. It is hard to see how anything much could be made out of the priest. He was a clever man but without nobility, wisdom, or spirituality. His tremendous decision to renounce Western Civilisation and "go native" does not hold our attention, for he did not renounce anything really except celibacy. Great acts of renunciation and great gospels of back to nature such as come from men like Tolstoy and Rousseau have a strange fascination for us. But the lusty priest Yakouba going native in order to satisfy his extreme sexuality and be quit of pontificating prelates, has nothing in it. One feels more interested in the author, Mr. Seabrook, than in the man he vainly tries to bring to life, and in the American nation he represents which, while liking to make everything snappy, does not object to unparalleled slowness of speech, to newspapers of incredible bulk, and to rambling biographies that have no particular point, but include photographs of the hero's

marriage license. But I should add that Mr. Seabrook gives a good description of Timbuctoo on page seventy, a good story of a boy who wouldn't stop stealing unless he was whipped, and a good remark made by Yakouba

—"The Holy Ghost knows where to build its nest." Though it is open to doubt whether the residence to which Yakouba was referring was ever thus favoured.

J. S. COLLIS

The Mahabharata: As It Was, Is and Shall Be. By PROMATHA NATH MULLICK. (The Pioneer Press, Allahabad and 27 Chancery Lane, London. Rs. 6.)

Cultivated Europeans, for the most part, know precisely nothing of the Indian epics. They know the *Bhagavad-gita*, possibly, but not the fact that it comes from the *Mahabharata's* sixth book. For the rest, their awareness of the mere existence of Indian literature is confined to (and that dimly) certain Vedas and Upanishads, possibly the *Sakuntala* of Kalidasa and the translations of Rabindranath, while the *Mahabharata*, the *Ramayana*—let alone the wealth of minor works—might, for anything they know to the contrary, be the names of fruits or provinces.

Which is lamentable, indeed, but no less real on that account. For an Englishman, therefore, assessing, in the light of his own cultural tradition, the value of works of Indian scholarship in English, the first question to be asked is: Does this or that particular work fulfil any need of our own culture? And, in the case of an historical, interpretative and critical work, like this of Mr. P. N. Mullick, that question at once divides up into three: Is the Matter under treatment of cultural importance to the West? Is the manner of its presentation likely to be pleasing—or at least acceptable—to English readers? And are the writer's Critical Conclusions sensitively adapted to Western habits of thought?

In answer to the first of these three questions—Is the Matter under treatment of cultural importance to the West?—nobody, probably, would hesitate to reply with a complete affirma-

tive. Western culture is weary, disintegrated: it has never been more necessary to attempt its re-invigoration with transfusions of fresh blood from alien cultures. And the *Mahabharata* is one of the fullest and most powerful expressions of a culture that has probably more than any other to offer of precisely those qualities which are needed for the regeneration of the West.

As butter to all other foods; as Brahmins to all other men . . . ; as the ocean to a pool of water; as the cow to all other quadrupeds; so is the *Mahabharata* to all other histories. . . . He who listens attentively to the couplets of the *Mahabharata*, and has faith in them, enjoys long life and great reputation in this world, and eternal heavenly life in the next.

Thus the epic ends; and though the man of to-day will hardly acquiesce in such lordly claims, yet the poem is indeed a piece of man's work which the West can only lose by neglecting. Apart from any other consideration, its length (amounting, with the many additions and corruptions of text accruing in the Buddhistic age, to some 220,000 lines) is greater than the total of the Homeric epics! And some of the episodes—that of Satyavan and Savitri, for instance, still celebrated in the annual festival of Savitrivrata—are of amazing loveliness.

But there are two further questions to be answered: Is Mr. Mullick's manner of presenting his material likely to be pleasing—or even acceptable—to English readers? And are his critical conclusions sensitively adapted to Western habits of thought? Unfortunately, it is impossible to answer either of these questions affirmatively.

Mr. Mullick is not, of course, writing for a wide audience: he is addressing

the learned world only, and his breadth of information is quite impressive. But it is doubtful whether the most eager Orientalist could find his style other than unnecessarily digressive or his arrangement of facts other than diffuse and without cumulative logical effect. Mr. Mullick's whole use of the English language, indeed, is uncomfortable, cumbersome and rather naïve.

And this same looseness of language naturally flaws whatever the book may claim of critical conclusions also. Mr. Mullick, indeed, has not concerned

himself in the least with the poetic values of the *Mahabharata*: he has used it as a source of moral teaching exclusively and concludes almost every paragraph with fervent but platitudinous exhortations to purity and discipline—for which, in any case, it is difficult to feel great enthusiasm, since they are bodied in a style which is itself devoid of either of these virtues, being voluptuously smothered with a quite astonishing weight of florid clichés and prodigally mixed dead or dying metaphors.

RAYNER HEPPENSTALL

My Confessional. By HAVELOCK ELLIS. (The Bodley Head Ltd., London. 7s. 6d.)

"Confessional" is not here used with any thought of calling up the ecclesiastical associations of the term, or even the modernised form of it sometimes supposed to be psycho-analytic. There are not only confessions of "sin," demanding penitence and absolution, but also confessions of "faith". The confessions that come to me are of both kinds, and . . . are frequently of still another class which I may call self-affirmation.

This explanation from the far-famed author of the volume should be kept in mind. Within this small volume no less than seventy topics of widely diversified nature have been treated, and the wide range of subjects traversed reveals the many-sided interests of the versatile author. His early training in scientific preoccupation with "facts" and the statistical method, matured by the mellowed experience of "years that bring the philosophic mind," has invested all his pronouncements, short and crisp as they are, with persuasiveness. It is not, however, possible to do adequate justice to the rich variety of topics handled by our author; all that we can do within the small compass of this review, is to select a few typical utterances. At the very outset, we are treated to an excursus on Eugenics wherein Mr. Havelock Ellis refers,

with approbation, to an opponent of Eugenics who declares that "the problem may be clear, but not its solution, and if eugenics is directed to eliminating the stupid people it will be robbing us of a valuable and necessary part of the community," and makes the somewhat startling announcement "I don't believe in eugenics" (pp. 5-6).

On the subject "What is the Worth of Education?"—the author is asked several questions by an Indian correspondent who "is an M. A. and professor in a college," and observes:—

It makes me sad that any one should ask them, or even desire any answer save his own. . . . It makes one sad because one feels that it has everywhere happened all over India. No doubt it was a noble ideal to bring European methods of intellectual training to India and to lay the fruits of our traditions at the feet of an alien race. The European traditions may be all right—though even about that one may sometimes have one's doubts—for us who have our ancestral roots in Europe, but it seems unreasonable to expect them to be right for a people of another race, of a totally different clime, a different hereditary endowment, who have grown into a social and religious structure as unlike ours as possible. That is a question the Indians themselves are now beginning to ask. And perhaps too late (pp. 91, 92.).

This is a statement so true as to pass for a truism. Comment is needless; what is needed is unqualified endorsement.

SAROJ KUMAR DAS

Crime: Its Cause and Treatment.
By CLARENCE DARROW. (C. A. Watts
and Co., Ltd., London. 2s. 6d.)

Clarence Darrow is one of the most famous figures at the American Bar, and when he places his forty years' experience at the disposal of those who study this difficult and ever-present problem, his views should receive attention. It is therefore not surprising that this volume of short chapters on the various aspects of the enquiry should have proved so popular that it is now reprinted in a cheaper form.

One must accept the proposition that in any large community crime is inevitable, using the term to cover those anti-social acts whose gravity demands that some communal action be taken against the offender. Such men for the most part are those who lag behind in racial evolution, being unable through inherent weakness of character to keep to the standard of behaviour which the community requires. They are unable to adjust themselves to their environment, and as such should receive the helpful consideration of all who love their fellow men. As the author points out, the key to the problem is the attitude which the community adopts towards these weaker brothers, and unfortunately that attitude is still primarily one of revenge. In the ideal one should try to educate them to become useful citizens, but such a course needs time, skill, and, last but not least, money, a commodity which few nations are prepared to spend lavishly on those who war against their interests. Society must be protected from further depredations, and a happy mean must be reached between segregation and regeneration. Meanwhile we punish the criminal. Have we any right to do so?—asks Mr. Darrow, who proves that the sole basis of punishment is revenge, for its reforming influence is nil and its deterrent influence very

doubtful. Moreover at least four other persons suffer for every one who is punished for his crime. Herein lies the value of the American experiment of the indeterminate sentence, the idea being that the prisoner knows his maximum sentence, but also knows that he may be released so soon as he can satisfy a visiting committee that, given a fair start in life, he will genuinely attempt to become a law-abiding citizen. In Mr. Darrow's opinion the system is excellent in theory but difficult to apply with fairness and good results.

It is when he comes to consider the causes of crime that the author betrays his limitations. Apparently a disciple of behaviourism, he considers that all criminals are the sole product of heredity and environment, and therefore irresponsible. Add to this that he considers chance a tremendous factor in the making of criminals, and that he holds no hopes for the ultimate regeneration of mankind, and it follows that his treatment of the problem is as materialistic as his views. It is true that he sees the need of regarding crime as a disease, to be treated as such, with a cure as a necessary preliminary to letting the "patient" back among his friends, but here above all is a social problem which can never be solved until the community at large appreciates that the causes of crime lie in the mind of the criminal, and that those causes date from previous lives. Heredity and environment must be viewed as the self-chosen field of action in which to work out past errors, and to learn from experience the nature of the laws by which alone one may go forward to happiness and self-enlightenment. Meanwhile, the voice of Mr. Darrow is the voice of all men of goodwill when at the end of his book, he says:—

As long as men collectively impose their will upon the individual units, they should consider that this imposition calls for intelligence, kindness, tolerance, and a large degree of sympathy and understanding.

CHRISTMAS HUMPHREYS

CONTEMPORARY INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

[Dr. D. M. Datta, Professor of Philosophy at Patna College, reviews here the progress of philosophical thinking in India, as he says that "retrospection acts both as a stimulus and a corrective". —EDS.]

"Philosophy in modern India," observed Sir Radhakrishnan once, "is an infant industry that needs protection". In spite of her rich philosophical heritage India can claim very little in the way of new contribution to modern philosophy. Yet it is not altogether fruitless to review the little progress that it can be said to have made.

When the indigenous philosophical systems ceased to function academically and came to be deserted either through indifference or through positive neglect, European philosophy was imported into the new educational institutions. This exotic plant took rather deep root in the minds of those Indians who took to Western education. The early teachers of philosophy were mostly Christian missionaries, and philosophy, as taught then, was more or less tinged with Christian theology. The ideas of Indian philosophy, which were too intimately bound up with the religious beliefs of the land to be altogether lost, were driven almost into the subconscious mind of the educated Indians placed under the censorship of Western ideas and Christian theology. Indian philosophy had no place in the new programme of liberal education imparted by the universities, and its only use in academic circles was perhaps to supply

examples of exploded, fantastic thoughts.

This state of things continued for a long time until some talented Orientalists of Europe began to take a dispassionate view of our ancient literature and to marvel at its rich stock of lofty philosophical writings. This admiration reacted on the minds of the educated Indians, and the desire to know the past began to return slowly.

It was during the earlier part of the last quarter of last century that the study of Indian philosophy was undertaken at the premier Indian universities, and since then it has been gradually spreading throughout the country. There are very few universities now that have not recognised the importance of the study of Indian philosophy.

To understand fully the mind of a modern Indian student of philosophy it is necessary to remember these vicissitudes through which that mind has passed; and to estimate correctly the scope and quality of philosophical research in modern India, one has to recognise the conflicts and difficulties which beset this task.

When a modern Indian mind tries to think philosophically, it is faced by two conflicting duties:—first, the demand to do justice to the inherited undercurrent of native ideas which cannot be ignored without repression, and

secondly, the demand to do justice to the stock of modern Western ideas which are superimposed on the indigenous ones and are in actual possession of the focus of consciousness.

I. Some Indian thinkers have successfully ignored and repressed the claim of indigenous ideas and have devoted their undivided attention to the problems of Western philosophy.

II. Others have addressed themselves wholly to Indian philosophy, without attempting to interpret Indian ideas in the light of Western ones.

III. A few have tried to compare and contrast the two systems and to arrive at conclusions by giving each its due.

These are the three broad lines along which philosophical speculation has advanced in recent times.

I. Three Indian writers can be counted among the more eminent philosophers of the first line. The earliest of these, and one whose academic record in the British universities has scarcely been surpassed by any other Indian, was the late Professor P. K. Ray, D. Sc. (London and Edinburgh). Thoroughly trained in Western science and philosophy at Western seats of learning and absolutely honest and unostentatious as scholar and thinker, Dr. Ray applied his rare philosophical talents to the unambitious work of writing text-books on Deductive and Inductive Logic. These works contain well-knit, precise, solid thinking and easily attained the rank of classical text-books on the subject. Eminent European logi-

cians like Keynes, Welton, and Read quote his views with respect.

Professor H. Halder, who retired a few years ago from the George V Chair of the Calcutta University, is another eminent writer of this time. By undivided attention to Hegelian philosophy, Dr. Halder has set an example of what intensive cultivation of a small area can yield. Those of us who fritter away our energy in the fruitless attempt to master everything have much to learn from Dr. Halder, whose one-pointed devotion to Hegel has given him a place of authority in that field. His work on Neo-Hegelianism has been held in high esteem by eminent European experts. The third writer is Professor S. Z. Hasan of Aligarh. Trained in England and Germany, and possessed of an extensive grasp of contemporary philosophical literature, Dr. Hasan has written his book on "Realism," which has been recognised as a standard work on the subject.

II. Contrasted with these is the group of workers along the second line indicated above, the most important among whom are Dr. Ganganath Jha, Dr. S. C. Vidyabhusan, Dr. S. N. Das Gupta, Dr. Belvalkar, and Professor Ranade. Translation of technical philosophical literature from Sanskrit into English requires patient understanding of texts as well as skilful treatment. By translating a stupendous number of abstruse philosophical texts Dr. Jha has placed students and writers of Indian philosophy, in India and abroad, under a deep debt. The

late Dr. S. C. Vidyabhusan (Principal, Sanskrit College) also did valuable work in this direction by translating some classical texts and especially by writing *The History of Indian Logic*. Dr. S. N. Das Gupta, the worthy successor of Dr. Vidyabhusan, has established his position also in this field by writing single-handed his encyclopædic *History of Indian Philosophy*, the first two volumes of which already published have engaged the attention of all interested scholars throughout the world. His aim has been to present a faithful account of Indian systems of all kinds and he has always attempted to be faithful to the original texts. Professor Ranade's more ambitious scheme of completing an exhaustive encyclopædia of Indian Philosophy and Religion in several volumes, which raised much expectation, has been partially worked out with the help of Dr. Belvalkar, and more fruitful work still is awaited with interest. In addition to these workers who have been long in the field, some other competent scholars like Mr. S. Suryanarayan Shastri (Reader, Madras University), Pandit Kalkeswar Shastri (Calcutta University), Mr. Kuppu Swamy Shastri, and Mr. M. Hiriyanna have been doing valuable work in the translation and presentation of Indian philosophy in English. Dr. Mahendranath Sirkar (of the Presidency College, Calcutta) distinguished himself very recently by his able exposition of Vedantic philosophy and Indian culture in Italy. His writings have a marked

mystic flavour and appeal most to those who seek spiritual nourishment in the study of philosophy.

III. Work along the third line consists of (A) Critical and comparative study of Indian and Western philosophy and (B) independent contributions arising out of the assimilation of Indian and Western ideas.

Work of the first kind has been done in recent times by a good many scholars who have either defended the various systems or critically evaluated them. The chief among these works is Sir Radhakrishnan's *Indian Philosophy*, which is up to now the only attempt to give a systematic, critical and comparative exposition of the important Indian systems. It marks a new epoch in the history of modern Indian philosophy. It has been an inspiring source of information for the whole world, and has raised the status of Indian philosophy in the minds of Western thinkers. Many of the theses submitted for Doctorate degrees by Indian scholars in the Indian Universities and abroad have taken this line of comparative research. One of the most eminent Indian teachers of Philosophy, who was also one of the earliest to guide students in this field, is Sir B. N. Seal whose name must be mentioned in this connection. While he was the George V Professor of the Calcutta University many ambitious scholars worked in different branches of knowledge under the guidance and encouragement of this great genius, whose talents, versatility and pro-

found assimilation of Indian and Western thought know no parallel in modern times. Comparative study is being encouraged to a great extent also by the infant institution of the Indian Philosophical Congress and some valuable papers are being read and published by it every year.

Their independent contribution to philosophy has been too poor to entitle Indians to any recognition in the modern philosophical world. As we have indicated above, this kind of work is made difficult by the conflicting traditions which face every Indian with modern Western education. In addition to the many existing philosophical theories, Western and Indian, which every Indian thinker has to assimilate before he reacts independently, there are the daily increasing theories of modern science which at least some thinkers try to understand in order to make use of scientific truths in the construction of their own theories. Difficulties of this nature stood in the way of original work even in the case of such a scholar and thinker as Sir B. N. Seal. He had always the ambition, as he himself once stated, to form his own views after reading every important thing about Western philosophy, Indian philosophy and the modern sciences. It was only late in life that this ambition was near fulfilment and he could begin to think out his own philosophy which would do justice to what he had learned. But before he could write down his thoughts there came the Einsteinian revolution in

science, and his synthetic philosophy required revision. By the time this modification was achieved, a paralytic stroke put an end to his literary activities.

The institution of the Philosophical Congress has been a source of encouragement to original thinking. Appointments to presidential positions have forced some otherwise silent thinkers to formulate their views and have sometimes artificially stimulated even some listless scholars to attempt something original. The symposia and the papers also have been the vehicles of free thinking on smaller scales.

The Indian Institute of Philosophy at Amalner (Bombay), the only research institution for philosophy in this country, which owes its existence to the munificence of the philosopher-merchant Mr. Pratap Seth, has been an active centre for philosophical activities for the last few years. Professors G. R. Malkani and R. Das along with some other able younger colleagues like Mr. T. R. V. Murti have created therein an atmosphere for free philosophical thinking in the light of Indian and up-to-date Western thought.

The idealistic views of Prof. Malkani and the realistic ones of Dr. Das have found expression in papers regularly published in the *Proceedings* of the Philosophical Congress and its organ, *The Philosophical Quarterly*. The efficiency of the institution has been very greatly increased recently by the appointment of Professor K. C. Bhattacharya as its Director.

In contemporary Indian philosophy, the two outstanding persons who have constructed comprehensive views of their own out of the assimilation of both Indian

and Western systems of thought are undoubtedly Sir S. Radhakrishnan and Professor K. C. Bhattacharya.

But of them and their work on another occasion.

D. M. DATTA

SOCIAL SERVICE

Attention of our readers may be drawn to a recent reprint of Madame Blavatsky's "*Let Every Man Prove His Own Work*," which analyses human suffering and shows the reasons why our efforts to relieve it largely fail. The poulticing of surface misery goes on apace, and causes multiply while diagnosis waits upon perfection of technique for dealing with results. Public and private charity essay in vain to stop the swelling flood. The public social services in many lands have fended off, admittedly, extremes of destitution, but it cannot be gainsaid that they have sown new evils in the shape of pauperism, lessened responsibility and weakened family ties. England and New Zealand may be named as instances of countries which have shown a marked revulsion of feeling against such services, which once were hailed as panaceas for most human suffering. The beneficent results of even so impersonal and well meant an effort as slum clearance have been seriously called in question.

Personal sympathy and exertion for others outvalue public charity, but giving blindly may be quite unwise. The Director of Public Information of the Welfare Council of New York City, writing in *To-day*, of August 1934, describes the New York Beggars Clinic which up to that time had analysed 1,000 cases and had proved beyond the shadow of a doubt that he

who gives to beggars in New York is harming both them and society.

Comes now this pamphlet which reprints an article that first appeared in 1887 but seems, if anything, more apposite to present-day conditions. "More mischief has been done by emotional charity than sentimentalists care to face," declares Madame Blavatsky. She does not acquiesce in the unbrotherly neglect of the poor and wretched by those in comfortable circumstances, but denies that men can be made good or happy by betterment of physical surroundings. She points to the way out of the apparent impasse, a way that may not lead to quick results, but holds a promise for the days to come :—

Mere physical philanthropy, apart from the infusion of new influences and ennobling conceptions of life into the minds of the masses, is worthless. The gradual assimilation by mankind of great spiritual truths will alone revolutionize the face of civilization, and ultimately result in a far more effective panacea for evil, than the mere tinkering of superficial misery.

And she tells those who long to help their fellow men, to fit themselves to serve :—

It is not the spirit of self-sacrifice, or of devotion, or of desire to help that is lacking, but the strength to acquire knowledge and power and intuition, so that the deeds done shall really be worthy of the "Buddha-Christ" spirit... Therefore is the double activity of learning and doing most necessary; we have to do good, and we have to do it *rightly*, with knowledge.

PH. D.

THE LAND OF PSYCHE AND OF NOUS

Spiritists are Not Scientists—Titles of Knowledge and their Jurisdiction—Dr. Urquhart thinks like a Church Missionary.

There is an unfailing custom on the part of exponents of Spiritism to look back on "the year that has gone" and take stock of progress made, not infrequently omitting reference to setbacks and disastrous events. The best of all possible movements in the best of all possible worlds pays attention to the felicitous side and to that alone. Now there is a British College of Psychic Science which has flourished for a number of years. It does not seem to hold classes, arrange an official curriculum or issue diplomas. It is a College notwithstanding; and its present Principal is well known among us as an expositor of "Survival" and otherwise as a novelist of repute. We refer to Mrs. Champion de Crespigny, who has published a retrospect of the kind in question.* It affirms (1) "a noticeable expansion" of Psychical Research—apart, however, from particulars; (2) "a rise in the level of mentalities" concerned with investigation, but apart from names; (3) unprecedented attention to the subject given by the Press; (4) "definite attempts" to convince scientists; (5) a "steady influx of new books" and so forth. Assuredly the growth of the movement is made evident by these details; but as it is difficult to conceive a College without a curriculum and without graduates, so

if Spiritism belongs to Science it is hard to comprehend how it profits by conversions, why it depends on the popular Press, and why the growth of books thereon demands such gratified notice. Other sciences do not compute with pride those who believe therein, nor do they wax zealous over space occupied in the public journals. It follows that Spiritists do not behave like Scientists, although they appeal to these. Their position is not easy to define; but it seems that more especially of an eschatological sect, warranted by a group of alleged facts, demonstrating personal survival after bodily death and a posthumous state in manifest opposition to Christian orthodox doctrine. As such, it is futile to invoke Science, which has no concern therein and no office of judgment. But Spiritism is not a religion, though it may have religious consequences. Religion is the Science of Union between the Soul and Deity and no more postulates personal survival than it postulates man on earth as personally embodied in flesh. It presupposes both and learns nothing from the dead testifying, as all post mortem utterances are from the "hither hereafter" and not from souls in union. Moreover, the eschatological side of Spiritism remains unverified testimony, be-

* I 't, December 27, 1934, pp. 793, 794.

yond our power to check.* Finally, the record under notice has not one word of reference to that cloud on the sanctuary of Psychical Research created by the "Margery" case, the acrimonious debate of which has been succeeded by ominous silence: We hear no more of the distinguished lady-medium or even of her critics. The significant Report of the English S. P. R. on a further investigation of the Rudi Schneider mediumship is also passed over. It was undertaken by the Research Officer, firstly in conjunction with the *Institut Métapsychique* of Paris; secondly at Braunau, the medium's former home; thirdly at Weyer in Upper Austria, where Schneider now lives, five Researchers being present; and lastly in the Society's séance-room. The results were throughout negative, or occasional seemingly paranormal phenomena were obtained under non-evidential conditions.

Seeing that Mr. Bertrand Russell did not in point of fact discover "that objects exist everywhere except where they are and nowhere except where they are not," it seems desirable to correct a misstatement to this effect before it spreads further. It seems uncertain also that the affirmation was made casually in the seventies of the last century by the Rev. M. Baxter, when he demonstrated

that Napoleon III was Antichrist. Supposing, however, that we are wrong on the important point, we shall remain anxious to dissuade inquirers from inferring that such findings of science have a real bearing on the question whether there is an open path of the Soul to God. There are at least a few of us who have loved discovery for its own sake, even when it leads nowhere; so it is good to hear the scientists when they talk "about it and about" or of that and this, within their own domain. Now it has chanced that Dr. Robert Clark † has cautioned people generally to beware of Mr. Bertrand Russell when he speaks of matters philosophical; but that which is said of one familiar name of the moment will apply obviously to all the roll of current science. Within their own measures, but not beyond: it is we, however, who tend to put them on pinnacles where they do not happen to belong, investing them with a semi-divine authority over matters general instead of particular matters. I have discovered, for example, that a certain super-unknown, denominated *X pro forma*, is governed in behaviour by Z, which is met with daily at most street corners, and is therefore in relation A to Thingumbob=B; and I become hereby a fit and proper person to decide whether Sludge hoccussed a certain circle at his last dark séance.

* It is therefore a form of faith, the acceptance as verdict of witness borne from the unseen. Here it is interesting to compare Prof. R. B. Perry, writing on "the meaning of death" in the *Hibbert Journal*, January, 1935, pp. 161-178, as if he had never heard of Psychical Research. He comes forward "empty handed," but would "like to justify the desire for immortality" (p. 162) and ends by suggesting that "it is possible to hope for a more doubtful life hereafter" (p. 177).

† *Proceedings*, October, 1934, pp. 251-285.

My titles remain, the fact notwithstanding that I am notoriously unable to see my own spectacles lying on the table before me or to remember whether an old friend happens to be bald or hirsute. *Per contra*, as a consequence of forty years spent on Psychical Research, I am President of a Society engaged therein, yet all my experiments and conclusions count for nothing, because I cling to the old fallacy that most objects tend to be present where they are and to be absent where they are not. Assuredly some titles of knowledge are well earned, but their jurisdiction needs revision.

In this connection, there is a credit on open account due to Dr. Clark for refreshing reminders on several findings which seem to be held authentic, amidst the flux of thought around us. They may be gathered into a group as follows: (1) That axioms are by no means necessary truths; (2) That "the age of deduction is going," even in the mathematician's realm; (3) That the syllogism is going also, and with these there folds up its tents, like the Arab, our "last hope of proving anything"; (4) That Nature provides us with no premises, and hence it is impossible to draw any certain conclusion; (5) That amidst universal nescience, it seems possible, however, to regard a critical attitude as often "the greatest barrier to truth"; (6) That "an absolutely valid ground of belief in God" has passed with the failure of Kant's

doctrine of ethics; and (7) That, according to Galt's applied statistics, baptised boys—otherwise the children of God—"the members of Christ and inheritors of the kingdom of heaven," are no more spiritually minded than the children of the world and the devil.

The question arises: What therefore remains? It is not asked in the monograph under notice and yet an answer is given. After citing that which seems cogent to Dr. Clark we shall venture to append our own, on other warrants than his. The alleged failure of Nature to provide premises compels us to seek elsewhere for a way of reaching conclusions, and we are counselled to remember that experience is "the only reasonable starting-point," meaning that "we must observe Nature and then guess what might have caused the observed events". This is induction. It does not emerge that we come to much good in the practice, since "a guess may always be wrong," while "various ways of testing its correctness are none of them fool-proof". In this pickle we are left apparently, but with a casual reminder that thoughtful people "naturally regard religious faith as a form of induction".* It cannot be obtained while the mind is critical; but it may lift up a "shining light which survives and is strengthened by criticism. It may not prove God or Christianity; but it justifies St. Paul in affirming that God has made foolish the wisdom of this world, which knew not God, and

* *Ibid.*, p. 705.

has saved them that believe. At this point, presumably, Dr. Clark had more to say and might have surprised his readers; but his discourse seems left intentionally at a loose end.

We recur therefore to that which he proclaims dogmatically. For him who would reach conclusions experience is the starting-point: there is none other in the known reason of things. But experience is a mode of mind, and there is hence an attainable state of our inward being "which can reach certitude".* Be it observed that in the matter of direction there is no attempt to qualify. Observation may be directed to Nature, the study of the world without; it may be turned upon the world within, the processes of human mind; but in either case we acquire that experience from which it is postulated that we can draw certain conclusions. It is not by deduction because "the age of deduction is going"; it is not in virtue of premises because they exist no longer; the "argument from analogy" may land us in a vicious circle; "what is known as correlation" may institute false connections; but *experientia docet*—God knows how, if you like; but that which is taught is that which sees within us, that which can come to know, not by debate about it but in virtue of experience. We thank our essayist, who has given us all things back, or has shewn us rather that they remain unaffected

utterly. He has illustrated only the several ways in which the logical mind is disqualified by its own processes. The lesson of experience abides. It has given us all the science that we have of the outward world, all of the world within—be it much or little in most cases; and above these, for some of us—few or many—there is that which the great of old, there is that which we in our measures have learned of the Life in God, the Quest of Reality, the State of Unity, beyond the Blessed Vision and St. Monica's "union there". *Experientia docet*: it gives even "the clue" of that "single Aleph" which leads not only "to the treasure house," but "per-adventure to the Master too".

The Principal of the Scottish Church College, Calcutta, Dr. W. S. Urquhart, asks whether the Indian identity relation between the Soul and God "can provide us with religious satisfaction," and suggests that, notwithstanding its beauty and attractiveness, "it does not seem to reach the possible heights of the religious relationship". The alternative and better way of "satisfying our religious aspirations" is surely that of "communion," for it is on such a basis alone that "true worship is possible". It is recognised that this is a reversion to the "subject-object relationship," regarded as the simplest of all. In Christian symbolism, it is the Blessed Vision

* Compare Prof. J. S. Moore, offering a new definition, that "Philosophy is a rational inquiry into the meaning of experience". It implies, as he points out, that "we can know *something* at least of the meaning of the things". See *Philosophy*, January, 1935, pp. 64, 65.

of Dante in place of the absorption of the unity. It is recognised further as the "sense of duality," not only admitted as the one authentic ground of communion between man and the Divine but beatified as the Way, the Truth and the Life, when raised within us to "the religious level through the conception of love". Dr. Urquhart is of course a Christian missionary in India and thinks as such. Christianity for

him makes actual that which is possible for us all—to "become the Sons of God," instead of "disappearing phantoms in a dream-like world". Presumably he has never known what French *Theosophia* has called *la soif de l'unité* or that inmost "orbicular wound" which comes from the dread of separation eternalised. Does Dr. Urquhart imagine that a man can lose anything when he attains the All?

A. R. WAITE

THE CRUELTY OF FURS

The steel trap is undoubtedly the cause of the greatest animal suffering. Women cause most of the suffering to wild animals, usually through ignorance, but some do not want to know, and prefer adorning themselves with skins, because it is the fashion.

From 8 to 10 beavers are killed for one coat, about eighty mink skins make one wrap. Practically all animals with paws undergo hellish tortures in the steel trap, which also induces an intense thirst that cannot be slaked. There are also countless mothers of the wild among these poor tortured things, whose young are left to starve.

Many a foot caught in a steel trap has been gnawed off; sometimes an animal is found caught by its only remaining foot, the other three having been lost in former traps. The law that a trapper must visit his traps very frequently is often broken, on account of weather conditions.

Here is some of the testimony of former trappers :—

"Every animal suffers excruciatingly from the moment when its leg is caught between the steel jaws of the trap, which lacerates and breaks it."

"My last bear I heard for many days, before suspecting what the sounds were. I found the half-grown animal half-dead with

its foot gangrened and stinking. Its teeth were broken with trying to sever the steel jaws of the enormous trap. . . . The bear's other leg was mutilated by its own agonised and frantic biting."

Humane steel traps, like those invented by Mr. Vernon Bailey, the well-known naturalist, and awarded the American Humane Society's prize, should cut the toll of suffering. Even now furs are obtainable from animals humanely killed, *e. g.*, those from hoofed animals (excluding broadtail), silver and black fox skins and other furs from fur farms sold with a guarantee of their source, moles, fancy rabbits, shorn lamb and imitated skins such as nutria-lamb, seal-coney, etc. Even better are the fabrics of silk and wool which look like fur. The artificial Persian Lamb, Karakul, Nutria and Pony skin are particularly attractive. A day in the rain does not affect them. Best of all, no animal has died a lingering and miserable death to make them available. Leaflets telling where humanely are available on request from Major C. Van der Byl, Wappenham House, Towcester, Northants, organiser of the Fur Crusade and Humane Trapping Campaign.

E. H.

ENDS AND SAYINGS

“ ends of verse
And sayings of philosophers.”

HUDIBRAS.

In the January *Fortnightly* a Calcutta Britisher reflects on “The Changed Mood of India” caused by the decisions of the Bombay session of the National Congress, at which Gandhiji withdrew from political life. Malcolm Muggeridge asks:—

How has this change affected the position of the ordinary European in India? There is undoubtedly less antagonism directed against him as a European. He is not made to feel, as he was some years ago, that he is an enemy surrounded by enemies. On the surface of things, his position is much securer than it was, his prestige higher. Yet I doubt if it is really higher. I cannot shake off a queer feeling that he is more easily tolerated than he was because he is less feared. It seems to me that the myth of his innate superiority has been so exploded now that it does not even need to be refuted, but is taken for granted. As I walk about the streets of Calcutta, trying to understand, to tune myself to their ebb and flow, the movement of stealthily chattering people, with mutilated beggars whining from the road-side and the air full of dust and stale fragrance, it is constantly borne in on me that, quite apart from whether there is to be this or that measure of constitutional advance, even any constitutional advance at all, something is petering out—is it an Empire?—leaving behind fragments of itself, mostly paltry, but soon to be no more.

As far as the Europeans themselves are concerned, they seem very much the same. They have as little to do with India as they can; and perhaps

they are right in so doing, because thereby they save themselves from being perpetually reminded of the precariousness of their situation, of the whole unreality of their relationship with the country wherein they live, and the people amongst whom they live.

A European who does not do something of the sort cannot but be vaguely unhappy, uneasy, most of his time. What is to be the end of it all? he wonders, sensing beneath the sound and fury of political agitation a deeper reality, a deeper antagonism—racial antagonism. This is the key to the situation; as long as it exists, no mere constitutional change, however far-reaching, will quieten discontent and bring peace, for racial antagonism means a perpetual state of tension, of morbid sensitiveness, of craven emulation or hysterical assertiveness, of bullying and acceptance of bullying. Probably hysterical assertiveness is better than craven emulation; but the former makes sworn enemies of Government, and the latter the only material available for Indian officials and Ministers. That is to say, generally speaking, the best men waste their energies and deteriorate in the negativeness of unending opposition, while the most inferior only are available for Government service and constitutional co-operation.

Here are some correct but misunderstood perceptions. The acute observations are wrongly interpreted. It is true that the innate superiority of the Westerner is an exploded myth; the Indian people know well that

Europeans and Americans are the same as themselves—both possess moral blemishes, mental limitations, unhygienic customs, insanitary habits, however different these may be. The same with virtues and capacities. If Indians suffer from the much talked of inferiority complex, the Westerners suffer from the equally objectionable superiority complex. Prides and prejudices die hard, in East and West alike. If even a fairly large number of Europeans in India would be as frank and truthful as Mr. Muggeridge and admit that their racial superiority is but empty talk, much ground would be cleared and their present position remarked upon in the above extract would improve. The English in India have blundered in the past and have lost the opportunity to shake the hand of real friendship with the native; to-day they may be willing to let by-gones be by-gones but their old Karma meets them in the shape of distrust, the cold shoulder and utter lack of respect on the part of the Indian.

But need mutual distrust verging on hatred continue? Cannot the English do something towards removing "the precariousness of their situation, of the whole unreality of their relationship with the country wherein they live"? Mr. Muggeridge is right. "Beneath the sound and fury of political agitation a deeper reality exists and it is "racial antagonism".

We are not among those who minimize the difficulties caused by the clash of cultures in India. But what a small group of friends have achieved, that a large number of people can achieve. In the work of which THE ARYAN PATH is a spokesman, Westerners and Indians, both men and women, are engaged and they labour for the Cause they love—rising above the racial prides and sectarian prejudices. In this venture are Hindus, Muslims, Parsis, Europeans and Americans and there have arisen no questions of who is who.

They do not live in a colony in socialistic fashion, nor have they formed themselves into a religious order with set rules and commandments. Each fulfils his or her many obligations in the ordinary walks of life. Some of them not only earn their own livelihood but also earn to support this journal and cognate activities. Common ideals and aspirations, the same aims and purposes, bind them, and all of these converge towards a Vision of the Brotherhood of Humanity without distinction of race, creed, sex, caste or colour. They form a united band for they realize the truth of the aphorism—The Way to Unite is to Unite; Nothing prevents if that is the Desire.

Are there sufficient Britons and Indians who desire to unite, ready to sink their sectarianism, to practise Brotherhood?



Point out the "Way"—however dimly,
and lost among the host—as does the evening
star to those who tread their path in darkness.

—*The Voice of the Silence.*

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EDUCATION FOR LEISURE

Leisure, down the ages, has been the luxury—often the ruin—of the few; the El Dorado of the toiling crowd. Now factories have brought it at least potentially within the reach of all. Actually, though the ranks of those suffering from surfeit of leisure have been greatly augmented by the involuntarily unemployed, grinding toil for long hours daily is still the lot of countless millions more. Storm Jameson, whose serious and provocative mind has influenced British thought, analyses the problem keenly in the following article. She presents a choice between the age of leisure and the loss of all. She takes us on to the Delectable Mountains and shows us the Celestial City, though she does not show us how to energize ourselves to enter in. She does, however, give a valuable prescription to fit us for the age of leisure if and when we do enter it—education with a threefold object: to enable

one to know one's place in civilization; to give one creative skill which will ensure joy in work; to kindle eagerness for the pursuit of truth.

We hope that appreciation of the past which the first object is to inculcate will not stop, as is so often the case, with Greek civilization. The Greeks themselves, to use Miss Jameson's telling phrase, were no "poor lost rootless men". Greek culture was firmly rooted in the older civilizations of Egypt and the ancient East. It is to-day that tap root stretching down into those culture strata of the past which alone can keep the tree of modern civilization from toppling to the earth before the present hurricane of stress and change. To paraphrase St. Paul, "The leaves cannot say to the root, we have no need of thee!" The open-minded study of the past alone can cure our modern arrogance and our absurd assurance that to-day's dictum is the final word.

To know where we stand in civilization is to recognize the place of the present moment in the temporal scheme—a mote in a measured and endless succession of motes that drift across a beam of steady light; no more important in its fleeting visibility than the motes that preceded and will follow it. The present stands to past and future in the relation of a trusted friend, administrator of the past that has gone and guardian of its progeny, the years to come. We hold in trust for the future the bequest of past civilizations. We cannot render a good account of our stewardship if we disprize the legacy or undervalue it.

One or more of the above objects of education is given lip assent to by every modern pedagogue, and yet the schools turn out, year after year, an ever-growing host sure that their place is in the van of progress, equipped with no creative skill and blandly willing to take their views as they buy their clothes, ready-made, cut to conform with fashion's latest whim.

The reason is not far to seek. Strange as it may sound, science stands in the way of real educational reform, though not so much, nor so directly, as organized religions do. In modern Russia we have a science-run State; and yet its criminals and its underworld exist and will persist as those of other States. Modern science, when not preaching mechanistic determinism, talks about a universe of chance and accident.

When Causation is on the throne, human will is declared a slave; when the tyrant is dethroned the rule is proclaimed, not of will, but of indeterminable caprice. Between such views of science and those of religions which worship a Personal God whose Machiavellian ways are shrouded in black mystery, what chance is there for men and women in their homes, shops or clubs to develop real initiative?

Ours is a race of blind believers. Man takes his knowledge of the universe from science, his religious beliefs from the priest, his politics from his party organ, his ethics from his social set; conformity is his god. Vows are an anachronism; credos and shibboleths—religious, scientific, political, social—have taken their place. Need we wonder that Miss Jameson's high pressure salesman finds it easy to beat down the resistance of prospective customers who have never learned to form their own opinions or defend them? That does not excuse deliberately overpowering a weaker will in order to make a sale. A truer scale of values would recognize such activity as little, if any, less antisocial than, say, thuggee.

The artificial stimulation of demand may be necessary to keep up our boasted high standard of living, but to what avail? That standard itself results largely from energy, deflected from independent mental effort, seeking an outlet in the feverish mechanical activity which characterizes our civilization. How can we set a proper

value on leisure when *doing* is at such a premium, *being* at a discount? Faster and faster human feet turn the treadmill, and the power generated turns out unnecessary gadgets, enervating comforts, needless luxuries in ever-swelling volume. Something better! Something new!

We submit that reformed education should make the rising generation recognize, for what it is, the mess of pottage for which the present generation has sold its birthright, so that, along with

their effective demand for reasonable leisure, they may assert their own inalienable right to think and, thinking, grow.

To pursue truth, to enjoy labour, to find one's place in the scheme of things, a philosophy of living is needed—a philosophy other than the mechanistic one of science or the mystifying one of ordinary religions.

Thoughtful people will find much food for reflection in the article of Miss Storm Jameson which immediately follows.

LEISURE

Common knowledge assures us that we have reached a stage—of technical and scientific wit—which would allow us to feed, house and clothe well and with little labour a greater number than those now living on the earth. This chance is ours by inheritance from the efforts of many men. A common instinct revolts against the senseless wastes, the unchecked and unsocial greeds (for power or wealth), which rob us of our inheritance. A common will, to administer our estate as a careful housewife cherishes her family, is yet lacking. Yet so many are our powers, and we have lately grown so ingenious, that wealth is forced on us. It is heaped up in vaults, it goes to market abroad (leaving many starving at home) and is the occasion of savage rivalry between nations, that is, between great inter-

ests giving themselves the names of nations. This rivalry could issue in disaster of a foul kind if it should not be prevented.

So that there are only two ways before us. One continues an irresponsible social anarchy to war and the death of society. The other opens to us in the moment we decide to use our inheritance—our clever machines, the inventions of many heads, and our latest-won powers—as good stewards and not, as now, for the profit of a few. A short naming of these two ways is Leisure or Anarchy. Another might be Man or Machine.

It is plain now, to any choosing to look, that machines are valued far above men. You may go into any power station and there see the magnificent steel monsters cared for by one or two minders, and again go out into the streets and

find everywhere men of all ages, even children, rotting from disuse. The reason you will be given is that it does not pay to use these men. Humanity is rated very low in the table of social values.

From this it is a short step to all those systems of thought and political forms which look on the individual as a mere thing of the State, within the narrowest limits compelled to do the will of the State, that is, of the State's head, of the Leader, the Dictator. The most benevolent of these social organisms can have no purpose more to their point than making obedient citizens. It is well if they should also be contented, but obedient they must be. Thus the model of all such societies, of whatever political colour, is that of the ant heap. Another sign for our two roads might then be Sons of God or Ants.

The choice is between a reasoned use of our great inheritance or an irrational squandering and at last loss of it. We should choose to believe that reason, with the help of grace (without which reason is cold and dark), will triumph. Then we are on the step of an age of leisure. Two or three months work in the year (or a shorter time) will, when all our resources are wisely used and directed, provide the ample necessities of our life. That is, the material necessities, good food and clothing, dignified houses, clean air. A wide leisure remains to every one of us.

"You will use it," says a cold voice, "in cinemas, cheap reading, dog-racing, and idleness." No

doubt I should, if my imagination had not, from the earliest age, had other food offered to it.

This fear that men will waste their leisure is blind and foolish. It does not see that the scarcely mitigated toil in which many of us spend our lives from youth to age is as crushing to the mind and spirit as any of the forms of amusement evolved to please a people which has forgotten how to please itself, in play or in work. And it forgets, or pretends to forget, that the wit and curiosity given to each soul at birth can be as easily shaped in it to a good growth as choked out of it by purposeless education, ignorance, insecurity and exhausting labour, delivering it up helpless to the purveyors of mental and spiritual degradation in every kind. (The place which advertising has usurped in our social economy is one mark of this degradation.)

To fit us for leisure our notions must be revised. I would not if I could make education free (as it should be) to every child, irrespective of its birth, unless I might at the same time change the manner and purpose of education root and branch. To begin with, I must have every child a learner until he is at the youngest eighteen or twenty. From then he will never cease to learn. His learning shall have three chief ends. The first is to show him that he stands in a current flowing through him from the past to the future. The literature and documents of the past, wisely opened to him, are the maps by which he learns his place,

in another sense than that intended by the authors of the phrase. Whether he is to become an engineer, a scientist or a farmer, he is the richer for knowing his way in another country, and that his own. Civilisation is itself a tradition.

There are other and valuable ways of keeping that continuity with the past which is necessary if we are not to become all poor lost rootless men. The change-over from older to new methods in industry made a rude break in our tradition. A vast deal of skill and wit has been lost in the process. The old peasant woman who works in my house has a dozen country crafts at her disposal, useful and beautiful, which she learned in her youth. Her grand-daughter is dependent on the cinema for her interest and on other forms of mass production for all her other needs.

This is the second end of right education -to breed craftsmen. I would have every boy and girl taught thoroughly a craft. Master craftsmen respect one another, and respect is a firm ground for a society. In the long practice of a craft the creative spirit of man is released, the same spirit which even now, under the dreadful weight of ugliness, squalor and poverty, tends a handful of flowers in the back yard of a slum. In the age of leisure, the meaning shall be restored to these words: "to work is joy". In present conditions few of us find any joy in our work: we work too long each day, for too many days

and years, at repetitive tasks. This is one of the heaviest losses inflicted on the human spirit by the spread of a mechanical civilisation. The many and diverse amusements—the wireless, the cinema, cheap cars—with which we can fill such leisure as we have been able to save from the machine, and the increase in comfort and ease, are no payment for what we have lost, the wish and the power to make with our hands and brains what is useful, pleasant, and fine. My old peasant making loganberry jelly or working in wool and canvas a design of flowers copied from nature lives a life filled with the deep excitement of creation—she is the true heir of the master craftsmen of the great cathedrals. A civilisation (already within reach) which gives every human being his own bathroom, central heating, aeroplane, wireless, and ample leisure, will be a wretched failure if its heirs are not workers for pleasure. I judge that education a failure which does not discover and bring to its full growth the instinct to create which is natural in us. By this test, our present method of education fails wretchedly.

The third ground of right education is to foster natural curiosity and, through curiosity, respect for truth and reverence for life. The rigorous pursuit of truth by the individual is lower in favour in the world now than it has been for some time, but it is occupation for many lifetimes and an age of leisure—such an age as the world will enjoy if it escapes the worst punishment of our present irreverence.

The division, in the leisureless state, of work into two chief sorts—mechanical and repetitive work done by a class of inefficient because human robots, and intelligent or creative work—is at least as harmful to the creative individuals as to the stunted machine-herds. The whole of society is infected by the existence of slave classes. Their mere existence is a source of fear, hatred and ugliness issuing in the fouling of the air and the defacement of the country. Beside that a certain amount of manual or routine work is necessary for intellectual health. In a fortunately governed society only the rarest exceptions will be made to the rule requiring all able persons to share in the routine work needed to provide the goods and services which the community needs.

Just as, through our reckless pursuit of money profit, we fail to use our present technical resources to the full, so we often misuse those we employ. There is no human purpose to be served in elaborating machinery, as now, for the production and over-production of what are called novelties or, more ironically, improvements. The world is cluttered up with labour-saving devices which do not save so much labour as they cost, with varieties of tinned and patent foods differing from one another only by the label, with newer versions of what is neither worn out nor inefficient. A vast parasitic army is engaged in the various branches of salesmanship to lie, cozen, and intimidate people into

buying what they do not need, did not desire and will be no happier for possessing. We are fortunate that no enterprising merchant has yet begun a campaign to persuade us that steel crutches are better for us than using our legs. In the age of leisure, those of us who crave many useless possessions will probably have to make them—and at that they will cease to be useless.

For one who from first youth has been trained to use mind and senses to the finest purpose, no lifetime can be too long. The exercise of his powers, or the perfecting of one of them, whether he wishes to walk, fly, speak foreign languages, write poetry, play and hear music, invent an aeroplane or a sauce, or meditate, will cost him his life. Now, if he is not so wretched that leisure is forced on him in the ghastly shape of unemployment, he has often to choose between living in poverty in order to have time for some work he wishes to do more than he wishes to eat or travel, and giving so much time to earning his wages that he can live only in the fag-ends of days. By either way he is cheated. There is no virtue in a forced starvation and no savour in working only to live. For the first time in human history, leisure, with all that we need for our physical life, is within our reach, at a price. Equally possible to us is the fitting of our minds and souls to enjoy long leisure as a musician enjoys the practice of his art.

STORM JAMESON

POETRY AND COMMON SENSE

I. THE POET AS DREAMER

[The work of **L. A. G. Strong**, poet, novelist and critic, has an attraction all its own. Essentially a poet, "he cannot help," as Mr. Gerald Gould writes, "being a better workman for it in all departments of life—a better navvy, or a better novelist". In this essay the poet offers the results of some original thinking on the use and the value of poetry in the life of the people.

In this first instalment Mr. Strong compares poetry-symbols with dream-symbols. Dreams represent but states of human consciousness and dream-states are experienced in waking consciousness. Thus day-dreams may be idle fancy, or may result in profound vision of some aspect of Reality. The poet, who rising to high vision in waking life, gazes directly upon ideas and penetrates them with his intuition, passes through the experience of the Soul in the pure state of Sushupti, called the dreamless state, because the dreamer is not able to remember his dreams on his return to waking life. Symbolical or allegorical dreams are of two kinds : (1) Hazy glimpses of realities caught by the brain and distorted by our fancy ; and (2) Clear vision of realities impressed on our brains by the self-conscious intelligence using his divine faculty of imagination. These two kinds of dream-experiences have their correspondences in the work of the poets.

There is a reference to psycho-analysts : exactly as they fail to interpret all dreams because they deal with the inter-relation of normal consciousness with sub-consciousness only, in contradistinction to super-consciousness, the nature and very existence of which are unknown to them—so also any attempt at interpreting poetry by psycho-analytic methods will fail. Great genius is not tinctured with madness in spite of the dictum of Seneca. The key of dreams is necessary both for understanding poetic inspiration and for interpreting poetic symbols but the explanations of Asiatic Psychology as to what the different kinds of dreams are should be taken into account. We may draw the reader's attention to p. 160 of the last issue of *THE ARYAN PATH*, which contains an important clue for a correct grasp of this subject.—Eds.]

When, a couple of years ago, I published a small book entitled *Common Sense about Poetry*, there were a certain number of people to whom the title seemed paradoxical, if not actually blasphemous. Poetry they felt to be a thing apart : a sacred mystery : subject to no mental process but that which, for want of a better name, we call inspiration. Poetry was inspired, and therefore an infinite distance beyond the tainting breath of common sense.

I agree with such people that

poetry is inspired. Where I differ from them is in maintaining that it is precisely in matters of inspiration that we have most need of common sense. The most vital inspiration in our lives, whatever form it chooses, is our religion : and in religion, be it never so transcendental, we freely admit the need for common sense. The whole practical difficulty of religion is to make inspiration transform the common task, to learn to express our inspiration in the necessary terms of everyday life.

This is a task which calls for all the sense we can muster,—often for a good deal more. We use our native wit, our common sense, for the *interpretation* of our religion. My book, as are these pages, was concerned with the interpretation of poetry. I approached poetry, quite simply, as an ordinary reader. No matter whether we write poetry or not, we are obliged to approach the poetry of every living creature except ourselves as readers. And for this approach we need all our common sense.

To think of poetry as an inscrutable mystery, to be savoured only by the emotions and in moments of solemn exaltation, is generally the sign of an amateur mind; by which I mean an inexperienced mind. Adolescents first in love consider nothing but Romance. They are right; but, as they soon find out, common sense more than anything else is needed if romance is to be preserved. It can and should be preserved, for we are given our inspirations that we may live up to them: and we are given our common sense to show the way. In love, the grocer's bills, the household affairs, the petty clash of preference, the hundred and one little everyday difficulties, are romance's most dangerous enemies. All these lie within the scope of common sense. If the lovers rely only upon their ecstasies, and do not call in the aid of common sense to subdue these petty difficulties, then romance is in for a hard time. It is the same with religion, or with poetry. No inspired activity of man can do

without the fullest support of his native wit. The greatest of living poets has expressed the matter once for all. Says Dr. W. B. Yeats:—

We must not make a false faith by hiding from our thoughts the causes of doubt, for faith is the highest achievement of the human intellect, the only gift man can make to God, and therefore it must be offered in sincerity. Neither must we create, by hiding ugliness, a false beauty as our offering to the world.

It will therefore be apparent that we may exalt common sense without decrying inspiration. Common sense is no substitute for religion or for poetry or for love, but it is indispensable for the health and maintenance of all three.

I do not of course mean to suggest that the study of poetry can ever be easy, or that common sense will ever take us to the heart of it. We can never fully understand a great poem till we know as much about it and about life as the poet knew when he wrote it. It must be remembered, too, that poets do not write for putative readers. They write for themselves. Their language is not addressed to convince us of anything. It is not the language of the sermon, which is rhetoric. It is the language of the spirit, which is incantation. Many people go astray in their consideration of poetry through looking at it as a means of communication chosen by the poet in order to speak to them. This is mere impertinence. How can we expect, by the exercise of our unaided wits, at a few readings, to understand a thought that may be the consummation of the great mind which,

after years of service, has seen it in a flash of inspiration. As a thinker the poet is usually far ahead of his time. Has any ordinary reader the arrogance to demand that the poet, upon some hard-won mount of transfiguration, shall stoop to remember him; edit his vision so that he may understand it? It would not be so in the case of any of the exact sciences to which men defer readily. Why should it be so here? The poet was not thinking of us upon his mountain. Yet he leaves his poem for readers, to understand if they can: and, since they cannot match his inspiration, it behoves them all the more to begin at the other, the humbler end, use common sense to approach the problem rightly, and to fit themselves for its solution.

At this point many will think the task sounds too much like work. To these may profitably be spoken what Shakespeare made Henry V say to his men on the eve of Agincourt :—

Proclaim it through my host
That he which hath no stomach to this fight,
Let him depart.

For a fight it is. Like everything else worth achieving, the understanding of poetry must be fought for and won. It is not easy. Some fine poetry can be understood immediately on the first reading; but this is a small proportion only, and it usually is so understood for reasons which will be outlined shortly.

When a poem is difficult to understand, the difficulty will usually fall under one of three

main headings. The syntax of the poem may be obscure; that is to say, it may be difficult to disentangle subjects and predicates, and see which clause refers to what. This kind of difficulty is the rarest in good work, since it is usually a sign of incompetence or of problems imperfectly solved. Where it occurs, it may be due to ellipsis, owing to the speed of the thought and the haste with which the rich metaphors flashed crowding on the poet's mind. Most of the obscurities in Shakespeare are due to ellipsis. Difficulties of syntax occur in the work of such poets as Browning and Hardy, who favour inversions which often leave a doubt as to their meaning. On the whole, however, this is the easiest form of obscurity to penetrate, and the least common. We have been told times out of number that modern poets are difficult, and this complaint, which echoes all down the ages, will nine times out of ten be due to the unfamiliarity of the thought expressed. Poets, as I suggested just now, are generally ahead of their time. Unless their work is strictly traditional, their thought, and the individual language in which it is expressed, will be some distance ahead of the immediate apprehension of their readers. This is, and always has been, a difficulty of new poetry. We are all familiar with the elderly and cultured man who picks up some classical poet and says, "This is the stuff for me. These modern fellows, you can't make out what they're at. I call their stuff cross-

word puzzles, not poetry. There's no beauty in it. I don't know what it means. Keats now, or Shelley, that's the stuff for me. I can understand that. Why don't these young men write like that?"

We have all heard this complaint. Our fathers heard it, and our grandfathers, and our great-grandfathers. The critic forgets an important consideration, which is (as Miss Sitwell has so often and so patiently pointed out) that that work of Shelley and Keats was written over a hundred years ago. The thoughts which it expresses have been made familiar to him by a hundred years of understanding on the part of others. The discoveries of these young by-gone poets are no longer new. The critic has had time to catch up on them. He has had, figuratively speaking, a hundred years in which to get used to the language of Keats and Shelley, to accommodate himself to their view of the world and their way of expressing it. He forgets, too, that Keats and Shelley in their day were abused for the precise qualities of incomprehensibility and lack of beauty with which he charges the young poets of to-day. To instance this is by no means to assert that the young poets of to-day are the equals of Keats and Shelley, or that their work is invariably beautiful. It is merely to point out that the difficulties of our imaginary critic are not evidence one way or the other. Accustomed to the old, he has found the new difficult, as has happened to every generation since the first

son went one better than his father.

There are several ways in which a new thought may be difficult, when it is expressed in poetry. The first is that it will nearly always be expressed symbolically. More than half the difficulty in all poetry is bound up with this question of symbolism. When the syntax of a verse is perfectly plain, when it states a grammatically logical relation of subject to predicate, and we still cannot understand it, the difficulty is usually due to symbolism. Usually, but not invariably. When Blake, for instance, says :

The caterpillar on the leaf
Repeats to thee thy mother's grief,

while we may not at once know what he means, we feel tolerably sure that he means what he says, *i.e.*, that the caterpillar is a caterpillar, the leaf a leaf, and the mother a mother. At other times, however, we feel uneasily that the persons and images of the poem get their meaning and their relationship not from themselves, but from what they stand for. When we reach this point, our difficulty is unfairly increased by the fact that there is no standard dictionary of symbols to which we can refer. Dr. Jung, it is true, and, subject to certain qualifications, Dr. Freud, offer to provide us with such a dictionary, but we cannot always accept the offer with confidence, and even if one or both of these psychologists were right, we meet a further difficulty, which is that the symbolism of most artists is private to themselves. Certain associations, which may

well turn out to be vital to any understanding of a poet's work, are the products of his personal experience.

At this point an analogy may be useful. A lorry, laden with loose sheets of corrugated iron, passes along a suburban road at two in the morning. The hideous clatter which it makes rouses some sleepers altogether. On a few fortunate others, who are deep asleep, it produces no impression at all. The remainder hear the noise, but it does not wake them. It reaches their minds under the guise of a dream, which is different in the case of each sleeper. A retired naval officer dreams that he is engaged in a prolonged sea fight. His daughter, who keeps house for him, and finds a difficulty in making his pension meet expenses, dreams that the new maid has dropped the laden breakfast tray down the kitchen stairs and smashed all the crockery upon it. A self-conscious young man dreams that he is watching a football match in which his college or hospital is playing. He has a police rattle in his hand, which he whirls to encourage his side. Suddenly it gets out of control, and whirls on and on by itself, making so loud a noise that the whole game stops, and spectators and players all look at him accusingly. An old gentleman dreams that his grandson, whom he had occasion to rebuke the day before, is persistently banging the door to annoy him.

All these dreams are interpretations of the original disturbance in

the road. Each one of them is a dramatisation of it in terms appropriate to the dreamer's mind; that is to say, in symbols. Each dreamer is aware of the disturbance *in terms of a personal symbolism*.

Needless to say, this is an exceedingly crude illustration, and all symbols are not so easily determined. The point I am anxious to emphasise is that symbol has originally a connection with objective reality, even though that connection be arbitrarily determined in the individual. Sometimes the individual is aware of the connection, sometimes not. Sometimes he only learns about it afterwards. For instance, a man who has been long and anxiously debating about a business choice, where two courses lie open to him, goes to sleep with the problem still unresolved. During his sleep he dreams that he is watching a fight between a lion and a tiger. The fight is long and fierce, but in the end the tiger wins decisively. Next morning the man wakes up to find that his problem is solved and his mind clearly made up as to the course to take. What has happened is that his mind has solved it symbolically during sleep. The tiger represented one choice, the lion the other. While the man watched them fight, he had no idea at all of their significance, nor any memory of his problem.

It is obvious from this that a great deal of poetry in which symbols play a part is going to be made clear for us once we can find out what the symbols stand for in the

poet's mind. It is equally obvious that a great deal of poetry is going to remain unintelligible to us, unless we can find out what the symbols stand for. This does not mean that fine poetry is ever simply a puzzle. There are criteria by which it can be detected, even if it be not immediately understood. Professor Housman, in his recent book, *The Name and Nature of Poetry*, confesses that for him the chief criterion is physical. There will always be a certain number of finely attuned minds which will respond intuitively to any poetry, however difficult, provided it be genuine. Full understanding may come later—though, according to Professor Housman, this is less important, since he contends that poetry is not the thing said, but a way of saying it: a statement which we shall have shortly to examine.

Mr. Robert Graves is the first poet or critic known to me to go boldly out for the interpretation of personal symbols, and to apply to poetry something of the technique of psycho-analysis. This he was obliged to do, since he sees the source of poetry in conflict. The few lines following are taken from his most stimulating and original book, *On English Poetry*.

The poet is consciously or unconsciously always either taking in or giving out; he hears, observes, weighs, guesses, condenses, idealizes, and the new ideas troop quietly into his mind until suddenly every now and again two of them violently quarrel and drag into the fight a group of other ideas that have been loitering about at the back of his mind for years; there is great excitement, noise and bloodshed,

with finally a reconciliation and drinks all round. The poet writes a tactful police report on the affair and there is the poem.

Or, to put it in a more sober form:—

When conflicting issues disturb his mind which in its conscious state is unable to reconcile them logically, the poet acquires the habit of self-hypnotism as practised by the witch doctors, his ancestors in poetry.

You will notice that he says self-hypnotism, *i. e.*, putting oneself to sleep, getting into the condition in which he can dream; in which the conflicting issues can dramatise themselves into symbols. Mr. Graves goes on, "He learns in self-protection to take pen and paper and let the pen solve the hitherto insoluble problem which has caused the disturbance."

I do not wish to emphasise this theory unduly, because after all it is probably only one side of the infinitely complex activity of poetic composition. But there is no doubt that sometimes it yields extraordinary results. These results often astonish the poet as much as anybody else, for he need not be, and often is not, consciously aware of the problem which his poem states or solves. I may perhaps be allowed to give an almost indecently personal example of this process from my own work. Some years ago, without understanding why, I wrote the following poem.

I turned and gave my strength to woman,
Leaving untilld the stubborn field.
Sinew and soul are gone to win her,
Slow, and most perilous, her yield.
The son I got stood up beside me,
With fire and quiet beauty filled;
He looked upon me, then he looked
Upon the field I had not tilled.

He kissed me, and went forth to labour.
Where lonely tilth and moorland meet
A gull above the ploughshare hears
The ironic song of our defeat.

When I wrote this, I saw no more than the picture and the drama which it literally presents. Why I wrote it, and what it meant, I did not discover till at least two years afterwards. I was at the time in love with a girl who grudged any attention on my part that was not given to her. She liked me to write, so long as what I wrote was addressed to her, and I foresaw uneasily that, if our lives were joined, she would become the enemy of my work, be jealous of it, or seek to turn it into channels which would be commercially profitable, and therefore to her advantage. She, then, was obviously the woman of the poem. "The stubborn field" which I left untilled was my work, from which I turned aside in order to win her. What would be the result of winning her? Children: and I foresaw my son, in whom should be transmuted the fire of her nature and the ambition of mine, standing up and mutely reproaching me for the work which I had not done, "the field I had not tilled".

The poem ends where tilth and moorland meet (moorland because I was brought up on Dartmoor - personal symbol again), with the picture of the boy singing bitterly of what has ended in the defeat of both. Defeat because I, leaving undone what I should have done, have left it for him to try and catch up, instead of going on and

surpassing me. (The gull in the poem is probably the white bird of Celtic mythology, the white bird of the soul.) This poem, as will be obvious in the light of these facts, stated with embarrassing and even brutal clearness a conflict of which I, in my intoxicated condition of mind, was only subconsciously aware. When I wrote the poem, I did not know its meaning. I saw only the picture; the symbols, the dream figures, which stood for the actual antagonists in the conflict. When poems thus conceived move us as we read them, it is because they have attained a beauty in the world of values, from which we dimly apprehend the agonies and the conflict behind them.

A far nobler illustration is the following poem by the great Irish mystic A. E. It would be safe to wager that ninety-nine readers out of a hundred would be unable to say precisely at a first reading what it meant, yet no one of sensibility could fail to realise at once that it is the shadow thrown by something significant and beautiful.

THE OUTCAST.

Sometimes when alone
At the dark close of day,
Men meet an outlawed majesty
And hurry away.
They come to the lighted house;
They talk to their dear;
They crucify the mystery
With words of good cheer.
When love and life are over,
And flight's at an end,
On the outcast majesty
They lean as a friend.

This brings us to the most important axiom of all. The finest poetry can never be translated out of its own terms.

L. A. G. STRONG

YOUNG INDIA AND THE RELIGIOUS PROBLEM

[The modern Indian phase of the age-old conflict between religions and Religion is sketched in the following article by **D. S. Ramachandra Rao, M. A., M. B. Ch. B., M. D.**, a member of the Senate of Mysore University with a distinguished career in the varied fields of education, medicine, literature and politics. During the World War, while serving on the staff of a London hospital, he carried the message of Indian culture and social ideals in lectures to the British and Colonial troops; in 1931-32, Dr. Ramachandra Rao lectured widely in the United States of America on " India's Gospel of Non-Violence and the World Peace ". His strictures on the harmful influence of creeds and dogmas are applicable far beyond the Indian situation.—EDS.]

It is common knowledge that some of the most heinous crimes, blood-curdling cruelties and unspeakable barbarities in the annals of the world have been perpetrated and justified with self-complacency in the name of religion. The world would have been happier had the monster of religious fanaticism not been let loose to work mischief among credulous people. Yet religion has been hailed as the harbinger of peace on earth and good-will to men! Sad, alas, has been the contrast between the ideal and the actual—and humanity has all along been groping in the dark, blunderingly feeling its way towards the ideal.

There has been nothing in history which religious bigotry and fanaticism have not attempted and to some extent achieved, except perhaps universal love. While coming to birth as a spiritual affair, concerning itself solely with the hearts of men, religion soon became the victim of an organisation manipulated by priestcraft. Doctrines undreamt of by the founders crept into religious belief and superstitions distorted religious practices. Even to-day many absurd

things are taught and practised in the name of religion which would be discountenanced straight away were they advocated in the furtherance of any other cause. Anything and everything is condoned on religious considerations, and highly intellectual people often hold most contradictory views and become credulous the moment they touch the religious sphere.

We are called upon to solve in this country what seems to be a world problem. We have practically all the religions of the world professed in India. It has been a common practice in this country to cry ourselves hoarse over our religious achievements. " We are a religious people and we are more righteous than the materialistic people of the West," has been our slogan both in the press and on the platform. We have deemed our political negation and economic backwardness not at all comparable with the glory of being the children of a land where faith is professed and every species of belief upheld. In spite of our servitude and humiliation we somehow have mustered courage to carry our heads high on the plea

that our religious tolerance has made India the heir of much of the religious experience of the world! For the moment we have betaken ourselves to the plane of other-worldliness and considered ourselves immensely rich in spite of heart-rending poverty on the material plane.

But the generation that gloated over the spiritual achievements of India has nearly passed away. A new generation is here. If less introspective and less sentimental than its predecessor, it is more matter-of-fact. It is swayed by modern ideas and stung with the thought of its own humiliation. It is in the grip of the present: the past does not count; the future does not hold out any hope. It scorns to draw on the credit of its ancestors and take shelter under cover of their achievements. It is madly desirous of transforming India into a modern State. Maybe it is hankering after the flesh-pots of Europe!

Impatient with the old ways of doing things it has lost faith in justice and gradual political emancipation. The hitherto fashionable programme of constitutional advancement no longer has any attraction for the more enthusiastic among the rising generation, who believe that the future of the country lies in their own hands, not in those of foreigners, however well meaning they be. They think the freedom of the country can be attained only through national unity and racial solidarity. For when the tide of nationalism rose high, and clever and honest political

manœuvring was about to clinch the issue in India's favour, did not ugly communal interests show their heads, blasting the hope of Indian freedom, for the time being at all events?

Religious fanaticism of the deepest dye has been colouring our national outlook. To the question "Who are you?" the inevitable answer in this country is "I am a Hindu, a Brahmin, a Muslim, a Christian, a Sikh, or a Parsee." The late Moulana Mohammad Ali, at the height of his nationalism, is said to have declared "I am Mohammedan first and Indian next." Some of Gandhiji's more ardent disciples interpret his sayings on Sanatana-dharma so as to claim him to be Hindu first and Indian next. How many are there among the leaders of the country who can be said to be Indians first and everything else next?

Is it any wonder then that Young India, imbued as it is with strong national spirit, has revolted against religion and its implications? That fact was brought home to me during my recent sojourn in the West. A young man travelled with me in the same compartment as far as Madras. He had been abroad and was then in service. He was quite an intelligent man, well-informed and patriotic. When I touched on the question of Indian freedom he flew into a rage and insisted that unless we do away with religion we can never hope to be a free nation. The conversation with him gave me food for reflection on my voyage. On my arrival in London I was invited to

attend a meeting of Indians resident there. Most of them were young men and women engaged in post-graduate studies, quite enamoured of European culture and realism. The second Round Table Conference was then in session with Gandhiji as the leader of the advanced section of Indian nationalism. All eyes were fixed on him, and his name and message were on the lips of every thinking man and woman in that great city. A British lady, a friend of India and quite well meaning, asked the young Indians at the meeting to suggest some constructive plan or something that would strengthen the hands of Gandhiji in his work for India's freedom. Many young men responded to the call and spoke with freedom and candour. "Be done with religion and win India's freedom," was the burden of their hopes and speeches.

A fascinating young girl spoke, with all the depth of conviction which her youth could inspire. She spoke feelingly and eloquently, decrying religious snobbery and the stupidity of the older generation of India for having thrown away through bigotry and religious inadaptability the chance of a lifetime to win their country's freedom. I met precisely the same spirit with regard to religion amongst the Indians in the United States of America. Eager, thoughtful young people voted for the destruction of every semblance of religion prior to the launching of a constructive programme with any hope of success in India.

On my return voyage a young

Sikh was on board. He kept to his typical Sikh dress just to please his father, he assured me. He was interested in photography and got acquainted with an officer whose tastes, too, lay in that direction. The latter was a Britisher, a much travelled man with an open mind on many problems. "I was once very conservative and could swear by our British institutions," confessed the ship's officer to the Sikh youth, "but I recently visited Russia and have since become a convinced Socialist. Russia is attempting something big, something wonderful: she has already achieved a great deal. Everything is sacrificed there for the well-being of the nation." "That's it. Socialism is the thing for India!" exclaimed the Sikh. "You speak of Socialism, you who dare not remove the turban to humour your orthodox parents?" retorted the ship's officer. "Russian Socialism is of a thoroughgoing kind; it is drastic. Socialism has no chance in India so long as religion makes the people fly at each other's throats. You are at best in a state of armed neutrality. Religion must go out for freedom to come in." My young Sikh friend took it in. The next morning he started discussion with a Hindu student about the possibility of banishing religion from his Motherland! These are just a few instances to show which way the wind is blowing.

That the finest elements of the race should rebel against orthodoxy is indeed a hopeful sign. To save the situation, we must be prepared to reckon with facts. Young

India is bent on creating a new India. The Young Congress Party of the Punjab has recently issued a manifesto on the eve of forming a new National Party. "Orthodox fanaticism and bigotry hold sway in social and religious spheres, and selfishness, corruption and chicanery hold sway in economic and political spheres. We shall wage ruthless war against all these evils and shall have no rest till we have destroyed them." The manifesto needs no comment. What is true of the Punjab is true of the rest of India.

Young India is wide awake: its imagination has been fired and its heart stirred. The steel of subjection has entered into its soul. It is determined to be free. It has realised that religion, as practised in India to-day, stands in the way of national solidarity, thwarting the attainment of the goal. Therefore it declares in unequivocal terms, "Down with religion: up with the nation!"

If the truth be confessed, religion has marred India but it has also made her! Some of India's priceless treasures are to be found in her religious thought and literature. It would be a national calamity to lose them for either economic gain or political advance-

ment. Young India must be made to see that it is the *excrescences* on religion and the *interpretations* of its doctrines that cause the present-day chaos—and that at heart religion is sound.

Religion must be reformed. Young India will not be satisfied unless a true critical spirit pervades the religious sphere, and emphasis is laid on ethical conduct rather than on verbal precept, empty speculation and degrading ritualism. Some religious genius, actuated by the wonderful tolerant spirit of the great Akbar, should dominate Indian national life. The days of orthodoxy are numbered here as elsewhere. But the heterodox reformers are treading slippery ground. They are not sure of their goal. Only the spirit of reason and enlightenment can save the situation.

From the dawn of history India has laboriously, patiently and enthusiastically sought after Truth. Religion is a way of apprehending Truth. And Truth shall make India free. If religions have been breaking India to pieces, irreligion cannot, surely, remake her. It will set ablaze the thousand and one inhumanities that have long been smouldering under the ashes of religions. India needs to-day less of religions, but more of Religion.

D. S. RAMACHANDRA RAO

MITHRAISM AND CHRISTIANITY

[Until recently **Dr. F. Saxl**, was Honorary Professor of the History of Art at the University of Hamburg. He has been the Director of the Warburg Institute now located in London. He hails from Germany, is a recognized authority on the subject he writes upon, and is the author of a volume on Mithra and another on the forms of artistic expression in late paganism and early Christianity.

The birth of the Mysteries of Mithra is lost in antiquity ; how exactly they originated in old Iran and came to occupy so important a place is not certainly known. Ages elapsed before they reached Europe. Doubtless many changes and corruptions took place during the travel and in the passage of centuries. The reader should keep the fact in mind that this article deals with the Mysteries as they were enacted in the last period—that of their decline and death.—EDS.]

It is only a short time ago that the first important Mithraic sanctuary was excavated on Asiatic soil. This seems strange considering that Mithra was a god of the great Asiatic-Indo-Germanic age. It appears less strange in view of the fact that Mithraism developed as a world historical power only on entering European territory at the beginning of the Christian era. The development of Mithraism therefore ran parallel to that of Christianity, both originating in the East, both expanding at the same time and in the same area, round the Mediterranean basin during the later periods of ancient civilisation. Both were the heirs of Hellenism—they contended for world sovereignty with each other.

This circumstance seems inconceivable to-day. It seems inconceivable that our world, now become Christian and ignorant of bloody immolation, should have become Mithraic and subject to the sacrifice of the bull god.

It may seem useless to speculate on the consequences of such a victory of Mithra over Christ—our

conception of history will not allow events to be imagined different from what they actually were, but it certainly is not useless, nay, it is even necessary for our thinking and our understanding of life, to ask how it has come to pass that Christianity became the religion of Europe and of a great part of the remaining world down to this day. What were the causes of its victory ? In order to answer satisfactorily this difficult question we ought to try and understand the essence of Mithraism. It is difficult to do this concisely ; the more so as the conceptions of its character, even those of the most expert scholars, are still indistinct. Mithraism was a mystery religion which bound its adherents to utter secrecy, and so faithfully did they fulfil this obligation that the contents of their ritual books have been lost almost completely. What we know of them is in the main part owing to the writings of their opponents. Only one other source is open to us—a very relevant one, it is true—the pictorial monuments which the archaeologist's spade has

brought to light. A number of sanctuaries, situated in natural or artificial grottoes, have been found and, in them, numerous inscriptions, statues and reliefs. These impart certain information which may be supplemented by what we know from the writings of religious adversaries. Each sanctuary contains a large relief, round which the cult gravitated, and which is sometimes arranged after the manner of a triumphal arch. It had a large representation in the centre, smaller pictures at the sides. These representations may be looked upon as the Bible of the Mithraic believers. Many copies of these reliefs have come down to us, in Asia Minor, Africa, on the Balkan peninsula, in Hungary, Italy, Germany, France, England, etc. We must try to "read" them, in order to understand the Mithraic faith.

In the centrepiece Mithra is seen kneeling on the collapsing bull. He has stabbed the animal with a dagger and now turns his full glance towards the faithful who approach his altar. Mithra by his deed has altered the face of the world. The scene takes place in the world-cave: in the womb of the world, over which the Zodiac spans its vault, Mithra slew the bull; the picture shows the kind of miracle that was performed here: from the dying animal's tail grows the ear of corn, from the dark night of the world-cave creation rises towards the light.

But the evil one lies in ambush wishing to prevent the creation of

good. The scorpion raises itself from the soil and poisons the seed of the dying bull.

The belief in this mythical genesis must have formed the centre of Mithraic piety. This may seem strange for an age which witnessed the rise of Christianity, an age in which ethical demands were of paramount importance, in which all religious and philosophical leaders endeavoured to direct their followers from primitive pagan belief, from ethical indifference, towards a moral conception of life.

The Mithraic religion, too, is, indeed, a religion which puts ethics in the foreground. The traditional altars and pictures were not only meant to be taken in their literal sense. The priests knew how to give a moral interpretation to the images which they placed before the eyes of the faithful. This is certain. But it remains uncertain how they interpreted each detail. In order to understand the centre scene just described, the scenes arranged round it ought also to be understood.

The series begins with a group of representations relating to the primeval age of the world. In the beginning chaos reigned, then came the marriage of the heavens and earth. Old god Saturn delivers his rulership to his son, who repels the attack of the evil forces. A new phase of the world dawns. During this period Mithra is born. He rises from out of a stone in miraculous birth. He holds in one hand the dagger with which he will slay the bull, in the other a torch, symbol of his luminous being.

In a hut rests the heavenly bull, the young god creeps near, he steals from the heavens the bull, the strong animal, the symbol of fertility. The bull tries to escape but Mithra hangs on to the struggling beast. He grasps him with Herculean force, and drags him from the heavens, down into the darkness of the world-cave. At the Sun-God's command, who sends him the raven as his messenger, he kills the bull hereby creating life. After this struggle comes his ascension. Mithra joins the Sun-God in his flight to heaven, and they feast together. He is now Mithra-Helios.

This, in a few words, is the content of this pictorial series. In another group of monuments Mithra is shown pouring the holy fluid over the head of a faithful follower, whose soul is led across the water and who feasts with Mithra at the celestial table.

It is the history of world-creation and world-salvation round which Mithraic pietv centres. But this creation of the world differs widely from the one in the Old Testament or from the genesis myths of the early Greek poets. There is certainly a natural significance in the creation of the floral growth in a dark cave but such a complicated myth as the one narrated on these reliefs would scarcely be needed in order to symbolize the simple fact that plants grow towards the light, from the dark lap of the earth. What deeper significance, then, lies in Mithra's carrying the bull from the heavens into the cave,

where still the seed of the slain animal is poisoned by the scorpion? If we want to find an interpretation of the myth which the priests of Mithra offered to their followers we ought to consider that Mithraism as a religion originated in Persia, was brought to the West by Persian priests, and that even on European soil the holy books of their cult were read in the Persian language. Persia is the land of ethical dualism, the land of Ormuzd and Ahriman; both good and evil, are divine principles. This dualism is also evident in Mithraism. Mithra is the god of goodness, he fetches from on high the heavenly bull whose seed envelops the atoms of light, and kills him so that luminous life be created on earth. Evil, in the shape of the scorpion, however, poisons what is being created in light, and thereby man is given his task. As a soldier of the God of Light he must in perpetual strife fight for the deliverance of the atoms of light. Then, at the end of time, ascension to heaven and the feast of the blessed will be his lot.

This cult offered man the magic means by which he might attain salvation. Only by degrees did the priests reveal the myth and its significance. Whoever wanted to be initiated had to give proofs of his perseverance, before the depths of secret knowledge were disclosed to him. Strange banquets destined to prepare the faithful for the participation of the future feast of the blessed were arranged, and the guests had to serve the priests.

Strange, also, were the names and characters of the ranks of the initiated—the Raven, the Persian, the Soldier, the Sun's Runner, etc. Sacrifices were made before the cult image of the god in the subterranean cave; the way to the altar was miraculous, symbolizing the seven spheres, the way of the planets through which Mithra had ascended after his deed and through which the faithful hoped to ascend to the holy place with his help.

At the end of the ages a great conflagration will occur, a miraculous bull will reappear on earth, Mithra will resurrect the dead, the good will be separated from the wicked, the celestial bull will be sacrificed, and Mithra will offer the good the drink of immortality mixed of wine and the bull's fat. Ormuzd drops a fire which devours the wicked, Ahriman and his unclean demons will perish and an era of perfect bliss will begin for the rejuvenated world.

Why was it that this stirring religion succumbed in its struggle with Christianity though stimulating the unfolding of man's moral forces and promising him salvation? Why did it succumb, since it doubtless offered him much of that which distinguished Christianity from the other pagan religions? Mithra like Christ was a mediator between the Almighty and man. Mithraism like Christianity included in its teachings a saint's life, relating the god's childhood, his miracles and his ascension. Both religions centre round the idea of sacrifice, both imparted to their followers a lore of the creation and

the end of the world, culminating in final salvation. In both religions a preparatory instruction of the novice was essential, in both sacred banquets were held as a magic means by which salvation was attained.

The difference between their two characters perhaps emerges clearest when their attitudes towards the idea of sacrifice are considered. In Mithraism the god, after a hard struggle, sacrifices the celestial bull, the receptacle of force and light, in order to introduce good into the world below. But by entering the world the bull becomes subject to evil. A moral life, together with the practice of magic rites taught by the Mithraic cult, enables the believer to ascend to light after his death. Mithras is the mediating god, he warrants salvation.

In Christianity the intervening god also descends to earth. But he does not sacrifice another luminous being: by offering himself as a victim he redeems mankind from sin by his death. Mithra is, in character, a hero in the sense in which the Greeks understood the word; from beginning to end there is no break in his heroic nature. Christ on the other hand, is no mere hero, but an historical figure, born of the Virgin Mary in the manger at Bethlehem, the son of man, who suffers a martyr's death; yet Christ from the beginning is also deity, supreme judge at the end of days. Christ—and this is an essential feature of Christianity—is both true man on earth and true god.

Seen from this angle the Mithraic world conception cannot but range as one among the other pagan hero-worshipping religions, and Christianity dissociates itself from it as entirely different. For Christ is akin to the worshipper and yet in his divine aloofness may exact humility such as no hero of Mithra's kind would ever be able to call forth. Christ died in his self-sacrifice to redeem men from sin; Mithra was victorious in his heroic fight with a wild beast, in order to fill creation with light. Mithra may be looked upon as a descendant of Hercules wrestling with bulls, lions and hydras, even if his struggle has a different significance. The figure of Jesus Christ surpasses all those of ancient gods and animal-fighting heroes.

Another feature that may serve to show the essential difference between the two religions is their cosmology. Mithra creates an earthly world by slaying the bull. The legend of the cult god cannot be separated from the cosmological myth. Christianity, on the other hand, was able to preface Christ's teachings by the biblical lore of world-creation without altering any points in it. Mithra is therefore inseparably connected with

the multifarious life on earth. He is, unlike Christ, the creator of terrestrial things. He is the god of the earth's plants and animals, god of fertility, of the sacred soil, like the Greek gods; he resembles the nymphs to whom likewise the grottoes were consecrated and the waters. Christ's divinity is utterly remote from all mere earthly things. His preaching tended to free man from the worries and cares of earthly possessions, nay, even from all interest in them. The bull, symbol of fertility, is incompatible with Christian piety even if allegorically interpreted. Bread is the symbol of Christ's body, wine symbol of his blood. For Christianity works towards the release of man from the rule of sensuality, from the bull-like part of his nature. It directs his soul to the recognition of his sinfulness and to the love of his redeemer. It had the power to conquer because it left behind all that is sensually heroic; because to Christianity, as the heir of Judaism and Greek philosophy, worship meant adoration in the Spirit, not bloody sacrifice, since its deity was no hero, but true god who as true man lived and suffered.

F. SAXL.

THE LION OF THE CABBALAH

[Dr. Cecil Roth, the distinguished historian who contributed to our October, 1934, issue an arresting article on "The Nazi Delusion: Aryan Versus Semitic," here sketches the picturesque and significant figure of Rabbi Luria or Loria of sixteenth-century Palestine. A mystic who found a hidden beauty even under the dead letter of ritualism, the Lion of the Cabbalah taught many doctrines of the Ancient East.—EDS.]

It was the darkest hour in Jewish history. The crowning tragedy of the expulsion from Spain had just taken place, in 1492, turning tens of thousands of homeless wanderers into an unfriendly world. As to-day, many of the exiles directed their footsteps towards Palestine, the Holy Land, there re-establishing the settlement which had been all but extinct since the period of the Crusades. From the crushing vicissitudes of this world, they sought refuge in the contemplation of the mysteries of the next. Assuredly, the recent catastrophes had been the veritable "pangs of the Messiah"—the darkest hour which proved that dawn was near. With greater singleness of purpose than ever before, they turned their attention to the study of the *Zohar* and the kindred esoteric literature. Gradually, the choicer spirits became concentrated in the "Holy City" of Safed in Upper Galilee—the scene of the terrestrial activity, fourteen centuries before, of Rabbi Simeon ben Jochai,* reputed author of the *Zohar*, "The Book of Splendour". Here there grew up the strangest, strictest, maddest, most amazing community in Jewish

history: a veritable Congregation of the Saints, recruited by eager mystics from every corner of Asia and Europe, passing twenty-four hours of every day in the study of the Holy Cabbalah, and maintaining in perpetuity the spirit of a revivalist camp. This was the scene of the activity of the Lion of the Cabbalah.

Rabbi Isaac Luria was born in 1534 in Jerusalem, of German parents.† While he was still a child, his father died, and he was sent to Cairo to be brought up by his uncle, Mordecai Frances, a wealthy tax-farmer. He shewed such promise in his studies that, at the age of fifteen, he was placed beyond the reach of worldly worry by being married to his cousin. From the study of the *Talmud* and kindred texts, he passed to that of the *Zohar*—the *Talmud* (as it were) of the mystics.

Its secrets appeared to him too profound to harmonise with the busy life of a great city. Affected, it would almost seem, by the traditional atmosphere of the country from early Christian days, he adopted the life of a hermit—a phenomenon almost unknown otherwise

*See Geoffrey West's study of this great Rabbi in THE ARYAN PATH for November, 1932.—EDS. Hence the surname *Ashkenazi*, or German. The name *Avi*, or Lion, is formed by the initials *Ashkenazi Rabbi Isaac*.

in Jewish history. For seven years, he lived in a hut on the banks of the Nile, pondering upon the mysteries of the sacred text. His family saw him only on the Sabbath, when he would speak to them seldom and allow no word to pass his lips excepting in the Holy Tongue. But, in his solitude, he was not alone. The prophet Elijah (he who had not known the taste of death and who, according to Jewish doctrine, was always walking abroad on the earth) visited him regularly and taught him the remoter aspects of esoteric doctrine. And, while he slept, his soul was taken up into heaven and was there initiated into the sublimest secrets of creation in the sublunar academies of Rabbi Simeon ben Jochai and other great teachers of the past.

In 1569, when he was in his thirty-fifth year, the call of the Holy Land became too strong for Luria to resist. He removed to Jerusalem, and thence (finding the prevailing atmosphere unsympathetic) to Safed. His presence gave fresh life to the circle of mystics assembled there, all of whom eagerly drank in his teaching. He divided them into two categories—the novices, to whom he expounded the elementary Cabbalah on the basis of the ordinary text-books; and the initiates, to whom he divulged the secret teachings and practical invocations which had been revealed to him from heaven. To this category belonged Solomon Alkabiz, the most delicate poet of his day; Joseph Caro, the famous legalist; and many another. His fa-

vourite disciple, however, was Hayim Vital, a refugee from the recent expulsion from southern Italy, who, according to his master, possessed a soul which had not been soiled by the sin of primeval man.

The new teacher's fame rapidly spread. Pupils came from as far afield as Italy or Bohemia, and filled the courts of Safed with their mystical chants. On Friday evening, the members of the circle confessed their sins one to the other. On the Sabbath, the Master dressed himself from head to foot in white, and wore a four-fold garment, symbolising the four letters of the Ineffable Name. Wonderful stories were told of his miraculous powers. He could understand, men said, even the speech of birds and beasts and plants. He could recognise from a man's face the nature of his soul. A scent such as that of the Garden of Eden was wafted from his table. He was reputed to be the Messiah of the tribe of Joseph, whose coming was to prepare the way for that of the Messiah of the tribe of Judah.

His teaching was not confined to the House of Study. He disclosed his most profound doctrines to the small circle of his elect while walking in the countryside, or visiting with them the tomb of Rabbi Simeon ben Jochai, the precise position of which had been miraculously disclosed to them.

His system was a remarkable expansion of the neo-Platonic doctrines of the *Zohar*. He developed to the full the conception

of the Emanations (*Sephirot*), the Agencies (*Purzufim*) and the primeval Infinity (*En Sof*), the contraction of which into Itself brought about the existence of the finite world. But his teaching was not purely theoretical. It covered every aspect of human life and activity. The mechanical observances prescribed by Jewish tradition were imbued by him with a new importance. Every commandment, every fulfilment, had its esoteric significance. Every prayer, and every word in every prayer, had in addition to its literal interpretation a special mystical meaning, embodying the Divine attributes and appellations. Certain combinations of the Divine name might have miraculous results. Even marital intercourse attained a special dignity and importance of its own, symbolising the different functions of the male and female principles in the cosmogony.

The Master differentiated between the five different aspects of the human soul, and taught not only metempsychosis, or the migration of souls, but also the "impregnation" of two souls, under certain circumstances, in one body. All human souls, according to him, were created together with Adam, and the final Redemption was not to come about until they had all fulfilled their function. As a logical consequence, misuse or thwarting of the human generative powers became one of the greatest of all possible sins to those who followed his teachings.

Luria's activity at Safed lasted for barely four years. On August

5th, 1572, he died, at the early age of thirty-eight. His active career had been incredibly brief. But, in that short space of time, he impressed his personality indelibly on the history of Judaism. His spirit continued to be active. He was said, indeed, to continue to divulge the mysteries of his teaching to his disciples in visions, long after his death; and each Friday night he was reported to have mystical communion with his wife, just as he had done during his lifetime.

He had written nothing: his activity had been confined to the spoken word. However, his favourite pupil, Hayim Vital Calabrese, became his Master's literary executor, prophet, and biographer. He embodied the new doctrines in a succession of works, based upon the notes of the Master's lectures which various of the disciples had preserved. The most important of these was the famous *Ez Hayim*, the "Tree of Life". This was permitted to circulate only in manuscript. Each one of the Disciples had to bind himself by oath not to allow a copy to be made for a foreign country. Thus the supremacy of Safed in the world of mysticism continued unquestioned for a long time: and the new doctrines retained the additional attraction of being difficult of access. Nevertheless, though these handbooks were printed for the first time only in the eighteenth century, the teaching which they embodied speedily permeated the Jewish world through and through, giving fresh life to

old observances, and enriching Jewish literature with fresh prayers, hymns, and conceptions. It was to these that the pseudo-Messianic movement of Sabbetai Zevi in the seventeenth century largely owed its being, as well as the Chassidic revival of the eighteenth and the activities of the many charlatans and saints who claimed to be "Masters of the Name," able to work wonders through the secret of the Tetragrammaton. Even to-day, the name of the Lion of the Cabbalah is one to conjure with, literally, in the Jewish communities of the Orient: and the Fifth of Ab is still widely observed as a religious celebration, with its own special rite of prayer, as the anniversary of his death.

In Jewish life generally, the new teaching was supremely important: and its effects have not worn away, fortunately, even amongst the intellectually "emancipated" Jewries of the West, who have attempted to divorce mysticism from religion. The "Tree of Life" and half a dozen other works truly or falsely attributed to the Master circulated throughout the Diaspora in the century following his death. The effect which they had on Jewish practice and on the theory which inspired it was immense. All the minutiae of religious observance, every letter of the liturgy, every action of daily life, became infused with a new esoteric significance—occasionally

bordering upon the superstitious, but often beautiful and sometimes profound.

The dicta of the *Ari* were copied and studied more universally and with greater devotion than those of Maimonides. In distant Ghettoes, eager students attempted to determine, on the basis of the calculation which he had left, precisely when the Redemption might be expected. New prayers and devotions were composed, some of remarkable beauty, accentuating the spiritual significance of observances which had become mechanical. The tendency is perhaps against the prevailing spirit of the twentieth century, but it is impossible to belittle the effect which it exercised upon the life of three hundred years ago. It was the most vital movement that had come from Palestine since the days of the Second Temple. The modern rationalists who sneer at the tendency do not realise what comfort it brought to their fathers in the long nightmare of the Ghetto, how it consoled them for the vicissitudes of daily life, how it made mechanical observances instinct with beauty, with hope, even with divinity.

In an evaluation of the important creative forces of Jewish life in the past, by the side of the prophets and legislators and singers and sages, the name of the Lion of the Cabbala deserves an honoured place.

CECIL ROTH

ON TEACHING

[J. D. Beresford's reflections on Teaching and Teachers are pertinent in these days when genuine spiritual Teachers are as hard to find as pseudo-gurus and false teaching are to avoid. It is necessary to remember that "the Guru is the guide or the readjuster and may not always combine the function of teacher with it". Madame H. P. Blavatsky was the first in modern times, to speak openly about the institution of the Guru; even in India it had become degraded; to raise it to its proper height she wrote at length on this subject; below we print a list she offered as qualifications for real Chelaship in her *Raja Yoga or Occultism*, p. 2:—

1. Perfect physical health;
2. Absolute mental and physical purity;
3. Unselfishness of purpose; universal charity; pity for all animate beings;
4. Truthfulness and unswerving faith in the law of Karma, independent of any power in nature that could interfere: a law whose course is not to be obstructed by any agency, not to be caused to deviate by prayer or propitiatory exoteric ceremonies;
5. A courage undaunted in every emergency, even by peril to life;
6. An intuitional perception of one's being the vehicle of the manifested Avalokitesvara or Divine Atman (Spirit);
7. Calm indifference for, but a just appreciation of everything that constitutes the objective and transitory world, in its relation with, and to, the invisible regions.

Such, at the least, must have been the recommendations of one aspiring to perfect Chelaship. With the sole exception of the 1st, which in rare and exceptional cases might have been modified, each one of these points has been invariably insisted upon, and all must have been more or less developed in the inner nature by the Chelas UNHELPED EXERTIONS, before he could be actually put to the test.]

In the East, the Chela has his Guru to whom he can go for advice and direction. In Europe we have no such reliable guides, and the seeker must find his own way with whatever help he may be able to obtain from his fellow pilgrims. This lack of a teacher is a great handicap, although not for those reasons which will first occur to the uninitiated.

My own experience has been very limited, but it happens now and again that I am asked for a direction, which I have neither the understanding nor the authority to give. And since nearly all those who have asked me to show them

the road are under a general misconception as to the functions of the Guru in relation to his Chela, it may be that readers of THE ARYAN PATH will be able to profit by my experience.

A common delusion of the Western European with regard to the search after wisdom, is that it can be learned as a lesson is learned at school. Many people appear to believe that the truth may be stated in language comprehensible to the multitude, as a series of definitions, with set rules for the guidance of conduct and some kind of regime for acquiring holiness.

Seekers of this kind—and many

of them are genuine seekers in whom the desire for truth has a spiritual and not an intellectual origin—go from religion to religion in their hopeless search for the desired satisfaction. They are to be found in Theosophical organizations and in new cults of various kinds, listening to preachers, reading relevant literature, accepting and trying to practise principles of conduct, always in the hope that revelation will come in some formula of words that they will be able to understand with the mind. After a time such seekers as these will either transfer their allegiance to another school of thought, or settle down into a mechanical acceptance of some not too arduous creed, in the belief that that is all that is necessary.

In the West there are no capable teachers for such people as these, nor would they be accepted as Chelas by any Guru in the East. Nevertheless it seems to me that they might be helped, or at least saved from much vain effort, if they could rid themselves of the primary delusion that wisdom can be passed on from one individual to another as are the facts of ordinary education.

Yet, if that were possible, the laws of Karma would have no meaning, for they imply beyond all possible question that the education of the soul comes only by experience. And if we tried to state as briefly as possible in what that education consists, the answer might be: In the liberation of the spirit—a task only to be accomplished by every man for himself.

Wherefore, the principle of Karma contains the lesson that there is no short cut to the acquisition of wisdom, and that we cannot profit by the experience, nor even greatly by the teaching, of another.

How personal and individual is the acquisition of that knowledge which alone is valuable for what we commonly call the "formation of character," can be exemplified by the relations of parent and child. There are many things that the father cannot, out of his own experience, teach the son. Each generation has to make its same mistakes, for until it has made them and learnt, it may be by suffering, the value of the relevant lesson, it will remain as a thing taught by rote and have no influence on the liberation of the spirit.

This may seem a tragedy to many parents, but the modern European has little wisdom in the training of children. He does not recognise the difference between development of the character and education for ordinary traffic with the world; nor realise that each child has an individual personality for which certain experiences are necessary if it is to be developed. The father, whether he has made a happy or an unhappy marriage, cannot pass on the knowledge gained by that experience to his son. What was right for the one may be quite wrong for the other. Such things cannot be taught, even by the wisest parent, or even, as I began by saying, by the wisest teacher.

It may appear from this that our

lack of teachers in the West is not the handicap I declared it to be. If wisdom cannot be taught by word of mouth, of what use, it will be asked, is the Guru to the Chela? I will attempt to suggest an answer to that question by pointing out, in the first place, that a Chela must be qualified before he is accepted for discipleship. Unless he has already reached a certain stage of development, the Guru can teach him nothing. Could the most gifted schoolmaster teach an ignorant pupil the processes of advanced mathematics? When Christ said: "He that hath ears to hear, let him hear," He knew, as the following verses show, that He was speaking to those who were spiritually deaf. And to them, as the history of the world shows all too clearly, the wisdom of the teacher appears as foolishness.

But having acknowledged this, we may go on to consider the methods of the teacher with those who have already made some progress on the road to wisdom. His function is largely that of a guide. The disciple must find his own way, but he may be warned of blind alleys and difficult paths. Sometimes he may be deliberately sent on such hopeless journeys in order that he may get personal experience of their dangers, and he will have to face the *impasse* until he learns for himself the means to overcome it. In these things the task of the teacher is to

indicate the difficulty and perhaps to outline the process by which it may be overcome; but he can give no instruction as to how it may be avoided. The disciple must, by his own effort, win each of the seven golden keys. "The Teacher can but point the way. The Path is one for all, the means to reach the goal must vary with the Pilgrims."*

There is, however, another way in which the disciple may obtain help from the teacher, namely, by gathering from him something of the courage and strength that he radiates. In that communion the disciple will find encouragement and spiritual peace. He will renew his faith in the presence of one who has trodden the path before him, finding in that example a proof that he is on the right way. Yet even that peace and encouragement in communion will not be his until he has already learnt much for himself and is able to recognise the truths of the spirit. To those who have no knowledge save that of the mind, the teacher will appear as other men. By them he may be condemned as a charlatan, since the physical proofs demanded will be refused. They will ask for a sign and no sign shall be given unto them.

Another instance of the pilgrim's inability to progress until he finds for himself and in himself the desired knowledge, is provided by the reading of such books† as the

* *The Voice of The Silence.*

† The New Testament is unfortunately the least reliable of these, the letter being dependent on the memory of those who were not very far advanced in soul-wisdom. But the whole *spirit* of Christ's teaching derives from and is consonant with that in the other two books referred to.

Bhagavad-Gita, *The Voice of the Silence*, or various passages in the Four Gospels. He may make a careful study of the teaching of these books, he may find truth after truth confirmed by reference from one to the other, but none of them will become living and urgent until he rediscovers it in his own spirit. Until the disciple makes that discovery, his learning will remain mechanical and fruitless. Just so might the layman learn by heart the symbols of a mathematical equation without any understanding of their significance.

I have dared to speak with a certain authority on this because I am writing out of personal experience. I know how I have read without understanding, accepting the letter but with no realisation of its inner meaning, and how having made the discovery of truth within the self, what I have read has suddenly leaped to life with a great power of illumination.

Let me take an instance to make my meaning clearer. What I have so far written in this article represents a patient rediscovery by myself of one aspect of truth, summed up in the realisation that there are many things, and those the most important in life, that we cannot learn from another. Yet all I have said here has been said again and again in the past. In the *Bhagavad-Gita*, you will read: "These temporal bodies are declared to belong to the eternal lord of the body, imperishable and immeasurable." In *The Voice of the Silence*: "In order to become

the KNOWER of ALL SELF, thou hast first of SELF to be the knower." In the New Testament: "The Kingdom of God is within you." But all such sayings will remain a form of words until the realisation of their inner meaning is found for each disciple in his own spirit.

I began by saying that in Europe we have no great teachers in whose advice we can confidently trust, and if we had them they would not be understood except by the very few. But those who are yet only at the beginning of the way may be able to give a little help to the kind of seeker described in my third paragraph. We can begin, for example, with the warning that is the principal subject of this article and go on from that with various suggestions applicable to those who have to live among the distractions of modern civilisation, and burdened with personal responsibilities.

In the majority, perhaps in all, of those who are at the very outset of the quest, the desire for separation must be diverted into another channel. This longing for solitude may be taken as an indication of a developing spiritual urgency, but if it is indulged there will be no progress. In our present state of Western development we have to learn that "By devotion each to his own work, every man gains true success." The way of stern asceticism and solitude will lead us nowhither. "Renunciation* and union through works both make for the supreme goal; but of these

* *Bhagavad-Gita*, Book V.

two union through works is more excellent than renunciation of works." This does not imply that there are not many renunciations to be made by those who follow the way of union through works, which is the way of love, of the search for the One in the many. But such renunciations are not made by a determined effort of will but by the longing for the satisfactions of the spirit, a longing that will in time convert those oppositions of the mind and body which work by the continual suggestion to choose that mode of life most conducive to their own gratification.

This, however, is no more than a beginning which represents the first recognition of that call of the Spirit described in Biblical phrase as "the hunger and thirst after righteousness". For a time, maybe, those to whom this recognition has come may feel a sense of inner peace, may perhaps believe that no more is necessary than the cultivation of a feeling of tolerance and good-will for all mankind. But there must be no pause at this critical point, for unless the everlasting search is actively prosecuted, that sense of peace will presently fade, and the seeker realise

that he is slipping back into old habits of thought, which will rise as an encroaching mist to obscure the vision that may fade as a present guide, even though it can never be forgotten.

But if, at this critical stage, the seeker is prepared for a perpetual renewal of effort, if he will continually hold in his mind the desire for consecration to the great service of humanity by the sacrifice of personal pride and self-love, he will inevitably find his teacher at last. Even at the outset he will attract to himself those fellow-pilgrims who are striving to follow the same path, and among them he may find one, here and there, older than himself in soul-wisdom, from whom he may gather help and encouragement. He will be, in short, steadily fitting himself for chelaship, and when he is qualified, no matter in what country he is living, he will find his Guru, not by chance nor by deliberate search, but as a necessary fulfilment of his spiritual condition, in accordance with the Law of Karma. Wherefore we may be sure that if a great Teacher is not known to us in Europe, it is because we are not yet qualified to be His disciples.

J. D. BERESFORD

ALCHEMY

THE BASAL PRINCIPLE OF HINDUISM

[P. Narayana Goud, M. A., B. Sc. (Edin.), Lecturer in Chemistry at Rajahmundry College, has been fascinated since his student days by the desire to find the scientific truths and experimental results which he felt convinced the Vedic mantras and mythology present in veiled language. He has made a study of the writings of Indian alchemists, and believes he has found the clue to the mystical significance of Yajna and Dharma in the Vedas.—Eds.]

Alchemy is an art which has for its end the production of the Elixir of Life. This Elixir is also called the Stone of Wisdom or the Philosopher's Stone, not because it is actually a stone but because, being made of mercury, it withstands the action of heat and remains without volatilising in much the same way as a stone. It is used by the alchemists to bring about perfection in animate as well as inanimate bodies. When internally administered as medicine it is claimed to exhibit the power to cure all ills which flesh is heir to, and to place its possessor in command of not only health and longevity but also wealth and material prosperity. Nay, by its use the alchemists claimed to attain communion with the Ultimate Reality of the Universe, and thus the ability to display extraordinary powers such as knowledge of the past, present and future, and to effect miracles, characteristic of the sublime state of self-realization indicated in Hindu religious literature.

Hinduism is the popular yet mystical embodiment of the practices, processes and doctrines of alchemy. Hence it holds out the prospect of material and spiritual prosperity to its followers.

It presents the *laukika* or *paramâthika* aspect according as it delineates the way to material or spiritual prosperity. There is, however, only one ideal, the alchemist's ideal of attaining perfection in the realms of matter and spirit, running through these two aspects, the progression through the *laukika* phase serving in any general case as a prerequisite to obtaining the *paramâthika*. This view of Hinduism enables one to draw from its two aspects all the clues necessary to the successful performance of alchemy and the acquirement and utilization of the Philosopher's Stone.

Superficial observation does not reveal this inner significance of, or the interrelation between, the *laukika* and *paramâthika* aspects. Thus the *laukika* aspect has been diversely interpreted as paganism, animism, polytheism, idolatry etc., according to the particular viewpoint of the interpreter. The very existence of these various interpretations shows that none of them represents the actual truth. It is only by the application of the scientific method of interpretation indicated by the ancients themselves, who have studiously garbed their alchemical knowledge in

myth and mystery, that it is at all possible to get at the hidden meaning. No assumptions are needed in this method: one has only to use the "yoga" or root meaning of the words and expressions employed, whatever may be their "*rûdhi*" or commonplace meaning. Studied in this way, the various factors of the *laukika* aspect, presenting externally great divergences, coalesce into symbols of the hidden alchemical lore.

The fundamentals of the *laukika* aspect are incorporated in the Vedas, the Sutras, the Puranas, etc. It is the translation of the ideas in the Vedic and allied literature into realistic art presentment that is now seen as idolatry, polytheism, creeds and castes, ceremonials and festivals and seemingly childish superstitions which, owing to our failure to discern the underlying chain of alchemical processes, appear to be incompatible with the high state of perfection anticipated in the *paramârthika* aspect, and to which no consistent explanation can be given in terms other than of alchemy. The *Pûrvamîmâmsa* leads one to the inevitable conclusion that Yajna is the ancient name for the alchemical art. Those who successfully perform Yajna and secure Amritam or the Elixir of Life enjoy all the privileges of the heavenly life, such as freedom from want, disease and even death. The Veda reveals *dharma* or the set of natural processes and occurrences that operate in the alchemical art. A mastery of this *dharma* leads the adept to the attainment of *artha*,

kâma and ultimately *Môksha* or Self-realization. To mark out the way for the fulfilment of this fourfold object of human desire is the purpose of Hinduism both in its *laukika* and *paramârthika* aspects: and the delineation of the alchemical process, during which *dharma* manifests itself, is the principal function of the Veda and the Yajna.

But because this knowledge of Yajna is serviceable for enormous good or evil, the Veda is so written as not to reveal itself to the profane. However, when it is properly understood it will be seen that it defines, describes and elucidates the Panchâkshari—Astâkshari sesame. The Panchâkshari is not the "five letters"—*Sivayanamah*; it represents the five everlasting substances, the Panchabhûtas, which are indispensable in the building up of the alchemical world which furnishes the Elixir of Life.

The purpose of the organizers of Hinduism was, therefore, to create a system which envelops this *dharma* and presents the Yajna in a popular way, so that any individual who earnestly endeavours to achieve the fourfold purushârthas—*dharma*, *artha*, *kâma* and *môksha*—will find the necessary indications and directions in the various factors of its *laukika* and *paramârthika* aspects. Here then is the proper outlook for the critic of Hinduism.

The idolatry, the mythology, the ceremonials, the festivals and all the other characteristics of Hinduism are but popular representations and observances of the Panch-

ākshari and the Yajna. In the Hindu temple we generally observe the worship of either Siva or Vishnu. All religious worship is simply an imitative performance symbolic of the processes and operations of the alchemical art. Siva is represented emblematically by the Lingam. He is depicted in association with serpents, the bull, the trident, the Ganga and the crescent moon. These symbols have been placed in the picture by the alchemist to suggest the ideas or substances involved in their art. Traditionally the Lingam is understood to signify mercury; for the latter is generally spoken of as Sivabeeja, which springs from the Lingam. The fact that serpents are represented as binding the limbs of Siva's entire body conveys the idea that mercury is bound by the substance symbolised by the serpent. This latter is, therefore, one of the reagents required in the art. Similarly the substances symbolised by the trident, the bull, the Ganga and the moon find employment in the art in their respective reagent capacities. The aggregate effect of these various reagents and their interactions is the production of Soma, in which mercury is present in a form distinctly different from its ordinary elementary or compound states known to modern chemistry.

The antagonism between the Vishnu cult and that of Siva or, for the matter of that, any other cult, is only a superficial one. When we ransack Sanskrit literature with a view to fathoming the mystery surrounding Vishnu and

his relation to Siva, we come to know far more of the alchemical art; so much so that we feel no hesitation in stating that Vishnu is a term employed to designate Siva or mercury which has assumed new properties, in virtue of which it can pervade animate and inanimate bodies and transform them into more perfected states. It is to draw attention to this essential identity of Siva and Vishnu that in some important Vishnu temples we find the Sivalingam worshipped in the *sanctum sanctorum* and the Vishnu image in that of some Siva temples.

The allegorical representation of Vishnu and his *Avatars* is symbolic of the different stages in the transformation which mercury undergoes during the progress of Yajna. The tenth *avatar*, that of Kalki (the bound), is the final stage of the transformation which gives us the much coveted Amritam composed of the "fixed" or "killed" mercury. It is by the use of this Amritam that the fulfilment of the fourfold object of human desire is effected.

We have thus far referred mainly to the material or the *laukika* or the *rasavâda* aspect of Hinduism. We find that this concerns itself with the perpetuation of the mystical significance of the different processes involved in the alchemical art through various methods of popular representation. We now proceed to give an all too brief version of the spiritual or the *paramâarthika* or the Brahnavada aspect.

It is a recognized fact that in the midst of the idolatry, polytheism and diversity of creeds of Hinduism there is a clear postulation of an Ultimate Reality, Brahman or Atman. What is this Brahman, to attain which is the highest ambition of a Hindu, and before which the amassing of a world of wealth and the possession of universal sway, obtainable through Yajna, are but childish trivialities? The possession of Amṛita is not a great asset if it is not used for the realization of this Ultimate Reality, for securing life beyond the reach of death. Amṛitam is so termed, not because life can be preserved by it eternally nor because physical death can be warded off by its use, but because by its regular internal administration, accompanied by the *Yoga* practice of mental concentration, the individual reaches a state of persistent awareness known as *Jivanmukti* or *Nirvāṇa* or *Samadhi*, which are but different terms employed to express the eternal blissful life beyond death. It is in connection with this Final Achievement that the peculiarly Hindu doctrine of *Yoga* has been evolved.

The sum total of the arguments relevant to obtaining the knowledge necessary for this realization has been preserved for us in the six *darśanas*. Incorporated in these we have, first of all in the *Pūrvamīmāṃsa*, information relating to the correct interpretation and performance of Yajna, the basis of all material and spiritual prosperity. The material prosperity attendant on the successful

performance of Yajna brings into our lives leisure and inclination for the study of philosophic problems. To enable us to develop an analytical view of existence we are provided with its purely metaphysical analysis in the *Sāṅkhya Sūtras*. Although this abstract analysis might give us logical conclusions as to what existence is, whence it has sprung and where it terminates, yet it does not satisfy our longings for the Reality because it does not manifest It to us. We are thus forced to have recourse to Natural Philosophy, in which field the *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika* systems are ready to help us. They present the solution of the problem of existence in terms of ultimate atoms of matter, mind etc. This position corresponds somewhat to the present state of our scientific analysis of the universe, and draws distinctions between matter, energy, mind, life, etc. But a further state of advancement is indicated in the attainment of mutual transformation of these. We are already beginning to recognize this in the inter-convertibility of matter and energy. With the help of Amṛitam, the ancients had, probably, found it practicable to establish this mutual convertibility throughout the range of matter, energy, life, mind and consciousness. For they were able to declare the *Advaita* or secondless condition of the Reality. But a purely mental apprehension of the *Advaita* state of existence does not by itself furnish us with the life beyond death, *i. e.*, the realization of the Sat-Chit-Ānanda state. We

require a more tangible grasp of it, a practical experience of it. Here we are assisted by the precepts of the *Yoga* doctrine. It is the practice of *Yoga* that enables us to realize this ultimate reality, the Brahman of the Vedântin.

Such, in fine, is the function of the six *darśanas* or Path-indicators. They are not wholly metaphysical tracts as generally understood. They indicate to us means and methods for the practical achieve-

ment of Amritam and Amaratwam.

Hinduism should, therefore, be defined as a system of practices of ritualized and mythographed alchemy, leading its follower to a heavenly life and ultimately through *Yoga* to liberation. The ceremonials and festivals of Hinduism are the landmarks of the alchemical art; and the Hindu temple displays the practice of alchemy carved in wood, rock, mortar and metal.

P. NARAYANA GOUD

Atma-Vidya is the only kind of Occultism that any theosophist who admires "Light on the Path," and who would be wise and unselfish, ought to strive after. All the rest is some branch of the "Occult Sciences," *i e.*, arts based on the knowledge of the ultimate essence of all things in the Kingdoms of Nature—such as minerals, plants and animals—hence of things pertaining to the realm of *material* nature, however invisible that essence may be, and howsoever much it has hitherto eluded the grasp of Science. Alchemy, Astrology, Occult Physiology, Chiromancy, exist in Nature and the *exact* Sciences—perhaps so called, because they are found in this age of paradoxical philosophies the reverse—have already discovered not a few of the secrets of the above *arts*. But clairvoyance, symbolised in India as the "Eye of Siva," called in Japan, "Infinite Vision," is *not* Hypnotism, the illegitimate son of Mesmerism, and is not to be acquired by such arts. All the others may be mastered and results obtained whether good, bad, or indifferent; but *Atma-Vidya* sets small value on them. It includes them all and may even use them occasionally, but it does so after purifying them of their dross, for beneficent purposes, and taking care to deprive them of every element of selfish motive.

—H. P. BLAVATSKY, *Raja-Yoga or Occultism*, pp. 30-31.

THE DIFFICULT PATH TO PEACE

[How **Max Plowman**, influenced by some words of Rabindranath Tagore, resigned his commission and "ceased from organized war for ever" is told by him. This was during the war, and for his action he was court-martialled. Subsequently, in 1919, he explained his position in *War and the Creative Impulse*. In this article he argues and appeals for a change of heart, for a New Birth, which alone will bring the Dawn of Peace.—Eds.]

Civilized man the world over is in the throes of a struggle which will end either in disaster or in triumphant readjustment. What is actually taking place may be shown in a simile. Up to the present century the nations of the world have been like the loose pieces of a jig-saw puzzle strewn upon a table. They have subsisted as more or less detached units without close coherent relation to one another. But within living memory, the table on which they lie has suddenly and miraculously become smaller; and suddenly it has become alarmingly obvious that the only way to accommodate the pieces is to fit them together and make of all the different bits a single picture. Yet the real problem is of course something vastly more complex; for the "pieces" of the world puzzle are organic bodies with wills and purposes of their own: they are not formed in shapes predisposed to fit in with one another; and there is no sovereign mind above them with power and authority to compose them into a single co-ordinate pattern. But the miracle is the fact. The table has contracted.

The change affects us in a two-fold manner. We welcome the receipt, in literally no time, of

tidings from the ends of the earth. We enjoy the ability to visit, with luxuriant ease, places which our fathers could only dream about. These effects of the change are pleasant, and therefore readily acceptable. But an effect less pleasant, and therefore less recognised, resides in the fact that the shrinkage of distance implies nearness. We are immeasurably nearer one another than we were even thirty years ago; we live in closer proximity: in how close, it is impossible to estimate. People living at the ends of the earth are now our neighbours. But because the actual mileage between ourselves and them remains unchanged, we are apt to treat the truth about our nearness as if it were elastic. We contract distance and accept proximity when proximity is congenial; but we stretch distance and are oblivious to proximity when proximity is undesired.

Obviously, we can't have this double standard. For richer for poorer, for better for worse, the world is now practically one household. Clearly, the members of a household cannot behave to one another as if they were strangers; no nation can now behave like a cock crowing upon its own dunghill.

The division implied by space offers latitude of conduct impossible where there is no such division. The world has become one house, and "a house divided against itself cannot stand".

Hence the world problem of radical readjustment. Hence the necessity of holding fast to the belief in the brotherhood of man as the basic fact for all political activity. Hence the prime duty of referring all the major problems of social, national and international behaviour to the court of common humanity. Hence the responsibility of recognising ourselves, first, foremost and always, as members of the human family, and of rejecting as specious and insufficient to the actual world of to-day the divisions of nationalism which would rivet the habits of past antagonism upon those who have become, in economic fact, common property holders.

"Living in the world of to-day" is a phrase most often on the lips of those who pride themselves upon their realism: too often they use it in many a specious plea for evil necessity, disguising as prudence their sense of the actuality of yesterday. But it is precisely because we are living in the world of to-day that those who are aware of it disclaim the titles of exclusive nationalism and exclusive individualism with their inevitable concomitants, military and economic warfare. They do so simply because they perceive that the strife of disharmonious units must be surpassed in a world compelled by the logic of its activ-

ity to find unity. For it is impossible that man should avail himself of the advantages of proximity while he rejects the responsibilities of neighbourhood. He cannot be at once friend for the purposes of economic life and enemy for the purposes of nationalism. He cannot retain the old habits of vagrant barbarism in a world that has become his own estate. Yet he is now attempting this impossible thing; and the world of men in consequence suffers the instability of recurring earthquake.

What then shall we do? The idea of international co-operation, weak in its inception and shackled by the fearful guile and craft of the self-seeking, has cumbrously expressed itself in the machinery of the League of Nations. What is the world going to make of that? Is the League a creative or merely a restrictive organisation? Is it a gateway through which the nations can flow, or merely a bear-garden in which they can quarrel? Is it the womb of international life, or merely an international divorce court?

The will to harmony is the will to sacrifice and accommodation: it is expressed in collective imagination. Have the western nations of the world any such will—any such imagination? The question is crucial. And since, in the last resort, it is abstract and idle to speak of nations as if they were self-existent units and not bodies of which individuals formed the mind, let us ask ourselves individually: have we the will to make personal sacri-

fices of property and well-being on behalf of peace; have we the imagination to envisage what international harmony implies?

For, to this creative body of good will, there is a subtle alternative which, disguising itself with the creative mantle, turns out to be the old destructive enemy in a new guise. This alternative is to convert the League into an omnipotent armed force, capable of imposing its dictates upon any and all the nations of the world. It is a seductive proposal promising just the kind of absolute the mind in pain jumps at. This alternative is undeniably attractive—especially to men accustomed to the thought of government in terms of restraint. It is the inevitable logic of government by force, and it appears as the logical way to peace without loss of the idea of government by consent. Actually, of course, the proposal bristles with improbabilities, such as the idea that vast numbers of peace-loving citizens of all nations should dedicate their lives to the exclusive pursuit of war; or that immense trained bands of mercenaries could be called upon at the will of an international organisation to impose peace and create order upon nations as vast as Russia or the United States. But apart from any such practical considerations, the proposal to arm the League is in principle the proposal to eliminate an evil by amalgamating the evil of units into one huge body of superhuman evil.

What the advocates of this monstrosity have forgotten, in

their sincere but misguided effort to abolish war, is the fact that peace is a stuff that by its very nature cannot be imposed. Peace is organic and depends upon life. It is not suppressed war. It cannot be forcibly created: it is harmonious activity, not activity in compulsive restraint. Those who pursue it with the desire of compulsion are pursuing a will-o'-the-wisp that vanishes the more ardently they pursue it. To arm the League is in fact to melt the national images of Moloch into one obscene international image. Peace is made of tenderer stuff. "What can be created can be destroyed." Peace is for ever of this order. To attempt to create a rigid and indestructible order called "permanent peace" is to make an order of death. Shall man attempt to clamp death upon himself and call it peace?

But what is the alternative?

There is none ready-made:—nothing, absolutely nothing that we can do which will infallibly save the nations, as they now exist, from war. There is no short cut to peace. Why, indeed, should there be? Can the patient who has developed chronic disease automatically cure himself? Can the nations pursue ruthless self-interest indefinitely, and yet by this route arrive at community of interest? Can individuals pitilessly seek their own, and reap the harvest of their neighbour's affection? "Do men gather grapes of thistles?"

There is no escape from the present necessity of new-birth.

Nations and men, the duty imposed upon us is one that involves change of direction. And what is that but repentance?

It is now nearly eighteen years since the problem loomed up before me in all its stark simplicity; and because I owe the immediate solution of my problem to one of India's sages, I would gratefully make my acknowledgment here. Compulsive logic had driven me into the British army in 1914 as a unit of an organisation vainly engaged in "a war to end war"; and I had seen something of the result at close quarters before I found myself pondering Tagore's lectures on "Nationalism". There I read: -

The veil has been raised, and in this frightful war the West has stood face to face with her own creation, to which she has offered her soul. She must know what it truly is.

She had never let herself suspect what slow decay and decomposition were secretly going on in her moral nature, which often broke out in doctrines of scepticism, but still oftener and in still more dangerously subtle manner showed itself in her unconsciousness of the mutilation and insult that she had been inflicting upon a vast part of the world. Now she must know the truth nearer home.

And then will come from her own children those who will break themselves free from the slavery of this illusion, this perversion of brotherhood founded upon self-seeking, those who will own themselves as God's children and as no bond-slaves of machinery, which turns souls into commodities and life into compartments, which, with its iron claws, scratches out the heart of the world and knows not

what it has done.

What to do when the personal application of such words came home to me, I did not know; but what *not* to do was plain as a pike-staff, and in the moment of that recognition I had ceased from organised war for ever.

"Not a very world-shattering decision," the cynic may object. And I agree. Nothing but a first, a negative and most rudimentary step on the difficult path to peace: nothing but a personal act of contrition. Yet as a symbol, to those who have the wit to see it as such, that decision is of vast and overwhelming importance; for nothing but a similarly decisive act of contrition on the part of the dominant nations of the world can change their direction and turn them into the path of peace. They also must call a halt. It is for them to desist from the imposition of national wills, and at the same time to abjure the hellish means of that forcible imposition. It is for them to signify their repentance for wrongs done in the name of nationalism by confession that nationalism, like patriotism, in the words of Nurse Cavell, "is not enough". It is for every nation—singly and upon its own moral responsibility—to recognise that national self-righteousness and the will to self-sufficiency are the very embodiments in world character of that unregenerate selfhood which, in its natural expression, is war eternal.

MAX PLOWMAN

AEOLIAN-IONIAN CULTURE

[**Lloyd Wendell Eshleman**, who here traces the stream of Greek culture, æsthetic and philosophical, eastward to its headwaters in Asia Minor, is an American educationist and historian, whose special interests lie in the history of Western culture.—Eds.]

For almost a century, certainly since the industrial revolution entered upon the final lap of its climatic rush in the early years of the Victorian era, we have been living in an age of fads. Only recently has there been a noticeable turning away, a new groping in the "spirit of humanity" for some new panacea that will cure our ailments.

Within the past few years there has been talk of a return to the Middle Ages, of a re-evaluation of classical antiquity, or of an attempt to unravel the tangled skeins of ancient religious and philosophic beliefs that lie as far in the past as pre-history. Recently Professor Davies, a well known English historian, wrote:—

Although the classical languages as instruments of education are now faced by formidable rivals, there appears to be, if anything, an increase in the influence we attach to a study of the institutions and the thought of ancient Greece. It is felt that in Hellenic civilization we have something lovely and precious, shining with a beauty and a splendour which have never been approached by any other land in any other age...

Hellas turned the dim and questioning light of ancient civilization into the brilliant glow of a new and rich civilization which we call classical.

But it must be remembered that long before the Hellenes of the Greek peninsula developed high

culture, the Hellenes of Anatolia, mixed, no doubt, with remnants of the Aegean race, came into contact with the richer culture of Lydia, of Persia, and of the earlier Aegeans.

Mitylene, Miletus, and Ephesus, the largest of the Aeolian-Ionian cities, set the pace for the approaching Hellenic summer and attained a fine flowering nearly two centuries earlier than Athens or Thebes. Miletus, controlling many trading posts on the Euxine, as the Black Sea was called, became the metropolis of the eastern Hellenes. From about 650 to 450 B.C., the Aeolian and Ionian Hellenes passed through a Hellenic summer of their own.

Among them lived Homer, a native of Aeolia, and here his great epic poems were perpetuated. It was nearly a thousand years before the time of Christ when he wrote the beautiful *Hymn to Earth*, that Shelley loved and translated.

After 700 B.C., the long narrative epics of early Aeolian poets died out. Individualism was asserting itself and personal experiences sought modes of expression. This tendency gave rise to a shorter poetic form, called the lyric. For different moods, different emotions and different types of experience, the sensitive souls of these expressive people found out-

lets in various types of poetry and in various metres. These have been retained to the present day, and it is significant that little which is worthy of note has been done to improve upon them. The world's best poetry has always been modelled largely upon ancient Aeolian forms. The lyric, or song metre, the iambic, the elegiac and other metres are used to-day with far less discrimination and appreciation for the nature of their form and possible meaning than was habitual among the poets of early Aeolia.

The Aeolian dialect of the Hellenes was liquid, melodious and wonderfully pleasing to the ear. Among the Aeolians a school of lyric poetry developed that found its highest expression in the works of Sappho, the greatest woman poet of all time. She lived in Mitylene, on the island of Lesbos, about 600 B. C.

One of her neighbours was named Alcaeus, and he was an ardent disciple of both her charms and accomplishments. To him, she was ever the "chaste Sappho, violet tressed and softly smiling". Swinburne believed Sappho to have been the greatest poet that ever lived. The lyric quality of both of these poets has been ceaselessly imitated: Alcaics and Sapphics being familiar names among devotees of poetry. One of Alcaeus's most imitated poems has been well translated in *The State* : —

What constitutes a State ?
Not high-raised battlement or labour'd mound,
Thick wall or moated gate ;
Not cities fair, with spires and turrets crown'd ;
Not bays and broad-armed ports,
Where, mindless of the storm, rich navies ride ;
Not — and haughty Courts,

Where black-brow'd baseness hides in perfumed pride.
No !—Men, high minded men,
With powers as far above dull brutes imbued
In forest, brake, or den,
As beasts excel cold rocks and brambles rude :
Men who their duties know,
Know too their rights, and, knowing, dare maintain ;
Prevent the long-aimed blow,
And crush the tyrant, while they rend the chain :
These constitute a State !

Many were the poets and singers of Eastern Hellas. Many also were the writers of prose and of "profane history". The Dorian city of Halicarnassus gave us Herodotus, the father of history, who was a contemporary of Pericles. And there is one other prose writer who must not be omitted even in the short space available in this article. He is reputed to have been a poor, crippled slave, living on the island of Samos ; and his name is known to every boy or girl who can read or write. He was Aesop, whose cryptic tales and fables have been presented in all languages and in all sorts of places, on page, screen and stage. To be positively scientific, I suppose we may be stretching a point in saying that he lived—but documents do not exist for everything that has ever happened, and to date I have seen no conclusive evidence that he did not live in Samos, about 550 B. C., just as the ancient Ionians said.

One more poet might be mentioned, Anacreon, also about 550 B. C., who lived at Teos, in Ionia, and who probably wrote more eulogies to "wine, women and song"—but withal in a very innocent and light-hearted spirit—than any other person who ever lived. His technique was widely copied, and imitations, then and now, are called *Anacreontics*. The fame of Anacreon is of especial interest to Americans. A much later song,

"Anacreon in Heaven," had its music borrowed to supply a melody for "The Star Spangled Banner". Herrick, Cowley, and many other fine poets have wrestled with his form and style in an endeavour to make the light Hellenic tongue fit with the clumsier and heavier English words. One of Anacreon's shorter verses is as follows :

Of am I by women told,
 "Poor Anacreon I you're growing old :
 Look ! how thy hair is falling all :
 'Poor Anacreon, how they fall !"
 Whether I grow old or no,
 My effects I do not know ;
 But this I know, and can't be told :
 "Tis time to live, if I grow old !
 'Tis time short pleasures now to take,
 Or little life, the best to make,
 And manage wisely the last stake.

The brilliant Ionians, not satisfied with art, poetry, and music, turned to other cultural endeavours. They were naturally curious and open-minded. From the close of the seventh century to the middle of the fifth century B.C., they threw down the barriers that hindered philosophic and scientific knowledge, and made the world heir to an intellectual foundation that shaped and altered all future history.

II

It was among the Aeolian-Ionian cities of Anatolia that the first enlightening forces which made for a completely rounded development of Hellenic civilization reached their maturity. It was the poetic imagination of the Hellenes of Asia Minor that enabled them to cut themselves free from superstitious convention, to rise to new heights and touch all the materials of earth and space with questing fingers. They introduced humanity, charm, tolerance, beauty, and grace into all of their exploits, mental, physical, and spiritual.

Among the Ionian thinkers, there were seven who were fit to be called "the seven wise men of Ionia". They are the founders of scientific investigation and study. Many of the early Near Eastern scholars had developed astronomy, mathematics, and other studies to high planes. Yet they had been interested in them mainly as practical or as religious pursuits. The Ionians interested themselves in all sorts of natural phenomena because they were possessed of intellectual curiosity and wished to know the truth for the sake of truth. This was idealism. The names that are outstanding are Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes, Heraclitus, Democritus, Pythagoras and Anaxagoras. Their lives filled seven successive generations, extending from a period shortly before 600 B. C. to a period shortly after 450 B. C.

For a long time prior to the seventh century B. C., Ionian thinkers had been interested in new discoveries about the nature and origin of the world, of mankind, and of the mysteries of life. Eventually they had decided that all things had developed from one original object or material. Thus early, in the dim recesses of history, a beginning was being made toward the development of a theory of evolution.

Thales of Miletus (about 600 B.C.) thought it likely that originally the earth had been all water and that, out of it, life and material objects had been evolved. He travelled widely and studied among the Chaldeans. From them he

learned how to predict an eclipse. When he returned to Miletus he foretold an eclipse in 585 B. C. It happened on the predicted day and thereafter the reputation of Thales was made. Until then, most Hellenes had viewed eclipses and many other natural phenomena as the handiwork of the gods. Now, Thales proclaimed that movements of terrestrial bodies were in accord with fixed, immutable laws.

Anaximander (c. 575 B. C.) of Miletus belonged to the next generation. He continued to experiment with new methods and ideas, becoming the first Hellenic pioneer of exact science. Anaximander is said to have introduced the sundial into Hellas. He also interested himself in the theory of evolution as suggested by the teachings of Thales, but went his master one better in developing his own theory of natural selection in order to explain the variations in forms of life. In this respect, Anaximander is the real founder of a biologic theory that upset the thinking world in the last century of our own era.

The next important philosopher of the Ionic school was Anaximenes of Miletus, about 550 B. C. who held that air was the origin of all life and matter.

Then came Pythagoras of Samos, about 525 B. C. He established a school of philosophy in Croton, in Southern Italy, which influenced minds for many generations. Pythagoras was both mathematician and mystic-moralist. In his eyes, numbers became the symbolic representation and ultimate ex-

planation of all things. He may be viewed as the creator of the mathematical theory of the musical scale. He also interested himself in the physics of musical tones. Yet the first purpose of the Pythagorean school was ethico-religious. Dissatisfied with local Hellenic cults, it sought to purify the soul by abstinence and by ceremonial mysteries. An excess of mysticism, however, caused the order to be expelled from Croton. Many of the followers spread through Hellas, and the resulting dissemination of views probably accounted for much of the fame of the founder.

In about 500 B. C., Heraclitus of Ephesus, called "the weeping philosopher" because he suffered from hay-fever, came to the fore. Heraclitus was of aristocratic birth and his fame spread far and wide. He had studied in Persia and may have been subject to Zarathustrian influence. He believed that fire was the original principle, out of which the soul was created. According to him "everything is and is not". His views were decidedly metaphysical and furnished strong support to the young Sophists who frequented the motherland.

One of the greatest, certainly one of the most influential of all Hellenic philosophers, was Anaxagoras of Clazomenae (near Smyrna). In about 475 B. C., he went to Athens and taught there until the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War. By his cool, objective point of view, by his strength of character and by virtue of his tremendous mathematical and astronomical wisdom, he attracted great

attention and respect. He instructed many of the men who were to make Athens famous: Pericles, Euripides, perhaps even Socrates, were among his students. His theories of natural laws and natural selection, despite the fact that he believed them to be controlled by one supreme and infinite God, brought against him charges of impiety by the polytheistic Athenians. His case was upheld vigorously by Pericles and he was acquitted; but shortly thereafter Anaxagoras retired to a new home on the shores of the Hellespont. Among his major accomplishments are the foundation of the atomic theory, and treatises on natural laws and on the mathematical laws of perspective.

Younger and almost as great was Democritus, about 430 B. C. Like Pythagoras and Anaxagoras, he concerned himself with laws regarding matter. He came finally to the conclusion that all matter is composed of atoms, all of which are alike, and all of which are ceaselessly in motion. Only by their arrangement and position might the objects that they composed vary; and even the varied appearance to us could be due only to our own sensations and perceptions.

There were many strong foundations of truth, and there was also much of a true scientific and philosophic spirit back of the works of the Ionians. While much that they speculated upon remained a mystery, and while their conclusions often are laughable to us, nevertheless what they did accom-

plish was tremendous when we consider that they were the first men of their age to probe the darkness of spiritual and material being which had enclosed their fellows for thousands of years. And their accomplishments seem still greater and more significant when we consider that they were completed without the aid of scientific paraphernalia or of backgrounds rich in the traditions of ancestral discoveries.

There were many other philosophers among the Aeolians and Ionians. Xenophanes of Colophon, a contemporary of Pythagoras and a poet as well as a philosopher, went also to Italy, where he founded the so-called Eleatic School. He was poet, satirist, historian, and philosopher. His fearless intelligence did not hesitate to scoff at deep and wordy philosophies of life. He remained a realist to the end, repudiating all that related to symbolism, mysticism, or to what he called the "anthropomorphic mythology". What interested him most was the unity of all life, existing under one God. One of Xenophanes's disciples, Parmenides, a contemporary of Heraclitus and Democritus, became the most famous of the Eleatic School.

The French author, Croiset, thinks that the great Hellenic philosophers of the fifth century B. C.

-Parmenides, Heraclitus, Empedocles, Democritus, Anaxagoras, and Socrates of Athens, represent the real flowering of Hellenic philosophy, surpassing in worth the philosophic output of any other age in history. They laid the founda-

tions for the future studies of physics, mathematics, astronomy, meteorology, biology, geography, psychology, and other subjects, as these have come down to us, besides making contributions in music, poetry, history and philosophy. Later geographers, such as Strabo and Ptolemy, borrowed extensively from them. Even in the writings of Plato and of Aristotle we find evidence of the astonishment aroused by the subtle dialectics of Zeno of Elea (not the Stoic philosopher of Cyprus), a pupil of Parmenides, when he visited Athens.

Just as in later history the "Greek Scholars" of Byzantium poured into Italy and prepared the way for Humanism and the Renaissance, so did the Aeolian-Ionian scholars and artists pour into Athens and other cities of the Hellenic world during the later sixth and early fifth centuries B.C., and help to bring about a golden age for Greece proper and for the Greek cities of southern Italy and Sicily. In both instances the cause was somewhat similar: pressure from the East. In the case of the Renaissance Byzantines, pressure westward came from Turkish armies; the Hellenes of Ionia suffered from the advance of the Persians. Peace and prosperity are necessary for art and civilization to flourish; warfare is not

conducive to original and artistic activities.

Politically and culturally the strength of ancient Hellas crossed the Aegean Sea into the peninsula of Greece. The traditions of Aeolian-Ionian culture and fame were to be swallowed up in the notoriety achieved by the Age of Pericles—the "Golden Age of Athens". To me, however, it has always seemed that the older age deserves the higher praise and the greater glory. For in the century and a half that preceded the birth of Plato it had produced a score or more of famous thinkers, many of whom deserve to stand with the greatest of all time, and these in addition to poets, musicians, prose writers, historians and inventors. It was this vast, connected chain of Aeolian-Ionian culture that laid the foundation for scientific knowledge and for idealistic thought in the classical world. Sometimes the Ionian philosophers were carried into the clouds—among the high realms of metaphysics—and sometimes they directed their thoughts to earth and to material things, inculcating within the human intellect a foundation for pragmatism and empiricism. But in any event, the great men of Athens received from Aeolian-Ionian culture a rich heritage upon which they could build their future fame.

LLOYD WENDELL ESHLEMAN

NEW BOOKS AND OLD

THE SALVATION ARMY*

[**Geoffrey West's** review shows how inspiration falters and dies when an organization tries to catch and contain it. And yet—there must be a way by which a shrine can be built whence the Light of that Inspiration will ever stream forth. The Line of Prophets is broken when the priests begin to take charge of it; Prophets are few and priests too many—the former are transmitters of inspiration, the latter are its murderers; between them stand the patriarchs who, catching the inspiration of the Prophets, revere the integrity of all human souls and refuse to dominate the free will of man which priests exploit. The world to-day needs Patriarchal Organisms wherein human minds may seek and find the way of the Prophets unhindered by the priests and aided by those who live by and in the spirit of sacrifice.—**Eds.**]

The story of William Booth and the founding and development of the Salvation Army as a world-wide organization is a long one, and Mr. Ervine has been at no pains to make it short. With immense industry he has collected and arranged a vast mass of facts relating to both. One can only regret a certain failure in the art of presentation, especially in the matter of selection; he presents well and vigorously, but he presents far too much.

Still, it is in its way a great story, and worthy of attention. For those who would study it in its fullness, here is the material. Nothing seems omitted that is known of Booth's humble parentage, his poverty-stricken childhood, his early religious fervour (he "surrendered to God" when not yet fifteen), his youthful preaching, his pawnbroking purgatory, his always eager grasping of any opportunity "to spend my life and powers publishing the Saviour to a

lost world," his restless shifting from orthodox Methodism towards less formal reforming groups, his courtship and marriage (to the book's heroine!), his uneasy years as minister and travelling evangelist, his break with his superiors—in his thirty-third year—because they would not countenance the latter activity, his hard years (his family's too) as roving preacher, his launching of the East London Christian Mission, his struggle to acquire a suitable headquarters, and his gradual transformation of the Mission into the Salvation Army in the decade of the 'seventies. Thenceforward the story broadens, exchanging the mainly private and personal for the largely public and general. It is the story of the Army as a growing entity of which he was but the leader, of gathering regiments waging their Holy War for Salvation on a front spreading rapidly from land to land, facing every form of assault and obloquy with the joyous chant-

**God's Soldier: General William Booth.* By ST. JOHN ERVINE. (William Heinemann, 1 td., London. Two Volumes 36s.)

ing of hearts that know no doubt. Here again Mr. Ervine tells it all—campaigns, rumours, accusations, the gradual winning of public tolerance and then approval, the development of social work. Only towards the end does Booth emerge again, turning over the staff work of the Army to his son Bramwell and taking once more the centre of the evangelist's platform.

Significantly (but comprehensibly enough) it is with this final phase that the first large-scale discords in the Army organization become evident, continuing and growing right to the present and made especially plain in the unhappy deposition of Bramwell from the Generalship bequeathed him by his father. To this affair Mr. Ervine devotes an Epilogue of 213 pages. He might well have dealt with it, as with most matters in the book, more briefly, but he was entirely right to give it due attention.

For the case of William Booth and the Salvation Army is, for those who have eyes to see, absolutely illuminating. It is, in its largest implications, just the case of all the religiously inspired who have left organizations behind them to carry on their work. From Jesus to Madame Blavatsky (and before and after them) the essential process is the same. The quality of the originating inspiration is really quite irrelevant. Booth was narrow-minded, coarse-grained and uneducated, and the voice of the spirit working through him spoke naturally in narrow-minded, coarse-grained and

uneducated tones and terms. But it spoke, nevertheless, for some of his kind, and for some not of his kind, *with power*. He had the ability, no less than his fellows on higher planes, to change the lives of men and to draw them after him. He could, he did, "take Drunken Jack and turn him into Happy Jack."

The fact which distinguished the Salvation Army from most of the religious societies in England at that time (was) that its members were boisterously happy.

In his life, or at any rate up to a relatively late point in his life, he was a leader, filling his followers with the inspiration of his own spirit, so that they obeyed him joyfully even when he exiled them—as missionaries—to the ends of the earth. His organization was a living organization, an organism, because its life flowed directly out from him through all its parts. He was an autocrat, admittedly, as any man must be who *knows* the spirit of God speaking within him, and he was, up to a point, rightly so. Where he began to fail was when he turned aside from a purely spiritual leadership and sought to impose a purely earthly and legalistic dictatorship upon those who failed to recognize his power (to the extent of differing from him). Never perhaps has it been so necessary as now to understand the difference between dictatorship and leadership, that which compels a man to follow against his will and that which compels him to follow of his will. The attempt towards the former must spring from doubt

of ability for the latter ; it is a sign of weakness and not of strength. Each of Booth's successive steps towards legalization of his autocracy marked the decline of the thing he had made from spiritual organism to material organization. The decline is plain in many respects. Typical and significant is his change of attitude towards Army ownership of property. In the early days, says Mr. Ervine, "he hated to see his soldiers building or buying halls . . . because he feared . . . they would become pew-renters, instead of serving soldiers". Later he at least acquiesced. But something of the true spirit burned living in him to the end ; on his deathbed his thought was of the saving of souls : "Take me to a meeting . . . and let me hear . . . dear old Lawley say . . . 'General . . . here comes . . . the fortieth for God !'"

So power never wholly failed in him ; but he could not, unfortunately, bequeath that, even to his son. This is to say no more against Bramwell Booth—a wholly good man—than that he was not, as his father had been, that rare thing, a religious genius. It is always a hard lot to be a great man's son, and doubly hard when one is commanded to wear one's father's cloak. The inevitable happened. Lacking that spiritual ability which would have renewed or preserved the Army's organic quality, he turned naturally and of necessity to strengthening organization ; he, "as he grew older, grew also in admiration for the methods by which the Society of Jesus is governed". The

spirit, and with it the glory, had departed. This perhaps was felt by Bramwell's opponents in the Army ; it seems hardly to have been understood by them. They talked of democratic reorganization, but did nothing to make it effective, while such small change as they did make was, Mr. Ervine powerfully argues, not at all for the better.

The possibility that a William Booth would ever again become General of the Salvation Army was almost certainly prevented when election by the High Council was substituted for nomination by the General. Bureaucratic businessmen will henceforth rule the Army : men of high spiritual perception are now, humanly speaking, debarred from the Generalship, and perhaps from all great authority . . . The prospect is dismal, and may justly cause those who admire the Army to fear that its life will be short and spiritually barren.

What is the conclusion to be drawn from the unhappy history ? Is it, as Mr. Ervine believes, that the religious impulse is incapable of organization ? It would seem so. There has never been a major religious body which has not come in action to direct contradiction of its founder's precepts or intentions. Where a new teaching, or the revival of an old, is concerned, one may conceive disciples grouping together that the Word may be preserved. But it must be in humility, content to present rather than interpret, demanding no infallibility but conceiving authority as direct between founder and follower. The grouping must, in effect, be absolutely democratic, that truth may be recognized by

its own light wherever its light may fall. For truth is a plant which grows only within, let its seed blow whence it will. Churches and Armies will not aid its growth,

once the originating incorporeal inspiration has faded to the point of necessitating legal incorporation; they can be, after that point, only obstacles.

GEOFFREY WEST

HERBS AND HERB LORE

[H. Stanley Redgrove, B. Sc., F. I. C., reviews two books dealing with the very interesting but too much neglected topic of herbs: one from the pen of an Eastern, the other written by a Western. H. P. Blavatsky in her *Isis Unveiled* emphasised the mystic and occult properties of herbs:—

"The secrets of the herbs of dreams and enchantments are only lost to European science, and useless to say, too, are unknown to it, except in a few marked instances, such as opium and hashish. Yet, the psychical effects of even these few upon the human system are regarded as evidences of a temporary mental disorder. The women of Thessaly and Epirus, the female hierophants of the rites of Sabazius, did not carry their secrets away with the downfall of their sanctuaries. They are still preserved, and those who are aware of the nature of Soma, know the properties of other plants as well."]

I *

In reviewing Mrs. Grieve's encyclopædic work, *A Modern Herbal*, in THE ARYAN PATH, April, 1932 (Vol. III, p. 270), I gave expression to the following opinion:—

Nature... is so complex, that the mind of humanity cannot assimilate her otherwise than in a piecemeal manner. Progress in understanding must be effected by means of generalisation; but, since no partial generalisation can be quite correct, the mind can proceed only by neglecting certain seemingly small aspects of Nature which, so to speak, won't fit in with its general view of things. This neglect, however, must be only temporary. The mind of the race, if real progress is to be made, must pause, ever and anon, and review the situation. This time has arrived, I think, so far as the science of Medicine is concerned. In short, it would be well... to look over the medical lore of the ancients to see if there are certain facts which, in the general advance of knowledge have been forgotten.

This opinion, apparently, is not only shared by Lt.-Col. R. N. Chopra, M. A., M. D., who has recently written an extremely important work on the indigenous drugs of India; but his experimental studies, as recorded in this work, have completely justified it.

In an editorial comment, the Editors of THE ARYAN PATH, asked, apropos of Mrs. Grieve's book, "Will some Indian Pandit follow the example and give us a reliable volume on Indian Herbs?" Dr. Chopra has answered their request in a decidedly practical manner.

His book is divided into five parts. The first, entitled "The Medical and Economic Aspects of Indian Indigenous Drugs" is of an introductory character, and contains matter of great interest and importance. The history of medicine in India can be traced to the remote past. The *Rig Veda*, which is one of the oldest repositories of human knowledge, makes mention of the medicinal use of herbs; but it is the *Ayurveda*, a later and supplementary production, in which herbal remedies are dealt with in detail, that must be regarded as the foundation stone of the ancient medical science of India. Until the time of the Mohammedan invasion, Hindu medicine flourished, and made its influence felt for good far outside the domains of

* *The Indigenous Drugs of India: Their Medical and Economic Aspects.* By R. N. CHOPRA, M. A., M. D. (Cantab.) (The Art Press, Calcutta. Rs. 15.)

India itself. Then decline set in, and the old remedies were abandoned or else used in an unthinking manner. But as Dr. Chopra points out, "old systems cannot be summarily condemned as useless"; and he instances the very ancient Chinese remedy for heart trouble, namely the powdered heads of toad-fish, which recent scientific research has shown to be rich in adrenalin and, therefore, excellent for the purpose.

He considers that the time is ripe for a re-investigation of the ancient system of the Ayurveda, and has himself done no small share towards the achievement of this truly gigantic task. Each drug must be carefully identified, tested in the laboratory and, if utility is indicated, in the hospital, and its active principles separated and analysed.

There is a great need for useful drugs in India, for, although the country is admirably adapted for the cultivation of a great variety of drug-plants, cultivation is much neglected, and those medicinal plants which are grown are commonly sent to Europe for extraction of their active principles, the finished medicines being returned, in part, to India at a price beyond the means of the mass of the population.

Again and again in his book, Dr. Chopra emphasises the real need for the production in India of serviceable medicines from wild or easily cultivated plants, at a price which the poorest Indian can pay. Moreover, India might enrich herself and at the same time benefit the whole of humanity by exporting greatly increased quantities of crude drugs. If, however, she is to take a leading place among the drug-producing countries of the world, greater care must be exercised in several directions. Care must be taken in cultivation to secure the finest products; care must be taken to effect collection at those times of the year when the active principles are at their maximum; the ignorance of dealers—of which, incidentally, the present reviewer has had some experience—

who confuse one species with another, must be overcome; and adulteration, only too prevalent at the moment, must be absolutely eschewed.

In Part II, "The Potential Drug Resources of India," Dr. Chopra treats of a number of drugs, recognised by the British and American pharmacopœias, which grow in India, details also being given of several Indian plants yielding products closely resembling the official drugs and which might, for economy's sake, be used in their place. This part contains much detailed information of practical interest, though it is rather a pity that it was not revised in accordance with the *B.P.* of 1932. Numerous references are given, but Dr. Chopra has failed to make acknowledgment to the present writer's article on Ginger, published in *The Pharmaceutical Journal* for July 19, 1930 (vol. 125, pp. 54-55), from which the greater part of his monograph on this drug appears to have been quoted.

In Part III, the author turns his attention to a consideration of the drugs used in the indigenous medicine, the greater number considered being drugs of vegetable origin. This section is of quite special interest. Dr. Chopra gives succinct accounts of the work done by himself and others to determine the medicinal value of the various drugs and of attempts to extract their active principles. In some instances, ancient beliefs in the efficacy of the drugs has not been justified; but, in a number of other cases, the drugs have been found to be of real value. The ancient belief in the virtues of garlic, for instance, seems to have been quite sound; and the utility of the drug is to some extent recognised in the western world, though it has not gained official recognition by the *B. P.* From *Boerhavia diffusa*, a plant whose medicinal value was taught by the Ayurveda, Dr. Chopra and his co-workers have isolated an alkaloidal substance, "punarnavine". This has a marked diuretic action, which is enhanced by the high percentage of

potassium nitrate and other potassium salts present. Many other instances could be quoted to show that the investigation of the ancient remedies has proved to be most emphatically worth while, did not considerations of space forbid.

Part IV, "Indian Materia Medica," contains a useful list of books and journals, a list of Indian medicinal plants, and inorganic and animal products used in the indigenous medicine, with vernacular names, uses, references, etc. Lists of plant remedies for snake bite and scorpion sting popularly employed in India are included; but experimental investigation has shown them not to be of use.

Part V contains a list of the common bazar medicines of India, brief details being appended in the case of those drugs not dealt with in the preceding sections of the book. The book has an index of Common Vernacular Names, as well as a General Index.

II*

It is an attractive speculation whether mankind first became interested in plants as potential foodstuffs or as potential medicines. Probably the former; but the fact remains that the medicinal use of herbs is extremely ancient, stretching back to prehistoric times; and, as the author (Mr. Richardson Wright) of a recently published work on the history of gardening remarks, the physic garden "specializing in plants from which medicines could be concocted . . . was the first of all specialized gardens".

Man's early experimenting with the medicinal virtues of herbs must have been a very hazardous affair; and it was only at the cost of many misadventures that knowledge gradually was gained. Perhaps one of the first lessons he learnt was the danger of bitterness, for it is a fact that many of the most potent plant poisons (including both alkaloids and glycosides) are characterised by extremely bitter

tastes. Then came the realisation that bitterness was not always deadly; and that the deadly herbs, used with discretion, had powers to heal.

Indeed, defining a poison as a substance capable of producing a violent physiological reaction, one might almost describe the history of medicine as the story of man's conquest of poisons, of his gradual learning how to use them aright.

Miss Wheelwright has written a decidedly interesting and instructive history of medicinal plants for the general reader, which appears at an opportune moment, since the view seems to be gaining ground that modern science has not yet said the last word concerning the medicinal virtues of herbs.

It is true that many of the old herbal remedies have disappeared from the new (1932) *British Pharmacopœia*. There we see reflected the tendency to replace herbs by the active principles extracted from them. When these principles are of a very potent character, there is much to be said in favour of this substitution, since it renders possible more exact dosage. On the other hand, there are medicinally useful herbs of a less potent character; and, moreover, there is the possibility— which, in certain cases, at any rate, seems to be more than a possibility—that associated with the chief active principles there are smaller quantities of other active substances which are lost in the process of extraction.

In a very interesting article by Frère Lazare, published in *Les Parfums de France*, reference is made to the work of the Paris Faculty of Medicine which

is undertaking numerous experiments, some of which have already given satisfactory results. These investigations have for object the thorough study of the vegetable drugs already in use and the discovery of new medicaments drawn from this source.

* *The Physick Garden: Medicinal Plants and Their History.* By EDITH GREY WHEELWRIGHT. Jonathan Cape, Ltd., London. 10s. 6d.)

Miss Wheelwright's book contains an interesting account of the work of Prof. Perrot, who is largely responsible for the increased interest in drug plants now being taken in France; and this account, perhaps, forms the most inspiring portion of her book. The state of affairs in England, where too great a reliance is placed on cheap foreign supplies of herbs, is less satisfactory. Reference is also made to the work in India of Prof. Chopra, who has recently instituted numerous researches into the chemical constituents and therapeutic value of drug plants used in indigenous systems of medicine.

The reader in the East will find Miss Wheelwright's second chapter, "The Medicine of some Early Races" of especial interest, for in it she deals with the ancient herb-lore of India, China and Mesopotamia. The medical systems of the ancients were largely empirical, and knowledge was freely admixed with superstition. The practice of trephining was, for example, common in China and elsewhere, and for the old reason—to allow a demon or confined spirit to escape. However, as modern research is showing, not all the medicinal lore of the ancients is to be despised. Miss Wheelwright remarks that "modern scientific research has shown that many of the old Hindu remedies were justified". Examples are given, one of special interest being *Holarrhena, antidysenterica*, Wall. a tree belonging to the Natural Order *Apocynaceae*, and known in India as Karchi or Kura (Hindustanee) or Kurchi (Bengali), whose bark has been found to contain active alkaloids (especially conessine) which render it useful in the treatment of dysentery, for which purpose it has been employed in India for many years.

China supplies another instance of an ancient herbal remedy whose utility has been thoroughly substantiated by recent scientific research. This is Ma Huang (*Ephedra equisetina*, Bunge and *E. sinica*, Stapf.). Used for ages by the Chinese as a cure for asthma, this

drug was entirely neglected by European scientists. It has recently been found, however, as Miss Wheelwright remarks,

To contain a medicinally valuable alkaloid, *ephedrine*, the hydrochloride of which is now official in the B. P., and is used in the treatment of asthma. Moreover the Chinese always held the idea that Ma Huang should be collected in the autumn. This practice has been justified by chemical analyses which show that the ephedrine content rises, by as much as nearly two hundred per cent. from spring to autumn.

The species *E. Gerardiana*, Wall, which is indigenous to India, is also a source of this valuable alkaloid.

The ancient Israelites were great lovers of spices and other aromatic products, to which there are many references in the Bible. Unfortunately, their identification is not always easy, owing partly to mistranslations and partly to the fact that, in the course of time, names have been transferred from certain products to others. Thus, the *ginnamon* of the Bible is not cinnamon, but is either cassia or some other aromatic product, and *kofer*, translated camphire, is not camphor, as some writers have supposed, but is almost certainly henna, as recognised by the R. V. Miss Wheelwright has some interesting things to say concerning the plants of the Bible, and has taken care to avoid the above and other errors of identification which have rendered worthless much that has been previously written on the subject.

Indeed, as I have already intimated, Miss Wheelwright has compiled a very informative book, and the story she has to tell is one of great human interest. Few tasks have called forth such enthusiasm and provoked such prolonged research as that of the conquest of disease. In its achievement, man has always turned to the physic garden for aid. Sometimes, it would seem, the physic garden has failed him; but, perhaps, when he has realised completely the potentialities of the herbal kingdom, therein he will find means for the task's complete achievement.

H. S. REDGROVE

THE MODERN NOVEL

[Claude Houghton is gaining fame as a creator of a new type of novel : he has just published *This Was Ivor Trent*.—EDS.]

Most books have many defects, and the best of books invariably has one. The chief defect of this collection of essays is its brevity. Yes, its *brevity*. It is necessary to stress that, for, now-a-days, so many books, and notably novels, base their claim to consideration wholly on length—not breadth, or depth.

Brevity, however, was inevitable in this volume, for these essays first appeared as a series in *The Fortnightly Review*, where, doubtless, considerations of space were important. What is remarkable is that, with one or two exceptions, the contributors have succeeded admirably in indicating the main trends of the novel in the chief countries of Europe and in America.

This book, then, was written by professional writers, and will probably be read chiefly by authors. But what one would like to know is the impression it would create in the mind of an intelligent layman. Here are eight writers discussing tendencies of the modern novel in eight countries. Well, what would an intelligent layman make of it all?

Probably his chief discovery would be that, in the world of fiction as in all the other worlds, "chaos is come again". Essentially, novelists are trying to come to some sort of terms with an age in which all established certainties have crumbled. They find themselves surrounded by the debris of the old order. There are no rules, no roads: no traditions, and therefore no self-evident values. All things are fluid—all things are possible. What can a man believe? What can a man serve? "What can one man accomplish?"

But a writer has to *create*—and creation does not proceed from the void. Broadly, this book seems to

show that novelists have adopted one of three attitudes in which to confront a chaotic world. Either they have turned their backs to Present and Future; or they have become "subjective" experimenters (sometimes contortionists) wholly isolated from "ordinary, suffering, patient, and often humorously courageous humanity"; or they have become propagandists of a Soviet future, fiercely proclaiming—in G. K. Chesterton's phrase—that "there is no God, and Karl Marx is his prophet".

On the broadest lines, that is what each of the eight essays—in their very different ways—seems to reveal. In his admirable paper on England, Mr. Hugh Walpole states that, in 1911, there were a number of novelists, recognized as such. There was no question about it. Now, there is "real confusion". And—in his essay on France—Mr. Hamish Miles tells us that one very characteristic feature of the post-war novel is the absence of moral conflict. There are no clear-cut standards, and, therefore, the element of conflict no longer arises. Each individual is free to do what he likes and to believe what he likes. There is no tradition to restrain or to guide.

Significant sentences, selected almost at random, reveal either the "antagonism" between Past and Present—or the denial of both in a fanatical dream of the Future. Even in America, where special considerations apply, novelists are roughly divided into two schools: one subjects America to a merciless scrutiny: the other withdraws from the ugliness and turbulence of the Present and returns to the Past "in order to create worlds of romance". As to Germany, it is

only necessary to quote Wasserrmann's statement that "Society, State, family, economic life, presented a completely changed appearance: where the old prevailed it seemed to challenge destruction," to realize how inevitable is the fact that, in the world of fiction, as in all the other worlds, "chaos is come again".

As to Spain, Mr. Pritchett tells us, in one of the best essays of this collection, that, spiritually, Spain still belongs to an old peasant and feudal culture. "She has not yet shown what the effect of social upheaval upon her life will be." But her long isolationist tradition is ending. The movement is towards Europe. Most of her writers are deep in politics. "Literature in the meantime waits."

The Soviet novel of to-day wants to be an instrument of knowledge applied to the great task of the time. It wants to be a picture of its vast collective effort. Purposefulness, co-ordination with the social whole, and an approach to imaginative work as a form of knowledge—these are the three main characteristics of the new Soviet novel. . . . The story turns on the rivalry of the three relays of workmen engaged in a particular part of construction, which of them will work better and hold the red flag. The issue is how many mixtures of concrete can be made in an hour. The story is told with extraordinary *brio*. . . .

Even admitting the *brio*, it is not surprising to learn that there is great interest "in the classic literatures of the world" and that translations of them are numerous and widely read.

Two essays remain: one dealing

with Italy, the other with Scandinavia. The former contains many comments on many writers—"In the recent works of Bontempelli we get the highest degree of actuality and life," is a fairly typical example—but little concerning the tendencies of modern Italian fiction. It reads like an inventory compiled in pseudo-scientific jargon. Fortunately, however, the last essay—Erik Mesterton's—is one of the best in the collection.

The chief tendencies in Scandinavian fiction are clearly and briefly revealed. "The flight to the Past" school produces the idyllic peasant novel which "as a picture of life is false, since it presents as peacefully existing an order of things which in reality is already destroyed or disintegrating . . . Superficially realistic, the tone betrays the falsity of attitude: the provincial idyll is of the past, and these writers can afford to be charmed because they are safely out of it."

Mr. Mesterton then reviews the work of the "post-war" school—the "subjective" experimenters and, finally, gives a lucid account of the proletarian and the psycho-analytic novel.

This essay, and those of Mr. Hugh Walpole and Mr. Pritchett are notable achievements. Collectively, they occupy about sixty pages, but—in that narrow compass the tendencies of the modern novel are clearly revealed.

This is a provocative, informative, exciting book.

CLAUDE HOUGHTON

Philosophical Studies. By the late J. MCT. E. McTAGGART, D. Litt., edited by S. V. KEELING, M. A. (Edward Arnold and Co., London. 12s. 6d.)

Here are eleven essays in McTaggart's characteristic style. Most of the essays have appeared elsewhere and are well known to the students of his philosophy. Still Dr. Keeling deserves our thanks for gathering in a volume what was not easily available.

McTaggart was probably alone among his contemporaries to rely ex-

clusively on deductive reasoning in order to determine the ultimate nature of reality. He did not, it is true, adopt the dialectic method of his master, Hegel; but, nevertheless, from two such slender empirical premises as "something exists" and "what exists is differentiated," he built up his whole system by *a priori* reasoning, without any further reference to facts of experience.

When the prestige of science stood even higher than it does to-day, and

when philosophy was urged to take note of the results of science, or at least to adopt its method, McTaggart stoutly maintained that neither the results nor the method of science could be of any use to philosophy. At the same time he held philosophical knowledge to be of great practical importance, inasmuch as it decided some of the vital questions of the human spirit. In his opinion philosophy alone can tell us the nature and destiny of human personality, whether there is a God, and what we can hope for in the future.

He was favourably inclined towards mysticism, and believed it to be "one of the great forces of the world's history" (p. 46). Indeed his own philosophising ended in a form of mysticism. But there is a difference between his mysticism and other current forms. He did not base his mysticism on a mystical faculty of intuition, but supported it all along on intellectual reasoning of a very high order. He saw that "a mysticism which ignored the claims of the understanding would indeed be doomed" (p. 272). But he saw nothing wrong in a mysticism postulated by the understanding itself and reached by it through self-transcendence. As all mystics, he believed in the unreality of time, but his grounds were thoroughly rational. His main argument is that the characteristics of past, present, and future are essential to time; whatever occurs in a time-series must possess all these characteristics: they are incompatible with one another, and so time is an illusion (p. 281).

McTaggart had an original view of eternity. The eternal is no doubt taken as timeless, but whereas it is generally represented as ever present, McTaggart regarded it as the extreme future. His view is that what appears as later in time is really a more adequate representation of the timeless reality, and "since the future is later than the present, we must place the timeless reality in the future, and at the end of the future" (p. 147).

McTaggart did not believe in God,

but believed in the immortality of man. The immortality of man did not mean for him merely continued existence after death. He believed, like the Hindus, in the plurality of lives both before the birth and after the death of our present bodies. For him spirits alone are ultimately real, and his Absolute is an impersonal society of such spirits bound together in a relation of love, in which both subject and object enjoy equal importance. His earlier position was that the relation could not be knowledge or volition, in which either the object or the subject predominated, so that neither knowledge nor volition was absolutely real. This view is developed in one of his earliest writings, *The Further Determination of the Absolute*, which is the longest paper included in this volume. His later view, expressed in a note to the second edition of *Studies in Hegelian Cosmology*, in which the above paper, in a slightly modified form, originally appeared, was "that every state of consciousness in absolute reality is a state alike of knowledge, of volition and of love". It would have been well if that note had been reproduced here, or the editor had pointed out somewhere this change in McTaggart's view.

The last paper, *An Ontological Idealism*, which is a reprint of his contribution to *Contemporary British Philosophy*, I, of course gives the maturest expression of his philosophical views, but this paper, which covers less than twenty pages, is a summary of his masterpiece, *The Nature of Existence*, which runs to nearly eight hundred pages of closely reasoned philosophical writing, and it cannot naturally be expected that this bald summary will clearly express all his ideas. Especially his theory of determining correspondence, which is essential to his philosophy, is left rather obscure.

McTaggart was undoubtedly one of England's greatest philosophers in recent times. *The Nature of Existence* is classed with such recognized classics as the *Enneads* of Plotinus, the *Ethics*

of Spinoza and the *Encyclopædia* of Hegel. But it is doubtful whether McTaggart will ever have many followers. His position that both unity and difference are equally fundamental in ultimate reality, as well as his view that spirits have parts (which are their perceptions) and perceive one another directly and as having parts, will remain incomprehensible to many. But in spite of these and other difficulties involved in his conclusions, the philosophy of McTaggart is one of

the finest examples of sustained effort at honest, consecutive thinking, which is at once subtle and profound. Besides, his writing is a perfect model of what philosophical writing should be, always clear and precise, and free from all manner of verbosity. All the virtues of McTaggart's thought and writing are fully present in these essays, and no serious student can study them without lasting profit and enlightenment.

RASVIHARY DAS

Thirty Years in the Wilderness. By P. G. McCULLOCH (Rider & Co., London. 7s. 6d.)

This book describes the experiences of an unbeliever who, through doubt and despair, has fought his way to truth. It is the cry of a man delighting in the freedom of his inner self; but it is also a passionate protest against the meaningless ritualism and outworn dogmas of orthodox Christianity.

After endless adventures among the great philosophies and religions of the world, the author is convinced at last of a "definite purpose underlying the whole scheme of creation," of Karma, of Reincarnation, and of Free Will. All the ills of life are the offspring of

our own deeds; and man, the doer, is master of his fate. Freedom, therefore, is not a gift from without, but a conquest through man's sleepless endeavours; he has freedom even to err. Emancipation may be the result of the evolutionary process of one age or of many a cycle of births and deaths; hence the necessity for reincarnation.

The way out of the perplexities of life lies through the eradication of all the giant passions and desires that obscure our real self; and such an eradication springs from love and the total annihilation of the lower self. Here we find the wise and reasonable ethical system of Buddhism melting into the idealism of the Vedantists.

R. S. DESIKAN

Outline of Modern Belief: Modern Science, Modern Thought, Religious Thought, Vol. I. Edited By J. W. N. SULLIVAN and WALTER GRIERSON. (George Newnes Ltd., London. 1s.)

This first of about twenty-four proposed parts of the *Outline of Modern Belief* presents "certain facts, about a number of things, as well as beliefs for which firm knowledge cannot as yet be claimed". The Editors truthfully remark:—

So far as the findings of Science, in many directions, from finality and certainty that the title of this work... is as appropriate for modern science as for the other branches of modern thought that are dealt with.

The section with the promising title, "The Development of Religious Thought and Modern Discovery" is disappointingly confined almost exclusively to tracing the historical evolution of the three Western religions, especially the influence of the Hebrew religion and Greek philosophy on modern Christianity. It takes us back only to the nomads of Mesopotamia and the Babylonian and Assyrian Empire, and quite ignores India's significant place in the development of world thought. *Outline of Modern Western Belief* would, therefore, be a more appropriate title for this book.

K. F. V.

Coleridge on Imagination. By I. A. RICHARDS, Litt. D. (Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner and Co., Ltd., London. 8s. 6d.)

To expound Coleridge is to expound a theory of poetry, a psychology of meaning and an idealistic philosophy. It is no exaggeration to say that the aspiration of Coleridge and of Mr. Richards is largely an achievement in ancient Indian poetics. The *Dhvani* school states the fundamentals of the situation in well-nigh final words. Its analysis of meaning is so thorough that a wholly new effort like that of Mr. Richards appears a sheer waste of energy. Science will advance much more rapidly if the Indian contribution is assimilated.

Three different types of meanings are distinguished, the usual literal meaning, the figurative meaning and the suggested meaning. *Dhvanyaloka* begins with the statement that *Dhvani* or resonance is the soul of poetry :

काव्यस्यात्मा ध्वनिः । यत्रार्थः शब्दो वा
तमर्थमुपसर्जनीकृतं स्वार्थो । व्यङ्ग्यः काव्य
विशेषः स ध्वनिरिति सूरिभिः कथितः ॥
ध्वन्यालोक १, १३.

Every word trails some kind of meaning-fringe and the poet by his extraordinary skill (अलौकिक चमत्कार) summons up a thing of beauty. *Dhvani* falls into two types: (1) *Avivakshita-Vachya* where the suggestion overshadows the literal meaning, and (2) *Vivakshītānyapara-Vachya*, in which the literal meaning leads to the suggested sense. Two sub-classes of the first type are distinguished:—(a) *Atyantatiraskatya-Vachya*, that in which the obvious meaning is completely abandoned as in "Brutus is an honourable man" towards the close of Antony's oration and (b) *Arthanatarasankramita*, in which the surface sense leads to the suggested meaning as in the famous lines,

Full many a flower is born to blush unseen,
And waste its sweetness on the desert air.

The second main variety, *Vivakshītānyapara*, again, falls into two classes (a) *Asamlakshyakrama*, where the transition between the usual and the

new meaning is imperceptible and (b) *Samlakshyakrama Vyangya*, where it is distinctly perceptible. The former includes some of the finest dramatic achievements in poetry as in Lear's pitiful "Undo the button," while on the verge of insanity. This effect is again analysed from the standpoint of the many different types of emotion suggested and their permutations and combinations. The second class involves a gradual transition between the usual sense and the suggestion. Much meditative poetry is of this kind, of which Gray's *Elegy* is an admirable example.

The distinction between imagination and fancy forms an integral part of the *Dhvani* theory. Imagination is the true poetic power and involves the two-fold activity of vision and expression. Of the two parts of the theory, *rasa* and *dhvani*, *rasa* corresponds to the Intuition and *dhvani* to the Expression or Communication, to use the terms popularised by Croce. This is distinguished sharply from fancy or *alankara*. In fact poetry is distinguished into three classes from the standpoint of suggestion:—(1) The best kind, in which suggestion is dominant; (2) the middling kind, in which suggestion is in the background, and (3) the lowest, in which figures and conceits abound.

Indian poetics does not mix up metaphysics and poetry. But the philosophical background colours the different theories of *rasa* or æsthetic experience. The realistic tradition makes use of the Sankhya theory of world-evolution and interprets the æsthetic emotion on the analogy of the cosmic panorama (*nati* or dancer) developing an eye to enable the Spirit to behold it. The three-fold strands of primordial matter (*Prakriti*)—*sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*—stain the white radiance of Spirit (*Purusha*) both in life and art. And, as is well known, the Upanishadic idealism thinks of art as capturing the eternal unheard melody that is in the heart of things—*Nada Brahma, asrutam srutani*.

Mr. Richards' present book seems

like a skirmish before the real battle begins and arouses expectations of im-

portant future developments.

M. A. VENKATA RAO

Faiths Men Live By. By JOHN CLARK ARCHER. (Thomas Nelson and Sons, New York.)

A History of Religions. By DENIS SAURAT. (Jonathan Cape, London. 12s. 6d.)

Fact and Faith. By J. B. S. HALDANE, F. R. S. (Watts and Co., London. 1s.)

"No one can study ancient philosophies seriously without perceiving that the striking similitude of conception between all—in their exoteric form very often, in their hidden spirit invariably—is the result of no mere coincidence, but of a concurrent design: and that there was, during the youth of mankind, one language, one knowledge, one universal religion, when there were no churches, no creeds or sects, but when every man was a priest unto himself."—*The Secret Doctrine*, I. 341

It is just because of this once universally diffused Wisdom that Mr. Archer is constantly struck by the "amazing similarities" (p. 46*i*) found in the world's religions. How did these similarities arise? Mr. Archer says that nearly every faith was influenced at its beginning by a previous one (p. 5.), and that on the form side they have all sprung from primitivism (p. 2.) If this were so, one result would be that each succeeding religion would be superior both in content and form to its predecessor, but we know as a historical fact that this is not so. On the contrary some of the old religious philosophies *e. g.*, *The Upanishads*, are infinitely superior to their modern heirs while the form side is seen to have degenerated a symbolism full of meaning as presented in the Mysteries into empty exoteric ceremonialism and ugly phallicism. We have to abandon Mr. Archer's theory. There is another propounded by Krishna in the *Bhagavad-Gita* where he speaks of the rise and fall of religious ideas. "I produce myself among creatures whenever

there is a decline of virtue and an insurrection of vice and injustice in the world; and thus I incarnate from age to age." That is, when unrighteousness flourishes, when the Dark Age approaches and the "mighty art" is lost, there is a recrudescence of Light and Wisdom. This is an ancient teaching well known in the East and hinted at, perhaps unconsciously to himself, by Mr. Archer. It will explain the phenomenon he notes but fails to understand. Once grant the existence of a body of Truth which advancing human consciousness rediscovers for itself, and the difficulties standing in the way of Mr. Archer vanish. He writes:—

The great reformers have not taught a new religion; they have sought to deepen the spiritual life of men. They have imposed upon mankind no authority beyond the spirit... The honour that we do ourselves must perish, if it does not flow from reverence for our ancient leaders. Nor is that true honour to the present which tacitly insults the memory of the past. It is not modern to scoff at Shankara, Buddha, Jesus and Aquinas... We profit by the race's long experience; time makes ancient *forms* uncouth, while ancient good is everlasting... Mohammed, Buddha, Jesus and Confucius were not acquainted with each other. They never walked a common road, then parted. Had they trod the common way, they would not have parted... Differences have been established by disciples... A faith may have peculiar *values* for its followers, but truth is one, and contradiction in essentials must appear unreasonable, immoral and spiritually deficient. Sentiment may not do duty as conviction. (pp. 469-70)

Did not the great reformers walk a common road? How else account for Mr. Archer's own conclusions? How else could we find often identical teachings in ancient China, Egypt, Mexico, South America and India, many of which are considered by Mr. Archer? Truth is one. It is that Truth which the great reformers have taught—that same Truth which the courageous and persistent student must rediscover for himself and recognize as that Wisdom known in all

ages as Brahma-Vidya or Theo-Sophia, Bodhi-Dharma or Wisdom-Religion.

Mr. Archer is a Christian who sees in his chosen faith "peculiar values for his followers," but he is a sincere searcher for Truth.

Mr. Saurat's point of view is very different. He too calls himself a Christian and sees in Christianity the only saving religion for man: "The conception of Divine Love is like a streak of lightning in the night: there was no light before . . . This is the essential proof of the reality of Jesus" (p. 196). The 'oriental religions' afford him no light or satisfaction; he writes: "We can do nothing with Oriental religions." (*Including Christianity?*)

The book is cleverly written, but is not a history, nor is it a philosophical survey. It is a brief for Christianity and belittles Hinduism, Buddhism, Occultism, Mysticism and Theosophy; many scriptures are held up to ridicule in order to prove the superiority of those of the Christians and the Jews.

Professor Haldane strikes a fresh

chord, a natural modulation from these studies of religious history. While his premises as to the origin of the earth, man, life etc., would not be accepted by the Ancient Philosophers, he is honest and sincere, and in more than one instance comes closer to the Archaic Teachings than Mr. Archer and Mr. Saurat. His insistence on Law and Order in place of a capricious miracle-working and most inhuman extra-cosmic god; his substitution of a scientific basis for brotherhood for wrangling adherence to impossible creeds or sentimental emotionalism, and his recognition of reincarnation as a possible and probable law of Nature in its cyclic progress, which he explains in his own way, are a relief to minds tortured out of all recognition by the grotesque absurdities of religionists. The book is bright and entertaining. As an agnostic Professor Haldane comes nearer Truth than those he laughingly dubs the "god-makers". But he chills rather than warms the heart.

T.

Morality and Reality: An Essay on Life. By E GRAHAM HOWE, M.B., B. S. (Gerald Howe Ltd., London. 6s.)

Here we have a naturalistic interpretation of life and the law underlying it, which Dr. Howe calls the "Law of Reality." Our view of reality should not contradict the facts of life. Dr. Howe's view of reality transforms morality to "a matter of form. It is a behaviour about Reality." Morality to him is essentially practical and clinical. The criterion of morality is not its approximation to truth but its acceptance of the Law of Reality. That morality is good which is the same as Reality and moves with Reality. The purpose of morality is both "a convenience and convention". Dr. Howe tells us that we should take life as a whole, not rejecting its unhappy aspects but accepting the stark facts of life and fighting them. He discusses

in two lectures the function of education, and the part played by the family, the school and society in the development of the morals of the child. He is not in favour of repression. He wants us not to thwart our instincts but to train them. The school, the family and society should make the child, and educate him to accept the Law of Reality. Happiness is conditioned not by getting what we want but by wanting what we can get.

Dr. Howe's interpretation of morality arises out of a confusion between the naturalistic and the ethical view of life. We cannot surrender our reason and make instinct our guide. To reduce morality to instincts and emotions is to mistake material laws for moral laws. Dr. Howe has given us physiology and biology—not ethics.

P. NAGARAJA RAO

The Mysteries of the Atom. By H. A. WILSON, M. A., M. Sc., F. R. S. (Chapman and Hall, Ltd., London. 10s. 6d.)

The distinguished author of this book is Professor of Physics at the Rice Institute, Houston, Texas. He is well known as a contributor in no small measure to the researches that have so completely revolutionised the outlook on atomic and cosmical physics since the beginning of the present century.

Excluding a valuable and extended series of appendices for the benefit of the more mathematically minded, he tells us, in the space of some 110 pages, the story of this revolution in physical thought with a lucidity and a simplicity that brings it within the reach of all people of education.

What, in brief, does this amount to? We may say of nineteenth-century physics that it was a conception of matter as consisting of small particles or atoms to which the system of Newtonian Mechanics was rigidly applicable; further, that these particles, comprising the whole of the material part of the universe, were contained and distributed in a space that was completely filled by a medium known as the ether, and that this ether was of the nature of an elastic fluid. Further, light was regarded as a phenomenon of wave motion in the ether. Finally, we may add that inasmuch as each particle of matter was behaving and moving in strict accordance with the laws of motion known to be applicable to heavy bodies, not only could such motions and the consequences of the mutual interactions of these atomic units be calculated with great accuracy, but their future positions and inter-

relationships were also accurately predictable. There was thus embodied in the scheme of physics of the nineteenth century the logical corollary of a principle of determinism.

In the world of Western science, theories legitimately hold the field so long as they conform with mathematical analysis and the test of experimental investigation. When either or both break down, the theories must be replaced. That has happened in fact to the whole field of atomic physics. One by one these cherished conceptions have had to go. Matter is now regarded as electricity and nothing else. In place of the simple "one" of the atom, we have the central "proton" of positive electricity, with its attendant systems of "electrons" of negative electricity. Also, as with matter, so with the "medium" in which it is situated, and with the light which travels through that medium. The ether has had to go the way of the atom. Its so-called geometrical and physical properties are in fact the properties of "empty space". In place of the wave-theory, too, we now have a partial reversion to the corpuscular theory of Newtonian days, the corpuscles in question being what are called "photons".

So we have our electrons, our protons, and our photons. And finally, in place of the principle of determinism of the nineteenth century, the idea of "certainties" has had to be replaced by that of "possibles," and so we now have a theory of probabilities. All this, and indeed much more, Professor Wilson tells us in his fascinating and well-written book, which we most heartily commend to all.

IVOR B. HART

CORRESPONDENCE

PSEUDO-RELIGIONS IN JAPAN

The morning sun of the New Year, 1935, rose upon an array of pseudo-religions in Japan. It was not so a year ago. Many of the Japanese pseudo-religions have arisen within the last half-year. Only a month ago one of them with the beautiful name, "Kodo Nichigetsu Kyo" or "Imperial Way of the Sun and the Moon Religion," was ordered by the police to be dissolved. Nevertheless, these folk-religions are sweeping the country like wild fire. Though they are mis-called religions, still they are doing much to appease the people's discontent with the times.

Unlike similar religions which have long existed among certain classes of people, the new cults contain in their faith such elements as can ease the sufferings of people by simple means. "Hito no Michi" or "Way of Man" is the largest cult. It is a strong concoction of Shintoism, Christianity and Buddhism. No deep thought, however, has been adopted from such world-religions, but only an easy way of salvation. The salvation of Hito no Michi is so simple that a believer can lay all his sufferings on the abbot of the church, who on his part bears them in behalf of God. Under the heavy weight of human sufferings gathered from each believer the abbot is said to be mentally and physically weakened in the course of the month until he gets relieved of them all at once towards the month's end, when a purification ceremony takes place. No religion can be simpler in easing the people's anxieties. The believer does not need to be taught any doctrines beyond elemental ethical principles. These he is taught at the church by evangelists under the Imperial Rescript on Education.

This church has a new feature, quite timely when there are millions out of work throughout the country,

i. e., giving a free morning meal to the congregation after the service at dawn. The practice of early rising must be a service to the employer. There is no reason why it should fail to obtain support from business people. Hito no Michi has come to be supported by the proprietor of a large publishing house, the Shuncho Sha, to such a degree that he is on the governing board of this religious organization and all of his employees now are members of this spiritual society.

Hito no Michi can claim an important position at the present day, when the majority of people are ready to grasp at a straw, but it is questionable whether it should be called a religion. As an advocate of early rising it no doubt has a right to exist, but there are too many pseudo-religions in Japan which can claim no credit. The founders of some of these are people with a questionable past. They talk of ethics, but also of miracles and salvation through monetary sacrifice to the deity personified in themselves. It is taught that God's message experienced and given by the priests of those religions must never be neglected by the followers. A poor man may be told to work harder for his ailment of indigestion; an icher one, to make pecuniary offerings to God. Strangely enough, great temples are being built in various large cities to house these pseudo-religious bodies, and the number of their followers is increasing.

These new churches excel in propaganda. They use the newest technique of journalism. What they want most is to increase their numbers. In a sense, they are like Nazi volunteer labour groups. It is interesting that many converted Communists are serving their cause and still more young unemployed journalists who have been walking the streets are now in their camps.

KANESADA HANAZONO

ENDS AND SAYINGS

" ——— ends of verse

And sayings of philosophers."

HUDIBRAS.

The aims and ideals of the League of Nations' organization for fostering *rapprochement* among thoughtful minds everywhere are widely known. One of the most significant publications of its International Institute for Intellectual Co-operation at Paris is the fourth in a series of Open Letters, just published under the title, *East and West*. In this epistolary exchange Prof. Gilbert Murray, the eminent humanist who heads the Geneva Committee of Intellectual Co-operation, and Dr Rabindranath Tagore discuss those aims and the obstacles in the way of their realization.

Each is eminently qualified to speak for the culture which produced him, and their respective views present an interesting difference of emphasis quite characteristic of Oriental and Occidental attitudes.

Prof. Murray sees a major cause of friction in the exaggerated regard for the surface differences of those of unlike backgrounds. "Infinitesimal peculiarities are noted and interpreted as having some great moral significance." And he regards as the first step towards international understanding "a recognition that our national habits are not the unfailing canon by which those of other peoples must be judged."

A long step from insularity has been taken when that becomes a working conviction. If only men would free themselves from unessential and accidental backgrounds and meet each other as *human beings*, as responsible participants in a human family, and as cultural agents there would remain little scope for misunderstanding. The modern nationalistic complex bars the way; false patriotism, that feeds the sense of separateness and exclusiveness.

The East has grievances deeper than prejudice against the Occident, as Dr. Tagore points out. The strain of idealism which runs through Western thought, the Western social conscience, the sense of fair play and honest zeal for truth which save the West from utter bleak materialism, are like clear water under the oily scum of brutal strength and greed, of "terrible efficiency," of ruthlessness, which is the aspect that the East has learned to recognize and fear. The attempt of Eastern minds to penetrate below that surface film to realize their kinship with the West is an arduous adventure of faith, beside which the pearl-diver's daring fades into insignificance. It is not the Westernized Oriental who can succeed in that attempt, for, as Dr. Tagore suggests, only the mind "matured

in the atmosphere of a profound knowledge of its own country, and of the perfect thoughts that have been produced in that land, is ready to accept and assimilate the cultures that come from foreign countries."

Prof. Murray cites Mme. Curie's recognition that during the World War "the intellectual leaders in the various nations had been not better but, if anything, worse than the common people in the bitterness and injustice of their feelings". Intellectual interchange alone will never bridge the gap. Dr. Tagore points out that the wide commerce of ideas which improved communications make possible has often augmented external differences instead of bringing humanity together.

It is difficult to convince people, on the intellectual plane alone, of the fundamental unity of the human family. What is needed is a new orientation of attitude, an altogether different kind of ideation. This can be achieved only by inducing an essentially moral outlook in the life of individuals all over the world. The morally awakened man or woman alone will be able to perceive the basic unity and harmony of the whole human family, and therefore to succeed in expressing that perception in actual life.

Religions, which should unify mankind, are among the chief factors strengthening separateness, not alone in the East, always

preoccupied with things of the Spirit, but also in the West, for all its absorption in material interests. The world's faiths can be harmonized, but only by emphasizing the basic elements common to all and minimising unique accretions. Dr. Tagore condemns sectarian prejudices and calumnies in no uncertain terms:—

Men have often made perverse use of their religion, building with it permanent walls to ensure their own separateness. Christianity, when it minimises its spiritual truth, which is universal, and emphasizes its dogmatic side, which is a mere accretion of time, has the same effect of creating a mental obstruction which leads to the misunderstanding of people who are outside its pale.... The fact stands out clearly to-day that the Divinity dwelling within the heart of man cannot be kept immured any longer in the darkness of particular temples.

In that direction and not in mere intellectual appreciation of foreign cultures lies the way. Prof. Murray's method is

healing the discords of the political and material world by the magic of that inward community of spiritual life which even amid our worst failures reveals to us Children of Men our brotherhood and our high destiny.

Humanity needs to be brought under the awakening influence of a spiritual philosophy grounded on the principle of self-responsibility of man, with its necessary implication of the law of Karma-Reincarnation, and on the fact of human interdependence, with its corollaries of collective progress and common evolution.

AN

Point out the "Way"—however dimly,
and lost among the host—as does the evening
star to those who tread their path in darkness;
—*The Voice of the Silence*

THE ARYAN PATH

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"THAT IS WHY I LIVE HAPPILY"

So said the Great Buddha.

The world is unhappy. Every one is longing for peace, for a tranquil mind and a heart which throbs good will for all. The great Buddha has been called a pessimist because he had the courage to state the truth he fully perceived that the world was chasing suffering and sorrow when it talked of wanting happiness and bliss. In numerous ways he taught the truth of pain and the ceasing of pain.

During this month the Buddhists will celebrate the triple festival of the birth, enlightenment and passing of Gautama. It is appropriate therefore to offer to our readers a condensed sermon of the Buddha in which he shows how it came to pass that he lived happily. Our civilization affirms its desire to learn the truth; will it accept the advice and instruction of the Buddha founded on his own personal experience?

—Thus have I heard.

On a certain occasion the Exalted One was staying near Ālavī, at Cowpath in Sinsapa Grove, lodging on the leaf-strewn ground.

Now Hatthaka of Ālavī was wandering there afoot, and as he went along he saw the Exalted One in that place, seated on the ground strewn with leaves. On seeing him he approached and saluting him sat down at one side. So seated Hatthaka said:

"Pray sir, does the Exalted One live happily?"

"Yes, my lad, I live happily. I am one of those who live happily in the world."

"Bui, sir, the winter nights are cold, the dark half on the month is the time of snowfall. Hard is the ground trampled by the hoofs of cattle, thin the carpet of fallen leaves, sparse are the leaves of the tree, cold are the saffron robes and cold the gale of wind that blows."

Then said the Exalted One :

"Still, my lad, I live happily. Of those who live happily in the world I am one. Now, my lad, I will question you about this and do you reply as you think fit. What think you, my lad? Suppose a housefather or housefather's son has a house with a gabled roof, plastered inside and out, with well-fitting doors and casements. Therein is a couch spread with a long-fleeced woollen rug, a bed-spread of white wool, a coverlet embroidered with flowers, spread with a costly skin of antelope, having a canopy overhead and a scarlet cushion at each end. Here is a lamp burning and four wives to wait upon him with all their charms. Now what think you, my lad? Would he live happily or not? How think you?"

"Yes, he would, sir. He is one of those who live happily in the world."

"Well now, my lad, what think you? Would there not arise in that housefather or housefather's son torments of body or of mind that are born of lust so that, tortured by them, he would live unhappily?"

"They would arise, sir."

"Again, would there not arise torments of body or of mind, born of malice, so that, tortured by them, he would live unhappily?"

"They would arise, sir."

"Again, would not there arise torments of body or of mind, born of delusion, so that, tortured by them, he would live unhappily?"

"They would arise, sir."

"Well, my lad, as to those torments of body or of mind born of lust, of malice, of delusion, tortured by which he would live unhappily, that lust, that malice, that delusion, have been abandoned by the Tathāgata, cut off at the root, made like a palm-tree stump, made unable to become again, of a nature not to arise again in future time. That is why I live happily."

Lust, malice and delusion are shown to be wombs of pain and anguish. The lust of modern men and women is encouraged by, say, birth-control practices, founded on unproven theories. Their malice is a natural growth of the competitive system which flourishes in school and mart. And stupefying delusion is the outcome of minds enslaved by senses and passions, minds which make strife and thus produce unhappiness.

Do men and women desire happiness? They say they do. In reality most people want excitement; only a few take the way of the Buddha and prove out for themselves that what he said in the above sermon is an eternal verity

THE LAW OF PERIODICITY

[The Hindu *Chakra* is the symbol of Cycles which the Greeks knew under the term—*Kuklos*. They celebrated the Sacred Mysteries of *Kuklos Anaghês*, “the Unavoidable Cycle” or “the Circle of Necessity” which denoted the period of the post-mortem states of the soul between two incarnations and also the longer period taken by the Eternal Pilgrims to complete their round of evolution in the cosmic field. The ancients divided time into endless cycles, wheels within wheels, all such periods being of various durations, and each marking the beginning or the end of some event either cosmic, mundane, physical, or metaphysical. There were cycles of only a few years, and cycles of immense duration, the great Orphic cycle, referring to the ethnological change of races, lasting 120,000 years, and the cycle of Cassandrus of 136,000, which brought about a complete change in planetary influences and their correlations between men and gods—a fact entirely lost sight of by modern astrologers.

It is necessary to emphasise the universality of the Law of Periodicity. Not only are there vast or long historical cycles but the Law of Rhythmic Repetition also works in small events of every individual life. Bodily diseases, for example, certain types of fever run their own cyclic course, so do human moods of depression or elation. The cyclic law prevails everywhere. It prevails in every kingdom of nature and encompasses the vast manifested universe.

In these two articles the subject is dealt with: The first demonstrates the activity of the Law of Periodicity in modern astronomy and meteorology. The second examines the Spenglerian view of cycles in European History.—Eds.]

I.—CYCLES AND THEIR MEANING

[**Jacques W. Redway**, is the doyen of American geographers and has an international reputation. He has written many books, the first of which was published as long ago as 1887.—Eds.]

Our English word “cycle” is a heritage from Greek literature, but we may trace it back beyond heroic times, for it has the tang of the Sanscrit; indeed it seems to have been born in Chaldea. The oldest cycle known must be credited to the astronomers of the far east. In the literature of the Greeks it must have been a term familiar to *hoi poloi* with whom it designated a circle, a ring, a wheel, the vault of the sky, and any orbital movement.

In English speech a cycle is still restricted to the cult of science. It is a series of events or conditions

that recur at regular intervals of uniform duration. In popular cant there is a tendency to apply the word to periods that vary in time and in character. A meteorologist who is an authority in that science recently wrote, “Our weather comes in cycles, warm and cold, wet and dry, etc.” Such a construction is contrary to the literal meaning of the word, but it has the sanction of newspaper use.

The cycle is primarily a function of astronomy, a period of time when heavenly bodies recur in certain positions, especially those

that have to do with the activities of humanity. Planetary bodies revolve about the sun in regular orbits, each in an unchanging period of time. Each revolution is one unit of a cycle—and so long as they continue so to move, and so long as numbers have least common multiples, there will be cycles. The year of the earth is a familiar example. It is a long trip from start to finish—more than half a billion miles bowling along at the rate of eighteen miles a second, getting to the starting point without measurable gain or loss of time. Other planets too whirl around the sun, each creating a cycle or “year” of its own. One of the planetary cycles, that of Jupiter, is a factor in the earth’s climate, as we shall see.

Were the earth’s axis perpendicular to the plane of the ecliptic, the weather conditions in places in the same latitude would vary but little during the year. There would be no seasons. The inclination of the axis, however, brings the northern hemisphere under the nearly vertical rays of the sun in June, and under very oblique rays in December. Thereby is created the cycle of the seasons. A most important factor in the affairs of human life. There are but few events in the world’s history in which the cycle of the seasons has not played a part.

Humanity hardly thinks of the day as a cycle; but in its effects it is the most far-reaching of all. At either pole of the earth an observer merely turns around, but at the equator he whisks along at the

rate of one thousand miles an hour—a part of the time in sunlight, a part in the darkness of night.

Our forbears may not have been wise in the intricacies of astronomy but they were acquainted with cycles of which nowadays we rarely hear. Ask the man in the street, or even the professor on the lecture platform, about the Metonic cycle—and most likely he will be wondering in his mind from what asylum you recently escaped. Nevertheless in the astronomy of the ancients it was a most important milepost; it was the period after which new moons recurred on the same day of the year. Two hundred and twenty-five trips of the moon around the earth, requiring about nineteen years, constituted a Metonic cycle. We moderns have discarded it, substituting a single lunation or revolution of the moon around the earth, a time of a little more than twenty-nine and one-half days. To this lunar cycle we have tried to fit twelve months of crazy construction—incidentally, lunacy and craziness are synonyms.

Certain eclipses of the sun as well as those of the moon occur at regular intervals, thereby constituting cycles. One of them, of the sun, discovered many centuries ago by Chaldean astronomers, bears the name “Saros”. It is a cycle approximately of eighteen years and eleven days. Once an eclipse has occurred it will recur with the passage of each cycle, but visible in another locality. The eclipse visible in New York January 24, 1925,

is due again in 1943, 1961, and 1979. According to Professor Luyten, Harvard Assistant in Astronomy, it will be a spectacle for New Yorkers again in 3075—provided the sky on the appointed day is not overcast.

That the complexion of the sun is sometimes impaired by spots was known to the Chinese more than sixteen centuries ago. Years ago—several hundred of them—a Jesuit priest told his superior about the maculae his small telescope was revealing. He was sternly rebuked and informed that the maculae were nothing but imperfections in his eyesight. Galileo also was made to recant all that his telescope was telling him. Nevertheless each was able to laugh last. Not only were their observations confirmed, but out of them a sunspot cycle in time was evolved. Sunspots occur in increasing and decreasing number uniformly as to time, thereby constituting a cycle. The time when they are most numerous is technically the "sunspot maxima," and it coincides closely with the perihelion, or the time when the planet Jupiter is nearest the Sun. Another cycle, seemingly related to that of the sunspots, has a period of thirty-three years, or about three sunspot cycles. This, the "Brueckner cycle" has an interesting history. Professor Brueckner's research in climatology extends backward for more than two centuries. He finds that it pertains to the rise and the fall of waters in certain lakes and to the opening of the navigation of the rivers in the same basins—

therefore covering temperature and rainfall in alternating periods. But Sir Francis Bacon antedates Professor Brueckner by a century. In one of his essays he writes:—

They say it is observed in the Low Countries (I know not what part) that every five and thirty years, the same kind and suit of years comes about again, as great frosts, great wet, great droughts, warm winters, summers with little heat, and the like.

Professor Brueckner's researches pertain to the eastern continent: of their application to the western continent little is known.

The relation of sunspot cycles to world weather has been one of stormy controversy for many years. More than half a century ago Professor Maxwell found that the time of sunspot maxima corresponded with the seasons of generous rainfall in India. That meant also the coincidence of bountiful cotton crops and financial prosperity. Maxwell's discovery aroused great interest, and meteorologists all over the world began to investigate and to check results. The results were discordant. Thereby began the contention that remained unsettled until about twenty years ago. Some observers reported increased rainfall; others, a well-defined shortage of cloud water. In time, it was found that both sides were right. Extended observations have shown that, in general, on the coasts of the continental areas of the northern hemisphere there is an increase of rainfall during the times of sunspot maxima, and a decrease in their interiors. Half a dozen more cycles, however, are neces-

sary to determine the facts more accurately. Why the opposite conditions? The answer is not certain. It may be that a shifting of rain-bearing winds alternately north and south is the explanation, but that is a question yet to be determined. Another possibility is receiving investigation. A slight lowering of the earth's temperature, due to the dense clouds of gases emitted from the sun, may intercept heat that otherwise reaching the earth might increase the humidity and thereby the rainfall. That, however, is only a theory.

Within the past few years the relation of sunspot cycles to earthquakes has attracted the study of many scientists. Long ago, Professor Milne compiled a list of destructive earthquakes, discarding the feeble tremors of which there are many each year. In the meantime, Professor Wolf compiled a catalogue of sunspots, showing their occurrence by months, covering about the same period. Professors Huntington and Visser composed a symposium of the two in which it is shown that earthquakes are far more numerous when the number of sunspots is at the maximum. More observations are necessary to determine the indicated relation, but the information so far obtained seems to be almost conclusive.

Our ancient brethren were astronomers whose discoveries are not to be despised by moderns. They had computed the cycle of the year and the major planets—a Greek word meaning “wanderer”—very

closely. Modern astronomy has added but little to their knowledge of eclipses. The Magi knew about “novae”; and, when a nova hovered over Bethlehem some among their number journeyed thither in order to learn if a traditional prophecy had been fulfilled.

Our ancient observers viewed cycles in ways that we moderners are apt to reject. In the opinion of the ancients we had “temperaments” which were Jovial, Saturnine, Martial, or Mercurial according to which planet was nearest at the time when an infant came to earth. We have discarded their beliefs but we have not yet given them a fair investigation. Is there anything in this theory that was held for several centuries? The approach of the planet Jupiter to the sun creates tremendous physical disturbances; does it cause the sun to emit rays that may affect life on the earth? We now know that ultra-violet rays are more or less essential to life; are there other rays that are similarly potent in one way or another? Two or three decades ago that question would have been regarded unworthy of investigation, but the more recent discovery of new and unknown rays has changed scientific opinion about such matters.

The belief that planetary cycles affect life and its activities is older than Christianity. Incidentally we must bear in mind that for several centuries the attitude of the Western Church toward the science of astronomy was “non credo”. In the score of years just past marvelous discoveries in radiology have

been made. It is now known that rays of solar energy—"emanations" we may call them—affect life and its activities adversely as well as beneficially. When a major planet approaches the sun, thereby creating tornadic disturbances, is it unreasonable to suppose that, in some way, they affect the earth? We may "suppose" but as yet the answer is not at hand.

The ancients certainly had great faith in cycles as affecting human emotions. They attributed the cause of many evils to the influence of heavenly bodies—stars, planets and comets. At one time the Litany contained the exorcism reading: "From the Turk, the

Comet, and the Devil; Good Lord, deliver us." At that time there was a widespread belief that comets were harbingers of war, or pestilence, or famine. Even to this day there is a belief that the fatal pandemic, the grippe, is due to the malign influence of the stars,—hence the name "influenza."

Inasmuch as the excitation both of the approaching body and of the sun are most intense at the time of perihelion, it is not unreasonable to assume that life on the earth may react thereto. Except as noted, however, evidence of such influences are wanting. The theory deserves investigation—but we must wait to see what we shall some time see.

JACQUES W. REDWAY

II.—SPENGLER'S THEORY OF HISTORIC CYCLES

[Quincy Howe is the Editor who has made *The Living Age* famous by his discriminative analysis of world-events. His book, *World Diary: 1929-1934*, has just appeared. Spengler was not the inventor of the idea that cycles mould human history. Dr. Eilers Petrie, the great Egyptologist, was the first in modern times to speak of them. It is, however, a very well-known teaching in ancient Hindu Philosophy.—EBS.]

In his masterpiece, *The Decline of the West*, Oswald Spengler set himself the task of "predetermining history," adopting the method of historical analogy. What is this method? What results has it yielded? How much respect does it deserve?

"The philosophy of the future," Spengler declares, italics and all, "expands into the conception of a *morphology of world history*." Humanity, he asserts, has brought forth seven great "Cultures"—Egyptian, Indian, Chinese, Classi-

cal, Arabian, Mayan and West European—all of which finally congealed into "Civilizations". Spengler defines culture in these words.

Culture is born in the moment when a great soul awakens out of the proto-spirituality (*Dem urse lenhaften Zustande*) of ever childish humanity, and detaches itself, a form from the formless, a bounded and mortal thing from the boundless and enduring. It blooms on the soil of an exactly-definable landscape to which plant-wise it remains bound. It dies when this soul has actualized the full sum of its

possibilities in the shape of peoples, languages, dogmas, arts, states, sciences, and it reverts into the proto-soul.

He then draws this contrast between Culture and Civilization:—

Every Culture has *its own* Civilization. In this work for the first time the two words, hitherto used to express an indefinite, more or less ethical distinction, are used in a *periodic* sense, to express a strict and necessary *organic succession*. The Civilization is the inevitable *destiny* of the Culture, and in this principle we obtain the viewpoint from which the deepest and gravest problems of historical morphology become capable of solution. Civilizations are the most external and artificial states of which a species of developed humanity is capable.

To illustrate his point, Spengler has devised three tables of what he calls "contemporary" spiritual, cultural and political epochs in the different Cultures. Thus he demonstrates that Cultures live exactly 1000 years and undergo identical changes at identical stages. Classical Culture, for instance, began in 1000 B. C. with Homer and the "Homeric Kings". Then came the age of the tyrants, the city state and the rise of Pericles and Themistocles. The cults of Dionysus and Orpheus replaced the early worship of Demeter. Socrates ushered in an age of "Enlightenment" which culminated in Plato and Aristotle. This period came to a conclusion with the rise of Alexander of Macedon and philosophy turned to Epicureanism and Stoicism. Civilization appeared when Rome conquered Greece.

Arabian Culture followed a parallel course. It began with the birth

of Christ and had its "Reformation" under the leadership of Mohammed. But Arabian Culture coincided with Roman Civilization and never fully expanded. In like manner, the Spanish conquistadors destroyed the Mayan Culture in the New World before it had exhausted its possibilities. But from what we know of Arabian, Classical and other Cultures, it is possible to trace parallel developments in all of them and to identify these with similar developments in Western Europe. Thus Spengler identifies the Siegfried legends as the "contemporaries" of Homer in Classical times and the Aryan hero-tales in India. The Egyptian pyramids, the Doric column, the basilica and the Romanesque and early Gothic cathedrals all appeared at corresponding periods in their respective Cultures. Martin Luther is the "contemporary" of Mohammed; Napoleon of Alexander; Goethe and Kant of Aristotle and Plato; Schopenhauer and Nietzsche of Epicurus and Zeno. Finally the years 1800 to 2000 in Europe correspond to the years 300 to 100 B. C. in Rome.

The first volume of *The Decline of the West*, "Form and Actuality," starts, in the words of its author, from the form-language of the great Cultures, attempts to penetrate to the deepest roots of their origin, and so provides itself with the basis for a science of the Symbolic. The second part, "World-historical Perspectives," starts from the *facts of actual life*, and from the historical practice of higher mankind seeks to obtain a quintessence of historical experience that we can set to work upon in the formation of

our own future.

Not only does Spengler indicate in great detail the parallels between the different Cultures; he defines the character of each :--

The Egyptian soul, conspicuously historical in its texture and impelled with primitive passion towards the infinite, perceived past and future as its *whole* world, and the present (which is identical with waking consciousness) appeared to him [the Egyptian] simply as the narrow common frontier of two immeasurable stretches.

In Indian Culture, on the other hand :-

We have the perfectly ahistoric soul. There is no pure Indian astronomy, no calendar, and therefore no history so far as history is the track of a conscious spiritual evolution.

But it is to the Classical, Arabian, and Western Cultures that he devotes most of his attention.

Spengler makes no secret of his prejudice against "the Greek who describes his ego as *soma* (body) and who lacks all idea of an inner development and therefore all real history, inward and outward". He prefers "the Magian soul of the Arabian Culture with its algebra, astronomy and alchemy, its mosaics and arabesques, its caliphates and mosques, and the sacraments and scriptures of the Persian, Jewish, Christian, 'post-Classical' and Manichaean religions". Above all he resents the Romans, whose Empire stifled the "Magian Soul" to which he devotes nearly one quarter of his entire second volume.

But he reserves his greatest enthusiasm for the "Faustian Soul" of Western Europe, since it justifies his entire work.

The Faustian soul looks for an immortality to follow the bodily end, a sort of marriage with endless space, and it disembodies the stone in its Gothic Thrust-system till at last nothing remained visible but the indwelling depth-and height-energy of this self-extension.

This yearning for the infinite has equipped Western man as he enters the period of Civilization to undertake such a study of world history as has never been made before and may never be made again since "we men of the Western Culture are, with our historical sense, an exception and not a rule". And Spengler offers his own theory of historical cycles as the best method of undertaking his appointed task.

From the standpoint of scholarship Spengler remains unchallenged. No important historian has yet detected any serious errors of fact in his interpretation of familiar material, and his interpretation of Arabian culture breaks new ground. His analysis of contemporary affairs also holds water. We have entered upon what was known in China as the period of "contending states" and what was known in Classical times as the "Punic Wars". To-day "the coming of Caesarism breaks the dictature of money and its political weapon democracy" just as Marius and Sulla broke down the Roman Republic. Finally, few would dispute Spengler's emphasis on the machine as the unique contribution of Western Europe. In spite of his personal antagonism to Communism he even admits that Russia is on the verge of creating

a new Culture as distinctive as any that has gone before but he regards Dostoevsky, not Lenin, as its precursor. "To Dostoevsky's Christianity the next thousand years will belong."

So much for Spengler's method and the results they have yielded. How much respect do they deserve? As a monument of scholarship and literature, *The Decline of the West* belongs on the same shelf with the works of Nietzsche and Schopenhauer; its journalistic flourishes surpass H. G. Wells's *Outline of History* which may be regarded as its British equivalent. Spengler himself, however, cannot be ranked among the immortals, with Goethe, Voltaire or Marx, with that small body of men whose work actually changed the face of the world. Even his theory of historic cycles remains a brilliant *tour de force* that falls apart if pushed too far into the remote past.

Ten years after *The Decline of the West* he wrote another and much shorter book, *Man and Technics*, that shows on what a shaky base his whole structure rests. Here he not only makes the categorical assertion that "man is a beast of prey"; he flatly declares that man emerged suddenly "like everything decisive in world history" fifteen thousand years before the birth of Christ. Man owed his first success to his hands, but it took him ten thousand years to develop a communal life and at that point history began.

Needless to say, there is no more reason to accept this theory than to accept the Darwinian theory on

which Spengler heaps scorn; both are mere hypotheses. But if we do admit the revolutionary effects that the human hand and human organization have had on human history, we must also admit that the harnessing of natural forces during the last two hundred years has created a revolution at least as sudden and as far-reaching as the two earlier revolutions on which Spengler bases his whole work. The best that can be said for the theory of historic cycles is that it may hold good for the seven known Cultures, and does yield results when applied to the three of which we have anything like a complete knowledge. It excludes however the possibility that other Cultures of an entirely different nature may be lost in the mists of antiquity. Furthermore, Spengler would impose his theory on us at a time when, even by his own assumptions, mankind's tools have undergone the most revolutionary change in fifteen thousand years.

In this period of rigidly limited possibilities when the Culture of the West is freezing into Civilization, when the artists, philosophers, poets and musicians have fulfilled their accomplished tasks, when "the men of the new generation" should devote themselves "to technics instead of to lyrics, to the sea instead of the paint-brush, to politics instead of epistemology," Spengler maintains that "many an inventor, many a diplomat, many a financier is a sounder philosopher than all those who practise the dull craft of experimental psychology". He looks around him in

vain "for an instance in which a modern 'philosopher' has made one deep or far-seeing pronouncement on an important question of the day". But he would be as unsympathetic to the socialism of a Steinmetz or the pacifism of an Einstein as he would be contemptuous of the philosophisings of a Montagu Norman, a J. P. Morgan or a Norman Davis.

Actually Spengler's own work is its own most complete refutation: its value lies not in its contribution to science, statecraft, or technology, but in its poetic vision. He has not revealed the secret of the ages, but the soul of the twentieth-century Germany, a hot-house growth. For between 1818 and 1914 Germany changed from an inchoate group of independent and backward states into a highly centralized Empire possessing the finest industrial equipment and the most highly trained personnel in Europe. England has taken twice as long to pass through a corresponding period of development and during those years produced, among other things, historians and philosophers who reinterpreted

past and present in the light of changing conditions. Germany, on the other hand, crammed into the space of a single human lifetime transformations which in England had been interpreted by Adam Smith in one century, by Charles Darwin in another and by Alfred Whitehead in a third.

This sudden emergence of Germany as a world power accounts in a large measure for Spengler's defects as well as for his qualities.

His literary and intellectual powers are beyond dispute and would have made him an outstanding figure in any age. But his sublime assurance that he can foresee history smacks of the nineteenth century rather than the twentieth.

Nor does he give any indication of having grasped the world revolution that the nineteenth century produced. He rails at the white race for having sold its birthright—technology—to the coloured peoples, as if any other course had been possible in an age of mass production and high-speed communication. He announces not the birth of a new idea but the death-rattle of an old.

QUINCY HOWE

POETRY AND COMMON SENSE

II. THE POET AS MAGICIAN

[In the first instalment of this essay, which appeared in our pages last month, Mr. L. A. G. Strong used the key of dreams to understand the activity of the poet's consciousness. He continues his examination to show how the true poet is a magician.

Just as psycho-analysis fails as an aid to a real understanding of dreams, so modern science fails to help us to know the nature of real magic. Poetry is a door which leads to the mysteries both of dreams and of magic, but one must go to ancient Indian views to obtain the key that fits.

A dreamer is subject to his imagination; a magician is master of his image-making faculty. The Vedic sages were poets who heard the melodious incantations of the Gods and recorded them in deathless hymns. Therefore they were called the Seers of the Mantras (मन्त्रदृष्टारः); they repeated in the language of men the ideas of divinities, and their incantations are said to offer mortals the power to reach the world of the immortals.

In the struggles of the poet of to-day Mr. Strong perceives the birth-pangs of the Genius-Magician who, hearing the Song of the Gods, would transcribe it as a message for the children of men.—EDS. †

A poem is not an arbitrary way of saying something which can be said in another form. It is the unique statement of something which must otherwise go unsaid. Infinite harm is done to impressionable minds, in schools and other places, by setting as an exercise the paraphrasing of poetry into prose. Not only is the exercise useless, but it inculcates an idea which is harmful to all future appreciation of poetry: the idea that poetry is an artificial way of saying something, a sort of fancy dress for a prose statement. It is nothing of the kind. There are a great many reasons why it is nothing of the kind, but the vital reason is that the magic of the poem and the emotion it rouses are as much a part of the poem, of its truth and reality, as any content of it which we can express in prose.

Tiger, tiger, burning bright
In the forests of the night,
What immortal hand or eye
Could frame thy fearful symmetry?

The significance of this is swift and obvious. It hits the mind like a lightning flash. To put it into prose yields either nonsense, or nothing. It will not bear logical prose analysis for a moment. Tigers do not burn, and even if we take "burning bright" to be an allusion to their stripes, "in the forests of the night" these would be invisible. The thing is of a higher order of statement than prose. It is the utterance of the kindled imagination, carrying instantaneous conviction. It says more about the essential tigerishness of the tiger than pages of a natural history book. Nothing could show more clearly the fatuousness of thinking of poetry in terms of prose. In case any reader of these lines has ever set

children this absurd kind of task, I would implore him or her to desist at once from a practice which all poets abominate, and which puts a definite and too often a permanent obstacle in the way of the child's subsequent appreciation of poetry.

We have now come to a position from which can be seen exactly what Professor Housman means when he says that poetry is not the thing said but a way of saying it. He means that poetry is not valuable for any logical wisdom or prose content which may possibly be extracted from it. It is valuable for the poem itself, from which no "thing said" can be separable. The magicians of old time used to utter incantations whereby they hoped to summon up spirits. The poet likewise utters incantations, which he hopes will call up the shapes of beauty which have troubled his mind. These shapes he can never expressly set down. He can only call them up by his magic. They elude definition. Poetry is an attempt to reach out and snare the intangible by tangible means. The most a poem can be is an organised collection of symbols which will call up beauty and feeling to our hearts.

WEST WIND

O white austerity,
Less cloud than flying air,
Light more than birds :
Under this sky how lost
The word that dowers form
Or prisons quality :
For what we see we know,
Yet know not with our eyes,
Cannot discern
Bird, light, or cloud
In the pure vision blown
Over our heads, and gone.

It is always like that ; the pure vision is blown over our heads and gone before our lagging prose minds can analyse or define it. It is a fleeting image, to be recalled only by magic, and the poet is the magician. His magic lies in symbols.

The philosopher Berkeley spoke of the material universe as a kind of language, expressing in finite terms the thoughts of the Infinite Mind. In a similar way we may envisage the poet making use of tangible symbols to express thoughts otherwise beyond his reach. Just as a crowd is more than the sum total of the characteristics of those who make it up ; just as the love of two human beings for one another is not two factors but three, the third being the influence of one upon the other ; so a poem which, considered prosaically, is but a chance assortment of the names for various qualities and actions, is more than the sum of those names. There is also the magical factor, the factor of their association in such a way as to produce music, and an incantation to call up shapes and spirits that are otherwise inaccessible. It does not matter by what symbols this is done, whether they are new symbols personal to the poet, or whether they are drawn from the oldest of mythologies. As long as the poet is inspired and knows his craft, the symbols will do their work.

STILL-HEART

Dread are the death-pale Kings
Who bend to the oar,
Dread is the voice that sings
On the starless shore.

Lamentations and woes ;
 Cold on the wave
 Beautiful Still-Heart goes
 To the rock hewn grave,
 The limbs are bound, and the breasts
 That I kissed are cold ;
 Beautiful Still-Heart rests
 With the queens of old.

These verses by a little-known poet, Dr. Pearce Sturm, whose symbols are generally taken from Egyptian mythology, at once arrest our attention. Why ?

This is no place for a discussion of such deep theories of symbolism as are put forward, for instance, by Dr. Jung, or for investigation into theories of the memory of the race. It is true enough that, as I found during the years I spent teaching, children will often dream versions of classical myths and legends which they could never have read in any book, and which make very plain the significance of their dreams. It is true also that there is a certain elementary symbolism buried so deep in our minds that we take it literally, without realising what it is or why we do so. There is no need to go into this, not only because it is disputable and would lead to all sorts of irrelevances, but because it does not matter. It is enough if we realise that the symbolism of a poem, the language, the imagery—call it what we will—has for us a magical effect which cannot be attached to any of the words or pictures or images taken from their context and considered separately. If a certain association of words makes our eyes smart and sends a tingling sensation up our spine ; if it sets our minds wandering upon a higher level and seems to add for

the moment a cubit to our spiritual stature, then it is enough for us to be content with the fact and to leave speculation on one side. It is the poet who has wrought this magic upon us, and we need not inquire over-deeply into the means. Of the pedantry which too often comes from such inquiry, a total loss of spirit in a waste of letters, the older universities have lately been providing us with fearsome examples. In art as in religion, definition often leads to heresy : and the reason for this is that it is almost always an attempt at analysis upon mistaken lines. The man who sits down to analyse a poem and the effect it has had upon him, unless he is himself a poet or a critic of exceptional sensibility, will almost inevitably bring the wrong sort of technique to his task. He will attempt to make a scientific analysis, an analysis by enumeration, and his attempt will be foredoomed to fail. A scientist, who is also an artist, Mr. J. W. N. Sullivan, has recently published a book, *Limitations of Science*, in which he tells us what, in his opinion, science can do and what it cannot.

The fact that science is confined to a knowledge of structure is obviously of great "humanistic" importance. For it means that the problem of the nature of reality is not prejudged. We are no longer required to believe that our response to beauty, or the mystic's sense of communion with God, have no objective counterpart. It is perfectly possible that they are, what they have so often been taken to be, clues to the nature of reality. Thus our various experiences are put on a more equal footing as it were. Our

religious aspirations, our perceptions of beauty, may not be the essentially illusory phenomena they were supposed to be. In this new scientific universe even mystics may have a right to exist.

Science can tell us about the structure of things. It can tell us about the structure of a poem. It can tell us—perhaps, if it can be brought to handle anything so disputable—about the exact connotation of the various classical symbols used in a poem. But there it stops short. The scientist who is also an artist, in other words, the man of supreme common sense, will approach a poem on its own ground, and analyse it in its own terminology. He will not leave out those intuitions which, on his own showing, may be a permanent aspect of reality. The mistake of those teachers referred to just now, who approach a poem from the angle of prose and invite their pupils to do so, will be impossible to him. Common sense in everyday life is the faculty of dealing with a situation in its own terms, of dealing with life in the round, of approaching a three-dimensional object in a three-dimensional way. The spirit of poetry may be likened to a kind of fourth dimension. To approach a four-dimensional reality in terms of three dimensions is not common sense, but nonsense. It will now be plain, if it has not been plain already, why, in connecting the term "common sense" with poetry, I am intending to poetry no disrespect. Common sense is a faculty which the world admires, the faculty for approaching things and people as they are.

We should approach poetry as it is.

Never seek to tell thy love
Love that never told can be;
For the gentle wind does move
Silently, invisibly.

I told my love, I told my love,
I told her all my heart,
Trembling, cold, in ghastly fears—
Ah, she did depart.

Soon as she was gone from me
A traveller came by,
Silently, invisibly—
He took her with a sigh.

Mr. Middleton Murry, in his recent book on Blake, a book with many evidences of profound perception, would have us believe that this poem means little more than Blake's comment on the un wisdom of confiding to one's wife the fact that one admires another lady. He is led to make this interpretation by an actual experience of Blake in the realms of everyday fact. Here for once Mr. Murry has made the mistake of approaching poetry through the medium of prose, of attempting to interpret a four-dimensional reality in terms of three dimensions. There are some who *know* that the poem means more than this. It has, in the holy sense of the word, mystery. It has magic. With our spirits we may know what it means, and know that it is a meaning insusceptible to expression in prose, not merely the poetical equivalent of "Never let on too much to the wife". (It is patently unfair to Mr. Murry to make this the sole mention of his book, which sheds a very definite light upon Blake, and is an indispensable part of the Blake student's library: but it is an instance in point.)

The fact is, as has already been insisted, the poet is always busy

trying to reduce to language the things that are beyond language. Language lags behind perception. It is a kind of common agreement to give certain names to the things men see often enough to be able to agree about them. The poet sees ahead. He sees things before there is any agreement as to what they shall be called, and has somehow to adapt language as he knows it so as to make a permanent and personal record of what he has seen. Goethe says of this:—

If now a man of genius gains an insight into the secret operations of Nature, the language which has been handed down to him is inadequate to express anything so remote from ordinary affairs. He ought to have at his command the language of spirits to express truly his peculiar perceptions.

The language of spirits: that is what poetry is, and that is why it must be approached, not in the terms of any special science or technique, but with all faculties, in the round; in other words, with common sense.

When we come then to the study of poetry, and particularly to the study of contemporary poetry, we are first of all likely to be held up by difficulties in the thought. The poet who is ahead of his time, who is endeavouring in the terms of some personal symbolism to express thoughts and visions which have not come the way of the rest of us, is probably going to be what we call obscure. There is a great deal of this obscurity at the present time, principally because the younger poets are insisting that, to be alive, poetry must take note

of the difficulties and social chaos of the time. Many of the young poets profess in their work a kind of theoretical communism, a brotherhood of man along the only terms in which they can see it. This does not make their work any easier, but, however we look upon it, we must accept it as the first constructive impulse out of the disillusionment into which their generation has been born. We must accept it in the hope that it will produce poetry. In the long run, almost all theories of art go the same way. A genuine impulse in poetry lasts perhaps thirty years, perhaps not so long. Of these, the first years are those of rebellion, chaos, and experiment. Then the wave sweeps to its peak, and the genius or the highest talents of the movement do their best work. After that, the movement declines, becomes conventional and respectable, till it in turn is rebelled against by a new movement. What the original impulse was does not matter to anyone but the poets. All that matters is the one or two or three works of genius or great talent which the movement produced. Hence the precise poetic faith of the newest movement, any theory its leaders may have adopted, is less important than the work it produces and may produce. Least of all is it a reason for suspecting or deriding the poets. It may as a theory be wrong as wrong can be—and I personally suspect that it is wrong; but that is neither here nor there.

Some of these new poets, I

have not only read what they say, but am honoured with their personal acquaintance--maintain that poetry will die if it does not take account of and spring from the social order of the day. They savagely deride the Georgians and the Nature poets of this century as refugees from reality, mere escapers who have dodged their responsibilities. This seems to me fallacious, and for several reasons. First of all, it begs the question whether in contemplating nature a man is not living as intensely as when contesting a by election on the Socialist ticket. Secondly, it rules out the contemplative life, an exclusion which history has always shown to be disastrous. Thirdly it goes flat against the history of poetry and art in general. We know that rather over a hundred years ago Coleridge advocated a communistic theory of life as fiercely as any modern poet. Yet Pantisocracy is not what we remember Coleridge for to-day. Shelley held all manner of political and social theories, including a strong dose of Godwin's Liberalism; yet I suggest that when Shelley's name is mentioned these are not the first things about him which we recall. The young Wordsworth was passionately interested in the French Revolution, but to-day we turn to the *Ode on the Intimations of Immortality* and the *Sonnet on Westminster Bridge*. Poetry is written out of conflict and disturbance in the soul. There is no lack of conflict to-day, and plenty to disturb the soul of a sensitive observer. There is also

plenty of poetry being written, and I think that soon the genius of the movement will come, even supposing he has not come already. We have been going through an age of spade-work in the arts, and spade-work is highly honourable. The genius who is to come will profit by all these labours, will pick up from all the experiments what is valuable for his purpose, will make his magical synthesis and produce the work which will be the full and ample justification of the labours of those who have gone before.

Let us be prepared, then, to find difficulty and harshness in contemporary poetry, and to make allowances for it. At the same time, it is folly to be browbeaten into the acceptance of any particular theory, or to have our admiration exclusively commanded by work of any particular kind. Poetry matters a great deal more than poets. We have at our backs the greatest treasury of poetry possessed by any country in the world. Let us study it sensitively, and study the new poetry sensitively, avoiding complacent insistence upon the supposed rightness of our own tastes, and being always ready for an adventure. If our poetic reading has not prepared us for adventure, it has done us little good. We ought all to be ready for the shock of meeting something new and strange and vital. Dr. W. B. Yeats, whom no one who talks about poetry can escape from quoting, said once that culture consisted, not in acquiring opinions, but in shedding them. Our studies in poetry ought to have left us

with minds sensitive, flexible and experimental, not rigidly loaded with opinions. Let us read the new poetry without prejudice, and when we meet anything which strikes us as difficult or even ugly, let us not timidly scuttle back to what we

understand and feel safe with, nor complacently lay hands upon some classic and condemn the new for not resembling it. We have our own tastes, and as sincere human beings we must be loyal to them; but loyal in humility.

L. A. G. STRONG

WAR AND PRIESTS OF THE CHURCH

The International Union of Anti-militarist Ministers and Clergymen was formed in 1928 at Amsterdam and is said to number already 8,000 members. The clerical profession has not usually been distinguished for its clear perception of the incompatibility of war and preparations for war with the Gospel of Jesus. That incompatibility, however, is fearlessly proclaimed in a protest dated January, 1935, to the French Government from the Dutch Branch of that Union. The protest was signed by all members of the council and 320 clergymen, members of that Branch, "Kerk en Vrede".

The protest was against the imprisonment of Pasteur Philippe Vernier, who for conscientious scruples had declined to undergo military training. The courageous

martyr to his convictions is reported, after nine and a half months' imprisonment, to have again refused to join his regiment and to be now in solitary confinement at Marseilles, under a two-year sentence. The protest to the French Foreign Minister requests his release and recommends the drafting of a measure like those passed in the Netherlands and Scandinavian countries to give conscientious objectors the opportunity of serving their country in the civil instead of the military service.

We confess to considerable gratification at the firm stand of these clergymen on the Christian Teacher's injunction of *ahimsa*: Resist not evil; but whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also.

PH. D.

THE HOME AND THE WOMAN

[Here are the pronouncements of two thinkers—an English man, **J. S. Collis** and an American woman, **Mary R. Beard**. The Englishman deplors the disappearance of the family, and the consequent loneliness of the individual—"the most appalling result of the machine". The American Feminist surveys the achievements of her sex, and hears the new throb of the woman's heart, "a desire to play a better social role"—not by the rebuilding of the family but by "a braver and more intelligent advance into life in the large".

In our civilization the individual is lost in the mass—the State is regarded as more important than the citizen. The social club imposes its morality, the political party enforces its programme, and the Trades Union inculcates its "ca' canny" methods—not so much with the idea that the minds of their respective members might be benefited, but rather that each organization should get its own way, subjugating the individual wills of its component units. Individual life has become lonely, and most men and women are wandering monks and nuns in this wilderness called the world—each selfishly seeking the peace of God (which, to them, is self-satisfaction) and as selfishly trying to attain immortality (which means keeping fit in order to survive as long as possible in the struggle of life).

Psychologically Japan has become a part of Europe, and China and India may follow suit. To rebuild the collapsed institution of the home, the modern thinker must adapt the ancient pattern (still technically recognized in India) of the Four Orders through which every man and every woman passed in succession, looking upon each of them as a training ground for the soul, as a field for evolution.

We include in this series a third article, describing this ancient pattern, which can be adapted to modern conditions.—Eps. 1

I.—WHY RELIGION IS NECESSARY

What life have you if you have not life together?
There is no life that is not in community,
And no community not lived in praise of God . . .
And now you live dispersed on ribbon roads,
And no man knows or cares who is his neighbour
Unless his neighbour makes too much disturbance,
But all dash to and fro in motor cars,
Familiar with the roads and settled nowhere.
Nor does the family move about together,
But every son would have his motor cycle,
And daughters ride away on casual pillions,

T. S. ELIOT

Religion is what men do with their solitariness, is a definition given by Whitehead. It is all right as far as it goes, but it certainly takes us only a very short distance. Some people might even regard it as the antithesis of religion, which is essentially a binding together, a communion of souls. For though

religion can only begin when the individual has created his soul, it can scarcely be said to bear fruit if the social life is not thereafter enriched. If a scientist had not given that definition it is doubtful whether it would have been taken seriously by the religious world.

Now it is precisely in lack of

communion that modern life is particularly desperate. For our mastery of the Machine has led to the most miserable of all goals—loneliness. We are continually told that owing to the machine life is becoming wider for everyone. It certainly is. From henceforth no man is limited by the village in which he lives. The skyline of the ploughed field is no longer the end of any man's vision. He has only to go to the nearest cinema to see all the world unfolded before him. He need not go to the cinema, he need not stir from his house or cottage—for instructors, lecturers, entertainers from every part of the earth are waiting on him if he will but press the radio switch. And when he is bored with his particular place, he has only to leap on to a car, a bus, a tram, a train, an aeroplane, a liner, and be swiftly taken somewhere else. If he is rich he can go anywhere; if he is poor he can at least see everywhere and hear everything.

But this leads away from all we most profoundly desire. There is only one thing we really want—and that is friendship. Call it congenial society, if you like. That is what we want. If we live amongst people whom we like, we can dispose of the motor car. Though it is pleasant to have a radio set, we can dispose of it also if we love our neighbours.

Yet never before has the neighbour been less loved. In this era of the most unexampled amount of discussion regarding socialism and communism there is less social spirit and less com-

munion than in the whole of recorded time.

That is what it has now come to—in England especially—the country of inhuman humanitarians. There is no longer any society. There never has been a large society. But there have been circles. Many people groaned at the smallness and pettiness of their circle. Now nearly all circles have been broken down and the individual stands alone: he—and especially she—has no circle at all. There has never been greater loneliness than to-day.

This is far the most appalling result of the Machine. It is heart-breaking. In the old days the life of the village was centred round the Manor or the Big House. And the Church was an integral part of the little kingdom. Now the Manor is dead, and the Church is dead. Now there are less rich and less poor. In the old times a crowd of servants and labourers worked together, and were happy to that extent: now everyone is as good as everyone else—and perfectly miserable. The peaceful hamlet no longer exists. By peace I do not mean lack of conflict and gossip; such things make the life of any community. I mean freedom from restlessness, and the conditions of social life. But to-day no one is at rest. Everyone wants to get out into the world—or at any rate into the town.

But is it better in the town? It is not better. We pass from the hateful village into the hateful city or into the still more loathsome garden city. And once more we

find everything except love and friendship. A hundred years ago Wordsworth was amazed when he visited London to find that no one knew his next door neighbour. Now no one knows or speaks to the people who live in the same house. There are thousands of streets in London consisting of large houses each of which was once inhabited by a family. But now the circle that consisted of a big family has disappeared, and each one of these houses is divided up into "flats" where either single individuals or tiny families exist in isolation. Often there are as many as five families living in one old family house—and each would separate itself stellar distance from contact with its neighbour. Elsewhere enormous buildings are set up straightaway as flats which house often over a hundred or two hundred people, none of whom address a word to each other unless to complain about noise.

Thus the smallest circle left is

the family. And nowadays the family consists of mother, father, and two to three children at most. This small unit would hold together if there was a community. Family life is only possible when each family mingles with other families on a family basis. When it has to feed upon itself it cannot stand the strain. And now it makes little attempt to stand that strain. Each member of every household endeavours to escape by means of the Machine.

The words by Mr T. S. Eliot in "The Rock" quoted at the head of this article, are very true. And his remark—"no community not lived in praise of God" is central. Men cannot unite save in their knowledge of God.

For the sake of clarity I have written this purely with an eye to England. Is it universal? Is the same thing happening in the East? Or is it only *about to happen*—in spite of all Gandhi's efforts?

J. S. COLLIS

II.—THE NEW FEMINISM

The word "new" as applied to any movement suggests a sharp break with the "old," a contrast, a clash, whereas the so-called new movement may be in fact but the natural growth of wisdom based on experience, part and parcel of a movement long in process of development. It is customary, for example, outside Russia to-day to regard the life and labour of women under the Soviet Republic as marking a radical change in the

nature and spirit of Russian women themselves and a revolutionized attitude of Russian men toward the opposite sex. But the history of the Russian people warrants no such conclusion. In a recent work entitled *Women in Soviet Russia*, Fannina Halle shows beyond the shadow of a doubt that the social role of the Russian women to-day derives from the indomitable spirit of their sex manifest throughout their history

running back to the matriarchate. Their active and responsible share in the making of a worker's republic is the same active and responsible share they have had in making every other type of society Russia has known. No attempt on the part of wilful males, even of the forceful Peter, to subdue the Russian women to arbitrary notions of the proprieties has found them utterly pliable. Only on paper has there been gross sex subjection. The Slav woman has been of a bold breed. If at this moment in time the Russian women are a prime factor in the operation of a workers' republic, it is because they have always been a prime factor in work and its direction. One could not therefore with justification speak of a "new feminism" in Russia as if it were a sudden expression of a sex long somnolent. Sex equality in Russia at this moment in time is a chip off the old block of feminine energy and resourcefulness characteristic of the Russian women since the dawn of time.

Nor have other women in truth been the passive and oppressed sex which written laws have often made them appear to modern historians who see life merely through the spectacles of statutes. More critical writers point out, for instance, the sex issues which coloured all Greek drama and letters. To the Greek sex struggle they give a setting in the effort of statesmen to establish private property and its affiliate, family loyalty 'mid a popular preference for the traditional liberty to love

and roam. If one examines the sources without prejudice, one discovers feminism self-conscious and vigorous throughout the centuries of Greek preëminence.

The Vedic hymns show how the proud women of another race entered upon marriage, with full appreciation of its advantages, particularly in the matter of greater security for their children. Later when women of India and of Rome rejected marriage for asceticism, their new attitude toward life reflected in large measure their experiences with war and politics. In other words, asceticism had roots in the political economy of India and Rome. So it did in England and in places on the continent of Europe where monasticism for women meant rather an escape into life than a flight from it.

Yet the modern world has grown accustomed to think of feminist insurgence, on any scale at least, as a phenomenon peculiar to itself. Feminism is now generally associated with the bourgeois economy of the contemporary age. Its challenging sex ring is to-day pitched in tone to the strident competition characteristic of the capitalist process of industry. Its declared objective—sex equality—has given countenance to the belief that sex subjection has throughout all the ages of mankind been an actuality. Its Holy Writ—the Woman's Declaration of Independence—drawn up at Seneca Falls, New York, in 1848, (a programme of "woman's rights" patterned upon the programme of men's "rights" proclaimed in 1776 at Philadelphia.)

has tended to obscure the fact that rights so conceived for man or woman were a late arrival on the historic stage. In the nineteenth century the habit of taking for granted that one sex has been dominant over the other throughout time spread and grew rigid. This habit was encouraged by such special pleading as that of the German Socialist, August Bebel, and that of the English Liberal, John Stuart Mill, both of whom argued that women had been as *nothing* in the past but could quickly—indeed automatically—become *something* by joining the Socialist party or by engaging in the democratic competition of a capitalist regime. Though these two parliamentary leaders relied on statutory law for their store of power (much as if one were to rely on a law of prohibition or repeal with respect to the liquor traffic as a faithful picture of liquor consumption) they played messianic roles in their mastery over the minds of men and women devoid of any historic knowledge even of law. Their reasoning was effective because convenient. But in such ways women became a lost sex—lost to themselves, to history, to political science, to the social sciences, to ethics and to philosophy. They entered the intellectual arena with but a casual appearance as “women in industry” or careerists.

Since men had invented the major machines of an industrial revolution and were manipulating them to suit their own taste, women learned to observe only

men in their landscape and to talk about the “man’s world” as if it were the only world in which they could steer their course, and imitatively. The factory system brought to women accustomed to the security of household industry the immediate issue of how they were to obtain food, clothing and shelter in a changed economy, and it was natural for them to concentrate overmuch on this immediate and burning question. Lightly they relegated their mothers and grandmothers to the status of anachronisms and spent no time studying their relation to the system that had gone before.

For American women this new order of life and labour had exceptionally exciting and alluring potentialities for a while. When the feminist programme was framed in New York in 1848 calling for equality of rights as between the sexes, a virgin continent of enormous size and natural wealth invited them to acquire and enjoy. For its exploitation amazing instruments had just been devised, and more were steadily available. Railways, steamships, automobiles and airplanes made physical movement across so vast a space a remarkably easy affair. The machines for mining and farming, for cutting timber and pumping water were so adapted to a swift and productive exploitation of minerals and soil, of trees and streams, that the future was lost sight of in the rush to profit by the present. Never had women at large been so tempted to forsake their primordial concern for human welfare in the

large and plunge on such a scale into self-aggrandisement, sometimes given the charming name of "personality". "Success" in terms of income and personal power was written blatantly in their heavens. A bourgeois complacency settled down upon the successful, equipped with the civil and political as well as the mechanical machinery for making headway in the "man's world".

Unfortunately for feminism so conceived—and so influential as a philosophy of life and labour among all the races of women in the world affected by the industrial revolution—capitalistic competition received a stunning blow when its excesses brought on a world trade war less than a century after 1848. The outcome was a resurgence of sheer brute force of a masculine temper in many parts of the world. Then in country after country women were pushed out of gainful occupations and driven to unpaid labour at home, divorced from the original access to raw materials which had once relieved that labour of its stigma and made it a work of joy and art. If Italy and Germany were the frankest in their display of anti-feminist zeal, even in Britain and the United States where gainful occupations for women, with wide business and professional opportunities, had become an accepted custom, the tide turned to running swiftly against equality so conceived. The "man's world" was having to battle for survival with itself. And as the year 1935 goes on its way British

and American women seem well aware that they may be under siege in the last fortresses of a feminism unqualifiedly individualistic in design.

In the circumstances, what are women's choices with respect to life and labour? They may remain intransigent defenders of their "rights" irrespective of how their rights are to be upheld, and so die intellectually at their posts, if that is the alternative to thought. They may retreat to asylums in kitchens and nurseries and try to forget in that seclusion the big world outside, or solace themselves, if its memory breaks in upon their minds, with the thought that they are loyal servitors of the State, accepting martyrdom as supreme wisdom. They may come to terms with life and labour on a more substantial basis.

Indeed all these choices now figure in the decisions of women. There are those who are satisfied with "equality" even though it be only equality in disaster. There are those who turn away from the liberal philosophy of traditional feminism and worship at the shrine of the totalitarian state demanding of them the ultimate offering. No more avid supporters of Nazism exist, for example, than some of the ex-liberal German women who are ecstatic in their readiness to yield themselves and their sons as sacrifices to the revived God of War, eternal foe of feminism of every brand.

But a powerful mass movement of women now assumes another form. Its objective is a more moral

world than either individualistic equality or self-annihilation creates. Millions of women are catching up with Emerson, whether they know it or not, who said, referring to Napoleon's failure :—

He did all that in him lay to live and thrive without moral principle. It was the nature of things, the eternal law of the man and the world, which balked and ruined him ; and the result, in a million experiments, would be the same.

Through the disaster conditioned by ruthless competition, induced in large measure by self-love, rises a compassion for a humanity-in-grief which savours of the understanding and sympathy of a first woman, a Mother Goddess, a Buddha, or a Christ. Women are reverting to first principles—the principles of mutual aid—without which human society could never have got a start, and apart from which it has no future worth contemplating. Feminists are enlarging their mental and spiritual horizon. They have travelled afar. They have seen and heard and felt. They have had experiences, with life and its labour. They have read the thoughts about thought. They are socializing themselves as a consequence. They are growing ethical. Their assemblies, their organisations, their journals, their programmes, their books, their outcry against the resurgence of force in international relations, their analyses of their own misadventures all indicate a deep-seated re-evaluating of objectives and a desire to play a better social role.

The new feminism, so conceived,

does not call for a withdrawal from life in the large. On the contrary it demands a braver and more intelligent advance into life in the large. It is still activist in temper. But it is creative for that very reason. There is no mood of resignation in its spirit. It breathes of feminine indomitability as of yore. But the revision of its goals is clearly evident in recent women's conferences, notably at Chicago.

In July of 1933 at Chicago two great assemblies of women,—one international and resulting from the call of twenty affiliated national American women's associations claiming a total membership of five million, the other the Federation of Business and Professional Women, took up the study of civilisation as a common concern and the issue of planning for its improvement.

It was generally agreed that while the initiative, courage, and competence of individualistic feminism were to be retained and no civil and political privileges renounced, social responsibilities were to be assumed as an antidote to excessive concentration on self. In this decision anthropology and other forms of modern knowledge played their part. Since the discovery has been made that woman launched civilisation, that she brought to bear on the first human crisis the essential intelligence necessary to save human life from destruction, that she in fact made the first clear distinction between the beast and the human by her invention of the industrial arts,

that she was the more likely inventor of agriculture, that she apparently found labour a joy judging from the beauty of her implements, that her respect for the group life was a primordial excellence, women now feel less ashamed to talk about social responsibilities and the commonweal even in machine-industry countries.

The primordial humanitarianism of the woman has indeed remained

a trait of woman throughout the ages. If it can now utilize the agencies of modern technology while holding fast to its commonweal urge, the most creative stage in human life may be reached—to enrich the story of mankind's experiences with itself. That experience has been fruitful of more good than evil, or humanity would be such not even in name.

MARY R. BEARD

III.—THE FOUR ASHRAMAS

“Ashrama” is literally a resting place, a stage in a journey, and derives from the Sanskrit root “shram,” “to suffer” or “to labour”. Spiritual evolution consists of three successive steps—self-effort, birth-pangs, rhythmic growth. In the ancient Hindu Codes of Law the term “Ashrama” signifies a definite period of special spiritual discipline, of which there are four in one life. Varna or caste symbolizes the stages of the individual ego or soul during many lives on earth, while Ashrama restricts itself to the progress during a single life. The four stages are those of the Student, of the Householder, of the Retired Contemplator, and of the Disinterested Servant of all. Each stage has its discipline. Ancient Hindu Lawgivers like Baudhayana, Apastambha, Gautama, Manu and Yajnyavalkya have treated them in exhaustive detail. The following verses from Manu outline the four Ashramas :—

THE STUDENT

A student should live with his teacher and practise control of his senses.

He should abstain from meat, honey, tasty dishes, acid foods, perfumes, garlands, and women. He should not injure any living creature.

He who takes the vow of discipleship must beg his food ; but he should not ask it from one person only.

The student should apply himself to the study of Vedas even when his teacher has not expressly ordered him to do so. He must also try to be of service to his teacher.

THE HOUSEHOLDER

After living with his teacher for the fourth part of his life the student should marry and spend his second quarter in the household stage.

The householder should gain wealth by blameless occupations and only for the purpose of maintenance ; he should not be avaricious in gaining property and his vocation should be in conformity with his caste.

For the sake of livelihood he should never stoop to the foul ways of the world ; he should live a pure, simple and honest life.

He should avoid all ways of making

money which would distract him from the study of the Vedas because it is that study which will enable him to fulfil the main object of his life, namely, the realization of the Self.

The householder should practise hospitality—but with discrimination.

Having first honoured the gods, the guardian deities of the home, the Pitris, the sages and men, the householder should eat whatever is left over.

He should not indulge in sensual pleasures, and should particularly guard himself in this. He should not accept presents and gifts from anybody.

THE RETIRED CONTEMPLATOR

When a householder has grown old, with grey hair and skin wrinkled; when he has had grandsons, he should retire to a forest for a secluded life.

After studying the Vedas, having produced the progeny in obedience to the sacred law, a man is fit to direct his mind to final liberation.

He should cast away all his possessions and should live simply on roots and fruit. His wife may accompany him or he may leave her with his sons.

He should study the Vedas, be patient in all troubles and hardships. He should be friendly to all; he should have a poised mind and compassion towards all.

THE DISINTERESTED SERVANT

The real ascetic should desire neither to die nor to live; as a servant waits for his wages he should bide his time of departure from this world.

Let him not be sorry if he obtains nothing nor rejoice if he obtains much. Let him accept only that which is necessary for the sustenance of life.

By the control of his senses, by overcoming love and hate, and by complete abstention from violence towards all creatures, the renouncer becomes fit for immortality.

When he becomes indifferent to all objects of desire he gains everlasting peace here and hereafter.

The renouncer who has thus

reached the apex of detachment and who has freed himself from all the pairs of opposites, reposes himself in Brahman the Absolute.

These four Stages were marked out by the ancient Hindu Seers in accordance with the laws of human nature and of its spiritual growth. Rhythm is the keynote of all truly natural processes. Lop-sided growth is the sign of a degenerating organism. Our civilization is too far ahead in its cerebrate development. The ratiocinative faculty in man has become hyperactive; but his moral nature remains undeveloped and the spirit in him is unawakened. This is because the principle of Ashrama has been completely ignored in the constitution of modern Western culture. In India of the ancient days the Ashramas were a living reality; now they are no more than a dead ritual.

The principle of "Ashrama" can be successfully applied to modern life and conditions. Our universities, colleges and schools can revive the ancient Stage of Discipleship by creating a new atmosphere of purity, of disinterested learning, of moral sincerity and spiritual earnestness.

The modern loneliness referred to by Mr. Collis results from the absence of real family ties and from the consequent lack of opportunities for cultivating true affection and mutual dependence. Spiritual perception can be best awakened and unfolded by reviving the institution of the family which our present civilization has almost wrecked. Life in a united family

gives the necessary scope for exercising our moral nature; there, we are constantly called upon to recognize our responsibilities as also to fulfil our duties. We are also required to be unselfish by the very nature of the situations in which the corporate life in the family often places us. Again, woman's place in the family is vital; it provides a most fruitful opportunity for an all-sided unfoldment, rounding out her nature. Modern woman is anxious to express her gifts and exercise her capacities anywhere except in her proper sphere which is her own home. No wonder she too is a helpless victim to that boring loneliness which is the sorry fate of the man to whom she is wedded and of the children to whom she has given birth. Of all the four Ashramas, that of the householder is the most important. Says Manu :—

As all streams, great and small, find their resting place in the ocean, even so, men at all Stages find protection with the householders.

The disciple, the householder, the contemplator, and the disinterested servant of life—these constitute the four Ashramas of which that of the householder is the main foundation.

Unless the family becomes the object of central interest for all

--men, women and children--life is bound to beget *ennui*.

Then as regards the third Ashrama: having duly fulfilled their duties towards the Family, men and women can prepare themselves and actually begin to spend their life in rendering *personal* help and *personal* service to the needy and to the suffering. And in the last stage of the Renouncer they should concentrate on the highest ideal of life—Meditation on the Infinite Being which is Itself the innermost nature of all beings and things, and which pours Itself out in compassion to all.

Teachings of Manu on the subject of Ashramas and on other sociological topics are based on eternal verities; they can be usefully adapted to modern conditions. "The laws of Manu are the doctrines of Plato, Philo, Zoroaster, Pythagoras, and of the Kabala. . . . Any one who has studied, even superficially, these philosophers, on reading the institutes of Manu, will clearly perceive that they all drew from the same source," says H. P. Blavatsky (*Isis Unveiled*, Vol. I, p. 271). No wonder that a Great Teacher advised modern aspirants to study Manu.

D. G. V.

BRAHMAN IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY AND THE SECRET DOCTRINE

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In an article in *THE ARYAN PATH* for May 1933, I pointed out that Theosophy is an expression of the Esoteric Philosophy or the Secret Doctrine (*Gupta Vidya*) which is described as the mother of all ancient religious philosophies. It is my intention to show that Indian philosophy—which is admittedly the most ancient, successful and influential of all such ancient systems—represents especially in the Advaitic form one such system sprung from this Primeval Fount. It will be sufficient for this purpose to show the real agreement subsisting between the teachings of Theosophy as given in H. P. Blavatsky's *Secret Doctrine* and the conclusions of Indian philosophy on such fundamentals as Brahman, Maya, Cosmology, etc. Such a study may help to remove the suspicion with which Theosophy is sometimes regarded in India, and aid in a more sympathetic appreciation of this Ancient Source.

For in the twentieth century of our era scholars will begin to recognize that the *Secret Doctrine* has neither been invented nor exaggerated, but, on the contrary, simply outlined; and finally, that its teachings antedate the Vedas. (*The Secret Doctrine* I, xxxvii)

In another connection Madame Blavatsky states:—

Buddhism (of Gautama, the Buddha) was “evoked” and entirely up-

reared on the tenets of the Secret Doctrine, of which a partial sketch is here attempted, and on which, also, the Upanishads are made to rest (*S. D. I, 47*).

Finally, in summing up her cosmogony, she claims:—

It is not taught [“as a whole,” and “in full,” she must mean] in any of the six Indian schools of philosophy, for it pertains to their synthesis—the seventh, which is the Occult doctrine. It is not traced on any crumbling papyrus of Egypt, nor is it any longer graven on Assyrian tile or granite wall. The Books of the *Vedanta* (the last word of human knowledge) give out but the metaphysical aspect of this world-Cosmogony; and their priceless, thesaurus, the *Upanishads*—*Upa-ni-shad* being a compound word meaning “the conquest of ignorance by the revelation of *secret, spiritual knowledge*”—require now the additional possession of a Master-key to enable the student to get at their full meaning. The reason for this I venture to state here as I learned it from a Master. (*S. D. I, 269*)

The following is peculiarly significant:

We say it again: Archaic Occultism would remain incomprehensible to all, if it were rendered otherwise than through the more familiar channels of Buddhism and Hinduism. For the former is the emanation of the latter and both are children of one mother—ancient *Lemuro-Atlantean Wisdom*. (*S. D. I, 668*)

To begin then with the conception of ultimate Reality or Brahman in Advaita: Ultimate Reality must be supposed to be eternal

Existence *per se*, transcending time and space; while specific forms of existence may be thought away, Being *as such* cannot thus be conjured away but must be presupposed, like Descartes' cogitating self, in every act of thought (*Brihadaranyaka*: II. i. 20). Madame Blavatsky prefers the expression "metaphysical ONE ABSOLUTE-BE-NESS," and says that it is "the first fundamental axiom of the Secret Doctrine". (S. D. I. 14)

An Omnipresent, Eternal, Boundless and Immutable PRINCIPLE. . . one absolute Reality which antecedes all manifested, conditioned being . . . the rootless root of "all that was, is, or ever shall be". . . It is "Be-ness" rather than Being (in Sanskrit, *Sat*). (*Ibid*).

But Pure Being—devoid of all determinations—is according to Hegel equivalent to Pure Nothing or Non-being. Some Indian thinkers shy at this identification and criticise Hegel by saying that absolute non-being is unthinkable because it is selfcontradictory. But Madame Blavatsky repeatedly endorses Hegel's dictum (S. D. I. 16. 53, 193). Her explanations, however, make it clear that she does not mean by non-being *nothing as such* but only fullness of Being.

The idea of Eternal Non-Being, which is the One Being, will appear a paradox to anyone who does not remember that we limit our ideas of being to our present consciousness of existence; making it a specific, instead of a generic term. An unborn infant, could it think in our acceptation of that term, would necessarily limit its conception of being to the intra-uterine life which alone it knows; and were it to endeavour to express to its consciousness the idea of life after birth

(death to it), it would, in the absence of data to go upon, and of faculties to comprehend such data, probably express that life as "Non-Being which is Real Being". (S. D. I, 45)

Asat | Non-Being | is not merely the negation of *Sat*, nor is it the "not yet existing"; for *Sat* is in itself neither the "existent" nor "being." *SAT* is the immutable, the ever present, changeless and eternal root, from and through which all proceeds. . . . It is the ever-becoming, though the never manifesting. *Sat* is born from *Asat*, and *ASAT* is begotten by *Sat*. (S. D. II, 449-450)

Thus with a better comprehension of the Indian view Madame Blavatsky is able to show that

The Hegelian doctrine, which identifies *Absolute Being* or "Be-ness" with "non-Being," and represents the universe as an *eternal becoming* is identical with the Vedanta philosophy. (S. D. II, 442, footnote)

Such a Reality it need hardly be said must be One and Impartite, and external to it nothing exists.

Now such an Ultimate Reality must be unconditioned and non-relational (according to Advaita): for relation implies difference, and the Absolute is, *ex hypothesi*, undifferentiated, homogeneous, all-comprehensive oneness. The Absolute cannot contain either *swaājñiya-bheda* (difference between distincts) or *vijāñiya-bheda* (difference between opposites), but can there not be even *swagata-bheda* (difference-in-unity) within it? This is the fundamental issue which sharply divides the Advaita from the Viśiṣṭādvaita system, the latter holding that the Absolute is a Unity of differing parts.

The pronouncement of *The Se-*

cret Doctrine, however, sounds rather ambiguous on this point, though Madame Blavatsky stoutly defends Advaita. The One Existence is spoken of as "the undifferentiated essence" (I. 197). And yet she says: "The first and Fundamental dogma of Occultism is Universal Unity (or Homogeneity) *under three aspects*." (Italics mine) (I, 58). And in order to imagine the Power which acts within the root of a plant, one has "to think of its stalk or trunk and of its leaves and flowers":—

The idea of *Absolute* Unity would be broken entirely in our conception, had we not something concrete before our eyes to contain that Unity. And the deity being absolute, must be omnipresent, hence not an atom but contains it within itself. The roots, the trunk and its many branches are three distinct objects, yet they are one tree. (S. D. I. 58,59).

Is this not perilous! near Viśistadvaita? Moreover, is not the Eternal Parent said to be "wrapped in her Ever-visible Robes," *i. e.*, necessarily associated with Mulaprakriti?

Further Madame Blavatsky adopts the standpoint of the *Vishnu Purāṇa* which describes the Pralaya state in the words:—"There was neither day nor night nor any other thing save only One unapprehensible by intellect or that which is Brahma, and Pums (Spirit) and Pradhāna (crude matter)" And she elucidates the text thus significantly:—

For Pradhāna, though said further

on to merge into the Deity as everything else does, in order to leave the ONE absolute during the Pralaya, yet is held as infinite and immortal. The commentator describes the Deity as: "One *Pradhanika* Brahma Spirit: THAT, was," and interprets the compound term as a substantive, not as a derivative word used attributively, *i. e.*, like something conjoined with Pradhāna. (S. D. I, 256).

The "*Prādhānika* Brahma Spirit" is Mulaprakriti and Parabrahmam. (S. D. I, 445).

Thus we find that while Parabrahman in Advaita is, according to the received interpretation, an a-cosmic Principle *unrelated in any manner to anything beyond itself*, the Eternal Parent, the Absolute of the Secret Doctrine, is necessarily and always associated with Mulaprakriti which is the Root of all nature and her evolutes. It is a concrete and synthetic Universal. It is unrelated only to finite and conditioned, *i. e.*, manifested things.

This, I imagine is what Madame Blavatsky means when she says that "Parabrahm. being the '*Supreme* ALL' the ever invisible spirit and Soul of Nature, changeless and eternal, can have no attributes; absoluteness very naturally precluding any idea of the *finite* or *conditioned* from being connected with it." (I. 7). It is 'devoid of attributes and qualities,' "Absolute NIRGUNA" (I. 62), because it is "essentially without any relation to *manifested, finite* being" (I. 14).^{*} It is "the Negatively Existent One" (II. 626), the realm of negativeness corresponding to

* The italics in the above passage are all mine. They show that the Absolute, while not being related to anything *finite*, may yet *in its entirety* be considered as a Unity of Parts. This is however, strictly *my own* interpretation of Madame Blavatsky.

the Upanishadic *neti, neti*.

Ultimate Reality, then, is Existence in the sense described above. Can we say anything more about it? Yes. Just as Descartes in his famous *Cogito—ergo sum* (S. D. II. 242) identified thought with existence, so too the Upanishadic seers conceive of Being in terms of consciousness. Reality cannot be different from or opposed to the nature of thought; consciousness must be of the very essence of its nature (*swarupa chaitanyam*). That is, consciousness is not a *property* of Brahman, but Brahman is consciousness.

The Secret Doctrine likewise teaches that the One True Existence is "absolute Consciousness" (I. 2) and this "absolute Chit and Chaitanya (intelligence, consciousness) cannot be a cognizer, 'for THAT can have no subject of cognition'" (I. 6). That is, the Absolute knows itself but not through the duality of self (subject) and its own processes (not-self, object). Madame Blavatsky herself explains:—

Consciousness implies limitations and qualifications; something to be conscious of and some one to be conscious of it. But Absolute Consciousness contains the cognizer, the thing cognized and the cognition, all three in itself and all three *one*. (S. D. I. 56)

For this reason, she is not even afraid—as some Vedantists are—of characterising the Absolute consciousness as "Unconsciousness" because our "finite understanding" is unable to distinguish such Absolute Consciousness "from what appears to us as unconsciousness" (I. 56). And yet although the

Absolute does not possess self-consciousness in the human sense of the terms (I. 50) and Madame Blavatsky severely criticises Hegel and the German Transcendentalists for holding that the Absolute evolves the Universe in order to attain clear Self-consciousness (I. 50-51) still, it is "Paramârtha-satya" or "true self-consciousness," "Svasamvedana" or the "self-analysing reflection" (I, 48 foot note).

It follows that, firstly, the One Reality is "impersonal, because it contains all and everything. *Its impersonality is the fundamental conception of the System*" (I. 273); and, secondly, that it "transcends the power of human conception," and is "beyond the range and reach of thought," in short, "un-thinkable and unspeakable." (I. 14).

If a proof were required for the self-identical existence of consciousness which is nevertheless impersonal, *The Secret Doctrine*, like the Vedanta, points to the experience of deep or dreamless sleep which is not "annihilation" but a state which "not being remembered in a waking state, seems a blank" (I, 47), and which "*leaves no impression on the physical memory and brain, because the sleeper's Higher Self is in its original state of absolute consciousness*" (I. 266).

Finally Vedanta affirms that Brahman is unutterable Bliss—Ananda, because it is perfection itself. And *The Secret Doctrine* likewise refers to the Absolute as "Paranishpanna" or "Paranirvana," which is "that condition of

subjectivity which has no relation to anything but the one absolute Truth (Para-mārthasatya)" (I. 53). And where there is conscious Paramārtha, there is Bliss (I. 54), so that "Absolute Being" is "the Bliss of Paranirvana" (I. 268).

Thus through logic as well as intuition, through reason as much as revelation, does *The Secret Doctrine* arrive at the same conclusion as the Vedānta regarding the nature of Ultimate Reality, viz., that it is Sat (Existence), Chit (Consciousness), and Ananda (Bliss) Sacchidananda.

Even then these attributes, according to Advaita, must not be taken as in any sense implying a *positive* characterisation of this Absolute! And in the spirit of a true Vedāntin Madame Blavatsky

declares :—

Yet such is the poverty of language that we have no term to distinguish the knowledge not actively thought of, from knowledge we are unable to recall to memory. To forget is synonymous with not to remember. How much greater must be the difficulty of finding terms to describe, and to distinguish between, abstract metaphysical facts or differences. *It must not be forgotten, also, that we give names to things according to the appearances they assume for ourselves.* (Italics mine, K. S.) (I. 56)

If Madame Blavatsky has astonished the Western World by her marvellous mastery of scientific facts and theories, she has no less amazed the Eastern world by her equally wonderful grasp of philosophical distinctions and metaphysical subtleties.

K. R. SRINIVASIENGAR

Spinoza recognized but one universal indivisible substance and absolute ALL, like Parabrahmam. Leibnitz, on the contrary perceived the existence of a plurality of substances. There was but ONE for Spinoza for Leibnitz an infinitude of Beings, *from*, and *in*, the One. Hence, though both admitted but *one real Entity*, while Spinoza made it impersonal and indivisible, Leibnitz divided his *personal* Deity into a number of divine and semi-divine Beings. Spinoza was a *subjective*, Leibnitz an *objective* Pantheist, yet both were great philosophers in their intuitive perceptions.

Now, if these two teachings were blended together and each corrected by the other— and foremost of all the One Reality weeded of its personality—there would remain as sum total a true spirit of esoteric philosophy in them; the impersonal, attributeless, absolute divine essence which is no "Being," but the root of all being. Draw a deep line in your thought between that ever-incognizable essence, and the, as invisible, yet comprehensible Presence (*Mulaprakriti*), or Schekinah, from *beyond and through which* vibrates the Sound of the *Verbum*, and from which evolve the numberless hierarchies of intelligent *Egos*, of conscious as of semi-conscious, *perceptive* and *apperceptive* Beings, whose essence is spiritual Force, whose Substance is the Elements and whose Bodies (when needed) are the *atoms*—and our doctrine is there.

H. P. BLAVATSKY, *The Secret Doctrine* (Vol. I, p. 629)

NEW BOOKS AND OLD

TRUTH AND AUTOBIOGRAPHY : H. G. WELLS AND MIDDLETON MURRY

[**Geoffrey West** is the author of *H. G. Wells, A Bibliography of the Works of H. G. Wells*, and *The Problem of Arnold Bennett*.—EDS.]

Vital truth to-day, it is often said, moves increasingly outside the walls of the Churches. Yet men lose their religion only that they may find it born anew out of their own personal experience. There are, of course, teachers among us still, but each is of necessity become his own prophet, speaking with the authority of no more than his own knowledge and being. In this state of affairs autobiography, as a man's own account if not of his knowledge then certainly of his being, acquires a new significance, a new importance even. For to be made acquainted with the experience, and the personality too, giving a message birth is of necessity to understand that message anew.

Thus the autobiographies of Mr. H. G. Wells and Mr. Middleton Murry have a claim to be regarded as important books altogether apart from their more extrinsic though very definite interest as contemporary social records or portrait galleries of living or recently dead figures interesting in their own right. Both Mr. Wells and Mr. Murry are

plainly not only would-be but actually highly influential teachers. The latter could not but echo the words of the former: "I believe I am among those who have found what key is needed." And if the "key" is in each case in part political, it is in each case at bottom avowedly religious. Moreover, there is something in their practically simultaneous appearance which gives these books an added interest. Mr. Wells and Mr. Murry are not only significant figures in themselves; they are in some sort significant one in relation to the other. Mr. Havelock Ellis touches the fringe of that significance when he writes of Mr. Murry as "representative of the generation immediately following Shaw and Wells, not yet attaining to the size of those imposing figures, but truly representing a later age even in its incoherence, and with an insistence on the elements of art and emotion and religion which the more materialistic age had pushed into the background." But it seems to need a deeper explication.

* *Experiment in Autobiography* (Two Volumes). By H. G. WELLS (Victor Gollancz Ltd. and the Cresset Press, Ltd., London, 21s.)

* *Seven Two Worlds : An Autobiography*. By JOHN MIDDLETON MURRY (Jonathan Cape, London, 10s. 6d.)

It would not be easy, nor probably profitable, to compare these two works in detail. Mr. Wells's is the longer, though not in proportion to the period covered, for he brings his story up practically to the moment of writing the final pages, while Mr. Murry takes quite two-thirds of the space and does not reach his thirtieth birthday. Each is the record of a boy of the poorest lower middle class climbing by his own gifts and efforts to literary and intellectual position. The rungs of Mr. Wells's ladder are fairly well known by now: dingy home, shabby private school, drapers' and chemists' shops, grant-earning pupil-teaching, scholarship studentship at the South Kensington Normal School of Science, teaching, journalism, and so at last authorship turning from sensational if imaginative scientific romance to the novel, and from the novel to (in the broadest meaning of the term) sociology. What is mainly new in the present account is the mass of intimate detail making plain the precise conditions of his ever-forward mental and social struggle, showing his intellectual development in every phase, and sketching the many personalities with whom he made his successive contacts--first the lowly and obscure, his parents and family, his first teachers and school-fellows, his employers and friends, his first wife, his second wife, and then, as he moved into the wider world, men of more familiar names, writers and politicians the most of them. Thomas Huxley entered

the earlier part as a revered teacher mostly seen afar off; later portraits range widely from Bernard Shaw, Frank Harris, Joseph Conrad, Stephen Crane and Arnold Bennett to Graham Wallas, the Webbs, Milner, Grey, Balfour, the two Roosevelts (Theodore and Franklin), and Lenin and Stalin. The pattern is one of restless drivings forward under urgent impulses of discontent with what life, in each phase, had to offer, a pattern in which one plain strand was the impulse to social order as the condition of personal happiness and harmony. This one strand he sees as ultimately--indeed from an early period--predominant. The "main arch" of all his story, "the structural frame of my life," is, he declares, "the development, the steady progressive growth of a modern vision of the world, and the way in which the planned reconstruction of human relationships in the form of a world-state became at last the frame and test of my activities," taking to itself at last a religious significance, so that he seeks to identify his attitude with that of the religious mystic, with the difference that his own "is still an escape from first-hand egoism and immediacy, but it is no longer an escape from fact". His Open Conspirator remains entirely "this-worldly," finding his sublimation in the active establishment of the kingdom of heaven ("the creative world community") upon earth.

Mr. Murry tells his story more directly, with fewer generalizations upon science, politics, education,

sex and literature. It may appear narrower thereby in interest, but it is none the worse as autobiography. He has fewer well-known personalities to discuss, but to these few his approach is far more intimate. The steps in his progress are first poor London home and Board School, thence by scholarship to Christ's Hospital school and Oxford University, and thence again to literary journalism and to friendship with D. H. Lawrence and marriage with Katherine Mansfield, the knowledge of whose fatal illness, in the winter of 1918-19, creates the dark and tragic mood of the book's ending. That of course is but the barest outline of the story. Its essence is rather Mr. Murry's own personal quest for some faith, in effect some security, wherein he might both lose and find himself. A rootless man, set adrift by education and circumstance from the class of his birth and achieving no compensating anchorage in a stable profession, he sought to orient himself and destroy isolation by "a peculiar intensity" in his personal relationships. But his friends either withdrew from him or were killed in the War; his wife, to whom he came nearest, was doomed to death. The time came when he could find relief, a bearable condition of being, only in the conviction that "the highest condition possible to man . . . was to be able to accept the necessity, and discern the beauty, of the denial of his own deepest heart's desire" He worshipped, in fact, a beauty of necessity which, as he

has said elsewhere, was not faith in life at all, but simply "acceptance of life's shipwreck—an ecstasy of death". There the account closes, at any rate for the time being, leaving him in this dreadful and sterile condition which was to find no alleviation until, after his wife's death early in 1923, there came to him that mystical experience which coloured and directed the bulk of his work for a number of years thereafter, giving him, for the first time, a "faith in life" indeed.

These are the two books, the two men: what is their relation? It lies in this: that there was a time when Mr. Wells was something more than a teacher, when he was, more deeply than almost any other figure of his generation, a *leader*. Mr. Murry himself wrote in 1916 of that pre-War Mr. Wells: "He was our standard-bearer, and fought for us so bravely that when he failed we failed with him." In that latter phrase is expressed the very essence of leadership. But a change came, a feeling among these younger men and among those yet younger, that their experience held realities no longer compassed and outpaced by Mr. Wells. He was wise, he was a great teacher, they would do him honour, but in the last resort their path must break away from his. Again we may call upon Mr. Murry to define that feeling. There was a brief period, in 1928 and 1929, when, after a long time of indifference, he seemed to pay particular attention to Mr. Wells's proposals

for action; but, in the last resort, to reject them because, basically, politics is not enough and Mr. Wells's ideas, despite the religious claim made for them, did not seem to him to move beyond the lower plane.

He seems to miss the essential quality of religion. . . . In the last resort he is always for doing, never for being; and because he is impatient of being, he is scarcely even aware that fine doing is the flower of fine being. . . . To present only an ideal of fine doing, as Mr. Wells does, and to neglect the inseparable ideal of fine being, will not really carry us forward. There is nothing in this to fire men's souls, only something to arouse their minds.

And again, on the same topic; "We shall not build the new Jerusalem, unless we first rebuild ourselves." And finally:—

"World peace" is not a religion, nor can any religion be based upon it. The "Resist not evil" of Jesus, really understood, might polarize thousands into activity; "world peace" will barely move one. . . . Sustained religious devotion can only be aroused by a religious vision. World peace is not a religious vision. . . . Why should there be peace? The only answer is: because men in their souls know that there must be peace. And men who know that in their souls will not band themselves into a militant organization to secure it. They would violate their vision, and in themselves annihilate their own ideal.

The criticism was narrow, but it was fundamental. The man who could utter it had penetrated to the heart of the situation, had himself touched those deeper realities for which others were in search. Thereby he was himself become a leader.

In truth there were many for whom Mr. Murry, in the earlier years of the *Adelphi*, in the days when he was writing *To the Unknown God*, *Things to Come*, *The Life of Jesus* and above all *Keats and Shakespeare*, was a leader indeed, one who spoke to the very roots of being, who had compassed our experience and outpaced it. What Mr. Wells had been, Mr. Murry now was, and he took the former's place for us by virtue of his deeper religious realizations. Mr. Wells was the child of his generation inheriting the late (or was it the mid?) Victorian optimism of a still expanding world, the faith in a Progress which would not be denied. And all his life, from first to last, has been expansion and progress. It has had its sorrows undoubtedly, but, as Mr. Murry has somewhere noted, "it hasn't got a tragic period; neither has Wells's work." The War came too late, certainly ruffling the surface of his Huxleyite rationalism, but hardly more than causing his optimism to clothe itself in new and perhaps less immediate forms. For it must be insisted upon that if Mr. Wells has been sometimes a prophet of doom he has never been, or more than momentarily, a prophet of despair.

Mr. Murry, in turn, was the child of *his* generation, across whose younger manhood the War broke as sheer naked evil, incapable of such easy compensation. If they—those who survived—were to discover faith in life it would be a hard faith, one rising out of the depths of despair, one that would,

to take Mr. Murry's own phrases, reconcile the demand of the heart with the knowledge of the mind, the nature of man with the nature of things. The battle between the contradictory demands of these opposed natures is no more than joined at the point where Mr. Murry breaks off his autobiography. But the question asserts itself: Is the battle finished yet? Illumination, it has been said, was given, and life gushed forth. From a predominant intellectualism he turned to a predominant mysticism. He had known in his own experience, as a fact of experience, the reconciliation of these opposites, and in his writing he could make his knowledge manifest. Have that knowledge and that power been sustained in him—or have they lapsed? The question is not easily answered, but it may be wondered whether Mr. Murry does to-day evoke the simple confidence he inspired ten, or even six or seven years ago. Not because he has gone forward, but perhaps because he has gone backward. In his book *God* the mystical experience received its complete rationalization, and while that was a book of more than merely intellectual quality, in certain of the writings which succeeded it intellectualism seemed in the ascendant, asserting categories and divisions, and turning in no small degree from the stress upon being to the immediate need for action, for doing. Of course it is not so simple as that—but neither is the long course of consideration which leads to this so-brief statement. Cer-

tainly there seem some odd parallelisms between Mr. Wells's "this-worldly" Open Conspirator and Mr. Murry's neo-Marxian Socialist whose activity is wholly in the world of Existence.

There is no possibility of total reconciliation between the nature of man and the nature of things save in a dedication of oneself to the work of changing the nature of things.

Need Mr. Wells hesitate a moment to accept the authorship of these words of Mr. Murry? And would it not have been plain to Mr. Murry in a more truly visionary phase that the only "things" whose nature man's effort might change were those in some sense born of the "nature of man" itself, that the distinction itself was in fact intellectual, not organic? And is it not clear that he has changed not only the direction but something of the ground of his effort when he turns from the dynamic of Jesus and his "Resist not evil" to reject "revolution by violence" not "because it is violent," but because, as "a political realist," he finds "the political possibilities" overwhelmingly against it? (See *Adelphi*, February 1933.)

Well, if this be true, what does it signify? And what has it to do with autobiography, or autobiography with it? First, this: That both Mr. Wells and Mr. Murry are, in relation to their day, cardinal figures, beings in whom the spirit of their day may be read, who have themselves discerned the problems faced by their generations and striven to their utmost to declare the one thing needful. Little

that either has written, or is likely to write, can be without value. Among Mr. Wells's major post-War works, his *Outline of History*, *Science of Life*, and *Work, Wealth and Happiness of Mankind* are useful and needed clarifications of their subjects likely to have been conceived and written by no other living man, while Mr. Murry is beyond doubt the profoundest English literary critic alive to-day. But no man can *be* the truth; he is at best its vehicle or interpreter, and the moment passes. For he is not, he cannot be of his nature as a man, wholly pure—the subjective must colour the objective, the personal limit the universal.

Here, to return to our beginning, appears the function of autobiography (and of biography too: indeed the only ultimate justification for either). In every man's gospel there is something we take on faith; when that ceases to be so he has no more to give us. But in that margin of uncertainty, beyond our own knowledge, the truth lies untestable, subjective mixed with objective, the personally with the universally valid. To know the person, in his prepossession and his experience, is to cast a distinguishing ray of light into that darkness; it is, of necessity, as has been said, to understand a man's message anew.

It is not possible, at this point in this article, to demonstrate the illumination directed upon the teachings of Mr. Wells and Mr. Murry by their respective autobiographies; to do so would need an

article upon each. It can only, but it must, be asserted. Perhaps something of the sort has been, at any rate in Mr. Wells's case, half indicated, but one would point too to his marked "claustrophobic" impulses, his perpetual restlessness, his tendency to evade direct conflict, and the outward rather than inward turning of his interests as all extremely significant. Mr. Murry is at once more subtle and in a sense more obvious. Reading his own account of his ingrained passivity, inertness, and fear of life, his unassuageable sense of his own non-being, it is hard not to view his insistence upon self-annihilation as the beginning and the end of religious experience, his presentation of every development (as his acceptance of Marxism) in terms primarily of self-sacrifice, and his determined denial of self-responsibility as the crown of his teaching.

To note this is not to note them as untrue, but it is to suggest that we should be more than usually scrutinizing before accepting their universal truth.

A man writes his autobiography at his own peril! But that, if he has sought truth as have these two men, will not deter him. These are important books, we repeat, because Mr. Wells and Mr. Murry are important men; to know their writings intimately, and to pass from the outward truths of the one to the inward truths of the other, is to apprehend something of the authentic and essential movement of the Western Mind to-day.

GEOFFREY WEST

SOCIETY AND FICTION

[A. N. Monkhouse is a man of mature literary experience whose voice is readily listened to. In this article he writes about the function of the novel as a mirror of evolving society. Does the novel mould it? Can the novel create a new social order? Mr. Monkhouse says that "it is a function of novel-writing to bind together the classes or, at least, to help them to understand one another". Is there emerging a novelist who visions the binding of races and nations in one great family? There are enough novels of wars and the impending doom. Does this mean that we are still far removed from the birth of a World-State united in peace and unfolding in progress?—EDS.]

In the February number of *THE ARYAN PATH* there is an interesting article on "Society and Literature" by Dr. Ernst Kohn-Bramstedt, who is concerned particularly with questions of class-distinction and literature in its international aspect as a means of unity or fraternity. While recognising the claim of æsthetics he concentrates on the social problems involved and he ranges over a wide ground. Perhaps one may yield but a partial assent to the proposition that "the literary taste of a missionary in India is different from that of a trade unionist in Wales or from that of a spoiled, elegant lady of society in London". Taste is not absolute, but very different people should have much in common. It is one of our difficulties to-day that democracy, with natural and laudable aims to promote its social and political ends, may undervalue literature which has no such aims. The missionary and the trade unionist should unite on "King Lear" and even the elegant lady might be induced to see that there is something in it.

Dr. Kohn-Bramstedt's historical sketch suggests that the old custom of patronage in the arts tended to

give a favourable view of the privileged classes. One of the notable things about English and American fiction is the very considerable shifting of interest to the lower social strata. "The publisher has taken the place of the patron" and the sublimities of tragedy are no longer confined to the socially exalted. Dr. Kohn-Bramstedt is not a mere visionary and he assures us that "the unity of mankind is to-day more a matter of easy transport and easy communication than a psychological and political matter". Yet he quotes Goethe, with great effect, upon the necessity of international understanding and sympathy. This must depend largely upon the interchange of literature.

What I have to say about society and literature is of comparatively narrow range. Literature of many kinds has its relations to society, but perhaps it may be agreed that these are especially close and significant in the novel; it is of the English novel particularly that I speak. This may be concerned with sociological themes and even with didactic intentions, but generally the value of the novel depends very much on what may

be called the independence of art. Historically we can learn more from the unbiased representation than from the attempt to demonstrate logically. Some shreds of a philosophy may be contained in almost any novel but it is not always a social philosophy.

Lately, for purposes of rest or recreation, I read Anthony Trollope's *Doctor Thorne*, a notable work in a series which has lately renewed its vogue. It was first published in 1858—the year of my birth—and, though it was the year after the Indian Mutiny, it was, as we see it in retrospect, a pretty comfortable time socially. The troubles of the “hungry forties” had died down or were conveniently inconspicuous; there was poverty and hardship but they seemed very much in the nature of things. To-day, with far more of care and effort given to the social problems there is far more—of course I do not mean too much—of complaint and revolt. Trollope's novel indicated a state of society that was comparatively placid though it had, of course, its trials and troubles. I cull from it a passage which represents a curious phase of aristocratic privilege. The scene is a country church on a Sunday Morning:—

There was a separate door opening from the Greshamsbury pew out into the Greshamsbury grounds, so that the family were not forced into unseemly community with the village multitude in going to and from their prayers; for the front door of the church led out into a road which had no connexion with the private path.

Privileges of this kind are not

uncommon now, I believe, and in some parish churchyards the graves of the squire's family are carefully separated from those of the rest of the congregation. Such differences, it need hardly be said, are out of harmony with the spirit of liberal and enlightened Christians; they are hardy survivals from a semi-feudal age. And in this novel, *Doctor Thorne*, there is much that appeals to a sense of history. The hero is heir to a heavily encumbered estate and so the refrain that runs through the story is “Frank must marry money.”

Trollope is alive to the ironical implications and to the beginnings of a more humane relation between classes. In the story the difficulty is that the hero's sweetheart is poor and that to marry her must bring disaster to a great family. The solution is typical of the time; the girl succeeds to a large fortune and all is well. A novelist could hardly venture on such a conclusion to-day, but Trollope knew how far he could go with safety. In a modern novel hero and heroine are called upon for suffering, for sacrifice, and the mere happy ending is discredited. The world has enlarged beyond the confines of the country house, even though this may make the scene or starting point. In reading the mid-Victorian novel one may perceive how far we have travelled.

Yet signs and portents might be observed in those days when the social structure offered a comparatively smooth façade. A novel which deals forcibly with indus-

trial conditions is Mrs. Gaskell's *Mary Barton*, and in this connection may be mentioned Disraeli's *Sybil*, George Eliot's *Felix Holt* and the novels of Charles Kingsley. Particularly, I think, is the growth of liberal idealism illuminated in that great novel Meredith's *Beauchamp's Career*, belonging though it does to pre-socialist days. With Arnold Bennett in the Potteries, Mr. Wells in an imagined future, the old limits of society seem capable of infinite expansion. Doubtless there is fiction that defies time but there is much, too, that reflects the phase of society. During the last few years there has been a notable contribution to the history of industrial Lancashire in a series of novels which have penetrated to the life of the poor who are suffering from the commercial depression.

It is a function of novel-writing to bind together the classes or, at least, to help them to understand one another. English fiction now is a strange confusion of thoughtful and observant writing which gives much of the form and pressure of the time; and, on the other hand, of recklessness and lack of moral restraint. The London cocktail novel with its facile adulteries may be something between a nuisance and a scandal, yet from the inextricable mixture of motives and tendencies, from moods of revolt and of acquiescence, the issues are not all ignoble. The trend of fiction may be obscure, but it makes for real values in society and not merely feudal or sporting traditions. The

most conspicuous of American fiction seems to have almost abolished the drawing-room, and in England, too, attention becomes concentrated upon the hero rather than upon his ancestors. It is recognised, more and more, in current fiction that an aristocracy—even if Big Business sides with it—can have no validity unless it can give us what might be called a spiritual leadership. And it becomes apparent, even to those who may hate Hitlerism as the devil, that we can very well make our aristocracy as we go. There may be more recklessness in society to-day but in the world there is more sympathy, a nearer approach to fraternity. Our fiction will act as pioneer as well as recorder; our novels are founded on society, and they will contribute to its evolution. In some of them we may find decadence, the irresponsible glare of wit, despair in brilliant disguise. The great Russian novels of the late nineteenth century gave warning of social change; we, too, have changes before us which we must hope to accomplish without disaster.

Is the novel preparing society for great acts of renunciation? Galsworthy's *Man of Property* and its successors may be taken as indications of momentous change. Those of us who are not politicians may yet see that it is a tremendous step from a material world to what we may conceive as a spiritual one. We may recall Browning's monk:—

I did renounce the world, its pride and greed,
Palace, farm, villa, shop and banking-house

And then comes that fine ironical twist :

Trash such as those poor devils of Medici
Have given their hearts to.

The Man of Property has still a

long way to go and he may look to fiction for signs of the times. The novel has reflected great changes in our social life and it will reflect greater.

A. N. MONKHOUSE

The Cosmic Cycle. By MAX WALDEMAR KURNIKER. (David McKay Co., Philadelphia.)

This book presents the theory of cosmic genesis developed by Hans Hoerbiger of Vienna, about thirty years ago. In many essential respects it is startlingly at variance with the Kant-Laplace theory still commonly accepted with some modifications. The older hypothesis has never been free from intrinsic difficulties, and some of the later variations have given evidence that astronomy is a mixture of facts, theories and guess-work.

This new theory, called glacial cosmogony, explains the origin of our solar system and of the Milky Way which it regards as connected both genetically and dynamically with the solar system of which it is a comparatively near neighbour. It traces many geological and meteorological phenomena (e.g., glacial epochs, floods, submergence of continents, hailstorms, tornadoes, etc.) to the action of cosmic forces—chiefly by the capture and dissolution of moons and by the action of cosmic ice missiles. It posits that all space is filled with atomically fine hydrogen and so offers resistance to the motions of heavenly bodies and tends to narrow the orbits of planets into spirals along which smaller ones march to their dissolution in the larger. It has a theory of primary, secondary and tertiary moons all of which were

captured and ultimately "devoured" by our earth with very catastrophic consequences to herself; and it mentions moonless intervals in our earth history—all which the memory of man, (Hoerbiger speaks of primary, secondary, tertiary man) has preserved in myth and legend.

These and many other interesting features of this cosmogony throw out a bold challenge to official astronomy, geology, paleontology, anthropology and comparative mythology. They are calculated to give an altogether new orientation to our accepted ideology of the universe, and new values to the ancient memories and wisdom of humanity. This cosmogony seeks to explain the origin of the solar system by the "explosion" of a giant Mother Star pierced by the bomb of a lesser luminary, the chaotic debris from the explosion gradually assuming the shape of our sun, planets, etc. The picture bears a suggestive likeness to some of the traditional cosmogonies of the world, particularly those given in the Vedic literature. The picture will of course require much touching and retouching, both as to outline and detail, with the progress of scientific research and thought; and it remains—purely mechanical as it is—incomplete without a spiritual background. Still it is an interesting, suggestive and promising picture.

PRAMATHANATH MUKHOPADHYAYA

SALVAGING DEMOCRACY

EASTERN LIGHT ON WESTERN PROBLEMS

I.—THE NEW DEAL EXPERIMENT*

This beautifully got-up publication of the Columbia University is a lucid exposition of the principles of the "New Deal". It is a forceful and spirited vindication of the regime of President Roosevelt, a clearly outlined survey of the economic and social problems that confront America, by one who is both a professor and a practical politician, and who holds the responsible post of Under Secretary for Agriculture.

Various are the objects for which the campaign of the "New Deal" was commenced. It is "a definite attempt to evolve a new governmental-economic relationship in response to the needs and opportunities created by the past methods of operating our (the American) economy" (p. 266), the "first great national counter offensive in that war against human misery" (p. 294), co-ordinated administration and negotiation being the key to legislation (p. 11). The "New Deal" tolls the knell of the old order under which competition was assumed to be an inherent part of democracy and the two were taken to be only two aspects of one and the same value (p. 6). Economics is no longer a "dismal science" but essentially social, and competition is recognised as compelling "business confusion" (p. 7). The present is an era of economic maintenance rather than economic development; and the move is therefore against the old *laissez faire* doctrine, with its "flexible prices" and "freedom in competition" (p. 81). The policeman's doctrine of government is found insufficient and even dangerous, under which government was only to "stop flagrant abuses and not to do more. It

was to be negative and arresting not positive and stimulating" (pp. 13, 14). The resulting abuses in the economic and social field have made urgent the need for anti-trust legislation to prevent the further growth of "Big Fellows" in industry and for interference to such an extent as to give the citizen protection against the "leechery" of "fakers, quacks and poisonous nostrum makers" (p. 98). "Incomes must be transformed into larger wages and higher prices to farmers" (p. 56).

Of the many problems that are dealt with in this survey the most important is agricultural. The Agricultural Adjustment and the National Recovery Acts are intended to co-ordinate and control private enterprise in agriculture and industry. The current depression in agriculture was brought about by more and more lands being brought under cultivation, by increased freights and the motorization of America, all which resulted in overproductivity (p. 225), fall in prices of farm products, a general decline in the purchasing power of farmers (p. 227), farm surpluses and farm debts (p. 230). One of the proposals to meet it is that "as fast as good new lands are brought into cultivation, . . . a correspondingly productive unit of poor submarginal lands will be taken out of cultivation" (116). Land is the basic wealth (p. 63), and a gradual resettlement of America and a changed appearance of great stretches of the country now bare and overfarmed (p. 63) by processes of reclamation, improved transportation and organization of industry is likely to achieve

* *The Battle for Democracy*, By REXFORD G. TUGWELL. (Columbia University Press, New York. \$3.00)

the desired result. The scheme outlined requires that industrial corporations, instead of using their earnings to enlarge their surplus, should utilize them to increase their pay-roll or reduce prices to consumers, thereby enlarging the demand for their own products, along with those of others (p. 188).

As regards the currency policy:—

"The whole gold action [of the President] looks toward freedom from an orthodox myth; it promotes equality and it will force us in the years to come to search for a really satisfactory medium of exchange—which gold never was and never could be" (p. 28).

Gold is a commodity like wheat, silver or iron; its value fluctuates and that rapidly. It is so scarce and so liable to fluctuation that it should give way to some other monetary medium (p. 48). As alternatives are suggested a "managed currency" and the "commodity dollar," each with its merits and defects, though the former is the course adopted by the administration.

The proof of the pudding is in the eating, and the modern era will have to wait patiently awhile before passing its judgment as to the merits or otherwise of the democratic programme outlined in the work. The author says guardedly enough that the legislation of the New Deal may be described as "a charter for experiment and research, for invention and learning" (p. 260). Though it is primarily a book for America and the

Americans, some of the modern post-War problems it deals with are of more universal application. Nor is the work lacking in a lesson for the politician of modern India. If even in an essentially industrial country like America are adopted and followed, such "experiments in reconstruction" as in the Tennessee Valley, and the "trial and error" in the Columbia Basin, how much more is there need in India for agricultural adjustment and reconstruction and for the regulation of rural economy? The view of the author on the sphere of governmental interference seems to be similar to the "principle of paternalistic interference" that we find amply illustrated in the political literature of ancient India. The government should play the part of the good parent and regulate its activities in such a way as to secure that posterity would thrive well in body and in mind. The ancient Indian law-givers also realized the impossibility of enforcing "prohibition" and therefore made rules that would rather regulate the traffic than seek to prohibit it. They seem to have granted also that wine taken in moderate quantities might serve as a healthy substitute for intoxicating liquor.

In the interest of topical continuity, rather than chronological sequence that has been kept in the work, the necessity for a re-arrangement of the chapters may suggest itself to the careful reader.

S. V. VISWANATHA

II.—LIBERTY IN THE U. S. A. AND WORLD PEACE*

Woodrow Wilson brought the United States of America into the Great War, determined that "the world must be safe for Democracy. Its

peace must be planted upon tested foundations of political Liberty." For a season, the world lay under the spell of this declaration. But years have

* (1) *The Challenge to Liberty*. By HERBERT HOOVER (Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, \$1.75)

(2) *Challenge to Death—No More War!*—By PHILIP NOEL BAKER and others with a Foreword by Viscount Cecil (Constable & Co., Ltd., London).

brought disappointment, and it has been bitterly borne in upon us that we live in a world which is neither safe for democracy, nor contains much of democracy to be made safe for. The Dictator's iron heel is everywhere, and a political twilight which is neither peace nor war, enshrouds mankind. The two volumes under review are a powerful exposition of this condition of the world and a stirring appeal to the friends of humanity to rouse themselves and act before it is too late.

The Ex-President of the United States of America devotes his volume in the main to the conditions brought about by the "New Deal," which is to him unadulterated despotism and invasion of individual liberty. He is opposed to the regimentation of the hour, though alive to the fact that the hope of humanity lies in co-operation. He holds that the other freedoms cannot be maintained if economic freedom be impaired, but is also opposed to the abuses of Liberty, which take the form of exploitation of labour and of the public. He is apprehensive that Bureaucracy may "rush headlong into visions of the millennium and send the bill to the Treasury," and consequently deprecates the "vast concentration of political and economic authority in the executive". In brief, Mr. Hoover's monograph is a latter-day version of the Millite gospel of Liberty.

The authors of *Challenge to Death* deal with the problem of International Anarchy. They stand for "collective security and for the maintenance and improvement of that machinery, which for all its imperfections, represents our sole defence against anarchy". They realise that "the sovereign State is the remaining wild beast-ferre natural, of the political jungle." They are disquieted by the growth of bitter nationalism all over the civilised World; and although education can do a great deal, and Sir Norman Angell may be right holding that "when men see, as they can be made to see, that such

ideas *are* evil, they will also cease to like them," they fear that those who preach peace will not be given time to finish their work. The authors, therefore, feel that the opponents of war must look for other means, and among them, "the collective ownership of armaments and the collective enforcement of sanctions against an aggressor".

Both the volumes are imbued with a vivid appreciation of the inexorable truth of Wilson's dictum that world peace can be established only on the tested foundation of political liberty. The authors of the co-operative work on the establishment of world peace see that Fascism is an ally of war, while Mr. Hoover holds that "the most practical proposal of Peace to the World has been the extension of Self-Government. . . . Modern Despotism has achieved its purpose by fanning the fires of Nationalism." If this is so, it is worth while asking ourselves why Democracy, instead of setting out on its appointed task of enforcing world peace, has tamely made room for the Despot. Why this double failure?

The answer is that Democracy is under a shadow, because it has disappointed both the privileged classes and the people at large in those countries where it has been at work. The former were prepared to acquiesce in changes in the constitutional scaffolding, so long as the structure remained unaltered in its essential characteristics of social and economic inequality. The masses cherished the hope that the possession of a vote would enable them in the fullness of time to obtain the reality of power for their representatives. Parliamentary Government in recent years went too far in its promotion of social welfare to retain its innocuous character in the eyes of the privileged classes; on the other hand, it became clear to the working classes, that even a sweeping majority in the elections would by no means place real power in their hands, so long as the vested interests held the

citadel, safely ensconced in the Civil Service, the Army, the Judiciary, etc. Disappointed with the unbecoming behaviour of Democracy, Privilege has sought its remedy in the authoritative state, while the masses faced with "the perpetual menace of destitution," which "has been the most intolerable feature of the modern industrial system" (Saeter) are turning away from a form of Government, whose wheels refuse to move when their leaders are "in power". This in brief explains why Fascism, Communism, and Direct Action are exercising a fascination over men's minds at the present time.

One may discern the same conflict between the Privilege of the few and the Rights of the many in the international field. If international anarchy is to be ended, and the rule of law should prevail among nations, the privileges of the great Powers must yield before the rights of the nations in general, and the League of Nations cease to be a gathering of the delegates of the Powers, but function freely as a real Parliament of Nations. But the great Powers, have great possessions, and will not willingly enter into an order of things in which the first may be last and the last first.

What then is the remedy? If mankind only would, it could enter into a great heritage of plenty and peace, now that Science has placed within its reach powerful instruments of abundant production and swift transport. But "the lust for domination, self-assertion, coercion" (Norman Angell) stand in the path of the march of men towards a better order. Ultimately it is passion, and not calculation, "the passion roused in rulers and ruled alike by what appears as a threat to their existence, that makes wars possible and inevitable": what is wanted is to use an overworked expression, a change of

heart. As has been well said by M. Benda: "What is needed is not the abstaining from the act, but the coming of a state of mind." The only recipe is enlightenment, and education the one method.

Is not a great part of the political maladies of the West the result of the unhappy divorce of politics from ethics, appropriately associated with the sinister name of Machiavelli? It is worth while remarking that in India, politics has never been allowed to make itself completely independent of religion and ethics. Of the principle of *laissez faire*, which for a time ruled the industrial West and is now discredited, Indian political theory takes no account, and the State did not confine itself to "the hindrance of hindrances," but set out to promote virtue and the good life among the citizens. Political power was a trust held by the ruler, and misrule was held in check not by constitutional devices, but by the enthronement of Dharma as the supreme arbiter. Even realist statesmen, like Chanakya, are alive to the supreme call of Dharma, and that line of succession continues in Mahatma Gandhi, whose unswerving loyalty to Dharma against the pressure of political exigencies is often a puzzle and an embarrassment to followers and critics alike. It was Gladstone's great service to humanity to set his face against the spread in his time of the sinister doctrine that "the State has nothing to do with the restraint of morals," and "the odious contention that moral progress in the relations of Nations and States to one another is an illusion and a dream". The West must now make a new synthesis of her life in which ethics and religion exercise their guiding and healing influence in politics and economics.

N. S. SUBBA RAO

III.—THE METHOD OF GANDHIJI*

Violence has so often led to sudden and spectacular accession to *Power* that the two almost appear to be necessary concomitants; so much so that the "Power of Non-violence" strikes us at first as a contradiction in terms! Alexander and Cæsar, Napoleon and Bismark are but chance reflections of the power-cult dominating the history of the Occident. The fundamental contradiction underlying the Cæsar versus Christ complex has not yet been solved, only conveniently shelved through Western political sophistication. It paid to be violent in Western history which developed a veritable ritual of violence through the systematic apotheosis of violent powers and only half-hearted appreciation of non-violent potencies incarnate in a Buddha or a Christ.

The East has also her power-cults, but by a strange coincidence we find most of the heroes of non-violence coming from Oriental countries. Oriental histories are but indifferently studied outside the group of professional Orientalists. Moreover, most of the Oriental peoples being politically or economically subject to the Occidental powers, both the ethics and the efficacy of non-violence came to be matters of dispute. Yet a growing section of thinkers of the East and the West now appears to be sincerely inquisitive about the Oriental technique of non-violence, as we feel when reading the admirable book of Mr. Richard B. Gregg. A graduate of the Harvard School of Law, he plunged into the study of labour and industrial relations from his headquarters in Chicago during the great strike, and chanced to see a booklet on Gandhi and his movement. He writes:—

I decided to go to India to find out about Gandhi and his methods at first hand, for he seemed more like Christ than anyone I had heard of in the present world.

Between 1925-1930, the author

spent about four years working in close co-operation with Gandhi and finally published his considered opinions in *The Power of Non-Violence* in which we are called upon, as the Rev. Rufus Jones says in his Introduction, "to follow a careful dialectic process which shows an effective method of life demonstrating itself, proving its genuine worth and verifying itself in practice".

With the characteristic thoroughness of a Western inquirer, the author turned his analytical genius to fundamental considerations of a biological nature, coming to the conclusion that "war and violence and divisive attitudes spell eventual biological suicide". Political, economic and social liberty are found to rest on *tolerance* which is the soul of non-violence. We talk glibly of liberty and pretend to die for it but the entire structure of political and economic governance of to-day is hostile to liberty of speech and conviction. Hence the non-violent resistance of Gandhi emerges as a precious instrument for the service of man and the furtherance of human liberty. The psychological problems involved are discussed in two brilliant chapters: "Moral Jiu-Jitsu" and "What Happens," leading to the method of "integration" in the solution of conflicting claims. In this line of argument the author has ably sustained his thesis referring to recent studies of capital importance like Prof. Hocking's *Human Nature and its Remaking* and Mr. Bartlett's *Psychology and the Soldier*. The author has significantly quoted the words of Marshal Foch: "The new kind of war has begun, the hearts of soldiers have become a new weapon." That war will not stop in a day is certain but the nature of war is changing and is bound to change from the primitive brutal annihilation to a civilized integration of conflicting aims and individualities. But conflict

**The Power of Non-Violence*. By RICHARD B. GREGG (J. B. Lippincott Co, Philadelphia and London S. 2. 50.).

is not limited to individual units. It is assuming colossal proportions transcending political and social frontiers in the form of *class-war*. But even here, non-violence, according to Mr. Gregg, is going to play a dominant rôle unless humanity submits to sacrificing all that is best in our history and culture.

Class-war may be on the national or supra-national plane in the form of communism, syndicalism, national self-determination and assertion of minority rights. But in each case civilised mankind would be challenged, through mistakes of violence, to the settlement of durable peace and concord by means of non-violence. "Non-violent resistance builds up a finer system of values and a profounder and more permanent trust than violence can do." (p. 137) This may be doubted still by thousands of people whom the author has duly acknowledged in his incisive chapter "Doubts and Queries". But the heroic suffering involved in non-violence and the *soul-force* emanating therefrom, as observed by Gandhi, are bound to triumph over temporary scepticism. A new science of self-discipline through a sincere preparation for and practice of non-violence would soon reveal to us new truths which may justify modern man's pretensions to the attainment of heights undreamt of. Buddha affirmed the principles of *Maitri* (Fraternity); and Christ, the creative power of Love in suffering. It requires some courage to treat them to-day as "back numbers," staggering, as we do, under the dead-weight of *avidya* crushing the fabric of our civilisation. Ours is an age of titanic conflicts, and India through her noble son Gandhi offers to benighted humanity the new method of solving conflicts—*Satyagraha*—holding to Truth, which alone makes Peace enduring. It is this India which "defies Time"

that was saluted by that eminent French pacifist Romain Rolland dedicating his impassioned "*Mahatma Gandhi*": "*a la Terrée de gloire et de servitude*"—to the Land of Glory and of Servitude! Deathless heroes of human thought from Galileo to Einstein have been bullied, nay, brutally persecuted by pseudo-heroes of history. But their prevision, their quiet courage and in finite faith have disarmed all doubts liberated new forces of good-will and renewed the very basis of human life and creative aspirations.

Our ultra-modern age is threatening to revive the cult of violence, of the strong man pursuing the policy of "blood and iron". But this over-acting is already boring the majority in the Grande Opéra. The Tin-Gods would soon cry a halt and the elemental hunger for justice and amity, let us hope, would make for a new Drama of Peace and Concord. Crucified Christs and defeated Gandhis may still emerge as archetypes of the great Passion-Play fertilizing the souls of countless generations to come. We shall always admire Power even when we reach those supernal heights, but it will certainly be the power of Non-violence. Hence the India of Gandhi may be proud that she of all nations was called to act as the Prologue to the new Cosmo-drama, breaking, through infinite pains of Promethean grandeur, the vicious circle of violence, staggering out into the ineffable region of *Ahimsa* where each human being may maintain his or her specific role and yet avoid the atavistic relapse to violent savagery. Mr. Gregg may appear now and then to plead for a Utopia but surely for a Utopia that seems possible, nay, inevitable if human mind and soul are to fulfil their divine mission.

KALIDAS NAG

Honoré de Balzac—Letters to his Family 1809-1850. Edited by WALTER SCOTT HASTINGS. (Princeton University Press, Princeton. \$ 5.00)

We are not generally aware of the enormous efforts that authors must put forth in order to produce worth while monuments of literature, nor with what odds they must contend. It is only by intimate correspondence, by diaries and stray fragments, that the actual truth is revealed to us. Balzac's work is tremendous, a gallery of portraits, a series of frescoes, a survey of almost every aspect of human life, truly "La Comédie Humaine". The stolid peasant, the conservatist bourgeois, the clergyman, the miser and the sinner, the *arriviste* and the soldier, the rich and the poor, the atheist and the religious, the materialist and the mystic, live and act before us. These many volumes of minute observation, painted by a master hand, were produced in an almost unbelievable rush and hurry. After unwise speculations, Balzac was left early in his career burdened down with debts. His only source of income was his writing and he therefore was forced to write constantly, unceasingly, very often selling even before he had written, in order to keep afloat. He sat at his table on the average of twelve to fourteen hours daily, stimulated by countless cups of black coffee. In spite of all his efforts he died with his debts unpaid and in a deplorable financial condition.

Nothing can show better the harassed life of our author than the letters which he wrote to his immediate family, Laure, his sister, and his mother Mme de Balzac. We have now a revised and corrected edition of his letters and some very interesting answers of Mme de Balzac. This whole collection brings to light his most intimate trials and tribulations, and though they prove tiresome reading now and again, they reveal a vivid picture of his character and his family life. For several years he was forced to live outside of Paris to avoid his creditors; and he wrote his mother, left in charge of his busi-

ness, all his instructions, hopes and fears. His constantly recurring wish was that within the year he might have paid off all bills and debts.

It is strange however that during all these years of separation, neither Balzac nor his mother mentioned any other subject, outside of a few words of affection, business directions and money details. Their letters are strikingly bare of anything else. And yet we know that there were many subjects which held their common interest. The time of Louis-Philippe is known for its interest in mysticism, occultism, spiritualism and magnetism. Mme de Balzac followed this trend and indulged in the reading of her favourite mystics, Swedenborg and others. There is little doubt that she influenced her son and he influenced her, for he also delved into the mysteries of the Orient and occultism; but we have to glean his theories and his intuitive perceptions from his works, for he does not seem to have expressed himself clearly and definitely in any one place. Perhaps due to the haste of production his novels do not reveal much of his inner feelings, and we are often struck by the lightness and flippancy with which he discusses such philosophers as Swedenborg, Leibniz, Spinoza and Kant. Did his insight penetrate their minds? We can, however, find more definite ideas expressed in for instance *Louis Lambert* the story of his own intellectual development while at school. The *Traité de la Volonté* incorporated in it puts forth the theory of the "Homo Duplex," matter and spirit interpenetrating each other, man within which we find this duality. In *Scraphita* he discusses the possibility of conceiving the Infinite and God through an analysis of number. Both theories would lead to high philosophical discussions and speculations if carried out, but unfortunately circumstances as well as temperament kept Balzac firmly tied to the round of material life. His most urgent desire, as we said, was, "J'espère qu'à mon retour les feuilletons auront repris et

qu'alors mes romans me permettront de finir mes dettes, et d'être utile aux miens"; and it was only unconsciously that he was pushed towards philosophical subjects.

Man is partly good and partly evil. In him the divine and the demoniac—God and Devil—mix and mingle. This universal phenomenon sometimes, though rarely, results in the emergence of two distinct psychological types, types not unknown to the student of Occultism. The first is the unconscious intriguer, who does evil without conscious intent, without knowledge, without motive; in such a one the assemblage of the nefarious and demoniac forces has grown so strong that it overpowers not only his soul but even his conscience.

The second type is the unconscious occultist (sometimes a resting adept) in whom the divine forces of knowledge have gathered strength so that he speaks and writes and acts in a wise manner, especially when the Presence of his own Divinity is upon him. Honoré de Balzac was one such unconscious occultist—so writes Madame Blavatsky (*The Secret Doctrine*, I. 66).

In these personal letters his knowledge and inspiration are not to be found. Just as Mr. Hyde shut out the action of Dr. Jekyll, so also Balzac, the person, shut out the activity of the unconscious occultist of French literature. In Balzac's case there was, however, no evil Hyde hidden, but there was what may be described as the corresponding aspect of Hyde on the white and beneficent side.

These thoughts occur to us as we peruse this volume of personal, prosaic letters, and then suddenly remember such a passage as this:—

"Then began for me a series of spells."

"Spells! exclaimed the clergyman. Is there such a thing as a spell?"

"But surely you who are reading just now so attentively the book of

INCANTATIONS of Jean Wier, you will be able to follow the explanation I shall give you of my sensations," at once retorted Wilfrid. "If one studies Nature carefully, both in her great revolutions as in her minutest phenomena, it is impossible not to perceive that spell is a possibility, and your giving to that word its real significance. Man does not create forces, he uses the only one which exists and which comprises them all—motion, incomprehensible breath of the sovereign manufacturer of worlds. Species are too definitely separated to enable the human hand to confuse them; and the only miracle of which man was capable has been accomplished through the combination of two inimical substances. At that gun-powder is allied to lightning! As to compelling creation to emerge suddenly, that cannot be, for all creation demands time, and time neither hastens nor slows down under man's finger. Thus, outside of us plastic nature obeys laws the method and functioning of which can be interfered with by no man. But, having once conceded to Matter its share, it would be unreasonable not to recognize within us the existence of a colossal power the effects of which are so incalculable that known generations have not yet succeeded in classifying them. I am not referring to the faculty of becoming immersed in deep thought, of compelling Nature to be confined within the Verbum, gigantic action to which the average person pays no attention just as he fails to reflect upon motion; It is that action, however, which led Indian Theosophists to explain Creation by means of the Verbum which they endowed with an immense power. The smallest portion of their food, a grain of rice from which alternately creation springs and into which it is again condensed, offered them such a pure image of the Creative Verbum and of the abstract verbum, that it was but natural for them to apply the same system to the production of worlds."

The Mystic Mandrake. By C. J. S. THOMPSON, M. B. E. (Rider & Co., London. 15s.)

It has been said that the proper study of mankind is man; and to study man we must study his beliefs. In his search for truth he has followed many tortuous byways; and it is pertinent to ask why he has chosen one rather than another, or not selected the path which to-day seems so plain.

It is not, perhaps, surprising that poisonous herbs filled his mind with awe. It was easy for him to revert to an animism, no longer accepted by the schools of philosophy, and to see in them the embodiments of demons. Moreover, when to great physiological or even psychical activity was added a root often bifurcated in form, in which an imaginative mind could see the replica of the human body, the plant almost inevitably became a centre for the clustering of fantastic and superstitious beliefs.

Above all plants, these conditions were fulfilled by the Mandrake, or to give it its scientific name *Mandragora officinarum* Linn., a native of the Mediterranean region, and a member of the *Solanaceae*, a family rich in herbs potent to kill, and, when rightly used, to cure.

Modern research has shown the roots of this strange plant to contain hyoscyne, one of the alkaloids which can lull man to sleep, but is also able, according to dosage, to excite him to madness. Its action is fortified by the presence of hyoscyamine and other alkaloids, the nature of which have not yet been fully investigated.

The ancients were acquainted with the remarkable properties of Mandrake root as a drug; and, in the form of an infusion or decoction, it was much employed legitimately as an anæsthetic during surgical operations. But it was perhaps, its power of creating a form of temporary madness, of making the man or woman who drank enough of the infusion indifferent as to his or her actions and forgetful of them when the effect of

the drug had passed off, that seized the popular imagination: that, and the similitude of the root to the human form. The similitude is not normally a very striking one though the root as I have indicated is frequently bifurcated. The idea, however, having once gained currency, it was fostered by impostors who fashioned Mandrake and other roots into little manikins by devices about which one may read in Mr. Thompson's book.

He tells the strange story of the Mandrake in an interesting manner which should make a strong appeal to the general reader, though the more serious student of the byways of human thought would, perhaps, have been more grateful had the book been more fully documented. Much has been written about the Mandrake; but, for the most part, the old writers are either too credulous or alternatively too contemptuous of beliefs recently exploded; and Mr. Thompson's readable book is very welcome. He deals with every aspect of the subject, and it is a large one; for legends about other plants seem to have had a habit of getting themselves transferred to the Mandrake. Even the story of the dreadful shriek which the Mandrake uttered when pulled from the ground, and the consequent necessity of utilising a dog to drag the plant up so that the shriek might not be heard, which is probably one of the best known of the many Mandrake legends, seems originally to have belonged to some other plant. At any rate, I find some difficulty in equating the *Baaras* of Josephus with the Mandrake, though this presented no difficulty to a more credulous generation. Indeed, the Mandrake has gathered to itself a larger and more curious collection of beliefs than any other plant in the world. It was a centre of phantasy; and hence, to the student of the mind of man, constitutes the most interesting plant there is.

II. S. REDGROVE.

[We appeal to this review by a man of science, two extracts from the works of H. P. Blavatsky.—Eds.]

The Mandragora is the *mandrake* of the Bible, of Rachel and Leah. They are the roots of a plant, fleshy, hairy, and forked below, representing roughly the limbs of a man, the body and even a head. Its magical and mysterious properties have been proclaimed in fable and play from the most archaic ages. From Rachel and Leah, who indulged in witchcraft with them, down to Shakespeare, who speaks of *shrieking*—

.... "Like mandrakes torn out of the earth
That living mortals, hearing them, run mad"

—the mandragora was *the* magic plant *par excellence*.

These roots, without any stalk, and with large leaves growing out of the

head of the root, like a gigantic crop of hair, present little similitude to man when found in Spain, Italy, Asia Minor, or Syria. But on the Isle of Candia, and in Karamania near the city of Adan, they have a wonderfully human form; being very highly prized as amulets. They are also worn by women as a charm against sterility, and for other purposes. They are especially effective in *Black Magic*.

—*The Secret Doctrine*, Vol. II, 27

MANDRAGORA (*Gr.*). A plant whose root has the human form. In Occultism it is used by *black* magicians for various illicit objects, and some of the "left-hand" Occultists make *homunculi* with it. It is commonly called *mandrake*, and is supposed to cry out when pulled out of the ground.

—*Theosophical Glossary*

Mirabai, Saint and Singer of India.
By ANATH NATH BASU. (George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., London. 2s. 6d.)

This unpretentious little book should be welcome to all interested in Indian religions and poetical thought. The introduction briefly outlines the available facts and traditions about Mirabai. Born a Rajput princess, her married life was surrounded by luxury. Her inner spiritual yearnings had, however, awakened early, and these eventually brought her into situations of much personal difficulty and even persecution. Always remaining true to her resolves, after the death of her husband she gave up the life of the palace and set out as a wanderer in search of spiritual rebirth.

Mirabai's songs depict with simplicity, and yet with the strength born of an inner conviction, the yearnings of the human soul, its aspirations its struggles, its frustrations, and the humility, the devotion, the sorrows and joys of the aspirant who would come out from among them and become as one newly born. Each poem enshrines, as it were,

some aspect of the singer's strivings, and the author has been fortunate in retaining in the English rendition the graphic simplicity of expression so dear to the Indian heart and mind.

Unfortunately too many Indians have neglected their old wisdom and have turned for inspiration to our chaotic West, with saddening results. On the other hand, there are those few of East and West, whom the suffering produced by a purely mechanistic civilization has awakened and who have turned their faces to the wisdom of the ancient East. They are slowly realizing that the regaining and retaining of lost standards of physical well-being are not sufficient. They are searching for some examples and inspiration which can fan into flame the dying embers of their hopes and aspirations. The lives and teachings of such as Ramananda, Kabir, Nanak and Mirabai can help to give the necessary impetus, but only if Indians themselves can present them sympathetically and with understanding.

B. T.

This Was Ivor Trent. By CLAUDE HOUGHTON (William Heinemann, Ltd., London. 7s. 6d.)

One who knew only the titles of Mr. Houghton's works might suppose him to be the author of "thrillers" or detective stories. Nor would he be far wrong. But the mysteries he unravels are of a psychic rather than of a criminal kind. His latest work is no exception. It begins in one of those yellow London fogs which were so congenial to Sherlock Holmes and before long there emerges from it a shrouded figure. Its face, however, is not of a kind to interest Scotland Yard.

The glance of the eyes transmitted a secret wisdom. The forehead was crested with serenity. *Trent knew that a man from the future confronted him.*

Yet no implacable Oriental on the track of a stolen diamond could have produced a more terrifying effect. Trent runs blindly through the fog to the house he was making for, beats with clenched fists on the door and falls senseless at the feet of his kindly landlady, Mrs. Frazer. And from that time until we reach the closing section of the novel, we see him no more. Immersed in his secret refuge, a self-contained flat at the top of 77 Potiphar Street, he becomes a mysterious question-mark and particularly to Rendell, who, reading in an evening paper of the distinguished novelist's sudden illness, calls at 77 Potiphar Street to inquire and almost involuntarily takes a room on the ground-floor. It is through and with Rendell that we discover some of the facts of Trent's past life. For there are other inquirers and Rendell has to open the door to most of them. The most frantic are two women who are in terror lest Trent in his supposed delirium should compromise them. Each is a "psychic invalid," and so in different ways are the other associates with whom Trent seems to have killed time between

bouts of novel writing. Of these the most notable is Denis Wrayburn who detects so clearly the deathrattle in all contemporary activities that his blood is frozen in his incisive brain. Rendell helps and studies them all with unfailing zest. He has indeed a talent for combining the roles of amateur detective and family doctor. But while he is engaged in soothing his neurotic patients at the cost of only one suicide, Trent himself is almost forgotten. At least we only get glimpses at second hand through his hysterical friends of what "*was* Ivor Trent". Nor does he reappear in the flesh. He leaves, however, a pseudo-Dostoevskian manuscript for Rendell to read, in which after laying bare the bankruptcy in his past and describing the crisis of revelation in the fog, he sensationally invokes the being he saw.

Mr. Houghton is at his worst in this concluding climax. In a sense his whole novel is a climax. For it has an ingrained theatricality, which is equally apparent in the plot, the characters and the style. His touch on human life is generally too insensitive and his view of spiritual problems always too crudely external to evoke the inner truths of either. He exploits both for the purposes of excitement and entertainment. And so long as he confines himself to the surface of the disintegrated modern world, we can enjoy the power and pungency of his writing and a humour that is as often kind as ruthless. But when he attempts to reduce to the same melodramatic level the mystery of re-birth and regeneration, the result is grotesquely meretricious. Of all the ghosts in his pages that have lost their way in the fog of the present and stare "into futurity with fanatical eyes," the Ivor Trent who announces with the skill of a practised showman that he has become the man of the future is the most spectacularly false.

HUGH P. A. FAUSSET

Outline of Buddhism. By C. H. S. WARD (The Epworth Press, London. 2s. 6d.)

A perusal of this book is almost sure to leave a new enquirer into Buddhist philosophy as confused as the author himself appears to be. It is written in a thinly veiled spirit of Christian protagonism, but as the churches many centuries ago abandoned Gnosis, their adherents should not perhaps be expected to be unbiased or philosophical. This "Outline" is based almost entirely upon the teachings and interpretations current in, and derived from, the *Hinayana* or Southern School of Buddhism, although it is admitted that the *Mahayana* Buddhism "is the faith of the overwhelming majority of living Buddhists."

There is no more deeply philosophical a people than the Hindus, and the Buddha was a flower of Aryan soil. His teachings are not different from the older doctrines which included Reincarnation, Karma, Moksha, etc.,

but he had first to arrest the prevailing superstition before restating the Truth. Unequipped, however, with the requisite philosophical background, the author in his comments on the twin doctrines of Reincarnation and Karma and on Nirvana has merely added to the prevailing confusion. He seems unable to take a general survey of the subject and produce either a synthetic whole or a rational explanation of doctrinal development. He is still talking about the view long since exploded, one had hoped, that Nirvana means "extinction": the Buddha having attained to it, continued to teach humanity for some forty-five years thereafter! As to Reincarnation, the Westerner suffers from the absence of the rudiments of this doctrine from his religious thought. And so with other teachings. No, this book does not outline Buddhism; it is a view of Buddhism as a church sectarian looks at it.

B.

Crime and Human Ethics. By CARL HEATH (Allenson & Co., London. 1 s.)

This brochure is the 1934 Roy Calvert Memorial Lecture. Calvert was an ardent humanitarian whose efforts were directed towards the abolition of capital punishment up to his death in 1933. Mr. Heath brings forward no new conclusive arguments. He goes over the old ground and launches the suggestion that more serious study should be given to the "psychic" or the metaphysical side of the problem. His viewpoint, it is regrettable to note, seems coloured with the conceptions of orthodox Christianity, and these suggestions are therefore in the main somewhat vague and to the materialistically inclined, unsatisfactory. On the other hand, his appeal that within each human soul there is something of fineness and nobility which can be evoked even from the most degraded, is entirely Spiritual.

But we find Mr. Heath unable to go to the root of the matter. If death

means the end of everything then the materialistic idea of doing away with a noxious human weed, is but logical and correct. If however, there is an understanding of what death really means, and what the human soul is, what its evolution and ultimate goal, then the solution of this pressing problem of the death penalty will be more readily understood. Unfortunately Mr. Heath seems more unaware of, than unwilling to consider, the result of civilizations whose metaphysical and philosophical sciences were and are still more advanced than our own. Unless he is prepared to consider the Laws of Reincarnation and Karma, which indicate that *death* is but change of state in the pilgrimage of the soul, all other arguments, despite their humaneness, will lose the requisite fortifying strength against attacks. These teachings are moderately enshrined in Theosophy and they indicate the *reasons* why the death penalty should be done away with.

T.

The Secret Path, By PAUL BRUNTON
(Rider and Co. Ltd., London. 5s.)

Who writes publishers' "blurbs"? In this case the book is termed "an amazing new system for unfolding the powers of the mysterious Overself". This sort of language only serves to prejudice readers against what is in fact a good book. It is certainly not new and scarcely "amazing". There is too much padding and far too much journalese but, all the same, it is a book which should be of service to many who are looking for the light and it is a welcome sign of the awakening spiritual aspirations of the West that such a book should have been written at the request of many of the readers of the author's previous work.

The Path described is the age-old one of detachment from the various sheaths of the Self, the physical body, the emotions and thoughts, leading to a realisation of the true Self, the God within the heart. It is the same Path that is set forth in the twelve verses of the Māndukya Upanishad but it is here presented in simple unsymbolic language which should be clear to the average reader though, to another class, the very fact that it has been found possible to dispense with symbolism may suggest a limitation.

The "yoga breathing exercise" which is "revealed" in the book is also a perfectly standard one being that which was recommended long ages ago in the Gita :—

"Prāṇāpānaṁ samau kritvā nāśabhy-
antarachārīṇau"

The author is convinced that the path recommended by him is a perfectly safe one even in the absence of a teacher, and it is certainly true that it is refreshingly free from all mystery-mongering and is as safe for a normally balanced man as any path can be which leads to the inner worlds. But, in truth, in the absence of a competent teacher, no inner path can be absolutely devoid of dangerous pitfalls. The independence of the Westerner is too little apt to realise that the necessity of the

teacher arises, not only in connection with spectacular "yogic" techniques, but is inherent in any method, however "safe"—provided it is one which will give any results at all!

The pursuit of what the author calls "mental quiet" can, and only too often does, lead to a passive mediumship and to a misinterpretation of the psychic experiences which may come to the *sādhaka*. The teacher is always necessary to dispel the lure of the psychic and, above all, to ward off what is perhaps the greatest danger of all for many Westerners, namely, the intensification of the separated personal life by a sort of sucking down of the spiritual power that is brought about by the passionate thirst for personal advancement.

For this reason, if I have any criticism to offer, it is that insufficient stress is laid upon the strenuous moral effort to transform the character that is the only possible safeguard on this path. Morality is apt to be unpopular nowadays and I recently read a review praising Patanjali for his supposed indifference to it but the truth remains that, however much we may react from the canting respectability that often passes for morality, no lasting spiritual edifice can ever be erected except on a basis of a sound moral character. I think the author would assent to this but, in view of the current delusion about the non-moral nature of yoga, it would perhaps have been wise to place a stronger emphasis on this aspect of the path. It is fatally easy to fancy oneself "beyond good and evil".

Nevertheless, it is a book which should prove a source of inspiration to many and, above all, it is delightfully free from all theological nonsense. It might be read with profit by a follower of any religion—or of none! and, even if not as absolutely fool-proof as the author believes, yet it must be admitted to give a truer, more useful and safer account of yoga than many far more pretentious treatises.

SRI KRISHNA PREM

Grains of Gold : From the Vaishnava Mystics. By R. S. DESIKAN M.A., and B. L. RANGANATHAN, M. A., (S. R. Chari, Madras.)

The authors describe their work as "an English rendering, from Tamil, of some of the soul-animating strains of the vaishnava mystics". They add that they have been true to the original, in the sense that they have been true to themselves in transcribing their own reactions to the Tamil Texts. This criterion of faithfulness to the original material is somewhat too subjective, and might justify the wildest possible rendering. But whatever degree of freedom these two authors have allowed themselves they have succeeded in making the translations beautiful; from the literary point of view they are well finished. But they do lack some-

thing even more essential—they lack the real mystical stamina, the spiritual strength and fervour which, probably, could have been secured in a degree if the translators had remained closer to the Tamil texts.

The preliminary matter in this book resembles in bulk, though only in bulk, the Prefaces of Bernard Shaw. There is first the Introduction, then the Characteristics of Mysticism, the Quest, the Symbolism, and lastly the Alvars or Tamil mystics. These essays seem to be suffocated by references and quotations and fail to make any substantial point. They compare poorly with the literary art exercised in the actual English renderings, which are strongly recommended since they give a valuable echo of Vaishnava songs in the Tamil language.

D. G. V.

The Promise of All Ages. By CHRISTOPHER. (Simpkin Marshall, Ltd., London. 5s.)

This propagandist work on Bahaism seeks to show Bahaullah as the fulfilment of the Divine Promise of all ages, the "Peer and Successor" of Muhammad as well as the Saviour universally expected by all religions. The Bahaists dream that world-peace will be established in this century through Bahaullah. Christians and Muslims are appealed to accept the gospel of Bahaullah, who is believed to have appeared "to make nations one in faith and all men brothers in love".

The life and teachings of the three leaders of the Bahaist Movement are interestingly described. The Bab, the Forerunner, who was shot dead in the presence of ten thousand people; Bahaullah, the Founder, who suffered lifelong persecution at the hands of the Persian Government for preaching against orthodox Islamic traditions; and Abdul Baha, the Exemplar. The Bahai scheme of reformation and unification of mankind, however, is uninteresting, and the aims of a world-calendar and government, a universal

language and law, seem fantastic.

Bahaism in its essence is equally as broad in appeal and outlook as Sufism, the first liberalising movement of Islam. Bahaism in some respects is to orthodox Islam as the Brahmo-Samaj is to orthodox Hinduism. Bahaism seeks to liberate Islam by discarding its dead incrustations. Therein, we think, lies its true mission. The sooner Islam becomes broader, the better for the world. The Bahaism of Persia seems wider in scope than the Ahmadiyya Movement of the Punjab. Though this book is meant primarily for Christians it is more suited to Muslims, and Indian Muslims particularly should peruse it.

The book makes extravagant claims for Bahaism as the sole remedy for all world-problems, but how can a sectarian religion, however broad, solve world-problems? The claims of Bahaism as a substitute for older faiths are meaningless. The great religions will continue, and harmony among them can alone be achieved by reinterpretation to bring out their common basis.

SWAMI JAGADISWARANANDA

CORRESPONDENCE

CONTEMPORARY INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

[In our March issue was published Dr. D. M. Datta's paper on "Contemporary Indian Philosophy," the remaining portion of which forms an independent whole to appear in a subsequent number. Meanwhile we have received from **Dr. R. Naga Raja Sarma** a criticism of Dr. Datta's views which seems to complete the survey of modern tendencies in Indian Philosophy.—Eds.]

I was considerably amused to read Dr. D. M. Datta's article published in the March Number of **THE ARYAN PATH** which purports to be a survey of "Contemporary Indian Philosophy" but, which as a matter of fact only contains the names of some Indian writers on Indian and European Philosophy and of their publications—these chosen and selected in a haphazard manner according to the personal preferences of Dr. Datta. If Dr. Datta had desired to commend the work of the Indian Philosophical Congress which had its latest session at Waltair, he might have summed up for the benefit of the readers of **THE ARYAN PATH**, the contents of the principal papers read and contributed, offering his own comments on the Presidential Address and the Address of the Chairman of the Reception Committee. If, on the other hand, he had intended to undertake a serious and systematic survey he might have proceeded along *two* approaches—(1) He might have examined the work done (the so-called Research work) in different Universities of different Provinces proceeding on a territorial basis. But if in these days of Nationalism and Internationalism, a provincial or a

territorial approach should seem repugnant to Dr. Datta, he had another approach available. (2) He might have reviewed or surveyed the work of various scholars in India in reference to the *six* Darsanas and in especial reference to the three schools of the Vedanta : Advaita, Visishtadvaita, and Dvaita. Dr. Datta's judgment on contemporary Indian Philosophy and Philosophers has, as far as I am able to see, had absolutely nothing to do with the *two* lines of approach; he seems anxious rather to advertise the work done by certain institutions and certain authors.

Without entering into controversy, Dr. Datta should be able to see that he is absolutely *not* justified in including Dr. P. K. Ray's Text-Books on Logic as epoch-making publications of "Contemporary Indian Philosophy". Dr. Ray's Text-Books contain just an ordinary account of the topics of Deductive and Inductive Logic, and Dr. Datta must have known that lecturers in different colleges have written more attractive accounts since. In *Neo-Hegelianism*, Dr. Haldar has examined in a sketchy manner the contributions to philosophy of the champions

of Neo-Hegelianism like Stirling, Green, the two Cairds, Bradley and others. In his "Standard Work on the Subject" Dr. Hasan neither openly champions European and American Realism, nor openly condemns it. Let that alone for a moment.

Dr. Datta however is entertaining when he sums up the work of philosophers assigned by him to the second category. (p. 198 THE ARYAN PATH) Does Dr. Datta think that he is distributing patronage (presumably on the doctrine of "Yamevaisha-vrinute-tena-labhyah")? Otherwise, I fail to understand why he has *not* mentioned the following translators. (1) Prof. S. Subba Rao has translated Madhva's *Sutra-Bhashya*, and *Gita-Bhashya*. Prof. Subba Rao's translations are the first in the field—has not Dr. Datta seen his *Purnaprajnya-Darsana*? Why has Dr. Datta not mentioned Dr. C. Kunhan Raja who has collaborated with Prof. Suryanarayana Sastry in translating *Bhumati* and *Manameyodaya*? Why, again, has he not mentioned Prof. M. Rangacharya's translation of *Sarva-siddhanta-sangraha*? While Dr. Datta mentions the work of Dr. Vidya-bhushan, why has he not referred to the translations of Srischandra Vasu? Coming to those who according to Dr. Datta have to their credit "presentation of Indian Philosophy in English" I would like to know why he has ignored Professor K. Sundararama Iyer who is perhaps the most accurate thinker among the Advaitins in South India. His *Ethical Aspects*

of the *Vedanta* is more a standard work than the "standard realism" of Dr. Hasan. By the way, is not Chatterjee's "Realism" also equally "standard"? Why has Dr. Datta not mentioned it? Who is the standardising authority? Then why has Dr. Datta failed to notice Professor (now Principal of the Madras Pachayaippa's college) P. N. Srinivasacharya's two "standard" works—*Ramanuja's Idea of Finite Self* and *Philosophy of Bheda-abheda*? Why, once again, has Dr. Datta failed to notice the remarkable, brilliant, and epoch-making translation of the Bhagavad-Gita by Professor (now Principal of the Rajahmundry College) D. Subrahmanya Sarma, and his *Primer of Hinduism* epoch-making and standard to be sure? Why, finally, has Dr. Datta not a word to say about Mr. K. A. Krishnaswamy Iyer's *Vedanta—A Science of Reality* which is from many a standpoint a new vindication of "Advaita-Vedanta"?

If Dr. Datta had cared to survey "Contemporary Indian Philosophy" as it has revealed itself in Sanskrit he might with considerable profit to himself and to his readers have mentioned *Moola-Avidya-Nirasa* of Pandit Subrahmanya Sarma; *Sutra-Anugunya-siddhi* of M. M. Krishna Sastry, and the controversial critique of it by Mr. A. V. Gopalacharya entitled *Sutra-anugunasiddhi-vimarsa*; M. M. Desikacharya's *Vyasa-siddhanta-Martanda*, and M. M. Pandit Srinivasacharya's *Darsana-mcemasma*. These controversial publications are devoted to a vindication of the supremacy

and pre-eminence of Advaita and Visishtadvaita. *Vyasatattvya-Nirnaya* and Anantakrishna Sastri's *Advaita-martanda* may also be recalled.

I shall indicate one or two more instances which would convincingly demonstrate that the so-called "little progress," a "review" of which appears under the flamboyant title of "Contemporary Indian Philosophy" has made Dr. Datta advertise his own idols. Dr. Datta has not cared to note anything of the work done by Principal A. B. Dhruva. And pray what is the mystery behind the omission of Mr. Jadunath Sinha—author of *Psychology of Perception*—a very decent volume? The contention that Dr. Datta is *not* attempting any exhaustive bibliography or *catalogus catalogorum* of contemporary philosophical publications is illogical as it should be quite transparent from the instances cited that his survey of "Contemporary Indian Philosophy" is restricted just to the work of his idols.

Let us face facts. Dr. Datta's idols and many others are presenting Indian philosophical doctrines after administering to them a European and American orientation. In the works of Dr. Datta's idols there is a nervous apprehension that this or that Indian doctrine may not be accepted and acclaimed unless it is shown to walk along the path of IDEALISM or MONISTIC ABSOLUTISM. This attitude is unphilosophical, and lacks the historical sense. Sankara has been discussed threadbare. Genuine workers in Indian Philosophy

should turn hereafter to the systems of Ramanuja and Madhva. Two lines of research remain yet to be pursued. (1) The formidable mass of Realistic literature should be explored. (2) Indian Psychology should be investigated, as therein lies the characteristic differentium of Indian genius. So far as I am aware Dr. Datta's idols have nothing to contribute to the two types of investigation.

In conclusion, I shall propose a simple test and ask a simple question—Is there a single systematic history of Sanskrit Literature on the lines of Keith's work? I have no sycophantic admiration for that work of Keith's. Dr. Datta knows here, there, and everywhere there are Sanskritists of provincial, all-India, world-wide reputation and it is perfectly reasonable to expect some half-a-dozen histories at least of Sanskrit literature. This remark would apply to Indian philosophy as well.

Take for example, Sankara's Advaita which is believed to be the philosophy of the Upanishads. Here are some philosophies of Upanishads—one by Deussen, another by Gough, one by Ranade another by Radhakrishnan. Does Dr. Datta contend that the latter two constitute an improvement over the former? Improvement or no improvement would after all be a matter of opinion. What Masson-Oursel has said about Indian Psychology is distinctly more illuminating than what Dr. B. N. Seal has said. The Indian systems of philosophy should stand or fall on their own merits and on account

of their incapacity to survive at the end of the struggle for existence, respectively. In the works of Dr. Datta's idols, Indian doctrines are presented in an apologetic manner and criticised from the ill-understood and ill-assimilated conclusion of Western systems. In the series of *four* contributions which appeared in THE ARYAN PATH early last year, I had something to say about what I considered and still continue to consider "Indian Misrepresentations of Indian Philosophy," and so far as I am aware there are no independent views in any of the works enumerated by Dr. Datta arising out of an assimilation of both Eastern and Western systems of

thought. Dr. Datta mentions with enthusiasm *The Philosophical Quarterly* but *not The Review of Philosophy and Religion*. I await with interest what Dr. Datta has to say about the evolution of the independent philosophical views of his idols arising out of an assimilation of both Indian and Western systems of thought. Meanwhile, I feel I must honestly state that his account of "Contemporary Indian Philosophy" appearing in the March ARYAN PATH is incomplete, and confined to the work of some few personal friends and acquaintances of Dr. Datta. It is emphatically *not* a systematic survey based on any valid objective criteria of philosophic criticism.

R. NAGA RAJA SARMA

THEOSOPHY AND MODERN PHYSICS

In his presidential address before the British Association last September, Sir James Jeans expressed views that have aroused widespread interest among the laity of science. His subject was "The New World-Picture of Modern Physics" but he digressed at intervals to indicate certain philosophical and moral interpretations of a few of the recent advances in physical science. Brief comment on some of his remarks has already been made in THE ARYAN PATH*, but the tenor of his thought lies so close to Theosophy that it is difficult to refrain from further quotation.

When, for example, he says, nature's "truths can only be made comprehensible in the form of parables," he is voicing a theosophical and occult aphorism of long standing. In physical science, however, it is new. Until comparatively recently it was

thought (by physicists) that physics was contacting absolute reality, and that to parable was wilfully to mislead.

He said also:—

Atomicity and division into individual existences are fundamental in the restricted space-time picture, but disappear in the wider, and as far as we know more truthful, picture which transcends space and time.

This, of course, is pure Theosophy, which teaches the fundamental unity of all on the higher planes of existence. He amplifies his statement a little later:—

When we view ourselves in space and time we are quite obviously distinct individuals; when we pass beyond space and time we may perhaps form ingredients of a continuous stream of life.

These quotations give the flavour of Jeans's musings on the philosophy toward which point the discoveries of modern physics, but when reading

*THE ARYAN PATH, Nov. 1934, p. 734.

them we must not deceive ourselves with the thought that science, and particularly physical science, is turning toward Theosophy, or even becoming metaphysical. To the working physicist such statements are almost sufficient in themselves to discredit their enunciator as a physicist. Because of such statements, and similar ones made before, probably most physicists would not bother to read Jeans at all. This attitude seems narrow and perhaps hard to believe, but nevertheless it exists, and not entirely without justification. "The old physics," again quoting Jeans, "imagined it was studying an objective Nature which had its own existence independently of the mind which perceives it." Although Jeans attributes this point of view to the old physics alone, it really is that of the "new physics" as well, and it is this feeling—always at least subconsciously held—that makes the working physicist have mental shudders at the suggestion of a theory that would so seriously undermine the importance of the work he is doing.

The scientist of to-day fills a place in the world not unlike that occupied before the twelfth century by the philosopher. To a larger extent he represents the intellectuality of humanity, and upon him devolves—it seems to him—the duty of acquiring true knowledge and imparting it to the masses. The physicist in particular, because of the large degree of success he has attained in apparently explaining nature, feels himself in a situation resembling that of the early prophets. To tell him that he is investigating only one narrow and relatively unimportant side of a many faceted nature, and that so far as the real destiny of man is concerned all the discoveries he can ever make, working along present lines, will never be of appreciable

importance, is, figuratively speaking, to impute falsity to his gods—an arraignment few can brook with equanimity.

This reaction of the physicist is closely akin to the instinct of self-preservation, which is fundamental to all organic existences. It is the only possible position for physics as a science. Nothing exists for physics but what can make itself known through the senses, or what may be inferred by recognized and accepted logical induction and deduction from observations. To allow departure from this procedure would convert an ordered science into chaos. It is hardly fair to the physicist to expect him to take any other view of the matter.

On the other hand it is exceedingly interesting to note that the further the physical investigations are carried on, the more certain are the indications that our knowledge—to quote Jeans again—"is at best a smeared picture of the clear cut reality which we believe to lie beneath." Now and then a scientist with unusual mental equipment will have intimations of a higher reality lying behind the apparent reality of physical life. In giving voice to this sentiment, however, he puts himself beyond the pale of physics.

Those who take Theosophy as the subject of their major study do not meet the ready successes of students in physical science. They carry on their researches without the help of touch, sight, or hearing. Discouragement is their common fare, frustration their daily companion. To them, therefore, it is great encouragement to find workers in the field of physical science discovering that their own researches are leading nowhere, that the deeper they delve, the more their findings seem artifacts of a vastly older science.

New York

PHILIP CHAPIN JONES

ENDS AND SAYINGS

"... ends of verse
And sayings of philosophers."

HUDIBRAS

Here and there, through the ashes of mental lethargy and moral indolence a living ember gleams, which gentle breezes of soul-wisdom could quicken into flame. One of the functions of THE ARYAN PATH is to help disperse these ashes and to fan the dormant sparks into a blaze. But any fan however consistently wielded, has a limited range. The influence, for instance, of THE ARYAN PATH cannot reach far beyond its circulation list. It welcomes, therefore, every kindred breeze that quickens into life the scintillae of idealistic thought and lights the sparks of brotherhood. THE ARYAN PATH is the friend of every idealistic and cultural movement along un-sectarian lines. One such we spoke of in our April "Ends and Sayings"—the International Institute for Intellectual Co-operation of Paris, which is doing excellent service in breaking down prejudice and promoting sympathetic understanding among men of different nations.

Another potent and growing influence for brotherhood and the spread of the power of ideas is the International P. E. N. Club whose Annual Congress convenes in Barcelona on the 20th of this month. These conferences bring together for friendly interchange outstanding writers from the four corners of the world.

The International P. E. N. not only seeks to promote a closer *rapprochement* among men of letters everywhere and to encourage the exchange of literature, but also has assumed the difficult and potentially dangerous task of championing freedom of thought and expression wherever its clubs exist. The insistence of the P. E. N. Club on absolute tolerance and freedom of expression—racial, political and religious—makes it unwelcome in countries where liberty is unknown or has "gone glimmering down the stream of things that were". The U. S. S. R., for example, has no P. E. N. Centre, despite the personal visit of the International President, Mr. H. G. Wells, to urge the establishment of one; the German P. E. N. had to be disowned by the International Club because of political enslavement. A threatened break with the Centre in Fascist Italy on similar grounds has recently been happily averted.

All organizations which cut across conventional boundaries help men to recognize their kind beyond the pale. But there are none more promising than those that rest, as does the P. E. N., upon free interchange of thought.

There are provisions for passport issuance and recognition, for visas and the rest, to enable men

and women to move freely about the world, and such travel is good in so far as it serves the cause of better international understanding. But more important still is the free passage of ideas and ideals from land to land. Alas! there is no provision in international law for *their* safe-conduct. Be they constructive or iconoclastic, views that lack the imprimatur of accepted thought are turned back often by the bigotry that makes and preserves the frontiers of thought—and there are none more impassable. Proscription has been carried to absurd lengths in certain autocratically governed countries.

A world renaissance seems overdue. Not so much ignorance as ill-digested knowledge hinders clear perception. And modern knowledge, especially the scientific, is like the shifting sands of the desert—ever changing and ever raising a thirst which it is incapable of assuaging. Literature is greatly influenced by scientific theories though its life-movements show better promise of uniting the peoples of the world; it cannot be exploited by big business nor be harnessed into its service by finance, as much as science, and therefore it has not the difficulty of science to overcome. On the other hand literature has a greater power to harm racial morals than science to injure the human mind. The more literature frees itself from nationalistic politics and from ever-changing theories of science, especially the questionable ones of psychology and psycho-analysis, the purer and more harmonizing

its influence will become.

India has had a P. E. N. centre since 1933 and naturally the progress is slow, for this is a land of numerous languages and English is used only by those educated in modern schools and colleges. The work of the Club announced in their organ *The Indian P. E. N.* is two-fold: to make the English writings of Indian authors better known and secondly to co-ordinate the results of the literary movements in different linguistic areas, "to bring outstanding writers in different language groups together in friendly relationship, and to spread interest in and information about vernacular literary achievements."

Even organizations somewhat restricted in aim and scope may make their contribution to the whole, especially if they bring a tolerant spirit to their task. Such, for example, is the Islamic Research Association of Bombay, also formed in 1933 to promote research in Islamic Studies. This Association already has issued several publications and is rendering scholarly service to the spread of appreciation of Islamic culture. Its constitution creditably disavows intent to "enter into any present-day religious or political controversy or propaganda" or to publish works relative thereto.

So can the complicated pattern of our modern culture be achieved each movement working along its own line and in its own way, but in a spirit of friendly tolerance and mutual help.



Point out the "Way"—however dimly,
and lost among the host—as does the evening
star to those who tread their path in darkness.
—*The Voice of the Silence*

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RELIGIONS AND RELIGION

In this issue we print a provocative article by an eminent Indian nationalist who is also a liberal-minded Christian. Dr. Bharatan Kumarappa writes on the defects of Christian missions and missionaries in India, and suggests certain reforms with a view to making their work useful. It might be pointed out that what is said about Christian missions and missionaries equally applies to all agencies and agents of every proselytising creed. Again, the weaknesses and claims of nonproselytising creeds such as Brahmanism or Zoroastrianism are as baneful, howsoever different they may be in their effects on the moral and social order in India.

The article does not raise what appears to us to be a fundamental question:—

Is there a necessity for any organized separative religion to persist as a competitor of other creeds in any part of the globe?

We hold the view that Religion is necessary for the well-being of man. Religion illumines the mind, unfolds intuition, and unites man to man. But this cannot be said of any organized religion, which, whatever its name, narrows the mind, engenders blind belief and fanaticism and divides man from man. Once an Adept spoke of the churches as anti-Christ and the same may be said of every organized religion. Because of the evils of the latter, Religion has come to be regarded—and not only in Soviet Russia—as an opiate. We are not overlooking the fact that the Soviet authorities primarily "took up the fight against religion as an integral part of the economic liberation of the working classes."

In sober truth, one of the pressing needs, perhaps the most pressing need of our civilization is Religion. Not a new religion; the world has been hitherto sufficiently cursed

with the intellectual extinguishers known as dogmatic creeds. What is needed to-day is freedom from the extremes—atheism is one, sacerdotalism is the other. Masses cannot be freed from the grip of these two monsters but a large number of individuals can free themselves.

To-day the individual needs the aid of some living power, some energy which would enable him to drive the engine of existence without injury to himself and to others and through it gather the experience which would not only sustain his whole being but unfold it to its full capacity. The True Religion alone can provide that power. The human individual suffers from his attempt to follow two religions—one, the creed into which he is born and bred or into which he has been converted and second, the impulses and the principles, good and bad, which he follows mostly unconsciously and which form his real inner religion. The result is compromise at every turn—between the sacred and the secular, between the urge of the flesh and the voice of conscience, between belief and reason, between concrete thoughts and vague intuitions, between personal affections and altruistic aspirations. The pressing need of the individual is a philosophy of conduct and of action which would reduce this conflict to the min-

imum, and bring about an integration in himself.

The occidental as well as the oriental needs this integrating influence of true Religion. Therefore to try to buttress the tottering churches and temples is not rendering real service to our civilization. That which is true in the outworn creeds is crushed by the debris of rites and ceremonies, of blind belief and exclusive claims; the priest has elbowed out the prophet and the latter is allowed by the former only to enchant the worshipper from a long distance. As the magic, used to invoke the sages, is that of the priest, no response comes. No, the old creeds should be allowed to die their natural deaths. An attempt should be made to present the soul-satisfying philosophy of the old Sages. That religious philosophy or philosophical religion offers a way of life for the intelligent man and woman of to-day. Its fundamental principles can well form the basis of action and conduct and these may be tabulated simply thus:—

- I Everything existing exists from natural causes.
- II Virtue brings its own reward, and vice and sin their own punishment.
- III The state of man in this world is probationary.

THE ÆSTHETIC OBJECT AND THE ÆSTHETIC EMOTION

[C. E. M. Joad's philosophical thinking is leading him to appreciate more and more the Indian point of view on many subjects. The following article is an example. —Eds.]

In October 1933 there appeared in THE ARYAN PATH an article of great interest by Venkata Rao, describing some of the contributions made by Indian philosophers to the theory of Æsthetics. The article, which is mainly devoted to the views of Anandavardhana and his commentator Abhinavagupta, was disconcerting to the European reader by reason of its demonstration of the extent to which views which are fondly supposed to have originated in the West have been anticipated by the thought of Indian philosophers. The general psychology of emotion popularised by McDougall, the theory of the nature of the poetic emotion sponsored by Matthew Arnold, and the account of the æsthetic emotion which appears in the work of Ogden and Richards are definitely foreshadowed by these thinkers, whose philosophy is almost completely unknown in the West. It is however, the account of Rasa, the æsthetic experience itself, which I found most illuminating, and which I propose to develop in this article in the light of the theory of Æsthetics which I have derived mainly from Plato.

The æsthetic experience, Mr. Rao points out, is wholly *sui generis*. This is not to imply that it is not distinguished by certain

recognizable characteristics. It is, for example, disinterested, in the sense that it is not concerned with our personal advantage; it is detached, in the sense that it is unrelated to and cannot be resolved into the emotions aroused by life; and it is transcendental in the sense that it is felt, for something which transcends the world in which we pass our every-day life, and which I should call "reality," using the word in a sense to be defined below. Æsthetic experience is also an end in itself:—"It is not" says Mr. Rao "a means to anything else. It is a form of creative joy characterized by complete forgetfulness of self and absorption in what Abercrombie calls 'pure experience'".

It is also, I should like to add, persistent in its effects. By this I mean that, whereas most of our pleasures arise out of the satisfaction of need, with the consequence that, when the need is satisfied, the pleasure fades and the organism returns to normal, that is to say, to the state which preceded the need and the pleasure of its satisfaction, the pleasure of æsthetic experience confers a permanent enrichment upon the whole being. We are literally different beings after the experience of listening to great music greatly performed—different and richer. Nor does the

difference fade. The experience leaves its hall-mark upon our being, with the result that we bring to our next hearing of music a sensibility which is finer and more receptive.

This, I take it, is part of what Plato meant when he included æsthetic experience in his category of "pure pleasures". Most pleasures, Plato pointed out, are relative to and dependent upon a preceding state of need or want. Needing or wanting is painful, and the mere fact of the cessation of the pain brings pleasure. Thus the pleasure of the convalescent recovering from an illness is dependent upon and conditioned by the illness which preceded it; and, since the occurrence of the pleasure is actually dependent upon and conditioned by the pain upon which it has supervened, it is an impure pleasure in the sense that it is infected with that upon which it depends and with which it is inseparably bound up. But there are certain pleasures which are not dependent upon need or want, and which do not arise from the satisfaction of desire. Our pleasures in a spring morning, in the feel of cool water upon the heated skin, in the acquisition of knowledge, or in the exploration of nature are of this type. They are not dependent upon the pain of want or upon the solicitations of desire. Plato, therefore, called them "pure," since they contain no admixture of pain to mar their enjoyment. Now æsthetic pleasure

is pre-eminently of this type.

There is one other psychological characteristic of æsthetic experience which is implied rather than directly stated in the work of the two Indian philosophers to which I have referred.

Æsthetic experience involves a fusion of a number of different faculties, a fusion which I should say, is an integration of the personality at a new level of consciousness. It is, alas, true of most of us that in normal experience we are bundles of different faculties and desires rather than completely integrated persons; faculties which are at war, desires which conflict. We desire something, let us say, of which the moral sense disapproves, representing the desire as a temptation to which it would be wrong to yield. The intellect, moreover, has calculated the consequences of indulging the desire in terms of pleasure and of risk, and concluded that the risk is too great to justify the pleasure. But the soul contains what Plato calls a "spirited element" which cries shame at the poltroonery of the intellect. "You can only be young once," says spirit.* "Take your pleasures while you can and face their consequences." Thus intellect and morality are found in alliance against spirit and desire.

This, no doubt, is an extreme case. Nevertheless, self-division and self-conflict are the normal experiences of the average human being. Hence the importance of æsthetic emotion in lifting us tem-

* I am using the word spirit in Plato's rather technical sense for the spirited element in the soul.

porarily out of the selfish little pit of vanity and desire which is the everyday self. As Venkata Rao puts it in the article—

We are lifted out of ourselves into a serene world. The cycle of ignorance, self-interest and activity in which our ordinary life is lived is broken into for the time being, and we are introduced into a *unique form* of experience different from the usual.

But to describe the æsthetic experience is not enough. We want to know what causes it. "Emotion" as Mr. Rao points out "is only the stuff or material of art. For, all expression of feeling is not art." For my part I should go further and insist that since all feelings are felt for something, since all emotions are aroused by something, and since, further, we have agreed that the feeling and the emotion which we call æsthetic are unique, what arouses the feeling and evokes the emotion must itself be unique. And so it is, for in admitting that æsthetic emotion is transcendental have we not agreed that its object is nothing less than reality itself? But the phrase "reality itself," while it may denote the ultimate object of æsthetic experience, is too vague and lacking in content to throw light upon the immediate æsthetic problem which is, broadly, why it is that certain forms, colours and sounds when arranged and combined in certain ways move us profoundly, and move us in the peculiar manner which Mr. Rao and I have described, while a different arrangement of the same colours, forms and sounds moves us not at all? Why, for example, can the

simple statement of the theme of a Bach Fugue thrill us to ecstasy, while the notes which constitute the theme when played at random, or, it may be, in the reverse order, succeed in producing only dissonance or dullness? If I may venture a criticism, it is in its treatment of this problem that I find Indian æsthetic theory, so far as it is summarized in Mr. Rao's article, defective, for, broadly speaking, the treatment is non-existent. Rich in its analysis of the æsthetic experience Indian philosophy seems to tell us very little about the æsthetic object. As so often, it strikes the Western reader as unduly subjective in its treatment. Preoccupied with the soul, it overlooks the world.

Yet, clearly, it is not any and every object that causes us to feel æsthetic pleasure. I doubt, for example, whether æsthetic emotion has ever been aroused in anybody by the window strap in a railway carriage. It is only *objects belonging to a certain class* which are normally regarded as the appropriate objects of æsthetic value. These objects are, therefore, distinguished by a certain property, the property, namely, of being able—able, presumably, under certain conditions—to produce a peculiar emotion in the mind of a trained and adult person when it is brought in contact with them. Now, this property cannot thus belong to æsthetic experience since it is its cause, nor is it a property of the relation between the experiencing mind and the object, since it is only because the property charact-

erizes the object that the relation comes to be. It must, then it is clear, belong to the object itself. What account, then, are we to give of it?

Plato's view, broadly, was that behind the world of sensible things, imperfectly manifested by them, and overlaid and distorted by the sensuous material in which it appears, lies the world of "pure Form". This world he called "the world of reality," since it was endowed with perfect and immutable being, while the world of which our senses make us aware, he called the world of "becoming" which since it is imperfect and continuously changing owns a reality of a different and inferior order. The relation between the two worlds is not described by Plato as satisfactorily as one could wish. Sometimes Plato speaks of it as one of "participation"; "sensible things" he says "participate" in the Forms. Sometimes as one of imitation; the sensible objects copy or imitate or approximate to the Forms, as closely as the sensuous material of which they are compared permits. In general, however, Plato thinks of the world of Form as the cause of the existence of the world of sensible things, and as conferring upon them such qualities as they are perceived to possess.

The artist (for the sake of simplicity, I am confining what follows primarily to the graphic arts, that is to say to the work of the painter and the sculptor) is one who, in virtue of his capacity for vision, is able disentangle the element of Form which is also the element of

reality from the sensuous material in which it is overlaid, but in which it is, nevertheless, latent. By virtue of his craft he then embodies in the work of art that element of Form which his vision has discerned in natural objects: embodies and emphasizes. The function of the artist is, therefore, less that of the creator than of the discoverer and the midwife; the discoverer, since he discovers something which the duller vision of the ordinary man misses; the midwife, since he brings it to birth by embodying it in his work. The function of the work of art is to throw up into high relief the Form which is latent in sensible objects, so that those of us who are not gifted with the artist's vision can see in his rich art those combinations of significant Forms which he has first discerned in natural objects.

Thus the peculiar characteristic of æsthetic objects is their embodiment in pre-eminent and pre-eminently visible degree of that element of reality which underlies and informs the sensible world; and they do this by reason of the artist's skill which enables him to drag the element of Form from the setting in which it is normally embodied . . . obscured, and to throw it into relief in combinations of paint or stone or sound.

It is because of the element of reality which it embodies that art is said to be "eternal." The Form of artistic expression changes from age to age, but the feelings that great art awakens are the same in every age. The Forms of art are inexhaustible, but they all

lead along the same road of æsthetic emotion to the contemplation of the same ultimate reality. It is for this reason, too, that the historical approach to art with its controversies over the sources of the work of particular artists and their influence on their successors is irrelevant to æsthetic appreciation, and that it is not necessary to know how, when, or by whom a work of art was created, in order that the vision of the reality which it imperfectly reveals may be enjoyed. Art, on this view, is a window through which we gaze upon reality; the panes vary from age to age and sometimes they are bright and sometimes dim, but the view which they offer is eternally the same.

And since art enables us to glimpse a reality which lies outside the realm of which we are normally aware, the emotions which it arouses are not of this world. Æsthetic emotion belongs to a world of its own, and is both unanalysable and unique. It is for this reason that we speak of the quality of remoteness in art. Æsthetic emotion is emotion felt not for this world but for reality, and for so long as the vision which it vouchsafes endures, we are shut off from interests which this world begets. Our anticipations and regrets, our hopes and fears, are alike arrested. It is as if we were enabled for the moment to escape from the stream of life and, forgetful of the turmoil of want and desire, of striving and seeking which makes up our daily experience, to be at peace upon the banks.

Some have held that the æsthetic emotion which we obtain from works of art is an emotion of the same kind as that felt by the mystic, and for the reason that it is felt for the same object. But, while the mystic's vision of reality is direct and is achieved by the contemplation of the mind without the aid of the senses, the artist's is indirect, since he uses, and uses of necessity, sensuous objects as a medium in which reality is seen and through which it is approached. The mystic's vision, moreover, is continuous and prolonged; the artist's is tantalisingly brief. Thus æsthetic emotion is at once the most satisfying and the most unsatisfying of all the emotions known to us; satisfying because of what it gives, unsatisfying because it gives so briefly, and, in the act of giving, hints at greater gifts withheld. Two points must be added in order fully to bring out the comparison between these views and those summarised by Mr. Rao. First, there is no suggestion in Plato that either the creator or the appreciator becomes one with the reality he apprehends.

In the æsthetic process the relation of the mind to its object remains one of contemplation. The artist discerns reality and assists us by embodying his vision in a work of art to discern it too, but the relation of knower and known is never transcended. In no sense, when I am appreciating a Bach Fugue do I become it. I do not even, except in a very metaphorical sense, enter into

communion with or lose myself in it. Æsthetic experience, in fact, and I think Plato is right in this, is felt for something which just because it is perfect cannot be human or akin to the human. Enjoying it we forget self, and admire something which is not only other than self but other than spirit. I doubt whether in the last resort the affirmation of the spiritual nature of all reality by Indian philosophy would permit this view.

Secondly, Plato in the Symposium makes specific mention of a form of Beauty which alone among the Forms can be apprehended in the sensible world as it really is. Art, on the view which I have suggested is a window through which man glimpses reality. But it is a window specially

directed upon that element of reality which is the form of beauty. Can Beauty be regarded as a separate and distinct element in the real? By Plato, yes, since except for an unrepresentative passage about the Form of the Good in the *Republic*, his reality is a pluralistic one. But given the Absolute Spirit which Indian philosophers affirm as the heart of the world, we are precluded from the acceptance of a reality which is an assemblage of separate reals? Hence, I doubt if Indian philosophy can legitimately speak of a Form of Beauty; it can only affirm that reality possesses an æsthetic or beautiful aspect. The issue here is that between a Monism or a Pluralism, and on this issue I must confess myself a Pluralist.

C. E. M. JOAD

[The above article was sent to Mr. M. A. Venkata Rao whose essay it discusses. While writing to us Mr. Venkata Rao points out that Indian æsthetics do not omit the treatment of the objective forms of beauty. In Hindu Music, the classification of Ragas provides a complete inventory of objective forms, in terms of Rasa; in painting and sculpture too, æsthetic objective forms have been recognized. In literature, "the problems of structure such as Exposition, Complication, Crisis, Resolution and Catastrophe, supposed to be the achievement of last century, are all set forth far more thoroughly in *Dhvanyaloka* by Anandavardhana."

Then, absorption or identification of the finite individual with the absolute Reality does not imply its extinction or annihilation. "Advaitin formulates his view of Moksha as a state of perfection which connotes the conservation of all that deserves to be conserved in the finite individuality." Plato's "Idea" is not a thing having value but value itself. In the view of Mr. Venkata Rao, Plato does not speak of the Absolute as *possessed of or having* the three forms of truth,auty, or goodness but Plato's Absolute signifies the Fullness of Reality which reveals itself in the three supreme forms.—Eds.]

CHRISTIAN MISSIONS IN INDIA—A CRITICISM

[**Dr. Bharatan Kumarappa**, comes from a well-known Indian Christian family. He received the Bachelor of Divinity degree graduating from the Hartford Theological Seminary, U.S.A. While turning away from Christianity of the orthodox type, Dr. Kumarappa remains a liberal-minded follower of Jesus, and in this article gives his reactions to the work and policy of Christian missions in India.—EDS.]

Adverse criticism which does not proceed out of animosity but out of genuine concern for the subject criticised is really more helpful and constructive than mere praise. In fact, criticism by one who thinks highly of an institution, but who finds that it has either gone astray or fallen short of what is required of it, is a duty. It is in such a spirit that this article is written.

I conceive the aim of Christian missions in India to be the spreading of a knowledge of the teachings and life of Jesus, so that those who have not heard of him may be thus drawn to follow his example. The emphasis is certainly on conduct. What matters is not intellectual allegiance to a creed or formal membership in an organisation, but a change of heart, showing an uplift in conduct. Jesus himself said: "Not he that saith unto me, Lord, Lord, shall enter into the kingdom of heaven, but he that doeth the will of my Father."

This being so, what kind of example did Jesus himself set for people to copy in practice? His whole ethic was summed up in "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, with all thy soul and with all thy might, and thy neighbour as thyself". His gospel was a simple one. It had nothing

to do with creed or dogma beyond the simple assertion that God was a Father, loving and holy, who expects love and holiness of His devotees. Jesus himself illustrated this by a life of loving communion with the Deity and a life of loving selfless service of humanity. This appears to form the core of Jesus's message. Christian missions have to be, and will be, judged accordingly.

Regarding communion with the Divine, it is obvious that Jesus regarded it as something inward and spontaneous. We do not hear much of this from him, as is only to be expected. But we find that when Jesus wanted specially to discover the will of his Father, it was either in a garden all by himself as in Gethsamane, or in the wilderness, or on a hill-top as in the Mount of Transfiguration. This would imply that for the communion of the soul with the Spirit, he felt that no formality was required—no priest, no church, no ceremony or ritual—only the soul face to face with the Deity. What light does this throw on the elaborate organisation of Christian missions, its priestcraft, its organised modes of Church worship, its ritual? All these are not really essential for the one who would

commune with the Deity. There is no gainsaying the fact that membership in a community of like-minded people has its use, but it is not essential and ought not to be required of those who would follow Jesus.

Therefore conversion, in the sense of becoming baptised and gaining admission into a Church, is unessential; and yet, this is the main plank in the programme of Christian missions. It is thought by missionaries in general and their Home Boards abroad that mission work is to be gauged by the number of converts made. Educational and medical missionaries will protest against this and say that their work is educational or medical and not evangelistic. I am convinced that if they do not convert and baptise it is not because they think it is unnecessary, but because they find no one wishing to be converted. Conversion, in the sense of giving up one's former religion and becoming a member of a Church is a consummation devoutly to be wished by all missionaries. This has led to intolerance towards other religions; if you desire to make converts from another religion your attitude to it cannot be friendly. This will be stoutly denied by missionaries, but I am sure that if the sympathy and tolerance which is to-day adopted be genuine, their attitude toward other religions could not be to supplant them by their own faith, as is their aim, but rather to seek to influence them in such a way that these religions will undergo an inner revival and

transformation if they need to. What is above all necessary is not adherence to this religion or that, but the free and natural realisation by the human soul of the Infinite Spirit. If it is felt that a particular religion does not effect this, the truly friendly attitude will not be to get rid of it, which is what conversion necessarily implies, but to influence it by the free interchange of views resulting from real religious experience.

The principle Jesus laid down in regard to other faiths, if at all he was concerned with them, is the one which the modern missionary speaks most about but practises least. It is contained in Jesus's words "I am not come to destroy but to fulfil". The fulfilment of Hinduism must not be sought elsewhere than in a full development of all that is highest and best in Hinduism itself. If Christianity had anything to teach Hinduism, and I believe it has, the lessons of Christianity would have to be assimilated by Hinduism and incorporated into it. Only then can Christianity regard itself as not supplanting or destroying Hinduism but fulfilling it. Conversion which aims at supplanting Hinduism by Christianity is anything but a fulfilment of Hinduism. Strict conformity to the principle of Jesus, above cited, requires preaching the gospel to non-Christians with genuine love for the non-Christian faith, and therefore not with the intention of supplanting it. The missionary's task, if he feels he has found truths which do not exist for the non-Christian, should

be to influence these faiths in the light of these truths in order to reform them, not to supplant them.

If I have written at such length on conversion it is because conversion is the main plank in the programme of Christian missions. But the test of whether a religion has fulfilled the task of bringing the soul into direct communion with the Deity, such for example as Jesus experienced, should in the last analysis alone suffice to justify or condemn a religion. Is the Christian Deity so petty as to refuse communion with a soul unless it approaches Him in one and only one way, *viz.*, through Christianity? And this *a priori* argument is supported by abundant *a posteriori* evidence in the religious literature of India, where the Hindu saint experiences inexpressible bliss in mystic realisation of the Infinite. God-consciousness and God-intoxication such as we find in the Bhakti literature of Hinduism are hardly to be met with in the same degree elsewhere. And even on the intellectual and philosophical side, Indian religions have always acknowledged a series of *boāddhisattvas* (enlightened ones), *siddhas* (those who have attained their quest), *jinas* (those who have conquered), *jivan-muktas* (those who have found freedom). If then we have such a cloud of witnesses who not only sought but *found* in non-Christian faiths the pearl of great price, for which they gave up their all, how can the Christian missionary think that for any non-Christian religion to fulfil its pur-

pose of leading the soul into communion with the Infinite, it is necessary for it to pass into Christianity? If it is replied that the Deity revealed Himself to all men prior to the time of Jesus, but after that time reveals Himself fully only in and through Jesus, and this is a line of thought not unknown in missionary circles, we can only answer that it is contradicted by the religious experience and lives of many non-Christians even at the present day. "By their fruits ye shall know them," said Jesus in regard to those who are his true followers, and it has been announced even from Christian pulpits that Gandhiji, a non-Christian, is the closest approximation in our own day to Christ. He leads a Christ-like life, fasts, prays and seeks guidance and support in all his great undertakings, and who will say that this is not religious experience? If one is so ungenerous as to say that in Gandhiji's case it is self-hypnotism, how can one at all prove that it is not self-hypnotism in the case of Christians also, and even in that of the Greatest Christian? In this, as in many other matters pertaining to religion, Christians might learn a little more tolerance than they have hitherto shown, and only when this happens will the gospel of Jesus attract non-Christians to the life and teachings of the Master instead of repelling them as it does when presented by the bigoted and the narrow-minded.

Jesus wandered from place to place carrying neither purse nor

scrip, and not knowing where to lay his head, preached and ministered to the needs of the people. This example is in accord with Indian religious traditions, and invariably the Indian mind looks for such absolute renunciation of wealth and comfort in one who aims to be a spiritual leader. In contrast to this, what does the non-Christian find in the homes of missionaries but luxury and comfort? The missionary's bungalow and the Collector's bungalow are the largest in most towns. The missionary and the Collector are usually in small towns the only two who possess cars. The missionary's drawing room with its carpets, sofas and cushions impress the visitor with pomp and grandeur, the liveried servants strike terror into him. The dining room with its exhibition of crockery, glassware and silver dazzle the eye; the bedroom with its softly mattressed cots, bedspreads, mosquito nets, wardrobe, mirror, dressing table and what not, does not bespeak one who does not know where to lay his head. The clothes of the missionary are as the Indian sees it the same as those of a British Collector; also he goes away to the hills for the summer, and once every few years to Europe or America. That being so, it is not surprising that the life of the missionary as seen by the Indian does not seem to him to speak of the lowly Nazarene. The missionary's service might be greatly appreciated but his religious influence will be practically nil; and if he has come to India on a religious mis-

sion, this is not a matter which he can treat lightly. It may be a hard saying that he must give up his all if he would follow Jesus. It may be easier for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle. But Jesus said: "He that taketh not his cross and followeth after me, is not worthy of me." To all this the answer will be that the missionary is used to a particular standard of life, and if he goes below a certain minimum his health and consequently his work will suffer. The argument is forceful so long as one is on a materialistic plane. But materialism in practice is not what one expects of a religious leader. Jesus said—

Take no thought for the morrow, what ye shall eat or what ye shall drink or wherewithal ye shall be clothed.... Seek ye first the kingdom of God and his righteousness; and all these things shall be added unto you".

If the missionary's religious influence on those around him is practically nil, may it not be because he has sought too much to save his life by guarding against discomfort and poor food? All this cold calculation about the minimum requirements for health and efficiency argue lack of a living faith in the programme of Jesus.

A missionary who preaches a gospel of love towards his fellow-men must not only practise it by sharing his goods with those around him, but also love and seek to promote, in so far as it is good, what the people hold most dear. What has moved us most deeply within the last few years as a nation is undoubtedly political

freedom. The average missionary's attitude to it has been one of apathy and indifference, if not one of open hostility. Missionaries sometimes outbeat British officials in their conservatism in political matters. Even if missionaries do not openly take sides with the people against the Government (for some of them have to undertake to refrain from all political activity), humanitarian considerations demand that in case of police excesses on a non-violent people, they should raise their voice in protest, not on political but on religious and moral grounds. When, on the other hand, one finds British and American missionaries British or Whites first and Christians next, one loses all faith in the genuineness of the religion they profess. Jesus's mission was primarily to the poor and the oppressed, but the missionary's sympathy appears to be with those who exercise authority. A religion which allies itself thus with the State, and especially a State which is at war with the people, will soon find that it has lost its soul and therefore its influence on the people. At any rate the aloofness and indifference of missionaries to the soul-stirring struggle of the nation for political freedom appear to the Indian to reveal a lack of real love for him.

Besides, the missionary in few cases makes himself one with the people amongst whom he works. He adheres to his own customs and modes of life, which estrange him from the people. For this rea-

son neither he nor the people feel at home or natural in the presence of each other. He hardly ever lives in an Indian home as a member of the family. The Indians are a hospitable people and would be glad to entertain him provided he would adapt himself to their way. They would even be willing to put themselves out for his sake to provide him with the conveniences he requires, but often their resources are limited and they are afraid he may be uncomfortable. His mode of life is thus an obstacle in the way of the Indian knowing the missionary and of the missionary knowing the Indian. And the result is that their relationship to each other is thoroughly artificial and affected. This is a serious matter which the missionary must ponder over and correct if he really wishes to exert religious influence over the people.

His adherence to his own mode of life has not only estranged him from the community he serves, but has also prevented him from partaking of Indian culture and civilisation and understanding it aright. The consequence of this has been that he has no real knowledge of, or genuine sympathy with, the culture of the people, and thus his influence has been decidedly detrimental to indigenous cultural development. He has superimposed on those on whom he has influence *viz.*, Indian Christians, his own culture, and has made of them a kind of hybrid community aping the customs and manners of the West and out of sympathy with the habits and traditions of their

own people. In this way he has not only cut himself off from real contact with non-Christians but also prevented Indian Christians from having any contact with them. And to-day when India is striving for unity, Indian Christians stand aloof as a separate community and even allow themselves to be classified with Europeans and Anglo-Indians. Can the missionary absolve himself of the responsibility of having set up this stumbling-block in the way of national progress?

In illustration of how the missionary's adherence to his own habits and culture prevent him from exerting any religious influence on non-Christians, I may point to Church-worship as at present carried on. The music is exotic and sounds strange to a non-Christian ear, and even when there is an attempt to have one or two items of Indian music, it is of a low order and causes nothing but a smile on the face of the non-Christian visitor. The clothes of the congregation range from European to Indian with all kinds of weird intermediate combinations. The walking into the Church with shoes not only by the missionary but also by the Indian Christians is revolt-

ing to the religious sense of the non-Christian. The furniture in the Church suggests to him a cinema or a theatre and not a place of worship. The result of the whole on the average non-Christian is that of a variety entertainment, and fails to stimulate in him the necessary religious response.

Similarly, in the moral realm, the missionary fails to realise how revolting meat-eating is to vegetarian Hindus. It appears to them as immoral and contrary to religion as cannibalism appears to the missionary. The height of irreligion is reached when the missionary eats not only meat but beef, the flesh of the Hindu sacred animal. The habit fills them with abhorrence.

If the Christian missionary would be successful he must have genuine sympathy with the people, their traditions and their culture. His mission cannot be other than the mission of Jesus, which was to fulfil, not to destroy; his one purpose, the purpose of Jesus, to reveal in his life, in however small a measure what Jesus revealed so abundantly. This will suffice to draw all men to Jesus, the Great Example.

BHARATAN KUMARAPPA

[The day of organized religions is done. What the world needs is a way of life—a philosophy which offers nobler standards of living; one such method is described in the article which follows.—EDS.]

WHY I TRY TO BE A BUDDHIST

[J. F. McKechnie tells his own story in the following article.—Eds.]

Some months ago in the pages of this magazine, a lady told its readers why she was not a Buddhist. The article moves me in turn to tell them why I am trying to be a Buddhist,—and have been so trying for the last thirty years. I say deliberately, "*trying* to be a Buddhist," because—to adapt Emerson's *mot* about Jesus—there never was but one Buddhist, and he died at Kusinagara two thousand five hundred years ago.

I try to be a Buddhist because I cannot help it, because I cannot do otherwise—the one sound reason for following any course in religious matters. I happen to have an adult mind. And the adult mind gets very weary of its limitations once it discovers them. I discovered mine—or at least some of them—thirty years ago, since when my cry has been that of Lawrence Sterne's skylark: "I want to get out, I want to get out."

As I searched through philosophies and religions, one after the other, at last I heard of one of my fellows who had "got out" and had told *how* he got out. He said that others might "get out" the same way. I looked into that way of his, and it seemed to me to be good and likely to lead to what it promised. It appealed to me because the advice it presented was not so very different in its earlier stages from what good men all the world over have given their fellow-men

to follow if they wish to be really happy. It seemed sound and "commonsensical" and promotive of comfortable and friendly relations amongst fellows. It advised me not to kill, not to steal, not to lust, not to lie and not to use intoxicants; and it gave a reason for refraining from these acts which fully satisfied my intellect. It said that they were all, at bottom, more or less emphatic modes of *self-assertion*, hence, acts that would keep me a prisoner of my personal ego-consciousness for a period exactly in keeping with the extent and intensity of my practice of them. In other words, it told me that if I seriously wanted to get out of the limitations of personal egotistic consciousness, I ought to drop such actions, for they were of the sort that would keep me bound for as long as I committed them. So I started out to follow this advice and found that it made me happy and free from care, and a fairly welcome companion to all my fellow-men whom I encountered on life's journey.

But this advice went a bit further than simple recommendations as to my conduct towards my fellows: it told me to observe *a certain way of behaving toward myself*. In plainer language, it told me to look out for, and avoid, certain ways of thinking, certain ways of feeling, on the ground that these too were only so many modes

of self-assertion and therefore, so many things that, indulged in, would keep me longer from "getting out."

These recommendations were fairly simple and obvious in their first beginnings, being just recommendations to avoid the states of mind that led to the self-assertive external acts already advised against. But they went further, very much further. I was advised to pay deliberate attention to all my thoughts and words and deeds, that these were just happenings in the stream of all the general happenings that make up a universe, that they were of precisely the same quality as these other happenings, and not to be distinguished from these others by attaching to them the idea that they were done by an "I" while the others were not.

I found this very difficult to do: I find it very difficult to do now. I have to keep on practising and practising at it every day, all the time, and not at all succeeding always in what I want to do, what I am advised to do. I cannot always remember. Still I keep on, for I feel sure that this is a certain and straight way to "get out." Nay, I think I may say that I *know* it is. For just once, for a brief second or so, I believe I did get out of my cage, at least—shall I say?—got my

head between the bars so that I had a clear, unobstructed view, of free open space, in a word, of liberty. It was the best thing that has ever happened to me. It was something so inspiring that I should like to have it happen again and again, to never stop happening!

So the upshot is that now I go on taking the advice of that fellow man of mine who died over two thousand years ago at Kusinagara, practising the outward conduct he prescribes and the thought-control he recommends. For I do not know anything else which holds out such promise as this, of helping me to get out of the chafing confinement of my ego-consciousness altogether some day, if only I go on long enough following this road. Even as I have done for the last thirty years, I shall keep on trying to be a Buddhist, I shall continue trying to heed the advice of the Buddha as to my thought and conduct, for the next thirty years, for the next thirty thousand years if need be, till the bars of the cage are finally left behind for ever. For I am perfectly sure that they will be if only I go on as I am doing, giving heed to the Teaching of the Teacher.

Homage to Him, the Blessed One, the Exalted One, the Perfectly Awakened One!

J. F. McKECHNIE

The world needs no sectarian church, whether of Buddha, Jesus, Mahomet, Swedenborg, Calvin or any other. There being but ONE Truth, man requires but one church—the Temple of God within us, walled in by matter but penetrable by any one who can find the way; the pure in heart see God.—H. P. BLAVATSKY

THE HINDU ZODIAC

I.—THE ANTIQUITY OF THE HINDU ZODIAC

[**Professor Arthur Beer**, is known for his researches into the astronomical significance of the Zodiac of the Qusayr' Amra, for his work on Astronomy and Astrophysics at the universities and the institutes of Berlin, Breslau, and Hamburg. He is now stationed in Cambridge.—Eds.]

The problem of the origin and evolution of the Hindu zodiac in its various forms raises questions of history, astronomy and philology. As it has been said by a modern investigator, a great page of history will have been opened for us to read when this problem has been solved in full. But on the other hand it must be admitted that up to the present the whole history of the zodiac is very obscure.

What have we to understand by this zodiac problem? Each reader knows the usual modern definition of the zodiac as being an imaginary zone of the heavens within which lie the paths of the sun, moon and principal planets, and which is bounded by two circles each nine degrees from the ecliptic and divided into twelve signs. Each of these signs is marked by a constellation, the names of which are well known. Each sign is to be understood as a geometrical division extending through thirty degrees, counting from the spring equinox in the direction of the sun's path through them. The first sign is Aries, and it starts therefore at the point of the equator at which the sun crosses going north. One month later the

sun is in Taurus, the next month in Gemini, and so on.

Thus—and this is the important point—there is a westward movement throughout the whole series of signs, due to the effect of the precession of the equinoxes (the conical motion of the earth's axis), to the extent of one degree in seventy-two years. Therefore the constellations of to-day do not coincide in position with the signs of the same name compared with the observations of, for instance, Hipparchus who first discovered the precession about 125 B. C. In this case the discrepancy is as much as the entire breadth of a sign: for instance to-day the sun while it is in the sign Aries passes the stars of the constellation Pisces. In this way it is possible to find the means of calculating the antiquity of old astronomical systems.

All the constellations of the zodiac have come down to us from remote antiquity. And so the apparent solar, lunar, and planetary motions through the zodiac "promises to provide us with an important clue as to its origin". (S. H. Downey in *Journal of the Royal Astronomical Society of Canada*, Vol. XXV, 1931); and as

R. A. Proctor says in his *Myths and Marvels of Astronomy* :—

If we could determine the origin of these zodiacal figures, their exact configuration as it was first devised, and the precise influence assigned to them in the old astrological systems, we should have obtained important evidence of the origin of astronomy itself.

A very thorough study of Hindu astronomy we owe to G. R. Kaye in "Memoirs of the Archaeological Survey of India, No. 18, 1924". Following for a moment his conclusions, we have first to remember that the chief phases of the Hindu astronomy are connected with the Vedas, the Vedāṅgas and the medieval text books, or siddhāntas. Vedic astronomy is more of the unscientific order, the Vedāṅga astronomy is formal but crude, while the astronomy of the later siddhāntas is on the whole of a very high intellectual order. Kaye has developed the more important items of the evidence that illustrate these phases, and draws attention to the relationship of the Vedāṅga astronomy to the current thought of the time, the exotic astronomy of the later period, the controversy regarding the antiquity of the Vedas, the evolution of astrology and the astronomical deities of India.

In the Jyotiṣa Vedāṅga and similar works there is no mention of the planets and their motions, while the contrary is the case with popular works of the same period. Assuming that the Vedāṅgas, Jātakas, the epics and Purāṇas overlap chronologically, the whole period, as a matter of convenience, may be taken as extending from

400 B. C. to 400 A.D. There are thus two conclusions, which follow from this assumption; either that the more advanced astronomical ideas displayed in these popular works are late additions or interpolations; or, on the other hand, that the knowledge of astronomy indicated in these popular works was much in advance of that exhibited in more formal works. The first conclusion is hardly likely, as the references are much too many and varied to be explained away, and the manner in which the terms are used certainly does not indicate interpolation. The second conclusion is thus the only tenable one, and from this one is led to the deduction that the Vedāṅga astronomy was of the traditional order, and that the professional astronomer of the times must not have been with the times but behind them.

Very important also seems a second point. About 450 A.D. the West gave Hindu teachers a new astronomy to expound; and not being obsessed by tradition like their ancestors they were in a sufficiently receptive state of mind to benefit by the new knowledge. Thus a "golden age" dawned for India, an age which coincided strangely enough with the "dark ages" in Europe, "where a bigoted hierarchy discounted the inestimable gifts of the heathen Greeks. India welcomed and assimilated as much of the Greek teaching as could reach her; but from Alexandria to Ujjain was in those days a long journey, and the transmission of knowledge was hindered

in many ways, so that finally the Greek knowledge was received in India in a somewhat frayed condition."

In his *Arctic Home in the Vedas* (Bombay, 1903), B. G. Tilak writes :—

The astronomical statements found in the Vedic literature supplied us with far more reliable data for correctly ascertaining the ages of the different periods of Vedic literature. These astronomical statements, it was further shown, unmistakably pointed out that the vernal equinox was in the constellation of Mriga or Orion (c. 4500 B. C.) during the period of the Vedic hymns, and that it had receded to the constellation of the Kṛttikās or the Pleiades (about 2500 B. C.) in the days of the Brāhmaṇas.

Tilak's position was strengthened when it was found that H. Jacobi (*Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland* 1909-1910) had independently arrived at the same conclusion.

Although Kaye remarks that Jacobi is one of the most learned of the European orientalists, he feels compelled to reject some of his conclusions, especially that one asserting that portions of the early texts were indeed composed some 4500 years before the Christian era. He puts forward his own suggestion that the "nakshatras" formed, at least in some cases, merely a relative scale whose initial point was an equinox or solstice.

In this connection we have to remember that in Hindu astronomy the path of the sun was not so important as the path of the moon. Therefore in the last phase of the later Vedic times one distinguished 27 or 28 of these "lunar mansions,"

the previously mentioned nakshatras. They formed a scale, the natural one of the stellar groups which the moon encountered along its path through the heavens. The name "nakshatra" originally connoted stars in general but later took on the particular significance of the stellar groupings in the moon's path.

There is no regularity in distribution in these constellations, and there is also some irregularity regarding their number. But the arcs which they characterise are invariably 27 in number. This number 27 denoting the various divisions of the zodiac goes back right to the roots of Hindu tradition, and the evidence seems to prove that this system of nakshatras is indigenous.

So the nakshatras appear to us as 27 or 28 groups of stars plotted out on the ecliptic in a manner similar to the western zodiac. The Rig-Veda gives no complete list of the nakshatras, but it mentions at least three of these lunar mansions, also called lunar asterisms. Complete lists are given in the Atharva Veda, the Taittiriya Saṁhitā, the Kaṭha Saṁhitā, the Maitrāyaṇī Saṁhitā, the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa, etc. It is interesting to point out that all these lists agree generally but that only the number of nakshatras varies between 27 and 28. Of the more modern texts the Jyotiṣa Vedāṅga and the Sūrya Siddhanta imply 27, and the Sūryaprajñapti, the Brāhmaphuṭasiddhanta and the Sūrya Siddhānta imply 28. These numbers suggest for Kaye a connection with the sidereal month, but

in the early texts the only month referred to is of 30 days duration, and even in the later works the synodical month is divided into 30 tithis. The Arabic Manāzil and the Chinese Sieou consist of 28 asterisms and the Chaldean scheme has the same number. The reader may also consult on this point with interest the papers of J. B. Biot in the *Journal des Savans*, 1840, and of L. de Saussure "La Symétrie du Zodiac Lunaire Asiatique" in *Journal Asiatique*, Sér. 11, T. 14, No. 1, 1919.

There has been some considerable discussion and not a little heated controversy concerning the possible connections between the Hindu nakshatras and other systems. These discussions throw much light on the antiquity of the Hindu zodiac. Sir William Jones wrote in his very definite manner:—"I undertake to prove that the Indian Zodiac was not borrowed mediately or directly from the Arabs or Greeks" (see "Works" IV). But afterwards he confessed that he found it practically impossible to find a Hindu astronomer who could name in Sanskrit all the constellations Jones pointed out. H. T. Colebrooke (*Asiatic Researches*, Vol. IX, p. 323), however, inclined to the belief that the Indian and Arabian divisions of the zodiac had a common origin. Jones thought that they had not, despite the proof adduced by Colebrooke that the coincidence was too exact to be the result of chance. Colebrooke argued that it must have been the Arabs who adopted with slight variations a division of the

zodiac familiar to the Hindus. Colebrooke also differed from Jones in regard to the stars constituting the asterisms of Hindu astronomy. Jones only stated a conjecture founded on a consideration of the figure of the nakshatra and the number of its stars, compared with those actually situated near the division of the ecliptic to which the nakshatra gave name. It would thus appear that he was not aware that the Hindus themselves placed some of these constellations outside the limits of the zodiac. In the face of the available evidence, there can hardly be any reasonable doubt that the nakshatras are native to India just as the asterisms of the Sieou are to China.

But it is interesting to note in passing that, though it is a traditional belief that India supplied the Arabs with their astronomical knowledge, it is equally probable that the Arabs were thus inspired to obtain their further knowledge from the Greeks. And thus, later, this knowledge was passed on by the Arabs to the Europe which formerly had rejected it.

There is no uniformity in the naming of the Hindu signs of the zodiac, and there is evidence of foreign influence. Greek communication is obvious in the names "Two Faces," Gemini, and "Lion's Tail," Leo.

And there is also no definition of the positions of the nakshatras in the heavens in the early texts. No evidence is offered even up to the time of Varāha Mihira in the sixth century A.D.—the Pañchasiddhāntikā of this time only gives the posi-

tions of seven asterisms with very little accuracy. Indeed the identifications with certain stars or constellations are all more or less modern, and as Kaye points out, apparently the nakshatras never were completely identified by Hindu astronomers. About 1000 A. D., however, the initial point of the Hindu sphere was marked by the principal star of the nakshatra Revati which was identified with *Zeta Piscium*, or by some authorities the initial point was perhaps some ten degrees west of *Zeta Piscium*.

An important indication of the remote antiquity of the Hindu lunar zodiac is shown by the following comparison of the original series with those of later times: *Kṛttikā*, the constellation "Pleiades," was the first in the primitive series. All the early lists of the nakshatras begin with *Kṛttikā*, which, if really equivalent to the Pleiades, marked the vernal equinox about 2300 B. C. This position could not have been possible at any rate after 1800 B. C. The *Jyotisha Vedāṅga* puts *Śravishtā* first, while the *Mahābhārata* substitutes *Śravapā*; the *Sūrya Siddhānta* gives *Āśvini* first, while the *Sūryaprajñapti* begins with *Abhijit*. These form two groups—*Kṛttikā* to *Āśvini* and *Śravishtā* to *Abhijit*, separated by about one quarter of the ecliptic. (See Kaye, *loc. cit.*, p. 24).

The change from *Kṛttikā* to *Āśvini* just mentioned seems at first to be an astronomical one, inspired by a knowledge of the effects of precession. But there are objections to this explanation, and

Tilak (*loc. cit.*) and F. F. Fleet (*Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society etc.*, 1911-1915) suggest that the original order was either a ritualistic or an astrological one. Tilak records that it is stated by Garga, who lived c. 548 B. C., that for ritualistic purposes *Kṛttikā* was first, while for the calendar *Śravishtā* was first. But Fleet in one of his latest papers wrote:—

I hope to revert to this matter in a paper in which I shall show that the *Kṛttikādi* list has no basis in the fact that the sun once came to the vernal equinox in *Kṛttikā*, but belongs entirely to ritual and astrology.

But as Kaye points out, another possible explanation lies in the various practices in different parts of India regarding the commencement of the year.

We cannot conclude this discussion more appropriately than with Kaye's view, that in all countries, in the early stages of intellectual development, the connection between astronomy and religion has been intimate. For India the history of this connection is particularly interesting. In comparatively late times an exotic astronomical cult tended to obscure the historical development; but the cult never became predominant and the scheme of astrology was altogether subordinated to the spirit of Hinduism. It is impossible to elaborate these themes in the present discussion, but it will have served its purpose if it draws a little more attention to these interesting topics and the important part they have played in the progress of civilisation.

ARTHUR BEER

II.—SOME OBSERVATIONS SUGGESTED BY Dr. BEER'S ARTICLE

[Dr. V. V. Ramana-Sastrin, lives "a retired life of learned leisure in the midst of my library, away from the hustle of town-life." He has specialized in the literature relating to Saivagamas and edited *The Agamic Review* from 1896 to 1915. He has also written a monograph on the history of Indo-Greek astronomy and astrology richly documented from Greek, Latin and Sanskrit of which languages he is a keen student; he is also acquainted with Hebrew, Arabic and Persian.—EDS.]

The first impression that one gets on reading Dr. Beer's article is that it is out to make no distinctive contribution to the age of the "Hindu zodiac" which Dr. Beer takes to mean the "Hindu lunar zodiac." But a closer scrutiny of the article shows it to be scissors and paste, pure and simple, *viz.*, a deftly dove-tailed assemblage of clippings from the late Mr. George Rusby Kaye's *Hindu Astronomy* (Calcutta, 1924), and hardly anything else. Of the first four paragraphs of the article, which may be said to introduce the subject, the first three are ostensibly Dr. Beer's own, being in the nature of a tame outline of the zodiac of signs, and the how of its displacement from the zodiac of constellations, while the last is a budget of thin quotations from Downey and Proctor. Of the remaining fifteen paragraphs, twelve are extracts from Kaye, more often implicit than not, and three, a rehash of either his ideas or those of the authors he mentions. The reader would do well to compare patiently in succession the fifteen paragraphs, which form the pith and marrow of Dr. Beer's article, with pages 95, 96, 32, 96, 22, 3, 4, 96, 23, 24 and 96 of Kaye's book, in order to bear me out. One

has thus to pit oneself against Kaye rather than against Dr. Beer, in appraising the worth of the averments that find a place in the article.

I was much in touch with Kaye when his book took shape, and he was courteous enough to call attention to a paper of mine on page 129. This paper had appeared, two years before, in the *Classical Review* (London: John Murray), having been addressed, amid a discussion of some special lines of internal evidence pointing to the living hold which Greek astrology had upon the Indian mind of the Indo-Greek period, to the interpretation of a Greek passage, excerpted in one of the parts of the recondite *Catalogus Codicum Astrologorum Graecorum* (Bruxelles: Henri Lamestain), a passage that seemed to clinch the accuracy of the Indian presentation of an important doctrinal convention of Greek astrology. But Kaye would not, or could not even if he would, profit by my paper, as he was sufficiently at home neither in Greek nor in the contents of Greek astrological classics.

It is perhaps not known to many that Kaye was not a genuine Sanskritist either by training or

by culture. He had of course a working knowledge of mathematical astronomy and related branches of study, sufficient to stand him in apt stead, in making intelligent use of the results of the investigations of others into the history of the development of ancient mathematics and astronomy. He was an indefatigable compiler, could flick, for his own use, the cream off the most ponderous and musty tomes in his ken and had an instinct not only for ferreting out the most curious and varied bits of information on subjects of study that interested him, but also for marshalling and displaying them all, in his own ingenious way, so as to make the maximum impression upon, or attract the maximum notice of, the public. He went in for writing to learned, out-of-the-way journals of Italy, America and Germany, but the staple of his contributions, however enjoyable each time, was ever the same in substance. He had considerable leisure as an employee of the Indian Government in the Educational Department, first as a teacher and then as an inspector in the U. P., and finally as the personal assistant to the Inspector-General of Education, Simla, and he turned that leisure to valuable account. He died not long after 1925, and was unaware of the astronomical implications of the revolutionary finds at Boghas-Koi and Mitanni and at Mohenjo-Daro and Harappa.

In the light of the above account of the mental get-up of Kaye, it will be easy to see that we have to deal in his typically Anglo-Indian find-

ings with just such hide-bound repercussions of western Indological research as easily square with his almost sworn predilection for assigning a comparatively late date for the dawn of the Indian astronomical conscience, and ignoring quietly every evidence to the contrary, on the convenient score that it is imagined from mere sentiment. But, all the same, his book was not subjected to any serious criticism when it came out, for scholars looked askance at it as in the nature of a facile hotchpot. And yet, it will be neither fair nor useful to criticise it at this late hour because of Dr. Beer's pirating it, since, for one thing, the views put forth in it do not hold the field. I shall confine myself therefore to a few general observations—a discussion of facts and theories on which they rest, being outside range of a non-technical presentation.

To begin with, let me give a sample of the accuracy of knowledge and depth of prejudice evinced by Kaye, by quoting the following from his book, leaving the interested reader to form his own opinion as to what to expect out of it in the long run:—

It may be explained that a Brāhmaṇa or religious manual, or a Sūtra or collection of rules are attached to each Veda; and that the Brāhmaṇa is further divided into three rather vague orders of which the Vedānta or Upaniṣad is chiefly concerned with theosophical speculations. (p. 8.)

Bhāskara is the only conspicuous figure in the second sub-period which extends from about A. D. 700, and his importance has been somewhat "exaggerated". (p. 9)

Kaye takes no notice of the fact that the extant Vedic *corpus*, which only represents the surviving remnant of a canon, originally fixed by a so-called "Veda-Vyāsa," is, for that reason, not to be treated as perfect; and that his canon was merely what he was able to rescue from out of a still larger volume of Vedic literature that, in his time, had irretrievably disappeared in part, and was tending to disappear in part; and that the received arrangement of the canon was the result of the considerable shuffling to which he subjected the rescued fragmentary material, in order to introduce into it a certain factitious uniformity of plan and scope. No Orientalist seems to remember this point when undertaking to analyse philologically or semantically odd chips of the Vedic *corpus* and extracting therefrom astronomical or chronological information: for, hymns or passages separated by millennia in age, and consequently reflecting widely differing celestial phenomena, may exist quietly side by side, without exciting the least suspicion: he must interpret what he finds without caring for the consequences.

It is again a modern triviality to assume that when a man has explored all the astronomical or chronographical references to be found in the Vedas, he will be in a position to speak definitively as to the length and breadth of the astronomical learning of the period which is covered by them: a reader of the Greek Testament is by no means expected to take its mention of the magi's sighting of Jesus's

"Star in the East" and there being led by it through all the vicissitudes of a long journey to the crib at Bethlehem, as a measure of the Greek astronomical learning of the time. For an estimate of the real astronomical knowledge of Vedic Indians, we must come by books addressed to the secular learning of their day: but such books have obviously gone to ruin in the efflux of time, though the Vedas have managed to hold their own by the singularity of their importance and the special manner of their preservation. There are however distinct references in the Vedas to the parallel existence of secular astronomical learning and professional astronomers, but the references are now and then marred by intense acerbity, as, evidently, the higher interests of astronomical learning which have for their object the fearless study of celestial phenomena, and those of a ritualistic cult implying a belief in mythical cosmology, cannot cohere. And, so, in the astronomical references found in the Vedas we merely touch the frayed religious fringe of a secular astronomical culture, of the full extent of which we can have but the vaguest conception. Sometimes capital is made out of the extant literature on the Vedāṅga-Jyautiṣa in order to anathematize the inaccuracy of the astronomy and the method of reckoning as taught in it, and to aver that they form the quintessence of the finished astronomical culture of the Vedic age. It is a mistake to do so. The extant Vedāṅga-Jyautiṣa, being in the

nature of a short-cut, designed exclusively for the use of the non-astronomical ritualist in formulating and regulating his sacrificial calendar, is based on a religiously enjoined, conventional system of religio-astronomical, if not pseudo-astronomical, reckoning, employing conventional time-measures, and it has therefore nothing in common with the true astronomical learning of Vedic India.

Hipparchus was not the discoverer of the precession. This phenomenon was well-known in India and Babylonia thousands upon thousands of years previous to the days of Hipparchus. He was perhaps the first to assign a value of the amount of annual precession. But even that value was far from accurate. Ptolemy refined upon his value only to get 36 seconds of arc in longitude, which again was considerably behind the truth. The Vedic Indians observed the phenomenon of precession of both the colures and of the pole, and periodically changed their asterismal and zodiacal scales in conformity with any observed change in the asterismal location of either colure, regard being had to the nature of the solar ingress, whether equinoctial or solstitial, which opened the year. To so shift the scales periodically and use the shifted scales as fixed ones till they are once again shifted on account of a further change in the asterismal location of either colure that opens the year, is really making a practical use of a knowledge of the phenomenon of the precession for

periodical calendaric reform. The *kr̥ttikādi* asterismal scale, *cum* the vernal ingress of the sun in *kr̥ttikā*, which finds mention in both the *Taittiriya-Samhitā* and the *Taittiriya-Brahmana*, points to the time when the equinoctial colure passed through the Pleiades, which must have been about 4500 B. C. The *Vedāṅga-Jyautiṣa*, though employing both the zodiacal and the asterismal scales, makes use of the year opening with the sun in *Śraviṣṭha* about its winter solstitial ingress, which shows that the date of its present redaction cannot be later than 1750 B. C. Patañjali, who was certainly pre-Hipparchian, refers in his *Yoga-sūtras* to methods whereby both polar and colural precession may be observed in ways that are peculiar. Both Garga and Parāśara make pointed statements as to the positions occupied by the summer solstitial point thousands of years before their respective dates. The phenomenon of the precession will thus be seen to have been quite familiar in pre-Hipparchian India.

If my remarks about the received Vedic canon which is the work of the so-called Veda-Vyāsa be kept in mind, it will be easy to see how, for different but perfectly cogent and sound astronomical reasons, we are forced to date a portion of the *Taittiriya-Samhitā* (vii, 4, 28) at *circa* 7000 B. C. and a portion of the *Taittiriya-Brahmana* (iii, 1, 5) at *circa* 5300 B. C. In this connection it may also be noted that the *Ṛksamhitā* (i, 105 and vii, 103) takes us to about 5000 B. C., the *Śatapatha-Brahmana* (ii, 1, 2) to

3500 B. C., and the *Maitrāyaṇīya-Upaniṣat* (i, 4) to 3200 B. C.

No one can deny for a moment that the study of astronomy and astrology received a fresh impetus in India from the time Indians first came into living contact with Greeks somewhere about 550 B. C., when under the Persian empire founded by Darius, the Ionian Greeks of Asia Minor, swarmed largely in Sindh, the Panjab and Afghanistan (Gāndhāra) as state-paid officials of the "Indian Satrapy". Then, there was the invasion of Alexander; the Hellenization of Indian culture; the establishment of a Greek centre of influence at the Court of Candragupta after he married the daughter of Seleucus Nicator; the dominion of the Indo-Greek, rather Indo-Bactrian, kings in North-Western India, of whom Demetrius, Euthydemus and Menander were the most illustrious; the apostolate of the Asokan Buddhist missionaries who travelled to all the Hellenistic Countries then in power; and lastly the freedom of social and intellectual intercourse between the ruled Indians and the ruling Greeks or half-Greeks. All these factors contributed to put the Indian intellect in a favourable situation for saturating itself with the best Greek learning in Astronomy and Astrology of both the pre-Hellenistic and the Hellenistic periods. The Indians were primarily indebted to the Greek makers of Astronomy and Astrology of about the second century B. C., and before. The fixed zodiacal scale of the Greeks (though in vogue in India

previously in a way) came to be formally accepted in Hindu Astrology and Astronomy at about 274 B. C. This was the time when the fixed asterismal scale beginning with *āśvini* was equated to the fixed Greek zodiacal scale, and the segmentation of the solar zodiac into the 108 *nakṣatra-pādas* adopted. But there never seems to have been a time when the Greek fixed zodiac of Constellations was put in requisition for strictly uranographic purposes. Kaye is totally wrong in thinking that Greek teaching reached India only in 400 A. D., and that, in a highly degenerate condition. There is evidence to show that Indo-Greek authors wrote in Sanskrit from the second century B. C., down to the second century A. D., with a facility of expression and grace of diction which were marvellous. When the Greek zodiac, along with the Greek astronomy and the Greek astrology, was admitted to full citizen rights inside the circle of Indian culture, India had not been without an indigenous solar zodiac and indigenous astronomy and astrology. But in the surging flood-tide of fashion which had an overpowering mania for everything Greek, the indigenous elements were absorbed into the imported Greek culture, beyond recognition. This was the time when Garga could speak of the culture of Greeks in astronomy and astrology as superb. But eventually the Greek food underwent thorough assimilation in the Indian body, becoming converted into its very life-blood.

The standard books which have now come down to us from the days of Āryabhata and Varāhamihira on the subjects of astronomy and astrology did not, as Kaye imagines, suddenly spring into existence after a long interval of prior, uncouth silence. These books, although not the best of their kind, are as their authors plainly tell us, based upon those of others; but what these latter books were like we have no means of knowing in the absence of even a trace of them. It is manifest they are lost, and with them, a whole line of books connecting them with the period of the inauguration of the Indian renaissance under Greek auspices. Though Kaye makes no mention of it, the mismatched celestial co-ordinates employed by Varāhamihira and his successors under the names *druvaka* and *viksepa* are a legacy of ancient Greeks. That astronomy and astrology had attained an enviable state of advancement at the hands of Brahmans is admitted by the classical authors themselves, notably Megasthenes, Philostratus, Strabo, Lucian and some others.

Further, everything that India received in the first flush of her passion for the Greek learning in astronomy and astrology, was by the land-route, from the Ptolemaic Egypt and the Seleucid Syria, and Kaye is sadly wrong in thinking of the middle of the fifth century A. D. and the sea-route, in that connexion. The star-lists, along with their "false" longitudes and latitudes, which the Hindus of Menander's time ought to have received through Greek teaching, and enshrined in books compiled by them must, along with the books containing them, have met the same fate as that of so many other valuable books written by Sanskrit-knowing Greeks and Greek-knowing Indians of the Indo-Greek period.

With these observations I shall stop for the present, as a more intimate discussion of all the historical, scientific and cultural questions so summarily decided with an *ex cathedra* air by Kaye, cannot be attempted here in the course of a sketchy threading of what, after all, is a mere *causerie* in disguise.

V. V. RAMANA

THE PATH OF THE SOUL IN SUFISM

[Dr. Margaret Smith is the author of *Rabi'a the Mystic, Studies in Early Mysticism*, and *Attar* in "The Wisdom of the East Series". She has contributed numerous articles on the Sufis and Sufism in this journal.—Eds.]

Before the rise and development of Sūfism, orthodox Islam had taught that within man was a Divine spark, for God had at the beginning breathed into him of His own Spirit, and there was therefore a real affinity between God and the soul of man. Sūfism, on the basis of this conception, developed the doctrine of a close relation between God and the human soul. The soul included the higher part, the spirit or heart, the "rational soul," containing the inmost essence of man (*sirr*). This, as al-Sarrāj (*ob.* A. D. 988) says, is the "secret shrine of God Himself, wherein He knows man and man can know Him."* This higher soul, previous to its existence in a body in this world, had dwelt in the Presence of God and had been one with Him. It has, therefore, the power to perceive spiritual realities. al-Ghazālī says of it:—

Man possesses two eyes, the outward and the inward, the former concerned with the world of sense, the latter with the invisible world, and this he possesses because he is a partaker of the Divine Nature, and so there is within man a power of apprehension, which seeks the highest, even God Himself.

But the power to apprehend depends on the purity of the soul. Here in this world it is joined to a low part, the carnal self (*nafs*)

ruled by passion, which is the seat of all evil, and exercises a downward drag on the higher soul. So the purity of the spirit becomes defiled, "that fair countenance has been disfigured by the darkness of sin," it is veiled from the apprehension of Reality by egoism, sensualism, error of all kinds. The process of removing the veils, of eliminating the evil, and effecting the purification which will enable the soul to become conscious of its own Divinity, is what the Sūfis call the Path, the way of inward ascent, which will lead at last to the reunion of the soul with God.

The Sūfis themselves constantly speak of this as a Way (*'ariqa*), a journey from the false self into the real self, which is one with the Creative Truth, that is, the One Reality. The "traveller," says Maḥmūd Shabistari, in the *Rose Garden of Mystery*, is the one who is acquainted with his own origin, who is aware of the Divinity within him, and who seeks to become "pure from self as flame from smoke," so that he may die to self and live a new life in God. God alone can guide men on the Way, and therefore man must attend to the promptings of Divine grace and light within his own soul, but the need for co-operation with the act of Divine grace is always upheld

* Kitāb al-Luma 'p. 231.

by the Sūfis in their teaching on the following of the mystic Path. Spiritual meditation, by which the mystic can apprehend the guidance and help of God, is to be combined with vigorous asceticism, by which the soul can be purged of self-will, self-consciousness, and all those human passions and creaturely conditions which are a means of separation from God.

The journey is marked out by a number of "stations" (*maqāmāt*) which constitute the ascetic and ethical discipline of the seeker, and indicate the degree of progress attained by the mystic in the Path of God, and he must perfect himself in each, fulfilling its obligations and acquiring the virtues proper to it, before passing on to the next station. This stage of the Path corresponds to what is known to Western mystics as the "Purgative Life," and belongs to the sphere of practical religion. These stations are succeeded, or accompanied, by a similar series of psychological "states" (*ahwāl*) which belong to the inner life, denoting spiritual experiences, graces received, which are the gift of God alone, and do not depend upon the mystic's own striving; and these correspond to the "Illuminative Life" of Western mysticism.

The first step on the way is repentance (*tauba*) which is really acceptance of the Path, a turning towards God and away from all else, when the traveller puts behind him all worldly attractions, shakes off all human and material ties that fetter him, and realises

what is the Goal of the quest, towards which he has set his face. Dhū al-Nūn (*ob.* A. D. 859), and others of the Sūfis, distinguish between repentance due to fear of Divine punishment, and repentance due to shame on account of the Divine Compassion.

The repentance of fear is caused by the revelation of God's Majesty, the repentance of shame by the Vision of God's Beauty.

Dhū al-Nūn also declared that repentance was of three kinds, the common kind, which was repentance from sin; that of the elect, which was repentance from neglect, and finally, that of the saints, which was repentance, *i. e.* turning away, from all save God. This meant forgetfulness, even of sin; for remembrance of sin, that is, of self, is a veil between the soul and God.

The novice who had thus set foot on the Path normally betook himself at this stage to a spiritual director, under whose guidance he underwent a long process of training and guidance as to the way to follow, but there were some Sūfis, such as the woman Rābi'a of Basra (*ob.* A. D. 801), who attained their aim without any such guidance, who found the right ascetical and psychological discipline for themselves, who trod the Path to its appointed end, and there found what they sought.

The first station after Repentance was Abstinence (*wara'*) and this, Ḥasan al-Basrī, one of the earliest Sūfis, declared to be the root-principle of religion, since he held that its opposite, "desire,"

(*tama'*) was the chief source of the corruption of the soul. Closely akin to this "station" was that of Renunciation (*zuhd*) the abandonment of all that distracted the soul from God, leaving the hand free from wealth and the heart from desire. Of renunciation, also, the *Ṣūfīs* taught that there were three kinds, the renunciation of what was unlawful, which was common; the renunciation of what was lawful, a more special type; and finally the renunciation of all save God, and this was the renunciation of the gnostics, the renunciation, not only of the temporary pleasures of this world, but of the hope of reward in the next. "The sign of true *Ṣūfī*," said al-Qushayrī, "is that he is indifferent to this world and the world to come."* Renunciation involved Poverty (*faqr*). Of those who are poor for the sake of God al-Sarrāj writes that they are the richest of all the creatures, for they dispense with the gift for the sake of the Giver. Poverty, to the *Ṣūfī*, meant not merely lack of material possessions, but indifference to both wealth and poverty. It meant self-stripping in the widest sense, and the merging of the personal will in the Will of God, until the mystic attained to complete self-loss. To a friend who asked her what a man should do in order to come near to God, Rābi'a replied, "He should possess nothing in this world or the next save Him alone."

Patience and Gratitude were also stations on the way, representing the passive and active sides of the

same virtue, acquiescence in all that was destined to come to the mystic on the Path, whether benefits or misfortunes, and acceptance of such, not only without complaint, but with thankfulness. The first stage is to leave off complaining, which is the stage of the penitent; the second is to be satisfied with what is decreed by the Divine Will, and this is the stage of the ascetics; and the third is to accept with joyful gratitude whatever befalls, and this is the stage of the true saints, the "friends" of God. "Gratitude," said Qushayrī, "is the vision of the Giver, not the gift." Trust in God and dependence upon Him (*tawakkul*) followed upon the stations which had gone before; it meant being contented with God and His provision, and so finding rest from the troubles of this world, engendered by anxiety on account of means and subsistence. Dhū al-Nūn taught that such trust meant that the seeker should no longer be influenced by worldly motives or anxieties, but should bring the self into obedience to God, and take from it the power of controlling its own destiny: the *Ṣūfīs* should be as "little children in the bosom of God." al-Ghazālī makes such implicit trust a test of faith in the Unity of God, for since He is the Sole Cause and the Only Agent, and all His acts are the result of perfect goodness and wisdom, then what need has the servant to be concerned with his own interests, for all that is destined for him must be for the best?

The final "station," in the view

* Kisāla, pp. 74, 75.

of most of the Ṣūfīs, was Satisfaction (*ṣīda*), and of this al-Muhāsibī (*ob.* A. D. 857), one of the greatest of all the early Ṣūfī teachers, has much to say. It is two-sided, for human satisfaction is linked up with the divine satisfaction and depends upon it. Muhāsibī says:—

Human satisfaction, is tranquillity of heart in regard to Destiny and equanimity of soul in regarding events, whether the Majesty of God or His Beauty be manifested therein. It is all one to the true servant, whether he be consumed in the fire of the Majesty of God or illuminated by the light of His Mercy and His Beauty, since both alike witness to God, and whatever comes from Him is good. When the servant sees God's choice and chooses it for himself, he is delivered from all anxieties, for satisfaction means deliverance. There are those who are satisfied with the gifts of God and the happiness these bring, and those who are satisfied with affliction and trials, and there are also those who are satisfied simply with being chosen, and this is love, for those who are satisfied with being chosen by the Beloved are His lovers, whose hearts dwell ever in His Presence, who are detached from the creatures and the fetters of the "stations," and their souls have escaped from all existences and have attached themselves to God.*

So Satisfaction is the last of the "stations": it begins with effort on the part of the self, but in the end it means escape from striving, for it has become a mystic "state".

The mystic "states," as we have seen, may follow the stations or may be experienced at the same time, for they belong, not to the outward life of asceticism, but to

the inner life of the soul. In attaining to the stations, the soul has been purged of the grosser sins of the self and the senses, but the "states" represent a still more subtle process of purification, affecting thought and feeling, and are experiences sent by God to encourage the soul in its ascent. Among them the Ṣūfī writers include Meditation, Nearness to God, Fear and Hope, Love and Longing, Fellowship, Tranquillity, Contemplation and Certainty. Of these Meditation (*muraqaba*) means a process of self-concentration, when the mystic keeps a close watch upon the thoughts, lest evil suggestions should hinder him from thinking of God. The meditation of the gnostics, the power for which comes from God, enables them always to concern themselves with God and to fix their minds upon Him. On the "states" of Fear and Hope the Ṣūfīs have much to say. One of them observes that the man who fears rightly fears his carnal self more than his enemy. Fear, says another, is like a lamp to the heart, making it see what is good and what is evil, and godly fear leads a man to shun what is feared, because it is evil. He who truly fears anything flees from it, but he who truly fears God, flees unto Him. Fear, to the Ṣūfī, was no mere dread of material consequences, but of separation from God, and Dhū al-Nūn says on this subject that the fear of Hell-fire is to the fear of separation from God, like a drop which has fallen into the bottomless sea. In

* *Kashf al-Mahjūb* pp. 219 ff.

proportion to the mystic's nearness to God is his fear of being cut off from Him. Hope, too, is concerned not with rewards, material or spiritual, for the Šūfi's hope, says al-Sarrāj, is in God alone, and he hopes for nothing from God except God Himself.

Hope and Fear and Love are bound up together. "The lover" said Dhū al-Nūn, "does not pour out the cup of love until fear has made his heart ready." Love is the greatest of the mystic "states" and the most essential to the progress of the soul if it is to attain its goal; and this, like all the states, is a gift from God, who has enabled His servants to love Him. It is linked up with the states of longing (*shawq*) and intimate fellowship (*uns*). Love, says Muḥāsibī, is a strong yearning, the heart's remembrance of the One yearned for, and its expectation of the state of union. The love of the mystic is that pure love in which is no defilement, which thrusts out from the heart all baser affections until all is in God and to God. Love of this type leads to ecstasy and to the consciousness of the nearness of God, and of the soul's communion with Him. "Drink the wine of His love for thee," says Dhū al-Nūn, using the mystic symbolism of the poets, "that He may intoxicate thee with thy love for Him." That close fellowship with God which results from love, he describes as "the joy of the lover in the Beloved," a radiant light to the soul, and by the light the lover is enabled to look upon the Beloved and to know

the rapture of contemplation (*mushāhada*), when the seeker is face to face with the Sought. The heart of the worshipper is the real sanctuary, said Muḥammad b. al-Faḍl :—

For the true sanctuary is the place where contemplation is, and only that one to whom the whole world is the trysting-place where he draws near to God, and a place of retreat where he holds communion with Him, knows what it is to be the friend of God.

From that one who contemplates God in his heart all else is hidden and the self passes away into nothingness in that Divine Presence and there remains naught in the heart save God alone. "So God, revealing Himself in His Majesty, causes the carnal souls of His lovers to pass away, and, then by the revelation of His Beauty, gives immortality to their hearts." To the mystic, then, filled with love, and rapt in expectation of what God will reveal to him, is granted the Vision of the Divine Beauty. "It begins with flashes of light," says al-Qushayrī, in a vain attempt to describe that mystic experience, "then it appears as rays of light and then as the light shining forth in its full splendour." But in truth the unveiling of the Divine Glory is among the unspeakable things which it is not fitting, nor indeed possible, to describe, as al-Ghazālī reminds us. None should attempt to share that experience with any to whom God has not chosen to unveil Himself.

The seeker has attained through sight to certainty, and now has passed beyond the "stations" and

the "states" and has entered the higher sphere of the mystic Gnosis, that direct knowledge of God which comes only by the illumination and the revelation of God Himself. This is the final stage of the Path, for the traveller is now in sight of the Goal. The real meaning of Gnosis, says al-Hujwiri, is to know that all belongs to God. When ignorance has come to an end, the veils vanish and this life, by means of Gnosis, becomes one with the life to come. Gnosis comes from the Light of lights, and the soul of the gnostic now knows itself to be one with that Primal Essential Light and knows that it shall be joined with it once more, as the spark returns to the flame and is absorbed in it again.

So the traveller reaches the end of the journey, the soul passes away from itself, from all sense-impressions, from all creaturely knowledge, and attains to the annihilation of the personal self (*fanā*), which Suhrawardī states is the end of travelling to God. Jāmi said :-

The end of worshipping God is that the worshipper should pass away in worship from worship, and be absorbed in Him Whom he worships, and this is the state in which perishability perishes. (*fanā al-fanā*.)

Mortality is ended, but in dying to itself, the soul is reborn to a new life in God, and immortality has begun. Immortality (*baqā*), says Suhrawardī again, is the beginning of travelling in God, for the soul has now entered upon the Uni-

tive life in and with God. Hujwiri wrote :—

This is the perfection attained by the saints who have left behind them the toil of conflict and are free from the fetters of the "stations" and the vicissitudes of the "states" and whose search has ended in discovery. They have come to know all the secrets of the heart, and of set purpose have become annihilated to all desire, and having thus passed away from mortality, have attained to perfect immortality."

The gnostic who has attained is fitly described by some Sūfī writers as the "*wāqif*" (the one who stands still), for he desists from seeking and passes away into the Sought; he has no longer thoughts of "otherness," for him all apparent and transient values have been changed into their real and eternal values. "Now," Ibn al-'Arabi says, "'Thou' art 'He' and thou seest all thine actions to be His actions and all His attributes to be thine attributes, and thine essence to be His Essence." So the line of distinction is obliterated. From one point of view the One Reality is the Creative Truth, from another, He is that which is created, but the Essence is one and the same. The Path of the Soul has brought it to the end of the journey, through knowledge of itself, to knowledge of God, the Ultimate Reality, and so to the realisation that knower and Known are one, and that God is not only One, but One in All and All in All.*

MARGARET SMITH

* In addition to the Arabic and Persian authorities quoted, cf. also R. A. N. Nicholson, "*The Mystics of Islam*."

THE NATURE OF THINGS

[In this story **Théophilus** brings out an important fact of occultism. There is a time when a man comes to know that his mind will carry him no further. There are neutral and critical states which human consciousness encounters in its progressive awakenings. In its development through the instrument of mind it faces insoluble problems; either it must fall back and admit itself defeated or it must find a vehicle superior to the mind and go through what to the mind is a thick, impenetrable wall. This superior vehicle, or, if it be preferred, state of human consciousness is Intuition. For most at the present stage of evolution, it expresses itself rarely and as a feeling—a kind of feeling. The deliberate unfoldment of this faculty of intuition, sometimes called pure and compassionate reason, is the basis of the Life of the Spirit or of Occultism. To be deliberate and wide awake in one's own consciousness cleansed of all emotions which colour and tarnish clear vision is the aim of the aspirant to Occultism which is the wisdom hidden behind all objects and events. Real clairvoyance is not seeing the invisible but understanding the visible, which understanding penetrates to the core and kernel of objects and events and perceives their very soul.—Eds.]

“Civilisation has ever developed the physical and the intellectual at the cost of the psychic and spiritual.”

The Secret Doctrine II. 319.

This was the third day of frost and fog. An anticyclone of unusual extent stretched from central Europe to Greenland with its centre over the British Isles: and at Greenwich the barometer stood at 31.06.

Under this crushing weight of still air, London's vast output of smoke had had no way of escape. For two days it had hung as a black pall over City, West End and Suburbs. The streets had been clear of fog. Traffic had run normally by artificial light. But for more than forty-eight hours that immense scab of houses which disfigures seven hundred square miles of earth had not been blessed by a single ray of daylight.

And on this third day, the pall had descended into the streets, and traffic was almost at a standstill. In the early afternoon, the hills north and south of London had been

slowly enveloped, and by five o'clock the steadily falling bank of fog had settled down into the basin of the Thames. After that, the streets became almost impassable. The pervading umber cloud was so dense that the range of visibility was limited to a few feet. Beyond that was nothing but a mystery of darkness out of which approaching shapes loomed suddenly near at hand.

Through this turbid murk, the immense motor traffic of central London had become locked in one enormous jam. Buses, vans, cabs and private cars could do no more than jerk spasmodically forwards a few yards at a time, as the peering driver or his walking guide—conductor, van-boy, or footman—saw the tail-light ahead of him melt into the darkness.

At the movements when the traffic made its brief surge onwards

the streets resounded with the harsh stutter of changing gears, the clamour of shouted warnings and directions, the momentary rumble of heavy vehicles. But between those spasms of effort, there was little sound except the steady murmur of running engines, of furtive steps on the pavement and the low tones of suppressed voices. During those intervals, London seemed to be strangely silent.

When the fog had first come down, it had been the subject of much Cockney humour. The majority of Londoners, their sense of abnormal occurrence already stirred by two days of darkness, had treated it as an entertaining break in the monotony of their routine existences. The fog became for them a diversion, an adventure, an experience of which they might presently boast. But this early elation gradually gave way to a feeling of frustration and imprisonment. Long before the streets were finally cleared towards midnight, the temper of the crowd was that of impatience, annoyance, resentful anger. At the back of every mind was the thought: "I wish I were out of this."

That thought came, for example, most insistently to Arthur Howes as he stood before the window of his flat in West Kensington and stared out into a blankness relieved only by a faint blur of light from the tall lamp-standard immediately below him. It was now midnight, and it had taken him two hours to cover the two miles that separated him from the Imperial Institute

where he had been speaking to an unusually meagre audience. He had driven his own car home and had more than once been tempted to abandon it by the roadside and feel his way back by the area railings. It was the first time in his life that he had suffered that oppressive sense of frustration, of impotence, of being snared and impeded by intangible resistances that no effort of his could overcome. Never before had he uttered that random prayer: "I wish I were out of this."

He had hitherto found no cause for prayer. He had always been successful—at his Preparatory and Public Schools, at Oxford, at the Hospital, in Harley Street. He had a fine brain and a vivid intelligence; he was a brilliant writer. As a psychologist he was already ranked with Jung, and he was not yet forty. Honours and prosperity were his already, but a greater thing than these was expected from him. His book on "Personality" had come nearer to giving a scientific account of the functions of those mysterious elements in the human complex, memory, mind and consciousness, than any previous work had ever done. His many admirers believed that Arthur Howe would one day endow the world with a comprehensible explanation of the wonder of being.

And to-night, as he stood staring into the obscurity of that umber fog, it came to him that the magic key which would open the way to that final, evasive mystery was very near to his hand. He had had

a new and valuable experience that evening; and had been, he believed, on the very verge of recognising the controlling limitation that bounded the exercise of mind and free-will. His enclosure and frustration by the fog had seemed to be an allegory of something vital and vastly important which he could not quite grasp. The meaning was almost within his reach and yet escaped him, as might the substance of a dream of which he could remember only the emotion.

He had been standing at the window for nearly an hour, lost in deep contemplation before he decided that the clue was slipping from him and that the generative experience must be repeated. It was now one o'clock in the morning and the fog was as thick as ever. He would get his car from the garage and drive again through the horror of this cloaking darkness.

There were twenty degrees of frost that night, and he changed from evening dress to thick tweeds and put on a heavy fur coat. It was nearly two o'clock when, having overcome the remonstrances of the night-shift at the garage, he set out on his journey. He did not know why he drove westward, out of London. He had no thought, then, of escape, but only of renewing his experience of driving through the fog.

It seemed as if his were the only car on the road that night, and by keeping close to the kerb he was able to maintain a fairly steady speed of some ten miles an hour.

Now and again at the crossings he got down and made a short exploration on foot; but by the time he reached Kew, the fog as seen in the light of the head lamps was beginning to change colour, fading from umber to orange yellow, to grey, and at last, after he had passed through Hounslow, to a thick white mist.

And not until he was running at an easy thirty miles an hour along the deserted Bath Road, did Arthur Howe realise that his experiment had, after all, never been made. Not once since he had left the garage had he experienced that sense of confinement and frustration. The reason for that leapt into his mind without being sought. When he had returned from the Imperial Institute to his flat, he had been intent on finding a definite object within a limited time, and had been compelled to acknowledge that in attempting that task a man may be stultified and confuted by material conditions. But when he had been travelling without any specific object or time-limitation, he had been entirely free from any feeling of constraint. The deduction was obvious, nevertheless he had again that illusive sense of a vital interpretation just beyond his grasp.

He had passed through Colenbrook when he rose suddenly above the white mist that had enveloped him since he passed out of London. It was as if he came unexpectedly to the surface of a pale, tenuous sea and from the mounting land could look down

upon the spread of vast mysterious waters. Above him the circle of the full moon shone with a clear, cold light, fit lamp for the fairy-land into which he had been so wonderfully transported.

For the grass at the wayside, the hedges, the trees, everything within sight was clad in a garment of black and silver, ebony in the shadows, sparkling with hoar-frost where it reflected the serene light of the enchanting moon.

Arthur Howe stopped his car by a gate, and sat gazing out across the great sea of mist that filled the valley of the Thames. He felt as if he had been lifted above the clouds, to a realm of peace beyond the incessant, aimless struggles of mankind, out of the dingy oppressions and confinements of ugliness into a world of chaste and shining beauty. It seemed to him that he and his car were the only disfigurements in this land of silver serenity.

He had been sitting there for some minutes, leaning over the steering wheel, lost in a deep abstraction, his mind alert and yet immensely still, when the figure of a man emerged from the shadow of the field and came to the gate. His long frieze overcoat, and the short grey curls of his hair and beard were rimed with frost. He, at least, was in harmony with his surroundings.

For a moment or two, he stood silent, his left hand on the top rail of the gate, the right apparently supporting some bulky object that he carried in the breast of his long coat, and then he said quietly, "So

you've escaped?"

"Escaped? From what?" Arthur Howe enquired.

"The foulness and the murk of cities," the strange man replied. "All day I see men passing here, their eyes on the road, flying from one town to the next, with never a thought that isn't a town-thought. London, Slough, Windsor, Maidenhead, Reading, Bristol, there's always a town for them at the journey's end. No escape for them."

"Then why do you say that I've escaped?" Arthur Howe asked.

"I saw it in your face," the stranger said. "It's the look that comes when a man of your sort stays from thinking."

"Of my sort?"

"Aye, you've the look of a man that's trusted his mind, and is coming to the end of it. There's a time when a man like you comes to know that his mind'll carry him no further. He has done all he can and he can do no more with it."

"And then?"

"Then he'll either go on doing again all he's done before, or he'll find himself."

"How can he find himself?"

"By keeping his mind still and waiting for the guidance of the spirit. But it won't come to him in the towns and cities. There's such a mort of things for him to think about and do, and all the other minds about working on him, so that his thoughts are never quiet from morn to night running hither and yon like a great nest of ants. It's what cities are, great nests of ants, always busy shifting

crumbs of earth from one place to another."

Arthur Howe became aware that the magic key he had sought had been put into his hand, but the door that it would unlock led into neither laboratory nor library but into an illimitable void. He knew, at that moment, with a great certainty that his life and work as a scientist was finished. He had gone as far as any man could go in his research for the scientific explanation of being, and had come, as all science must come sooner or later, to the limitation that confines every material account of the universe. For mind can deal only with manifestations, phenomena, not with the spirit, the noumenon, since that is of a different order.

"Where did you learn all this?" he asked.

"Not from books," was the reply. "There's naught but dead knowledge to be found in books. What I've learnt, little enough it is, has come from feeling the nature of things, by living with 'em. You can't do that in the towns. There is too much rush and hurry. If you want to feel the nature of things you must keep your mind still."

It was all true. Arthur Howe knew that it was all true.

"What are you? A shepherd?" he asked.

"Aye! I came up to-night to help a ewe, but the cold killed her. Mid-February's too early, but them in the cities must have their meat out o' season, it seems. I've got the lamb under my coat. She's warm. I can feel her heart against me. We'll raise her by hand."

THÉOPHILUS

It is with the advent of the divine Dynasties that the first civilizations were started. And while, in some regions of the Earth, a portion of mankind preferred leading a nomadic and patriarchal life, and in others savage man was hardly learning to build a fire and to protect himself against the Elements, his brothers—more favoured than he by their *Karma*, and helped by the divine intelligence which informed them—built cities, and cultivated arts and sciences. Nevertheless, and civilization notwithstanding, while their pastoral brethren enjoyed wondrous powers as their birthright, they, the builders, could now obtain theirs only gradually; even these being generally used for power over physical nature and selfish and unholy purposes. Civilization has ever developed the physical and the intellectual at the cost of the psychic and spiritual. The command and the guidance over his own psychic nature, which foolish men now associate with the supernatural, were with early Humanity innate and congenital, and came to man as naturally as walking and thinking.

—H. P. BLAVATSKY: *The Secret Doctrine* Vol. II, pp. 318-19

NEW BOOKS AND OLD

ALBERT SCHWEITZER ON INDIAN THOUGHT

[Lillian M. Russell worked with Dr. Schweitzer about whom she wrote in our issue of June 1932. Last autumn she acted as interpreter of his Hibbert Lectures (London and Oxford) and Gifford Lectures (Edinburgh). In the next autumn she is herself bringing out a book entitled "General Rigby, Zanzibar and the Slave-Trade". She is the only daughter of Major-General C. P. Rigby who passed much of his life, from 1836 to 1866, in India and was British Agent and Consul at Zanzibar 1858-1861.

Below she sketches the contents of a new volume by the celebrated Alsatian, warning us that "it is not intended as a review. I should not like to prejudice the chances of the book, when the translation appears, by receiving a review from some learned Indian scholar." That task will certainly have to be taken up in the interests of knowledge and in justice to Indian thought. The personality of Albert Schweitzer has a romantic attraction. A doctor of theology, a doctor of philosophy, and a doctor of medicine, well-known in the world of music he is famous also as a philanthropist and a servant of his fellow-men. To criticise his views of Indian ideas and thinkers from this article would not be fair; but it arouses sufficient curiosity, and attention of Indian philosophers is invited to the volume.—EDS.]

It will be glad news to many students in both East and West that Dr. Albert Schweitzer's latest book, recently published in Germany, is entitled "*Die Weltanschauung der Indischen Denker*" (The World-view of the Indian Thinkers). Those who have followed his work will have noticed that he has for years been deeply interested in Indian Philosophy and not a little influenced by it. As it is common knowledge that Dr. Schweitzer devotes what little leisure remains from activity on behalf of his African jungle Hospital to the completion of his Philosophy of Civilisation, there may be some surprise that he has found time to write a book on the above subject. The simple explanation is that in the course of his studies for Volume III of the Philosophy he accumulated a vast mass of Indian material—

the matrix of the turquoise which is to form a chapter of his *magnum opus*—and believed it would be useful to many who feel somewhat lost among the weighty tomes of the original scholars. He is eager to make the thought of India better known to Europeans, and this handy volume both profound and suggestive should serve his purpose well.

He traces Indian thought from its earliest beginnings, pointing out how its world-view (*Weltanschauung*) has been unswervingly based on mysticism—mysticism which is faith in the ideal of union of the human being with the Universal Spirit. This loyalty to its ideal is the strength of Indian thought. But along with its strength is also a weakness. The Brahmins introduced the principle of negation, the denial of the value of life in itself; and this

principle has embarrassed and hampered the development of Indian thought. It is this principle too that makes it so hard for Western thinkers to assimilate and sympathise with Indian Thought. Indians are wrong, says the author when they criticise Europeans for their lack of inwardness, spirituality and mysticism. They ignore the great schools of mysticism in the West, and are not aware that mysticism failed to make headway in Europe because men could not reconcile it with the reality of life in the world. What is wanted now is that Western and Eastern thinkers, humbly realising how much they have to learn from each other, should get together in spirit and continue their search for Truth on new lines. This book should help Eastern students to an understanding of European thinkers no less than those in the West, for whom it is primarily written, to an appreciation of the thinkers of the East.

The outlook of negation is so unnatural that it has been impossible to hold it consistently. Even the Brahmins have been forced to admit the necessity for a certain degree of activity. Indians are sometimes puzzled that Western peoples whom they criticise as lacking in contact with the Divine are compared with themselves so much greater in social achievements, in all they do for the poor and suffering. It is their own world-view that is at fault. If 'life is not a good and valuable thing which it is our religious duty to preserve and promote

and further by every means in our power, then there is no reason why men and women should give themselves to the service of their fellows. If negation were consistently followed, not a finger would be lifted to alleviate the suffering caused by famine, plague or earthquake. Dr. Schweitzer traces gradual concessions to the reality of the world and life in Indian thought, until in the views of Rabindranath Tagore the change is complete, resulting in an optimistic, altogether affirmative world-view.

Europe is engrossed in activity of all kinds; until we quite forget the main purpose of life, spiritual union with the Divine. We have much to learn from the principle of negation; and have no actual right to our easy optimism before considering this, to us, alien world-view. From the East we can learn the oneness of life and that all its forms are deserving of reverence.

In the Vedic hymns we see that men took a simple delight in life itself and at first it was only Yogis and Brahmins who thought of renouncing it. In practice, though not in theory, activity was always valued in popular Hinduism. The idea of active love was very strong indeed, in the Kural for instance. Now, reinforced by ethics, the idea of activity is winning the day and necessarily defeating the Brahmanic ideal of negation.

In his chapter (III) on the Upanishads Dr. Schweitzer points out that the Brahmanic mysticism of union and identity with the Infinite, is of quite a different nature

from European mysticism. "In the latter man gives himself up to the Infinite in humble devotion and in the Infinite is absorbed; in Brahmanic mysticism he realises with pride that in his own being he carries Infinite Being within himself."

"Compared with the Brahmanic super-man, Nietzsche's is a miserable creature. The Brahmanic super-man is exalted over the whole universe, Nietzsche's merely over human society."

The Brahmin regard for truth is magnificent. As a caste of priests, with quite exceptional nobility they actually follow the truth even when it endangers their own privileges and interests. But their mysticism has nothing to do with ethics and the Being to whom they are united in a state of ecstasy has no ethical qualities. They frankly say, "The immortal man overcomes both the thoughts 'I did evil' and 'I did good.' Good and bad, done or not done, cause him no pain." (For those who remain in ordinary life the customary ideas of good and evil of course remain valid.) It is because of its ethical concept that the doctrine of Reincarnation comes to replace the Brahmanic doctrine that all souls are automatically reabsorbed into the Universal Soul.

The chapters which follow are concerned with the salient features of the Sāṃkhya doctrine, Jainism and Buddhism. Of the first the author says, "The Sāṃkhya doctrine is a wonderful achievement. Rarely in human thought

has a theoretical problem been so clearly recognised; rarely has a solution been undertaken and achieved with such clear judgment." By Jainism the idea of being exalted above the world is replaced by that of keeping unspotted by the world—"an event full of significance for the thought of India!" It is to this idea and to the principle of non-activity demanded by negation that the Ahimsā commandment owes its origin, not to the idea of compassion, as is so often assumed. The Brahmins must have adopted Ahimsā from the Jains, for it is incredible that the idea of not killing should have originated with them whose calling as priests required the slaughter of the sacrificial victims. Although Ahimsā did not originate in compassion, it fostered it and prepared the way for further advance, so that "the laying down of the commandment not to kill and not to harm is one of the greatest events in the spiritual history of mankind." The Jains seem to have been the first to realize that ethics know no bounds. It is due to them that Ahimsā has been preserved throughout so many centuries. It has often been taken for granted that the Buddha originated this commandment, but He only adopted it, and did not observe it so strictly as the Jains, for He did not altogether prohibit the eating of meat. What He did originate however was an ethic of compassion, limited unfortunately by the principle of non-activity. The Buddhist has to avoid the per-

* *Brahad Āraṇyaka Upanishad*, IV. 4.

formance of pitiless actions, but he is not bidden to give active, sympathetic help either to man or beast. To the Buddha all life is suffering, and the only way to relieve it is by thinking—by renouncing the will to live. Thus the Buddha's "is rather a compassion of the understanding than the direct sympathy of the heart which carries within it the impulse to help." He wanted to change spiritual conditions in the world: with material things he was little concerned. By "right action" He meant only the avoidance of evil. And nearly all His teaching was addressed only to monks—to people who had renounced the world. In practice He must have often followed the dictates of his own warm heart, as when he found a monk ill with dysentery lying in his filth and with his own hands washed him and changed his bed. But that the Buddha, the preacher of compassion, in theory makes man occupied with his own redemption only, not with that of all living creatures, is a weakness of his teaching. In the later Mahāyāna-Buddhism, by a logical development, this becomes incomprehensible and so the teaching follows that the man who gains his freedom from reincarnation shall voluntarily renounce Nirvana and return to earth to strive for the deliverance of every creature that shares the unhappy gift of life. Yet, noble as it is, Mahāyāna-Buddhism is still entangled in negation and cannot become fully effective.

After an excursion to China,

Tibet and Japan, Dr. Schweitzer devotes the greater part of his tenth chapter to the 9th Century commentator, Saṃkara. The doctrine of Maya, rejected by the Brahmasutras, Saṃkara recognises as a logical conclusion of the theory of Brahman; but the world of the senses nevertheless has for him practical reality and value. Thus he becomes the great representative of the doctrine of twofold truth. He teaches the highest esoteric truth of union and identity with the Universal Brahman, and the lower, exoteric truth of the doctrine of reincarnation and a Brahman-divinity. By the higher truth the reality of the sensuous world is denied, by the lower it is assumed. But Saṃkara still holds that redemption from reincarnation depends on knowledge and faith alone, not on ethical conduct, whose only result is to procure a better reincarnation.

In the *Bhagavad-Gītā* Hinduism faces the problem not only of whether action is justifiable, but even whether at times non-ethical action is admissible. Dr. Schweitzer considers that this famous book has been very much idealised by Europeans who have been so impressed by its beauty that they have failed to note its shortcomings in the matter of ethical teaching. Love of Deity is for it an end in itself and it does not make that love express itself in action and service. Deity—who is beyond all good and evil—requires it; man must consent to engage in non-ethical activity. This is the penalty the *Bhagavad-Gītā* has to pay for

adhering to the world-view' of negation !

The veneration accorded to Rāma from the Middle Ages onward is of great significance in the development of Indian thought, for Rāma, the deified hero, is an ethical god. Rāmānanda in the 15th Century teaches a devotion to him which finds expression in loving-kindness even to the poorest and most despised of mankind.

In the nineteenth century the trend of Indian thought towards the ethical gains impetus in many distinguished personalities from Rām Mohan Rai onward, who though great in the field of religion and ethics, are not outstanding thinkers, for they fail in the problem of reconciliation between life-affirmation and life-denying mysticism. They are prisoners of tradition and dare not admit advancement beyond the sacred Upanishads.

Dr. Schweitzer notes that in this neo-Indian thought the problem of winning redemption from reincarnation has quite fallen into the background, so that the fear of transmigration no longer plays a part. Union with Brahman is sought for its own sake, and thus Indian mysticism regains its spontaneity and freedom.

That Rabindranāth Tagore in the name of ethics decides for life-affirmation is a great achievement. But that he tries to read his own views into the Upanishads is a weakness. His mode of thought bears resemblance to that of

eighteenth century rationalists in that He believes that only beauty, harmony and order rule and that all unhappiness will be resolved into happiness, all disharmony into harmony. That we do not understand the universe and can never hope to understand it is far from his thought.

Both Western and Eastern philosophies are going through a period of change. The former has had to recognise that its foundations built on imagined knowledge are illusory and insecure. It needs to find a new basis for its ethical world and life-affirmation in realism. For the latter the problem is to renounce negation and adjust itself to the opposite principle. It will have to give up fantasy and poetry and make itself independent of tradition, in other words abandon all that is foreign to the spirit of reality. "The pathway from imperfect to perfect recognised 'Truth leads through the valley of reality. European thought has already descended into this valley. Indian thought is still on the hill on this side of it. If it wishes to climb to the hill beyond, it must first go down into the valley."

"So Western and Indian thought together face the task of finding for the mysticism of ethical world and life-affirmation foundation based on reality."

The translation of this work, will be eagerly awaited in India as in England.

LILIAN M. RUSSELL

DREAMS AND FOLKLORE

In her introductory chapter, the author says that the dreams in Old Norse literature are the only dreams of the heathen Teutonic people on record, and they include a proportion of Christian dreams. Very industriously, with detailed references to original sources, and translations of actual dreams recorded, Miss Kelchner has examined and tried to classify the themes of the old Norse dreams and to relate them with their affinities in folklore.

Obviously the material here surveyed has indirectly a universal interest: a concentrated study like this offers a kind of model of how dream material becomes a part of literature, and in its symbolism outreaches the local and temporary environment of the dreamers.

I imagine, however, that the author and the majority of her readers would attach primary importance to the light shed upon the early Teutonic people as it passed from a heathen poetic tradition to the new and disturbing Christian faith, which, as we know, was often but a veneer of conscious belief covering ancient and deeply ingrained ideas and superstitions.

As a contribution to the study of early Teutonic civilisation, Miss Kelchner has made her monograph a treasury of literary references and suggestive facts, though the difficulty of reading so closely packed a treatise is unfortunately increased by her awkward and cliché-ridden style in English. It seems a pity, too, that after the first two chapters she abandoned the English spelling of Norse names, thus making her text very difficult for any but an Icelandic scholar.

Her examination of the dreams culled from the Eddas, the prose Saga and Skaldic poetry and their relation with folklore is packed with interest both psychological and historical. You see how the restless and warlike Scandinavians in their dreams were moved usually by hopes and fears of adversity and prosperity, and how the desirable gifts varied from success over an enemy (especially during adversity) to success as a bard (generally in a prosperous time). Her chapters on "Symbolic Images in Dreams" are especially important in their general application, and as we survey with Miss Kelchner the Norse dreams of Fethes, Guardian, Spirits, Trolls and Gods, it is not possible to avoid a little mind-wandering, to find comparisons as far afield as in Mahomedan and Greek oneirocriticism, though she never goes further abroad than Irish and Scottish legends.

Yes, to me the greatest interest of the dream material here displayed is its ordinariness, its similarity with dreams of other peoples separated widely in time and space from the early Scandinavians. It is true, as the author recognises, that the dream soon becomes a literary convention, but the reality of experience persists usually and is unmistakable long afterwards. In concluding a somewhat sparse account of a well packed study, let me quote one of Miss Kelchner's most interesting generalisations:

Although the prophetic dream constitutes an effective and convenient means of welding together literary material, it is, in view of its emphasis on fate and its intense interest in the things of this world, a typical expression of heathenism; in the same way, the folklore dream, with its insistence on the life beyond the grave, is, as has been mentioned before, a characteristic product of the Christian ideal.

R. L. MEGROZ

* *Dreams in Old Norse Literature and Their Affinities in Folklore* with an Appendix containing the Icelandic Texts and Translations. By GEORGIA DUNHAM KELCHNER (Cambridge University Press, London. 10s. 6d.)

ON SAIVAISM

There appears to be an unfortunate confusion of purpose about this book : apologetics have got the better of definition. Promising to set out the characteristics of Śaivism, as distinguished from what may be called orthodox Hinduism, the author has made his task the occasion to cover a very much wider field, and in his exposition of the doctrinal and ethical purpose of a particular sect, has incorporated a general study, not only of comparative religions, but of religion itself : its decline and its hopes of resuscitation. This is the more unfortunate in that "The philosophic part of Śaivism has found very little place in this book, as the purpose of this work is to present only that side of Śaivism which has a direct bearing on daily life." Since Mr. Shivapadasundaram believes : "proselytizing must cease. The public must regard it as a crime against humanity and the State and society must penalise it," —the purpose of his work would appear to have been much better served by an historical and philosophic statement of the distinctive characteristics of Śaivism, as contrasted with other faiths, rather than by the somewhat perfervid and platitudinous advocacy of doctrinal religion in general.

Superficial glancings at the superficial absurdities of other forms of religious belief are a poor substitute for reasoned exposition either of the philosophic superiority of any particular belief, or of an historical account of how a particular sect came into being, and by what distinctive principles it maintains adherence. That English student, avid for the facts, meets with far too many doubtful generalizations of ethical persuasion such as :—

Knowledge useful only to a few cannot be good enough for a large number.

As even the most saintly man has the urge to go higher, there is no limit at which the urge

stops. The objective of the urge is therefore perfection. We may therefore define religion as the inward power which urges all living beings to strive to reach higher and higher stages, the highest being perfection.

But mere doctrines are not of much consequence to the evolution of the soul, and the view that all religions are different paths to the ultimate goal is as untenable as the belief of the bigot that his religion alone can take a soul to God, since it is the capacity of the soul that counts and not the guidance given by books.

Philosophically Mr. Shivapadasundaram stands in a very elementary class. He is capable of making the most doubtful statements with the conclusive air which only a novice can compass. Nowhere is this more clearly and disastrously shown than in the chapter entitled "God". Here we are presented with those dogmatic statements upon the objective nature of God that have always been provocative of Atheism in the enquiring mind. This, surely, must be intolerable to the people of a country which, more than any other, has always recognised the subjective nature of the apprehension of God, and by making its evocation of the unspeakable name a negation has acknowledged the insurmountable limitation of the Finite in any attempt to give definition to the Infinite.

The Nature of God is at once the first enquiry of the childish mind and the last apprehension of the conscious soul. Between them lies a hinterland of totally false reasoning, wherein the subject of consciousness is divorced from consciousness and made the object of pure intelligence. And there, in truth, God cannot be known. As the New Testament teaches : "The world by wisdom knew not God." Nothing is more provocative of theological doubt than the attempt to give objective finality to the conception of God. The first utterance of dogma is a challenge to common sense. And it is easy to see why this must be so ;

The Saiva School of Hinduism. By S. SHIVAPADASUNDARAM, B. A. With a Preface by J. S. Mackenzie, Litt. D., LL. D. (George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., London. 6s.)

for that which is all-inclusive cannot be subsumed by partiality, and no intellectual statement can be made which is free from the partiality of the finite mind. "It is impossible to think of the heavenly without some image of the earthly." Consciousness proceeds from the subjective, to the objective, and can proceed in no other way. That is why the conscious mind necessarily rejects dogma; for dogma inverts the order: it presents us with the postulate of God and in so doing bars the passage of the soul to its own path of apprehension. "A list of God's attributes" is the vainest of all catalogues. In vain does Mr. Shivapada-sundaram prove that the performance of miracles would be "attributing to God the human frailty of favouritism"; for what is any love but the bestowal of favour? In vain does he say of God; "Neither has He likes and dislikes";

for such a conception nullifies itself, since, humanly speaking, that which is without preference is incapable of distinguishing good from evil, the living from the dead, an ordered from a chaotic universe. Even to say: "It is just as immaterial to Him whether we worship Him or despise Him" is to assert that God is wanting in a quality of sensitivity common to every human being.

All such statements only go to show the absurdity of attempting to give objective finality to the Infinite. It is against the whole attempt—in contradistinction to the whole tendency—that theosophical philosophy stands opposed. And it matters not whether dogma proceeds from East or West—against its puerile finalities we must set our faces, knowing that religion begins in fidelity to experience and in no intellectual postulate whatsoever.

MAX PLOWMAN

KANT AND SANKAR

This book is a compendious abridgement of Professor Norman Smith's translation of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* which was in itself an achievement of the first magnitude. Here I propose to examine in some detail a few of its ideas in the light of Indian philosophic method and thought. Kant's *Critique* represents a reaction as much against the empirical school of thought as against the ultra rationalist school in Western philosophy, laying thus the foundations of the Western Idealistic School in Epistemology. The salient ideas of the critique briefly stated, are as follows:—

(I) Kant believes that the *whole* of knowledge does not arise out of experience, though a part of it arises out of it. The part that arises out of experience is merely the raw material which can be transformed into know-

ledge. He posits two *a priori* forms, Space and Time, as the necessary pre-conditions of perception. He further tells us that these two forms are indispensable and envelop every act of perception. Perceptions are impossible for Kant without these *a priori* forms.

(II) The perceptions of the senses within the Space-Time framework are worked upon by the understanding with the aid of a dozen indispensable *a priori* categories. These categories are Unity, Totality, Plurality, etc. They are the patterns of all thought and they are synthesised into a unity, whence knowledge results.

(III) Kant divides reality into two parts, first the Noumenon, about which we cannot predicate anything, for human reason has no applicability in that realm. Secondly, the phenomenal realm. Human knowledge is confined only to this part. The categories

of understanding and the forms of perception work only in this realm. So, according to Kant, we can only know the thing as it appears, and not the thing in itself.

(IV) Finally Kant states that though Pure Reason cannot prove the existence of God, the Soul and Immortality, we have to take them as the moral imperatives dictated by our Practical Reason. The ontological, the causal and the design arguments cannot prove the existence of God. God is a moral postulate and an ideal to be used.

Let us examine these ideas in the light of Indian philosophy, with a view to finding out in what respects Kant's epistemology has been anticipated and in what respects improved upon definitely by Sankara. Primarily to Sankara, the object of knowledge is Brahman. He posited Brahman and asserted that it was the only reality. Kant on the other hand abruptly stops with the Noumenon and fails to tell us what its purpose is. He posits the Noumenal realm to make the phenomenal world intelligible. Kant explains the relation of the phenomenal to the Noumenal world in terms of cause and effect. It is a piece of self-contradiction to introduce the category of causation for explaining the Noumenal where he himself says that it is inapplicable. Sankara's Brahman is not a mere ideal to be used like the God of Kant, but the ultimate reality to be experienced, the ground and the goal of existence. Brahman is not a mere regulative concept arising as a result of the demand of morality, but an object of spiritual experience whose existence is taken for granted on the authority of the *Srutis*. Sankara explains the world of phenomena as a continuous stream of illusions. Sankara with his inimitable, scientific and logical frame of mind suspended his judgment about the phenomenal world and its relation to the Noumenal. He said it is indescribable (*Anirvach-*

niya). He was a sceptic in the sense that the human intellect cannot grasp the nature of the ultimate reality. Sankara as well as Kant are both realists in their theories of knowledge in the phenomenal realm. Sankara also posits the raw material of knowledge and tells us that the categories bring knowledge to the empirical self.

Sankara destroys the eternal riddle of epistemology, namely: If the known object is different from the knower, how does the knower come to know it? If mind is mind and matter is matter, how does mind come to know matter?—by reducing the content of all the three factors of knowledge, the knower, the known, and the instrument of knowledge to one primordial mindstuff. Sankara's solution of this riddle is definitely superior both in its framework and in its results. He does not fail to grapple with the problem, nor does his solution involve the fallacy of *petitio principii* as some ill-instructed Western critics are apt to think. Sankara's epistemology when compared with Kant's is more coherent and indisputably better articulated.

The chief defect of Kant's epistemological structure is the high place given to reason. His Reason, however, is another name for intuition. He is an intuitionist. It must be said to his credit that he exploded the sensationist psychology of his day and established an elaborate theory of knowledge. He examined the telescope before he turned it upon the stars. In the words of Prof. Ward, Kant tried to make human reason either Caesar or nothing at all and thus spoiled a case for a constitutional monarchy. The moral law within and the starry heavens above about which Kant so often spoke are akin to the perceptions of our own Upanishadic seers. The imperfections of his epistemology do not however detract from his transcendent eminence in philosophy. Assuredly his place is among the great thinkers of the world.

Taqdir and Predestination. By MAULANA MUHAMMAD ALI (Ahmadiyya Anjuman Isha'at-i-Islam, Lahore).

From the orthodox and theological point of view this is an interesting and a learned dissertation on fate and free will; but is full of barren discussions and unethical conclusions—a typical illustration of warped theological reasoning. The thread of argument is cut into a thousand shreds which have been woven with dexterous ingenuity into a multicoloured pattern, the effect of which is indeed bizarre. Our Maulana is trying to prove that according to Islamic teachings man is responsible for his acts and deeds—as indeed he is—but interprets quotations from the *Quran* and *Āhadith* in such a manner that as a consequence man can get away scot free from all responsibility.

Taqdir . . . is the universal law of God operating in the case of man as in the rest of nature. (p. 3). He has no doubt created man; he has also created the circumstances under which he lives and acts; but still He has endowed man with a discrimination to choose how to act, which he can exercise under certain limitations . . . (p. 6). All men are created sinless, all men are created pure . . . (p. 18). " . . . notwithstanding all the limitations he is free to exercise his will . . . (p. 7). "Death or distress is due to circumstances over which man has no control . . ." (p. 11). Every child is born a Muslim and if he is initiated into a wrong religion, it is not God's action, but the action of his parents or his own action (p. 23).

What a mosaic of self-contradictory statements! Quotations could be multiplied to show the fallacious reasoning. Every child is said to be "created sinless . . . pure . . . with the right impress" (p. 23). Some children show signs of intelligence, even genius, from birth, while others are born congenital idiots. Who is responsible for such terrible inequalities from birth? What have these pure and sinless souls done to merit such cruel differences if they have come into human bodies for the first time? Again, where did man incur this destiny if he is born pure and sinless? This theological confusion of thought arises from a wholly

erroneous concept of Deity, which is conceived as an extracosmic Power or "Being," which "creates" the universe. Our author calls God the "Creator" of the universe and an "Infinite Being" and endows "Him" with anthropomorphic attributes of "mercy" and "displeasure". How can a "Being"—a conditioned existence—be "Infinite"? In the *Quran* itself *Allah* is described as Light. Light has ever been the symbol of manifested Deity—the one principle of Life or eternal motion. Man, like all else, is an expression of this one principle of Life. In man life has attained self-consciousness, hence man has the power to choose. His will *per se* is absolutely free. If at times he finds it difficult to express his will, it is due to Karma or Taqdir, which he himself has made in the past by the wrong use of his free will. To correctly understand the doctrine of Taqdir the aid of mystic philosophy and not verbose theology is needed. Taqdir is the same as Karma, and like the Hindu doctrine is very much misunderstood.

Death or distress is due to circumstances over which man has no control. . . . (p. 11)

This is the most unethical teaching. If man were to believe that he had no responsibility for and no control over the suffering that comes to him it will not only make him bitter against the supposed dispenser of pain and pleasure but demoralize his whole life. It will tempt him to beg and supplicate for favours that none can give. There are "no privileges or special gifts in man, save those won by his own Ego through personal effort and merit throughout a long series of reincarnations"—successive human lives on earth. Similarly "there is not an accident in our lives, not a misshapen day, or a misfortune, that could not be traced back to our own doings in this or in another life".

M. A. BARI KHAN

The Celestial Hierarchies of Dionysius the Areopagite Trans. by Editors of The Shrine of Wisdom, (London.)

Done into English from the original Greek by the Editors of the "Shrine of Wisdom" the Manual No. 15 entitled "Celestial Hierarchies", attempts to give an account of the three Triads of Celestial Intelligences which constitute as it were the spiritual connecting links between the Almighty Lord and aspiring souls. The Celestial Hierarchies are the agents of the Almighty Lord whose work they are appointed and enjoined to carry out.

While according to Dionysius the orders of the celestial beings are innumerable for us,—ten thousand times ten thousand, multiplying and repeating the very highest numbers we have, (p. 47)—the Hindu account of angels (Devatas) is restricted to thirty-three crores (Trayastrisatkti). All theistic systems are obliged to admit the existence of a veritable hierarchy of angels to whom is entrusted the task of the governance of the cosmos for all outward appearance as a matter of fact, however much the Immanent Lord be the dynamic energiser of all. Madhva in his *Anuvakyahana* has sketched a hierarchy of Gods commencing from Pushkara who stands at the bottom-most rung of the ladder and rising to Brahma or Mukhya-Prana who stands at the topmost rung thereof. Mahalakshmi and the Supreme Lord Narayana are *not* included in the hierarchy as they transcend and control it. The *Taittiriya-Upanishad* makes mention of a hierarchy of gods from a different standpoint. The hierarchy is reproduced in replica in our own nervous mechanism. The microcosm is just a recapitulation of macrocosm as ontogeny is a recapitulation of phylogeny. The Tattvas are so to speak the raw material of the nervous mechanism. Each Tattva has a presiding or controlling deity (Abhimani-Devata). There is the finite self. There is also the Immanent Lord (Dvasuparna-sayujasakhayau).

The strictest Vedantic quest has nothing to do with the number and the mysteries of celestial hierarchies. The Lord, in all theistic systems is to be worshipped as the Creator of the Cosmos and as the Immanent dynamic Energiser of everything in the cosmos from the meanest to the most magnificent (Tena-vina-trinamapi-na-chalati). Without His Energising not even a blade of grass will move. Devotion to this or that God who presides over wealth, or learning, or power etc. indicates a fall from the exalted Vedantic Ideal. Devotion should be directed only to the Supremest Reality and in that devotional worship the fact should not be lost sight of that He is the only Independent Power (Svatantra), and that all else is dependent on Him for very existence (Para tantra). Within the Universe of discourse determined by theological systems, hierarchies of angels may be believed to have been entrusted with this or that task, but, when a transition is effected from theology into the province of philosophy and philosophic discipline proper preoccupation with hierarchies of angels may even inhibit higher types of Yogic concentration and devotion.

An aspirant is not showing any lack or want of respect or devotion to the members of the celestial hierarchy. Life is short. There is only a little way to fly. The bird is already on the wing in the picturesque phraseology of Omar Khayyam. There is no need for him to concentrate his attention on the hierarchy in question. On the contrary all available spiritual energy should be directed to securing the Grace of the Supreme Lord which alone is the means of freedom from the ills of existence. The celestial hierarchy of Dionysius based on the New and Old Testament texts and the Hindu hierarchy (Devata-taratamya krama) grounded on Upanishadic and Puranic, and Smriti texts converge in the direction of the central purpose of indicating the Glory and Majesty of the Supreme Lord of the Universe.

R. NAGA RAJA SARMA

Matter, Myth and Spirit. By DOROTHEA CHAPLIN. (Simpkin, Marshall, Ltd., London. 8s. 6d.)

Evidence has been accumulating in recent years of the spread of primitive Hindu Culture to various parts of the earth; and the book under review records the cultural affinities between Sanskritic India, Keltic Britain and Central America. The title which may be rendered as *Prakriti, Purusha* and the *Māyā* between, may seem rather ambitious; but the contents are seen to deal in general with these aspects in culture, so far as the scope of the study is concerned. Though the subject matter presented is more a series of notes than a continuous and constructive account, these studies contain a bewildering variety of material, the wonder-weaving legends of pre-history, archaeology, geography, literature, medicine, astronomy, folklore, music and the arts. They show also an intuitive and intellectual sympathy which is highly essential for such a comparative study.

Symbols and conventional signs, natural and man-made have been in use in all parts of the world, such as trees and plants, animals, reptiles, pillar-stones and sacred waters, which properly handled, can be roped in as an aid to archaeological finds. A comparative study has enabled the writer to deal with some universal beliefs and practices such as the Fire Cult, the worship of the Cow, the Cult of Fertility, the Deluge, the Symbol of the Serpent, Worship of Ancestors etc. So far as the British Isles are concerned, these hold "another history of 2000 years' duration from the end of the Stone Age to the first Roman invasion." (p. 16) "Great Britain (*Sveta-Dvīpa*) appears to have been a meeting ground for Latin saints from an easterly direction and deified heroes from the West" (p. 138).

The book brings out the racial and cultural affinities of the Kelts, Gauls and Acts whose culture must have migrated from the Westerly direction through the land of the Mayas,

Mixtecs, Toltecs, and Anztecs, which served as a "bridge".

Even if these people were not Hindu Indians, there seems to be no lack of evidence that they drew their inspiration from *Bhārata-Varsha* (p. 111).

India was the cradle of this culture which diffused from Meru on the chain Sumeru, a theory—I may be permitted to state—expressed years ago in my *Racial Synthesis in Hindu Culture*.

Many Hindu statements have been ridiculed in the past, which have now become established facts. (p. 74).

The sun of human knowledge rose in the East, which has always been the guide, philosopher and friend of the West. (p. 101).

A study of chapters XIII and XVIII, in special, will give a fairly good idea of the conclusions reached in the book.

This thought-provoking book (and provoking a smile from those that have their faith pinned firmly on "accepted" views) is mainly based on a co-ordinated study of names. These may serve well to bring out the relationship of ancient cultures, though much depends on the epoch-levels, historic or pre-historic that are represented by them. The very large number of Indian names met with in the British Isles and in Central America cannot, however, be disposed of as chance coincidences. To wit, Canada, Niagara, Narada, Pipil, Rama, Macara, Nila, Ali, Ohio, Maya, Uruguas, Indu, Eiri, Dagda, Anu, Angus, Bo, Derga, Tain, Jwawl, Tara, Apoala, Aztec, Nevada, Fal, Shanny. Cali, Vracki, Malvern, Rudry, Avon and Garu, besides a host of features in culture equally interesting.

The work is not free from the defect of not knowing things first-hand, though the writer has done her best to draw her information from reliable sources. As examples may be cited the title of the Frontispiece, the origins of Shamanism, of Sarasvati and Lakshmi of Kārtikeya and Ganeśa (pp. 22, 34, 37, 44). Though the conclusions of the author may not find general acceptance and may even appear

fantastic to some, they surely serve to whet the appetite of those who seek to know the meaning of the immortal symbols which are found to be of

universal application; and her modest aim expressed in the Foreword must be deemed satisfied by the contents of this little volume.

S. V. VISWANATHA

Hypnotism in the Treatment of Disease: Its Scope—A Plea for Research. By B. LAYTON LLOYD, M. B., D. P. H. (John Bale, Sons and Danielsson Ltd., London. 3s. 6d.).

The author presents here some of the results of his experience as a practitioner in hypnotism, together with suggested explanations and various arguments to overcome the fears of the timid. He feels that the power of hypnotism to heal the sick and help the weak should be more widely known and used. The pity is that his conclusions about the beneficial character of hypnotism are based on insufficient data, and are therefore at fault.

He rejects the idea of "animal" magnetism, since he thinks if it exists it should affect a magnetic compass, but he only shows thereby an arbitrarily limited conception. Indeed medical science in general ignores the very existence of the exact science of the therapeutic magic, of which magnetism and mesmerism, are important branches; hypnotism is but a new substitute for old terms. It is but natural that those who work under the fallacy that the field has never been explored before should, in their ignorance, interfere with the most potent forces of nature, which heal as well as kill.

Dr. Lloyd does write that "It is misleading to say that a man has a subconscious mind. I regard the mind as the man or the soul, and that he possesses a physical body". This postulate of an inner intelligent entity is a good step from the materialistic outlook, yet it leaves out of account the real man beyond even this lower mind. Half-truths can be dangerous.

For the fact of the existence of this innermost controller, however latent its power may seem, renders any outside control not only unnecessary but positively harmful. Hypnotism in place of being a blessing may prove rather a curse that masks its real nature by giving a temporary apparent relief.

The book fortunately does warn against allowing oneself to be put to sleep by any one, especially for amusement, and states that hypnotism should only be performed by a fully qualified doctor whom one can trust. Yet even fully qualified doctors are only experimentalists in this subject and an empiric basis is not safe ground for making such decisive statements as "Going into the hypnotic sleep does nothing whatever to the patient." "The hypnotist's power over the patient" (with one exception) "ceases as soon as he wakes." "With hypnotism we get precisely the effect we desire and no other effects." These statements are all incorrect, though space will not permit of detailed criticisms and the responsibility for spreading them is grave. Those who really desire to learn facts are recommended to study *Raja Yoga or Occultism* by H. P. Blavatsky (pp. 123-132).

This is said in no carping spirit, for one can value the manifest desire to help men. Yet hell is paved with good intentions and it is only wise to ask that those who wish to work with the potent dynamics of human thought and will should train themselves to qualify as soul doctors before they start to practice.

W. E. W.

Village Songs of Western India: Translations from Tukaram. By JOHN S. HOYLAND. (Allenson and Co., Ltd., London. Paper 1s.; Cloth 1s. 6d.)

When a child is learning to write,
Pebbles are placed to guide him:

But when he knoweth the letters' shapes,
What need of pebbles?

And I, my friends,
I know, I know.

Pebbles are no more pebbles when they signify the shapes of letters; they are viewed in a new universe of reference. Great mystics, like Tukaram of Western India, have always used their words as pebbles signifying and symbolizing the letters of spiritual experiences; but without the proper key, *i. e.*, responsive intuition, the spiritual import of their words cannot be perceived.

The translator is utterly unable to see beyond the pebbles. But his choice of verses for translation is eminently tactical. He has created a Biblical atmosphere out of what he calls translations from Tukaram; in this his success has been remarkable:—

I am created of sin,
All sin am I. (p. 16)
My God hath sent me unto you,
I bear His brand upon my forehead,
His word I bear, and His authority,
To sound aloud His will that all men come, and live. (p. 32)
My God is like a father with his child: (p. 49)
Within our hearts Thy face is seen...
Thy likeness is reflected. (p. 68)

These lines should unmistakably point out the nature of Mr. Hoyland's approach to his subject. He has carefully read about five thousand verses of Tukaram only to pick and choose such lines as would contain Biblical images and ideas. Of course he has not hesitated to read *his* own meanings into the original verses and this should be obvious, even to those not knowing Tukaram's original Marathi tongue, from the completely Biblical tone of his renditions. Unless Tukaram had been an actual missionary we could not have expected him to echo the Bible in such faithful accents.

It is really amusing how Mr. Hoyland has refrained from translating

ing a certain kind of verses—verses which describe God as the Impersonal Principle or God as immanent in the highest aspect of man. Such verses are not too few, and admittedly Mr. Hoyland's plan of ignoring them has been skilful. May we produce a few lines in which Tukaram has denounced the popular conception of the Deity as a person or as an image?

Who will care for all those petty gods that beg food themselves when they are hungry?
Why should one care for hospitality from the maid servants of the house?

He is a fool who calls them gods.
The real god is universal and immanent: meditate on Him, says Tuka.

Verily, all of you are Immortal.
Do not own your body and then alone you can realize the truth of my statement.

Why should we fear anything at all, when all things are our own?

Believe me, says Tuka, that all of you are gods in reality,

It is only he who has become God, that can realize that others are gods

Those who have not known this are only tale-tellers
Tuka says, Experience is required here and not words.

Tukaram achieved his spiritual progress "not with the knowledge that scriptures give". He passed through the gamut of inner development. Perhaps he did pass through the stage where the illusion of a personal god is a reality, but he quickly left it behind and arrived at a new vision of the Deity as the Law which embraces in its impersonal sweep both the universe and humanity.

In knowing Thee, my God,
In one swift flash I know the whole universe. (p. 81)
Show reverence to humanity
Because of God within humanity (69)

In these lines Tukaram has clearly enunciated the impersonal unity of Man, God and the Cosmos. It must be admitted that Tukaram's mysticism is not always openly impersonal, but the quotation with which this review opens gives the reasons. The awakened intuition alone can sensitively unveil his intimate symbology.

Mr. Hoyland has evidently little interest in Tukaram's mysticism as such, and his translations therefore are a bad introduction to Tukaram. But we need not blame Mr. Hoyland for his failure in what he did not mean to do.

D. G. V.

THE LAND OF PSYCHE AND OF NOUS

Spiritism and Reincarnation—The Medium Margery and Her Husband—Christianity and the Greeks: Not the son of God, but Sonship which is the birthright of every soul—The Great Conflict of Religion, Science, Philosophy: the death of organized religions and the way out.

A competent journalist—Mr. Prevost Battersby—who has devoted his more recent years to Spiritism and connected researches, has come forward with a dogmatic affirmation that it does not matter how we came here, but only “whither we are going”.* The statement, however, demands too much of our consent, even if some of us are not wholly unwilling to suffer those “proofs palpable of immortality” which rank among the chief exhibits in the Museum of Spiritism. It is open to question whether a tolerable hypothesis on life “beyond the ken” can be proffered apart from the “whence” of our previous being. The essayist under notice implies speculatively that “man came from God,” in which case—and in view of our possible return—it is assuredly most important to throw light, if ways there be, on our immemorial source and origin. But except in one rather neglected and negligible French school of psychic thought—now almost apart from experiment—there is no audible voice on origins, anywhere in the psychic forum. Reference is intended at this point to the Allan Kardec School, which is not only very old indeed, as age counts in the Movement, but

impressed its seal upon French psychic activities and on the Spiritistic doctrine of return during the life of its founder and for at least a generation subsequently. There is quite a little literature on the subject, though it is now rare in France, and there is also an old-established Review which stands high in the psychic press.† With the best intention on our own part, it is difficult to regard the Reincarnation of French metaphysics as representing more than a collective persuasion, supported solely by trance and other communications, the evidential value of which would satisfy very few at the present day. It has to be remembered also that during his own period the forceful influence of Allan Kardec is said to have silenced and driven away from his *séances* the alleged communicating spirits who denied his favoured doctrine. On the other hand, if personal survival connotes immortality it connotes also pre-existence in the logic of the subject, while pre-existence may or may not connote the fact of Reincarnation on this earthly plane. Now it happens that Mr. Battersby’s suggestive statement—which seems to have been made almost casually, and was not followed up in his

* “*Light*,” February 21st, 1935.

† “*La Revue Spirite*,” which has been in existence for at least 70 years.

paper—was succeeded presently on the part of another well-known writer and lecturer on extra-normal subjects. Mrs. St. Clair Stobart proffered her views on pre-existence to a large assembly, taking care at the outset to distinguish her theme from that of Reincarnation, the latter being much less important than the question of the soul and its dateless origin. But as Mr. Battersby passed by this pregnant subject with the "extreme flounce" of Mrs. Browning's imagery, so is her case stultified by Mrs. Stobart, who fails to illustrate her hypothesis of Pre-existence except on the basis of Reincarnation and time-worn cases of "infant genius." Between them they seem to portray unawares the position of Spiritism, so vague upon the past of the soul, so voluble on the unseen hereafter.

It would appear an open question at the moment whether any portion of the psychic press would feel willing to welcome a further consideration of the "Margery" mediumship, with the sole exception of the official organ issued by the American S. P. R. It continues to print accounts and analyses of thumb-print experiments, observations on alleged mis-statements of hostile witnesses,* and so forth. There is also a long report on (1) an example of clairvoyance, (2) the apport of a solid from place to place, and (3) a supposed instance

of the passage of solid matter through solid matter.† It is in connection with this report, which appears over the signature of Dr. Crandon, the husband of Margery, that we recur again to the subject of this famous medium. He affirms respecting a certain *séance*, held on Nov. 2, 1932, (1) that there were present—among others apparently—Mr. W. H. Button, President of the American Society, and Miss May Walker an English lady who is a member of the English Society and has been connected for many years with active Psychical Research; (2) that in the course of this *séance* "the light was put on and all the sitters announced that they saw what appeared to be a hand"; (3) that Walter—the manifesting personality—affirmed it to be his own hand, picking up some plaster of Paris "and taking it away."‡ But on March 6, 1935, Miss Walker wrote § a disclaimer, affirming (1) that, to the best of her knowledge and belief, but in the absence of her notes on the sitting, she saw no supernatural hand and bore no such witness; (2) that no materialisation of any kind took place in her presence at any Margery *séance* and (3) that she could not have failed to remember such an event. Whether Mr. Button concurs on his own part remains to be seen; but there is little doubt that we are confronted by another of Dr. Crandon's manifest inaccuracies, which have helped materially

* "Journal" December, 1934, pp. 324-333.

† *Ibid*, February, 1935, pp. 36, 37.

‡ *Ib.*, pp. 37-51.

§ "Light", March 21st, 1935, p. 183. (see p. 5)

to discredit the cause that he is naturally so anxious to defend. Meanwhile it is just to add that Miss Walker's position with regard to the Margery mediumship remains as it was since 1927, namely, that it exhibits genuine telekinesis and that the direct voice is also supernormal.

It is certified by the President of Corpus Christi College, Oxford,* that Christianity is neither a "cancellation" of Hellenism nor a declension therefrom, but is its development and completion. The chief reason is that "God is a conclusion to the Greek," but to the Judaic-Christian He is "the main premise". From this point of view Christianity had "a survival value" and "possessed something which the world needed and which Hellenism lacked." That something was a belief in the "direct divine revelation" of a "vividly personal God," Whose nature was revealed by His Son "taking the form of man and leading a human life on earth". Now we are invited to regard this view as a middle path between two others, being (1) that of some early Christian Apologists, for whom "Christianity superseded and annulled Hellenism," but this is untenable; (2) that Christianity is a deviation from "the true line of world progress"—which lies through Greece—and that its noble and beautiful prospects are only a mirage. The *via media* is that of the Christian

Church, in the persons of the Doctors of the church, from St. Augustine onwards. We are told further that the Judaic-Christian conception of the personality and fatherhood of God "placed Religion in the centre of life" and "drove the invisible world into the foreground"; that it filled man with the sense of an ultimate reality "behind the shows of life," insisting that the things which are seen are temporal and that the unseen are eternal. Here, as it seems to us, are aspects of the Great Subject; but something has escaped, and this is the living essence. That Mystery at the heart of things to which our author makes one allusion is not the personality of God, but God abiding within us and so alone attained. It is not merely one only Divine Son taking the form of man, but that Sonship which is the birthright of every soul leading its life on earth. It is not alone that there are things unseen which are eternal, but that these things are within us. This it is that enlarges "the Greek conception of man" and emphasises "the place of Religion in life". Is there not haply as if it were a Church, within the Church, which "holds this view"? Some of us may have heard voices and seen records that seem like those of its Doctors. And fragments here and there, floating down the centuries, do even now hint in no uncertain tones, though in other symbolical forms, that Greece also knew.

* *The Hibbert Journal*, April, 1935, pp. 356-370, s. v., "Christianity and Hellenism," by Sir Richard W. Livingstone.

The oft-repeated story of a "conflict between Science and Religion" is reviewed by Sir Herbert Samuel* on the basis of an affirmation that it "has thrown the modern world into the state of intellectual confusion in which it finds itself." Whether the confusion in question is referable to this one source is the first point that arises, especially as Sir Herbert himself opens the study under notice by stating that "the whole structure of our mental and material life" was shaken "like an earthquake" by the Great War. Professor Whitehead is quoted also concerning Religion and Science as (1) "the two strongest general forces" which influence men, (2) concerning the future course of history as depending upon the decision of this generation respecting the relations between them; and (3) on the fact that "they seem to be set one against the other." This being the state of the case, we are led next to the immediate consequence, it being understood that Religion, all over the course of human history, has been the chief agent in promoting morality. It has "lighted up morality," in the opinion of that most delightful of Victorian false prophets, Matthew Arnold. The result is (1) that "the ancient buttress of morality is weakening"; (2) that "we see a growing divorce between Religion and daily life"; (3) that "the hold of the creeds upon conduct has been loosening"; and (4) that the

influence of Churches, Temples, Synagogues, Mosques, and so forth is very different from that which they exercised even a century ago. All this is old enough and has been familiar to most of us since we left the preparatory schools. But what of the remedy proposed? It is this only, that upon Religion and Science "there lies an obligation to find the method and the means whereby they shall draw together."† There is, however, at its value something that is called Philosophy, though its influence "has sometimes been harmful" and though it turns out after all, at its worst—in Fichte, in Hegel, in Nietzsche—to be included "among the principal causes of the unrest in the modern world."‡ In Britain it has "moved upon other lines"—not however particularised. Here and elsewhere it may "even now be on the eve of furnishing to the world that broad guidance for lack of which it wanders bewildered."§ Religion may co-operate powerfully and Science "succeed in pointing the paths along which man should move," the great encouragement to hold this rather nebulous faith being that man is now for the first time conscious of "what he is doing and where he is going".*† It is of course possible that Sir Herbert is defining here, almost unwittingly, his own position; and in this case it is like that of Goethe, who, according to Matthew Arnold—had come to see his way. Otherwise, no more preposterous

The Contemporary Review, Match, 1935, pp. 256-268, s. v., "Philosophy, Religion and Present World Conditions".

† *Ibid.*, p. 261.

Ib., p. 262.

§ *Ib.*, p. 264.

Ib., p. 268.

statement has been made of recent times on the age in which we live, and of which, in a cooler moment, Sir Herbert himself has said in this same paper, speaking as the new generation: "What kind of world is this into which we have been born?" He makes no attempt to answer; and an answer on behalf of Europe would be yet more difficult since the date on which he asked this question. As regards his remedial measures, there will never be a real *rap-prochement* between official Religion and Science till the Religions have revised their Creeds, which none of them is likely to do, in the West or East, so long as they remain official instituted systems. Remedial Philosophy, on the other hand, is the last hope and the fondest. Sir Herbert has counter-defined the State, against Hegelian doctrine, as "nothing other than a collection of men and women

who have organized themselves for purposes of joint action." He adds truly that "apart from them there is nothing". And what is Philosophy but the accepted findings *pro tem.*, of X, Y and Z, about which those who differ have always waited patiently till the next fashion of thought has come to weed them out? Meanwhile the unfailing successions of X, Y, Z have never saved the world, and they never will. Individually it can be saved only from within by the finding of that Christ who is called by many names in different quarters of the world. Externally, on the other hand, the "good time coming" of Charles Mackay is that which every man of goodwill can help forward; and we hold no doubt whatever that Sir Herbert Samuel, working by his personal lights, has done and is still doing his personal best in this desired direction.

A. E. WAITE

Occultism pure and simple finds the same mystic elements in the Christian as in other faiths, though it rejects as emphatically its dogmatic and *historic* character....For, we say it again, the surname Christos is based on, and the story of the crucifixion derived from, events that preceded it. Everywhere, in India as in Egypt, in Chaldea as in Greece, all these legends were built upon one and the same primitive type; the voluntary sacrifice of the *logoi*—the *rays* of the one LOGOS, the direct manifested emanation from the One ever-concealed Infinite and Unknown—whose *rays* incarnated in mankind. They consented to *fall into matter*, and are, therefore, called the 'Fallen Ones.'

—H. P. BLAVATSKY, *The Esoteric Character of the Gospels.*

CORRESPONDENCE

TWO INDIAN PHILOSOPHERS

[Dr. D. M. Datta, author of *The Six Ways of Knowing* read a paper at the last session of the Indian Philosophical Congress at Waltair of which the following part examines the influence of two modern philosophers. Dr. Datta wrote in our March issue on "Contemporary Indian Philosophy".—Eds.]

Sir S. Radhakrishnan, as Dr. Tagore once observed, is one of the few Indian scholars the springs of whose mind have not been crushed by the load of scholarship. With this vitality of mind, he combines a width of outlook and interest, a quick apprehension of fundamental issues and a wonderful power of expression. All of these together have contributed to his success as a philosopher and won him wide recognition. Even as early as his *Reign of Religion* he was trying to choose his own place among the different schools of the ancient East and the modern West and was beginning to incline towards the idealism of the Upanishads. This book is unique. Comparative studies by Indian writers nowadays consist in the critical consideration of Indian in the light of Western philosophy. The object of such enquiry is "How do we appear to the West?" "What does the West think of us?" Critical as such an attitude is, it is still a self-forgetful and diffident one. The vitality and the superior self-confidence of Radhakrishnan has enabled him to rise above this inferiority complex and to see how the West appears *to the Indian eye*, if an Indian looks at the West from his indigenous point of view, in the light of Indian ideas. It is a pity that few have followed him in this work. The importance of this spirit of enquiry from the Indian point of view for the development of modern Indian thought cannot be exaggerated.

Professional philosophers, whose minds move along the fixed grooves of technical, official philosophy, will scarcely look to poets for philosophy.

That Radhakrishnan's unfettered mind ranges far beyond conventional grooves is proved by his *Philosophy of Rabindranath*, in whom he finds the unconventional expression of India's own philosophic vision.

Radhakrishnan is essentially a philosopher of life and his catholic outlook is as wide as life itself.

It is natural, therefore, that his style is so unconventional, his language so forceful and dynamic and his appeal so wide. This explains also the synthetic character of his philosophy. Indian culture and Western civilization, the ancient ideals and the modern achievements, Absolute Perfection and biological evolution are all fused together in one organic philosophy. Finally, the Absolute of Radhakrishnan, which elusively alternates between the Pure Being of Sankara and the Concrete Absolute Spirit of Hegel, is intelligible only as the playful freedom of the Absolute Life.

It is a point of pride for us that the philosophy of Radhakrishnan has been given such a rousing reception in the West—recently, in addition to innumerable reviews, an independent treatise on his philosophy has been written, Joad's *Counter Attack from the East*. But it is also a pity that we are not paying sufficient attention to it to see how far he deserves the fame the West is showering on him and whether he offers any new line of work which can be followed for the modern revival of philosophy in India.

In the philosophy of Sir S. Radhakrishnan and that of Professor K. C. Bhattacharya there is a fundamental unity, both upholding the Vedantic

conceptions of the world, soul, freedom, intuition and God, and therein leaning towards Sankara. But there is a striking contrast also between them in style, method and underlying attitude. The style of Bhattacharya is as stiff as that of Radhakrishnan is simple. The peculiarity of Bhattacharya's style is that though his words are simple and mostly non-technical, yet his sentences do not easily yield their meaning. Another point adding to the difficulty of understanding is the total absence of references and allusions which could enable the reader to perceive him in historical setting and understand him by comparison. It would be a great mistake to suppose his thought devoid of historical connections or his reading not wide. Though his ideal of study appears to have been, "How much have I understood?" rather than "How much have I read?" his reading is sufficiently wide and up-to-date not to miss anything vital in general knowledge and philosophy. As a student he distinguished himself by passing with great credit in *three* honours subjects and as a teacher he moved freely from English, History, Economics to Philosophy, where he ultimately settled down.

A number of very competent scholars, specialists in ancient Western and Indian philosophy or contemporary philosophical movements, who have intimately discussed their own subjects with him, know him to be one who has profoundly assimilated fundamental truths, who can throw new light on a good many subjects and can trip a specialist even in his firmest conviction by quietly analysing it and unostentatiously presenting the many alternative possibilities. It is only in such intimate discussions that he lets one peep into the historical background of his theories. His reluctance to connect his views explicitly with those of other thinkers is partly due to his diffidence to express the correctness of his statement of others' views, but mainly to the fact that by temperament he views his own theories as well as those

of others in logical rather than historical or genetic perspectives—as so many *possible* theories. Apart from the justifiability of this attitude, it has always been a potent obstacle to the intelligibility and the recognition of his views and has stood in the way of their benefiting others.

But in spite of the stiffness of his style it is rash to jump to the conclusion, as is sometimes done, that he is an obscurantist or meaningless hair-splitter. His writings, like those of the many classical Sanskrit philosophers, tax intellectual patience and perseverance—qualities which unfortunately are disappearing fast from the majority of modern scholars. Sir S. Radhakrishnan once declared, in summing up a lecture delivered by Professor Bhattacharya at the Calcutta University, "To criticise his views is to understand them and to understand them is to think over them again and again."

Bhattacharya seldom sits down to put his views on paper unless somehow pressed to it. His earliest work, *Studies in Vedantism*, written under the stimulation of the Premchand Roychand scholarship, contains much close, solid thinking and shows the high mental calibre which he possessed even as a student. This book remained the only work to his credit for about twenty years, during which he only read from time to time some short papers, at the Calcutta Philosophical Society, then particularly active.

It is in these short papers that his philosophical views took definite shape and were made accessible to the members and a limited circle of outsiders. Most important among these are "Some Aspects of Negation," in which he sought to express the fundamentally different logics of negation underlying different schools of thought and the manifoldness of truth; "The Jain Theory of Anekantavada," in which he interpreted in a strikingly original and profound manner the Jain theory of manifoldness of truth and supported the view that truth is objectively

manifold; "The Place of the Indefinite in Logic," in which he put forward a strong plea for the objectivity of the irrational. In addition to these and a few other papers he took part in a symposium on the conception of the Absolute along with Dr. P. K. Roy and Dr. H. Haldar. These papers mark him as a deep analytical thinker who can assign the exact logical place to the chief metaphysical theories of the East and the West, and on everything has something to say which is impossible to brush aside as unimportant, but is equally difficult to accept, chiefly because it takes us beyond our common standpoint to the presuppositions of our ordinary thought. All these isolated papers have an internal connection based chiefly on theories of the indefinite, of negation and of the manifoldness of truth, which are the logical keynotes of his philosophy.

It is only during the last few years that Professor Bhattacharya has stepped out of a comparatively secluded intellectual life to join the corporate philosophical body, the Institute of Philosophy at Amalner, as its Director. This marks the beginning of a new and most useful period of his career as philosopher, both because he *has* to state, discuss and defend his views in discharge of his official duties and because he has to formulate them intelligibly and acceptably to the society of philosophers who are not easily beguiled into any conviction. Thanks again to the authorities of this Institute, the most important statement of his views, expressed as lectures to the Institute, has been made available in a book, *The Subject as Freedom*. When one has gone arduously through the first few pages, he finds that after all Bhattacharya's philosophy is not an unintelligible collection of paradoxes but that there is a system behind his mind, and once its outline is grasped the rest is not difficult to follow.

To state his views fully is to expand each pithy sentence of his to a page and we can only state here in a dogmatic way some of his fundamental

propositions. His philosophy is indebted most to Kant, among Western thinkers, and to the monistic Vedanta, among the Indian schools. This is only to recognise that his conclusions resemble those already known views; for to follow his arguments one has to toil with him through logical mazes all his own. His originality lies in his compact, irresistible logical chain of arguments.

Though Bhattacharya is at bottom an idealist he prefers realism to cheap idealism which begins by denying the objectivity of perceived objects and establishes the existence of the self by direct introspection. Following most of the realistic writers like Alexander, Moore and Russell he distinguishes the object of consciousness from the consciousness of objects and does not believe that the one can be lightly dismissed as reducible to the other. Again, he does not believe that either knowledge or the subject of knowledge can be made the object of any privileged introspection and therefore can be so easily established to be true. He therefore agrees with the modern behaviourists that the psychology of introspection is a pseudo-science of the mental life, which, he further points out, mistakes the different aspects of the known-ness of an object for mental states; and he also holds with them that the objective method of the study of behaviour is a more candid and legitimate enquiry than the so-called subjective one.

But if the subject cannot be caught by introspection as an object how can it be known or believed in? The reply to this he gives in various ways. The most obvious is that the subject is primarily known as the speaker of the word "I". To the possible objection that the subject can then be said to be known as the object meant by "I," he replies that though the subject is understood through the word "I," it is not known as the *meaning* of the word:—

A meaning that is conveyed by a word must be intelligible to the hearer as what he

himself would convey by the word. . . The word *I* as used by a speaker is not understood by the hearer to convey what he would himself convey by the use of it. (*The Subject as Freedom*, pp. 2-3)

To reinforce this primary argument he asks, if the subject, the "I," be said to be known as an object, *i. e.*, as what is expressed or communicated by the word "I," what is it that expresses and what is the process of expressing? Besides, he points out, the reality of what is meant, that is, the object of knowledge, "can always be doubted and so the object is not known with the same assurance as the subject that cannot be said to be meant. There may be such a thing as an illusory object." The self-manifestness of the self is not like that of an axiom which is accepted because the attempt to deny it ends in self-contradiction, because in the case of the self *there is not even the possibility of such an attempt*. This insight into the real meaning of the self-manifestness of the self is at once profound and original.

But by far his most characteristic argument in favour of the subject is that the subject is what remains by its own right on the denial of the illusory object. In the denial of the illusory, in a judgment implying the correction of an error, the subject dissociates itself from the object, feels its distinctness from the object in a peculiar way and realises its freedom from the object and the fact of the objectivity of the object being dependent on its free relation. (The possibility of the unreality of an object in every case means only the possibility of the object being reducible to the subjective.)

Denial of the objective world is impossible, Bhattacharya holds, as long as appearance is there, but assertion of it is unreasonable in the face of its dependent objectivity and possible unreality. Idealism is therefore, a faith though not yet an accomplished fact. And "this faith has to be cherished and there should be a subjective discipline to get rid of the persisting

realistic belief". Here, in his view comes in the necessity of the spiritual discipline (Vedantic Sādhana one may call it), which is nothing but the attempt to realise the subject as free. This attempt should be directed to all the ways in which the subject relates itself to objects and appears thereby to be fettered to them.

There are stages in the realisation of the subject's freedom. The bodily subjectivity is first felt to be dissociated from the extra-organic objects; then psychic subjectivity from the body viewed by it as an object; then the spiritual subjectivity from the psychic states viewed as objects. At every stage the feeling of the freedom of the subject is achieved by realising the dependence of the objectivity of the object and the corresponding free relation of the subject that relates to it. He observes:—

The elaboration of these stages of freedom in spiritual psychology "would suggest the possibility of a consecutive method of realising the subject as absolute freedom, of retracing the felt positive freedom towards the object into the pure intuition of the self." (*The Subject as freedom*, p. 43).

This is a short sketch of one of the most important aspects of Bhattacharya's views, showing how Western and Eastern thought blends together into a constructive philosophy. But his philosophy, though not yet fully expressed in writing in every aspect, has a comprehensive scheme in which logic, psychology, epistemology, ethics and religion have all well-connected places and deserve careful study.

There are two fundamentally different attitudes or methods in philosophical thinking which explains Bhattacharya's position and distinguish it from Radhakrishnan's. The one is illustrated by modern scientific philosophy of the West which attempts to piece together the up-to-date scientific theories like evolution and relativity and raises on them grand metaphysical systems. The other is illustrated best by the philosophy of Kant, which attempts to analyse the given through

reflection upon its different aspects and implications. The first is a kind of synthetic imagination which is more allied to the poetic than to the scientific imagination, because it is beyond verification and its perfection is of an æsthetic value. The other is an analytic reflection which does not aspire after system-making. Radhakrishnan's synthetic philosophy follows the first line, while Bhattacharya's analytic philosophy follows the second. Kant's view that the mind can know about nature only what it has itself imparted to nature and his distrust of the dialectical use of reason underlie Bhattacharya's philosophical attitude.

The future development of Indian

philosophy, if it is to be an adequate solution of the problems that the modern Indian mind philosophically faces, cannot be achieved by the logic-tight segregation of Indian and Western ideas but by a thorough assimilation of both. In this direction the only two adequate and comprehensive attempts are those of Sir S. Radhakrishnan and Professor Bhattacharya. They supply the initial capital in which ambitious Indian thinkers can profitably interest themselves and add to the development of modern Indian philosophy by interpretation, criticism, modification and opposition—in ways whereby philosophy has always flourished.

D. M. DATTA

Mr. BERESFORD ON REINCARNATION

Mr. J. D. Beresford's article dealing with Reincarnation, in the March issue, had my particular interest. Though I am a Ph. D. (Chemistry and Botany), earning part of my living through science pure and applied, yet I am one of those Westerners for whom the doctrine of Reincarnation is not "a matter of scientific or philosophical discussion, but one of settled conviction from the moment I first heard about it."

The doubt Mr. Beresford feels, however, seems hardly in proportion to the importance of the doctrine involved.

Mr. Beresford himself agrees that, after all, his doubts have little weight in view of the fact that "he can find in his own philosophy nothing that is not consonant with the doctrine of Reincarnation". I might suggest for his consideration that here he touches, perhaps, unwittingly, on one reason for the difficulties mentioned in his paper. Is it not typical for most of us in the West to have a philosophy *of our own*, and judge any and everything that is placed before us on this basis of our already existing opinion?

If the attraction to Reincarnation is not yet an inner certainty but so far developed as in the author's case, why not forget for a while all of this previous knowledge, which in reality is made up of personal convictions, and put aside the tendency towards *separateness in thought* to which all of us in the West fall prey consciously or unconsciously, day after day? Originality is one of the prerequisites for success and esteem in our society; let us have the moral courage to be a disciple, within to say, "Thus have I heard." If one from free will, without bias, honestly and by strong search, tries to contact this great Law and its twin Karma—doctrines humanity needs most desperately to definitely understand them, and then to illumine his mind in terms of this Teaching, the ordinary prejudices and head-learning will lose their hold and the inner conviction will become clear. "Once teach them that greatest of all Laws, *Karma* and *Reincarnation*, and besides feeling in themselves the true dignity of human nature, they will turn from evil and eschew it as they would a physical danger."

Leyden, Holland.

W. C. DE L.

ENDS AND SAYINGS

"..... ends of verse

And sayings of philosophers."

—HUDIBRAS

A Minister for Peace who should have equal standing with the Minister for War, a Peace Office with funds at its command equal to those of the War Office—these revolutionary proposals are the contribution of Dr. Maude Royden to the vexed question of international relations. She offered them on March 15th in *The Daily Mirror* (London) under the caption, "If I Were Dictator." They were intended for England but might equally well apply to other countries. Of course no one will take them seriously for a moment—that is characteristic of the modern mentality. We shall not attempt a debate as to whether or not they are intrinsically reasonable; but mention them as significant of the increasing trend of thought towards organization for peace and the deliberate fostering of mutual good will and friendship among peoples.

The realization is gaining ground among the thoughtful everywhere that an effective will to peace will never appear spontaneously in our selfish and self-centred world. The first number of the annual *Bulletin of League of Nations Teaching*, recently issued, is an expression of that growing conviction. Two articles in that volume, one by M. Jean Piaget, Director of the International Bureau of Education, and the other by Prof. José

Castillejo of the University of Madrid, deal specifically with education for peace.

M. Piaget recognizes national egocentricity as a barrier to peaceful collaboration among nations but seems to acquiesce in it as inevitable. We cannot surmount it, he implies, but we can in a measure circumvent it by showing that self-interest calls for a mentality adjusted to embrace international relations. He sees national self-interest as the safest foundation for international education—convincing the individual that the effort to understand others is "necessary for his own existence and for the expansion of the particular ideology he upholds." He specifically disavows a universal outlook as a practical aim of international education.

In the international sphere, any real effort towards psychological adjustment, even if it is inspired by selfish and purely national considerations, leads to a method of mutual understanding and discussion which, in the long run, promotes the growth of an international spirit.

The possibility is as remote as that of gathering figs from thistles. Unless the motive is disinterested, the result will be superficial and inadequate. To enter sympathetically into another's hopes and fears is an achievement of unselfish imagination, for it means

putting oneself mentally in that other's place and trying to see things as they appear to him. This is impossible unless we abandon our own intense preoccupation with ourselves. Prejudices and predilections must be laid aside, as a spectacled person must lay aside his glasses if he would see through a microscope.

The international point of view can never be attained so long as the nationals of each country cling tenaciously to their separative views, however freely they may recognize that other views exist. The egocentricity of a nation is fatal to an international outlook and as menacing to international peace as selfishness in the individual is to domestic tranquillity. Mr. Piaget's appeal is, in effect, to enlightened self-interest. But however enlightened, self-interest it remains. It is not by pandering to the weaknesses in human nature that an international point of view can be produced, but by showing how those weaknesses can be overcome.

The concept of unity must be impressed upon the plastic mind of youth throughout the world. In the larger view of history as the evolutionary journey of mankind, every conquest of mind over natural forces, every victory of ideals over self-interest, is the triumph of all. From the standpoint of the corporate unity of humankind, all wars in their true light are warrings among the members of a single body. Mankind is the unit and all divisions

among men, whether political, social or religious, are as artificial as they are arbitrary and impermanent. Teach the individuals of all countries to look upon themselves as cells in the body of the race, and they will regard international collaboration as natural and inevitable.

Prof. Castillejo's recommendations are practically constructive. He would present ideals of mutual respect and tolerance by teaching even the younger children that "the variety of human types and conflicting interests" are "elements in our existence which are not only compatible but indeed indispensable for the progress and well-being of mankind." He would have children in secondary schools study the fundamental problems which have occasioned conflicts among peoples:—

By making an objective study of such conflicts and doing full justice to the opposite point of view, it is possible to arouse in young people a feeling of confidence in themselves and of hope in the union of mankind which will place justice above all other considerations.

At the university, Prof. Castillejo would have the elements of the problem dealt with scientifically on objective and universal lines, with the formation of a world conscience as an ultimate objective of such training.

We submit that an international outlook is not a Utopian dream but a practical objective which may legitimately be hoped for from international education along right lines.



Point out the "Way"—however dimly,
and lost among the host—as does the evening
star to those who tread their path in darkness.
—*The Voice of the Silence*

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THE CHOSEN PEOPLE

Claims and counter-claims for national, and racial and religious superiority are common. From the stenographic report of a lecture given under the auspices of the Israelite Brotherhood of Bombay, on "The Temple of Solomon" the following is extracted:—

Let us study this doctrine about the Chosen People. Most Jews misunderstand it. Just as they have forgotten and do not truly understand their doctrine of Gilgool, so also they have an entirely wrong conception about the meaning of the expression "the Chosen People". Think calmly and dispassionately for a moment: Jews claim that they are the chosen of God. Very well, but our Muslim brethren make a similar claim—there is no God, but one God, Allah, and Muhammed is His Prophet; those who are not Muslims are Kafirs or infidels. Turn to Christians—what do they say? Jesus is the only begotten

Son of God, and those who are not Christians are Heathens, and go to eternal damnation. Some Parsis also have a similar foolish notion; to them birth in a Zoroastrian body means perfection of the Soul! And among the Hindus we have the Brahmins—ah! they too are very proud, they belong to the highest caste, and what are Jews and Muslims and Christians to them? Mlechchas! How absurd this is for a reasoning man! Yet behind this arrogant superstition of almost every race and religion there is a truth. Who are the Chosen People? The Chosen People are those Souls who have determined to guide their own lives by the use of their own reason; who have resolved to let superstitions go, to question every habit and custom of their lives, and who seek aid and guidance from the Soul within their own Hearts. Such persons may be Jews or Gentiles, Christians or Heathens, men or women, rich or

poor, young or old—those distinctions and differences matter not; in them the Soul has made a resolve and thus that Soul has become the chosen of God. Therefore you must not look upon yourselves as being chosen ones simply because you are Jews in this life, that is, wearing Jewish bodies. You know as well as I do that there are bad and wicked Jews, immoral Jews, evil Jews, just as there are bad and wicked and immoral men and women in all other communities. How could such Jews be the chosen of God?

How to know if we are the Chosen Ones? Very easy. Each one of us must ask himself whether he has in him any streak of the six and seven things hateful to the Lord. What are they? Go to *Proverbs*, chapter 6, verses 16 to 19 and see for yourselves what are these things:

These six things doth the Lord hate: yea,
seven *are* an abomination unto him:
A proud look, a lying tongue, and hands
that shed innocent blood,
An heart that deviseth wicked imagina-
tions, feet that be swift in running to
mischief,
A false witness that speaketh lies, and he
that soweth discord among brethren.

Pride, falsehood, cruelty, wicked thinking, mischief making, false witnessing, and sowing of discord—could any thing be clearer? To abstain from these seven sins is the commandment. Of what avail can it be merely to wear a Jewish body, or to observe outwardly Jewish rites if the mind and the

heart are not free from these impurities?

In the entire human kingdom the process of evolution brings a man to enter the race of the Chosen People, by seeking Soul-Knowledge, and with its aid beginning the task of erecting the Temple of Solomon. Among the Hindus there are seven-storied and nine-storied temples and these stories symbolize the degree of knowledge acquired. Wherever Pure Magic and Wisdom Religion are studied, its practitioners and students are known as Builders—for they build the Temple of Knowledge and of Secret Science. There are two classes of Builders: speculative and operative. In Freemasonry they use these terms also, but not quite correctly, for Masons as well as Jews have lost the real knowledge of Building the Temple. When students study theory they are called Speculative Builders, but when they begin to practise the art in their daily lives, and to exemplify in works their control over Nature and Nature's forces then they are called Operative Builders.

Thus theoretical study is the first step, and practice is the second. If we desire to be the Chosen of God we must become the actual builders of the Temple. What substances and what qualities shall we need for our task? What are the requirements for building a Temple?

THOUGHTS ON THE DHAMMAPADA

[**Hugh I'A. Fausset** here examines the Buddha's Way of Law and the Christ's Way of Love and shows how they are complementary.—Eds.]

A new English translation of the *Dhammapada* by Professor Bhagwat has recently been issued by the Buddha Society of Bombay and is obtainable* in England for the small sum of one shilling. It is both a handy edition and a reliable translation, and it includes, for those who can benefit thereby, the Pali text in Devanāgarī characters.

The Society believes that the *Dhammapada*, which is accepted as a genuine collection of the sayings of the Buddha, deserves to be as widely known as the *Gita*. And they have brought out this Edition to popularise it. Sharing as I do their belief that a sympathetic study of it cannot fail to purify the mind and enlighten the heart, I am anxious to commend it as helpfully as I can to the notice of English readers. And perhaps I can do this best by discussing some prejudices which have commonly to be surmounted by Western minds before they can receive the truth of the Buddha's teaching.

A recent contribution to THE ARYAN PATH (by Lady Hosie—March 1935) reproached the Buddha for encouraging his followers to pile up merits for themselves and for regarding women and children as hindrances to perfect living. She contrasted his monastic temper with the kindly humanity of Jesus Christ, of whom she wrote that "His is the only

religion which says that a man can be at one with God while having a wife, a family, and eating three meals a day—including flesh." We may well smile at this easy disregard of such sayings of Jesus as that "if any man come to me, and hate not his father, and mother, and wife, and children, and brethren and sisters, yea, and his own life also, he cannot be my disciple." And we may regret the prejudice which allows a writer to suggest that there was no place in Buddha's teaching for the married householder, when in truth it provides with great wisdom for the needs of those in all stages of development.

But no great teacher in allowing for these different stages has ever reduced his ultimate demands. In those demands both Jesus in his love and Gotama in his wisdom were uncompromising. Neither taught that it was enough to domesticate the physical appetites or to be impulsively warm-hearted. Each, in their different modes insisted that the Gate was strait and the way narrow which lead unto life. Nor in their knowledge of the few that find it did they ever encourage the many to believe that it could be entered by any wider gate. After framing his divinely simple and direct moral code for the needs of all, at whatever stage of growth, Buddha addressed him-

* Obtainable from THE ARYAN PATH Office in Bombay, London & New York.

self more particularly to those who were ready to advance towards spiritual maturity. Consequently despite his rejection of the two extremes of pleasure and mortification his teaching tends to affront those who are still dominated by a thirst for physical existence. In his five rules, which were sufficient for the immature in years and experience, Buddha sought only to bring this thirst under control, to civilise and humanise it. But ultimately he insisted, in the one who would enter into the true being of Nirvana, it must be extinguished.

And it is the fundamental stress he laid upon the necessity of extinguishing this thirst which offends the instincts of so many Westerners and which they resent as inhuman. They fail to recognise that Jesus expressed the same truth in a different way when he taught that the desires of self must die on the cross of love.

"But what a difference!" many would say, who find it easier to reconcile their personal desires with Jesus's gospel of love than with Buddha's sacred truth of suffering. And one must admit that there is a real difference, if only of aspect and emphasis, between the narrow way of Christ and the middle way of Buddha. *Dhammapada* means the Steps of the Law. Jesus invited men into the way of love. Are these but two modes of one way, each of which in the expression of imperfect devotees can reflect characteristic weaknesses, but which beyond a certain point merge into each other, love fulfilling the law, the law informing love? Unless a

reader approaches the *Dhammapada* with at least an open mind towards this question, he is likely to allow prejudice to blind him to its truth. But given a readiness to study it in the light of unflinching self-awareness, I think he will find that the law it unfolds is as necessary as the love which he has too easily assumed to be a sufficient inspiration.

And, indeed, the distinction which I have suggested between love and law is itself misleading. For the *Dhamma* of which we follow the Foot-falls in the *Dhammapada* is no legal code imposed upon human nature by an austere moralist from without. It is the Creative Order, divined by the Buddha within the living movement of the universe and the evolving Soul of man. He named it "Truth and Law" and bid each man "visualize it in himself" and so become "*The Custodian of the Law*". And it was out of his own vision of the reality of this order that he defined the demand it made upon those who would bring their nature, step by step, into harmony with it, until they entered the freedom at its heart.

Those in the west who have been taught to conceive of redemption exclusively in terms of sacrificial love may well at first find the Buddha's message too cool and collected. But there are different modes of sacrifice, and the heart is not the only altar of purification. The mind must be redeemed too. This is a hard fact for many warm-hearted people to face. They insist that love is enough without

considering its degree of illumination. Ideally, pure love is pure truth; it opens the doors of vision. But actually few are so pure in heart that they can afford to neglect the discipline of the mind which brings enlightenment. This discipline does not involve a supreme and sudden act of self-devotion, but rather a persistent reduction of the self to the measure of truth, until at last the illusions of self-will and personal desire are dissipated and the bonds of error are broken.

The sacrificial nature of this patient process of self-effacement is seldom recognised by those who point exclusively to the cross of Calvary without being called themselves to make any such supreme sacrifice. Many in fact who shrink from what they consider the inhuman detachment of Buddha betray an unconscious fear lest the quality of their "human" feeling should be put to a test which it cannot survive. But for Buddha who knew that a complete self-knowledge was a condition of true self-sacrifice, this test was crucial. Hence the primary emphasis which he laid upon "right thinking". Ignorance had begun in the "awakening of a thought". In the soil of self-conscious thought had sprung up craving. And this craving, wherein disunited man hungered in all sorts of perverse ways to regain unity could only cease when his consciousness was reconciled with the original will from which it had lapsed: The ignorance of partial knowledge must be resolved in the illumina-

tion of perfect knowledge. Hence it was that in Buddha's teaching to "embrace false views" was to be consigned to hell. And the *Dhammapada* continually emphasises the truth that "worst of all stains is the stain of ignorance," and that it is the man who is "full of wrong thoughts," who is at the mercy of his lusts.

Consequently Buddha saw in the resolving of doubt or division the crux of the spiritual problem. "Neither nakedness," says the *Dhammapada*, "nor matted hair, nor dirt, nor fasting... nor assuming ascetic postures, can purify a man who has not solved his doubts." The primary stress which Buddha laid on the solving of doubt is particularly relevant to the needs and the temper of to-day, when men's minds have turned away from Faiths but are at sea for want of inward enlightenment. Buddha, one might say, distrusted faith as he did love, because he saw how easily the force of both could be exploited by false feeling. And human experience proves him right. He saw that the mind had to be perfectly clarified, if the heart's reason was to become truth itself. For let the smallest element of doubt be left imperfectly resolved beneath an affirmation of faith, however enraptured or assured, and it would falsify that faith—it might even infect it with fanaticism (how often it has!) and make the faith a bondage, not only to its professor but to thousands of others. But the man who had truly thought his last doubt away by correctly understanding the nature

of reality and accepting in full consciousness its self-renouncing conditions was free from both doubt and faith, as he was from yearnings in regard to this world or the next and from the fetters both of merit and demerit. If Buddha encouraged his followers to "accumulate much merit," as Jesus did his "to become perfect even as your Father in Heaven is perfect," it was only that they should attain to a pure worth beyond all self-interested attachment, of which considerations of merit and demerit were a reflection. But in his view the bondage of the false self would persist, if in subtle and deceptive ways, until the unreality of this self was completely realised. Then reason itself would cut the bonds. And so we read: "Get yourself rid of this vast suffering by becoming possessed of perfect knowledge."

But if wisdom was in Buddha's teaching the key to disinterestedness, compassion was the oil by which it was to be continually turned in the harsh locks of the world. Yet the two were never to be dissociated and it is hard for many Westerners to believe in the virtue or perceive the value of a dispassionate compassion. How, for example, they may ask, can a man be really compassionate who accepts and acts on the following?—

"Impermanent are all component things." He who perceives this with insight becomes thereby immediately unmoved by suffering. This is the Path of Purity Supreme.

To be "unmoved by suffering"

may seem to imply a callousness which makes compassion impossible. Yet we know that Buddha who had perceived this truth and been changed by it was at once the serene and the compassionate one. Do we do right then to resent the stress he lays on the necessity of growing through and beyond suffering? Or is our attachment to suffering but another reflection of our attachment to a false self? If we are to profit by Buddha's teaching, we need above all to get this clear. The escape from suffering which he preached was not from helping to lift the burden of the world's suffering nor was it from consciousness into nescience. None knew better than he that, in the words of *The Voice of the Silence*, "Thou shalt not separate thy being from Being". This is the true suffering without which we cannot live and breathe in all, as all breathes in us. And Buddha never counselled escape from it. The suffering to which he insistently drew men's attention and which he bid them eradicate was of another kind. It was the result of being at discord with the Creative Will instead of at unity with it. It was the price men paid for having fallen, in the necessary pursuit of self-awareness, out of reality into appearance. Buddha knew that men must come to truth through the fires of such suffering, but out of his compassionate wisdom he sought to save them from prolonging the pains of blindness. Not, however, by acquiring a stoic invulnerability. That is a familiar misreading of his teaching. For

the stoic has not entered the realm of being; he has merely fortified himself in the realm of existence. Buddha invited men into the realm of being. He bid them to be "in full accord with all that lives" by shedding the last veil of the *exclusive, acquisitive ego*. And if his teaching with regard not only to sensual pleasures, but to the affections seems at times in the *Dhammapada* to demand too much of human nature and to deny its dearest and tenderest ties, it is well to remember how subtle and tenacious is the bondage of egoism, just because it is interwoven with tender affections. The great teacher inevitably shocks men out of their acquiescence in error, and if Buddha seems too severe in his exposure of men's false' conceptions of what is dear and pleasurable and painful, it was that he might release them into the truth. And this truth was no such negative emptiness and indifference as his critics, who have not crossed the gulf, suggest. To those who are still bound and blinded by existence, Nirvana seems a state of nonentity. But those who have entered being through non-being know it to be the only state of real identity. Far from denying the hope of joy to men, Buddha assured them that they should experience it in all its fullness and purity. "Let him renounce his little pleasure," we read, "in view of the abounding bliss." And it was "from the profound happiness which results" that one will put an end to suffering. Nor was this happiness to be

enjoyed in a sublime isolation. It was the self-bound man who was alone and homeless in spite of all his apparent attachments. The liberated man had come home to the real, where alone true and free relationships were possible and where out of a spirit poised and at peace he could "bring out the spirit of the events of ordinary life".

Doubtless the emphasis which Buddha laid upon the necessity of SELF-possession displeases many people. And the calm cultivation of the twin virtues of wisdom and compassion may seem at first inferior to the simple organic surrender to love which the Christian has been taught to revere in Jesus. I have already suggested why Buddha, in his clear vision of man's bondage to false feeling, counselled a different method. But he, no less than Jesus, put before men the ideal of a complete response of the soul to its creator. There are, however, two ways of realising this ideal. You may lose the self to find it or you may find the self to lose it. The two ways are not of course separable. But Buddha may be said to have stressed the latter, Jesus the former. The impulsive may lament the cool reasonableness of Buddha's spirit, but they have no right to say that he taught men to elevate the self, not to change it, or that his ideal was one of superior self-centredness. Certainly he did preach that the true self, the "Lord very difficult to find," was the necessary centre of the divine life, and that self-sacrifice, far from destroying SELF-possession, inevitably brought it into

being. But that is true, and it is one of the reasons why the *Dhammapada* should appeal to the many to-day in the West who recoil from doctrines associated with primitive blood-sacrifice and look for emancipation by becoming more mindful instead of less. Its twenty-six

Cantos may not possess the poetic suggestiveness which irradiates the *Gita*. But from the standpoint of dispassionate reason they define very explicitly the process and discipline by which the conscious self may be brought into the unity of being.

HUGH P.A. FAUSSET

We are all children, learning to walk. The Path of Life stretches all around us, east and west and north and south. Shall we walk the pleasure path of sensuous life and find our garden path turning into a dry sandy desert, trackless, waterless, where we will famish and die? Or shall we walk the routine path of waking and sleeping, now well—now ill, till birth leads to death, and death to new birth and another routine of life? Or shall we walk the lonely path of the creating intellect, of poet—philosopher—artist, who has eyes for the stars and space, but who is blind to the real souls of stars in space; who seeks beauty of form and allows beauty of life and spirit to illusion him; who, even when he serves his fellows serves gropingly because his is but a partial, a shadowy vision? Or shall we take that straight way and that narrow path of the Sage, of the Buddha, the path of Wisdom and of Compassion?

It will be well for us to pause a while and try to see the mighty distinction between the first three paths just mentioned, and the last one, the Path of Enlightenment and of Service. The path of sensuous life, the path of routine, the path of the intellectualist or the creative artist are not single paths. There are millions of ways in which senses grow wild. Every home and every member in every family has a different routine, and there are endless paths of routine. The painters and poets, the critics and philosophers all differ from one another, and must differ, for unless they differ and show this dissimilarity, they are called copyists, plagiarists and rejected by the world. But turn away from these, and now come to the fourth of these ways of life, to the straight Way and the narrow Path of which the Bible speaks, to the Path of the *Gita*, and the Upanishads, to our own Arhatta, the Noble Path of the Arhats. Ah! that Path is of a single file. On that Path we but follow faithfully in the footsteps of our Illustrious Predecessors. On that Path senses are to be controlled in one and only one way; the routine of life for each and all is one and the same routine; the philosophy which teaches Truth, the art which reveals Beauty, the religion which enhances the Good in each of us is a single philosophy, is an art that repeats itself, is the good that makes us exactly the same at each stage of the pilgrimage. On that Path not originality, but identity is needed—there is no difference between the Arhats, on the one hand, and the Sownees on the other. It is ever the same old Path, the Ancient Way, the Grand Trunk Road on which all souls progress, the Highway of the Spirit which leads to Nirvana.

--From a Lecture on "DHAMMAPADA—STEPS ON THE PATH"

PUNISHMENT AND PERSONALITY

[During a three years close investigation of the English prison system **Rev. Gordon Lang** was rendered every assistance by the Home Office and the Prison Commissioners. This article is a partial result of that intensive enquiry. An important volume on penal methods covering the entire research will soon be published by Rev. Doctor Lang. He is an authority on criminology and has made many contributions to leading journals on the subject of penal reform. He is the biographer of Mr. Justice Avory, England's foremost criminal judge for many years, a Minister of the Free Church, and was senior member of Parliament for Oldham 1929-31.—Eds.]

A few years ago the late Mr. Justice McCardie delivered a lecture to the Cambridge University Law Society in which he asked :—

What is the function of punishment? What is the object of the Criminal Law? Is the object of inflicting punishment on a man to reform, or is it to deter that man or others? And the curious feature of our system, and indeed of other systems, is this: that, so far as I can see, nobody has ever yet set forth with clearness the principles of punishment which ought to prevail.

The complaint of the learned judge was well founded. From time to time jurists have expressed views which were as definite as they were wholly inconsistent. Sir James Stephen, author of *The History of Criminal Law in England*, stated that, "the criminal law proceeds upon the principle that it is morally right to hate criminals, and it confirms and justifies that sentiment by inflicting upon criminals punishments which express it." This dictum embodies the principle of retribution, a view also laid down by Sir Edward Fry in the words, "the object of punishment is to adjust the punishment to the sin." On the other hand, Professor Kenny, in his *Out-*

lines of Criminal Law, suggests that to most of the accepted authorities, deterrence is the main principle underlying punishment and says that the hope of preventing repetition of the offence "is not only a main object, but the sole permissible object of inflicting a criminal punishment." It has never been decided whether deterrence should apply to the criminal himself or whether his punishment should be vicarious in the sense of acting as warning and deterrent to others. It is probable that both these aspects are present in the mind of the judge when he determines judgment. The morality of retribution in punishment will be largely decided for himself by the individual's allegiance or otherwise to the *Lex Talionis* or the Mosaic conception of "An eye for an eye; a tooth for a tooth."

The efficacy of deterrence as the reason or part of the reason for punishment does not receive much support from the statistics of recidivism in crime. The yearly receptions into English prisons on conviction show that seventy-three per cent of prisoners have previous convictions and that more than a third of the total have been convic-

ted on at least five previous occasions.

It would appear, therefore, that some element or principle other than, or additional to, those of retribution and deterrence is required in an intelligent and socially useful theory and practice of punishment. The Prison Commissioners have recognized this and in their Report for 1925-6 inserted an admirable summary of the position as follows:—

Prisons exist to protect society, and they can only give efficient protection in one of two ways, either (a) by removing the anti-social person from the community altogether or for a very long period; or, (b) by bringing about some change in him. Any general application of the first method would not be supported by public opinion. The prison administration must therefore do its utmost to apply the second; that is to say, to restore the man who has been imprisoned to ordinary standards of citizenship, so far as this can be done within the limits of his sentence. Unless some use can be made of the period of imprisonment to change the anti-social outlook of the offender and to bring him into a more healthy frame of mind towards his fellow-citizens, he will, on leaving the prison gates after a few weeks or months, again become a danger or at any rate a nuisance. He may, indeed, be worse than before, if the only result has been to add a vindictive desire for revenge on society to the selfish carelessness of the rights of others which he brought into prison with him. The change can be, and is, effected in a good many cases by vigorous industrial, mental, and moral teaching, pursued on considered lines by officers, teachers and prison visitors of character and personality. The effect of such training, properly conducted, is to induce self-respect, to lessen self-conceit (characteristic of

many prisoners on first reception) and to arouse some sense of personal responsibility. Failures there are, and always will be, but the records of successes justify the system and the efforts of those who work to carry it out.

This statement is historical in matters of penal administration for it pre-supposes reformation as the object of imprisonment. It is a considerable step forward, how considerable only those know who were acquainted with the former regime. Then, prison was a place of shameful degradation and sheer punishment. Any real attempt at restoring personality was left until the moment of discharge when it devolved upon some such voluntary organisation as The Discharged Prisoners' Aid Society. Under the modern method the prisoner, from the first day of his reception, is regarded in the light of his subsequent release. It is more important though of course more difficult, to prepare a man to face the life of initiative and comparative freedom outside prison walls than it is to inure him to a life of complete obedience to mechanical routine. The latter method can never equip a man for his battle with circumstances when once more he becomes a free person. It is a deal easier to live entirely by regulation, where no initiative is required and no responsibility is incurred, than otherwise. The failure of the old system was that it never prepared men for the ordeal of facing life again under normal conditions—and it is an ordeal after years of routine life behind prison walls.

The humiliation of prison then lasted from the first day to the last day of the sentence. It is necessary, if a man is really to make good, that he should steadily, if slowly, regain some of those conditions of modified freedom which, sooner than anything else, help him to recover his self-respect. Prison should never be a hopeless place for the prisoner. The road he has to travel may be painful, and must be restricted, for prison will always remain a most uncomfortable place, but it must not be a place on which can be inscribed: "Abandon hope, all ye who enter here."

Unfortunately, at the moment, the prison authorities seem to be in advance of general opinion, and each successive step to saner treatment of law-breakers is criticized as "coddling convicts" or "pampering prisoners". Only recently Wormwood Scrubs prison, London, where a splendid work is being done with first offenders, was described from the Bench as a club. The recent cases of disorder in British prisons, unusual both as regards number and gravity, have been seized upon as evidence of too lenient treatment though in no case have the disorders had the slightest connection with the more humane treatment. It is important to remember a categorical denial to the suggestion that more humane conditions were responsible for the unprecedented Dartmoor mutiny in 1932, which was given by Mr. Justice Du Parcq, who conducted the official enquiry.

A comprehensive investigation of the English prison system has convinced the writer that it is in the newer spirit that English prisons are being administered to-day. It must not be supposed that the improvements are only to be seen in minor adjustments. There are many of these, but the whole atmosphere of prison has been changed in the last few years. It really is a revolutionary change. Gone are the utter hopelessness and complete helplessness which were once characteristic of the English gaol and which affected prisoners and prison officials alike. The minor changes have been mostly those which have removed the brutal and stupid degradation from the system, and as a result the prisoner is less likely to feel that he is just a caged beast. These adjustments include the abolition of the hideous broad arrows from prison clothing, provision of enamel washing-utensils in lieu of the old tin bowl, permission to shave with safety razors, and much better conditions for the visits of relatives and friends. More exercise is permitted, there are educational classes and the horror of solitary confinement has been abolished except as punishment for gross breaches of prison discipline, and even then its infliction is strictly conditioned.

The first big step taken has been in the matter of classification. This is determined, not by the trial judge nor by the prison governor but by the Prison Commissioners. Length of sentence is not considered so much as the general char-

acteristics of the convicted person. There are three main classes; (1) the Star class for first offenders, (2) the Intermediate class; and (3) the Recidivist class. The Intermediate class really defines itself and in this category are placed those who are not first offenders and whose habits render them unfit for association with the "Stars" but who, by reason of the fact that their previous offences have not been very grave or very many, or who by their youth, can yet be regarded as not coming within the group of Recidivists.

The method by which the objective of reform is reached with convicts (prisoners sentenced to penal servitude, the minimum term of which is three years), is the "Stage" system. There are four stages and the first lasts for eighteen months. Then, if conduct and industry are satisfactory, promotion is made to the second stage in which convicts may attend lectures and entertainments and indulge in a limited amount of evening recreation. Entry into the third stage may be reached in a further twelve months or, with "Star" convicts, in half that time. Here are important modifications of regime. A different dress is worn, more furniture and comforts are allowed in the cells and evening

recreation is taken in association with others when conversation is permitted. The fourth stage cannot be reached until four years have been spent in prison but it is very important. The prisoner may now have his meals in association with others, may talk at exercise and, most valued of all, can earn small gratuities which may be spent on luxuries.

It will be seen that each additional privilege gained means that the man is a little more, just a little more, like the average well-behaved citizen outside the prison walls. My investigation into the prison system satisfied me that the new methods are on the right lines. Much remains to be done but it is not possible in this article to outline suggestions as to this. Public opinion must be educated to the necessity of reform instead of punishment. An encouraging fact is that the steady improvement and humanisation of the penal regime has been followed by a sharp decline in the prison population and, which is even more significant, by a remarkable reduction in the percentage of prisoners punished for misconduct. Punishment which injures personality is immoral and it is ineffective. The duty of the State is to restore men to citizenship, not to confirm them in crime.

GORDON LANG

NEW RELIGIONS OF MODERN MINDS

[**Helen Bryant** shows how the religious sense is manifesting itself in the chaotic conditions of to-day in Communism, Fascism, Nazism. These new religions are not likely to afford intellectual satisfaction or heart-contentment, even if any or all of them restored order and brought economic prosperity to the masses. Those only who do not succumb to the over-powering influence of such new-old creeds and resist with a calmness born of knowledge its tyranny as deteriorating as that of Jesuitism will succeed in throwing light on the path of humanity. Mankind is in need to-day of the Religion of Self-Reliance in which neither the dictator nor the priest has any place, and each soul recognizes himself as the soldier-statesman, the soldier to fight his own vices and the statesman to adjust his own environment. In this task each soul needs the friendship of those who are in the same divine venture.—EDS.]

Each generation has its own particular religious problem. Our grandfathers and fathers were embroiled in problems of escape. The intellectuals among our grandfathers broke away from superstitions about a god who was by turns a kindly old gentleman and an unforgiving maniac, and worked out for themselves a more rational faith. But their sons broke away even from this faith. The older generation still believed in a god, shorn of childish inconsistencies, but their sons felt that science had annihilated a god of any kind. They contemplated and—in the first enthusiasm of escape were content to contemplate—a world as chaotic and meaningless as it was complex. But having torn their faith up by the roots they began to feel themselves bleaching in their spiritual wasteland, and the more extravagant among them expressed their *malaise* in mirthless songs, restlessness, dissipation, and sometimes a childish display of temper and despair.

The next generation comes upon the scene with untroubled brow, inclined to ask what all the agony

is about. Science, it now seems to them, has on the one hand cleared away superstition, while continuing on the other to unlock vaster and vaster regions of miracle. Without any struggle of their own they inherit the essentials of Christianity uncluttered by superstition. For of course they do not grow up *untouched* by Christianity. Although many people in the West to-day feel that the churches offer nothing to the intelligent, this does not mean that they cease to be Christians. They do not become Mohammedans. They do not even become atheists. Church ethics will be part of them and their progeny for many generations unless torn out by a prolonged and violent campaign of eradication.

Theoretically, therefore, one would have said not so very long ago that to-day's generations seemed religiously fortunate, that they were entering upon a period of felicity in which, free of all struggle to escape, they would be able to develop their conduct along the best lines.

So much for theory! The actual case is very different. To-day's

generations find themselves in a peculiarly infelicitous world, find themselves very possibly faced with physical distress, very certainly faced with momentous choices. They find that although certain old forms of religion and certain old conflicts are dead, new forms have sprung up, with their concomitants, ideals, faith, hymns, saints, intolerance, persecution, martyrdom. The names of these religions, Communism, Fascism, etc., at present bear no more odour of acknowledged sanctity than Christianity bore to the nostrils of the unconverted at its inception; but religions they are and very few can escape being affected by them. In Europe, the war set a match to the rotten tinder of old tyrannies. First in one country, then in another, men formulated these new creeds and put them violently into action. One at least of the creeds promises ultimate ease and happiness (paradise) in terms that appeal to the intelligentsia as well as to the masses. Its promises to millions of people now in distress are so alluring that it threatens to sweep the world. It laps at the frontiers of America, where the depression has glaringly shown up the tremendous inequality of the regnant system, the colossal stupidity of the privileged few who would rather sink the ship than give up their privileges, the colossal wickedness of those who would send millions to die in order to grow rich on making arrangements. A creed that offers to change all this is not unnaturally alluring to those who think as well

as to those who suffer. So when a worker's parade goes by with its young, naïve, powerless, courageous marchers, so ignorant but so essentially right, it is hard for the thinker not to join it. The young philosopher of to-day finds suddenly that he cannot live in an ivory tower cultivating his soul; he must come down into the arena. He cannot even vote without pondering right and wrong; he is ethically forced to concern himself with government. Science has stripped us of our old "religions," our old superstitions, but man's need of an orientation which it is the function of religion to supply, cannot be filled or obviated by science. There is a spiritual quality in man that moves him to set up ideals and try to achieve them.

The real problem which confronts us and for the solution of which we sadly need a standard of values, arises precisely when we try to accomplish our ideals. What are to be the rules governing the means we take? Should we do evil to achieve good? But this opens the door to everything. It justifies Lenin in his instructions to his followers to lie, intimidate, betray and kill. It allows Hitler to say his strong and cruel hand is for ultimate good. It leaves the ethics of every question up to the individual with no new Sermon on the Mount to steer himself by. You may not want to subscribe to Communism because you may think Communism is self-destructive, swinging ever more to the left until the

reaction brings in Fascism. You may not want to support either Communism or Fascism because you disapprove of their methods. These new religions use the old tricks. Communism has its Saint Lenin, Nazism is actually rewriting Christian hymns, substituting the name of Hitler for that of Christ. Both Communism and Fascism use violence and Jesuitism. The Soviet leaders have indeed bred up a strange group of cynical idealists. How long can they use violence and deceit without being changed, without becoming incapable of differentiating between good and evil? One cannot touch pitch, says the old proverb, and not be defiled. The Nazi leaders do not even have the saving grace of a noble ideal. Their dreams of empire are horrible anachronisms.

These are not, of course, the only religions. There are still many men who are neither cynical nor naïve, who are liberal, intelligent, honourable and as ardent in their desire to better conditions as any fanatic. But they are liable to be accused of nanby-pambyism and to be swept aside, simply because they do stop to think. Yet it may well be that the liberal man is the hope of the world. It may well be that, unless he prevails, the fanatics and the corrupt will destroy each other and everyone else.

So to-day's generation, whose outlook a few years ago might

have been so rosy, faces a welter of creeds, from which it must choose; for which it may have to suffer as followers of creeds have suffered in the past. But there is a difference between past and present—the emphasis has shifted. Religion has a dual rôle—it integrates man with the Infinite and regulates his worship, and it integrates man with man and regulates his social conduct. In the past stress has generally been on man's attitude to God, on his method of worship (in spite of Christ's teaching): to-day, the stress is on his duty to man. He is called upon to sacrifice, not for God, but for Humanity. He is not called upon to decide whether he shall be Catholic or Puritan, but he may be called upon to decide just as religiously and just as dangerously whether he shall be Communist or Fascist or Liberal. And he may feel, should he renounce one of these faiths through fear, that he is betraying the ethical sense that is the modern equivalent of his immortal soul. Every man who is not abnormal has this ethical sense, more or less rudimentary. Every normal man says to himself "I ought,"—hence all his perturbations of spirit.

Man is a little dust, miraculous dust, and for that which is miracle in him he must pay, it seems, century after century, with much searching for truth and suffering in its name.

HELEN BRYANT

REINCARNATION

NECESSARY IN THE EVOLUTION-MOSAIC

[**George Godwin**, is a Bar-at-Law, and author of numerous volumes the latest of which is a novel *Anna Berger* which deals with the phenomenon of stigmata. In this article he shows not only the reasonableness of Reincarnation but also the necessity of using the doctrine as a complement to the scientific scheme of evolution which takes no account of the self-conscious intelligence of the human soul.—Eds.]

The desire to know the fate of the dead has been, throughout human history, an important factor in the stimulation of man's curiosity as to his place in, and fate in, the universe. The many answers made to this immemorial question, enshrined in the religions of the world, reflect man's changing concepts of his ultimate destiny.

Where are the dead? is merely another way of expressing the ever-present preoccupation: What fate awaits us, the living, beyond the grave?

From this fundamental question of primeval as of modern man has sprung up the many-branched tree of faith. A study of comparative religions reveals the fact that there has always been an unanimity vastly impressive on this point: humanity in all ages has rejected the idea of soul's mortality, of the extinction of the individual by physical death.

All religions resemble one another in that they are systems whose object is to determine, first, the nature of the hereafter, and, secondly, that way of earthly life that shall lead surely to the blessed state.

Bound up with the riddle of the hereafter is the mystery of the

godhead. Man has made many gods and most of them have been in his own image, the personification, in pantheistic cults, of human attributes and natural forces; in monotheistic cults, of an undivided and unlimited power governing all creation.

The godhead or godheads conceived, religions evolved into so many ways of life, each one an attempt to read and interpret the divine mind and to do its will. Thus, obviously, the conception of deity has been the conditioning factor of all religions, whether dogmatic, cultural or revelatory.

The god of wrath has been a deity demanding propitiation; the god of love one evoking reverence and brotherly love as the rule of life. And so on. But whatever the religion under review, one common idea colours all. It is the idea of justice, of rewards for merits, of punishment for wrongdoing.

If the history of religion makes one thing certain it is that, like all else in human affairs, the process of evolution is here at work: religions, like principalities and powers, are engendered, wax to maturity, and sink to decay. The earth is the graveyard of dead and

forgotten gods as it is the birth-place of gods yet to be.

But if religions come and go, Religion abides as the permanent manifestation of a divine principle in man. This, the argument from general consent, is one that has been assailed by unbelievers many times, but it remains, perhaps, the most impressive of all arguments for the essential truth of religion.

Religion, however, is more than an objective attitude towards the problem of human destiny: it is also that subjective mystical experience that rests neither upon reason nor the evidence of the phenomenal world. It is the inborn sense of mystery, the innate longing to achieve a harmony with divine things.

Thus our problem shifts from the weighing of evidence, the balancing of probabilities, to the realm of mysticism, of inner experience. This mystical approach has had its adepts in many religions for example Aristophanes who says;—"We alone enjoy the holy light, we, who were initiated and led a life of godliness toward both kin and stranger"; the keynote he sounded by expressing that deep sense of an ultimate divine justice which rewards the suffering of the innocent and requites the triumph of the wicked. The mystic holds by ultimate values and envisages the working out of divine purpose as the perfecting of a pattern of justice.

Reincarnation, as a religious philosophy, is a conception of the operation of this divine plan which places man's spiritual destiny on a

level with his physical evolution. It is, therefore, an hypothesis that harmonizes with known natural law and merely carries it over into the realm of the spiritual.

In the western mind there is a widespread idea that this belief is peculiar to the East. Actually, this is not so, for one may find evidences of it in the worship of Dionysus and in the Orphic cults. Pythagoras believed in reincarnation, as he held, also, that all living things are kin. The doctrine is also explicit in the writings of Plotinus, of Plato, of Empedocles; and Herodotus referring to it suggests that its source was Egypt.

Reincarnation was also the central teaching of England's oldest known religion, the religion of Druidism, which taught that men's souls do not perish at death, but transmigrate.

It is obvious, therefore, that to regard the doctrine of reincarnation as a purely eastern cult is contrary to historical fact: it is a theory of religion to provide the heart and the brain with an acceptable hypothesis that has appeared in many ages and in many lands.

What is the appeal of this doctrine? It is, perhaps, the satisfaction brought by it to man's sense of justice. But, unlike orthodox Christianity, the ideas of rewards and punishments appear as a natural evolutionary process rather than as a price put upon virtue and its reverse.

Much Christian teaching is repugnant to thinking people because it suggests, not virtue as an end in

itself, but for the purpose of securing rewards hereafter, a teaching which invalidates all moral values. For where is the virtue of a way of life that is followed as a means to reward or as way of escape from condign punishment?

Yet there are, in the sayings of Christ, expressions that lend themselves to an interpretation seldom put upon them. For example, when Christ said: "Ye must be born again" he may have been referring to the rebirth of spiritual awakening, but, on the other hand, he may have been making an allusion to the rebirth of reincarnation. So, too, when he said: "In my father's house are many mansions" he may have had the same thought in mind. However that may be—and the two passages* are quoted merely because they seem of peculiar interest in this connection—the doctrine of reincarnation, for so long neglected in western religious ideology, is one well worth examination from the ethical and practical standpoints.

Reincarnation postulates a process founded upon justice worked out in an evolutionary manner and envisages man's spiritual progress upon the same grand scale that science has designed from the material data of geology, embryology, and history.

Consider how the theory fits with the evolutionary doctrine. The theory of evolution reveals the climb of man from the lowest life-forms. Through countless cen-

turies he has slowly evolved to his present highly-organized and complex form, the highest development of material life on earth, perhaps, in the Universe. He has become possessed of a soul and that soul is subject to the same laws of development that conditioned the rise of his bodily form. Indeed how could it escape such application?

Reincarnation, then, can be stated in terms of natural law operating in the spiritual realm.

If we predicate the immortality of the soul we must elect for one of two alternatives. At death the soul passes either to a beatific state or place of punishment, or proceeds, housed in successive fleshy habitations, upon the upward or downward path of spiritual evolution.

It is necessary to think in terms of astronomical time to come anyway near an idea of the briefness of human life. Yet many religions teach that the acts of this moment of existence determine an eternity. Thus the Roman Church teaches that a life of unrepented wickedness for the little moment of man's day, involves the incredible punishment of eternal damnation; that a single pious passage through this world is rewarded by the stupendous gift of eternal bliss.

When one contrasts such teaching with the central idea of reincarnation the ethical and reasonable grounds for the latter are apparent.

There are others. Those interested should read a small pamphlet (U. L. T. No. 8) *Reincarnation in Western Religions* by W. Q. Judge in which evidence from Judaism, the Bible and the Church Fathers in favour of Reincarnation is marshalled.—EDS.

Reincarnation, as a doctrine, falls into the pattern of the phenomenal world as we know it from the teachings of science. There are no scientific impediments to its acceptance: on the contrary, the advance of science suggests the possibility of the soul's independent action outside the house of the body, and brings evidence in support of the proposition. We know, for example, that it is possible to see events happening at a distance, events in the future, to reach out and make contacts with other minds.

The idea that after death the soul returns to take up its abode in another body of the same species therein to continue to work out its destiny is surely one that has all the appeal of reason and probability to commend it.

If man's physical form is the product of so long a process of evolution, may one not believe his soul destined to a life long process of perfecting?

Science has taught us much, but the secret of the intangible soul still escapes the probe of the laboratory worker. Whence comes the soul? What factors determine the character of each new-born creature? We know that heredity determines the physical form,

that it determines largely the mental qualities: but science can offer no explanation of the soul.

The teaching that the soul leaves the body at death to continue its progress towards perfection in another physical form is one that offers few obstacles to reason and none to instinctual belief.

It is a grand conception which takes an heroic view of human destiny. It gives a new significance to life and a greater hope for the ultimate destiny of humanity. Yet it remains the religion of the humble, envisaging the path to perfection, as it does, as one never to be achieved in the mere moment of a single earthly existence, but only through countless reincarnations.

Once grant the existence of the spiritual life of man and the doctrine of reincarnation provides a working hypothesis that satisfies the mind, the heart, and the instincts.

Why has it played so small a part in the modern thought of the western world?

Perhaps an answer to this question would take us some way towards a solution of the sickness from which the world of machines is suffering.

GEORGE GODWIN

GOD AND MAN IN HINDUISM

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It is generally asserted, and certainly it is true, that a man's or a nation's life is greatly moulded by his or its conception of Deity. The Hindu conception of Deity and the Hindu programme of man's evolution are intimately related. We are not overlooking that in Hinduism itself there are different conceptions of Deity and its Emanations, Man and his Evolution. These different concepts are points of view—not contradictory but complementary, and when truly harmonized, will make a picture of religious philosophy which will answer every intellectual problem, and satisfy every moral aspiration.

One of the tasks before Hinduism, as a living system of faith, is to unify in a splendid pattern all these view-points. Universalize the teachings of Hinduism, make applications of the teachings implicit in the institution of Varna-Ashrama-Dharma to every human Soul evolving in the School of Earth-life, and we have a philosophy of action and conduct which will satisfy and succeed. Worship of a jealous and cruel god has produced jealousy and cruelty in the world; so dethrone that god. What shall we substitute? As expressed in the words of H. P. Blavatsky in her *Key to Theosophy* :—

"The *root* of all nature, objective and subjective, and everything else in the universe, visible and invisible, *is, was, and ever will be* one absolute essence, from which all starts, and into which everything returns. This is Aryan philosophy, fully represented only by the Vedantins, and the Buddhist system." (p. 36) "All men have spiritually and physically the same origin, which is the fundamental teaching of Theosophy. As mankind is essentially of one and the same essence, and that essence is one—infinite, uncreate, and eternal, whether we call it God or Nature—nothing, therefore, can affect one nation or one man without affecting all other nations and all other men." (p. 31) "The identity of our physical origin makes no appeal to our higher and deeper feelings. Matter, deprived of its soul and spirit, or its divine essence, cannot speak to the human heart. But the identity of the soul and spirit, of real, immortal man, as Theosophy teaches us, once proven and deep-rooted in our hearts, would lead us far on the road of real charity and brotherly goodwill." (p. 36)]

The attitude of Hinduism to the world of spirit is the same as the attitude of science to the world of matter. This is clearly seen in its conception of the Deity and Its Manifestation, and of Man and his Salvation. Let us consider these four subjects in that order.

I

The Hindu conception of God is the most adequate synthesis of all phases of religious communion.

God is both transcendental and immanent, both impersonal and personal, both creator and destroyer. Hinduism does not over-emphasize the transcendental aspects of God and make Him "a wholly other," or the immanent aspects and make Him identical with the universe. The God of the *Gita* says, "All beings abide in me, but I do not abide in them." If God were "wholly other" we could never know Him; if He were only

identical with the universe He would be finite. Again, according to Hinduism, God is both personal and impersonal. The former is a poetical view, and the latter a scientific view. A poet gives us his sense of fact, as Pater puts it, while the scientist gives us the fact itself. The ultimate Reality is a person *to us*, that is, when viewed through human spectacles and interpreted in terms of human experience. This is a legitimate view, and it satisfies the emotional demands of the religious man. Only if we overemphasize it, we get the anthropomorphic conception of popular religions whose gods have inseparable consorts and truly begotten sons. A salutary corrective to this is the view of God, not as He is to us, but as It is in Itself. The absolute view as opposed to the relative is a humble confession of our weakness in trying to understand Its ineffable perfections. It is a courageous admission that even our highest human values of righteousness, beauty and truth are transmuted in the ocean of Spirit to something rich and strange. *The Absolute with its infinite possibilities is looked upon as the personal Deity by us in relation to one of the possibilities which has become an actuality, namely, the present universe.* To call this a negative conception of God is absurd. On the other hand it is the only conception that does justice to our deepest intuitions. *The impersonal Brahman manifesting itself on the plane of human consciousness as the personal Iswara satisfies all the*

demands of our minds and hearts. And, lastly, *the personal Deity according to Hinduism is neither a ruthless judge demanding the fullest penalty for the sins of mankind, nor a sentimental saviour offering the cheapest means of salvation.* Retributive justice and loving mercy are the opposite sides of the same shield. They become irreconcilable attributes, demanding separate impersonations, as in Christian theology, only when God is viewed as a Being external to ourselves. The grace of an immanent God is not a negation of the law, but the operation of a higher law.

II

The dissociation of the Absolute into subject and object or spirit and matter constitutes creation, or manifestation, according to Hinduism. And the whole aim of the universe is an attempt on the part of the sundered spirit to get back to its original wholeness through growth in the time-process. Thus we have evolution in the phenomenal world, though there can be no change or growth in the eternal That. By the way, it is the absence of the recognition of this latter fact that makes the evolution admitted by Hinduism so different from the creative evolution of modern European thinkers. In the lowest stages of evolution we have *annam* or matter with only the latent possibilities of spirit, and thence we have a gradual ascent to plants, animals and men. The *Taittiriya Upanishad* clearly marks the stages of growth from matter to life, from

life to consciousness, from consciousness to self-consciousness and from self-consciousness to spiritual Universal consciousness. The progress of the world is therefore to be measured by the increasing supremacy of spirit over matter, of self over not-self. And the goal is reached when there is complete supremacy of spirit over matter, when the many become One again, and the abstract unity gives place to concrete totality. But the end, like the beginning, is only ideal and beyond the time-process.

It is very important to understand clearly this view of the Hindu sages of the evolving universe, for as we shall presently see, it is the basis of all their ethical and social systems and their programmes of discipline. If progress is always to be measured in terms of the supremacy of the spirit, a man who leads a life of the spirit and strives incessantly for the spiritual values of righteousness, beauty and truth, not only for himself but also for all others, is evidently in harmony with the purpose of the universe. He co-operates with the Deity. Therefore the ideal human society is that in which initiative and direction are in the hands of those who care only for spiritual values and who have nothing to gain personally by their labours, and in which the ignorant masses are treated like the younger children in a family, well cared for and protected. Indian sages had evidently this ideal in view, when with the materials they had in India they

laid down plans for the construction of Hindu society. Their attempt could not in the nature of things result in permanent success. It would take us too far from the limits of the present paper to consider the causes of the failure of the caste system, which, as it exists now, is a millstone round the neck of India.

The Rishis sought to order the life not only of society but also of the individual according to the central purpose of the universe, as they understood it. The four grades of society are repeated in the four stages of individual life. The *Asramas* are parallel to the *Varnas*. The first stage in the life of a man is to be devoted to service, obedience and education, the second to productive life and citizenship, the third to disinterested service and the fourth to the complete liberation of the spirit. Thus the famous formula of Varnasrama-Dharma is an indication of a severely practical attempt on the part of the Hindu nation builders of later ages to organise individual as well as social life in India according to the revelation of the Upanishads.

III

Hinduism looks on man as the latest product of the phenomenal evolution of the spirit in the universe. He is a mixed being, part animal and part spirit. The purpose of his life, in accordance with the purpose of the Cosmos, is to realize the spirit in him and to make his animal nature subordinate to it. It is a mistake to

suppose that Hinduism encourages the asceticism which looks upon the body as the enemy of the spirit and which seeks to eradicate all desires of the flesh. Far from looking upon the body as the enemy of the spirit, Hinduism according to an oft-quoted formula declares that the body is the instrument of the spirit. The *Gita* in a hundred different places recognizes the forces of nature in man and teaches that these should be sublimated into spiritual habits. Why, the whole discipline of the graded *Asramas*—student, householder, anchorite and mystic—and the mention of *Artha* or wealth and *Kama* or gratification of legitimate desire in the well-known Hindu formula of *Dharmarthukamamoksha* show conclusively that the Hindu sages never ignored the claims of the body. The emancipated soul in a song in one of the Upanishads says, "I am the eater of food,"—meaning thereby that spirit uses up matter for its own purposes. The incarnated God of the *Gita* says, "I employ nature which is my own and take birth through my divine power." Thus it is clear that, according to Hinduism, nature is the resisting medium in which spirit has to work before it can realise itself. It is as necessary to the spirit as air is to a bird or water to a fish.

One of the results of Hinduism's recognition of the forces of nature in man is the Law of Karma. It is an extension of the law of causation to the moral world. As a man sows, so shall he reap in this life or in the life after death. For death

is no dividing line for the evolving spirit. We can no more wipe out our past than we can jump away from the earth. We are what we made ourselves in the past, and we shall be what we are making ourselves in the present. No God is going to sit in judgment on our actions on some Judgment Day. The Law of Retributive Justice is ingrained in our natures. A pure thought exalts, and a foul one debases our nature as surely as fire burns or water wets. Thus all the movements of the spirit in man either upwards or downwards are recorded in his unconscious psyche and become the instincts and tendencies, the vague longings and innate powers of the man in his next life. The Law of Karma is sometimes misrepresented as something which fills a man with despair, saps his strength and encourages fatalism. Far from doing so, when rightly understood, it fills him with hope as it teaches him that he is the architect of his own fortune, that his future lies entirely in his own hands, and that God is ever present within him to help him in all his efforts. We should look upon God as an Omnipresent Gardener who waters with his grace each creeper, plant or tree and helps it to bring forth its own flower and fruit.

Our past Karma determines our natural endowments and the environment in which we have to work. And these give rise to our duties and responsibilities. Every man's duty or *Svadharm*a depends on his place in society and the stage of evolution reached by his

spirit. These provide the basis for his future work which will largely depend on his own free will. For it should be remembered that the law of Karma never shuts out free will. It only points out the conditions under which that will has to operate. Some things are determined for us even before we take birth; they are the outcome of our own past actions and our will has to make the best of them. But there is a very large field where we can exercise our free will and make or mar ourselves.

IV

Lastly, we come to the question of salvation. Hinduism views the salvation of man as part of the evolution of the spirit in the cosmos. We have already seen that the central purpose of the universe is to make the sundered many grow into the original One. So man has to be saved not only from sin, but from his finiteness and from the delusive notion of a separate self, which is the root of all sin. Salvation, therefore, according to Hindu conceptions, is a metaphysical as well as an ethical process. Dr. Radhakrishnan says:—

When the Hindu thinkers ask us to attain release from rebirth, they are asking us to transcend the standpoint of mere individualism and rise to an impersonal universalism. To seek for liberation from the wheel of births and deaths is nothing more than to rise to the spiritual level from the

merely ethical... Perfection belongs to another dimension than the ethical, though it may express itself on the ethical plane.

Therefore not only should a man become absolutely pure in thought, word and deed, but he should also thoroughly identify himself with the purpose of the Supreme spirit and make the perception of the mystic unity of all things in the Deity a settled habit of his mind. The ways and means suggested by Hinduism for this great consummation are all comprehended in the single word Yoga, in the sense in which it is used in the *Bhagavad-Gita*. Yoga means union or fellowship with the Deity. And this fellowship has to be gained on all the planes of the human psyche—in action, in feeling, and in thought. Accordingly we have the well known division of Yoga into Karma-Yoga, Bhakti-Yoga and Jnana-Yoga. To do the work of the Supreme Spirit in the world, to love Him, as a son loves his father, and to know Him and be one with Him—that should be the endeavour of the religious man who seeks moksha or liberation. But, according to Hinduism, no man's liberation is complete till all are saved. We are all one, we rise or fall together. The liberated souls therefore retain their individuality and work for the redemption of the world till the cosmic purpose is achieved.

D. S. SARMA

THE IDEA OF THE INFINITE

[Ivor B. Hart, O. B. E., Ph. D., B. Sc., does not need an introduction to the readers of THE ARYAN PATH. In this interesting article he shows the identity between the ancient and modern views of the Infinite.

While the human mind cannot know the Infinite, that which is Infinite in man is able to sense spiritually the Infinite in the cosmos. "Only those who realise how far intuition soars above the tardy processes of ratiocinative thought can form the faintest conception of that absolute Wisdom which transcends the ideas of Time and Space" says H. P. Blavatsky (*The Secret Doctrine* I. 1). Through the faculty of spiritual intuition direct and certain knowledge is obtainable (Cf. I. 46). And she defines (I. xix) *Buddhi* as "the faculty of cognizing the channel through which divine knowledge reaches the 'Ego,' the discernment of good and evil, 'divine conscience' also; and 'Spiritual Soul,' which is the vehicle of *Atma*." She quotes "When *Buddhi* absorbs our EGO-tism (destroys it) with all its *Vikaras*, *Avalôkitêshvara* becomes manifested to us, and Nirvana, or *Mukti*, is reached."—Eps.]

If there is one vital significance in the great fact of the human ability to reason and to think, it surely lies in man's age-old striving to apply that ability to the problems and the purpose and the responsibilities of his own existence. Philosophers and thinkers—that is to say, all those who have taken the trouble to use the gift of reason—have inevitably concerned themselves with questions of "how" and "why". They see themselves in a world of law and order and beauty; they find themselves inevitably developing a code of ethics in which, starting from a sense of distinction between right and wrong, two urges become manifest, namely, a desire to better themselves spiritually, and a desire to better the world spiritually. They view the universe around them objectively, and the life within them subjectively, and they find, or at least they seek to find, the two correlated in a sense of purpose. Where would this sense of correlation be but for the persistent

impression of a limitlessness in Nature and the Universe? And given further an impression of control behind all this limitlessness, Man strives, and will go on striving, to pierce the barriers of his understanding and to put himself "in tune with the Infinite"—spiritually by his ethical codes, and physically by the processes of scientific analysis and experiment.

So it is to-day, and so it was, spiritually at any rate, in the distant past. Very much so was it in the religion of the Indo-Aryans as represented in the Vedas many centuries before Christ; and although time has brought a multiplicity of gods and goddesses to serve the needs of those whose religious ideas are supposed to require the aid of external symbols there is, behind the maze of all the mythology that has grown up, a definite philosophical background of one Eternal Self-Existent Being or Universal Spirit, into whose unity all visible symbols are gathered, and in whose Essence all

entities are comprehended.

In the Vedas this unity, vaguely stated at first, gradually developed by the time of Manu. Thus we read in the last verses of Book XII:—

Thus the man who perceives in his own soul, the Supreme Soul, present in all creatures, acquires equanimity towards them all, and shall be absorbed at last in the highest Essence.

The *Rig-Veda* speaks very definitely of a deity, the Goddess Aditi, called simply "the boundless or infinite Expanse," and conceived of subsequently as the mother of all the gods. In later times the boundless Aditi may have become identified with the sky and the earth, but originally she was far beyond this. Thus we read (*Rig-Veda* v, 62.8) in a hymn addressed to Mitra and Varuna:—

O Mitra and Varuna, you mount your chariot which at the dawning of the dawn is golden-coloured, and has iron poles at the setting of the sun [*i.e.*, expressing the contrast between the light of the morning and evening by the colours of the two metals gold and iron]: from thence you see Aditi and Diti—that is, what is yonder and what is here, what is infinite and what is finite, what is immortal and what is mortal.

The appeal of the Infinite, then, profound and compelling, has been with mankind from the very beginnings. We may almost claim for it that it has been both tantalising and baffling—full of allurements yet full of puzzle, full of certainty yet full of doubt. The striving for its attainment has produced an ever-present hope arising from a positive knowledge of achievement and

advance, mingled with a consciousness of the impossibility of absolute success. Yet there is in this no sense of futility. If the Infinite is beyond absolute achievement, there is always the certainty of approach. That indeed is the measure of the growth of civilisation. We referred at the outset to the problems and the responsibilities of man. What we may call the duty of approach is definitely not only a responsibility, but indeed one of the main responsibilities of mankind. Any code of conduct which falls short of this is nothing more nor less than a gross betrayal of those gifts of reason and of the powers of distinction between right and wrong with which Man is endowed.

So far we have considered the idea of the Infinite from the ethical point of view. This is, indeed, the viewpoint that must ultimately prevail. The viewpoint of Science, however, cannot be ignored. All the higher concepts of mankind must flow not only through the gates of our senses, but also through the gates of reason. Science has applied reason and deduction to observation and experiment, and it has much to tell us in this matter of the Infinite. In this article we shall consider more particularly the bearings of mathematical science upon the subject, and right from the outset we find that here, too, that same tantalising evidence of positive approach combined with the impossibility of ultimate achievement confronts us. Consider the science

of number as an obvious illustration. One can start with unity, and go on doubling it to obtain increasingly vast numbers. Each brings us nearer to the infinitely great; yet however far we get in the process, however huge the number we reach, the process can still go on apparently without limit. And similarly with the infinitely small. Starting again with unity, one can go on halving and halving to obtain a rapidly diminishing quantity which, whilst continually approaching that infinitely small goal which is mathematically referred to as zero, yet never in fact reaches it.

Next let us take an example from the science of algebra. Consider the fraction $\frac{1}{1-x}$. If we divide this out by the ordinary process of algebraical division, we find ourselves embarking on a never-ending operation the result of which takes the form $1 + x + x^2 + x^3$ and so on, with successively higher and higher powers of x . This goes on until we give it up in sheer despair, conscious of the futility of continuing what can never be completed, yet equally certain that the longer we continue, the nearer we come to a result which can in fact be never reached. What could be more tantalising?

And now let us turn to geometry, which, by virtue of the pictorial vehicle with which it represents the facts and properties of space, offers a welcome relief from the abstract in its imagery. The simplest geometrical entity is a point. We use the word "simplest"

a little unguardedly, however, for a point is that which has neither length nor breadth, but position only. It is, so to speak, a zero entity—the infinitely small. No instrument known to science, however delicate, can produce a point. The finest prick is too big. Right at the outset geometry begins with the unattainable. We can only accept the abstract notion after all. The rest is imagination. It is the unattainably infinitesimal in the geometry of space. Similarly the line, which was defined on the old Euclidian formula as having length but no breadth, also has its element of the unattainable. It is made up of an infinite succession of points. But let us consider in particular the straight line. Beginning at any point whatsoever, can it go on for ever? Readers who have followed previous articles by the writer will recall that the physicist of to-day has established, to his own satisfaction at any rate, what we speak of as the curvature of space. Inherently a plane surface is not flat, but forms part of a vast sphere. Therefore a line on it is really part of a vast circle, and ultimately would bend back on itself and return to the original starting point. Geometrically we may well say it goes off indeed to infinity, but it would seem that that is not the end of the story. It does not stop there. It goes on, not beyond infinity, since that is manifestly impossible, but returns so to speak round the other side. Students of mathematics who are familiar with the methods of Cartesian co-ordinates know that if a

framework of two axes of reference are taken at right-angles to each other, distances measured to the right are regarded as positive, and those to the left as negative in respect of the horizontal axis, whilst distances upwards are positive and downwards negative in the case of the vertical axis. A straight line drawn parallel to the horizontal axis goes off to infinity at the right, but is continuous in that it ultimately reappears from infinity at the extreme left, finally to rejoin up with the positive portion of the line.

We venture finally upon one further illustration of this type in view of its special importance to our theme. A large and important section of mathematical enquiry centres round what are known as the conic sections. According as a cone is cut by a plane at various angles, one or other of four curves are obtained—the circle, the ellipse, the parabola and the hyperbola. The cut is a circle or ellipse if the plane is exactly or nearly at right angles to the axis of the cone. But if the cut is nearer the vertical in its angle, then instead of slicing right through, it slices downwards, so to speak, on to the base of the cone, and we get a hyperbola (or more rarely a parabola).

These are important, among other reasons, because Nature provides innumerable instances of bodies in space whose paths are precisely one or other of these curves. The planets move around the sun in ellipses, for instance, and the comets have parabolic

orbits mostly, with elliptical orbits in some cases. Similar orbits obtain for the paths of the electrons that move round the central proton in atomic particles of matter. Perhaps the most interesting of these conic sections is the hyperbola. It appears to have two branches. This calls for a little preliminary explanation. All readers are familiar with a simple cone, but it should be understood that mathematically a cone does not end at its tip, but really continues with an inverted branch. A perfect picture of what is meant can be seen by taking a cone and placing it horizontally with the tip against a mirror. The image seen through the mirror is precisely what we mean by the second branch of the mathematical cone, and a plane that slices the cone at a suitable angle would, if projecting through the mirror, also slice the "image" portion, and give the second branch of the curve. These are the two branches of the hyperbola. One final point and we are done with the preliminaries. The mathematical cone has no limit in size. It extends downwards (and of course upwards) from the tip or apex indefinitely. It therefore follows that the hyperbola that is sliced out extends both downwards in the one branch, and upwards in the other branch, also indefinitely.

So the hyperbola affords a striking instance of not only a curve which is endless in that it extends right away to infinity, but also in that it possesses a "mirrored" counterpart. In Cartesian geometry we should show it, remembering

that the two axes of reference at right-angles make four compartments, so to speak, as one curve in the top right-hand compartment, and its "mirrored" counterpart in the bottom left-hand quarter. The point of importance that the reader is called upon to grasp is that mathematically these two are really one. Picture the curve in your mind, set in the framework of its two axes of reference at right-angles. In the top right-hand quarter, the curve swings down and away to the right, getting nearer and nearer to the horizontal axis the further it goes off, yet never actually reaching it. It does in fact just reach it at infinity. Here, like the straight line above referred to, it starts its return journey, bending back on itself and coming back from the left, this time *below* the horizontal, and forming what before appeared to be the "mirrored" branch of the curve. Now it comes in and swings downwards to the *left* of the vertical axis, always getting nearer and nearer to it, yet never actually touching it until it reaches infinity in a downwards direction. Once more it now bends back on itself this time reappearing at the top to the *right* of the vertical axis, to join up with the original top right-hand quarter of the curve

at which we started. In the absence of a diagram this is perhaps a little difficult to follow, but it is hoped that the description here given will enable the reader to appreciate that mathematics, which we are told, cannot lie, at one and the same time shows infinity to be a link of continuity in nature, and yet to be unattainable in itself.

What, then, are we to conclude from all this? Considering, as we did at the outset, the idea of the Infinite in the first instance purely from the ethical standpoint, we saw in the conception an ideal, unattainable possibly, but approachable definitely. Now, turning to the world of modern science, we find the mathematician offering us, in the rigidity of his logic, precisely the same picture. Space forbids us to pursue the topic further for the moment.

We may conclude with the remark that if we are agreed that the Infinite, with all that the term implies, represents an ideal for humanity, the question as to whether it is in fact unattainable matters not a tithe in comparison with the undoubted truism that it is possible to draw nearer and nearer towards the perfection of the mind and spirit that must persist as Man's ultimate goal.

IVOR B. HART

PALINGENESY

[H. Stanley Redgrove, B. Sc., is the author of numerous works on philosophical and mathematical subjects, as also on those dealing with the chemistry of perfumes. He writes about one and refers to several "exploded superstitions" which are likely to become "scientific facts". We append a Note to this interesting article.—Eds.]

In John Phin's *The Seven Follies of Science* (Second Edition, London, 1906), palingenesis, along with the belief in the powder of sympathy, and the quests for ever-burning lamps and for a universal solvent, is accounted one of the minor follies, or attempts to achieve the impossible. The seven major follies are comprised under the terms squaring the circle, duplication of the cube, trisection of angles, perpetual motion, transmutation of metals, fixation of mercury, and the elixir of life. Phin's book is very readable, but it is not profound; and, now that the transmutation of the elements has actually been effected, albeit on an ultra-microscopic scale, the ideas of the old alchemists do not strike us as being so preposterous as they did in the days when Phin's book appeared.

Palingenesis, he defines as "a certain chemical process by means of which a plant or animal might be revived from its ashes. In other words a sort of material resurrection". He writes:—

Kircher tells us in his *Ars Magnetica* that he had a long-necked phial, hermetically sealed, containing the ashes of a plant which he could revive at pleasure by means of heat; and that he showed this wonderful phenomenon to Christina, Queen of Sweden, who was highly delighted with it.

Unfortunately he left this valuable curiosity one cold day in his window and it was entirely destroyed by the frost. Father Schott also asserts that he saw this chemical wonder which, according to his account, was a rose revived from its ashes. (pp. 106-7).

Phin adds :

The explanation of these facts given by Father Kircher is worthy of the science of the times. He tells us that the seminal virtue of each mixture is contained in the salts and these salts, unalterable by their nature, when put in motion by heat, rise in the vessel through the liquor in which they are diffused. Being then at liberty to arrange themselves at pleasure, they place themselves in that order in which they would be placed by the effect of vegetation, or the same as they occupied before the body to which they belonged had been decomposed by the fire; in short, they form a plant, or the phantom of a plant, which has a perfect resemblance to the one destroyed. (pp. 107-8)

I must confess to feeling no sympathy with Phin's attitude of superiority and contempt for the errors made by old-time investigators of Nature's marvels. They should, rather, be commended for the efforts they made to explain phenomena which must have seemed very puzzling to them; and I think it decidedly worth while to endeavour to determine why they went astray. Quite prob-

ably, some of the most cherished scientific theories of the present age will appear just as much nonsense to a future generation as palingenesis seems to us.

While the literature of alchemy is immense, that dealing with palingenesis is trifling in bulk. Phin refers to a number of other old writers who deal with it; but he is not really helpful, as he never bothers to give references. (One evening, some little time ago, it occurred to me that it might be of interest to see what the old books in my library would reveal on this highly curious subject; and here is the result, which I give for the benefit of those who may feel interested in this quaint old belief.

First of all then, let us see what Sir Kenelm Digby has to say on the matter. Digby is chiefly remembered for his connection with the powder of sympathy which, it was claimed, cured a wound by application to the weapon with which the wound had been inflicted. Evelyn, in his diary, calls him "an errant mountebank". This was unjust. Digby made a number of useful observations of natural phenomena, and some of his books are of real practical value. In the work from which I am about to quote, for example, he records valuable experiments with saltpetre as a fertilising agent. He says:—

By the help of plain *Salt-petre*, dilated in water and mingled with some other fit Earthy substance, that may familiarize it a little with the corn into which I endeavour'd to introduce it: I have made the barrenest ground far out-go the richest, in giving a

prodigiously plentiful Harvest. I have seen Hemp-seed soaked in this Liqueur, that hath, in due time, made such Plants arise, as, for tallness and hardness of them, seem'd rather to be Coppice Wood of fourteen years growth at least, than plain Hemp. (p. 223)

This quotation is from *A Discourse Concerning the Vegetation of Plants*. It was delivered by Digby in 1660 at a Meeting of the Society for promoting Philosophical Knowledge by Experiments, which two years later, became the Royal Society. It appears, along with "A Discourse of The Cure of Wounds by the Powder of Sympathy," as an Appendix to vol. 2 of Digby's work *Of Bodies, and of Man's Soul, To Discover the Immortality of Reasonable Souls*, published in 1669.

In the same discourse Digby refers to hermetically sealed glasses, containing ashes, which, on warming became converted into the exact resemblance, of "Idæa" of the flowers—Roses, Tulips, Clove Gillyflowers—from which the ashes had been obtained, perfect in colour shape and magnitude. These he had never seen, for says he, "I confess it would be no small delight to me to see this experiment." Kircher, he adds, told him he had performed it successfully, and gave him details of the process. "But" adds Digby, "no industry of mine could effect it." (p. 226)

Another process, however, for details of which he was indebted to the same source, he successfully carried out.

I calcin'd a good quantity of

Nettles (Roots, Stalks, Leaves, Flowers,) : in a word, the whole Plant. . . . With fair water I made a Lye of these Ashes; which I filtered from the insipid Earth. This Lye was exposed by me, in due season, to have the Frost congeal it. . . . And it is most true, that, when the water was congeal'd into ice, there appeared to be abundance of Nettles frozen in the ice. (*Idem.*)

"Their form," he adds, "were as exact as any painter could depict the plant, but," he adds regretfully, "they lacked colour, being white."

I turn to an interesting eighteenth century figure: Ebenezer Sibly, brother of Manoah Sibly the Swedenborgian. He was a doctor of medicine, a Fellow of the Royal College of Physicians of Aberdeen, a Fellow of the Royal Horticultural Society, and, withal, an ardent astrologer. He had knowledge of botany, and edited an edition of Culpeper's Herbal, adding thereto an Appendix containing descriptions of a number of foreign medicinal plants.

His *New and Complete Illustration of the Celestial Science of Astrology* appears to have been an immensely popular book, if one may judge from the number of editions through which it passed. It is in two volumes, and my copy of volume II is of the twelfth edition, dated 1822, that of Volume I being of the thirteenth edition dated four years later.

One of the plates in volume II is a remarkable representation of a laboratory in which the process of pal genesy is being performed. The operating chemist has been highly successful in his task, very

realistic "representations" of a Pink in full bloom, a sprig of Rosemary, a sprig of Balm, and a Rose in full bloom having been obtained as a result of his labours. The artist is certainly to be congratulated on his imaginative powers.

Here is Sibly's recipe:—

Take any whole herb, or flower, with its root, make it very clean, and bruise it in a stone mortar quite small; then put it in a glass vessel hermetically sealed; but be sure the vessel be two parts in three empty. Then place it for putrefaction in a gentle heat in balneo, not more than blood warm, for six months by which it will all be resolved into water. Take this water, and pour it into a glass retort, and place a receiver thereunto, the joints of which must be well closed; distil it into a sand-heat until there come forth a water and an oil; and in the upper part of the vessel will hang a volatile salt. Separate the oil from the water, and keep it by itself, but with the water purify the volatile salt by dissolving, filtering, and coagulating. When the salt is thus purified, imbibe it in the said oil, until it is well combined. Then digest them well together for a month in a vessel hermetically sealed; and by this means will be obtained a most subtile essence, which being held over a gentle heat of a candle, the spirit will fly up into the glass where it is confined, and represent the perfect idea or similitude of that vegetable whereof it is the essence; and in this manner will that thin substance, which is like impalpable ashes or salt, send forth from the bottom of the glass the manifest form of whatever herb it is the *menstruum*, in perfect vegetation, growing little by little, and putting on so fully the form of stalks, leaves, and flowers, in full and perfect appearance, that any one would believe the same to be natural and corporeal; though at the same time it is nothing more than the spirit-

ual idea endued with a spiritual essence. This shadowed figure, as soon as the vessel is taken from the heat of the candle, returns to its *caput mortuum*, or ashes, again, and vanishes away like any apparition, becoming a chaos or confused matter. (pp. 1114-5).

Sibly adds that the effect, though surprising, "will not appear so much a subject of our astonishment, if we do but consider the wonderful nature of sympathy, which exists throughout the whole system of nature, where everything is excited to beget or love its like, and is drawn after it." (p. 1116)

Sibly's account of the process for achieving palingenesis is quoted, I fear without acknowledgment, from a much older book, namely Dr. John French's *The Art of Distillation*, of which my own copy is of the "Third Impression," dated 1664, and he, for all I know to the contrary, may have copied it from an earlier source. French's book is a practical one written for those whose trades involved distillation processes, and his account of the palingenesis experiment (pp. 34-5, and 148-9) does not convey the impression that anything is achieved more than a representation of the *form* of the flower.

It is, of course, obvious that these old writers—at any rate, those who, like Digby, certainly essayed experiments in palingenesis—were deceived by appearances which, to their eyes, looked far more realistic than they do to ours. Digby's resuscitated Nettles were crystals of mineral salts present in the Nettles; and it is remarkable

how certain crystals when allowed to form under favourable conditions simulate plant forms, more especially those of Ferns.

It is, however, pertinent to enquire why these appearances seemed so very realistic to those who in days long past thought they had succeeded in effecting palingenesis. Nor is the reason far to seek. Let me add a further question: Why did they term volatile bodies "spirits"? The explanation in both cases lies in the fact that their minds were saturated in theological doctrines. Palingenesis was, so to speak, a picture of the resurrection of the body. Digby reveals this mental attitude very plainly. A little later in his discourse he says "All this leads me to speak something of the Resurrection of Human Bodies," adding: "There we may find some firm and solid footing." (p. 228)

It is noteworthy how difficult it is to record an observation free from mental embroideries. We are apt to see what we expect to see: we read "meanings" into what we observe, and record these "meanings" as though they were pure observations. The Law Courts provide evidence of this every day. How often do witnesses contradict each other in perfect good faith?

Proof-correcting provides another instance. Many authors are exceedingly bad correctors of their own proofs. They "see" on the printed slips what they intended to write, and not the printed word.

Again: What is the Loch Ness monster? Apparently it is a mul-

titude of things, for it is the image of what each observer expected to see.

Nor are scientific works free from this confusion between observation and interpretation. During the nineteenth century, phenomena were largely observed against a background of materialist philosophy, which colours the records

of them, just as in previous centuries, they were observed against a theological background which similarly distorted them though, usually, in an opposite direction.

We are, however, learning to observe dispassionately, without theoretical bias. It is a useful, albeit a difficult art.

H. S. REDGROVE

A NOTE ON THE ABOVE

Modern science laughed only a few years ago at the alchemists who taught the transmutation of elements; to-day that transmutation has actually been effected. Similarly other major and minor "follies" of old Kabalists and Magicians are being recognized as important facts by modern biologists and chemists. In the above article Mr. Redgrove mentions in passing some of these "follies"; we should like to draw the attention of interested readers to the exposition by H. P. Blavatsky of a few of these. Thus, in *Isis Unveiled* (I. 226-229), she writes of "ever-burning lamps" at some length; "Universal Solvent" called the "alchemical principle" and "alkahest" she explains in the same volume (I. 50-51, 133, 147-8, 191); numerous references are to be found on the Elixir of Life, but we shall content by naming only one on p. 502. The article however deals at length with Palingenesis and so we give the two following extracts from her book published in 1877:—

The claims of Gaffarilus—which, by the bye, appeared so preposterous in 1650—were later corroborated by science. He maintained that every object existing in nature, provided it was not artificial, when once burned still retained its form in the ashes, which it remained till raised again. Du Chesne, an eminent chemist, assured himself of the

fact. Kircher, Digby, and Vallemont have demonstrated that the forms of plants could be resuscitated from their ashes. At a meeting of naturalists in 1834, at Stuttgart, a receipt for producing such experiments was found in a work of Oetinger. Ashes of burned plants contained in vials, when heated, exhibited again their various forms. "A small obscure cloud gradually rose in the vial, took a defined form, and presented to the eye the flower or plant the ashes consisted of." "The earthly husk," wrote Oetinger, "remains in the retort, while the volatile essence ascends, like a spirit, perfect in form, but void of substance."—*Isis Unveiled*, I. 475-76.

In Siam, Japan, and Great Tartary, it is the custom to make medallions, statuettes, and idols out of the ashes of cremated persons; they are mixed with water into a paste, and after being moulded into the desired shape, are baked and then gilded. The Lamasery of Ou-Tay, in the province of Chan-Si, Mongolia, is the most famous for that work, and rich persons send the bones of their defunct relatives to be ground and fashioned there. When the adept in magic proposes to facilitate the withdrawal of the astral soul of the deceased, which

otherwise they think might remain stupefied for an indefinite period *within* the ashes, the following process is resorted to: The sacred dust is placed in a heap upon a metallic plate, strongly magnetized, of the size of a man's body. The adept then slowly and gently fans it with the *Talapat Nang*, a fan of a peculiar shape and inscribed with certain signs, muttering, at the same time, a form of invocation. The ashes soon become, as it were, imbued with life, and gently spread themselves out into a thin layer which assumes the outline of the body before cremation. Then there gradually arises a sort of whitish vapour which after a time forms into an erect column, and compacting itself, is finally transformed into the "double," or ethereal, astral counterpart of the dead, which in its turn dissolves away into thin air, and disappears from mortal sight.

The "Magicians" of Kashmir, Thibet, Mongolia, and Great Tartary are too well known to need comments. If *jugglers* they be, we invite the most expert jugglers of Europe and America to match them if they can.—*Ibid.* II. 603.

To the students of the occult forces the following will have special significance.

Ever on the lookout for occult phenomena, hungering after sights, one of the most interesting that we have seen was produced by one of these poor travelling Bikshu. It was years ago, and at a time when all such manifestations were new to the writer. We were taken to visit the pilgrims by a Buddhist friend, a mystical gentleman born at Kashmir, of Katchi parents, but a Buddha-Lamaist by conversion, and who generally resides at Lha-Ssa.

"Why carry about this bunch of dead plants?" inquired one of the Bikshuni, an emaciated, tall

and elderly woman, pointing to a large nosegay of beautiful, fresh and fragrant flowers in the writer's hands.

"Dead?" we asked, inquiringly. "Why they just have been gathered in the garden?"

"And yet, they are dead," she gravely answered. "To be born in this world, is this not death? See, how these herbs look when alive in the world of eternal light, in the gardens of our blessed Foh?"

Without moving from the place where she was sitting on the ground, the Ani took a flower from the bunch, laid it in her lap, and began to draw together, by large handfuls as it were, invisible material from the surrounding atmosphere. Presently a very, very faint nodule of vapour was seen, and this slowly took shape and color, until, poised in mid-air, appeared a copy of the bloom we had given her. Faithful to the last tint and the last petal it was, and lying on its side like the original, but a thousand-fold more gorgeous in hue and exquisite in beauty, as the glorified human spirit is more beauteous than its physical capsule. Flower after flower to the minutest herb was thus reproduced and made to vanish, reappearing at our desire, nay, at our simple thought. Having selected a full-blown rose we held it at arm's length, and in a few minutes our arm, hand, and the flower, perfect in every detail, appeared reflected in the vacant space, about two yards from where we sat. But while the flower seemed immeasurably beautiful and as ethereal as the other spirit flowers, the arm and hand appeared like a mere reflection in a looking-glass, even to a large spot on the fore arm, left on it by a piece of damp earth which had stuck to one of the roots. Later we learned the reason why. — *Ibid.* II. 609-10.

ATLANTIS: DID IT EXIST?

[Paul Brunton is the well-known author of *A Search in Secret India*.—EDS.]

We have learnt from ancient sources the startling story of a great continent which lies wrecked beneath the grey rolling waters of the Atlantic Ocean. Plato, the Athenian philosopher, has given us in his *Timæus* and *Critias* a fragmentary picture of what he had gleaned concerning the fabled land of Atlantis, as he named it. Aelian, too, mentions it in his *Varia Historia*. Among native peoples of the Pacific a similar legend exists.

But what the ancients thought and taught upon this fascinating theme is of less concern than what scientists of our own day have to say. Few, of course, have the time and interest to concern themselves with the subject but those few have begun to marshal an increasing list of facts and evidences. Many more years will have to be devoted to investigation, and many more minds will have to engage themselves in it before we shall be in a position to decide conclusively one way or the other. But there is enough result already to make the legend of Atlantis take on an aspect of scientific probability and therefore to warrant further research.

It is obvious that until science has developed methods and perfected apparatus to enable divers to explore the bed of the Atlantic Ocean, which is 21,000 feet below the surface in its deeper part, the only source of possible evidence must lie in a comparison between

the Old and New Worlds, together with a study of the existing Atlantic islands. This means that we have to take up the testimony of deep-sea soundings; we must compare the distribution of fauna and flora in the Euro-African and American continents; we must look for the similarities of language and ethnological types; and finally we must consider the early religious beliefs, rituals and architecture which have left their remnants on both sides of the Atlantic.

Last century the British and American Admiralties despatched expeditionary ships to investigate the depths of the Atlantic at various parts. The German frigate "Gazelle" was also engaged in similar work. As a result of these deep-sea soundings the ocean bed has been carefully charted. The maps reveal the existence of an immense elevated land-mass, beginning not far from the Irish coast and stretching in a south-westerly direction as far as the South American coast near French Guiana. This great plateau lies in deep mid-ocean at an average height of about 9,000 feet above the bed out of which it rises.

The higher parts of this land-ridge are only a hundred to a few hundred fathoms from the surface of the water, while islands like the Azores, St. Paul, Ascension and Tristan d'Acunha, are considered to be its peaks.

We know from the study of geology that the earth's surface has provided a stage for the successive appearance and disappearance of land. Continents have been submerged beneath water more than once; and existing parts of Europe, Africa and America show plainly, by geological evidences, that in former times they were washed by ocean waters. Even to-day the phenomena continue before our eyes. The western coast of Japan has begun to rise above sea level. The Greenland coast is sinking so rapidly that ancient buildings erected on low rock-islands, are now submerged.

We see therefore that it is not impossible for the great land-belt in the Atlantic to have once stood out of the vast sheet of water which now engulfs it. Geological history stretches away into the remotest periods of time until it loses itself. Nature does not remain stagnant for ever but shakes the giant body of this planet at wide intervals, producing the different epochs about which geologists are slowly collecting information. Vast volcanic disturbances even yet occur in the bed of the Atlantic and evidence the probability of past and future changes.

In 1923 the Western Telegraph Company sent out a ship to search for a lost telegraph cable which had been laid down about twenty-five years previously. Marine soundings were taken at the exact place where the cable had been deposited. The captain of the vessel was astounded to discover that the surface of the ocean

bed had risen during the quarter-century by two miles! This surprising and striking fact reveals what might be discovered if the opportunities for such investigation were more widespread and more frequent.

The late M. Pierre Termier, Director of Science of the Geological Chart of France, was able to state that the bed of the Atlantic is one of the most unstable parts of the earth's surface. The area of his investigations showed that the eastern part of the Atlantic was involved in frequent submarine catclysms and volcanic activity. The islands of this region, such as the Azores and the Cape Verde Islands, are composed chiefly of lava.

A French ship which was used in laying the cable from Brest to Cape Cod during the summer of 1898, tried to fish up a broken strand at a spot about 560 miles north of the Azores. The depth was seventeen hundred fathoms. The grappling-iron drew up oceanic debris, soil and rock. The nature of the last two was such as to indicate that the Atlantic bed, in that locality, was mountainous, high-peaked and deep-valleyed. Among this material was a kind of vitreous lava which you can still see preserved at the museum of the school of Mines in Paris. These broken pieces, belonging to the species known as tachylite, could solidify into their existing condition *only under atmospheric pressure*. Had they been thrown up under the depth of water in which they were found, they would have

assumed different form; they would have become crystallised. Every eminent geologist would support this contention.

The grappling-iron also tore off some splinters of rock from an irregular peak. These were discovered to consist of lava likewise. They were subjected to microscopic examination later by Dr. Frederick F. Strong. Geologists know that lava decomposes to a certain extent under sea water in a period of roughly fifteen thousand years. Dr. Strong found that these splinters had not decomposed to this extent and that, as in the former instance, the lava had solidified under air pressure. This indicates that the crater which had thrown it forth must have had its head *above the ocean*; a further conclusion is that a part of the Atlantic bed now seventeen hundred fathoms deep, was dry land less than fifteen thousand years ago.

This latter piece of evidence was quoted By M. Ternier in a paper read before the Institut Océanographique of Paris. An interesting inference which he drew from the ruggedness of the bed was that sinking of the land had followed suddenly after the eruption of lava. Otherwise atmospheric erosion would have smoothed down the surface.

II

What has the distribution of fauna and flora to tell us concerning the probability of the existence of an Atlantean continent?

There are species of plants and animals on both sides of the Atlan-

tic which have existed in the same habitations as long as history records. Those species are identical, yet three thousand miles of water separates the continents on which they are found. Biologists and botanists can offer no plausible theory to account for this undeniable fact. But those who have begun to take the Atlantean theory seriously, find a simple answer.

Here are a few instances. In the existing Atlantic islands we find to-day earth-worms precisely similar to those which we can find in Europe and North Africa. It must be obvious to any intelligence that the rolling ocean waves provide an impassable region for earth-worms. The logical conclusion is that dry land once connected those islands with the Old World.

The molluscs of the West Indies and the molluscs of Europe are so similar as to have become the subject of special remark by naturalists. The *Glandina*, a carnivorous snail, possesses its habitat in the Antilles. Yet you will also find it around the Mediterranean. It cannot be looked upon as a recent visitant to our continent because it is found in isolated existence in different places between the Caucasus and Algeria. Dr. Kobelt was persuaded by this and similar instances to conclude that dry land stretched from the Antilles to Europe until the Miocene period. His theory received the backing of other scientists, notably Brettger and Andrae.

Another West Indian illustration is the most ancient mammal which has been in existence there. This

is that curious creature the *Solenodon*, a snouted and insect-eating being found in Haiti and Cuba. Its closest affinities are the *Centetidae* whose domains are West Africa and the island of Madagascar. Where is the connecting link between these distant parts of the earth's surface? Professor Leche has answered that there must have been a land-bridge between Madagascar and Brazil, if not to the West Indian islands themselves.

Geologists, digging the earth in different places, have found remains of the hairy mammoth, the woolly-haired rhinoceros and the musk-ox on continents separated by vast sheets of water, the European and the American. The beds in which the remains are deposited, always belong to the post-glacial period. In view of these facts and in the attempt to dissipate the shadows which time has shrouded around the origins of animal life, Professor Edward Hull carefully studied the Admiralty charts recording the Atlantic soundings I have already mentioned. His judgment was :—

The flora and fauna of the two hemispheres support the geological theory that there was a common centre in the Atlantic where life began, and that during and prior to the glacial epoch great land-bridges north and south spanned the Atlantic Ocean.

A curious and enlightening instance which has been a standing puzzle to botanists, is the case of the banana. Here we have a tropical plant which is to be found in America, Asia and Africa. We know that it existed freely on the American side *before* Columbus sighted his first West Indian island.

Now the banana is seedless, and its bulb is not easily transportable like that of the potato. It cannot be propagated by cutting as we can propagate the willow tree. Even if some way had been found to transport it from one side of the Atlantic to the other, it could never have successfully endured the long voyage which a primitive type of vessel would have slowly made. Finally, as a plant possessing no seeds it must have been under culture for a considerable period on one side of the Atlantic before it appeared on the other. How then was it carried by its cultivators across the seas?

This problem remained a riddle till Otto Kuntze, a German botanist who spent many years in the tropics, propounded the first plausible solution. He pointed out that the only conclusion was that the banana had been brought to a high state of cultivation on land now submerged beneath the Atlantic waves, land once peopled by inhabitants who had developed the agricultural arts.

III

This question whether Atlantis, granting its one-time existence, was ever peopled by human beings who raised on it a high degree of civilisation, as Plato claims, is also provocatively interesting but more difficult of solution. Ancient folklore makes similar references to cultural development in its memories of the cataclysm which drowned a continent. One may even wonder whether the Biblical story of the Flood is not some echo of the same catastrophe.

Modern investigation of this question must necessarily be limited to comparisons of the culture existing among the earliest races of the Old and New Worlds. If the similarities are sufficiently striking, we may decide that the connecting link has been lost since Atlantis sank into the sea, and that both cultures spread out from this once-inhabited central area.

Take the case of the architectural form known as the pyramid. At Teotihuacan in Mexico there are two giant pyramids still standing. They date back to prehistoric times. The explorers Waldeck and Lowenstein have examined and described them. They were built towards the points of the compass. So were the Egyptian pyramids also built. They were used as burial places for certain personages whose bodies were embalmed and mummified. The Egyptians utilised their structures for similar purposes and followed the same methods. The interior arrangements of the galleries and chambers in the Mexican pyramids were almost identical with those of the Egyptian ones.

The common origin of these architectural evidences seems indicated. If the American aborigines and the ancient Egyptians learnt pyramid-building from the same

source, was it not the central civilisation of Atlantis?

The Maya and Inca monuments in Central and South America carry strange reminiscences of Indian symbolism which have puzzled archaeologists for several centuries. The Central American arts and crafts curiously resemble those of the Mycenaean culture of early Greece. In Peru there are puzzling reproductions among the architectural ornaments of ancient Greek designs. These likenesses have recently been pointed out by Professor G. Elliot Smith and he asks whether they are merely fortuitous or due to some causal relationship.

One cannot present within short limits the further evidence which is available. Deep in the silt of the Atlantic ocean lies the last proof that a great continent and a developed civilisation have sunk from human sight. Until that final confirmation becomes possible to modern science, we must patiently collect our facts and show that there is something more than mere probability in the Atlantean theory. And we may ponder upon the strange history of this planet, the gigantic changes which Nature makes at her will in laughing defiance of man.

PAUL BRUNTON

TSONG-KHAPA

[**Geoffrey West** has contributed in *THE ARYAN PATH* several highly interesting biographical studies of occidental mystics and occultists. Here for the first time he writes about an Oriental Adept-Reformer, one who has influenced the thought of the western hemisphere in a peculiarly direct way by his fiat to which Mr. West refers. However obscure the cause of that influence the West owes a mighty debt of gratitude to the Great Tsong-Khapa. -Eds.]

Tsong-Khapa—called the Luther of Buddhist Tibet, declared in the East the first reincarnation of the Buddha after Gautama—his very name is unknown to the West. Small wonder, for over most of Europe Tibet remains the veritable symbol of mystery, and, were not the two all but identical, one would assert its religious history even less known than its national. What could the name of Europe's Luther mean to one who knew nothing of its sectarian Christianities?

Tibet, within historical eras, has known two religions, one a primitive and animistic demon-worship, necromantic and superstitious, and of unknown antiquity, the other a Buddhism of, in origin at least, a refined and esoteric character. When the latter first comes upon the scene it also is probably impossible to declare definitely. One tradition would associate the very earliest introduction of civilisation into Tibet with the coming there of a Buddhist missionary within two hundred and fifty years of Buddha's death; while another reports the existence there at a period scarcely less remote of a brotherhood of holy ascetics known as "the great teachers of the snowy mountains" who practised an esoteric Buddhism long

before its exoteric gospels were preached to the country at large. Not, however, till as late as the fifth century of the Christian era is there certain record of its even tentative introduction, and only in the seventh century, when the great King Song-tsen Gam-po became a convert, do we find it established as the state-religion. It was in the eighth century that another famous ruler, Ti-song Detsen, brought from India the Tantrik Buddhist Padma Sambhava, who by his labours truly made Buddhism the national faith.

Well that he did so, for very soon thereafter the line of "the great kings" ended, to be followed by nearly four hundred years of disorder, the squabblings of petty chiefs fighting each for his own hand. But Buddhism now was held in such esteem that learned teachers could still come from India and be honourably received. Chief among these was Atisha. Their influence continued to spread, and received renewed impetus when in the year 1270 the kingship of the country was given by Kubla Khan to the Abbot of the Sakya Lamasery. This first reign of "the priest-kings" lasted until 1345, when power was seized by a warrior-king whose dynasty

endured for three hundred years. Tsong-Khapa was born a dozen years after his accession.

It is the fate of every faith to be tainted by the earthly air it breathes, and Buddhism in Tibet could claim no exemption from this natural law. It derived direct from the Mahayana Buddhism of Northern India, denounced as a corruption of the true gospel by the disciples of the Hinayana school of the South, but held by its own followers to be the authentic and esoteric teaching of the Buddha Himself, and beyond question of high metaphysical and mystical refinement. But it came to them in the first place and especially in the person of Padma Sambhava, by no means free from marked Tantrik influences, whose necromantic leanings made special appeal to the still superstitious Tibetans. The result is seen in the perpetual inclination of exoteric Tibetan Buddhism towards spells and sorcery. The denunciation of the practice of the darker magic arts was the theme of each reformer in turn, though notably of Atisha and then of Tsong-Khapa. Atisha preached a strict religious life and celibacy to his followers, who formed the first "reformed" sect, the Kahdam-pa, holding themselves aloof from the Nyingma-pa, the unreformed or "old ones" who kept the laxer teachings of Padma Sambhava. In the century after

Atisha there appeared another minor sect of the "semi-reformed," compromising between the old and new, and interesting here mainly as marking the relapse of even some of the best instructed back towards the temptations of demonolatry. The Nyingma-pa prevailed in the land right to the time of Tsong-Khapa, but the reforming impulse was not ineffective. By the early fourteenth century it had produced a complete recension of the Buddhist scriptures, both "precepts" and "commentaries," and their very existence led to the realisation in many minds of the need for further reform.

At this juncture appeared Tsong-Khapa.

Who was he? *What* was he? Many legends have been associated with his name. It is said that he was born of a virgin, that he came into the world bearing a white beard and speaking words of wisdom, that he was only three when he renounced the world for the religious life, and that when his reverent mother shaved his head and threw the hair outside their tent there sprang up therefrom the far-famed and marvellous Tree of the Ten Thousand Images, whose every Leaf bears the natural imprint of some sacred Tibetan character—a tree, by the way, to whose existence and remarkable nature the travellers Huc* and Gabet testified less than ninety

*Here are the words of the Abbe Huc:—"Each of its leaves, in opening, bears either a letter or a religious sentence, written in sacred characters, and these letters are, of their kind, of such a perfection that the Type-foundries of Didot contain nothing to excel them. Open the leaves, which vegetation is about to unroll, and you will there discover, on the point of appearing, the letters or the distinct words which are the marvel of this unique tree! Turn your attention from the leaves of the plant to the bark of its branches, and new characters will meet your eyes! Do not allow your interest to

years ago ! It is said that following the religious life he became in due course the pupil of a very learned Lama "from the remotest regions of the West," who taught him his knowledge and then died; that inspired by this encounter he set forth westward but on reaching Lhasa was bidden by "a radiant spirit" to remain there; that summoned by the Chief Lama he refused to obey, and when this high personage appeared before him miraculously compelled his submission. One account tells how in 1419 he ascended into heaven; according to another story his body lies to this day in the Galdan Lamasery, preserved in perfect freshness and at times uttering encouraging words, with other wonders.

Less disputable as what the West terms "fact" are his birth about 1357 in the province of Amdo in north-eastern Tibet, probably of the humblest parentage, his early religious devotion and his studies at the Sakya and other famous Lamaseries, his eight years passed as hermit in southern Tibet where the teachings of Atisha were still preserved in something of their original purity, his appearance in Lhasa about the year 1390 and rapid triumph as religious teacher and reformer, his foundation of the great Galdan, Sera, and Drepung Lamaseries, and his death in 1419.

With these things, we know

something of his writings and of the nature of his work as reformer. Most of the extant sacerdotal manuals of his followers are ascribed to his pen, but his main effort was towards a clarification of Buddhist doctrine, stripping away the accretions of two thousand years and restating its essential nature. Of his best-known exposition, the *Lam-rim-ch'en-po* (The Progressive Path to Perfection), we read that it originally consisted of two parts, one the exoteric teaching addressed to the ordinary reader, the other intended for more advanced and esoteric students, and that it asserted the need to adjust the rendering of truth to the capacity of one's audience.

But however attentive to doctrine as his essential inspiration, it was as proselytizer and organizer that he made his immediate mark. Against the power of the Nyingma-pa followers of Padma Sambhava, he drew together the disciples of Atisha under the new name of the Gelup-pa (or "virtuous ones"), establishing them in new buildings where old were lacking, and causing them, as symbol of their return to older and purer ways, to wear robes or at least caps of the traditional yellow used by the earliest Buddhist priests, thus instituting the rivalry constant in subsequent Tibetan history of the Red Caps (the Nyingma-pa) and the Yellow Caps.

flag ; raise the layers of this bark, and still OTHER CHARACTERS will show themselves below those whose beauty had surprised you. For, do not fancy that these superposed layers repeat the same *printing*. No, quite the contrary ; for each lamina you lift presents to view its distinct type. How, then, can we suspect jugglery ? I have done my best in that direction to discover the slightest trace of human trick, and my baffled mind could not retain the slightest suspicion."—*The Theosophical Glossary*, p. 180.

He demanded of them a discipline even beyond that of Atisha, prohibiting the use of alcohol, enforcing celibacy, denouncing absolutely the magical practices everywhere rife. In all things, he insisted, they must live according to the laws laid down by the Buddha Himself.

He not only reformed the lives of his followers, but introduced into their liturgies innovations which have given rise to most curious speculations. These were markedly ritualistic, and hardly less markedly Christian and even specifically Catholic, including the use of cross, candles, censers, bells, rosary, mitre, cope, holy water, the practice of confession, exorcism, benediction, the tonsuring of monks and nuns, the worship of relics, and the like. Could these things, ascribed to Tsong-Khapa, be, it is asked, of actual Christian origin? And then it is asked whether, having regard to the known facts of Catholic and still more of Nestorian penetration of even the remotest parts of Asia both before and during this period, Tsong-Khapa's mysterious teacher the learned Lama whose "great nose," that markedly European feature, is mentioned in almost every reference to him—might not indeed have been a priest of Christ, scattering afar the Christian seed with unexpected consequence!

Such speculation, interesting as it may be to those who would find in Christian theology and liturgy the beginning and end of all religious illumination, neglects an alternative derivation, asserted by

H. P. Blavatsky, not from the West eastward, but rather from the East westward, not from Christianity to Buddhism but from Buddhism to Christianity. The evidence is set forth for those who would pursue the problem further in the early chapters of Volume Two of *Isis Unveiled*.

In regard to Tsong-Khapa, the matter is clearly not of primary importance, as we see directly we turn to the central problem of Tsong-Khapa's identity and authority. His own followers doubt neither; by them he is revered as the incarnation of Amitabha, the very Buddha! If that be fact, it is not "simple fact"—here we tread upon delicate ground, in the realm of mysteries perhaps incapable in the terms of Western thought of any satisfying explication. Reincarnation of the astral being of Gautama, Buddha-vehicle, there had been before, as in Shankara, India's great Vedantic teacher, but in Tsong-Khapa we encounter, it is declared, a different, a profounder manifestation of the Divine Wisdom-Principle. Was he then—he, the man, the child born in Amdo—from birth, or did he like Gautama but later become, the vehicle of Truth? Who shall say? But if the former, then what need of teachers from either West or East for the very teacher of all; and if the latter then what instruction could think to stand unshrivelled in the bright glare of that infinite knowledge which at the due hour must come to Him? In either, in any case, surely we have to credit Tsong-Khapa with an

understanding deeper than the forms of any single creed, the capacity to penetrate to those eternal truths underlying all creeds and forms whatsoever. Did he perchance know aught of those "great teachers of the snowy mountains" already referred to? In Sinnett's *Esoteric Buddhism* we may read how about the time of the fourteenth century many adepts, deeming their occult knowledge in danger of too wide diffusion, withdrew towards these hidden fastnesses of Tibet, and how to Tsong-Khapa fell the task of safeguarding their wisdom by rule and law. And among *his* commandments, Madame Blavatsky informs us, was one enjoining the Arhats (or adepts) "to make an attempt to enlighten the world, including the 'white barbarians,' every century, at a certain specified period of the cycle."

He was certainly a wise and holy man whose work changed the course of religious, and again it must be added of national, history in Tibet. His nephew, Ganden-Truppa, who founded the great Lamasery at Teshu Lumbo in 1445,

became as head of the Yellow Caps the first Grand Lama of Tibet, and though the rivalry of sect with sect continued but little abated for two hundred years, the Yellow party triumphed when in 1641 the Mongol rulers of China gave the sovereignty of the country to the fifth Abbot of Teshu Lumbo. This Abbot was the first true Dalai Lama, and he created his own religious instructor first of the Tashi Lamas, who thus became the spiritual superiors of the Dalai Lamas, though inferior in worldly power.

For the rest, Tsong-Khapa must seem, to the ordinary western view, to stand quite outside the stream of European development and even interest. Yet one reflects, one questions, if that *was* his command—"to attempt to enlighten the world, every century, at a certain specified period of the cycle"—and its latest consequence, presumably, the sending of H. P. B. herself, and the inauguration of the Theosophical Movement in 1875—if indeed that was *his* command, can we then dismiss him quite so lightly . . . ?

GEOFFREY WEST

NEW BOOKS AND OLD

PROFESSORS AND POETS *

[**John Middleton Murry**, the well-known critic is the author of numerous books among them *Keats and Shakespeare*—EDS.]

The New Temple Shakespeare is not primarily a new edition of Shakespeare, in the critical sense of the word "edition," but a new and very attractive impression of the plays. Its predecessor, the old Temple Shakespeare, had a great and well-deserved success. It appeared to me, as a schoolboy in the beginning of this century, an uncommonly beautiful thing, and I used to save up my scanty pocket money to buy it, volume by volume. The new Temple Shakespeare is a still more beautiful thing; but book-production has made great advance in the last thirty years, and typographical beauty which was extraordinary then is familiar now. To become the owner of a volume of the old Temple Shakespeare was, to me, at fifteen, to become the possessor of a rare work of art, and I stinted myself of many twopences for the privilege. I can hardly conceive schoolboys of today paying their money to enter the new Temple as I did to enter the old. I hope I am wrong in this conjecture, but I must say that my schoolboy-successor will hardly make so good a bargain as I did.

The editor's introductions to the new Temple Shakespeare are

sometimes very perfunctory. Thus, for example, all he has to say about *The Comedy of Errors* is contained in a single page; and the only critical remark is the following:—

The play is thoroughly competent and "slick" 'prentice work, going one (or indeed two) better than its model in the complications of the old time-worn mistaken-identity motive; and apart from a few stray passages might, one feels, "have been written by anyone."

To feel that this is altogether inadequate is not to maintain that the *Errors* is intrinsically an important Shakespeare play. It is not. But the suggestion that it might have been written by anybody is, I think, to indicate a curious insensitiveness to the loveliness of Shakespeare's early blank verse. In the very opening scene of the play a quite new voice is heard. One would listen in vain for anything like it in the verse of young Shakespeare's contemporaries. The silver and sustained liquidity of Aegeon's speech is marvellous of its kind.

Let us take the case of a more important play—perhaps the most important of all Shakespeare's plays—namely, *Hamlet*. Here the editor identifies himself with the

* *The New Temple Shakespeare*: Vols. I-XII, edited by M. R. RIDLEY, M. A., and decorated by Eric Gill (J. M. Dent & Sons, Ltd., London. 2s. per volume.)

opinion of Professor Gordon, and he quotes it as an ideal criticism of *Hamlet*.

The ordinary view of *Hamlet* comes from Coleridge. It was the opinion of Coleridge, and therefore [*Sic*] of the nineteenth century that the central thing in *Hamlet* is a problem of conduct; that Shakespeare's chief purpose in writing the play was to exhibit a character in which reflection fatally prevailed over the principle of action. This is a false opinion, which time will destroy. What we see in *Hamlet* is not a moral problem but a tragic situation; not a problem of character, but an experiment of fate; not a problem of conduct, but the agonies of a soul.

Coleridge's opinion, when it was first expressed, was a novelty in England... We are asked to suppose, then, that Coleridge was the first English writer who grasped the meaning of a play which had been read and acted with applause since the reign of James. . . . If Coleridge was the first man in England to understand the play, how did England contrive to enjoy it so thoroughly for two centuries without understanding it?

Now this seems to me a striking example of what I call mechanical thinking: of all habits of mind most dangerous when the object on which it is exercised is a work of the imagination. It calmly assumes, in the present case, that it is impossible that *Hamlet* should represent *both* a moral problem *and* a tragic situation. According to this habit of mind these alternatives exclude one another. But a moment's dispassionate reflection, based on actual experience of the play, will convince any sensitive mind that the peculiar fascination of *Hamlet* is that it embodies both a tragic situation and a moral problem; and that these are, by the

creative and intuitive skill of Shakespeare, indissolubly united.

Further, another moment of reflection will convince us that the specious argument—"If no one understood the play till Coleridge, how did England contrive to enjoy it for two centuries?"—is merely forensic. It is perfectly possible and highly probable that English audiences did enjoy *Hamlet* for two centuries without *fully* understanding it. That is, indeed, a commonplace experience in the theatre, or in reading. How many children have enjoyed *Gulliver's Travels* without fully understanding it? How many people even to-day enjoy Molière's *Misanthrope* without fully understanding it? And seeing that Shakespeare's habitual method was to take a familiar, dramatic story and steep it in his own sensibility and imagination, the overwhelming balance of probability is that his plays did mean more than contemporary audiences saw in them. Beneath this specious argument lurks a denial of the "prophetic" function of the poetic imagination. Coleridge, certainly, believed in that: and so do I.

But there is worse to come. For brevity's sake, I have so far, in controverting Professor Gordon and his disciple, accepted the professorial statement that Coleridge's opinion of *Hamlet*, which he is alleged to have imposed on the nineteenth century, was that "the central thing was a problem of conduct." But, in fact, Coleridge nowhere expresses such an opinion,

His recorded criticism of *Hamlet* is more copious (I believe) than his criticism of any other single play of Shakespeare's. I have not been able to refresh my memory by re-reading every separate reference to *Hamlet* in Coleridge's Shakespeare criticism; and perhaps there may lurk somewhere in it a sentence to give colour to Professor Gordon's statement. But considered as what it professes to be—the substance of Coleridge's opinion of *Hamlet*—it is a perversion of the fact. Here is the true and recurrent substance of that opinion in Coleridge's own words:—

The first question we should ask ourselves is—What did Shakespeare mean when he drew the character of Hamlet? He never wrote anything without design, and what was his design when he sat down to produce this tragedy? My belief is, that he always regarded his story, before he began to write, much in the same light as a painter regards his canvas before he begins to paint—as a mere vehicle for his thoughts—as the ground upon which he was to work. What then was the point to which Shakespeare directed himself in *Hamlet*? He intended to portray a person, in whose view the external world, and all its incidents and objects, were comparatively dim, and of no interest in themselves, and which began to interest only, when they were reflected in the mirror of his mind.

And again:—

This admirable and consistent character, deeply acquainted with his own feelings, painting them with such wonderful power and accuracy, and firmly persuaded that a moment ought not to be lost in executing the solemn charge committed to him, still yields to the same retiring from reality, which is

the result of having, what we express by the terms, a world within himself.

These are two typical statements by Coleridge himself of his own view of *Hamlet*. There is not in them a word, or a suggestion, to the effect that the essence of the play is "a problem of conduct." The whole emphasis is on the portrayal of a certain type of character. Above all, there is no suggestion, or implication, that the substance of the play is not "a tragic situation." On the contrary, the plain suggestion is that Shakespeare meditated deeply on the question: what manner of man, what type of character, could be credibly involved in the tragic situation which was fixed by tradition for Hamlet, Prince of Denmark?

Now, there is no means of proving by evidence valid in a Court of Justice, either that Coleridge's conception of Hamlet's character was in fact Shakespeare's, or that his "theory" of how Shakespeare set to work was correct. One has, in such matters, to trust one's intuition. My intuition tells me that Coleridge was right. Further, the fact that Coleridge's view was gradually accepted by nineteenth-century criticism counts for something. For still more counts the fact that Coleridge was a fine poet and a fine critic: Professor Gordon, so far as I know, is neither. And, anyhow, whatever may be his achievements in other branches of learning, it is indisputable that, for the purpose of controverting Coleridge, he is compelled first, seriously to misrepresent Coleridge.

ridge's opinion, and second, to use an argument that is obviously fallacious.

For my own part, I must record my opinion that Professors of Literature at universities make very poor critics and editors of Shakespeare. Professor Bradley is the obvious exception; but he never was a Professor of Literature, but merely Professor of Poetry at Oxford—an honourable and brief appointment which lasts for only five years. But professional professors of literature—as are both Mr. Gordon and his disciple Mr. Ridley—are not the men for Shakespeare. I have often wondered concerning the cause of this. And sometimes I have thought that they are burdened with an inward sense of inferiority. They have something of an uneasy conscience about their own academic security. This certainly was the case with Professor Raleigh, whose disciple Professor Gordon was. And the form of expression which this uneasy conscience assumes in the presence of the truly creative and poetic is an unconscious bias towards reducing the poet to a “professional” like themselves. Now the poet may be a professional, as Shakespeare certainly was, in the sense that he has to earn his living by his craft and art; but he is not a professional like a professor of literature. He takes risks, he adventures himself, he knows what it is to meet life naked, he is aware of its brutality as well as its beauty. Even Coleridge, though he retired beaten from life, knew infinitely

more about it than professors do. He could have been a professor, easily; his genius drove him instead to do desperate and foolish things—enlisting in the dragoons, preparing to emigrate to a communist colony, stumping the country with a message to men, marrying on nothing and with no prospects: all very unwise and unworldly things, but experiences which, working upon his “more than ordinary organic sensibility,” made him more intimately akin to Shakespeare than a solid and safe professor of literature can ever be. And the solid and safe professors—though they do not know it—seem to resent the “life-adventure” of the poet. They want to clip his wings, so that he cannot fly out of the realms of security where their minds inhabit: they want to assure themselves that there is after all nothing better in this life than to be a professor, and so they make the poets like themselves. But they are not.

Professor Raleigh did his best to persuade himself that Shakespeare was, after all, only an ordinary “healthy Englishman”. Professor Gordon improves on it and assures us that *Hamlet* is “something older and finer than the morbid psychology of the critics”—and the poets. Professor Ridley accepts it all and tells us that *Hamlet* is, “in its essence a superb melodrama of revenge.” Not only does he forget to tell us how it comes about that “this superb melodrama of revenge” has fascinated the minds and the imaginations of thousands of men not deeply interested in

melodrama; but he even forgets that he has swallowed Professor Gordon's doctrine entire. He suddenly remembers that Professor Bradley has written a famous, and deservedly famous, book on Shakespeare's tragedies—a book with which he dare not disagree. "It is," he says, "perhaps the greatest work of Shakespearean criticism in English," and he goes on:—

Even where all is excellent, the section on *Hamlet* stands out, because of the balance which the critic manages to maintain in executing a task of peculiar difficulty... One sometimes

hears his criticism dismissed with the comment, "Bradley finds in Shakespeare what Shakespeare never meant." If that means he finds what is not there, it is I think demonstrably untrue; if it means that he finds point after point which Shakespeare did not insert of set purpose, then I think that it is true but very far from damaging.

Yet Professor Ridley has just applauded Professor Gordon for dismissing Coleridge's criticism of *Hamlet* on precisely this same ground, that he finds in Shakespeare what Shakespeare never meant. He cannot have it both ways.

J. MIDDLETON MURRY

THE LIMITATIONS OF MARCUS AURELIUS*

[D. L. Murray, after a brilliant career at Oxford, served in the Intelligence Department of the War Office from 1916-19. He is the author of various books, and was the dramatic critic of the *Nation and Athenæum* from which he has risen to a position of eminence. He here reveals the hesitancy of many who admire but cannot accept the Stoic philosophy of an irreproachable administrator.—EDS.]

The late George Russel recorded in one of his volumes of Victorian reminiscence how, visiting Matthew Arnold the day after the premature death of his eldest son, he found him seeking consolation from the "Meditations" of his favourite Marcus Aurelius. Arnold is only one of the eminent men of later times who have gone to the "Saint of Paganism" for the food of their souls; Mr. Hayward enumerates among others Frederick the Great, Captain John Smith of Virginia, General Gordon, and (rather surprisingly) Arnold Ben-

nett. Mr. Hayward's own volume may be regarded as an attempt to open to a wider circle of modern readers the spiritual treasures contained in the life and works of the Stoic Emperor. He writes under the influence of Comte, and as an educationist who has promoted the "Celebration Method" of keeping before the eyes of humanity the great figures of its guides and saviours. These Positivist sympathies as well as the fact that he has on this occasion to champion a philosopher whose relations with Christianity were hostile, may ac-

* *Marcus Aurelius: A Saviour of Men.* By F. H. HAYWARD. (George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., London. 10s. 6d.)

count for a certain asperity in some of his references to the orthodox Christian Tradition, which is bound to a narrower circle of saintliness than the Religion of Humanity. And it is perhaps the desire to speak to modern readers in a tone with which they are familiar that has led him now and again to introduce a note of flippancy (almost of slanginess) into his text, which no doubt brings it into line with the modern fashion of historical biography, but which is really unworthy of a writer of Mr. Hayward's serious purpose and philosophic depth.

These trifling complaints cannot obscure our sense of the value of this study as a whole; it is truly illuminating, not only of the mind and religion of Marcus Aurelius Antoninus, but of his life and labours as Roman Emperor. The author of the "Meditations" has for long been a figure with a curious relevance to the spirit and problems of the modern world. Matthew Arnold insisted upon it in his essay on him, and Walter Pater in his wonderful "still-life" novel "Marius the Epicurean" was able to diagnose the spiritual unrest of the late nineteenth century under the forms of the Empire of the Antonines. But Marcus Aurelius is relevant also to the political problems of the modern world. Renan found in him a foreshadowing of the "lay" state of French Republicanism, and now Mr. Hayward points out with fresh emphasis how "every historian regards the age of the Antonines as the greatest example in history

of the supercession of nationalism and jingoism by a world-state." It was indeed an age in which the fondest dreams of a widespread and influential class of modern political theorists seemed to have come true; the age of which Gibbon out of our own minor Augustan tranquillity wrote: "If a man were called to fix the period in the history of the world during which the condition of the human race was most happy and prosperous, he would, without hesitation, name that which elapsed from the death of Domitian to the accession of Commodus." The Golden Age of Mankind!—and the age in which, on the evidence of Mr. Hayward's own pages, there was a regular Cult of death (self-inflicted) among the noblest minds; the age in which the most spiritual energy of the time, the Christian faith, turned aside from the Empire and its concerns as dead and profitless to the soul; the age in which statesmanship and generalship, devoted to maintaining the *status quo*, were unenlightened by a single creative spark; the age in which literature had decayed to the pedantries of the rhetoricians and grammarians, and art, as often in ages of pessimism, excelled only in the realism of pathetic portraiture, at this time in stone. The Golden Age was in short, in every respect, the age of *aurca mediocritas*—a warning to be taken into account by advocates of the regimentation of mankind into the uniformity of any World-State which fails to promote the free play of the religious, political and

artistic genius of individual nationalities both in West and East.

That this autumnal melancholy falls upon the pages in which the philosophic Emperor consigned his thoughts on duty and destiny has never been denied by his keenest admirers. He was the most irreproachable of rulers, giving his whole time to the smooth running of the vast imperial machine, tempering its rigours with clemency whenever he could find grounds for mercy, yielding himself un murmuring for years to the distasteful task of prosecuting those "police wars," without enthusiasm or glory, which were essential for the maintenance of the wide frontiers within which the *pax Romana* gave to its subjects the blessing of unbroken tranquillity. There were no Furies of crimes committed to haunt his conscience; his "persecution" of the Christians—over which too much time has been wasted in attack and defence, and upon which Mr. Hayward spends more subtlety than the subject requires—is amply covered by the maxim of Christianity's Founder that they are to be forgiven who know not what they do. Nothing can really be added to Matthew Arnold's judgment that: "A kind of Mormonism [in our own days, we might say Bolshevism] constituted as a vast secret society, with obscure aims of political and social subversion, was what Antoninus Pius and Marcus Aurelius believed themselves to be repressing when they punished Christians." Yet the monarch, of unstained character, of an unshakeable constancy

and a most successful reign (despite family troubles, and the inevitable anxieties about the future of his Empire), was the apologist of the supreme treachery against Life, suicide; and, as Mr. Hayward adduces only too plausible reasons for believing, deliberately brought about, or hastened, his own demise. Something evidently was lacking in the felicity of the "most happy and prosperous" of human eras, and, more significant still, something evidently was lacking in that Stoic creed with which Marcus Aurelius fortified himself against the disillusionments of outward circumstance.

Mr. Hayward rightly reminds us that the Stoics upheld the inspiring ideal of a spiritual Kingdom of Mankind. Like Comte, they believed in Humanity as a mighty organism, of which the individual was a member, drawing his life from the greater whole. "There is one who says," wrote Aurelius, "'Dear City of Cecrops'. Wilt thou not say 'O Dear City of Zeus'?" If men can be patriotic towards the city of Athens, can they not be patriotic towards the Kingdom of God? The argument is unassailable, if the City of Zeus embraces the City of Cecrops, if heavenly ideal is based upon the natural human loyalty, if the Universal does not reject the particular, but builds it into a larger Whole. But Mr. Hayward writes of his Emperor, "Marcus was faithful to the empire but was not impassioned of it," adding, with one of his striking historical comparisons, not so impassioned even

as the English King Edward I was "impassioned of the conquest of Scotland." Mr. Hayward, basing himself on one of the aphorisms of Aurelius, is desirous of depicting him as a "Saviour of Men." But men will never thank a Saviour who seeks to redeem them by denying their ordinary world of passion and love and hope. They will feel more sympathy with the erring humanity of a Hadrian, the majestic remains of whose Villa near Rome, a world in miniature, still remain to testify to his sympathy with all human arts and aspirations, than with the passionless benignity of the author of the "Meditations". Mr. Hayward regretfully charges his hero with "neglect of science"—though, to be sure, there was not very much in the way of science for him to neglect; but certainly the science of the phenomenal world would have had but little interest for the Stoic. So, too: "For the Stoic there was 'nothing new under the sun,' because everything moved in cycles. Why then, wish to live on?" This lack of evolution or progress is again a common-place of Græco-Roman thought; but, again, Stoicism would not be likely to stir itself to remedy it. At this point it may not be inopportune to proffer to a disciple of Comte a passage written by a disciple of Hegel. Speaking of the unreflective contentedness of the Hellenic mind in the days of Aristophanes Edward Caird writes:—

But this happy moment rapidly passes into the stern, self-centred life

of the Stoic, who withdraws from the world into the fortress of his own soul . . . and finally into the despair of the sceptic, who, doubting everything, is driven in the end to doubt himself and regarding everything objective as an empty appearance, is forced at last to recognize the very consciousness of self as an illusion.

For the division of man from the world is his division from himself, (italics ours) and when he shuts himself up within his own soul (the very maxim of Marcus Aurelius) he finds there nothing but emptiness and vanity. (E. Caird, *Hegel*, 1883.)

Caird goes on to ask: "What is to heal this division?" and proceeds to the Hegelian solution of the Spirit that finds itself *in* the world and not in opposition to it. Arnold hints that the secret lies in the Christian joyfulness and tenderness which (in his view) Marcus Aurelius had no opportunity of understanding. This is too large a subject to pursue; but Mr. Hayward has a curious speculation at the end of his book. Noticing, as all must notice who reflect upon it, the resemblance between the face of Aurelius in bust and statue and the face of Christ as commonly portrayed in Christian iconography, he suggests that the familiar features of the beloved and deified emperor were gradually identified in the general imagination with those of Christ. This can neither be proved nor disproved; such interchanges of pagan and Christian imagery were certainly not uncommon. But the suggestion holds at least the symbolic truth that Marcus Aurelius, if he is to be more than the teacher of a select and world-denying band,

must undergo a transformation. His spirit may still be a tonic to humanity, if blended with love for

the common nature of man and faith in the world wherein man expresses that nature.

D. L. MURRAY

The Pravacana-Sāra of Kunda-Kunda Āchārya together with the Commentary Tattva-dīpikā, by Amritacandra Sūri. English Translation by BAREND FADDEGON. Edited with an Introduction by F. W. Thomas. (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 15s.)

Jainism is one of the earliest systems of non-Brahmanical thought which somewhat antedates and rivals Buddhism in the history of Hindu Heterodoxy. But while Buddhism through its larger human appeal came to be a subject of international study, developing a vast and polyglot literature both within and outside India, Jainism remained a purely Indian denomination. Even then, through some mysterious combination of circumstances, Jainism failed to preserve and hand down to posterity an ancient and authentic mass of texts and traditions. Hence it is very fortunate that veteran Indologists like Prof. F. W. Thomas of Oxford and Prof. Barend Faddegon of Amsterdam have collaborated in bringing out an excellent English version of a standard manual of Jainism dating from the early centuries of the Christian era.

The *Pravacana-sāra* or the Essence of the Doctrine was composed in Prākṛit Gāthā stanzas by Kunda-Kunda Achārya who is placed by the learned editors in the third century A. D. A Sanskrit commentary *Tattva-dīpikā* or Lamp of Truth was composed by Amritacandra Sūri (circa 905 A. D.) and both the works have been presented now to the general readers

in a careful and conscientious translation which, we are sure, would rouse a fresh interest in Jaina philosophy and religion.

The three main sections (Śruta-Skandha I, II, III) of the original treatise are entitled the Principle of Knowledge, the Principle of the Knowable and the Conduct. These were subdivided by the commentator into (a) The chapter on Knowledge, (b) The exposition of Joy, (c) The chapter on Good Evolution (of the soul), (d) Exposition of the substance in general, (e) The truth of the Knowable, (f) Exposition of the Conduct, (g) Exposition of the road to liberation, (h) Exposition of the good psychic-attention (Upayoga-response), and (i) The Five Jewels.

In his learned introduction Dr. F. W. Thomas observes: "By Kunda-Kunda's time India, with say 150 millions of inhabitants, had experienced at least seven centuries of active ubiquitous debate between sects, schools and individuals". Naturally we find veiled references to 80 classes of *Kriyā-vādins*, 84 classes of *a-kriyā-vādins*, 67 of *ajñānins* (Agnostics) and 22 of *Vaināikas*. Of the Brahmanical disciplines mention is made of Grammar, Metries, Law and Policy (*Logic, Naya* or *Nyāya*) together with Vaiśeṣika and Sāṃkhya systems. The four principle pillars of Hindu scholasticism; Dharma, Artha, Kāma and Mokṣa are tacitly admitted although the emphasis of the author is on the "perfection and all-sufficiency of the Scriptures". The

significant phrase is *Himsārahie damme* or religion void of *Himsā* or hurt. A subtle discussion on the topic is found in the section on Conduct (Śruta-Skandha III, 16-19) The mere act of a hurt is external. What is to be seriously remembered is, the intention of hurt (bhāva-himsā). By the mere act of hurt, he who is careful in his observances incurs no bondage. If he behaves carefully then like a lotus in water he is unsoiled. Bondage may arise or not arise when in case of a bodily action, a living being is killed; but from appropriation (upadhi-parigraha) bondage certainly results. If the renunciation (tyāga) is not absolute, then there is no purity from āsrava (karma-inflow) and in the mind of the not-pure how can there be annihilation of Karma? From a few of such sparks of living thought we feel that the author was a virile thinker soaring above petty ceremonialism and that he was a spiritual cousin of the compiler of the *Bhagavad-Gītā* who also laid his emphasis on absolute *tyāga* (mā phalesu kadācana) although he was against the renunciation of Karma as duty.

To a Jain, Karma or *puṅgava* is synonymous with Matter, association with which results the condition of jiva or soul which is Self, combined with vital powers (prāṇa). But the Self (ātman) is a generality, embracing all its particular states, whereof it is also the creator (Kartṛ) In its perfect condition (kevala) it is omniscience

and truth and identical with the Jain-faith itself. Hence the uncompromising discipline imposed by that faith with a view to developing that Grand Self which by other names, was equally emphasised by the Upaniṣadic Rishis and by the Buddha himself who however negated or modified the concept of *ātman* by his new doctrine of *anatma*. The antifeminist attitude of Jainism (Vide *strī-nirvāna* pp. 202-203) is more pronounced. The 10th century commentator delights in drawing similies and examples from current scientific observations on clouds, crystals, flowers, metals, looking-glass, mirage, water transformed into the sap of a tree, etc. These seem to suggest a *positive background* of the logico-epistemological doctrines like the *syād vada* or *dravya* (substance) as a universal which we find discussed with a rare scientific acumen in the second section on the Knowable.

But above all shines the moral earnestness and absolute sincerity in the quest of Truth :—"Why babble at length? Gain, religion, pleasure and final release and other pursuits all depend on *sincerity*." It is a convincing book of an Age of Convictions opened by the *Bhagavad-Gītā* of Sri-Krishna and *Śraddhot-pādaśāstra* or the Awakening of Faith of Āśvaghoṣa, both preceding and preparing the ground for the speculations of the Jaina *Kavi* (poet) *Muni* (sage) and *Paṭṭadharin*. (ecclesiastic) of the type of Kunda-Kunda Āchārya.

KALIDAS NAG

The Matsya Purāna—A Study. By V. R. RAMACHANDRA DIKSHITAR, M. A. (University of Madras, Madras. Re. 1)

This short but painstaking study of the *Matsya Purāna* consists of six chapters which deal with its origin in flood-legends, its date, Indian polity and architecture as disclosed in it and a study of the Tamil version, the *Machcha Purana*. The Puranic tradition of India requires to be more carefully explored for purposes of Indian cultural history, and therefore the book under review is welcome.

By far the most important point discussed is the legend of the Flood. The author makes a rather superficial study of the well-known versions of the legend in India, Sumer, Babylon and the Hebrew canon but arrives at the acceptable conclusion that "the Hebrew version had the Babyionian for its basis; Babylonian the Sumerian and the Sumerian the Indian version" (p. 14), and would locate the place of the flood in South India. He would have profited in this study from the observations on the subject made in H. P. Blavatsky's *Secret Doctrine*.

The great Flood had several meanings, and...it referred...to both spiritual and physical, cosmic and terrestrial, events: as above, so it is below. The ship or ark—*navis*—in short, being the symbol of the female generative principle, is typified in the heavens by the Moon, and on Earth by the Womb: both being the vessels and bearers of the seeds of life and being, which the sun, or Vishnu, the male principle, vivifies and fructifies. The First Cosmic Flood refers to primordial creation, ... But the terrestrial Deluge and its story has also its dual application....The "Deluge" is undeniably an *universal tradition*. "Glacial periods" were numerous, and so were the "Deluges," for various reasons. Stockwell and Croll enumerate some half dozen Glacial Periods and subsequent

Deluges—the earliest of all being dated by them 850,000 and the last about 100,000 years ago. But which was *our* Deluge? Assuredly the former. (S. D. II, 139-40-41)

In the Symbolism of every nation, "the Deluge" stands for chaotic unsettled matter—Chaos itself: and the Water for the feminine principle—the "Great Deep"...Now Vishnu is the divine Spirit, as an abstract principle, and also as the *Preserver* and *Generator*, ...Vishnu is shown in the allegory as guiding, under the form of a *fish*, the Ark of Vaivasvata Manu clean across the waters of the Flood. (S. D. II, 313)

Similarly the attention of the author may be drawn to the far-seeing remarks contained in the work, as regards the causes of "Deluges" which are mentioned by him on pp. 11 f.

This question is still an open one. [One must take into account] the effects of nutation and the precession of the equinoxes, [besides] a change in the position of the axis of rotation....Tradition, taking into no account the difference between sidereal and geological phenomena, calls both indifferently "deluges"...The cataclysm which destroyed the huge continent of which Australia is the largest relic, was due to a series of subterranean convulsions and the breaking asunder of the ocean floors. (S. D. II, 314)

The author has some interesting observations to make about the origin of the *Matsya Purāna*. After examining the "Fish" legends in India, he states that South India was the original place of the Purāna and "it would appear that the floating legend was reduced to writing for the first time in South India." Apart from the question whether this view could be considered conclusive, it has to be conceded that this Purāna displays larger acquaintance with the Dekhan and South India (Dravida Desa) than

any other. Regarding divine incarnation, the summing up that "every *avatara* represents a distinct stage in the story of evolution of life," and that "Vāmana is representative of the sub-man of the anthropologists" is not a new or original theory of the author, as will be clear from the following extract from *Isis Unveiled*, II, 275:—

In this diagram of avatars we see traced the gradual evolution and transformation of all species out of the ante-Silurian mud of Darwin and the *ilus* of Sanchoniathon and Berosus. Beginning with the Azoic time...we pass through the Palæozoic and Mesozoic times, covered by the first and second incarnations as the fish and tortoise; and the Cenozoic, which is embraced by the incarnations in the animal and semi-human forms of the boar and man-lion; and we come to the fifth and crowning geological period, designated as the "era of mind, or age of man," whose symbol in the Hindu mythology is the dwarf—the first attempt of nature at the creation of man.

In chapters II and V the writer is at some pains discussing relative dates with a view to show that the *Matsya Purana* shows systematic copying from the *Vayu Purana* which "is a much earlier composition from the point of view both of its matter and form." (p. 127) It may be pointed out in this connection that the Purānic contents are truths traditionally transmitted from times immemorial, and a comparative examination of passages or sec-

tions, however carefully it may be done, cannot lead to any positive result in this regard. As *The Secret Doctrine* (I, 306) has it, "The Puranas are written *emblems*" (Italics mine). Every name in them "has to be examined at least under two aspects, geographical and metaphysical." As regards the date of the compilation of the *Matsya Purana* the author says cautiously enough that it is to be spread from the third or the fourth century B. C. to the third century A. D., that is before the rule of the Guptas when the Puranic list stops—a conclusion that does not cross the view generally held and is palatable to Western orientalists.

The political theories and ideas contained in the Purana appear to be only a replica of what is usually found in works secular and religious, dealing with the subject. The chapter on architecture is interesting, for it is believed that the sections of the *Matsya Purana* bearing on this science form the ground work on which the classical works on *Śilpa-sastra* are based. No more useful purpose seems to be served by the study of the Tamil Version of the Purana than to show that it is entirely based on the original Sanskrit, being in parts either a paraphrase or abridgement, and is a work of the sixteenth century after Christ. Here and there, through the discussion is noticeable the defect of citing a doubtful authority for clearing one's doubtful points. To cite only one, and the best, example, the author of *Outline of History* cannot be taken and used as an authority either on evolution or on geology.

S. V. VISWANATHA

Japanese Buddhism. By SIR CHARLES ELIOT (Edward Arnold, London. 42s.)

I cannot share the confidence in the superiority of the Europeans and their ways which is prevalent in the West. . . . In fact European civilisation is not satisfying, and Asia can still offer something more attractive to many who are far from Asiatic in spirit.

Thus wrote Sir Charles Eliot.

Dispassionate, critical, with no hint of mysticism in his nature but sympathetic in his study of Oriental religions, he has written *Japanese Buddhism* as complementary to his magnum opus, *Hinduism and Buddhism*. Unfortunately he died before the completion of his task, and the last

chapter is written, and written extremely well, by another hand. As there is no indication in Sir Harold Parlett's "In Piam Memoriam" that any amplification or change in the plan of the book was contemplated, we may perhaps express regret that so much space is devoted to Buddhism in India and China that his treatment of Japanese Buddhism concludes with a study of Nichiren. We must turn to an earlier book, Dr. A. K. Reischauer's *Studies in Japanese Buddhism* if we would learn something of that religion in Japan to-day. Within the limits prescribed Sir Charles Eliot has written a valuable contribution to the subject, and has followed his history of Japanese Buddhism by a detailed account of the sects and their doctrines.

When the King of Pekche (Korea) sent a mission to the Emperor of Japan in 552 he introduced Buddhism to that country with a memorial which included the words: "This is the most excellent among all doctrines but it is hard to understand." That Korean king attempted to fulfil Buddha's saying: "My Law shall spread to the East." In Japan it spread rapidly. It became native, individual, for the Japanese have always known the art

of transmuting what they borrow. Buddhism during its history in that country underwent so many changes that at times we must associate it with parody and travesty. It was made to blend with Shinto. It had the simplicity of Amidism, no more than an act of grace, and the deep mysteries of the Shingon sect founded by Kobo Daishi, and in its esoteric form associated with the two Mandaras. The Spartan discipline of Zen was twisted into a prop for militarism. Nichiren, "the most striking example of religious enthusiasm that Japan has to offer," sought to create a Universal Church. It was an excellent idea, but his militant attitude and intolerance of those who differed from him were remote from the Sutra of the Lotus of the Good Law upon which he based his teaching. He claimed to be a reincarnation of Viśiṣṭācāritra and at the same time maintained that "The Nembutsu is hell: the Zen are devils: Shingon is national ruin and the Risshu are traitors to the country." We ponder again the words: "My Law shall spread to the East." In Japan that Law was too often distorted, the Way of the Buddha shrouded in the mist of metaphysicians and fanatics.

HADLAND DAVIS

The Creed of Kinship. BY HENRY S. SALT (Constable and Company, Ltd., London. 5 s.)

A certain school of literary critics calling themselves humanists has of late attempted to cast a stigma on humanitarianism; Mr. Salt makes us again conscious of the detestable narrowness of spirit embodied in that effort. He is so imbued with a sober and magnanimous sympathy with all things living that we are almost persuaded to believe "humanitarian" and "humanitarianism" to be the finest words in the language. Authors dealing with this theme are apt very often to render their minds to their feelings; not so Mr. Salt: his sweet reasonableness, his serene good hum

our, his acute perception of the strong points—when there are any in his opponent's case—these never desert him; they give his writing a charm and persuasiveness to which few readers could be insensible. Once, he recalls, a cynical journalist described him as a "compendium of the cranks". He glories in the appellation; he is the champion not of this or that particular cause but of every cause that strives to alleviate suffering and extend the area of kindness in this unhappy planet. "It would be amusing, were it not rather sad," he observes, "to note how afraid the reformers sometimes are of each other, socialists of zoophilists, zoophilists of socialists, or pacifists of both. Thus the creed

which is to come includes a number of beliefs that are at present held separately, if at all; whereas my argument is that it is only when they are held as one that they can be understood..... The real 'crank' is not the man who studies these matters collectedly, but the man who, except here and there, practically refuses to study them at all."

His book is thus a statement of the creed which, according to him, underlies all movements aiming at social reform: the creed, namely, that the basis of any real morality must be the sense of kinship between all living beings. From this point of view he surveys the whole range of issues which tend to be treated as "fads" from socialism and pacifism to vegetarianism and the abolition of vivisection. It would serve no purpose to enumerate the topics discussed in

his lucid and fervent pages. Suffice it to say that whether he is pleading against blood sports or flesh eating or the squalor in which at present millions are condemned to live, he presents his case with unvarying candour and cogency. Besides, the tranquil optimism which pervades his reasoning exerts a quiet influence on the reader. "Civilization," he says, is a phrase, a manner of speaking; it is in fact "quite a rude state as compared with what may already be foreseen." If mankind has in general abandoned cannibalism and outgrown the rough justice of the "eye for an eye" stage, is it too much to hope that in the centuries that lie ahead it would renounce with equal success the subtler forms of cruelty and intolerance that to-day characterise human and sub-human relationships?

K. S. SHELIVANKAR

Anti-Christ. By JOSEPH ROTH (William Heinemann, Ltd., London. 7s.6d.)

Anti-Christ is the work of a novelist of international reputation, and may be described as a tract for the times, though it is written with an artist's feeling for æsthetic form. It describes experiences in the War, at Hollywood, in Soviet Russia, Geneva, Hitlerite Germany and other scenes of "front page news interest," and achieves an effect of objective simplicity by the well-worn method of endowing the imaginary narrator with the mental detachment of a visitor from another planet—although, in this case, he is an ordinary working journalist.

As a portrayal of Occidental civilization in many evil and inhuman aspects, the book is largely true and sometimes of penetrative effect. Because of its pretentious scope, however, and its religious—even eschatological—tone and manner, we are entitled to ask whether it really clarifies the spiritual problems raised by Western culture. Is this conception of Anti-

Christ a true diagnosis or delineation of the working of evil in contemporary civilization?

Herr Roth himself appears, at the outset, to have intended some definition of the predicament of man in the Age of Science. He has tried to present Hollywood as, in some sense, the essence and nemesis of our culture, elaborating the idea that the projected forms of human beings on the cinema screen acquire greater reality than the men and women themselves. The analogy is suggestive: for we know that civilization tends to compel every individual, from ruler to menial, to play a role, and the actor is increasingly sacrificed to the part he must play, but the idea is not well developed, and its applications appear somewhat far-fetched. Nor are we given any definite conception of the Satanic as it works in the heart of modern man. Instead, Herr Roth exposes various evils, of avarice, sensuality, national prejudice and æsthetic pride in their latest manifestations, and the effect is somewhat diffuse. We are left with

the impression that modern evils spring more from weakness than ill-will, from soft brains rather than stony hearts, a depressing picture of muddle-headed benevolence impotent before bewildering problems. The more sinister working of the Evil Will is vaguely suggested but never clearly detected.

Such a picture does not justify its apocalyptic title. Anti-Christ is a conception as definite as that of Christ. Just as Jesus attained to Christhood, Krishna attained unity with Isvara or Gautama attained to Buddhahood, even so the meaning of Anti-Christ is that an individual may work to attain that infernal state—may will to transmute all the light of consciousness into the power of egotism. And it is true that the decadence of the West is due to the activities of those individuals who are using science, industry, finance and politics as so many veritable cults of Anti-Christ: true also that the temptation to do so is intense, and felt in some degree in every heart. But while Herr Roth depicts various symptoms of this supreme illusion and

perversion of will, he does not diagnose their cause. His account does not trace all delusions to the one father of lies, nor connect all evils in one intelligible Satan. The Enemy escapes him.

Is this because Herr Roth's standpoint is not so perfectly impartial as his style seems detached and aloof? The so-called "Aryan" persecution of the German Jews has left traces of emotional emphasis in his description, for which one can sympathise and make allowance. But we ought not to have to make allowance. Such a work as this demands, for its perfection, a more complete *vairagya*.

To assume this seat of judgment, aloof from race, caste, creed and sex, an artist must first have freed himself from all affinity with his own race, at least as regards the work.

For these reasons, Herr Roth's book, however humane, is yet all-too-human, and though it may be widely read and is worth reading, its rank is only that of a brilliant pamphlet.

PHILIP MAIRET

Edward Stuart Talbot and Charles Gore, Witnesses to and Interpreters of the Christian Faith in Church and State. By ALBERT MANSBRIDGE, with an Epilogue by the Archbishop of York (J. M. Dent and Sons Ltd., London. 3s. 6d.)

The author writes of two bishops who were pillars of the Church of England during the last fifty years and whose full biographies are soon to be published. They were contemporaries who had very similar careers and in many respects supplemented each other. A chronological table gives events in their lives side by side with outstanding occurrences in Church and State at that time.

The character sketch of the two men is acute and penetrating, but one wishes that more space had been

given to what these two leaders of the Church in England lived for and achieved. The title of the book describes them as "Witnesses to and Interpreters of the Christian Faith in Church and State." One would have welcomed an account of how two bishops witnessed to and interpreted the Christian Faith during the last few years of bloodshed, economic turmoil and oppression, more especially because there is a growing feeling that leaders of the Church do very little to apply the principles of Christ—the principles of non-violence and peace—to the problems of the day. But of these matters we are told nothing. The book closes with an excellent three-page Epilogue by the Archbishop of York, and is enlivened with fine illustrations.

BHARATAN KUMARAPPA

Music To-day. By JOHN FOULDS (Ivor Nicholson & Watson Ltd., London. 10s. 6d.)

One of the most important, and one of the most neglected, poets of to-day, Mr. F. Victor Branford, has proved in the only effective way—by doing it—that in spite of the contemporary chaos of western thought, it is still possible to write magnificent metaphysical poetry. In *The White Stallion* he expresses profound and splendid conceptions in tremendous music and imagery, so that for the right readers (who must be few at present) that book is a landmark of modern literature. It is destined certainly to attract increasing attention as the hubbub of contemporary fashions and faked intellectual reputations dies down. And I have been sent back to it by a recently published book written by a distinguished composer.

Mr. John Foulds has probably set up a landmark in the history of music. He has intricated (if the verb may be allowed) western musical æsthetic with a sort of semi-mystical science of mind that is oriental in its sources. He appears as a herald rather than a discoverer, and his part is to remind critics and all who pay attention to music of the influences that have been spreading in the west for perhaps half a century through work done by such researchers as Maud MacCarthy, to whom he pays a special tribute in the Postscript to his book.

I do not set up as a serious critic of oriental wisdom and I believe much of the so-called "occult" literature has been crude mumbo-jumbo. Any serious propagandist like Mr. Foulds must be handicapped by the antagonis-

tic atmosphere to genuine studies which have to use some of the "occult" terms for mental and spiritual experiences, and one could not be surprised if musicians preferred even more emphatically than was justified his forcible and stimulating criticism of the practical aspects of music. There is some excuse for those who think that so experienced a musician should stick to his own subject, for on modern composers and questions of musical technique he is more adequate and to all but the already converted more convincing than in his treatment of the things that are not perceived by the physical senses alone.

Mr. Foulds however has a sincere and fervent belief in the importance of the occult realities involved in the creation of music, and for readers of *THE ARYAN PATH* his attempt to expound his convictions in this direction will be the dominant feature of a fascinating book. His knowledge of musical literature enables him to quote with discretion great composers on their own psychic experiences, in support of his more explicit statement of the spiritual realities corresponding with the sound patterns that weave beauty out of physical "pitch," "tone," "rhythm," and so on.

Although in other directions he has many true things to say about borderland aspects of music, such as its therapeutic effects, the theosophical reader will find of main interest Part Three, "Towards a Musical Aesthetic," wherein Mr. Foulds boldly adventures into classifications of spiritual planes,* the nature of genius, of rapture, of "prāna," of the key-note and vibration of the individual, and cognate matters.

* Any careful student of Theosophy perusing this Part III will have no difficulty in concluding that Mr. John Foulds has drunk somewhat deep at the muddy waters of pseudo-theosophy. If he had taken as much pains with H. P. Blavatsky's *Isis Unveiled, Secret Doctrine* and other writings as he seems to have with those of pseudo-"theosophists," to use his own term, he would have succeeded in gleaning and garnering truth about his subject. His present source of information about the septenary classification, etc., is pseudo-theosophical and distorted. This is not said to adversely criticize Mr. Foulds, for whose hopes and aspirations we have respect. We write in justice to pure Theosophy, genuine Occultism, and true Mysticism, and also with a hope that people like Mr. Foulds and Maud MacCarthy avail themselves of the information and hints to be found in the body of knowledge which H. P. Blavatsky called *Wisdom-Religion*.—EDS.

The nature of physical and psychic vibrations is a subject closely related to music which has received some attention in Europe in our time, largely owing to the extended study of oriental psychology, and in view of my opening remarks, it may be of interest to note that Mr. Branford was for many years an invalid incapable of any work or any physical movement—a consequence of serious injuries received during the War—and his two remarkable volumes of poetry, *Titans and Gods*, and *The White Stallion* were the rapid creation of brief periods of intense activity before the next relapse into complete apathy. Lying on his back, conscious but externally inactive for so long, he virtually thought him-

self back to a more active and fit condition, and in describing his experience to me he declared that he seemed to become aware of the inner secrets of his own being and of the nature of life. This knowledge he was able to perceive best in terms of vibrations. He became aware of his own vibrations and the effect upon him of the vibrations of others. Much of his poetry gives a philosophical vesture to the searching intuitions that came to him by such concentration.

There seems to be here a remarkable illustration in the sister sphere of poetry of the truths about creative energy in music that Mr. Foulds so earnestly, and for a professional musician so boldly, strives to communicate.

R. L. MÉGROZ

CORRESPONDENCE

A CORRECTION

I have just received a copy of the May number of THE ARYAN PATH and in glancing through my own article notice a rather unfortunate mistake which occurs in the second column of p. 311, last sentence of the top paragraph, where the ending "crown of his teaching." should have the addition, following a comma instead of a full-stop, "as having all a peculiarly personal derivation and satisfying a peculiarly personal need." It is unfortunate because it is this omitted phrase which gives the sentence its meaning, and which in large degree underlines the special point of the article! As the sen-

tence stands people must read it that I am saying that It is hard not to view Murry's insistence etc., his presentation etc., and his determined denial of self-responsibility—these three things—as the crown of his teaching. Whereas what it means and originally said is that It is hard not to view his insistence etc., his presentation etc., and his denial of self-responsibility as the crown of his teaching—these three things—as having all a peculiarly personal derivation etc., (as above). It was just the *personal* nature of these things I was trying to insist upon.
Herts, England. GEOFFREY WEST

ENDS AND SAYINGS

" ends of verse

And sayings of philosophers."

—HUDIBRAS

Professor C. A. Campbell has performed a distinct service in writing an able and reasoned analysis of the problem of suffering, in the April issue of *Philosophy* (London). Regarding the problem as "essentially a problem in philosophical theology"—and we must note he means Christian theology—he plays "the not very congenial part of destructive critic." But he plays it admirably and in concluding remarks: "It is a gloomy picture that I have been painting. But looked at from the point of view of 'pure reason' is it not a pretty gloomy reality?" It certainly is.

Professor Campbell, at the very outset, asserts the fact that "the most influential philosophies of the present age, for example, have almost nothing to say on the subject—and there is no reason why, on their metaphysical principles they should say anything." We must not, therefore, expect from the article any positive instruction or guidance. But it clearly sets forth probable answers and shows how they do not stand the test of analysis and reason. The author examines the view of an all-wise God as active dispenser or passive witness of suffering; also the proposition of whether suffering can be justified on the ground of its disciplinary value, and comes up against "sufferings which are not a discipline

of the Soul but the Soul's very destroyer"; and considers the possibility of suffering in earth-life being compensated for by happiness in the hereafter.

In the course of this examination he approaches the boundary of the sphere of eastern thought:—

It may be pointed out to us that at least most of the sufferings which so distress us are the result of the wickedness of the human race. . . . The remedy for our ills is, in short, in our own hands. It is absurd for man to regard as ground for impeaching the goodness of God evils for which man is himself responsible.

His rejection of this view has a moral all its own. He seems unwilling to part company with his belief in a Father-Creator because he prefers to "*adhere to ordinary religious postulates*" (italics ours). He says:—

It really seems impossible (if we adhere to ordinary religious postulates) not to lay the ultimate responsibility upon God Himself.

Looking upon free-will as a gift from God instead of as a power unfolded in man during the long process of evolution, he is not able to accept the eastern view. It is true that neither in western theology nor in western philosophy is there a satisfactory answer to the problem of suffering; but in Indian philosophy, especially Buddhist, there is. The doctrine of Karma fully and satisfactorily

gives an explanation, but generally speaking, it is not acceptable to westerners because Karma implies dethronement of the Personal God, the Almighty Creator, the All-Wise Ruler of the world. That does not mean that Buddhistic philosophy is atheistic. It proves the necessity of an absolute Divine Principle in Nature. It only refuses to accept any of the Gods of monotheistic creeds. With the Christian theists "Divine Providence tempers His blessings to secure their better effects," which Karma—a sexless principle does not.

The Buddha solved the problem of suffering tracing its course to the very source, and so was able to offer the remedy. The Four Noble Truths—Sorrow, the Cause of Sorrow, the Cure of Sorrow and the Way to Enlightenment are too well-known to be dwelt upon here. But very many westerners want a solution of the problem without discarding the false belief in a Personal God. They are not called upon to become agnostics, much less atheists, but Karma does call upon them to recognize the truth of pantheism and to become Gnostics.

The Eastern view may be presented thus: Nature is destitute of goodness or malice; she follows only immutable laws when she either gives life and joy, or sends suffering and death. Nature has an antidote for every poison and her laws have a reward for every suffering. The real evil however proceeds from human intelligence and its origin rests entirely with reasoning man who dissociates himself from Nature. Humanity

then alone is the true source of evil. It is neither Nature nor an imaginary Deity that has to be blamed, but human nature made vile by selfishness. When we work out the causes of evil, tracing them to their origins, we have solved, let us say, one-third of the problem of evil; this is due to excessive indulgence of the appetites which are natural to the human kingdom, such as food, sexual relation, etc. After making due allowance for such evils that are natural—and so few are they, that the whole host of western metaphysicians can be challenged to call them evils or to trace them directly to an independent cause—it may be pointed out that the greatest, the chief cause of nearly two-thirds of the evils that pursue humanity, ever since that cause became a power, is religion,—under whatever form and in whatever nation. It is the sacerdotal caste, the priesthood and the churches. It is in those illusions that man looks upon as sacred, that he has to search out the source of that multitude of evils which is the greatest curse of humanity and that almost overwhelms mankind. Ignorance created Gods and cunning took advantage of opportunity. The sum of human misery will never be diminished unto that day when the better portion of humanity destroys in the name of truth, morality, and universal charity, the altars of these false gods.

But will this eastern view be acceptable to the ordinary western mind steeped in notions either religious or scientific?



Point out the "Way"—however dimly,
and lost among the host—as does the evening
star to those who tread their path in darkness.

—*The Voice of the Silence*

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THE LIGHT IN THE HEART

During this month of August Hindus of all castes and classes will celebrate the Natal Day of Krishna the Christos, the Hindu Logos, Shabda-Brahman, the Word Made Flesh. The Hindus look upon Krishna as Purna-Avatara, the complete Incarnation of Divinity just as the Christians do upon Christ. The orthodox of both creeds claim this unique position for their respective Saviours. Leaving them to their quarrels we can only appeal to the thoughtful few who have emancipated themselves from the slavery of blind belief not only to read but to study the greatest of Lord Krishna's gifts, His message of Theo-Sophia enshrined in the *Bhagavad Gita*.

Even a casual reading shows that the *Gita* is not a creedal scripture; its appeal is universal. As a text book for those who aspire to live nobly the *Gita* is most helpful, inasmuch as it contains instructions for every

mind, from that which is childlike in its innocence to that which is profound in its penetration of the mysteries of Nature. Moreover, the *Gita* has the distinction of containing a masterly survey of the various philosophical points of view, followed by an exposition which reconciles the truth in each of them by uniting them with the truth which is not in any of them. Its metaphysics are as lofty as its ethics are noble and both become the foundation for practice in daily life. Thus it is suited to those who desire to have clear perception of the universals and ultimates before they handle the particulars of life, as to those who desire to begin now and here without troubling about metaphysical abstractions.

The fundamental propositions of the *Gita* may be summarised thus:—

I. Every man, every woman,

irrespective of creed, colour or class holds within the heart the Light of Divinity.

II. That Light is not able to shine forth because the heart, which holds the Light, has not been made active by the human mind. The function of the mind is to activate the heart so that the Light may radiate through it to the senses, transforming the body into a Temple of Light. Thus only does the individual become the Master and the Servant of all Nature. But foregoing its own duty the mind has activated the senses and become involved with the objects of sense; it is now reaping the nemesis of being misled by the false values it has assigned to the things of the world.

Herein we see the course of human evolution described, and also its deflection by the faulty action of the mind. To enable man to extricate himself from this self-made destiny the *Gita* continues its instruction.

III. As long as the mind persists in its mistaken policy of false valuations it must go from bad to worse. Because of the Law of Polarity which is active in Nature, the mind separated from the Light of the Heart will create out of the senses and the body a demoniac entity, in place of the Divinity which it should and could have

manifested in unison with that Light in the heart. The propelling force which drags the mind to the demoniac state is triple in character: Lust, Anger and Greed are the Gates of Hell. The mind must free itself from this triad. It cannot do so without a recognition of the forgotten principles to which the mind owes its duty. It must therefore abandon the path of going away from the Light and take the Path of Return—the Path of duty to the Light in the Heart. However arduous and protracted this labour no one need despair.

The message of the *Gita* is the message of war which leads to victory—and permanent peace. The courage, the chivalry, the glory of war which attract and even inspire so many to-day, if rightly practised on the Field of Duty as the Master Krishna taught His Chela Arjuna, would precipitate the kingdom of heaven on earth. But Dictators are like Duryodhanas—they want to loot others instead of conquering their own puny selves.

Indeed the *Bhagavad Gita* has a message for the world—both for the Hindus who pay lip-reverence to it without practising its teachings and for the non-Hindus who are ignorant of its message. The assurance is given (II. 40) :—

Even a little of this practice delivereth a man from great risk.

A TORCH OF DARKNESS

[Maurice Samuel was born in a village in Roumania ; at the age of five was brought to Manchester, England, where he was educated, his training in science being under Sir Ernest Rutherford ; at the age of nineteen he went to the United States, and during the war he enlisted in the American army. He says : " From my twentieth year on I have been deeply interested in Zionism both as a spiritual and political movement. I was already mature when I began the study of Hebrew, and it was not until 1924 that I first visited Palestine. But most of my books have been devoted to the Jewish question. My time is divided between Palestine and America. More recently I returned to the study of general problems in the novel *Beyond Woman*." He is also the author of a study of the destruction of individualism in western culture under the title *King Mob*.

The article examines the false claim made on behalf of Science and of Mysticism. Co-ordination of the knowledge of the "scientist" and the pseudomystic is not possible. But can that be said of the knowledge of the true Scientist and the true Mystic ? To-day the scientist runs away from the world of Spirit and Ideas as the Hindu yogi or Muslim faquir runs away from the world of Matter and Objects. For the former, that which is not touched by the sensorium does not exist ; for the latter, objects and even beings are maya, not to be probed but to be shunned. But there is the real Gnyani who is the real Yogi to whom both Spirit and Matter are realities ; for him it is true that "the deeper he goes the clearer it gets." But as the *Gita* says : "Such a Mahatma is difficult to meet."—EDS.]

In the novel *Beyond Woman* there is a phrase which recurs like a leit-motif of despair, "The deeper you go the darker it gets." It is the reiterated utterance of one Hugo Enders, the chief protagonist of the story, a man in search of the right life ; it comes to his lips—an acknowledgment of impotence and a repudiation of responsibility—every time he fails to penetrate to the secret of his relationship with other human beings. On this phrase I have been asked to write an explanatory essay.

The setting of the novel, and the particular personal and social complications which torment Enders, are irrelevant to the questions here raised. Relevant are only the following facts : a man trained in scientific thought brings the scientific method to bear on

what is essentially a non-scientific problem—the problem of a satisfactory morality ; it is made to appear in the novel that he ultimately finds the solution in the dedication of his life to the pursuit of "knowledge" : on arriving at this solution he proclaims triumphantly : "The higher you go the clearer it gets" ; he thus relegates to a secondary position the problem of human relationships, or rather, he assumes tacitly that when the desire for pure "knowledge" has become the dominating and directing passion of his life, his moral problems are solved of themselves. He has reached "the good life."

During the writing of this novel I was haunted by doubts as to the validity of this solution, but these doubts I ignored or suppressed for a

number of reasons, of which the chief was the impossibility of facing the issue and of completing the work along the lines which I had originally laid down. Now, after an intimate examination of my doubts,

I want to say what no critic has bothered to say: however accurately the novel may describe the state of mind of Hugo Enders, its basic theme is false; and to the extent that I claimed to have led the hero out of moral darkness into moral light, I was wrong, and even wilfully wrong. As I see it, I have been able to come to this definite conclusion only after riding myself of the deflecting compulsion to get the book completed. The truth is this: as long as the scientific attitude of Enders was his distinguishing characteristic, he was bound to admit, as often as he made the attempt to resolve the moral problem, "The deeper you go the darker it gets." The reasons follow.

The "knowledge" spoken of by Enders is scientific knowledge, that is, knowledge of spatio-temporal processes. He tries to bring this sort of knowledge to bear on something which has no spatio-temporal aspect, i.e., morality. But there is no transition from one to the other. The two orders of perception are neither commensurate nor parallel. The parallelism (or causal relation) which materialists claim to have established between material processes (environment, chiefly economic laws) and human behaviour does not apply to morality; and if it applies at all, it does so in respect

of a "system of morals," a code, which is in reality a pseudo-morality, an unilluminated and mechanical discipline, a complicated reflex action.

How has this confusion arisen in the man (and type) Enders? It is due largely to two false claims, that of the scientist (as distinguished from the scientist) and that of the pseudo-mystic (as distinguished from the genuine mystic).

The false claim of the scientists is that in the search for scientific knowledge you will find all the necessary guidance (the necessary impulse is somehow implied!) for moral conduct. With them morality is the result of a knowledge of the universe as process or calculable reality. Morality is a branch of science. The false claim of the pseudo-mystic is, on the other hand, that out of grace or moral illumination comes all the knowledge needed for an understanding of the universe as process. As between these two claims the modern man, much more impressed by the achievements of the scientists than by those of the moral teachers, inclines to acknowledge the validity of the first.

What is the nature of the ostensible transition from science to morality? One example is the following: "In the study of astronomy, in preoccupation with the immense inter-stellar spaces, we learn humility." And humility is of course a moral attribute. But is it true that the realisation of our own spatial ignominiousness—no-

thing else is meant—inspires us with humility? It may (very stupidly, be it noted) inspire us with a feeling of the unimportance of *all* human affairs, (it would follow by the way, that in a limited universe we should be twice as important if we were twice as tall), but that is not the same as the feeling of personal humility in the presence of another personality, which alone, under certain circumstances, may have moral significance. As a matter of fact this sorry type of spatial inferiority complex is apt to be accompanied by a corresponding pride of intellect. How utterly marvellous that such small creatures should harbour such immense concepts, and should thereby achieve such brilliant humility! But even when this feeling is absent, though it seldom is, the utter unimportance of everyone in the world makes it seem ridiculous for us to pay more than the slightest attention to the sufferings, physical or moral, of human beings.

Another example is this: "The passion for scientific truth is unselfish. In its pure form it is indifferent to worldly advantage, and therefore cannot inspire that type of hostility which is the foundation of badness." But apart from the fact that a passion for scientific truth is not born from the study of science (i. e., science itself does not inspire the love for science), we may well ask whether the passion for scientific truth is not like any other passion, a personal desire for a certain type of experience, a fixation related to no

moral impulse! In other words, it may be as selfish as a passion for sleeping, for day dreaming, or for any other (let us say) solitary indulgence which does not necessarily imply conflict with others. It may, even when not associated with the desire to shine in the eyes of others, or in one's own eyes, be a flight from hated obligations to a beloved obligation—*if obligation it is.*

Most other examples are variations or admixtures of these two. So the study of biology is supposed to show us our proper place in the larger biologic scheme and, like astronomy, rob us of our self-centredness, in the "that-will-teach-you-a-lesson" spirit. But again this may teach us the unimportance of morality along with the unimportance of all other human preoccupations. Or we are told that the ingenuities of mathematics will so delight the spirit that no man once trapped by this divine pleasure will ever have taste again for the baser joys of life (including, be it noted, the joy of loving one's fellow-creatures). Now the poignant pleasure which is derived from an understanding of higher mathematics is admittedly akin to the experience of the artist. Yet it is generally admitted, likewise, that a passion for art—even the purest and most unselfish and least careerist kind—does not necessarily lead to morality. We are, on the contrary, often assured that the great artist can be discharged of moral obligation.

What, on the other hand, is the nature of the ostensible transition from true morality, the illumina-

tion and grace of complete goodness, to a knowledge of the processes of the universe? This, lacking even the shallow ingenuity of the opposite claim, is complete darkness from the outset. It is a claim and nothing more. But about its character I shall say something more below. Here I would only observe that as it is arrogant to assume that an understanding of Einstein's theory contributes to the moral impulse, so it is fatuous to assume that moral grace will enable us to discover for ourselves Euler's Theorem. And it is the fatuousness of this assumption which drives a man like Enders to the opposite extreme, equally wrong, but not as obviously so to his type of education.

But it is not enough to say that the passion for science does not help to make us moral. We must add that it is useless to employ the methodology of science in the search for moral law—and the word "law" is itself in this connection, a half-unconscious betrayal of morality to science. For the morality, the grace, or illumination which I seek is not an inert and independent thing lying outside of me, to be picked up, examined and classified. It is not something like a knowledge of medicine, which I can dispense with as long as others have it and can tell me what to do in this or that difficulty. It is not measurable or calculable, to be deduced from other data, an extension of another branch of observation. It cannot be fastened into a system of tuition, and inculcated

into others by impersonal communication. And (this I conceive to be the most important and the most dangerous error) it is not a function of time and place, of a given form of society, a given system of production, or a set of circumstances, so that by the study of these we may arrive at a complete understanding of it. It is *sui generis*. Like love (to which it is akin) it is a sort of gift, and as little susceptible of explanation and tuition.

What method to employ in the investigation I do not know. But it is clear now that morality is a blank when examined by science. The scientist, approaching this subject *qua* scientist, finds that the closer he gets to the problem the more completely is he stripped of his equipment, his security and his "light." No wonder, then, he is compelled to say, "the deeper you go the darker it gets." Yet he is only in the same position as a shoemaker who would approach the problem of morality *qua* shoemaker, or a bridge-player who would approach it *qua* bridge-player.

But, how is it that, without an experience of grace or of goodness, Enders could (if he had been allowed by his author to remain honest) say so much about it? And why, as long as he does remain honest, *does* he say "the deeper you go the darker it gets"? The answer is that his knowledge is mostly negative. What he is specifically aware of is that the original hunger for goodness, intermittent, obscure, powerful, re-

mains unsatisfied. He returns from his various explorations in search of morality, to report : "It is not there, or there, or there."

The lie of the novel consists in this : that during a moment of self-deception, when the intermittent hunger is stilled artificially, Hugo Enders is taken off the scene (by a triumphant ending of the novel) as though he had found ultimate satisfaction. Actually the conviction would grow stronger and stronger that he has been looking not only in the wrong places, but with the wrong eyes. At the same time he would become aware that goodness is more important than science, or, to be more accurate (since comparison also suggests commensurability) he would begin to feel that the meaninglessness of life, which is confirmed by the study of science, may be resolved (not answered—for "answered" is a scientific concept) by love or grace.

But it gives meaningfulness to life on another plane than the scientific. It is here that the scientific modern finds himself repelled by the pseudo-mystic. It appears that the effect of grace is so powerful and so illuminating, it fills a man so completely, that he falls into the erroneous belief that the illumination holds good on the plane of the scientific too. That is how he becomes a pseudo-mystic. Hence, too, his extravagant misstatement that not only can grace

do in its own field what science cannot do, but that grace can substitute for science in the scientific field too.

The most important, most specific and, to the scientist, most unacceptable instance of trespassing has to do with the subject of personal immortality. Almost every man who has experienced grace lays claim to a special type of authority on this subject—derived from grace—and he almost invariably asserts a belief in personal immortality *in terms of process*. But if it is indeed in terms of process the evidence for it cannot be accessible to grace rather than to science. The study of process is the proper field of science, the investigation of personal immortality *as process* does not lie within the field of morality.

And yet...the scientifically trained modern has obscure intimations that somehow, somewhere, goodness has some sort of connection with this very problem of immortality! He is compelled to assert that to him personal immortality is, as an idea, primitive, neolithic, demonological, anti-intellectual, *while morality is not*. Nevertheless morality is as great a need for him as for anyone else. And it is this dilemma which, more than anything else, defeats every attempt he makes to deny the monopolistic and universal spiritual claims of science and to realise human relationships in terms of grace.

MAURICE SAMUEL

THE GOOD LIFE IN A SICK WORLD

[Irwin Edman is Professor of Philosophy at the Columbia University, New York. In this article he offers some fundamentals for social reconstruction, putting first things first—not a common procedure in our world where the director enslaves the citizen and the machine the soul.—EDS.]

The good life, though it is in danger of becoming a cant phrase is in essence the whole theme of moral philosophy. Thinkers from Plato to the present time, in so far as they have tried to turn their analyses upon distinctively human issues have tried to frame a vision or a version of a life that might truly be called Good, or an approximation to some absolute Good which human life might hope at best only partially to exemplify. The good life has been in every philosophy the considered statement of an ideal. That ideal might be perfected pleasure, realized duty, the harmony of all impulses or the integrity of one's soul. But there are two senses in which the good life cannot be considered in isolation, as philosophers have repeatedly discovered in pushing their inquiries to their fundamental implications. The good life is not a private soliloquy; it is not the exercise of a cloistered virtue, even for an ostensible hermit. It takes place in a society and a cosmos. A moralist is perforce a social philosopher and a metaphysician. He must make his peace with the ultimate before he can make his peace with himself. He must understand the relations of man to each other before he can counsel them as to their harmonization of themselves. It has there-

fore come to seem otiose to conceive the good life without reference to the society in which that life must be lived and of which it is indeed the flowering and the expression. It is impossible to conceive of the good life without making some ultimate commitment as to that world order by which it is conditioned. It is no accident that moral injunctions have differed according as their authors were idealists or materialists, as they made matter or spirit the substance of things, nor that moral conclusions have differed according as their framers were communal or individualistic in their political thinking.

None the less time and again philosophers have tried to write about morals as if it were possible to think about conduct in insulation from society and from the nature of things. It is here submitted that the good life is impossible in a sick society, and that any serious proposal as to the former involves a profoundly reconstructive attitude toward the latter. By a sick society I mean more than the surface political and economic dislocations of the present day. These, serious though they are, are palpable symptoms of something more profoundly diseased. In an industrial society, means have been taken for ends; in a mechanically

mind ed age, the instruments and materials have been taken for realities. The spirit has been stifled and by its material conditions, the fires of life quenched by the ashes of intellectual formulas on the one hand and practical operations on the other. It is not simply the disorders of our economic society but the obsession by economic criteria that is one of the diseases of our society. It is not simply that we are tangled by mechanism and that things, as Emerson put it, are in the saddle. It is that mechanisms and things have been taken as the ends of life and the realities of nature. It is not simply that we have inadequate formulas, but that we have become addicted to intellectualism as to a drug. Life is best defined in its full flowering; the reality of it is in the flame of consciousness and the fire of spirit. In so far as society crosses and kills these, it is a sick society and no good life is possible in it.

The social dislocations of our society have been widely canvassed of late, and with very good reason. But they need a brief restatement in connection with the theme of this article. However refined and subtilized be the sensibilities of the individual, however sensitive a harp of response be the individual psyche, every honest and realistic thinker from Aristotle down has realized how much individuality is social in its origins, how much even its rarest blossoming is a social expression. Even soliloquy uses a language and language is not a purely private invention; it

is a social tradition. This holds true *a fortiori* of moral ideas, and attitudes and the expression of an ideal in a society whose basic economic conditions make the practice of that ideal impossible leads to hypocrisy, to disillusion or to despair. To enunciate a vision of the good life which is impossible even in approximation for the majority of those living in a particular social and political system is to cultivate Pharisaism. Even to those relatively comfortable and relatively secure, morality becomes at best a sickly, introspective retreat from existence, not a harmonious fulfilment of it. Obviously the grosser inequities, the cruder bitternesses of misery and uncertainty must be removed before the good life is possible for the many, or even for the privileged few.

But those concerned, as are so many of the foremost thinkers of our day, with the more brutal maladjustments of our society, with economic chaos and with the threat of war, have fallen into an error equally grievous. They have been so concerned with the amelioration of social and economic evils, that they have neglected the basic and directive issue of what constitutes social good. An ordered society is the condition of the good life, but it is not a sufficient condition. One of the reasons Spinoza assigned for order in the commonwealth was that men might only in an ordered commonwealth be free to lead the contemplative life without distraction. If individuality can thrive only in a

free and equitable commonwealth, it is still the fact of individuality that is the be all and end all, the justification and value of a commonwealth at all. Many of our political philosophers of the present day are like physicians who might prefer all humanity to be ill that they might have a wider field for the exercise of their profession.

The fact remains that though the good life presupposes an ordered, a free and a relatively co-operative commonwealth, its distinctive elements are elsewhere to seek. Ants in an ant-hill live in an ordered polity; their lives are good for ants, not for men. For the distinctive trait of the possibility of mankind lies in the fact that given the chance, man may think and dream. Born among other human creatures, in time he may contemplate eternal things. Bound externally by physical objects, a body among other bodies, a thing among things, he feels himself most alive and most real, and indeed may be said to be so, when he rises to the level of his distinctive essence, spirit clear and lucid, timeless in its reach and transcending body and matter in its context and its aspiration.

One may measure then the adequacy of our social institutions and of our moral systems to the extent to which they liberate that activity of spirit in which men may be most truly said to find themselves. *The deepest sickness of our society is that it is almost calculated to make man lose sight of himself and his deepest being.*

Everything about our age, certainly in the Western world, conspires to make him lose himself in the secondary, the trivial and the illusory. Pressed by economic disorders, he comes to think almost wholly in economic terms. Constrained by the techniques of science, and taking the formulas of physical control for the forms of ultimate reality, he takes economic interests as final and material concerns as ultimate.

The writer should be the last to dismiss as unimportant economic readjustment or the conditions of physical well-being. But economics and physics are or should be the servants of spirit, not its conquerors. And we have come to pay too devout and too uncritical obeisance to the language of economics, of physics and of the analytic intelligence. The sources of life and the ends of life both lie deeper. And the sources of and the ends of life may be said curiously enough to be identical. They both lie in the domain of a reality wider than any formulations of intellect, more profound and complete than any of those practicalities and materialities in which our actions and indeed our imaginations are so much confined. They lie in the deep movement and tendency of Nature toward the Good.

The sickness of our society is not to be cured then simply by economic and social re-arrangements, important and pre-requisite though these be. We need a new orientation which reduces itself ultimately to what used to be and

might still be called, putting first things first. First things are not the materials which life uses, the instruments which it employs. First things are the ends for which life is lived and the realities at its core. One does not have to wait for a political revolution to revolutionize one's sense of proportion. One may within limits, unless the pressure of events becomes too terrifying, manage to some degree to live a good life even in a society far from rational adjustment or equitable distribution.

The revolution in a sense of values and in a sense of ultimates is already beginning in the Western world. The enslavement by mechanisms which should themselves be our slaves is beginning to seem fantastic and in some ways the chief sources of our major social disasters. The West will never again be able to pin its faith complacent, provincial and optimistic to the machine, and to material progress. Too much faith in the machine has succeeded in reducing life itself to mechanism, too much faith in material progress to reduce experience to mere meaningless and blind routine. The faith in intellectual formulas has been seen to be a post-mortem analysis of reality rather than a communication of it. The spirit has deeper foundations and higher altitudes than intellect itself can plumb or scale.

The good life, in whatever terms it be stated, is a concern with, an attempt to discern ultimates, in the light of which conduct may be directed. Those

ultimates are not to be found in matter defined in mechanical terms, in practice defined in terms of instruments, in society delineated in terms of forms and institutions. Finalities lie in another direction. They are such essences as are approached by the enterprises of art and of metaphysics. They are such values as the spirit traverses when it looks beyond its chains and its conditions to its sources and its objects. One is tempted to borrow the language of one of the great mystics of the world, Plotinus, born in Egypt and destined to teach in Rome: "This is the life of gods and of god-like men, a flight of the alone to the alone." The spirit retiring to its own solitudes looks into itself and to the ultimate and eternal nature of Being. It moves in time but it breathes eternity. In so far as in art and in contemplation such ultimate vision is touched, these are moments of the good life in a sick society. In so far as those moments of contemplative breadth and aesthetic insight are rare in our Western civilization, we can see how really sick our society is. Perhaps a change in philosophy is the first step toward social health. Perhaps when the spirit has learned to breathe freely in terms of eternal things, it will have learned how to measure the need for social reconstruction and what the ends of all social reconstruction are, the freeing of the spirit itself, and its recognition of its affinity in the nature of things.

IRWIN EDMAN

THE CHILD-STATE WE HAVE LOST

[Lovers of children make good teachers because their love unfolds the capacity to learn from their pupils. Children have an advantage which adults have lost—they have perception of spiritual verities, and in their desire to express and explain themselves they naturally take recourse in the language of symbols. This is brought out by R. L. Mégroz in the first of the following two articles. Child-consciousness by analogy represents human consciousness, not of primitive savages but of primitive seers of early humanity before the cycle of sin. The Golden Age is called *Satya-Yuga*, the Age of Truth, when men possessed the Eye of Innocence and lived wisely without knowing what they possessed or how they lived. This is not fancy; it is fact which anthropologists and archæologists have yet to discover. Ours is an age of sophistication and those who are sick with it find in the company of children not only a solace but an inspiration. This is well brought out in the second article by Hugh de Sélincourt. The aspirant to spiritual life is told in *The Voice of the Silence*: "The pupil must regain *the child-state he has lost* ere the first sound can fall upon his ear"; in achieving this the company of the young proves helpful, especially if it is remembered that the soul in the child-body has been on earth before and possesses knowledge and experience unsuspected by us.

For a variety of reasons the doctrine of Reincarnation is important, but we regard it as of supreme importance for educational reform. Until the educational reformer recognises the child as a soul returning to earth in a new body to continue its task of mastering Nature, gradually and slowly, he is bound to be mistaken in any system he devises for its all round improvement. People speak of giving the child a chance to develop its own special talents, or to use the Eastern phraseology "to work out its own Karma," but the state and the church (and its equivalent in non-Christian lands) pull and push the young so that they may become obedient citizens and orthodox followers. What is the ideal to be aimed at? To deal with each child as a unit, and to educate it so as to produce the most harmonious and equal unfoldment of its powers, in order that its special aptitudes should find their full natural development. We should aim at creating free men and women, free intellectually, free morally, unprejudiced in all respects, and above all things, unselfish.—EDS.]

POETRY AND THE CHILD'S PERCEPTIONS

Peacock in "The Four Ages of Poetry," which was published first in 1820, and as we know, provoked Shelley's splendid "Defence of Poetry," argued that poetry was an anachronism in the modern world. We had become reasoning and civilised beings and the substance of poetry was now fantastic make-believe lacking the reality that originally it had conveyed to a barbaric community. In brief: "a poet in our times is a semi-barbarian in a civilized community." The essay was largely an

attack upon the rich new poetry of the "Romantic Revival," which included Wordsworth, Coleridge, Shelley and Keats. To Thomas Love Peacock even Wordsworth was "a morbid dreamer." Peacock summarised in a lively manner the common-sense revolt against "Gothic" superstition. This common-sense attitude was sorely tried when confronted by new poetry from Blake to Shelley, and needed the impressive support that Victorian science was soon to provide. Shelley had no difficulty

in overwhelming Peacock then, but Peacock's fallacies were really of a permanent type which crops up at all times when conditions are favourable.

The next conflict assumed the character of a contest between "religion" (or rather theology) and "science," but below the surface there was still the opposition of common sense to fantasy and what was essentially a mystical attitude towards reality. By unveiling fresh mysteries, the scientists undermined the position of common sense, and strengthened or liberated again the poetic imagination, and gave new impetus to mystical philosophy.

A very important consequence of this progress in thought was the recognition of the validity of the child's perceptions. The poetry of childhood seemed no longer a merely fantastic play, or an adult's condescension to make-believe. The profundity of Blake, for so long obscured, began to influence adult intelligence. The modern reader could grant more than beauty of language to Blake's lyrics, or to Wordsworth's "Intimations of Immortality." Wordsworth asked:—

Whither is fled the visionary gleam?
Where is it now, the glory and the dream?

and answered:—

Our birth is but a sleep and a forgetting:
The soul that rises with us, our life's star,
Hath had elsewhere its setting,
And cometh from afar:
Not in entire forgetfulness,
And not in utter nakedness,
But trailing clouds of glory do we come
From God, who is our home:
Heaven lies about us in our infancy!
Shades of the prison-house begin to close
Upon the growing boy.

The seventeenth century Thomas Traherne had set down the same confession in his then unknown "Centuries of Meditations." To him in childhood the world was paradise, the very fields "orient and immortal wheat." He existed in that eternity of the imagination proclaimed by Blake, and declared:—

Those pure and virgin apprehensions I had from the womb, and that divine light wherewith I was born are the best unto this day, wherein I can see the universe. By the Gift of God they attended me into the world, and by this special favour I remember them till now. Certainly Adam in Paradise had not more sweet and curious apprehensions of the world, than I when I was a child. . . . You will never enjoy the world aright till the sea itself floweth in your veins, till you are clothed with the heavens and crowned with the stars.

No longer can we philosophically disregard the validity of childish perception by drawing a simile between the childish mentality and that of the uncivilised savage, or, as Peacock called him, the barbarian. And a useful key to unlock the treasures of childhood is at hand in the poet's characteristic mode of perception. When we realise this, we are also possessed of a valuable means of educating the child.

Actually a gulf is now recognised between the mind of the primitive savage and the consciousness of the civilised adult, a gulf which is not completely bridged by the consciousness of the child in a civilised society. In the mixture of seemingly unreasonable connections of one thing with another

and a sort of fantastic logic, which are typical of ordinary dreaming, we return half-way to that primitive simplicity and directness of perception. This resembles the perception that is the substance of poetry, which, says Shelley, "lifts the veil from the hidden beauty of the world, and makes familiar objects be as if they were not familiar".

The easiest pleasures of poetry are in simple metrical effects—perhaps the jingle of a nursery rhyme, repetition of a refrain, and the obvious imitation of sounds, like Tennyson's "murmur of innumerable bees." A step further and our pleasure implies a deeper insight. Vowel sounds acquire subtle tones or the values of colour by their patterning, and this intensifying of expression is really a sharper definition of ideas or sensations :—

Dagon his name, sea-monster, upward man,
And downward fish : yet had his temple high
Reared in Azotus dreaded through the coast
Of Palestine, in Gath and Ascalon,
And Accaron and Gaza's frontier bounds.
Him followed Rimmon, whose delightful seat
Was fair Damascus, on the fertile banks
Of Abbana and Pharpar, lucid streams.

To mere common sense Milton's splendid diction refers to nothing but a discredited mythological creature and a small country, but Milton makes the domain as impressive as the monster, both being of that class of realities which are persisting symbols. Verse is not essential. The same kind of reality can be conveyed in prose where the words are a channel for it. Perhaps you remember Mr. Walter de la Mare's deeply poetic story of the two lost travellers who came

upon those immemorably ancient stone "Vats" in which was the water of life. In this prose we see how language has become Janus-headed, looking calmly at science one way and gazing with hungry eyes the other into the wild memories of the human race and its half-descried future. The words are gems that change hue in the light of thought. The author uses words musically and symbolically, combining concrete images of reality with mythological associations. More numerous than "Cherries in Damascus or beads in Tierra del Fuego," he says. As a common-sense statement of immensity this is weak, since there are probably far fewer cherries in Damascus or beads in Tierra del Fuego than in London! The words convey symbols for ideas which could not be expressed otherwise. Since the cherries and beads represent *centuries*, the logical statement adds its force to the symbolism of the immaculate solitude and antiquity of the Vats.

The youthful mind, when it is not dulled by the wrong sort of "education," can respond directly to this kind of perception. In illustration of the childish power of perception, Sully, the psychologist and philosopher, told us of a little boy, two years and five months old, who, on looking at the hammers of a piano which his mother was playing called out :— "There is owlegie." "Owlegie" was his diminutive of owl. His eye had instantly caught the similarity between the round felt disc of the hammer divided by a piece

of wood, and the owl's face divided by its beak. Simile and its condensed form, metaphor, are both childish and true, and so become the very substance of poetry, which gives concrete expression to perception. Another child, seeing dew on grass says: "the grass is crying." If it saw grass spiky with frost and realised the connotations of "shrill" it might, with Miss Edith Sitwell, say the grass is shrill, and having perceived that, go on to say that someone's voice is like frosty grass. When it finds imaginative clues in words that fuse into music, perception is vivified and enriched by all the associations of its energetic and aroused mind. Here we touch on an explanation why the finest of Blake's *Songs of Innocence* and *Songs of Experience* are ideal poetry for the child, who may not apprehend all the possible associations—few adults do—of profoundly simple poetry like "Tiger, Tiger, burning bright in the forests of the night." Perception becomes one with fantasy, discovering both the seen object and the unseen reality of which it is a symbol.

Verse became the most effective medium of poetic utterance at a very early stage because it began as an accompaniment to dance and chant. As it developed separately it retained certain primitive characteristics of the pantomimic dances and ecstatic chanting of religious ritual, and began to express the basic mystical union which these expressed by an ever increasing variety of concrete

imagery. The two-fold aspect of primitive thought—pantomime and ecstasy—lives as imitation and insight in poetry; but the change of terms is scarcely necessary. Imitation refers not to photographic reproduction but to a sort of reincarnation in the mind, of external objects a process which at many points can be compared with the work of imagination in dreams. While the movement of the primitive and symbolic dance is translated by poetry into a mental dance, all the objects in that pantomime of mystery are seen in a changed light which makes them significant of more than their mere appearance—makes them to be, as Shelley said "as if they were not familiar." These new apprehensions are conveyed through the beauty that the poet creates out of words. They are sensuous and, as all profound truths are, simple.

Now sensory apprehension of knowledge is what the Greeks meant by æsthetic pleasure, the sense of beauty. Before we get involved in the abstractions of theory the senses are the gateways of knowledge. To the fresh senses of the child all the sensuous qualities of poetry therefore are perceptible, not only obvious sound-imitation and banging metres, but melody, colour, and the subtleties of rhythm and imagery which make a universal appeal. Many people do not feel the finer evocations of poetry, but the æsthetic appeal is none the less universal. It is in the nature of mind. When the poet probes to a level of

experience beyond the conscious or rational thought he explores a region where the adult and the child are linked in a common knowledge and awareness. The sensuous feeling of reality, the flashing perception of beauty which is a refashioned dream, is every child's inheritance. The radically poetic way of knowing reality, is therefore peculiarly that of the child, who is akin to the savage. Primitive languages are always poetic before they are scientific; that is why so many words in currency which have been worn smooth by custom contain fossilised poetry. In its vivid expression of the childlike way of perceiving reality, poetry is a record of the human mind's creative faculty: all gaps in understanding are filled in with

symbolic myths and pictures.

"We must know best what we are least conscious of knowing," said Samuel Butler. "We are symbols and inhabit symbols; workman, work and tools, words and things, birth and death, are all emblems"—said Emerson. This is the vindication of the childish vision, which some intellectual people of our day, irritated by much cant, would dismiss as an adult invention. A survey of the modern age yields no promise for the future so bright as that which may be found in our growing knowledge and appreciation of the childish mind, an appreciation which comes of a fuller understanding of poetry, which in turn we owe largely to the self-destructive progress of science from materialism to acknowledged mystery.

R. L. MÉGROZ

LEARNING FROM CHILDREN

It sounds pretty and sentimental, to learn from children. The words are quick to conjure up in the mind a picture of large-eyed innocence, golden-haired and immaculate, some sort of little angel thing, upon which the actual fact of some small reprobate with dirty hands and a talent for mischief bursts rather crudely jarring. Yet Christ, though many established ministers of his gospel might incline one to doubt it, knew very well what he was about, and meant what he said when he set a

child up in the midst of his somewhat staid disciples and pointed out that except they became as one of these they would not enter into the Kingdom of Heaven. Goethe, too, generally meant what he said; and he remarked, when he was mature in years, old in wisdom and young in heart: "We learn from children what women have failed to teach us." And who are the *we*? Men; not the pompous politician or publicist or professor, though they presumably are men too; but men of his own kidney;

men, that is to say, who are not content to repose perilously on their own dignity or position, but who remain capable of learning, growing still, as years pass, and lively.

In the presence of some great dignitary of Church or State, of some brilliant man of the world, of letters or society, I find comfort in remembering that after all not so very many years have elapsed since Mother lifted little heels with one hand while she changed his nappy with the other. The thought of such grand gentlemen renders the idea of learning from children preposterous in its absurdity, unless the truth of the words has bitten deep into the consciousness, in which case it is, I am afraid, the grand gentlemen who appear preposterous and their dignity which appears absurd, and ill-founded, however salient and towering.

What then can be learned from a child—apart from some vague aspiration towards a misty purity (begotten of a distorted idea of innocence) which the compact reality of the child's robust presence dispels as a fresh wind dispels fog? The idea is so fundamental, involves such a complete change of heart, from the ordinary conception, that it is difficult to come to grips with it in words. Blake helps with the phrase *errors of acquired folly*, in the passage commenting on Lavater where he says:—

Those who are offended with anything in this book would be offended with the innocence of a child and for

the same reason because it reproaches him with the errors of acquired folly.

The child is a challenge to our integrity which is apt to become dusty with habit, and dull with familiarity. The child brings a fresh and unspoiled eye to bear upon matters which we are inclined to take for granted; intimate and homely matters for the most part. I am speaking of course of families (and their number is increasing on every side) in which an effort is made to understand the child and the child is allowed to grow to its own shape, not forced into a mould by parents and nurses and teachers and so on, until it becomes an obedient little automaton, incapable of any action but revolt.

If a man is able to re-live an experience with a child he is able to free himself from the errors of acquired folly with regard to that experience: he can re-educate himself and indeed must do so, if he is to keep in touch with the child. All his ideas have to be re-sorted quite from the beginning—to be on a level with the child's honesty. First of all he must know whether it is the child who is being naughty or whether it is he who is cross. It sounds simple. Would that it were! But judging from my own experience, I may help by confessing that scrutiny revealed out of a hundred cases ninety-nine in which the cause of any little contretemps was elderly crossness, and the one case of naughtiness (throwing a young cat into a small pond) was immediately confessed.

"I've thrown Wepus into the pond".

"But why, dear? How unkind!"

"Yes, but I wanted to see what would happen."

It was all vastly solemn. The culprit aged four and the young cat were great friends, and remained friends. He bore no malice and allowed himself to be dried with hot cloths in front of the kitchen fire.

The treatment of animals is important. Any sort of cruelty is insufferable. But cruelty is no more natural to the young human being than a boil at the back of the neck: both are signs of disorder, the one in the body the other in the mind. Knaveries, as Blake exclaims, are not human nature: knaveries are knaveries. The assumption that all little boys are cruel little rascals is an absurdity, showing only that most little boys are rather inhumanly treated. And here again you can learn.

The small person of four was carrying the young cat's mother staggering along, hands clasped tightly round the cat's middle whose front paws stuck out and back paws drooped dragging. I hurried out to explain how cats hated to be carried in that way. I was assured the cat liked it. "Put her down and you'll see she'll scamper off enraged." The cat was accordingly with some difficulty deposited on the ground: the wretched creature immediately arched her back, hoisted her tail, and pressed a happy head purring against the small person's leg, and was picked up again in the same

way. I may mention that she still treats cats in a manner that I continue to consider reprehensible, and the cats (two especially who have deigned to spend long lives with us) astound me by showing a vast preference for her. There is an understanding between them which my own more delicate methods have been unable to achieve.

We have to re-sort our notions from the very beginning, and such a mass of examples surges over my mind that the difficulty is which to choose—in the long process of re-education: all simple fundamental things—on what is truthful, what is dirty or nasty, what constitutes good behaviour and so on. And any one instance leads you by gentle implication into the source of conduct and the very make-up of human nature, which good behaviour, for all its convenience, usually exists to cloak: that is, the crosser you are the more virtuous you feel in behaving beautifully; and the more obnoxious you are to the child or to any right-minded person. Own up that you are in a bad temper and no harm is done except to your personal dignity, which dislikes a person of your august presence and position to appear just cross—dislikes it so much that it will discover the most astute and admirable reasons (in the conduct of others, in the state of the world, in the very fact of life itself—there is no limit to the tricks of acquired folly in this matter of self-justification) why such a perfect person should be

annoyed: in fact, that you are annoyed swiftly becomes a proof of your worth—your intelligence and your sensitiveness and your inherent goodness. All fault-finding, indeed, comes to be seen as an ingenious form of self-justification, based on that commonest illusion that you prove yourself right in proving another wrong.

An old friend of mine said of her son, Edward, a small friend of mine, with much distress: "He is such a dreadful little liar." I could not agree with her; indeed his persistent corrections of her frequent inaccuracies with regard to names in books, or routes of buses or makes of cars struck me as being a trifle pedantic. Now at the time of their visit a main topic of conversation was connected with bullfinches which were nipping the buds off the plum-trees, and which I was being continually urged to shoot. I came home from a walk to be greeted by an excited Edward.

"I've killed a bull-finch. The most marvellously lucky shot."

"Never!" I said, "How did you do it?"

"It was sitting on that branch. See. And I had a stick in my hand and flung it and the end struck its head as it flew off."

He spoke with complete conviction: no shadow of doubt crossed my mind.

"Excellent!" I said. "I want to see one close. I don't really know exactly what they look like."

"Oh! I am sorry. I've buried it. Over there." He pointed behind a nearby privet hedge.

"Never mind. We'll soon find the grave."

"Ah! but it was in the cinders and I stamped them down hard."

We went and searched. There was no trace of any grave.

"Rotten!" he said "I never thought you'd want to see it. I am sorry".

"Ah!" I said, beginning to doubt. He instantly sensed my doubt and exclaimed in a hurt, accusing voice: "You don't believe I ever did kill a bull-finch at all. But I swear I did."

"Well, why shouldn't I believe what you tell me?" I countered and wandered off from the search, that I now knew must be fruitless. That was my first taste of his inventive genius. I didn't want to let him down too badly, so at tea I said: "That bull-finch drove it out of my head: I meant to tell you. A marvellous thing happened on my walk. Over the hill towards me a huge creature came hopping. It wasn't a dog. It was an enormous kangaroo. I had no stick. (Edward's eyes began to pop out.) You know how they rip up dogs with their great back legs. They can be very nasty, Kangaroos can. So I turned and stopped to see what the human eye could do. He came nearer and nearer." I broke off.

"No: I think it's rotten not to believe a chap's story."

"What happened?" cried Edward eager to know.

"Well, it was a friendly kangaroo: must have been some person's pet, who lives near."

"How did you know he was friendly?"

"Oh, I sort of felt it and he had a nice kind eye. Anyhow he came quite up to me—and raised his tail up like a happy cat only sideways—and on the end of his tail was sitting, what do you think?" Edward was chuckling all over him—a little red and shy, but chuckling: he answered quickly: "A bull-finch, I expect."

"No. Two bull-finches!"

We both laughed. The story of the kangaroo and the bull-finches has become a stock joke, with many pleasant elaborations.

And the point of this charming story is? The little boy never told another lie? Not at all. That would depend, I expect, on many things. But we both learned (and here age may be, perhaps, an advantage in this matter of learning and applying the results of what one has learned) a little more about the nature of truth. Above all, this fact emerged: that people are inclined to see what

they wish to see. My small friend had so wished to please me by destroying a bull-finch that he had practically convinced himself the bull-finch was destroyed. Elder persons in the same way convince themselves, with even less to go upon, of the faults of others, for example, in order to feel superior.

Also, (and far the most important) communication has been strengthened between my small friend and me. We like to talk together when we meet about things that interest us—people, books, animals and so on; and we talk openly and with confidence, which we both find very pleasant. Here, again perhaps age scores in being able to appreciate a little more thoroughly the value of such confidence, and to savour more fully the bouquet of its pleasantness. But of this I cannot be sure. Prejudice plays queer pranks. He thinks me a decent sort of chap, and leaves it at that. Which is no doubt wiser.

HUGH DE SÉLINCOURT

LIME JUICE AND MUSTARD OIL

CONCERNING THE MARVELLOUS POWERS OF A YOGI

[The pen-name of **S. Bradbury-Flint** is "Resurgam" which is not unknown in literary circles. At our request he has put his name to this narrative which contains actual experiences; he assures us that the names of persons and places mentioned are real. He writes—"I have endeavoured to study the people of the Orient, and prior to this stay of nearly ten years in India, I roved in Syria, Indo-China and North Africa."

Students of occult lore will understand the rationale of events and ideas in this report of true experiences. Can the Modern Scientist, or the Psychical Researcher or the Spiritist explain, for example—

(a) how the yogi controlled from a distance the movements of the serpent?

(b) how the yogi read characters of absent people by looking at their photographs?

(c) how the yogi read the character of an absent person by looking at his hand-writing, without knowing the language of the writing? And more, how was he able to predict the future of that man?

Those desirous of seeking answers and explanations will find them in H. P. Blavatsky's *Isis Unveiled*.—EDS.]

Previous to this series of incidents, during the whole ten years of my stay in India as a district representative of a British commercial firm, I had no time to spare, nor any inclination to do so, on religious mendicants or "Yogis" of Hindustan.

I had, of course, seen many of them in the streets, had emphatically pronounced them as "bunkum," until one day I met Swami Raju Krishna, and learned that there are more powers at work in man than the practical Occidental mind thinks possible.

It was during the summer of 1930. I had left broiling Lahore and embarked on a shikaring and fishing trip into the Kulu and Kangra Valleys. It had been my intention to shikar in the southern slopes of

the Dhaula Dhar Range and then to wend my way down the upper reaches of the Beas River seeking the "mighty mahseer."

At the end of the leisurely first day's trek, from the railhead at Jagindar Nagar, through glorious scenery, I arrived within a mile of a few scattered huts. Here I decided to make camp. Leaving the old hunter and my servant to arrange things I made my way towards the huts with hopes of purchasing such fresh supplies as were obtainable and also to hire a couple of men to act as carriers of the camp equipment. As I strolled along the narrow track, smoking my beloved pipe and thinking of the unlucky devils still on the plains I was arrested by a movement in the path about four yards in front of me. I stop-

ped abruptly as I saw the swaying and darting head of an angry cobra with hood extended.

Whilst I was considering whether to gracefully retire and wish the cobra the best of luck, for there was not much space on that narrow path running round the hillside, or to risk a blow with my walking stick, I heard a voice speaking in Hindustani which said: "Walk on, Sahib, do not hesitate or the snake will know that you are afraid." I walked straight ahead, though my heart appeared to be in the vicinity of my mouth. As I started walking, however, the snake slid to the ground and remained motionless, so much so that when I reached it, it was lying rigid.

I looked up from the snake to where, seated on the hillside, was a Yogi with the clean-cut, serene face of a true ascetic and raven black hair resting on his shoulders. His vermilion caste-marks stood out in high contrast with his dusky complexion and saffron robes, but the most striking features of this personage were his eyes; these were large even for an Indian, black and can only be described as piercing.

I called out to him, climbed up to where he was, and found him seated on a flat stone at the mouth of a small cave in the hillside. For what he had done, I thanked him and asked if there was anything that I could do for him. To this he replied: "There is nothing I require at present." I stayed for a short time and our conversation became of things in

general in India.

As I was about to depart, I asked him how the snake had dropped dead at that precise moment. He answered that the snake was not dead, for it was against his caste to kill anything except in self-defence; it had only been rendered harmless. But the ways of doing that would not be understood by the "Sahib Log". To this, I remarked that, although I was an Occidental, I was quite willing to hear and learn, so, with a promise that he would explain at some other time I departed.

That was my introduction to Swami Raju Krishna, and I found his speech so interesting and enlightening that I not only stayed in that camp more than the two or three days, as I had proposed, but for the remainder of my leave, much to the disgust of the Shikari, and was even then sorry when it terminated.

Our conversations were not always of things in general, sometimes he would tell me of his early life; how, as a disciple to a priest of his sect in a temple, and later as a disciple to a wandering Yogi, he had learned the mysteries of life; and how he had enlarged his knowledge whilst serving his period of "penance" in the bare hills to the North, with only the wild beasts for companions.

How, in his theory of the transmigration of souls, he believed that human beings inherited some of the characteristic markings of their former animal lives, in their faces and hands, in their mode of living and their minds, and that these

composed the factors of a person's character and the reason for many of his or her actions.

He gave me an exposition :—The lion would kill and eat the flesh of its kill but would rather die of starvation than eat the flesh of a carcass that had been killed by some other animal or that had died. Whereas the jackal would not kill but feed entirely on the dead flesh left by other animals or those that had died or even thrown away as garbage. So it was with human beings, some would battle royally against great odds and overcome them but would disdain to war with odds that they knew they could easily overpower. Whereas others, not willing to stand even a chance of defeat, would pick as their opponents only people who they knew could not put up any stout resistance.

I asked him if he could delineate my character from the little he knew and could see of me. He replied that I was as an open book. He portrayed my character, telling me my strong points and my weak ones. How, because of the former, I had succeeded in some business ventures, and how, because of the latter, I had lost on others. Here was a very knotty problem indeed. How in the name of all that is wonderful could a man who had undoubtedly, never been inside a business office tell these things.

He then turned to my past, and his version was most startlingly accurate. He told me of my birth, not only the year, the date and the

time, but also mentioned the fact that I was born whilst a blizzard was in progress. This was quite enough to convince me—or anyone I think, who had previously been sceptic of these strange powers—that I had been “barking up the wrong tree.”

He then continued by telling me how I had at the age of three undergone a minor operation and pointing to the place told me that I still carried the scar made by the doctor's knife; on to many half forgotten incidents of my school days, and how I had lost my father in the Great War in Europe; how I came to be in India and also that I was contemplating marriage in the not too distant future, but that circumstances would necessitate the marriage taking place six months previous to the time arranged.

Showing a photograph of my fiancée I asked him if he thought that we would make a happy pair. He looked at the picture for some minutes and then passed it back to me, saying that he would do as I asked on the last day of my stay there which, he said, would be the sixth of the next month. As the last day I could remain and report back to the office in time was the ninth, I was rather puzzled to know why this should be, for it was not my intention to leave until the last minute. Seeing the look of perplexity on my face, he said : “Do not worry, Sahib, you will hear all about it on the sixth day.”

Up to that time, and although I had asked him several times, he

would only answer: "Patience, Sahib, patience."

I showed him other photographs, of my sister, friends and business acquaintances, and he gave me full details of the life of each. Whilst I was taking out one of the photographs from my wallet, I accidentally dropped a letter on to the ground. Before I could replace it, my friend had picked it up and was staring at the few lines of writing that were visible.

I thought this was very strange but did not say anything for I could see that the writing was not that of my fiancée. After a few minutes he handed it back to me saying: "Sahib, the man who wrote that has the character of a jackal. The less you have to do with him, the better for yourself."

To my amazement, on opening the letter I found that it was the written sanction for my leave, typewritten except for the signature and a small footnote in the handwriting of my "Boss" in Calcutta. Still amazed, I asked my friend the Yogi, if he was sure that he had not made a mistake, as, how could he, not knowing a word of the written English, tell me what kind of a man had written those few lines.

He answered that it was not necessary to know the jackal's tongue to be able to follow his footmarks in the snow, and although he did not know one word of what was written he could tell by the way it had been written that the writer was not a man to be trusted. Still thinking that he had made some mistake for although I

had not met the "Boss" many times he had impressed me as being a "straight-dealer," I took out a group photograph on which the person in question was the central figure. Pointing this out to the Yogi, I asked what he thought of that man. At once he replied: "This is the same man, Sahib, and, if you are willing to listen, I can now tell you more about him."

This is the story he told :—

This man cannot be a true friend to anyone, not even to himself. Although at present, he has everything he wishes in the way of money and position, he is not happy and the future is dark for him. He is now spending money which is not his own. It will cause his death. His wife, whom he married many years ago, and his son, now a grown man, left him because of his brutal actions, and both stay in the home of the mother across the seas. The woman who is living with him and is known as his wife has reaped the crop of the seeds she sowed, for he is now tired of her affections and takes his pleasures with the street-girls. He is fast sinking into the mud of disgrace and despair and will not be able to stand and fight his way back. He will make a coward's retreat and die by his own hand.

That did not sound very good ; but I can at least vouch for the truth of the latter part becoming authentic, for within a year of hearing this story, the "Boss" had blown out his brains on being asked to account for certain deficiencies with regard to the firm's accounts.

The sixth day of the month arrived and by that time I had so much faith in the words of my Yogi friend, that I ordered my servant to strike camp and to get all

the kit ready so that we could move within a few minutes of my return. I then made my way to the Yogi's cave in the hillside.

He greeted me with the words : "I have been expecting you Sahib, for I know that you are anxious to hear what I have to say to-day. I know that whatever I tell you, you will recognise to be the truth, for you have shown your faith in the words I speak by ordering your servant to break camp. Sahib, it is now nearly the hour of one. If I talk with you until the hour of four you will still have time to take your refreshment and walk the nine miles to the railway station to board the train leaving at the hour of eight ; so will you make yourself as comfortable as possible and take interest in what I have to say.

"Our paths have met on this lonely hillside. We have conversed on many subjects. Some of which, although you recognise the words as the truth, are a matter of great mystery to you. To me who has spent many years delving into the mysteries of life, these things are no longer mysterious. I will endeavour to tell you about these things but I am afraid that you will know just as much after I have finished as when I started ; not because you have a dense mind but because you are an Occidental and cannot understand our ways. Both races think rightly according to their own ways, but those ways do not, and never will, run parallel.

"Sahib, every man shall be known by the marks bestowed

upon him by Nature. The leopard cannot change his spots for the tiger's stripes, no more can a bad man change his Nature's markings for those of a good man. Nature still continues with its work of marking every person but under the veneer of civilization many persons have forgotten how and where to look for these marks. The eyes have been too busy watching civilization's progress to trouble about the markings on the bodies of their fellow-creatures. Yet all these markings are Nature's way of pointing out the paths of life, and many pitfalls would be avoided if they, the markings, were recognised in the way intended and interpreted for the good of mankind.

"But all these things I learned as a disciple. These were merely the ground for me to stand upon so that I might reach to higher things. Often when I was alone with the wild animals in the hills to the North, I was afraid of these creatures and also the snakes, until I learned how to wrap my thoughts around me like a wide-spreading mantle, and put my absolute faith in the ability of that mantle to keep me safe.

"It is far easier to influence human beings, for in that way the sick are healed, than to influence animals. With human beings their inner thoughts can be influenced by the pacification of the conscious or outer thoughts, though even then they cannot be made to do things they would ordinarily refuse to do. An honest man cannot be influenced to steal or to murder,

but a man who thinks he is dying, can be influenced to think that he is not and in many cases can be made fit and well again; this because human nature is bent on living.

"With regard to animals the position is reversed for it is instinctive and natural that most of them should be "killers," so they have to be influenced contrary to their natural bent.

"Strange as it may seem, the snake which has been the symbol of wickedness for countless years is the most sensitive to these influences. Even the influence radiated by an unborn child renders it harmless. The snake will lie asleep in the path of a pregnant woman. This influence over the snake, is also evident amongst animals, for the snake will not kill an animal in young, except when attacked.

"Sahib, all these things and more have become known to me and I have adapted them to the good of man. The blind man is made to see because he is influenced to have supreme faith that he can see. By the same means the sick man is made well, the cripple to walk, and so on. All these things may not be clear to you—nevertheless they are true.

"I will now speak of the things that have been troubling you for many days past. Will you let me again see the picture of the lady you are going to marry, also one of the pieces of written script that I know is in your little leather pocket? I wish to be able to tell you all there is to tell at the present, as for many years your

path will be my path and mine yours. I have known for long that we should meet and that we are ruled by some unseen and unknown power for the good of each other, though the first acts of goodness must be done by me.

"I will now meditate and send my thoughts to see the lady of your choice, so that I may read from the original all that you wish to know. I see her in a hospital bedroom, in the City of the Moghul Emperor's Delight and Sorrow (Agra). She is sitting at the bedside of her mother, whose neck is covered with bandages. She is whispering brave words to her mother, which her heart does not feel, telling her that the doctors will soon make her well.

"That is the reason, Sahib, why you will be leaving here this evening. It is also the reason why you will be married six months earlier than you or your bride anticipated, for your future mother-in-law who has always been a good woman, thinking that she is going to die shortly wishes to see her daughter safely married to you. But she will not die; she has many years yet to live, and the doctors are making a great mistake. They are treating her for a disease which does not exist in her body. If you will take her away from that place and the doctors, give her plenty of the fruit of the lime tree and put bandages soaked in water around her neck, she will soon become well again.

"Your future wife will make you happy. She will deliver to you a son which will be

the pride of both your hearts—and mine also. Soon after you are married you will move to Simla and as I know that you will require my help, I too shall not be far away.

“It is now time for your departure, Sahib whom I will now call Brother. Although you leave me I shall always be with you to guide your footsteps in the paths where snakes and pitfalls are many. Before you go away, however, go to the Post Office in the village. There is a letter which has come quickly for you.”

I left Swami Raju Krishna after a few words of thanks and many of hope that I might see him again and made my way to the Post Office. Here I found, as I had been told, a telegram from my fiancée which read: “Mother very ill. Can you come at once.” On the return journey as I was passing the Yogi’s cave I waved the telegram and told him that he had been quite right.

Boarding the small train, which appeared to positively crawl down the hills to Pathan Kot, I arrived at Agra where I learned the whole truth of what I had been told by the Yogi.

Her mother who the doctors said was suffering from a cancer in the throat thought that she was dying and wanted us to be married as soon as possible. Knowing that it was necessary to get her away from the doctors and the hospital, I hit upon a plan. I approached the mother and said that I would marry her daughter as soon as possible but I wanted her,

the mother, to holiday with us whilst we were on our honeymoon. She of course raised all manner of objections. But I said that her daughter refused to go on a honeymoon and I refused to take her, if the mother did not come with us. At last I got her to agree to come.

We were quietly married and the three of us *en route* to Mussoori four days later. Soon after we boarded the train I had the opportunity to start the treatment as prescribed by my Yogi friend. Having ordered plenty of limes and ice, I proceeded to make iced lime drinks. These at first the mother declined but later decided to drink in preference to the doubtful milk obtainable at the railway stations.

Eventually my mother-in-law, Mrs. Field, came to the conclusion that the drinks made from the fresh limes were ideal. I made sure, that there was always a good supply of limes on hand.

The next part of the treatment also became easy, for the neck is not a very convenient part of the body for a patient to bandage, so I volunteered to do it for her. When I had gained her confidence, I moved the lotion and bandages to her bathroom, saying that the smell of the lotion was not a good perfume for the bedroom. By dressing the pad in the bathroom, I was able to substitute water for the lotion but was very careful, so that she would still get the smell of the stuff, to dip the edge of the bandage into it.

By that time she had forgotten all about dying, for my wife and

would drag her out of the house to all and every function in the place. She always enjoyed herself and arrived home too tired to think of anything but of going to bed.

On reporting back to the office after the honeymoon I was told that I had been transferred to another district and my headquarters would be at Simla.

It was not long before my mother-in-law came to stay with us there, for my wife had written and told her that a baby was coming. It was good to see the mother, who, about three months previous, had been quite convinced by the doctors that she was dying, fussing about her daughter and arguing whether the trimmings should be "blue" or "pink".

I still carried on with the treatment, although I knew that she had reverted to the use of the lotion during the time she had been away from us. She was still as much in love with the lime drinks, though as the weather got cool they had to be made with warm water, and so the treatment was carried out uninterrupted throughout the autumn and winter until the baby arrived. A bonny baby boy!

Three months later my wife, most untactfully, brought up the subject one night at dinner, when she exclaimed, "Oh, Mother, the swelling has vanished from your neck!" Up went the old lady's hand to feel for it, and then a smile spread over her face and she said: "Why, so it has! It must be God's way of repaying me for forgetting my own troubles when

you and the baby required my help."

I did not question that but said that I would call in a doctor to pronounce her fit. This I did, first having had a private talk with the practitioner, and he was convinced and also convinced the old lady, that the other doctors had mistaken a small tumour for a cancer and that tumour had in some way become dissolved and had vanished and that she was as fit as a fiddle.

When my son was nine months old he caught a chill which developed into bronchial pneumonia. He was nearing the crisis when I was told by a servant that a Holy Man was asking to see me, and I went out to find that it was Swami Raju Krishna. I asked him if he would come inside and wait or call upon the morrow, as my son was very ill and I wanted to stay with him. He answered:--

All this is known to me, Sahib, and the reason why I am here, for did I not say that this self-same son of yours would also be the pride of my heart. I will with your help make him well again, as I did the mother of his mother.

Take these small leaves and, after boiling them in water, give a small spoonful of the juice to your son every hour. First of all undress him in front of a fire and rub the oil of the mustard plant on to his chest and back, dress him again and then give him the juice and put him back to bed. Do this every hour throughout the night! If the baby is sick from the mouth, the juice is doing its work well, and Brother Sahib, do not rub the oil on with a strong hand or you will cause your son great pain. Farewell, I now go to pray for your son.

He then departed into the night.

I asked my wife to go and rest; I would call her if necessary. As soon as she was out of the room, I lit a spirit stove and put a saucepan of water and the leaves upon it. I then rang for a servant and got a bottle of mustard oil.

When I had everything ready, I took my son from his bed and undressed him on a blanket in front of the fire praying all the time that the treatment would be successful, and after rubbing him gently with the warm oil, dressed him again and gave him a spoonful of the juice.

The poor little fellow did not make a sound for he was breathing with great difficulty. I had no sooner finished and was carrying him back to his bed than he started vomiting. I was then convinced that the cure would be successful.

All through the night I stayed with him, my wife having fallen into the deep sleep of the exhausted, and treated him every hour. I noticed that after the first few doses the secretion of his vomit-

ing was not so thick and when I gave him a dose just before dawn, his stomach instantly returned the juice and it was devoid of phlegm. He had no difficulty in breathing.

I went along to his mother's room and gently waking her asked if she would come to the nursery as I thought our son had had a turn for the better. When we returned to the child my wife agreed with me and proceeded to give him something to drink.

By the time the doctor arrived I had removed all evidence of my activities in the nursery and what I could not remove I eliminated with the aid of some perfume.

The result of the doctor's examination was most favourable and he, in a most pompous and self-satisfied tone, assured me that my son would be his own bright self again within a fortnight.

How I would have loved at that moment to have told him the things I thought and to have done the things I wanted to do. But I refrained, politely showed him out and paid his bill as soon as possible after I received it.

S. BRADBURY-FLINT

THE PRACTICABILITY OF THE GOLDEN RULE

[For years Miss L. Stratford Houghton has served with voice and pen the cause of Anti-Vivisection in England. She writes here with conviction of the ancient Golden Rule, reformulated by the Nazarene two thousand years ago — the rule so many quote but few apply.—EDS.]

How long, one wonders, will it be before people's logical faculties cause them to realise that the only antidote to cruelty is kindness; the only antidote to filth, cleanliness and sanitation; the only antidote to disease, pure clean blood streams and clean health in every way. In short, that the only antidote to that which is bad is that which is good.

Did we but realise these obvious facts we should never try to get rid of that which is bad by means of the superimposition of something equally bad but stronger, as we do, for instance, when we try to cure cruelty by means of harsh punitive measures—by trying to prove, in fact, that we can win at the game of trying to see which can hurt the most; or as we do in another sphere when we try to immunise against disease by means of introducing the product of disease into erst-while pure blood streams.

Once we realise the wisdom of trying to get rid of the undesirable by introducing the desirable, we surely must see that nothing could be more practical or logical than the Golden Rule. For if we do unto others as we would have them do unto us, they are far more likely to do unto us as we would have them do than they are if we do not ourselves treat them thus. The chances are very great that they will treat us as we treat them; that if we are

cruel to them they will be cruel to us, and even cruel to others as a result of our having filled their hearts with what our American cousins would call "the cruelty complex"; that that cruelty of theirs to others will create cruelty in the hearts of others towards them and towards us and towards everyone else until the whole world becomes swept with a great wave of cruelty. On the other hand, every act of kindness of ours helps to spread a great wave of kindness and happiness over the world, which benefits everyone, in a great and universal benefit in which benefit we cannot fail to share ourselves.

True, the immediate result of harshness is often more effective than the immediate result of kindness and it is this fact which causes many to fail to realise the beneficial effects of kindness. Fear influences so much more quickly than love that we can force a sort of negative goodness by making people afraid to do wrong, but we have not thereby filled their hearts with goodness. We have filled their hearts with a resentment which will continuously grow, and which will cause them to find a way, some time or other, of "getting their own back," and of doing more harm to the world than they would have done or wanted to do if they had not been successfully mastered.

Gradually we are growing to realise this. Gradually, more and more, we are discontinuing capital punishment and other forms of retributive crime. And, *pro rata* with our abandonment of these practices, comes a decrease of the crimes these punishments are given for. We used to hang for sheep stealing, and even quite small children were hung for petty thefts, while greater crimes were punished by their perpetrators being "hung, drawn, and quartered"; or being "tarred and feathered"; or receiving some other similarly barbarous retribution. To-day it is recognised that the retributive crime must not be greater than the original one. To-morrow, perhaps, it will be universally agreed that it cannot be right to practise *any* cruelty, no matter how great the crime.

What is it that brings out the best or the worst in us? Is it not obvious that universal love, given and received, brings out the best in everyone? It must be almost as obvious that the root cause of all wrong deeds is fear. Fear of other countries causes wars. Fear of strange dogs causes us to act in such way towards them that they are likely to bite us whereas, if we had not been afraid of them, they would probably have been perfectly friendly towards us. Fear of disease causes the frightful brutality of vivisection, and here again we find that fear of disease

results in our having more disease, for the practice of vivisectioning animals leads us ever further away from a true understanding of man and Nature!

A study of the facts and figures regarding zymotic diseases shows that in the districts and during the periods where and when there has been most vaccination, there and then there is most smallpox. Also that diphtheria, and other diseases with regard to which we inoculate extensively, have not decreased to anything like so great an extent as have those diseases with regard to which we do not inoculate so widely.

Yet so great is the popular belief in the efficacy of force that many even of the most learned of people contend that the way to escape zymotic diseases is by filling our blood streams with the products of zymotic diseases. Acting on the same principle of a belief in the desirability of force they contend that disease arises from germs entering our bodies, and that the only way to keep out these diseased germs is to put in other disease germs which will resist their intrusion—while the fact is that the greatest security for good health is a pure blood stream.

The wisest as well as the most worthy thing is to do unto others as we would have them do unto us; and this commandment is at one and the same time a Divine Command and a Natural Law.

L. STRATFORD HOUGHTON

WHAT IS INTUITION ?

ACCORDING TO TAGORE, RADHAKRISHNAN, AUROBINDO

[Dr. K. C. Varadachari offers a comparative study of how a poet, a philosopher, and a mystic in modern India view and value the faculty of Intuition.—Eds.]

Intuition in Indian thought is usually identified by modern Indian thinkers with the fourth instrument of knowledge, namely, *śruti*, that which has been heard, communicated or seen. These are revelations of the ultimate truths and are the content of all intuitive experiences. They are absolutely true, intrinsically and completely. As such they are discovered; they are not made or caused by any one God or Man (*apourusheya*). Being absolutely true, they are fundamentally friendly counsel (*aplopa-desah*) capable of removing bondage, banishing sorrow and annihilating the eternal cycle of *samsara*. They alone can and do intimate the solutions of the ultimate problems of existence and value, such as the existence of Deity.

Śruti becomes personal experience or intuition (*sva-anubhava*) through intuition. In this personally lived experience one perceives the essential unity or integrality of all; or even identity as in the case of Vam-deva; or, again, as in the vision of the Universe-Form (*Visva-rupa-darsana*) seen by Arjuna, that complete stretch of the awe-inspiring titanic movement of creative power of the All, as also its soul-revealing ecstasy and comforting intimacy

with the life of the individual. Out of such an experience, Vivekananda once said, one comes out a sage though one entered it as a fool. This is divine Gnosis, that transcends in certainty and completeness all other instruments or faculties of cognition. It is to be realised as non-conceptual, direct knowledge (*aparoksajñāna*). This is Intuition.

Three living thinkers use intuition to explain their philosophies, namely Rabindranath Tagore, Radhakrishnan, and Aurobindo Ghose. In very many respects they accept ancient thought, but there are certain interesting developments that deserve careful consideration.

Rabindranath views philosophy through his poetic spectacles. Intuition to him is æsthetic perception. Rightly he stresses that intuition is perception of the significance of life and things. It is the most thorough-going relation of intrinsic values of beauty, truth and goodness. What the future thinker has to do is to foster this supreme spiritual understanding of the profound unity of nature and man which is possible to intuition alone. Again true understanding of individual differences is possible to intuition only. And

this alone is the basis of true culture.

Sir S. Radhakrishnan's concept of intuition has not been built up from the poetic or mystical phases which certainly are traceable in Rabindranath's concept. To begin with, his view of intuition is a criticism of Western thinkers like Bergson. His intuition has undoubtedly an intellectual basis. He refuses to view intellect and intuition in terms of contradiction. The one is the natural consequence of the other; a liberated intellect is intuition. His concept of intuition thus rejects the dualism between intellect and intuition.

Such a dualism has two important results. Firstly it is bound to condemn all intellectual thinking such as is done in science, mathematics, etc., and which undoubtedly makes the universe intelligible to us. Secondly, intellect, in spite of Bergson, is not an instrument of merely practical or utilitarian and selfish character, nor are its interpretations fictions. The very disinterestedness of science in the pursuit of truth shows this to be untrue.

This defence of intellect does not mean that there is no intuition at work. Radhakrishnan is firmly convinced that there is a place for intuition as much as for intellect. Intellect and intuition reinforce each other; either may be disregarded. Intuition is the only means by which we can transcend the limitations of intellect which can only intimate the form of things, never their essence. Intuition, leading to the

knowledge of things in their essence, is non-conceptual knowledge but it is not irrational. It is so thoroughly rational that it may well be called supra-rational. It is the immediate knowledge of things in the concrete. But since it gives truth and not mere feeling it is more than intellect and more than feeling. Its immediacy is not the unconscious immediacy of sensation; it is not the unawakened intuition of the Crocean philosophy. It is the "reward of a life's devotion to the highest quests." It transcends intellect, is constantly flowing out as certain, definite and inevitable knowledge.

Intellect can lead only to tentative conclusions on the metaphysical and scientific problems of existence. In that sphere it has a legitimate function, but it never can give the meaning of life. It never can foster the values of spiritual concern to humanity. Its *métier* is towards abstract dealings with the concrete; its goal is aloof from human values. Intuitions on the other hand, are perceptions of the values of pre-eminent concern to humanity—the values of beauty, harmony, moral life and freedom in the truest sense. Intuition as cognition of the spiritual threads in the texture of life is the supremest vision. Life reveals the immanent workings of the Universal Spirit in each individual. Intuition as the intimator of this supreme secret of existence, its depth and its exalting significance, is a true religious function.

Analysing Sir S. Radhakrishnan's position, we find that he holds,

unlike Bosanquet and other Idealists (and Dr. Radhakrishnan is an idealist) that the supremest function of the Absolute is Intuition—neither intellect nor reason. That highest could only be non-conceptual. He affirms the actuality of the supra-reason of Bradley. But Radhakrishnan's intuition partakes of the certainty and absolute integrality of the *aparoksa-anubhava* of Indian thought. The functioning of intuition in man results in the emergence of absolute values and their realisation in the world process. Thus for Radhakrishnan intuition is the meeting place of the Absolute and the Actual, leading to the emergence of true life. The content and character of intuition make it the dynamic maker of history and an instrument of the ever-present and incarnate universal in all.

The statement of Sir S. Radhakrishnan focuses clearly and definitely the significant features of the ancient doctrine, and, as far as it goes, is an original and spirited defence of the continuity of thought and revelation. To abandon the one criterion by which one can judge intuition, namely, its rationality, is to abandon oneself to subjective hallucinations of the worst type.

The confusion between the supra-intellectual and the sub-intellectual, the root-cause of false symbolisations in religions, explains how so much of light can co-exist with so much unwholesome darkness. This confusion can only be avoided by the exercise of discrimination, the chief

tool of philosophy. Philosophy never can cease to be intellectual, or rather conceptual, so long as it has to be communicated to others, and for philosophy to be possible, intuition, even when non-conceptual, must be amenable to the figures of conceptuality. Thus as Plato and the Indian Puranas show, the use of myths and parables and comparisons are necessary devices for expressing any intuitional truth. An intuitive thinker is forced to adopt them for the sake of communication. Nor does intuition alone have need for these; Science itself has come to feel that symbols are an absolute necessity in the communication of thought. Only, the figures of intuition are less definite because infinitely suggestive of features transcending sensuous and intellectual limits.

Prof. Leonard Woolf looks upon all intuitional thinkers as quacks. The attack is not new. Intuition has been likened to mysticism, and Prof. Stace characterised all mysticism as infantile, and styled Indian thought as such. George Santayana and Signor Croce have also expressed themselves no less vigorously. To transcend intellect does not mean the abolition of reason, of clear perception of the true. This charge, however, has not been definitely answered by Dr. Radhakrishnan.

Sri Aurobindo Ghose is definitely a thinker who feels no doubt as to the utility of intuition for purposes of philosophy, realisation, the transformation of mankind and the establishment of the King-

dom of Spirit on all levels of existence. To be born in intuition, to utilise it for the purposes of all thought and action, is to have rebirth into the true life or Brahman.

In Aurobindo's philosophy we have an apparent return to the absolute distinction between intuition and intellect.

Intuition sees things in a whole, in the large, and details only as sides of the indivisible whole ; its tendency is towards synthesis and unity of knowledge. Reason on the contrary proceeds by analysis and division and assembles its facts to form the whole ; but in the assemblage so formed there are opposites, anomalies, logical incompatibilities, and the natural tendency of reason is to affirm some and to negate others which conflict with its chosen conclusions so as to form a flawless logical system.

Intuition is direct perception by pure consciousness, whereas intellect is the cognitive activity of the unregenerate analytical man. Intellect can never understand the purpose of life, its divinity and scheme. Intuition alone in its synthetic grasp can feel and know, enjoy and act in the whole in an absolute manner. But the contrariety between intellect and intuition is not of the accentuated type of Bergson. Aurobindo's view is that every plane of life has an appropriate function, absolutely satisfactory for its limited purposes. This parallelism of distinguished functions applies on all planes. What applies on the plane of vegetable life applies also on the animal and human planes. Similarities like these are obtained again in the

higher levels. This does not mean that one leads to the other. Just as there is indestructibility of matter on the level of matter and conservation of energy on the level of energy, so everywhere. There is a transformation of these distinctions without their annihilation when intuition functions, for it understands all. Thus intuition in the philosophy of Aurobindo is not a mere synthetic function ; it is effectively the enjoyer of all planes in their entirety. It is the conserver of distinctions in a unique manner, in terms of the whole.

The distinction between intellect and intuition then consists in this : to the intellect the highest ever remains a postulate, a belief, and never passes to certainty or conviction ; to the intuition it is conviction and certainty. Knowledge that merely approximates truth can never be truth, and truth, since it cannot be grasped by intellect ever recedes from it ; its combinations are just improvised mechanizations that simulate the highest truth. The Absolute of intellectual philosophy is barren, bereft of life and movement and so utterly negative as to be non-existent ; quite the contrary is the Absolute of intuition ; its purity is rich with transcendence and infinity. Still on a superficial valuation the two concepts of the Absolute resemble each other.

Intuition is the only formative element in human life and should become the conscious implement of life. Intuition seizes upon the individual and is dynamic enough

to recreate him in the divine image which he is in immortal essence. To be intuitively cosmic-conscious in thought, act and feeling, is to feel the true spiritual essence as the very life of beatitude; that is to be a vehicle of the divine life in terms of space and time. That is the ecstasy of creative life, balanced, harmonious, and practical. Intuition alone unfolds the greatest mystery of life (*guhya-tamam raha-syam*).

Intuition is akin to pure awareness, varied and omniscient. In itself it is truth, intelligence and bliss—*sacchidananda*. Its reaches beyond intellect are infinite and immense. Intuition becomes super-human in its adventurous creativity. It is the *turya* consciousness; constant in its creative delight, it is the Self in action.

Intuition as the organ of knowledge gives the true wisdom of existence; as an intimator of right action, flowing from its splendid perception of the total

reality under the harmonious vision and synthesis of Self, intuition becomes the powerful and deciding factor in social conduct or morality. Its field of knowledge includes the eternal archetypal values of truth and beauty. It is the one force that can transform all forms and re-value all values, and that alone can make the future safe for the kingdom of Spirit. In a word, it alone can confer freedom, immortality and delight at every instant of being and forever.

This is the place of intuition in Aurobindo's philosophy. Every other function is subordinate to it. Not to have unfolded intuition is not to have known oneself as the highest. Aurobindo's view of intuition combines both the aspects of the Upanishads, *pratyaksa* and *siddhi*, perception of the true and the attainment of incomparable enjoyment of all creation as delight. Just as intellect has marked out man from the animal so intuition marks out the divine from the human.

K. C. VARADACHARI

THE PROBLEM OF EVIL

[How did evil originate? How can it be overcome? Poets and philosophers have tried to fashion answers as will be seen from these two articles.

The first is by **Mademoiselle Claudine Chonez** who says: "two things interest me, poetry (in the largest meaning of the word) and morals." At present she is preparing for publication a study of the poet Claudel, her compatriot. The second is by **Dr. J. M. Kumarappa**, who needs no introduction to the readers of **THE ARYAN PATH**.

Those who wish to translate intuitions into ideas will feel that there is some lack in the poetic view presented in the first; also, those who wish to transform reason into clear apperception which satisfies heart-aspiration, will feel that there is a gap in the philosophic view offered in the second. Such will find two pamphlets of H. P. Blavatsky's, most helpful: *The Origin of Evil* and *The Fall of Ideals* which are available from **THE ARYAN PATH** Offices.—EDS.]

I.—IN THE ROMANTIC SCHOOL

The problem of Evil is an aspect of the general problem of our destiny, for it raises a question as to the nature of the power which rules that destiny—whether it be beneficent, maleficent or indifferent.

How does Evil come to be if God is Perfection? If Perfection does not exist, how can we conceive of it? There is no antinomy, the solution for which the human spirit has sought so constantly in its quest of the Supreme Good. The problem of Evil, the pivot round which most religions, as well as cosmological and metaphysical systems revolve, is the legitimate basis of all philosophy. It is also the only metaphysical point of view capable of literary expression: that is to say, through concrete symbols and human emotion one could write a poem on the nature of things but not on the nature of God. Victor Hugo's poem, *Dieu*, is an exception only in appearance. If we compare it

with the section on God in Spinoza's *Ethics*, we see that it would be difficult to find another two such totally dissimilar pieces of work under the same title; the rigorously abstract reasoning of Spinoza leads directly to God as supreme necessity; Hugo works up to God as the supreme good by a series of images, all of which are relative to the problem of Evil.

According to the dualistic doctrine, Evil is a divine principle opposed to the equally divine principle of Good: it is God, hateful yet formidable. In the Judeo-Christian monotheism, Evil, the rebellious and chastised slave, is only relatively powerful as against absolute divine Perfection: Satan might tempt Job, but Job, with God's help, would vanquish him. And the concrete genius of the pagan mythologies conceived not of principles but of individuals, gods and goddesses personifying each passion or phenomenon with

its mixture of good and evil: Erinnyes, Fates and Furies are not independent principles but minions of the wrath of the gods, and Pluto in Hades is no more than a gaol warder.

Whether they view Evil as an independent divine principle, or in the last analysis an attribute of divinity, or an inferior spirit, all religions believe in a more or less perfect divine justice, rewarding the good and punishing the bad in a future life. The philosophy and literature of [European] antiquity furnish us with two other possible conceptions: the maleficence of God or His indifference. The *Prometheus* of Æschylus sums up magnificently the first of these ideas: "For having taken pity on mortals, here I am being put to a cruel test." Lucretius, in *De Natura Rerum*, expounds in no less sublime fashion the Epicurean doctrine—that of an ultimate fatality and serene indifference of Olympus: *Nec bene promeritis capitur, nec tangitur ira*, a lofty doctrine as fearless as it is devoid of hope.

In the *Divine Comedy*, that epic of Christianity belonging to an intensely religious age, fear returns equally with hope: Hell, a just recompense for Adam's sin, and Heaven, the appropriate reward earned through the Redeemer's Passion. Milton, the greatest poetical exponent of the Christian faith since Dante, is equally orthodox: in *Paradise Lost*, the Angel of Light, on becoming the Prince of Darkness, still retains a nobility of bearing and character which ren-

ders him very different from Dante's monstrous three-headed ogre or the grotesque "diabolus" of the medieval Mysteries, and permits us to see in him the forerunner of the alluring demons to come with Romanticism. Whereas until then the Devil, love-lorn or drunken, had merely been a joke with Satan playing the rôle of an engaging scoundrel. Towards the end of the eighteenth century, in the *romans noirs* of the English school of writers (Anne Radcliffe, Mathurin and Lewis) Satanism rose to the dignity of a literary genre. The prodigal abundance of macabre cemeteries, witches' Sabbaths and vampires to be found in these books was but a childish method of exciting the horrified interest of the reader; but the boredom aroused by the Satan drawn on classical lines in Chateaubriand's *Martyrs* shows that the subject in its orthodox vein had been exhausted.

It was in succeeding generations that the personality of Satan, or his disciple Cain, took on an extraordinary amplitude. Between 1820 and 1860 Lucifer, symbolising the problem of Evil, or the man "branded with the mark of Cain," and characterised by his haughty gloom, became the dark sun of the romantic universe.

The figure of the Rebellious Angel has been, almost without exception, a temptation to the Romantics; they all boasted, as Baudelaire was to say, of having "*fait sa rhétorique chez Satan*." Heine and Musset toyed with the devil's machinations; and Goethe

put a sarcastic Mephistopheles beside the tormented figure of Faust. Vigny sang of Satan's seductiveness. Even the poets who had by nature little that was satanic about them succumbed to the temptation: Lamartine did not deny himself the pleasure of singing about *Cedar*, the fallen Angel, since the latter, after many incarnations, was to take the form of Jocelyn; and his muse wooed Childe Harold all his life, only to leave him in the end, converted to authority.

The conflict between God and the Devil is a theme dear to romanticism: it is the conflict in *Cain* and in *La fin de Satan*. Byron confronted Jehova with Lucifer and his disciple, as heroes and martyrs; Victor Hugo, too devoted to God to side with the Devil and sympathising too much with the Devil to countenance God's severity, reconciled them to each other.

In this remarkable partiality of romanticism for creations like Faust and Manfred, for personalities like Lucifer and Cain; and in the complete liberty it took in interpreting subjects which were at the same time religious dogmas, there is something more than artistic interest or states of sentiment. The whole movement implies a new attitude in regard to the problem of Evil.

"Men," said Pascal, "not being able to conquer death, misery or ignorance, have persuaded themselves, for the sake of a happy life, to give no thought to them."

This statement would not apply

to the romantics! "Our crime," said Lamartine, whose repentance was not altogether perfect, "is that we are human and yet wish to know." Never has the passionate quest of the value of life, never has a sense of the supreme importance of its discovery, been more constant and more widespread.

Their contemplation of human destiny did not lead all the romantics to the same conclusions: The literature of romanticism, Hugo said, has, "like all things human, despite its unity, its sombre side and its comforting side."

Some of the romantics, like Lamartine, like Hugo himself, attained eventually to an optimistic view. But the constant preoccupation with the problem of Evil characteristic of them all implies a very lively sense of its reality, of its predominance. The pessimism of *Candide* is nearer to the position of the romantics than the pre-established harmony of Leibnitz: if none of them is a Pangloss, neither is he a Pangloss, not even Lamartine, in spite of his "all is good..." Some of them no doubt withdrew to cultivate their gardens, while others preferred to toy with the Wertherian pistol.

Romantic pessimism is essentially on a higher level than *Candide*, Christian in its origin: the weakness and solitude of humanity, the vanity of earthly grandeur, the lack of balance between the capacity and the inclinations of the spirit—these are the constant themes from Augus-

tine to Pascal. It is in the course of developing this tradition that a sense of the suffering peculiar to man—spiritual suffering—has been rendered more acute. But with the new school the religious vision has been distorted. Christianity has a certain symmetry: the believer's eyes falling on earthly miseries turn at once to the promised paradise; to the romantics the glass is so dark that all rays of hope are lost therein, or so cramped with incertitude that they are deflected in the most varied directions. The firm orthodoxy of Bossuet is as alien to optimism as it is to pessimism.

It is because the overweening individualism of the romantics led them to pit themselves against God; because the heritage of the Revolution had made them athirst for liberty; because, in a word, they were intellectually children of the eighteenth century that individualism and the critical spirit united to weaken or destroy in them the Christian attitude toward the problem of Evil.

Going beyond all traditions of the Christian age, it was the audacious ideas of Æschylus and Lucretius which were re-united in the extreme wing of the romantic school. The Prometheus Æschylus had left enchained to the Caucasus was released by Shelley in that magnificent outburst of revolt, *Prometheus Unbound*. Lucretius' lines on the indifference of the Deity were re-echoed and with more bitterness by Vigny in *Montes Oliviers*. Byron's pride would not be content with this silent con-

demnation: he faced God not with scorn but hatred, not with cold silence but with screams of revolt.

For Hugo, too, the decrees of his mind were supreme. But as Lucifer was not compatible with his optimistic nature, he chose Jehovah—a Jehovah not biblical but Hugoesque. He preferred the tranquillity of Olympus to the warfare of the Titans; he did not set himself against God only because he had seated himself on His right hand. Pride was common to both believers and unbelievers. Common also was the ethical preoccupation implied in the very choice of the problem of Evil, the struggle to achieve an ideal of justice—a heritage, again, of Christianity, heightened while it was deformed under the influence of an individualism viewing justice as a bulwark against external pressure.

An extreme individualism is indeed the most salient characteristic of all romanticism. Each wants to bring the world into harmony with his own tune: chaos seems inevitable in the circumstances. Yet a certain amount of harmony emerges out of all these varied works. The adventurous Faust as well as the wise Jocelyn have both known the moral torments of Satan and Cain. The conflict between the sense of liberty and the experience of weakness is the same in Vigny's *Destinées* as in Leopardi's poems. The dualistic antithesis (in a more or less distorted form) is common to all the poems which, as in Shelley's *Prometheus Unbound*, bring God and Satan face to face.

It is the need for God which sharply divides the two camps of romanticism, Hugo and Byron, for example, the two extremes. Between the religious heritage and the critical heritage of romanticism, each camp made its choice. Byron might have said of his Cain what Goethe said of his Faust: From Heaven, across the world, through to Hell. In the *Fin de Satan* the terms are reversed: it is a prodigious ascent from Hell, across the world, to Heaven.

These metaphysics are dictated too much by the heart to present us with perfect coherence. Byron could not reasonably have suggested that one should believe in a miserable and malignant divinity. And it might be said in criticism of *Le Fin de Satan* that evolution of a pure spirit takes place outside duration; for time being defined as awareness of the succession of ideas, it would seem that eternity implies changelessness. But all this does not signify much. Every metaphysical system has some logical gap. However close the chain of reasoning, there is invariably a missing link and the two ends never come together perfectly. For reason is not an adequate instrument for the exploration of metaphysical abysses, it is only a useful guide. In short, if it be proper for the philosopher to give free play to his intuition, for the poet it is a duty.

Victor Hugo was aware of it: from principles which seemed to him intellectually and emotionally necessary he deduced the laws of human destiny with the aid of his

deep intuition. Byron's method, on the contrary, was entirely positive: "I judge but by the fruits," said Cain. He took his stand on facts alone and derived the elements of his philosophy from them. But his feelings influenced this philosophy sufficiently to deprive the dry logic of events of clear-cut perfectness; and his mouthpiece, Lucifer, is only a rather conceited pedagogue. Enthusiastic though he was for the poetry of *Cain*, Goethe said of Byron: "When he begins to think, he is a child." The philosophy of *Cain* is indeed extremely jejune, pinned to the mask of fact without piercing it, pinned to the immediately perceptible aspect of the problem without seeking to probe it, without making any effort at synthesis, at the formulation of a positive hypothesis.

Much richer is the metaphysical content of *Le Fin de Satan*. No doubt it often weakens ideas for the sake of phrases, no doubt these ideas are not always rigorously precise, but Baudelaire praised Hugo for having known how to preserve the indispensable element of obscurity in these transcendental problems; and the object of philosophy is less to be faultless as an idea than to excite thought. Victor Hugo attained that end by vivifying his work with fecund hypothesis, and constructive suggestion instead of, like Byron, stopping in the midst of the ruins. The conclusion of *Cain* is "Lasciate ogni speranza" at the threshold of life: the fundamental idea of *Le Fin de Satan* is that

other phrase of Dante: "L'amor che muove il sole e l'altra stelle." From the point of view of the philosophic elevation of the work,

one cannot deny that love is more fertile than hate and intuition richer than dry logic.

CLAUDINE CHONEZ

II.—AN INDIAN POINT OF VIEW

Wherever the religious consciousness of the people has reached the stage of reflection, there the question of Evil—its nature, its origin, its reason, has become one of the most perplexing of problems. Man finds himself hampered and baffled by antagonistic forces proceeding not only from his environment but also from his own nature. Permanent satisfaction fails him, and a mysterious necessity of evil seems to be present in the world. Natural ills, he discovers, are bound up with the very structure of life. All human history seems to tell him that pain is necessary to life and that the goodness of the world is bound up with its evil. Truly, he declares, the world is wrong, and yet—rightly wrong? This dark enigma harasses him and he has striven through the ages to find a clue to this challenging mystery. Again and again he cries out: Whence arise these adverse influences? What do they betoken? In all sincerity he seeks an explanation for some philosophy which shall explain *why* evil came into the world.

I

Any profitable discussion of this topic must begin by drawing a

distinction between natural and moral evil. By natural evil we mean all kinds of physical pain, suffering and loss, not excluding failures, through ignorance or error, to realize our ends. By moral evil we mean badness of will. But these two are not unrelated. In the order of development the former is, of course, the earlier, for only where there is reflective will can moral guilt come into existence. The natural wants, cravings and pains form the sensuous ground out of which sin emerges through specific reactions of the human personality. If the existence of a physical order in which evils are involved is granted, and if self-conscious wills, capable of choice, supervening on that order are also granted, then the conditions are present under which ethical evil can emerge as a fact in the universe.

But the attempt to explain evil really demands an answer to two problems: the psychological problem of its origin and development, and the metaphysical problem of its ultimate source and meaning. Of these the former is the simpler, and a more or less satisfactory solution can be offered for it. As already suggested, the psychologi-

cal conditions lie in the sensuous character and selfish impulses of man. Supervening on these is the deliberative will, with a norm set to it by the custom, tradition or law which has been gradually evolved by the social system. Consequently, the elements are there which make significant choice possible, and the choice may either be consistent with the norm or a transgression of it. When the acts of transgression pass into habits and tendencies, evil as an anti-social force makes itself felt. When spiritual self-consciousness defines the law as the will of an ethical God, transgression is determined in its theological form as sin. Psychologically therefore, the consciousness of sin develops *pari passu* with the consciousness of the good.

II

And now if we turn to the metaphysical question, that is, the question of the ultimate source and meaning of moral evil, we find that the answer involves the deepest problems of spiritual development. The postulates that all things are sustained by a Divine Will and that God, the ultimate Ground of all things, is supremely good, have made it difficult for philosophers of the West to offer a satisfactory solution to this problem. Nevertheless, some theistic thinkers have sought to explain the existence of moral evil through the idea of human freedom. And they have generally come to the conclusion that the

infinitely wise and holy God could not help evil coming into the world when he created a moral being with free will. There are, they say, some things which God himself cannot do, *viz.*, such things as are a contradiction in terms and therefore absurd and unthinkable. Would not such a thing be *a moral being without freedom to choose right or wrong?* To make him incapable of sin would be to make him also incapable of virtue, of righteousness, of holiness; for he must acquire these for himself by free choice, by struggle, in short, through the progressive conquest of the animal by the distinctively *human* nature.

Although the fall of man was not, according to this account, necessary or inevitable, still, on the hypothesis of the moral freedom of man, it was necessary that such corruption of human nature should be *possible*. And when once man fell, it was equally necessary that the physical universe should also come to be full of evil. According to this theory God becomes wicked or imperfect, inasmuch as he either must have had a foreknowledge of what his creature was going to do, or else was unable to forecast the future. The best account of the fall of man from the Christian position seems to be that which declares that the fall was a premundane act of the assertion of the individual against the unity of mankind. Here one finds the supposition that the original state of humanity was harmonious, god-

* The Problem of Evil by PETER GREEN, Ch. vii. (Longmans).

like unity in which each individual possessed the totality of human nature without any limits of mutual separation. The Fall, shattering as it did this unity of human nature, necessarily resulted in the individual becoming self-centred and self-seeking, a limited and partial, instead of a complete and perfect being.

III

But why did man attempt to assert his individuality against this unity of human nature? We cannot say that it was a necessity of his moral freedom, for such freedom is not incompatible with true goodness. It is here that the Christian position breaks down. For a satisfactory answer, therefore, it becomes necessary to lift this question out of its narrow limits to the larger regions of the Cosmos itself and there, in the workings of Nature, to look for an explanation. Moral evil can find its true source only in metaphysical evil. And it is here that the archaic Indian formula points to a deep metaphysical truth which alone makes even the Christian account of the fall of man intelligible. It declares that the assertion of the individual against the unity of mankind is only a dim reproduction of the universal principle of evolution, *viz.*, that the primordial unity or homogeneity splits up, as it were, and gradually transforms itself into heterogeneity, giving rise to differentiation, contrast and even conflict of forms. Since this principle

of individuation is inherent in primordial Matter or *Mulaprakriti* and supplies the *elan vital* of cosmic evolution, it becomes intelligible how the unity of mankind also must have gradually broken up into separate individualities, resulting, since the first law of individuality is self-preservation, in self-centredness and self-seeking. Thus the Primeval Desire of the Deity, "I will be many,"—the plunge of Spirit into Matter—was the origin of evil and misery in the world.

Augustine maintained that evil was due to the "total depravity of man," but the Indian sages do not hold man entirely responsible for it. Neither do they, like J. S. Mill, make God responsible for creating the devil. Good and evil are so only from our finite point of view; they are the human terms for the principle of contrast or opposition manifest everywhere in the world. It is this principle which gives us Good and Evil from the purely moral or human point of view, Harmony and Discord from the cosmic or naturalistic standpoint, and Reality and Appearance from the metaphysical point of view. Indeed, it is through the operation of the above principle in the evolving process of the cosmos that Reality—one and indivisible—caught in the network of space and time, appears to be Many. In other words, strife and struggle everywhere in the universe are indispensable for the development of life. In its manifested state, Reality lives, moves and has its being in conflict and contrast.

IV

If that be so, is the moral experience of good and evil, one may ask, but the play of this principle of opposition? Not so, for the very tension of the opposed forces everywhere results in harmony, unity, equilibrium. The fairest harmony is born of differences. Even according to the Eastern theory of evolution, differentiation involves the correlative process of reinvolution, by means of which the manifested universe gradually returns to the condition of primordial unity, or the final quiescence wherein *Sattwa* (Harmony) predominates. And so for man, who is phenomenally part of nature and yet noumenally a self-conscious being, able to form and realize ideal ends, every conscious attempt to retard or obstruct harmony, to promote discord, hatred and separation, is morally evil. Nature itself—or the Spirit behind Nature—works through conflict, no doubt, yet towards harmony. Hence, if we choose harmony, we do right; if we choose discord, we do wrong.

This explanation enables us to understand better the problem of evil, moral and metaphysical. Strife, discord, opposition and contrast do exist in the world. But they are all elements in a whole which, *sub specie æternitatis*, would seem to be the very embodiment of perfection. But to our finite eyes in a temporal world, they are bound to appear as good or evil—good for some and evil for others. This is evil in its naturalistic signification, as equivalent to dishar-

mony or what produces disharmony. And moral evil (badness of will) arises when the individual by willing tries to disturb the harmony of the world, producing pain either to himself or to others, for as Plato justly observes, the penalty of evil-doing is to become like the evil. The badness here consists not in producing the disharmony so much as in willing it, in identifying ourselves with it. In other words, evil, like the good, originates in the soul. We thus sow the seeds of our own and, necessarily, of the world's Karma, and the law of Absolute Harmony sees to it that everyone reaps the fruit of what he sows.

V

There is an aspect of Karma which Western critics have hitherto all but ignored. The Christian doctrine of redemption, it is said, goes beyond the Indian demand for rigorous Justice and shows the essence of the Divine Spirit to consist in Love which freely flows for the sinner, tempering justice with mercy. It seems to me that this Christian emphasis on Divine Love is only the necessary correlate of the equally Christian emphasis on the utter wickedness, the unredeemed vileness and sinfulness of Satan. The doctrine of Karma on the other hand, is under no necessity to emphasize love, for the simple reason that back of Karma, and even superior to its might, it recognizes the existence of Love, *i. e.*, the desire for harmony discussed above, "which forms—nay, must form—

the essence of eternal Harmony and Light, and is the element of forgiving reconciliation even in its... last terrestrial offspring, Humanity." Furthermore, love can never be entirely absent from the breast of even the most sinful and hateful of beings—angelic or human. No man is wholly divine; neither is he wholly satanic. Satan himself is only the personification of the principle of opposition between spirit and matter, of contrariness and conflict, discord and differentiation in the manifested cosmos. However, since discord can never exist without an inner core of harmony, the spark of divine love always illumines even the heart of Satan. And so, according to the Indian theory, not only the fallen man but even those who rebel against God himself are not lost for ever, as is the Satan of Christianity. They are given a chance to overcome their sinful ways and regain the status of "oneness with the Deity" through repentance, meditation and devotion. Thus this theory holds out hope for everyone; even the most wicked are not beyond the pale of salvation.

Though the range of human insight is too limited to allow of a conclusive answer to the problem of evil, the Indian explanation seems more satisfactory than most. No doubt Indian philosophy does start with a note of pessimism

based on the conviction that man's immediate environment is imperfect and finite; however, it must be pointed out that the Indian pessimism is not of the materialistic type which aims at escaping from evil by putting an end to being itself. In fact, every system of Indian thought, not excluding even the so-called atheistic systems of Samkhya, of Jaina and of Buddha, believes in a future state—not necessarily in a future world—in which the imperfection of the present would be annihilated and the spirit would attain complete freedom. Therefore the Indian solution to the problem of evil is not the destruction of being, for being (*esse*) cannot be destroyed. Recognizing evil and sorrow as the result of the heterogeneity of the manifested universe, our sages maintain that, through a practical realization of the unity of the human with the divine, the present veil of *Maya* (appearance)—that which constitutes the isolation, limitation and imperfection of the individual—can be rent asunder. By the same method, the bonds of materiality can be broken, and the cycle of birth and death, which imprisons spirit in matter, can be ended. Through such a process of spiritual evolution, the spirit can rise to a stage of reality transcending good and evil and enter into Perfect Harmony—the Glory of All-Being, All-Knowledge and All-Bliss.

J. M. KUMARAPPA

NEW BOOKS AND OLD

RACE RELATIONS*

ADJUSTMENTS OF WHITES AND NEGROES IN THE UNITED STATES

[Lord Olivier, P. C., K. C. M. G., C. B., joined the British Colonial Service in 1882 and began his public career as the Secretary of the Fabian Society in 1886. In 1924 he was Secretary of State for India in the Labour Government. He has had a long and varied experience in the West Indies, and distinguished himself as Governor of Jamaica in 1907-13. He is the author of numerous volumes, among them *White Capital and Coloured Labour*, and *The Anatomy of African Misery*. He writes: "In view of the purpose of the book I have considered it most useful as a contribution to the subject it studies to develop from my own experience and observations a comparison of the reactions of the transplanted African to his different environment in the United States and Jamaica. And this has made the article much longer than a mere review would have been."—Eds.]

This book, the first Essay in sociology produced in co-operation by a white man and a negro, presents an exceptionally comprehensive and intelligent exposition of what is summarily described as The Colour Question, with special reference to inter-racial relations in the United States. It is peculiarly valuable in the lucidity with which it exhibits the essential relativity of all propositions and dogmas with regard both to (so-called) "racial" characteristics among mankind and to the balance of adjustments between white and coloured stocks within different states and at different periods. This balance to-day within the United States is a deplorable maladjustment. It is not so unsatisfactory as is the parallel maladjustment between the black and white races within the domain of Africander social philosophy in South Africa but, on the other hand, it produces a very unhappy impression as compared with what has been attained in some other mixed communities in which the principal distinct racial elements (white colonists and African slaves) started severally with practically identical characteristics

in each location. The political, social and economic environments have, owing to the operation of non-racial causes, evolved differently; and the resulting racial balances differ in consequence. Nevertheless, if one accepts as inexorable the persistent slowness of modification in social temperament and its recalcitrance to reason and common-sense, the aspect of the balance in the United States to-day, as compared with what it was a generation ago is by no means altogether disheartening. Although the present relations between the white and the coloured may seem to forbid any confident hope of rapid improvement, conditions within the coloured section offer in many respects more cause for congratulation than ever previously; and the temper and attitude of intelligent persons among the white community is gradually yielding to education in social facts.

Dr. Thomas Pearce Bailey, Professor of Psychology in the University of Mississippi, concisely formulated, as lately as in 1914, the orthodox creed of the Southern Whites with regard to the Negro:—

**Race Relations: Adjustment of Whites and Negroes in the United States*, By WILLIS D. WEATHERFORD, Ph. D., and CHARLES S. JOHNSON Litt. D. (D. C. Heath & Co., New York and London. 15s.)

Blood will tell. The white race must dominate. The Teutonic peoples stand for race purity. The negro is inferior and will remain so. This is a white man's country. No social equality. No political equality. In matters of civil rights and legal adjustments give the white man, as opposed to the coloured man, the benefit of the doubt, and under no circumstances interfere with the prestige of the white race. Let there be such industrial education of the negro as will best fit him to serve the white man. Only Southerners understand the negro question. The status of peasantry is all the negro may hope for; if the races are to live together in peace. Let the lowest white man count for more than the highest negro. The foregoing statements indicate the leadings of Providence.

That might serve equally well for a statement of the Africander colour-philosophy. But the fact is that social adjustments in a mixed community in which the coloured people are, specifically, individuals of human character and not the kind of sub-human creatures which prevalent popular ignorance about negroes (even very generally in this country) presumes them to be, do not work out in harmony with such clear-cut programmes. Even in South Africa there is increasing recognition among practical publicists that the official nostrum of "segregation" in that mixed community is impossible of realisation; and, with regard to the evolved situation in the United States, these writers point out that :-

Although the white South has been solid for this policy ever since the (Civil) War and has believed that the exclusion of the negro from politics would leave the white South free to discuss issues and to divide when needed, on matters of policy.....it has not proven so. The negro still dominates the South. Indeed one could hardly find an issue of any import, which has come before the white South for decision during the last hundred years, that has not been decided largely in the light of the Negro's presence. Our social customs, our educational systems, our political life, even our religion ["our music" might well have been added,] have been deeply coloured by the presence of the Negro. Much of the energy of the South has been expended over this problem. The white man has been constantly concerned about maintaining his supremacy; the coloured man has been trying constantly to come into his own. It is in the light of this fact that the present political situation takes on large social significance.

There are three cardinal beliefs at the

basis of practically all of our social dogmas, and these serve to control in one form or another, most of the thinking about Negroes; first, that they are mentally inferior; second, that they are immoral; and third, that they are criminal.

All these beliefs, as general propositions, are false. There is no department of human intelligence in which it can be maintained that the brains of (some) Africans have not shown themselves as good as the brains of the best Europeans. Taken in bulk, the average black man in the United States or other mixed communities may, no doubt, still be fairly classed as unequal mentally to the average white man. But when the two races were first thrown together in a single society, the difference in mental capacity, judged by European standards, between the slaver and the slave might reasonably have been judged immense; and, by the same standards, would appear very much smaller now; and if that obvious fact has any significance it would indicate, at the least, that the black man's mental capacity has increased and has proved susceptible to stimulation by European culture, religion and education. But the vast majority of the American negroes have continuously been debarred and still are disabled in almost every line of culture from any opportunity of achieving such progress, so that, remarkable as the progress has been, it is manifestly much less than it presumably would have been had any reasonable degree of well-wishing attention been given to promoting it.

The second dogma that "they" are immoral—(meaning licentious in sexual relations)—if their morals are to be judged of in comparison with those of innumerable Europeans, is merely ridiculous. This particular superstition has been a good deal less self-assertive since the Great War, the experiences of which threw a flood of light on the actualities of white men's erotic. The white American cannot invite the black man into his picture-palaces and allow him to read Judge Lindsay's observations

on young America's amative habits, or confront him with newspaper-headlines recording from day to day the conjugal combinations and permutations of national Hollywood idols, male and female, and at the same time expect to convince him that he is a sexual monster and unfit for American civilisation.

The third dogma that "they" are criminal, is equally preposterous as an absolute generalisation. *With fifty years official cognisance of West Indian Police and Judicial statistics I state uncompromisingly that negroes are less criminally disposed than whites of the same class.* If there is a greater proportion of criminality among United States negroes it is obviously because white crime is more rampant and uncontrolled in that land of lynchers, gangsters and kidnappers. City life, for black as for white, no doubt, is more stimulating to crime, and the black man is less acclimatised to its bad influences. But the cities and the crime they foster are both the white man's creation.

Our authors very perspicaciously and cogently summarise the fundamental facts with regard to the genesis and growth of race-prejudice. In ancient times there were constant hostilities between peoples and states, but these were not attributed to race inequalities. One of such early antagonisms formulated the classical distinction between Greek and Barbarian; but this was a matter of neither colour nor of race but of culture; and it is important to bear in mind that antagonism of cultures is a very active element of discord in mixed communities, continually prone, in modern times to formulate itself as an antagonism based on race. But it is in fact quite distinct, for populations of identical race are themselves, in distinct surroundings, devotees of antagonistic cultures, not only as between the locations, for example, of African racials in Africa and in the New World respectively, but also as between transplanted Africans in the United States of America and African racials

in Africa or in the British West Indies. And the discord between Hindus and Moslems, of the same race, in India, outruns any manifestation of race-antagonism.

Until the latter part of the eighteenth century nobody doubted that mankind formed a single and indivisible species. Exploitation of conquered people was justified as a matter of economic expediency rather than as the high calling of superior blood--part of the White Man's Burden. The rise of race-antagonisms based on colour is clearly traceable to the period of the rise of the British slave trade; and it is now a complex of many reactions of negro slave holding.

The first reaction of white American colonists towards imported negroes was not one of racial repugnance, although there were decided feelings of cultural superiority provoked by the heathenism of unbaptised individuals.

The negroes were slaves, indentured servants, or free--they themselves held servants and intermarried or otherwise interbred. Especially did they marry or interbreed with the white indentured servants or convicts who were introduced at the same time for similar work on plantations. Material conditions changed, and a shift of sentiments accompanied the material change. The argumentative rationalisation of the status of negroes as slaves, in support and justification of the profitable institution of slavery, served to place a stamp on the coloured folk as a Race, which remains to-day only slightly changed in its main content. The scientific literature and the political arguments in proof of the assumed inferior qualities of the black races which emerged in profusion both in the British West Indies and in the United States when the institution of slavery began to be called into question, went to lengths of absurdity which would have been contemptuously repudiated by the seventeenth and eighteenth century creators of plantation slavery. These prepos-

terous doctrines survived emancipation and have become part of the culture of the common people educated in white schools and white families, as well as of the employing class originally interested; and although anthropology itself has now repudiated practically every dogma of essential inequality which they supported, the slave-state distinctions vulgarly persist. The reactions have become customary and are felt as instinctive.

The average character of the African slaves in the United States and the British West Indies was sufficiently homogeneous to be taken as furnishing a common point of departure for comparative judgment of the capacity of the Negro to progress under free conditions. We are able to compare the divergent results in the aspect of social laboratory experiments on the same material under different conditions. Both in Jamaica, which was the largest British slave-owning state and in the Southern States of America, the judgment even of temperate and humane-minded persons (not being representatives of the Evangelical Christian churches), was equally disparaging to the Negro. In Jamaica early nineteenth century commentators who write very sensibly on other topics connected with the affairs of the Island, constantly uttered such prophecies as the following:—

Abolish Slavery and there would be turned loose on Society a herd of idle, immoral and profligate wretches who would instantly become pests to society and who would be a perpetual burden on the community until they ceased to exist. Great numbers of them, especially the most worthless, would seek the bush and the mountains and become wild savages; the ruin of the Island would be the most favourable contingency; far worse consequences would be probable. This Island, the Queen of the West Indies, would become a waste, the houses would be burnt, the water destroyed, and industry would come to an end.

Bryan Edwards, the English-born, eighteenth century historian of the West Indies, a very prosperous and high-minded colonist, was equally persuaded of the degraded character of

the negro: but he was prepared to attribute some of these characteristics to the evil effects of slavery.

Nevertheless he shared the local conviction that its abolition would spell disaster to the community. "Monk" Lewis, the ablest writer on Jamaican plantation life of the early nineteenth century, himself a landed proprietor, whilst he was horrified by the oppressive mismanagement of estates, (his own among them), held an equally low opinion of the capacity of the negroes to do justice to freedom. He declared that emancipation would be a disastrous mistake.

Joseph Sturge, the Quaker emancipationist, who toured the West Indies during the period of apprenticeship, (1837) between the Act of Emancipation and the grant of complete freedom, wrote:—

We have heard the sentiment frequently expressed that the negro population of Jamaica is more unintelligent and degraded than that of Antigua and Barbados.

He (Sturge) traverses the planter's judgment:—

Comparative observation has left a contrary impression on our minds. There are undoubtedly in Jamaica a greater number of benighted negroes, both Africans and Creoles, but there is also a larger proportion who evince intelligence, energy and independence of spirit, similar to what is manifested in the peasantry of a free country. The cause of this difference need not be traced further than the several modes in which the slaves have been subsisted in the two regions. In Antigua they were formerly fed by rations; in Barbados they are still chiefly supported in the same way; but in Jamaica they are dependent solely on their own exertions, in their own time, for the necessities of life. Their children, their aged and infirm relations look up to them for support, and although, under present circumstances, (i. e. those of apprentices), the pressure of such claims frequently causes suffering, yet these wholesome cares and responsibilities develop an intelligence of mind, a firmness and a self-reliance which are marked characteristics of many of the apprentices of Jamaica."

The slaves in Jamaica grew their own food, in grounds assigned to them for their own use in the mountains. They marketed the surplus and were enabled to accumulate considerable personal savings by doing

so. These savings were sometimes employed for buying personal freedom, but at the date of emancipation there was a very great deal of money in the hands of the freed slaves. There was also, at the same period, considerable opportunity for buying properties of those who had lost their slaves, and, within a few years of emancipation, there occurred a very extensive development of small ownership and escape from the need for wage employment, among all the most intelligent and progressive of the freed people. This development was promoted and assisted chiefly by missionaries of the Free Evangelical churches who bought estates that came into the market and cut them up into small holdings, establishing in a few years' time more than 200 free villages, for which, with the aid of some contributions from England, the people themselves built churches and schools, and paid teachers.

The importance of this development in regard to the topic of racial capacities and race relations is that it was practicable and occurred in Jamaica, and that it was not practicable and did not occur in the United States where the ex-slaves had to remain on the planters' estates as labourers, renters or share-croppers; or in other West Indian Islands such as Antigua, Barbados, and St. Kitts where no land could be bought or rented at all and they remained workers at wages. The outcome is, as every traveller knows, that Jamaica to-day is the most prosperous and socially comfortable community in the West Indies, and that colour prejudice except in a very limited sphere in private relations, is non-existent. In no commercial or public relations is there any species of colour bar. True, the black man has not overtaken the handicap with which he started as compared with the Jew and the Scotsman who have been the principal other racial stocks contributing to the development of Jamaican economy, but he is under no conventional disabilities, and both

in economic prosperity and in general independence and intelligence of character he is ahead of the agricultural labourer, as he now exists, in many parts of England.

Familiar acquaintance with the mixed community of Jamaica dissipates as ridiculous many theories subsidiary to racial discriminations which are accepted as dogmas of social regime in the American Southern States and which survive in considerable force in Barbados, Antigua and St. Kitts, where, because the black man has not had the opportunities which he has had in Jamaica, there is in fact more excuse for their lingering as intellectual convictions.

Now it is important to realize that the divergence between Jamaican social history and that of the Southern States has been due not to the superiority of British colonial administration; but to the development of native human capacities in the subjects of the experiment and to the material and economic conditions in which the diversity has developed.

Neither the British Government nor the Jamaican ever gave the slightest encouragement to the establishment of negro freehold settlement in Jamaica. The British Colonial Office, convinced that the prosperity of the West Indian Colonies depended upon estate cultivation, and dominated by the orthodox economic philosophy of the period, which condemned peasant proprietorship as an uneconomic relic of barbarism, disregarded and in fact remained substantially ignorant of the whole of this development for fully two generations after emancipation. So far as it occupied itself with Colonial economics, it did what it could to help the estate proprietors by providing them with indentured immigrant labour at wages on which the Jamaican labourer could not live, and certainly was not prepared to work if he could find any alternative—as he could.

The Jamaican Local Government, run by the planters, persistently did its best to discourage small settlement,

and it was not until about fifty years ago, when the sugar industry of the West Indies began to collapse under the competition of bounty-fed beet sugar, that Jamaican Governors began to awake to the fact that in spite of all difficulties, the Jamaican peasantry fed the Island and were producing nearly three-quarters of its exportable produce, began to make roads for them, and to devote some attention to the improvement of peasant agriculture.

One of the principal reasons why the adjustment of social relations after emancipation took so much more satisfactory a course in Jamaica than it did in the Southern States was that in the former the two racial elements were not held in such close political and industrial contact as they were by conditions in the United States. One of the active irritants in the latter was that the freed slaves were forthwith admitted to voting citizenship in a developed democracy, with results quite justifiably felt as intolerable by the dominant civilized whites. In Jamaica it was many years before the black peasantry generally became political voters or took any direct interest in island politics. Economically, although great numbers of the poorer and less intelligent negroes remained resident on the sugar estates, or in planting districts, and dependent on wages for part of their livelihood, the economic and social matrix and nursery of the freed black population was the community of the peasant cultivators whose free labour produced the island food supply and whose association with the sugar-estates was to a great extent voluntary and only in times of scarcity indispensable to them. The Planters grumbled and scolded the negroes for not working for them at low wages, and the negroes regarded the Planters as an oppressively-disposed set of people who would take every advantage of them that they could; but there were no "labour troubles," in the sense that such troubles were constant all through the nineteenth century between employers and workers in European industri-

alised societies. Neither politically nor economically was there any corporate organisation of the two sections to act against one another; whilst at the same time less practical education was imposed upon the negroes in the technique and tactics of policy or industry.

The comparative laxity of the contact between white and black in Jamaica, so far from promoting a tendency to segregation (in the sense in which that term ideal is contemplated in America and S. Africa), has actually favoured and fostered a continuously progressive integration and interfusion of the racial elements of the community because it has given greater freedom of adaptation to both sections in all matters in which they had either common interests or no practical grounds for antagonism and aloofness. This effect has been conspicuous in many relations.

The same effect is notable in relation to agricultural interests and religious culture. A far-seeing Governor—Sir Henry Blake, who in his time was criticised by some planters as "negrophilist," insisted on extending the scope of the Jamaica Agricultural Society, originally a planters' and ranchers' association, modelled on the Royal Agricultural Society of England, so as to make it a comprehensive association dealing also with small holders, constituted and supported by a federation of local societies. These branches now number nearly 300 and they include agriculturists of all orders—white and coloured—who work together in a friendly and public-spirited manner in the interests of the general productiveness of the island.

But the most remarkable development has been the establishment of the Jamaica Banana Producers' Association, which was, after many years of education and effort, established to enable the island planting community to hold its own against the monopoly of the United Fruit Company of the United States. This remarkable body, now including about 15,000 members,

white and coloured, and covering banana producing properties of every size from 2,000 down to 2 acres, cultivates and markets one-third or more of the total banana export of the whole island, owns its own ships, is rapidly redeeming, out of profits, its capital investments, and is able to distribute to its members a higher price for their fruit than they have ever been able to obtain under previous conditions.

No colour bar or colour prejudice can withstand the rationalizing influence of such common interests. Even now Black and White "share-croppers" are combining in the American South! But it is in the province of religious culture that the most interesting criticisms of colour bar dogmatism suggest themselves.

Whatever may be the significance of the fact, it is unquestionable that the religious potentialities of the transplanted African are particularly susceptible to the appeal of Evangelical Christianity. The writers of this book bear witness, if any were needed, to the importance in American culture of Evangelical Christianity and to the nobility of the character of religious leaders, that have emerged under that inspiration among the black community of the United States. It is also well known that the greatest spiritual curse of the negro community under slavery in the West Indies lay in the superstitions of African witchcraft, and that only the preaching of Evangelical Christianity has proved an effectual antidote to those superstitions, Christianity was brought to Jamaican negroes not by the established Anglican Church of the Island, but by the Free-Church. English and Scottish missionaries who approached them not as officers of the slave-owning state, but as independent messengers of the delivering love of the Son of God. What gave them their influence with the ignorant African was that quite naturally and unaffectedly they took the slave man seriously as being important in his own personality, as he felt himself to be. They believed in and respected his

spiritual self, and in friendly contact with him they found their belief in his equal humanity justified and confirmed by his response to it. They were immune to colour prejudice or racial superstitions, because they were unconscious of any reason to entertain them, any more than they had in their relations with individuals of different characters and different racial origins in their own country.

Not only did this attitude increase the negro's sense of self-respect by recognising his equal humanity, but the characteristic approach of Evangelical Christianity aroused sensibly in him the consciousness of a spiritual life—a spiritual principle—in himself more efficiently than the interpretations of his African witch lore. And "converted" negroes in thousands positively ceased to be possessed by any belief in or fear of the operations of witchcraft. Conversion, in the black man as in the white, effected enhanced consciousness of the spiritual soul: reinforced the sensory organ of the more intimate constitution of man. Whatever again may be the significance of the phenomenon, what is known as Revivalism, with its particular quickening of the religious consciousness is, of course, a familiar method both of American and West Indian Evangelism. Even in America this fact has not failed to act as an intermediary and unifying influence between the white and coloured communities. The revivalist ritual methods of religious excitement are so near akin to many of those practised in Africa, that there are often produced grotesque and disturbing vagaries among its subjects. (Precisely the same excesses are of course quite familiar in connection with religious revivalism in white communities.) But J. S. Gardiner, the broad-minded author of the best known history of Jamaica, after describing a period of widespread revivalism in that island, and detailing its insanities, thus concludes:—

Apart from these excesses the movement

effected an enormous amount of good. The extravagances attracted attention; the quiet purifying influences were less discernible. Many thousands of marriages were celebrated; evil habits were abandoned; rum shops were forsaken, and thousands were added to the various congregations. 37,000 copies of the Bible were sold in the Island in 18 months.

Those elements in the society of the United States, which may specially be regarded as embodying the national culture—the educational and religious world, the professional, commercial, mercantile and industrial classes—form a more generally advanced and powerful complex than the corresponding classes in so small a community as that of Jamaica; but the greater mass and complexity of this culture in the United States is as manifest in regard to those coloured people who have adopted it, as it is among the white people. This fact of itself makes the situation in the United States in regard to the problem of fusion, much tougher than it is in such a simple community as Jamaica. In Jamaica, though the general level of culture is not so high

and is unfortunately perhaps more susceptible of vulgarisation through reactions to inferior American culture, especially through the agency of the cinema, than the tougher society of the United States, yet such cultural associations as exist in the religious, educational, literary and musical provinces are racially inclusive and not racially discriminating.

Accommodation between racial constituents such as has been evolved in Jamaica may not be practicable in the United States or in South Africa, but its history does incontestably prove that the obstructions to such accommodation do not reside in anything in the racial, physical, intellectual or spiritual make-up of the individuals of different coloured and local origins who compose these mixed communities, but arise from material, social and economic circumstances in which the white section has started with an advantage which they are bent, in their own sectional interests, on maintaining.

OLIVIER

LETTERS FROM SRI AUROBINDO *

[**Sri Krishna Prem** is more than a theoretical student of yoga; himself a practitioner, and a devotee of the great Krishna he writes out of wide knowledge and actual experience.—EDS.]

This book is a collection of extracts from Sri Aurobindo's letters to his pupils and deals with the theory and technique of yoga as practised in his āshram. It is the more welcome because, though there is no dearth of books on the subject, most of them are based not on experience but on other books. Glib plausibilities are set forth with assurance and misguided aspirants set about practising "concentration" or, worse still, breath control and hope by "raising kundalini" to prance about the world as supermen. If the aspirant is of the ordinary dilettante

type no great harm will be done beyond the discrediting of the "yoga" by its lack of results but if he is of the psychic temperament or if he pursues his practices with ardour and perseverance, serious damage may be done to mind and body as a result of his unwise and misguided efforts.

In this book the subject is lifted on to quite a different plane from that of common-place self-development. The first section which is entitled "The Goal" makes this quite clear. "Our yoga is not for our own sake but for the sake of the Divine" and in it is

* *Lights on Yoga*. By SRI AUROBINDO, (The Arya Publishing House, Calcutta. Re. 1, 4 As.)

implied "not only a realisation of God but an entire consecration and change of the inner and outer life till it is fit to manifest the divine consciousness and become part of a divine work."

Full emphasis must be given to the last half of the preceding sentence. Many yoga systems aim simply at enabling the yogi to transcend his ordinary sense consciousness and to rise in spirit to a union with the Supreme Reality and are content to rest when this has been achieved. This system aims at more than that, namely, at "bringing down" the power from the lofty levels of the spirit and allowing it to manifest here on the ordinary level of worldly experience which is to be transformed not merely transcended.

Its aim is not only to rise out of the ordinary ignorant world consciousness into the divine consciousness but to bring the supernatural power of that divine consciousness down into the ignorance of mind, life and body, to transform them, to manifest the Divine here and create a divine life in Matter.

It is claimed that on this point this yoga is different from all "former yogas" which taught only the life-transcending movement and ignored the possibility of a life-transmutation. Whether this claim is justified or not is a difficult matter for one who follows a different discipline to be certain about. It is always easy for the outsider to miss some important point and then triumphantly demonstrate that there is nothing new in the system. It must in any case be admitted, I think, that the teaching is not one which can be found in the usual standard, partial and, so to say, orthodox systems of yoga whether those of knowledge, devotion or action. Nevertheless I believe that something of this sort *has* been the teaching of inner traditions throughout the ages and that traces of it are to be found even in published documents. Space forbids extensive quotation but I will briefly mention three such passages.

The Buddhist "Lankāvatāra Sutra" after describing the higher levels of "Mind-only," the *chitta-mātra*, (super-mind?) goes on to say: "Its rays of light move forward like a mass of fire. . . . and transform the triple world. Some worlds are being transformed while others have already been transformed." (Suzuki's translation)

The same doctrine was taught by H. P. Blavatsky, and in the *Voice of the Silence*, a book of mystical Buddhist teachings translated by her we read: "Shalt thou divert the stream (of Divine Wisdom) for thine own sake, or send it back to its prime source along the crests of cycles? Know, O Narjol, thou of the Secret Path, its pure fresh waters must be used to sweeter make the Ocean's bitter waves—that mighty sea of sorrow formed of the tears of men."

The third instance is taken from the West where similar views appear to have found expression in the Gnostic "Untitled Apocalypse" of the Codex Bezae Cantabrigie which, in the words of its translator, Mr. Lamplugh, contains the record of a "stupendous spiritual adventure, the attempt to produce a race of Divinised men to form an ideal community of gods in God by a series of grades or steps and . . . by a descent of the Divine Grace which should transform the manifested order."*

Perhaps it will be said that these experiments failed. Possibly they did, but *it remains true that they did form a part of the teaching of some schools and I confess that, for my part, and as far as published documents entitle me to a conclusion, I regard Sri Aurobindo's yoga as a new and valuable representation of an age-old inner teaching which has long been veiled under orthodox distortions, rather than as an altogether new path that has not been trodden before.*

The second section is entitled "Planes and Parts of the Being" and deals with

* It is not so clearly demonstrable but in my opinion, similar ideas underly a passage in Plato's *Republic*, Book VII. p. 519.

the various supersensible human principles, and with the various occult centres in the body. Every word of what is said here will be read with interest by sādhas as the author is clearly writing from his experience and not from mere book-knowledge. The section, though short, is intensely interesting even though the outsider is a little apt to be puzzled by the special technical terms which are not sufficiently explained as, for instance, "overmind" which is distinct from "supermind". Another instance is the word "psychic". Psychologists such as Jung use the word to signify all "inner" or "mental" phenomena, whether conscious or unconscious. Common also is its use to denote the lower grade of occult experiences, the phenomena of mediumship and crystal-gazing, or phenomena of what Sri Aurobindo has elsewhere termed "the intermediate zone." His use of the word "psychic" is different from either of these. In his system the word clearly refers to a level of the inner being that is above the mind though "below" what he terms the "central being" or Jivātma. It is apparently more or less permanent from birth to birth and is the same as, or at least is connected with, what the Upanishads term the "Purusha in the heart." Its "awakening" or "new birth" is an essential part of the yoga for it is through the "psychic" that we get into contact with the higher Divine levels.

Sri Aurobindo's insistence on this important point is highly significant as it reveals on which side of the fence he is. The sterility of so much current Advaita Vedānta is intimately connected with its lack of recognition of just this very point. It is too conceited, or at least, ambitious, and seeks to leap at once to the *Nirguna* Brahman scorning the ladder by which alone that Brahman can be reached. The result is usually a thin and sometimes proud (the intellect's contribution :) intellectuo-spirituality which is but a pale reflection of the authentic life of the Spirit.

The third section, entitled "Surrender and Opening" is perhaps the most important of all. The mainspring of the yoga is seen to be a surrender and self-dedication to the Divine. It is no mere upthrusting desire for "Self-development," no mere discipline of introversion but a complete offering of the whole nature to the Divine, for the sake of the Divine and in order that it may serve as a basis for Divine activity. Too many seem to think that yoga can be achieved by some psychic trick, some facile quietism or some simple reversal of current modes of thought which will enable the ordinary man to glide into the supreme achievement like a skilful motorist slipping smoothly into reverse gear. It is this misconception that is at the basis of the pernicious half-truth that yoga has no concern with morality. Sri Aurobindo makes it abundantly clear that in his yoga at least, no mere disciplines, meditations or psychic exercises will be effective save as embroideries or instruments of a thorough and whole-hearted self-dedication to That which is beyond all self.

Moreover, there is yet another reason for self-dedication though it is not explicitly referred to. Without such an offering of the self the yoga is full of dangers. Too easily it is assumed by many that "divine" protection will be available to ward off serious harm but this is a sentimentality of popular religion. Why on earth should it be? In the case of those (perhaps a majority) who practise yoga for the sake of having supernormal experiences or of mere self-development there is no reason to suppose that any such protection will be available any more than it is for the unauthorised fool who starts fiddling with the switches in a power station.

The last section of the book is entitled "Work" and explains the necessity for a union of meditation, devotion and action in a yoga which must be what he terms "integral".
Temporary retirement for meditation

may be useful in certain circumstances but an exclusive inwardness is as useless because as unbalanced as an exclusive outwardness. This is profoundly true and as profoundly important though it is a truth from which we always tend to slip away because of our innate one-sidednesses. Our natures are unbalanced and we wish to abstract ourselves in a pure contemplation, to luxuriate in a welter of unalloyed devotion or to give ourselves over to sheer activity unhampered by "the pale cast of thought." But all these phases are one-sided if taken by

themselves. One is reminded of the words of the well-known theosophical book, *Light on the Path*: "seek it (the Path) not by any one road. To each temperament there is one road which seems the most desirable butnone alone can take the disciple more than one step forward."

The *Gita*, too, if we free our minds from the influence of one-sided commentators, clearly sets forth the same ideal, a harmonious blending of head, heart and hands in which all shall be transformed into an instrument of the Divine Līlā.

SRI KRISHNA PREM

[Our esteemed reviewer has given but one short extract from *The Voice of the Silence*. It might be stated without fear of contradiction that those chosen fragments from the *Book of the Golden Precepts* revolve around the central teaching of the Great Renunciation and the Great Sacrifice. They contain an exposition and an answer to that question which the Yogi hears: "Now bend thy head and listen well, O Bodhisattva—Compassion speaks and saith: 'Can there be bliss when all that lives must suffer? Shalt thou be saved and hear the whole world cry?'" (p. 78)]

In *The Voice of the Silence*, "The Two Paths" are thus described:—

The *Open* PATH leads to the changeless change—Nirvana, the glorious state of Absoluteness, the Bliss past human thought. Thus, the first Path is LIBERATION. But Path the second is --RENUNCIATION, and therefore called the "Path of Woe." That *Secret* Path leads the Arhan to mental woe unspeakable; woe for the living Dead, and helpless pity for the men of karmic sorrow, the fruit of Karma Sages dare not still. . . .

The "Secret Way" leads also to Paranirvanic bliss—but at the close of Kalpas without number; Nirvanas gained and lost from

boundless pity and compassion for the world of deluded mortals.

But it is said: "The last shall be the greatest." Samyak Sambuddha, the Teacher of Perfection, gave up his SELF for the salvation of the World, by stopping at the threshold of Nirvana—the pure state.

Thou hast the knowledge now concerning the two Ways. Thy time will come for choice, O thou of eager Soul, when thou hast reached the end and passed the seven Portals. Thy mind is clear. No more art thou entangled in delusive thoughts, for thou hast learned all. Unveiled stands Truth and looks thee sternly in the face. She says:

"Sweet are the fruits of Rest and Liberation for the sake of Self; but sweeter still the fruits of long and bitter duty. Aye, Renunciation for the sake of others, of suffering fellow men."

He, who becomes Pratyeka-Buddha makes his obeisance but to his Self. The Bodhisattva who has won the battle, who holds the prize within his palm, yet says in his divine compassion:

"For others' sake this great reward I yield"—accomplishes the greater Renunciation.

A SAVIOUR OF THE WORLD is he. (pp. 45-6-7).

As our reviewer truly points out this is an age-old inner teaching, but like other truths has been distorted or forgotten. Madame Blavatsky learnt it from her Teachers; she also taught that there exists on earth a group or band of these Great Renouncers; They remain with Orphan Humanity out of compassion to help the lonely sore-footed pilgrims, who at present are wandering in this limitless desert of illusion and matter called earth life. They endeavour to precipitate the kingdom of Heaven on earth and among Their methods is the augmentation of the number of such Renouncers. To the aspirants They say, in the words of *The Voice of the Silence* (p. 36):—

“Know, O beginner, this is the *Open*

PATH, the way to selfish bliss, shunned by the Bodhisattvas of the ‘Secret Heart,’ the Buddhas of Compassion.”

The grand concept of these Sacrificers and Renouncers and of Their Path, which is immemorial however special it may be, has been grossly corrupted since the passing of H. P. Blavatsky by some who have called themselves Theosophists. Misunderstanding the genuine teachings they have grotesquely materialized them, thus misleading not only their own blind followers, but the public at large. The ideal Sri Aurobindo holds forth is an ancient one, though it has been forgotten even in this ancient land of India.—EDS.]

The Zohar (Vol. V.) Trans. by MAURICE SIMON and HARRY SPERLING (The Soncino Press, London. 21s.)

For the information of those who may happen to be wholly unacquainted with the subject-matter of this brief notice, it must be explained that *Sepher Ha Zohar*—“The Book of Splendour”—is pre-eminently the text-in-chief of Jewish Kabbalism, and that the Kabbalah in Jewry, by the hypothesis concerning it, constitutes a Secret Theosophical Knowledge, perpetuated from an immemorial past with the Lawgiver Moses as channel, by the mode of “Reception”—otherwise, from mouth to ear. The fact that there is extant any knowledge respecting it, outside the secret circle of Recipients, means that it passed ultimately into writing: as such, however, it is a product of the Christian centuries. At what date—actual or approximate—it originated therein, when and where it developed, and what names are connected therewith, these involve matters of expert research which it is impossible to approach here. There can be said only as regards the *Zohar* itself, that this vast storehouse of mystical debate and contemplation emerged as a point

of fact, meaning the fact of its existence, above the horizon of Israel, towards the end of the thirteenth century. The modern criticism concerning it may be said to have begun with Adophe Franck, *anno* 1843, and the clash of opinion up to the present time may be said to have left it where it stood from the beginning, namely, as a composite work, incorporating old material with a good deal of later date. The research can be left hereat; but it must be on the understanding that, for him who writes these lines, the *Sepher Ha Zohar* ranks among the great books of the world; that he has taken it as such into his heart; and that it bears for him most emphatic testimony to deep mystical experience. Whether it is so many centuries older or younger than this or that group of scholarship has thought at a given moment of the past, or may tend to lay down now, is not—as he has explained elsewhere—the prime question at issue. There is for him and for some others a question of inherent values, a question of life and essence. It is also from this point of view that he would offer a few notable facts respecting the work on its external side to readers of THE ARYAN PATH.

So far as Western Europe is concerned, there are four epochs in the bibliographical history of the *Zohar* which more especially merit our attention: (1) The purchase by Picus de Mirandula of certain Strange MSS, from an unknown Israelite, which were demonstrably a codex of the *Zohar*, and his publication in 1486 in the days of Pope Julius of a sheaf of extracts therefrom. In this manner, however imperfectly and vaguely, the existence of the "Book of Splendour" was announced. (2) The publication at Sulzbach, by Baron Knorr von Rosenroth, between the years 1677 and 1678, of his monumental *Kabbala Denudata* * which—to all intents and purposes—gave Latin-reading Europe the first materials of substantial knowledge concerning the *Zohar*, its connections and developments. The *Conclusiones Kabbalisticæ* of Mirandula in reality made nothing known, while the sparse *additamenta* of William Postel to his translation of the Kabbalistic *Sepher Yetzirah*—otherwise, "Book of Formation"—make no reference to the *magnum opus* of Theosophical Israel. (3) The translation of the *Zohar* into French by Jean de Pauly, done in six volumes, under the editorship of Emil Lafuma-Giraud and published, after the translator's death, between 1906 and 1911. (4) The English translation by Maurice Simon and Harry Sperling, produced by the Soncino Press in five volumes, published at London (1931 to 1934). It is to be noted that this version, as compared with that of Paris, reduces the dimensions of the undertaking in a very substantial manner by omitting the *additamenta*, which consist of independent matter, under distinctive titles, brought at more or less arbitrary points into the original text. The latter is *ex hypothesi* a sort of commentary on the Pentateuch. Literally, however, or in any ordinary sense, it is nothing of the kind; but the great mass of sections comprised in the fundamental work

are grouped together under the denominations of successive Mosaic books; accordingly as they open by citing from Genesis, Exodus or Leviticus, etc. and continue so to do. As regards things that are omitted, their enumeration would signify nothing to the general reader; but it may be noted in passing that the "Book of Concealed Mystery" the "Greater Holy Assembly" and the "Lesser Holy Assembly," though conspicuous here by their absence, are precisely those which Rosenroth put into Latin as if they were typically characteristic of the entire *Zohar* and might stand at need for the great collection at large. The choice of that German scholar in the old days has always seemed past searching out; and because of the preposterous symbolism of these obscure texts we confess to a sense of relief at their exclusion in the present case. Personally, it must be confessed on the other hand that we should have liked to see specimen extracts at least from "Secrets of the Law," the "Luminous Book" and the "Faithful Shepherd" (who is Moses) in an English vesture. Have we said in our enthusiasm only that it is among the world's great books? Let those who will, collate and codify its allusions to the Mystery of Shekinah and the Mystery of Sex which are scattered up and down the volumes: perchance and more than possibly they may begin to see with us. But a certain call is postulated, a certain election is supposed. We at least on our own part offer thanks and salutations to those who have undertaken this venture, have carried it to completion, and perhaps in the time to come will have multiplied by many those who love the *Zohar*, as he who subscribes hereto and has placed this English version on his shelves, amidst other codices and extracts, with a thankful heart.

A. E. WAITE

The work was re-issued at Frankfort in 1684 with added matter.

The Great Pyramid in Fact and in Theory. Part II, Theory. BY WILLIAM KINGSLAND (Rider, London. 15s.)

In the first Part of Mr. Kingsland's work, published two years ago, he dealt exhaustively with the constructional details of the Great Pyramid, and gave us exact figures, checked in some cases by himself on the spot, as to its dimensions both internal and external. In this second Part he examines critically the various theories that have been advanced from time to time as to the purpose of the Pyramid and the methods employed in its construction. These theories are innumerable, for no contemporary history of the erection of the Pyramids has survived, nor does such appear to have existed even in classical times; and where definite information is lacking on so outstanding a problem, people are apt to attempt to fill the gap by guess-work, more or less, usually less, in accordance with the facts.

The evidence that the Great Pyramid was built by Khufu (Cheops), as is generally accepted, is slight enough; but "although," as Mr. Kingsland writes :—

There are no facts to support any other theory as to the actual builder of the Pyramid, there are some strange illusions by various ancient writers which appear to throw doubt upon the matter, and which modern writers have not failed to seize upon in support of their own particular theories.

But to attribute the Great Pyramid to Khufu is still to leave its date unsettled, for that monarch himself is placed by different writers at periods ranging from B. C. 4789 to B. C. 2140, which is like saying that King Alfred reigned some time between the battle of Marathon and the present year.

Sir Flinders Petrie estimates that the Great Pyramid contained in all, 2,300,000 stones averaging $2\frac{1}{2}$ tons each in weight. Some of these were granite blocks of 70 tons, quarried at Syene and transported 600 miles up the Nile. Some of the heaviest of them were used in the structure no less than 160 feet above foundation

level. The casing stones were shaped, according to Petrie, with "an amount of accuracy equal to the most modern optician's straight edges of such a length"; and fitted together so that a razor blade could not be inserted anywhere in the joint. How these feats were accomplished with tools, assumed to be primitive, are problems, for the solution of which many curiously inadequate explanations have been propounded. Mr. Kingsland, himself, a practical engineer, suggests that the ancient builders must have possessed "far more efficient means for raising and settling these stones than those of mere rollers, levers, ramps, and man-hauling power."

Quite as numerous and quite as unsatisfactory are the theories that have been put forward with regard to the purpose of the Pyramid. Mr. Kingsland examines them in order, and sets forth with admirable impartiality the arguments pros and cons for each of them. Not one, he finds, can account for all the facts; and some of the theories have tried to buttress their hypotheses by colouring the facts. Under Mr. Kingsland's critical scalpel the Tomb theory, the Astronomical theory, and the Biblical theory are all shown to be wholly inadequate.

While carefully retraining from any dogmatic statements, Mr. Kingsland does not disguise his own opinion that the Great Pyramid was designed by initiates in Occultism for use in connection with the celebration of the Mysteries. If this were so, then it would have followed that its secrets would have been closely guarded, and that none of them would have been recorded in hieroglyphic inscriptions or papyri. Mr. Kingsland considers that some of the occult forces of nature may have been employed in the building of the Pyramid, "and that they would, did we but know of them, solve those problems of construction which still remain an enigma to us." He goes on to suggest that an explanation of the shape and dimensions of the

Pyramid and its complex of passages and chambers may be found in the symbolism of the Mysteries.

The author also has much of interest to say about the religion of the ancient Egyptians and its principal surviving document, *The Book of the Dead*. In a deeply interesting chapter on "The Ancient Mysteries" he quotes with approval Madame Blavatsky's statement (*The Secret Doctrine*, II, p. 558) that the Sarcophagus in the King's Chamber was used in the ceremony of initiation.

Like Part I, Part II of Mr. Kingsland's book is richly illustrated and carefully indexed. The two parts together constitute a complete and accurate account of the Great Pyramid, together with a critical resumé of the facts and speculations recorded by ancient, medieval and modern writers on the subject. The book we venture to say, will rank as the standard-work on that marvellous problem in stone, which for thousands of years has been justly regarded as the greatest of the material works of man.

R.A.V.M.

The Illusion Of Immortality. By CORLISS LAMONT (G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York. \$ 3.00)

A Witness Through the Centuries. By Reginald Hegy (E. P. Dutton & Co. New York. \$ 2.00)

This laboured volume with its clatter and appendages of erudition covers no new ground. At best, it throws into relief the confusion produced by centuries of dogmatic, unphilosophical teachings of the Christian church on such subjects as the immortality of man. The belief in immortality, according to Mr. Lamont, is a religious opiate, and temporal opportunities for enjoyment and work should not be neglected for such unprovable speculations. No brain, no soul may be said to be his underlying thesis. Man is merely the result of the evolutionary progress of simple cells. His present nature, known and unknown, is quite sufficient to account for all perplexities without seeking in the super-sensuous.

The philosophies of the East are superficially treated. The author seems entirely ignorant of the rationale of reincarnation; and even of its having been known and taught in ancient Judea. Similarly various aspects of spiritualistic phenomena are summarily handled to fit in with predetermined conclusions. Lucretius, the Roman Epicurean, whose views

Mr. Lamont seems to endorse, is quoted extensively. Lucretius, by the way, is reported to have been subject to fits of madness, and to have died a suicide at the age of 44. Was the latter due to his morbid brain disease or to most decided and strong materialistic views?

No, this book offers no solution to the problems of injustice and the sufferings of humanity, nor will it provide ethical food for a sense-satiated public. It is a product of that noisy but diminishing school of Western thought, which owes existence to ill-digested scientific hypotheses and to revolt against a dogmatic irrational Church exploitation.

The second book is as definite and decided in its conclusions, but in the opposite extreme. "Reginald Hegy M. A., (T. C. D.) M. D., Ch. B., B. A. O., (Dub. Univ.) L. M. (Rotunda)" assures his readers:

I now know that life is indeed eternal—I have endeavoured to show how a few medical experiences set me upon a new path of thought and how this was followed by *actual proof* made possible by one of the Almighty's most loving gifts, that of personal spirit and angel communication.

Neither of the volumes need have been written. Their manufacture may have given satisfaction to their authors, but they do not stand the test of reason nor do they uplift the heart of the reader.

B. T.

Katha Panchakam. By KSHAMA ROW (Sahakari Granthakar, Bombay. Re. 1)

Satyagraha Gita. By KSHAMA ROW (Librairie d'Amérique et d'Orient, Paris.)

Katha Panchakam as the title indicates, is a collection of five stories. They deal with social evils that have been corroding Indian society. Ironically enough, we have the tragic paradox of the most cultivated and educated section of Hindu society ranging itself against their eradication. The evils which these stories illustrate, early marriage, the sufferings of widowhood, the tragic lot of the daughter-in-law in the average orthodox Hindu household each of these is a secret cancer gnawing at the vitals of our social fabric. Our womanhood stands shut out from civilisation and from the chance of a free, spontaneous and natural life.

The author is to be congratulated on the competence, nay, the easy mastery, with which she has presented the evils of contemporary life in a language often called dead but still the vital stream of our cultural life.

The story of Mahatma Gandhi, who has stirred up the new moral influence "*Satyagraha*," has been told in many languages. Mrs. Kshama Row attempts this great and thrilling story in Sanskrit verse with remarkable success. The history of this great man is obviously an epic theme. True artist that the author is, she takes the historical incidents connected with the *Satyagraha* movement and sings them beautifully.

Kshama Row's technique is nearly faultless and we tender congratulations on the competence with which she has handled the theme, to which her style is so well adapted.

P. NAGARAJA RAO

The Mahābhārata: Analysis and Index. BY EDWARD P. RICE (Humphrey Milford and Oxford University Press, London. 7s. 6d.)

Based on Manmatha Nath Dutt's Text and Translation, this well-conceived and handsomely printed handbook gives a summary of the contents of the Great Epic of India, in four parts. It begins with a short catalogue of the characters that figure in it—Brahman, Ātman and Paramātmān; the three great gods; *Devas* and *Asuras*; glorified mortals and human, semi-human and sub-human beings. There is only bare mention of these; this part cannot, therefore, be deemed satisfying. This is followed by the apportionment of the narration among the three, Sauti, Vaiśampāyana and Sañjaya.

Next comes the detailed summary of the incidents, chapter by chapter. The opening section of the *Ādi Parva* itself is devoted to an abridgement of the substance of the *Mahābhārata*; but what we have presented in this part of the book is very much more than its paraphrase. It is the outcome

of the author's detailed study of the entire contents of the Epic, and gives a clear outline which will at once serve as a guide for the beginner who wants a clear idea of the subjects treated of in this mine of information.

At the end, the book is devoted to indexes of names and subjects that figure prominently in the *Mahābhārata*. Here the author could have profitably drawn from the exhaustive "Index" of Sorensen, which does not even find mention in the Preface. What really should be helpful to the students of *Mahābhārata* is an abridgement of this monumental but unwieldy volume. This is, in a way, what the present writer felt would be contained in the book, as it was placed in his hands for review. Yet, the work will prove useful as a "map" to those who require to be introduced into this "jungle" with its many paths and byways; and therefore "indispensable for those who would learn to understand the spirit and culture of ancient India," as Dr. Barnett says in his Foreword.

S. V. VISWANATHA

ENDS AND SAYINGS

“ ——— ends of verse
And sayings of philosophers.”

HUDIBRAS.

John Cowper Powys has penned an indictment against Vivisection in *The Abolitionist* (London) for June. He writes:—

A new tyranny is now appearing among us, finding its support in a new superstition. I refer to the tyranny of Science. The old horrors are being brought back. Though we no longer torture in the name of God or in the name of the State, we torture in the name of Science. Just as we were formerly mesmerised into tolerating cruelty to men and women by reason of one widespread superstition, so we are being mesmerised into tolerating cruelty to animals by reason of another superstition. . . . These vivisectors are assuming in their secret torture-chambers, the right formerly claimed by all fanatical despots, of *being above the ordinary human sense of right and wrong*.

We are among those who look upon vivisection as an unmitigated evil. Not forgetting that there are a few rare exceptions among vivisectors who would use, if need arises, their own bodies to experiment upon as willingly as that of a rat or a dog, most of them are devoid of compassion, justice, mercy and chivalry. Further, their method of fighting disease is as futile as their ghastly practice is unnecessary. But for all that, is not the tyranny of vivisectors but an aspect of the more widespread tyranny exercised by the major portion of the medical profession? Most doctors obstinately follow their everchanging speculations and

theories as the orthodox religionists do their superstitions. We are not unmindful of the wonderful relief medical science has given to modern humanity, but there is no doubt that the doctor of to-day does take advantage of the credulity and the ignorance of his patients.

But there is another kind of doctor whose good work is fast gaining recognition. We are referring to the different types of Nature-Cure practitioners, and their labour is bound to purge the orthodox medical science of its mistakes and weaknesses. But they would seem to have a hard fight before them, judging from an article by A. Barker, President of the National Association of Medical Herbalists of Great Britain, Ltd., entitled, “Our Jubilee Stock-taking.” In the May number of *The Medical Herbalist* he reviews the achievements of his profession during the last quarter of a century:—

What do we find? That we are worse off now than at the beginning of the reign: that enactment after enactment has left us weaker and has strengthened those who pretend to despise us because they fear us; that the Press, the wireless, the schoolroom, in fact the whole propagandist machine is being increasingly employed to create a monopoly in the healing art, in which patients will no longer have freedom to choose either practitioner or system.

Against this we have the success of the Osteopaths in Great Britain, and we should not forget that in other parts of the world, especially in U. S. A., Nature-Cure Doctors are making fine progress.

But Mr. Powys does not stop at vivisectors; he attacks modern science *en bloc* :—

This new superstition is our unbound awe and our obsequious respect for everything done in the name of Science. The most startling and by far the most dangerous symptom of modern life is the growth of man's scientific power *irrespective of his character and his conscience*. It is Science used for purposes of evil that has made the modern war the catastrophe it has become. It will be Science used for purposes of destruction that will enable our Western Civilization to commit its final suicide. And it is Science that will make the next war a war primarily directed against the helpless, a war against the old, a war against women, a war against children and animals. And the scientific preparations for this wholesale destruction are *being made in secret*. That is the point. Science takes the power away from open tyranny in order to hand it over to an inhuman secret tyranny.

No one can question the validity of these opinions. But why stop at science? In other departments of knowledge also there is the same force of tyranny. It may not strike human imagination as in the case of vivisectors or the inventors of poison-gases but all the same the tyrannical influence is there. For example, western phil-

ologists translate and interpret ancient eastern texts from their own points of view and scoff at and ridicule mystical and spiritual interpretations. Prejudiced in favour of dead-letter interpretations, and dogmatic in their view that all eastern religious philosophies are rooted in animism and fetishism, they have so far successfully used the rod of punishment against their opponents. Or take chronology: influenced by Biblical chronology they have systematically opposed Puranic chronology and have laughed at Hindu chronologists and their ancient calendars. The force of their tyranny has been such that even modern Hindu scholars seem afraid to counter the literalness or the calculations of their occidental gurus. When not so afraid, they are obsessed by the superstition that real seats of learning are only in the west and that their own old native methods and institutions have little to offer—an indirect result of the tyrannous influence of the orientalist. The remedy suggested by Mr. Powys is applicable in other departments of life also.

There is only one ground to take in this matter; and that is the ground of simple conscience... Ordinary conscientious men and women *shirk from thinking about it*. They feel in their hearts that these fanatics of Science are doing something that they themselves would shudder to do. But their obsequious superstition in the presence of this new "Holy Office" shuts their mouth and drugs their conscience.



Point out the "Way"—however dimly,
and lost among the host—as does the evening
star to those who tread their path in darkness.
—*The Voice of the Silence*

THE ARYAN PATH

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REGENERATION OF SOCIETY

On the 2nd of this month India will celebrate the 66th birthday of her great and beloved leader—M. K. Gandhi. As coincidence would have it (we prefer the term Karma) we are able to print in this issue two valuable articles dealing with his present work and its influence not on India only but on the world. This gives us the opportunity to offer him our greetings and wishes for many happy returns of the day.

John Middleton Murry's socialistic philosophy somewhat approximates that which was recently propounded by the practical-idealistic and reformer of Aryāvarta. We sent Mr. Murry the following article by Gandhiji which appeared in *Harijan* of June 29, 1935. We reprint it in full for the benefit of our readers, especially the occidental ones, who may not be able to see the weekly through which Gandhiji now speaks to his countrymen, that they may be able to appreciate the comments of Mr. Murry.

In this connection we may mention that *Harijan* will prove of more than ordinary interest to readers outside of India, not only because it chronicles the great work of social and industrial reformation now going on in this country, but also because thoughtful westerners will find in it many an idea of practical utility which they can adopt in their own work. The second article, by Dr. Kumarappa, treats of the ideology and Soul-religion of Gandhiji which energizes all he does.

The following extracts will help the reader in seeing the inwardness of the contentions of the article of Gandhiji. They are some of the answers given by Dr. J. C. Kumarappa, organizer and secretary, of the All-India Village Industries Association, to a questionnaire submitted by the Editor of *Contemporary India* (Lahore):—

Gandhiji's constitutional position is one of Advisor and Guide but he is the heart and soul of the movement which

stands for his ideals of Truth and Love in the economic sphere.

We are up against superstition and tradition in the villagers who are also rendered lethargic by malaria and bad nourishment. Their dire poverty

makes them desperate and dries up the fountain of hope. They have not the enterprise to try new methods nor have they the resources to carry out experiments.

DUTY OF BREAD LABOUR

"Brahma created his people with the duty of sacrifice laid upon them and said, 'By this do you flourish. Let it be the fulfiller of all your desires.'... He who eats without performing this sacrifice eats stolen bread"—thus says the Gita. "Earn thy bread by the sweat of thy brow," says the Bible. Sacrifices may be of many kinds. One of them may well be bread labour. If all laboured for their bread and no more, then there would be enough food and enough leisure for all. Then there would be no cry of over-population, no disease, and no such misery as we see around. Such labour will be the highest form of sacrifice. Men will no doubt do many other things either through their bodies or through their minds, but all this will be labour of love, for the common good. There will then be no rich and no poor, none high and none low, no touchable and no untouchable.

This may be an unattainable ideal. But we need not, therefore, cease to strive for it. Even if without fulfilling the whole law of sacrifice, that is, the law of our being, we performed physical labour enough for our daily bread, we should go a long way towards the ideal.

If we did so, our wants would be minimized, our food would be simple. We should then eat to live, not live to eat. Let anyone who doubts the accuracy of this proposition try to sweat for his bread, he will derive the greatest relish from the productions of his labour, improve his health and discover that many things he took were superfluities.

May not men earn their bread by

intellectual labour? No. The needs of the body must be supplied by the body. "Render unto Cæsar that which is Cæsar's," perhaps applies here well.

Mere mental, that is, intellectual labour is for the soul and is its own satisfaction. It should never demand payment. In the ideal state, doctors, lawyers and the like will work solely for the benefit of society, not for self. Obedience to the law of bread labour will bring about a silent revolution in the structure of society. Man's triumph will consist in substituting the struggle for existence by the struggle for mutual service. The law of the brute will be replaced by the law of man.

Return to the villages means a definite voluntary recognition of the duty of bread labour and all it connotes. But says the critic, "millions of India's children are to-day living in the villages and yet they are living a life of semi-starvation." This, alas, is but too true. Fortunately we know that theirs is not voluntary obedience. They would perhaps shirk body labour if they could, and even rush to the nearest city if they could be accommodated in it. Compulsory obedience to a master is a state of slavery, willing obedience to one's father is the glory of sonship. Similarly compulsory obedience to the law of bread labour breeds poverty, disease and discontent. It is a state of slavery. Willing obedience to it must bring contentment and health. And it is health which is real wealth, not pieces of silver and gold. The Village Industries Association is an experiment in willing bread labour.

AN ENGLISHMAN'S COMMENT

I am not competent to speak on the practical possibility of M. K. Gandhi's proposal for India ; I can write only as one deeply interested in it as a prophylactic against the deep-seated disease of our Western industrial civilization. The difference in the situations of India and England is outwardly great. Western industrialism has, as yet, bitten hardly deeper than the surface of India ; and M. K. Gandhi may have good ground for his evident hope to resist its further ravages by summoning the Indian people to an intense moral and spiritual effort to resist it. I imagine that to the great majority of the Indian peoples Gandhi's appeal comes naturally. It is simple and self-evident, in accord with their habits of life and their unspoiled religious instincts. Were I an Indian, I have no doubt I should be found among Gandhi's most ardent supporters and disciples.

But I am not an Indian. I belong to a society which is now completely permeated by industrialism. I am concerned, therefore, not with resisting the advance of machine-production (for that is impossible), but with the effort to establish an order of society which is living enough to bring the machine under humane control. As things are there is no doubt that, in a country like England, the machine controls our humanity, not our humanity the machine. *Not merely does the machine control our humanity ; it has so perverted*

and impoverished it, warped and suffocated it, that we have almost forgotten what it is to be a Man. Our simple life-instincts are starved ; we have lost all native harmony.

I believe that Gandhi utters a profound truth when he says that "Willing obedience to the law of bread-labour must bring contentment and health" ; for it is a restoration of the natural rhythm which unites man to the process of the Earth to which he belongs. "A definite *voluntary* recognition of the duty of bread-labour and all it connotes" is, therefore, a spiritual victory of the highest and simplest kind. Nevertheless, I believe it would be mistaken in the actual condition of an industrialised society like the English, to make that appeal directly. The English people are too far removed from the conditions of a pastoral society to be able to make a simple response to such an appeal ; and those who made the appeal would immediately be in danger of cutting themselves off from the people at large. By his appeal, I imagine, Gandhi touches the heart and instincts of the Indian people : it would not be so with us.

Nevertheless, in spite of that great difference between the two societies, I feel and have come increasingly to feel, that Gandhi's doctrine and programme is in accord with our English necessities also. We Socialists, who advocate and work for a social revolution

in industrialised society, by which the machine shall be subordinated to human needs, not human needs governed by the machine, find ourselves (I believe) driven at the last to a position essentially the same as Gandhi's. Our ideal is a society, in which the machine is so completely subordinated to the *real* necessities of human life, that the vast economy of human efforts which the machine makes possible may be turned to the benefit of every member of the community, to whom (by every right, natural and divine) it manifestly belongs. But what is that liberated human being to *do*? His humanity has been so mutilated by two centuries of machine "civilization" that he would be incapable of using his freedom. He would blink bewildered in the sunshine like a prisoner released from years of captivity in a dark dungeon. But that problem, though it is real, I am inclined to put aside on the principle: "Sufficient for the day is the evil thereof." We are so terribly far from liberating our Western man from his slavery to the machine that we need not worry our heads yet over what he will do with his freedom when he gets it.

But the problem becomes more urgent when we recognise that in one grinding and debased form many Western men already have attained freedom from the machine. Our huge and constant armies of the permanently unemployed are slaves who have been grudgingly liberated from the machine. And straightway it becomes obvious

that work—natural and creative work—is a necessity of human life. Without it, our unemployed collapse as human beings. Their spiritual and physical energies depart from them. They become incapable of taking part in the political struggle for a new order of society. They themselves recognise that they were better and stronger men while they were still the active slaves of the machine.

And in yet another form the problem becomes manifest and urgent again. The man who is engaged in Socialist politics comes at the last to recognise that an intense moral and imaginative effort is necessary if the politics of Socialism are to be prevented from degenerating into a mere taking of the line of least resistance, which, though nominally aiming at the regeneration of society, is in fact directed towards a controlled degeneration of society. For what is called Socialist policy to-day tends towards one of two things: either increasing the number of, and the payment to, the unemployed; or employing them at the machine again on works "of national importance." It is inspired by no recognition of the fact that both are evils. Work at the machine is itself an evil; and secure subsistence, just above the poverty line, without creative work is also an evil.

In its final form our problem is this: From whence is the moral and spiritual energy to be derived which will preserve Socialism, in a political democracy, from taking this line of least resistance which leads to human degeneration?

From what source can Socialism be continually inspired with faith in its real mission—to create a new society of regenerated men and women?

I am driven to the conclusion that this source of inspiration and strength will only be found in communities of men and women who have achieved the equivalent of what Gandhi urges—"the voluntary recognition of the duty of bread-labour and all that it connotes." Our circumstances are different, and we must adapt ourselves to them. Our communities will have to be in the nature of physical and spiritual "retreats" to which the members retire to live, as far as may be, on the product of their own labour for a short period in the year. From those of the unemployed who understand the vital necessity of re-establishing the natural law and rhythm of life we may expect the permanent element in such communities: the rest of us, who are enmeshed in the obligations of capitalist society, and can escape them only for brief periods, must perforce be content with the regular "retreat"—to adopt a term from the monastic tradition. But from this "retreat," I believe,

they would derive a renewal of strength, both physical and spiritual, from simple creative work, from frugal living, and above all from the immediate experience of comradeship in simple creative work undertaken in common, which alone will enable them to withstand the innumerable subtle forces which constantly tend to degrade the ideal of socialism.

The likeness between this conception and Gandhi's is manifest; so, I suppose, are the similarities between this proposal and Gandhi's *ashram*, which alas, I know only by name. But the point on which I would insist is that this conclusion of mine has been reached, so far as I am consciously aware, in complete independence of Gandhi's teachings. It is, in my case, the residual outcome of four or five years gruelling experience of political Socialism in England, and of a prolonged process of groping, through trial and error, to some practical conviction. It is my answer—not my personal answer, but the answer which has been impersonally forced upon me—to the unrelenting question: What are we English Socialists to do?

JOHN MIDDLETON MURRY

EDUCATING THE MASSES OF INDIA

GANDHIJI'S INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL PROGRAMME

[Dr. Bharatan Kumarappa wrote this article at Wardha, the present headquarters of Gandhiji, where he has been working for the Village Industries Movement.—EDS.]

"What I want to achieve—what I have been striving and pining to achieve these thirty years—is self-realisation, to see God face to face, to attain *Moksha*. I live and move and have my being in pursuit of this goal. All that I do by way of speaking and writing, and all my ventures in the political field, are directed to this same end."—*My Experiments with Truth*, pp. 4-5.

These words offer a key to the mysterious heart-working of the great man about whom the world never seems to tire of talking. They also explain the so-called inconsistencies of Gandhiji which have baffled both his friends and foes alike.

Even to-day most people look upon Gandhiji as a political leader. His other activities such as popularising hand-spinning, fighting untouchability, creating Hindu-Muslim unity, are regarded as having only political ends. He is however an idealist, relentlessly pursuing his ideals wherever they lead him and a yogi seeking by the practice of truth and non-violence to realise the Spirit.

If such were his aim why did he not become a monk instead of dabbling in politics? This question is commonly asked by Occidentals who somehow believe that religion and politics are incompatible. To the Oriental, steeped in his philosophy, a religion that does not express itself in action is impotent. Faith without works is dead. Moreover, life should not be split up

into compartments. A religion which keeps its mouth shut except in the home or in the church is bound to beget insincerity and hypocrisy. Gandhiji's religion floods his whole life and its soul being non-violence it resists injustice and oppression anywhere.

His entry into Indian politics came soon after the Jallianwala Bagh tragedy. Also there was the unredeemed pledge of the Government to the Muslims in the matter of Khilafat. Soon he found himself in the dock before an English Judge; he explained his disaffection on these points but added:—

I came reluctantly to the conclusion that the British connection had made India more helpless than she ever was before, politically and economically... Little do they realise that the Government established by law in British India is carried on for this exploitation of the masses. No sophistry, no jugglery in figures can explain away the evidence that the skeletons in many villages present to the naked eye. I have no doubt whatsoever, that both England and the town-dwellers of India will have to answer, if there is a God above, for

this crime against humanity, which is perhaps unequalled in history.

His entry into politics was therefore brought about by his religious devotion to truth and non-violence. This brings him into conflict with any power, foreign or indigenous, which practises untruth and oppression.

Turn in the opposite direction : More than once when the whole country had been worked up to enthusiasm for Civil Disobedience Gandhiji suddenly ordered withdrawal. It was the psychological moment to go on with the movement, and politicians were astounded that instead of taking advantage of it he put an abrupt end to Civil Disobedience. On these occasions the movement was suspended because he found that people in their frenzy were breaking into violence. To him non-violence was of greater importance than political gain; he would not sacrifice his ideal for any political advantage.

Two years ago Gandhiji made Untouchability a live issue. To many of his followers this was a blunder : why distract the attention of the people by raising a domestic issue when it was necessary to focus all available energy on fighting an alien government? Gandhiji diverted the people from Civil Disobedience to Untouchability, because he was a devotee of non-violence. He felt that Untouchability was as grievous a form of violence as foreign oppression. The offence might be British or Indian, political or social, he had to wage war against it.

I should be content to be torn to

pieces, rather than disown the suppressed classes. Hindus will certainly never deserve freedom, nor get it, if they allow their noble religion to be disgraced by the retention of the taint of Untouchability.

So also in regard to spinning—to many an enigma and a mystery. Why should a leader of Gandhiji's eminence spend time on spinning and even insist that his political followers do the same? A spinning franchise—only those who were pledged to spin could join the Congress. Was ever such a thing heard of in the history of any political party? He saw the masses were on the verge of death through starvation because they had no industry subsidiary to agriculture. To alleviate their poverty and suffering, he championed hand-spinning which in olden days had kept the villager above want. He thus identified himself with the poorest in the land, for he who practises love must take upon himself the poverty of the masses.

Towards the end of 1934 Gandhiji decided to retire from the Indian Congress. He was looked upon as the Deliverer destined to fulfil his peoples' aspirations. Universal was their disappointment. The country was stirred. Why did he take such an unusual step? If a soldier who deserts is court-martialled, what shall we say of a general who in the thick of the battle withdraws from his high office? Such was the accusation levelled against him. He saw that some of the items on his programme which he held dear were not so held by most Congressmen. He felt that it

would lead to tyranny on his part and hypocrisy on theirs if he continued as leader and they paid lip-homage to his ideals but would not whole-heartedly labour for them. He who worships truth cannot lead others into hypocrisy, and he wrote :—

Satya, i. e., Truth is my God. I can only search Him through Non-violence and in no other way . . . I cannot suspend this search for anything in this world or another. I have entered political life in pursuit of this search. And if I cannot carry the reason as well as the heart of educated Congressmen—it is plain that I should work single-handed in the implicit faith that what I fail to make clear to my countrymen to-day shall be clear to them some day. . . . It has appeared to me that there is a growing and vital difference of outlook between many Congressmen and myself. I seem to be going in a direction just the opposite of what many of the most intellectual Congressmen would gladly and enthusiastically take if they were not hampered by their unexampled loyalty to me . . . I put the spinning wheel and khadi in the forefront. Hand-spinning by Congress intelligentsia has all but disappeared. The general body of them have no faith in it. . . . and Congressmen have not been wanting who have reminded me that I am responsible for the hypocrisy and evasion about the working of this Clause.

It was his devotion to Truth and Love that drove him into politics and—out of it. The whole nation seemed to think that in politics lay our salvation, that through self-government we could rise like Japan and become a great people. Gandhiji, however, took a different view: real salvation is not to be found through the external form of government by which we are ruled,

but through Soul-ideals which govern our lives. He asked for a change of heart, for a moral transformation :—

Swaraj does not consist in the change of Government; that would be merely the form. The substance that I am hankering after is a real change of heart on the part of the people The symbol—the transformation of power—is sure to follow, even as the seed truly laid must develop into a tree.

This message is applicable not only to us in India who look upon self-government as the panacea for all our ills, but also to the rest of the world. The League of Nations, the British Democracy, the Soviet Republic, the Fascist Regime have all failed to solve the problems that confront the world. Governments and institutions are man-made, and they are, as Plato realised, the individual writ large. They cannot rise beyond the level of the individual.

This truth is being graphically illustrated in the failure of the League of Nations to either prevent wars or the manufacture of weapons necessary for wars; because its members are militaristic and have not changed their hearts. Can we blame Gandhiji then if he puts little faith in mere political reform, and considers moral transformation as fundamental? That is why he retired from politics.

Retiring from the Congress, however, does not mean retiring from duty. True to his principles, Gandhiji is now directing his energy along two lines of activity—Anti-Untouchability and Village-Reconstruction.

He has sought to secure, through propaganda and through legislation, entry for "untouchables" into temples. He toured the country last year raising funds and establishing centres. He secured tanks and wells, schools and hostels for the "untouchables." He is carrying on incessant propaganda through his weekly, *Harijan*, at the same time giving valuable direction to workers all over the land.

Then for Village-Reconstruction he founded the All India Village Industries Association; its object is "village re-organisation and reconstruction, including the revival, encouragement and improvement of villagers of India." Gandhiji's aim is not solely economic as the name of the Association might suggest; it is also for the moral and physical development of the villager. He is instructing village workers to pay special attention to sanitation, drains, scavenging, street-cleaning, public wells and tanks.

He takes very great interest in research into the nutritive values of grains and vegetables, so as to develop a diet which, while still within the means of the villager, will increase his bodily strength and vitality. Since medical opinion is in favour of wholly unpolished rice and whole-wheat, hand pounded flour, *ghani**, pressed oil, and *guort*† in place of refined cane-sugar, these items form the basis of his food-reform. He is also advocating the cultivation and use of Soya

beans, which are said to be rich in vitamin-content, and which are abundantly used in Japan. Realising that food is the first consideration of a starving man, Gandhiji has directed that the primary thing to be done is to educate the villager to eat food that is really sustaining and which can be procured by his scanty means.

Then there is the study of village industries, both those that are perishing as well as flourishing. Industries best suited to local conditions are to be introduced, revived or improved; markets for surplus products are being discovered or created.

The results of research and effort in every department are passed on to the villagers and thus they are being educated. Is this not perhaps the right solution of India's pressing problem—education of the adult masses?

At present Gandhiji does not trouble himself about large-scale production, which in his opinion should be under State control and run entirely in the interests of the people. He confines himself to commodity production by individual effort, with or without machinery. He has no objection to machines as an aid to the worker; but he has no use for machines which fill the pockets of the rich and convert the worker into a slave. He realises that when there is no large-scale commodity production, there can be no question of competition. His plan is to make the

* Wooden crusher worked by bullocks.

† Uncrystallized, unrefined sugar from which molasses have not been removed.

villager produce what he immediately needs—grain, oil, guor, vegetables and cloth. The village producer is also the consumer; he sells only the surplus. Once he produces for others, he is dependent on market fluctuations and would be exploited by middle-men, and become a hewer of wood and drawer of water for the foreign exporter.

The peasant depends solely on agriculture for his livelihood, and thus he is unoccupied for a considerable time during the year. Gandhiji, therefore, advocates that the villager should engage in subsidiary industries which should be related to the needs of the village and not of cities. The villager may produce goods for which he himself has no use if the materials necessary are locally available and if it gives employment to several, and provided there is a ready demand. There is no use in villagers producing fountain-pens or watches; the machinery and raw material are not locally available, the demand for them is from townspeople; the West has perfected these industries and the villagers cannot compete. This is not so, for example, in regard to the manufacture of palmyra *gur*, the material for which is found everywhere, the demand for which is great, and which can therefore give occupation to several families in most villages.

Gandhiji insists that the worker shall be assured of a minimum subsistence wage. To illustrate, the spinner must get say one anna

per hour as wage instead of the quarter anna which he may be now receiving. But this will double or treble the price of khaddar, and there will be fewer buyers. Gandhiji is not deterred. He would rather that the trade in khaddar perished than that the villager be paid an inhuman wage. To-day, in a world intoxicated with a passion for gain, with ruthless exploitation and cut-throat competition, Gandhiji, adopting the view-point of the villager, asks an amazingly original and arresting question: "Why trade, when my neighbour and I can produce all we want for ourselves and can be self-sufficient?" Like a sulky villager who realises his own importance, Gandhiji says to the trader who wishes him to produce goods for commercial purposes: "I am quite happy and content to produce what I need. If you want me to produce for you, pay me what is fair and equitable. Else I shall not work for you. I will certainly not allow myself to be exploited by you."

The scheme has not only the virtue of freeing the villager from exploitation, it also ensures a close and harmonious relationship in the future development of agriculture and industry in India. In the West, industrialism is not related to agriculture, with the result that the West (as also industrialised Japan) is seeking by fair means or foul, to keep the races over which it has control bound to agriculture, so that they may provide it with necessary material. This is violence and oppression on a very wide scale. In India, industries which

once flourished in the villages have died out, people have been thrown entirely on agriculture for their resources and the villager is consequently reduced to abject poverty. To overcome these evils, Gandhiji plans to confine industry to the village, so that like the two lungs of a nation (a metaphor borrowed from him) agriculture and industry will function together in close juxtaposition and grow and develop in unison.

In all this planned economy the villager occupies the central place. Round him revolves Gandhiji's whole plan for the future economic development of India. India is a land of villages, and economic planning without the village as the centre cannot fully succeed. Gandhiji is village-mad; if India follows his guidance, whatever else happens, the country will certainly develop along lines very different from those of the West. More, India will make a unique contribution to the problems now confronting the nations of the world. Large cities in the West are the centres of civilization—producing evils—over-crowding, ill-health, slums, immorality, extremes of poverty and wealth, strife between capital and labour, unemployment, cut-throat competition between nations leading to a race in armaments, and periodical devastation and bloodshed. Overcome by these, the West knows not which way to take. *It would be folly for India to follow the West and find*

herself in the same ghastly predicament. Gandhiji wishes to revert to the ancient plan. The hoary civilization of India was essentially rural, free from competition and strife, founded on the principle of Varnashrama Dharma or trades handed down from father to son. Work was not for profit; the skill of a doctor, the art of a sculptor, musician or engraver, the wisdom of a philosopher were offered free and could not be bought; the village was self-sufficient providing all the necessities of life, where none was denied the opportunity of employment and all obtained a subsistence. It is along such lines, where profit is not the prime consideration but where man and the things of the Spirit obtain their rightful place, that Gandhiji wishes to mould the future of India. He does not covet for the villager a multitude of goods but rather scope for initiative, for the unhampered development of his personality, and for self-expression in work—which is impossible in large-scale centralised production be it under Capitalism or under Communism. These can be secured only in decentralised production such as Gandhiji advocates for the Indian villages.

His adherence to Truth and Love has led Gandhiji to shun city-politics and to go to village-action; his work is vital and is already producing results whose ultimate far-reaching effects it is not possible now to forecast.

THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

THE DARK AGE OF SCIENCE

[What would a future historian say of our mechanistic civilization? **George Godwin** epitomizes it here. But our author assumes that the western hemisphere is the whole globe. Would not the historian chronicle the strange awakening of the hordes of Asia? And what about the fight which a half-naked little Hindu is putting up against the workings of "the dark age of science?"

In every age the still small voice of truth is drowned in the clamour of falsehood and half-truths. This happened in the nineteenth century and should not the twentieth feel its effects? Again, can there be "abundant living" and "full functioning" for the individual without altruism and sacrifice for all? And can any one nation thrive at the cost of another or one continent advance by exploiting another?—EDS.]

In a world where millions are unemployed, the problem of the right use of leisure may well seem remote. The mechanization of industry has brought about precisely those results long since predicted of it: it has invested man with the productive power of giants. We have a vast leisured class as a result; only, as **Bernard Shaw** has observed, we call them the unemployed.

What is the explanation of this paradox of enforced idleness without the means of life in a world of plenty? It is to be found in the circumstance that man has mastered the machines before he has mastered the elements of social and economic justice.

Yet the remedy is, paradoxically enough, more of the disease itself. When the world is completely mechanized it will be possible for man to produce all he needs of basic necessities and luxuries in a working day of four or less hours. When the worker's right to share in the product of his labour is recognized, then the problem of

leisure will manifest itself and will be seen as one of education for the right use of leisure.

Is leisure so important, then? Yes, it is, for its right use is a large part of the technique of living, and that is something man does not come by instinctively, but must acquire by process of education.

There are three prerequisites for full and abundant living, they are full function on the physical, mental and emotional levels. In the world as it is to-day, full function is the rare exception: for the vast majority of mankind life is an experiment conducted by means of trial and error. We spend our days in painfully acquiring the art of living and, having acquired some measure of it, find our little lease of days expired.

Essential toil performed, man inherits the freedom of an earth-home of infinite delights, yet seldom does he enter in upon this inheritance. That there may be joy in living he is innately aware, but how to secure joy he knows not.

The problem is one of education, of self-understanding, of full function. It is something to have recognized the nature of our problem, to have made a diagnosis of the disease of the modern world, the disease of frustration, unfulfilment. How will the people of the future see this present age? They will look back over the centuries and see it as the Dark Age of Science, as the age of chaos. And the historian of to-morrow, etching a picture of our times, may write something like this:—

“In the twentieth century, the Dark Age of Science, mankind was already possessed of the solution of nearly every material problem of survival. Even then he was armed with machines powerful enough to make him master of a large portion of his time. Greed and social injustice, however, denied to the producers the product of their labour: the powerful few, under cover of barbaric laws, deprived the many of the fruits of their labour.

“As for the nations of the world, they still denied the patent fact that their sum made up a single indivisible organic world: fear and hate cast reason down.

“In such a system, the fulfilment of the individual was not possible. Men and women passed through life, as we know it, unaware of the great and joyous experience. They were mere specialized units degraded to the status of a machine's parts, atrophied, stunted, stultified.

“From such toil all turned again to the machines to fill for them their hours of leisure. Where once men knew the joy of performance and creation, they now resigned themselves to the passive role of machine-fed receptacles. Like empty jars they paid their tolls and received in return a measure of mechanical diversion. The idea of leisure as opportunity for function seems never to have been advocated by the thinkers of that age, or to have come into the numbed minds of the multitude.

“No more did men follow the ancient crafts and through them acquire both skill and a sense of the beautiful. The playing of musical instruments became superfluous when by the mere turning of a switch the melodies of the world's great capitals flowed into every home.

“The art of acting, once practised in every village community, died temporarily, and passed to the numerically insignificant caste of those whose shadows alone were known to their audiences of many millions.

“All forms of leisure were, in a word, divorced from the practice of manual or artistic skill and became completely passive.

“Even so primeval a function as walking in the sunshine passed, for, here again, the machines replaced the man. Why walk at four miles an hour when one may travel by machine at sixty? They asked.

“The Dark Age of Science was a period when the technical genius of the few manufactured the

soul-destroying drug of the many." passive approach.

Thus may the historian of the future write of us. Yet there are few individuals who cannot, if they will but make the effort, recapture something of the joy of life that was man's when his working day was spent in action.

Education for leisure means "bringing forth," it means the self-discovery of latent talents and their practice. It means function and the elimination of the purely

passive approach. There is no joy comparable with creation, for in the act of creation, however humble the thing created, man comes most near to the divine. Indeed, this power, innate in him, is the gift which distinguishes him from the lower animals.

For a while, at least, the machines menace man, the functioning animal, but, one may be sure, only for a while. That so costly a folly can continue unrecognized forever—that is something beyond belief.

GEORGE GODWIN

Wealth and piety will decrease until the world will be wholly depraved. Property alone will confer rank; wealth will be the only source of devotion; passion will be the sole bond of union between the sexes; falsehood will be the only means of success in litigation; and women will be objects merely of sensual gratification. External types will be the only distinction of the several orders of life; a man if rich will be reputed pure; dishonesty will be the universal means of subsistence, weakness the cause of dependence, menace and presumption will be substituted for learning; liberality will be devotion; mutual assent, marriage; fine clothes, dignity. He who is the strongest will reign; the people, unable to bear the heavy burthen (the load of taxes) will take refuge among the valleys. Thus, in the Kali age will decay constantly proceed, until the human race approaches its annihilation (*pralaya*).

—*Prophecy about our present Dark Age (Kaliyuga) made in VIṢṆU PURANA.*

RELIGIOUS POLICY IN INDIA

I.—EAST INDIA COMPANY AND THE MISSIONARIES

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From ancient times in India, there has always been a close intermingling of religious with social life—an application of religious principles to personal affairs. We see the result even to-day in a peculiar persistence of customs and practices some of which can be traced as far back as the third millennium before Christ. Thus our antiquity is a living presence with us.

In modern India a number of religions like Hinduism, Islam and Christianity live peacefully, cultivating among themselves a mutual understanding and sympathy. This was equally true of ancient India where a multitude of philosophies and religions flourished and unity prevailed. This is indicative of India's special genius for tolerance and appreciation of differing points of view. Realising that the essence of Hindu culture was religious and philosophical and touched the life of the people very intimately, the kings in ancient India made it a rule never to interfere with the social and spiritual practices of the people. Thus it became possible for people of different religious persuasions to live in peace and harmony. A striking example of this was the rule of the great Mauryan Emperor Asoka under

whom flourished followers of the Brahmins, the Buddha and the Jina as well as various other sects like the Ajivikas and Nirgranthas.

India has seen countless invasions of alien culture; that Hindu religion has survived these onslaughts is due to an innate vitality and a capacity for assimilating all that is best in other creeds.

On this point the estimate of James Forbes who lived in India for over a decade in the last quarter of the eighteenth century, will be read with great interest :—

Megasthenes, who was sent ambassador by Seleucus to Sadracottos, king of Practi, whose dominion now forms the fertile provinces of Bengal, Bihar, and Oude, wrote an account of his embassy, which Arrian has preserved in his *History of India*; and that narrative, written two thousand years ago, when compared with the modern history of the Hindoos, convinces us how little change they had undergone during that long period; nor have the conquests and cruelties of their Mahomedan invaders, nor their commercial intercourse with the Europeans settled among them, been able to alter the long established manners and customs so deeply interwoven in their religious tenets.

With this as a background let us examine the religious policy adopted by the East India Company, and subsequently by the British Government.

We must begin this by recording the immense debt the Hindus and the world owe to Warren Hastings who was instrumental in introducing the *Bhagavad-Gita* to the western hemisphere. It was Warren Hastings who encouraged and supported Charles Wilkins the first European who translated the Great Song in any western language. In a memorable letter dated 4th October 1784 Warren Hastings wrote to Nathaniel Smith, Chairman of the Board of Directors in England the following, which reveals in a remarkable way the attitude of the Company's administrators :—

It is not very long since the inhabitants of India were considered by many, as creatures scarce elevated above the degree of savage life ; nor, I fear, is that prejudice yet wholly eradicated, though surely abated. Every instance which brings their real character home to observation will impress us with a more generous sense of feeling for their natural rights, and teach us to estimate them by the measure of our own. But such instances can only be obtained in their writings : and these will survive when the British dominion in India shall have long ceased to exist, and when the sources which it once yielded of wealth and power are lost to remembrance.

How far did the Government promote the cause of social reform and intellectual progress of India ? The policy adopted by it is one of strict non-interference in the religious and social matters of their subjects. This is only a continuation of the policy launched by the Company's Government in early days. In 1793 the Bengal Government passed a resolution, according

to which Hindu and Muslim laws were to be applied in all civil cases, and their respective religious and social institutions were to be respected in their integrity. It is said that when Warren Hastings invited Mahāmahopādhyāya Pandit Tarka Pañchānan to make a digest of Hindu Law, he received almost royal honours ; and his traditional rendering of Hindu Law became the basis of Halhed's *Gentoo Code*. We can also call attention to the patronage and support accorded by the Company's Government in the shape of "turning out troops and firing salutes on Hindu festivals," and levying the pilgrim taxes and duties for maintaining temples, mosques and tombs. This policy was continued for a long time in spite of the representations of the Christian missionaries. There is every indication that this policy of the Company's Government towards the religious endowments and institutions of their native subjects was unavoidable. In order to infuse a friendly feeling into the minds of their subjects, the Company promised to recognise their long cherished religious and social rights and privileges. It was because of this attitude that in 1801, when he took over the direct administration from the Nawab, Wellesley promised the people of the Carnatic full enjoyment of all civil rights and unfettered liberty to follow all their ancient usages.

Having thus guaranteed security and patronage to the native faiths, as it were, it was but consequential that besides firing salutes civil and

military officers represent the Company at the great Hindu and Muhammadan festivals. Arrangements were made to make the pilgrims feel quite comfortable. It is said that even persons professing other faiths were compelled to drag the cars during great festivals like the Ratha Jatrā at Jagannath Puri. Arthur Mayhew who has studied this aspect with care narrates that it is on record that an Indian Christian who refused to join the car festival was punished by a British magistrate.* We are further told that a military salute was fired at the commencement of the Ramzan. What is more interesting is that "Government records were dedicated to Ganesh and government letters were prepared with the Hindu invocation 'Sri'." The budget estimates of this period show pilgrims' tax on the receipts side and donations to temples and mosques on the expenditure side. Again in addition to the endowments which were directly under the Company's management, the Government annually allotted sufficient sums for the support of mosques and temples. Thus the Company's Government continued its patronage of Hindu and Islamic cults. It is said that Collector Place of Chingleput in 1796 induced the Government of Madras to take over the management of Conjeevaram Varadarajaswami temple for the proper conduct of religious ceremonies and festivals, and himself presented valuable jewels to that shrine. According to an official report in

1833, as many as 7600 Hindu shrines were under management of the Government. Records show that in 1837 the Order of British India was bestowed on Kilpauk Chittaldroog for his splendid organization of the procession of Jagannath. There is also evidence that the Madras town temple and the Triplicane temple were managed by the Company's chief Dubashas under the general supervision of the Governor and Council. A moiety of the tolls, levied on goods coming into the city was given towards the support of these shrines.

This "tender dry-nursing" of Hindu and Muhammadan religious institutions evoked resentment among Christian officials and non-officials who submitted a memorial, signed by two hundred persons, to the Madras Government through Bishop Corrie. It was a mild protest against Government patronage of religious institutions other than Christian. Lord Auckland was then Governor-General. As a result of this memorial the Bishop was censured and the Commander-in-Chief of Madras, Peregrine Maitland who refused the usual honours to national festivals was forced to resign. Thus, from the Hindu point of view the Company Government was of a benevolent type, under which they enjoyed perfect religious freedom, and received adequate patronage from Sarkar funds.

Though the immediate effects of the memorial were not encouraging from the Christian standpoint, it

* See his *Christianity and Government of India*, pp. 146 ff.

evoked much keen criticism. The question was hotly discussed in Parliament and the pressure of Parliament was definitely brought to bear on the Government of India for the first time. This led to the abolition of the pilgrims' tax in 1840. It took a few more years before the British Indian Government relinquished its guarantee of protection and patronage in respect of all religious institutions and their funds. This gradual withdrawal of all responsibility on the part of the Government which had so recently shouldered it with enthusiasm was viewed with suspicion by the natives of India, and contributed to the increasing unpopularity of the Government. It was one of the causes of the outbreak of 1857. Confidence was soon restored, however, by the epoch-making Proclamation of Her Imperial Majesty Queen Victoria the following year.

A word may be said of the administrative system as it operated from 1818 to 1858. From the start caste and caste-distinctions were

recognised by the Government. The Charter of 1833 reaffirmed Bentinck's principle, *viz.*, "no disabilities in respect of any place, office or employment should be recognised by reason of religion, place of birth, descent or colour." In the period of the Company's Government as some of the Council Consultations will show, whenever disputes between different castes arose in the City of Madras, it was the usual practice for the Governor and Council to effect an amicable settlement between the caste leaders and not to force their own ideas upon them. One marked feature of the administrative policy was a developed educational plan. A purely secular system of education coupled with the influence and activity of Christian missionaries was a challenge to Hinduism, and as Prof. H. H. Dodwell believes, "the Hindu world was bound to react, sharply and convulsively to these external impulses." (*The Cambridge Shorter History of India*, p. 727)

V. R. R. DIKSHITAR

MY LADY POVERTY

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I never consciously have wooed my Lady Poverty, but even without initiation to her inmost circle she has conferred upon me precious gifts. For such favours she must be approached closely; then what various reactions from human nature she reveals!

To the poor is given a secret mirror in which they see reflected many sides of human character hidden from the rich; looking therein few endure the shock without bitterness and resentment. Only the consistent devotee of truth can gaze into it without rancour.

The word poverty covers a wider field than my Lady Poverty is used to symbolize: Saint Francis did not intend her to imply poverty of thought or feeling, of life or health. Nor did being wed to my Lady generally mean foregoing the necessities of life. Saint Francis had these; if utmost poverty were a virtue in itself he would not have provided others with food and clothing. A symbol is never adequate in all respects: my Lady Poverty as conceived by her religious devotees is the renunciation of personal possessions, of the narrower limited life, to participate in a greater one. However pathological Saint Francis' physical condition may have been, and his attitude toward nature sentimental

and egoistic—preaching instead of listening to the birds—yet his gaiety as God's troubadour and his human sympathies were sound, drawing men for many centuries to him. His ideal of my Lady Poverty means to me that spiritual state which corresponds to the highest æsthetic one, where the artist scorns to use excess of line or form or colour, where he sees that the greatest significance lies in the purest form, free from all accretions, superfluities and distractions, with ornament springing from the integral qualities of an object. So my Lady Poverty symbolizes, I would maintain, that natural direct relationship with life itself, depending on the daily contacts and on the generosity of nature and man. Thus Saint Francis lived. No lover of Lady Poverty will hoard treasure which others need; humane feelings will force its circulation. Even regarding our lives only from an æsthetic point of view, how can we feel that it is good taste to keep material wealth for which others are suffering and in which they are asking to share? How on any ground can I justify my superfluities when the man next to me is in want of them? I have no doubt that *the highest morality and the highest æsthetics are one and the same for human action.*

Material means seem very real things, alas the most real to many of us. We feel we know when we possess or command them, and when we do not. Yet even if this outward truth is so simple—which I doubt—it is not that outer aspect which most concerns us. The important thing is how poverty affects us inwardly. The artist or the religious may hardly notice his poverty, taking it for granted and continuing his way serenely, even merrily, where the businessman might commit suicide. My Lady is a tremendous test of character, under whom some fall and others rise—under whom some appear to fall but really rise, under whom some appear to rise but really fall. This effect upon character is determined by our attitude, which subjective state is as much under our control as anything in this world can be. The fact of poverty is serious, but how much more important our subjective reactions to it; in them our happiness or misery lies. To these truths, as to many obvious ones, we do not give adequate consideration.

Modern economists recognize that the problem of poverty is psychological and moral—and therefore spiritual. Some of them teach that to forgive our debtors, and give away all that we have is high economy. But who likes the word economy? She was not Saint Francis' bride! Nor are we venturing here on an economic treatise.

To wed poverty the lover should be very wise, as in all marriage, for my Lady Poverty produces in

the ignorant many terrible things. I would consider here the evil which may arise because of the wrong attitude toward poverty, the difficulty of relationship between the poor and rich, the spiritual significance of poverty, and finally the blessings which come with its understanding and voluntary acceptance.

St. Paul wrote (I. *Timothy* VI, 10): "The love of money is the root of all evil." and Jesus Himself said: "Blessed be ye poor for yours is the kingdom of God." (*Luke* VI, 20) Yet human nature, as in His time, continues to love money as though it could buy all things, including that very kingdom. We continue to quote St. Paul's saying about money as though he had said it were the money itself and not the love of money which caused evil. I wonder who loves money more, the poor or the rich? Alas, the poor too would have and hold and exploit, just as the rich whom they envy and admire. The poor will continue to be exploited by the rich until the poor realize that the power of will and labour, which they themselves embody, is the true source of money and more important than money. Only by their consent has money value. If they would they could organize a form of life without money. Thus ignorance or greed is the weakness of both poor and rich; the weakness which causes their love to turn toward a material power instead of a spiritual one. From such ignorance springs the poisonous crew of hatred, resentment, envy, jealousy and all the rest.

The poor cannot inherit the kingdom of God until this ignorance and stupor are gone, and there is awakened in them a greater awareness of their own vital being—a deeper consciousness both of the inner self and the glory of the earth. Such a state seems farther away from them now than ever. How many—slaves of machines—have almost ceased to exist. They have deserted the earth to stand or sit watching wheels go round: while those left to dig the soil do so with rather stolid resignation. Even in the most rural districts of Europe their feet no longer tread the grape. The ritual which accompanied their work, as well as the song, the pipe, and the dance are gone: the natural festivals are little celebrated. Unmoved they watch vulgar gyrations of colourless pictures, or listen to mechanical music created and executed by others for them.

Once I lived among very poor Italian peasants: on their hills were trees bearing pine-nuts, said to be the most nutritious food in the world, there were also chest-nuts of the large Italian variety, and many other products of much food value, but the peasants left these for the pigs and squirrels to eat, believing that they themselves would starve without macaroni. In diseases, for whose cure, sunshine, fresh air and water are the chief requisites, and so easily obtained, these were assiduously excluded. Indeed the poor of the "civilized" world have forsaken the knowledge which once gave

them this earth: they look not for the kingdom of God here, but in some future life after death. Ignorance, dulled sensibilities and lack of responsiveness to life (not the lack of money) are the fundamental causes of their suffering,

We have almost ceased to consider what a terrible condition is that in which life itself is measured in terms of money; not only human life but the very sky, sea, rivers and earth are so controlled, as well as their products. The American Indians, the wild tribes of Africa, the South Sea Islanders, and our own savage ancestors, having had free access to the world about them, barely could have known what poverty meant; they possessed vital knowledge because of that freedom, and an æsthetic culture beyond the grasp of our poor. Losing intimate contact with nature, has civilization lost more than has been gained? It is reported that in a certain district of Africa the native inhabitants lived happily without money of any kind until their white rulers, unable to persuade such free ones into their service, imposed a money tax upon them, for the obtaining of which the natives were forced to serve the white man and to forsake their natural mode of life. The want which millions are suffering to-day is because man has forsaken his direct relationship with the land, from which his sustenance comes, to attend the machine.

So long as there is poverty in the world, it might be a good thing if each one of us had to share in it,

otherwise we act or speak with presumption about that which requires experience and humility for its understanding. Yet there are important questions we may venture to ask—much to be observed. The hunger for food, the pinch of cold, are these things worse than the fear of them? Is actual beggary more painful than the sinking feeling which comes over one when there is no wherewithal to pay accumulating bills?

If our attitude toward the world were one of brotherhood it would seem that we should as freely ask as we would give. But how difficult to practise—although we know that to receive graciously is often conferring the greater favour! For the spiritually exalted ones like Saint Francis such difficulties do not exist: with childlike purity they either give or beg, while resentment or embarrassment does not arise from either side. History well illustrates the difficulty of brotherly relationship between the poor and rich. We read much about the exploitation of the poor by the rich; indeed the social conscience of our time is largely occupied with this problem, but there also is exploiting of the rich by the poor, though quite properly we hear less about it: and the rich, somewhat like the poor, are resentful and bitter in their grievances. They are tormented by beggars of all kinds, from the simplest to the politely crafty. For the rich most contacts become suspect. Not infrequently they regard the high taxation upon their wealth as exploitation. Brooding over their

grievances has poisoned the minds of both rich and poor, and prevented the flow of sympathy between them. The poor can expect understanding only among themselves. The man in similar poverty realizes the need of confidences and co-operation: he cannot remove troubles with the magic of money, but for that very reason he does not ask with suspicion: "Why do my friends bring their troubles to me?" Instead he gives his sympathetic advice and comradeship. Thus the rich man is not only denied the knowledge which arises from feeling many of the natural needs of life, but, also he is kept from experiencing the brotherhood which arises between men having those needs. This is a serious loss for the culture of the rich, and a loss to the world in the establishment of that harmony necessary for progressive life. Such are some of the tragic aspects of poverty arising from the ignorance of spiritual truths. Without class consciousness the elect spirits rise above the hypnotic spell of money standards; when they give it is with an easy generosity unknown to others; they give themselves, which makes a gift vital, transubstantiating the bread of charity into the bread of life.

Consider that aspect of poverty blessed by my Lady's presence. She confers keenness and sport to many circumstances. She is romantic and loves the young, especially the young adventurers. How many of us recall with happiest memories the poverty shared with fellow students! With

all such my Lady is in playful mood, leaving precious experiences behind her. Frequently she even allows herself to be defeated: only the wise few continue clinging to her. Just scraping through, surmounting obstacles—such a life is most exciting, most amusing and interesting. Doing one's own work, travelling afoot, sleeping out-of-doors, third class on trains, third class hotels, tramp-steamers on the sea, the aid of pawn-brokers, having to sell some of one's possessions, working one's way, begging—such experiences bring vital knowledge of the world. So much so that some, knowing these ways, wrongly and conceitedly think there are no others.

The richness and complexity of Hindu culture through the centuries, connected with the great poverty of India, yield a vast wisdom of our subject, viewed from many different standpoints. It was the ideal of their highest caste, the Brahmin, to be poor in material wealth. To-day in India, as in no other country, many of all castes cleave to this ancient goal: it is not uncommon there for distinguished persons to renounce their wealth and position. I know of a Brahmin lady of means, who upon the death of her husband—her several children being established in life—immediately entered upon the way of the religious pilgrim, which she has followed for many years, walking through India, carrying a sacred scripture, an extra garment, a bowl for her food, and a few

rupees. Once a year she returns to her family for only four or five days. Her sons and daughters adore her, but they cannot persuade her to forego the joy which she finds in the voluntary life of poverty, pilgrimage and meditation.

The sensitiveness of the Hindu's nature is apparent in his attitude toward the making and the receiving of gifts, although his argument about this seems an endless circle. He holds that it is more meritorious to give than to receive, that in accepting a gift he is conferring a greater favour upon the giver than the mere acceptance since the receiver is the means through which the giver obtains merit. Furthermore some quality of the giver is believed to go with the gift, and in some cases it is conceived that power over the receiver is obtained through the gift. For these reasons a gift from a holy man is especially valued, and those from others are very carefully considered before being accepted. The giver resents words of thanks, as he holds that to return even words for a gift detracts from its meritorious quality, reducing it to a mere exchange.

So important is this matter of gifts to the Hindu that the non-receiving of them is placed among the first five requirements of the way to spiritual freedom. The classical authority, Patañjali, thus presents the first stage to *Yoga* :—

Abstinence from injury, falsehood, theft, incontinence and the acceptance of gifts are the abstentions.

Abstinence from the acceptance of gifts is to be practised "even when one is suffering terribly" says an ancient commentary. The effect of this practice was considered so purifying that we find Patanjali adding in a further aphorism :—

When he is established in the abstinence from the acceptance of gifts then comes memory of past lives.

When we consider the Hindu cult of Daridra-Nārāyana, the beggar God, then indeed my Lady Poverty almost pales in significance. This cult believing that God dwells in everything, worships and serves Him where he most obviously is to be served, in the needy and suffering. Hindu monks, devoted to this ideal, work as nurses in hospitals, and search city streets for those who are ill and in want. In this case the receiver of gifts is regarded as greater than the giver, for the receiver is looked upon as God incarnate.

Many names in Indian history come to mind, from Gotama to Gandhi, as examples of voluntary poverty. Sri Ramakrishna taught that wisdom could only come with the renunciation of possessions, but also that religion should not be offered to a man of empty stomach. Swami Vivekananda's moving words of sympathy for the poor, and his belief that service to them is the surest way to God, have had a profound influence upon modern India. He declared :—

What vain Gods shall we go after and yet cannot worship the God that we see all around us, the *Virat* ? . . .

The first of all worship is the worship of the *Virat*—of those all round us. . . . These are all the manifold forms of Him. There is no other God to seek for! He alone is worshipping God, who serves all beings! Let us throw away all pride of learning and study of the Shastras . . . and all attainment of personal *Mukti*—and going from village to village devote our lives to the service of the poor. Without doubt man is the highest symbol of God and his worship the highest form of worship on earth. . . . It is the poor who have done all the gigantic work of the world. . . . So long as the millions live in hunger and ignorance, I hold every man a traitor, who having been educated at their expense, pays not the least heed to them! . . . May I be born and reborn again and again and suffer a thousand miseries if only I am able to worship the only God in whom I believe, the sum total of all souls, and above all my God the wicked, My God the afflicted, my God the poor of all races . . .

It may be asked if it is not inconsistent to praise poverty while at the same time trying to relieve it. The answer is found in what I have tried to show, that there are different kinds, conditions and degrees of poverty, and that it is the voluntary, enlightened kind which is upheld. The aim is not to change the poor into the rich, to do away with the poverty which has been embraced, but to enlighten it, to find a way of life in it for all who wish it, which shall "give us this day our daily bread," without the need of personal holdings. Certainly the ideal of these volunteers is not that of jumping into the river to be drowned, but yielding to natural impulse they go into the water to help those who struggle there: those who

renounce have no intention of adding to the number of the helpless poor, they enter upon the life of poverty to find a better way of living, free from exploitation, sensuality, indifference and satiety.

Saint Francis' economic programme was Service rendered without stint: livelihood received as a natural right, and no official tie between the two. Poverty to-day is so associated with misery that we have forgotten, almost, that it could be otherwise. Yet if the non-possession of personal property may be called poverty, we shall be able to recall individuals and classes of people, who, while free from such possessions live most happily, even "blessed," as described by Jesus. Both the worldly and the religious apply the words "poor" and "poverty" to such individuals and to such ideals: the words are only applied in their dominant sense of "having little money or property" (*Fowler's Modern English Usage*) but they are not otherwise properly applicable; on the contrary the belief of those who follow my Lady is that their lives have grown richer because of their participation in a larger mode of living.

The man with any feeling for others, when he sits with them at the table, partakes of the food considering not only his own appetite, but the quantity of food served, and the number of people present. Such is the simple feeling which leads some to renounce personal property. How can I ask in prayer for my daily bread when I see that others have none? The

voluntary following of poverty is made from one of two great ways or from both, the love of man and the love of God.

The first way is inspired by the humanitarian sentiments of social justice and brotherhood, prompted by that simple impulse which makes us wish not to take more than our share from the table, or by the desire to render aid to the afflicted, or by love for that greater life which comes with wider human contacts.

The second way is prompted by the aspiration for spiritual freedom, by the wish to cast aside all those hindrances, superfluities, distractions and over-indulgences which keep us from the deepest spiritual realizations. These two ways are clearly expressed in the life of Buddha, who first renounced wealth that he might be free to find enlightenment: attaining his goal, he passed forty years in the service of man. Also these two ideals are very much marked in Franciscan poverty which "had as its aim the freeing of the soul for God." Such too are the ideals of Tolstoy and Gandhi.

The culture of our day tends to overlook the second purpose of the renunciation of wealth. Stressing the humanitarian aspect, it ignores that subjective importance of renunciation which Jesus declared to the rich young man; it forgets the God in the beggar and the God in ourselves. Our philanthropists rightly give for the benefit of the oppressed, but they are apt to feel more scepticism regarding the benefits conferred, than any joy in the

giving; perhaps they feel a little proud that their charity continues, regardless of satisfaction to themselves. Such people are too isolated from life, and their giving is often like a sop to Cerberus. It seems as hard for them to feel the truth of brotherhood as for the camel to pass through the needle's eye: the widow's mite remains the symbol of the truest gift. More to be regretted is the fact that those people who give the inestimable gift of their lives to social service are often so absorbed in external welfare that they lack the joy which would come to them if they sought not only to aid man externally, but to realize the second purpose of renunciation—spiritual insight.

There are distinguished religious teachers to-day who believe that the renunciation of wealth is a mistake, that wealth is a power which should be wielded by the spiritual man and not left in the hands of the less scrupulous. By such a teacher it is held that when the earthly kingdoms were laid before Jesus, he should not have said: "Get thee behind me Satan," but taking the material power, as well as the spiritual one, unto himself he should have ruled for the welfare of mankind. Such I presume is the attitude of the Roman Catholic church toward wealth and material power, but with a great difference, for it is not the power of the individual which controls but that of its organized body, whose members are often wedded to poverty. The segregation of wealth raises the important

question how far the welfare of the people should be left in the hands of individuals, outside the general control. Surely the ideals of freedom and democracy are opposed to it, although the long arguments have been continuing for ages. Apart from those already mentioned there comes to mind, as apropos, the wise Socrates and his words at the end of his life:—

For I do nothing but go about persuading you all, 'old and young alike, not to take thought of your persons or your properties, but first and chiefly to care about the greatest improvement of the soul. I tell you that virtue is not given by money . . . Not even the impudence of my accusers dares to say that I have ever exacted or sought pay of anyone . . . my poverty is sufficient witness. . . . When my sons are grown up, I would ask you, O my friends, to punish them; and I would have you trouble them, as I have troubled you, if they seem to care about riches, or anything more than virtue. (*Apology*)

To-day the world watches a frail little Indian, Mahatma Gandhi—as much dedicated to my Lady Poverty as Saint Francis was—who by the power of truth, or "soul force" (*Satyāgraha*), seeks to gain the freedom of his country. He is proving every day the power of spirit, of non-resistance and love, against physical force: he is proving that a man dedicated to poverty may at the same time exercise a vast influence and take a great active part in world affairs. He has declared:—

Those who would make individual search after truth as God, must go through several vows, as for instance, the vow of truth, the vow of Brahma-

charya [purity] for you cannot possibly divide your love for Truth and God with anything else—the vow of non-violence, of poverty and non-possession.

Scattered throughout the world are many voluntarily wed to poverty: spiritually inspired, their lives are hidden from view. In America too, such devotees have found a way, even if general custom and the pioneer spirit have not been favourable for their mode of life. Thoreau and Walt Whitman come to mind. Whitman after confessing to have put aside only enough money for his burial, writes:—

The melancholy prudence of the abandonment of such a great being as man to the toss and pallor of years of money-making with all their scorching days and nights . . . is the great fraud upon modern civilization.

The ways that life may be lived without money are unlimited. We almost forget that money is not an actual necessity, that it has power only because it commands faith. There is no doubt that love and faith, without money, could do all the work of the world. New ways are to be found: surely the list is not to be exhausted by slave, beggar, child, hermit, monk, and the various forms of community life already tried. It is for the pioneers and creators, of to-day and to-morrow, who dream of a richer life for all, to *make* these ways. Here is scope for all their powers!

Let us consider in more detail how it is that the voluntary acceptance of poverty may bring peace

and joy. Undoubtedly the greatest cause of mental distress is fear, the commonest form of which is anxiety for material sustenance; often this fear is found among those of great material endowment, causing increase in the greed for possession and security, in all cases giving rise to envy, worry, resentment, and to many ingredients of misery. To remove by one act, as it were, so much of our anxious, ugly load, would be in itself such a release, for many of us, that we may well describe that freedom by the words joy and bliss. There can be no doubt that voluntary renunciation of possessions does just this: also the voluntary acceptance of poverty—even when unsought—must give nothing less. Nor is it a matter of renunciation of will: our acceptance of ill health may be as voluntary, but produces no such happiness, physical health being the vital part of our life, while our financial possessions are certainly not that—rather they are incrustations hindering the true flow of life. Given the acceptance of or the will to poverty and its accomplishment, there arises a new life of fresh perceptions and deeper realizations. It must be thus, when so many barriers to life are removed.

What a relief it may be to the tired mind when the financial collapse comes, over which it has spent itself in worry and dread. In these days of financial depression such experiences are probably not rare. I know a man who maintained that he had found the happiest days of his life when that befell

him which he had so long dreaded; though living in poverty, life in comparison to that former threatening state seemed simple and happy.

As for our children and others dependent upon us—should we deny them first hand experience of life, or doubt their valour? Do the children of the rich succeed better in life than those of the poor? The qualities which the poor child must develop to meet life may compensate for his hardships, while the rich child may be weakened by his inheritance.

The way of voluntary poverty belongs to that thought which would make a zero of life's denominator, that is, which makes no demands for its own external conditions. Then all experiences which come are accepted as so much clear gain, at full value, just as a sound is more significant which comes in pure silence, or as the affairs of daily life have deeper meaning when felt in relation to Spirit. For long the sages have taught that the increase of happiness is in proportion to the decrease of greed, and though it seems obviously true, still we have taken little heed. He who truly "accepts the universe," cannot consistently complain, or feel discontent with what befalls him. If

he does not go forth to seek poverty, at least he must not be cast down by it: he may look upon it, not only with equanimity, but with confidence that he will find therein rare treasure.

To the spiritually minded the world is not mere nothing: it is the outward manifestation of spiritual forces at play.

Somehow the objective world seems to show itself more clearly and intimately to us. Not only has its beauty not failed us, but for that very reason its beauty seems enhanced, and all the more evident: this more than compensates for what is lost, and leads us into an ever higher communion, even to those deepest spiritual experiences. With the removal of that material wall of possession comes the deeper awareness of the mystery underlying all things. We find both the importance and the non-importance of material means. Even when the ideal of poverty has long been held, in its realization it is not without surprise that we find how independent of material means are goodness, beauty, truth, love and life. The claims of religion are justified by her children:—"Blessed be ye poor; for yours is the kingdom of God."

E. H. BREWSTER

THE SONG OF THE HIGHER LIFE

II.—THE DEJECTION OF ARJUNA

[Below we publish the second of a series of essays founded on the great text-book of Practical Occultism, the *Bhagavad-Gita*. Each of these will discuss a title of one of the eighteen chapters of the Song Celestial. The writer calls them "Notes on the Chapter Titles of the Gita"—but they are more than notes. They bring a practical message born of study and experience.

Sri Krishna Prem is the name taken in the old traditional manner prevailing in India by a young English gentleman when he resolved to enter the Path of Vairagya, renouncing his all, including the name given to him at birth. He took his trips at Cambridge in Mental and Moral Sciences and is a deep student of Indian philosophy. Away from the world but serving it with faith he lives in the Himālayas, and is esteemed highly for his sincerity, earnestness and devotion.—Eds.]

Too many readers pass by the first chapter of the *Gita* hurriedly as of no great importance, considering it a mere introduction to which no special significance need be attached. This, however, is a mistake. It is no doubt true that it is an introductory chapter but introductory to what? Not merely to an historical situation or to a body of philosophic teachings that have been embedded in the epic poem but to the Yoga itself and, if properly understood, it has a great significance for us. Like all the other chapters, it is termed a Yoga and is entitled *Arjuna Vishāda Yoga*, the Yoga of the Dejection of Arjuna.

We have seen that the *Gita* commences at the point where the Soul, like one awakening from sleep, has emerged from the obscurity in which it lay buried. Arjuna as the individual Soul finds himself on the battlefield of Kurukshetra faced by the necessity of a terrible conflict in which all his

friends, relatives and former teachers are ranged against him, "eager for battle." On this field, significantly enough termed "dharmakshetra," the field of dharma or duty, the opposing forces of *pravritti* and *nivritti* stand face to face and, from a position to which it has been guided by the Divine Krishna, the Soul Arjuna, stationed between the rival armies, surveys the situation.

As long as the Soul remains hidden in the inner worlds, so long the conflict does not come to a head and the individual passes from one experience to another in an apparently unordered fashion as described in the introductory section. But this cannot last for ever and after the intoxication of the awakening symbolised by the triumphant battle fought on behalf of king Virāt has passed off, the Soul finds itself in a situation which may well engender dejection.

It was easy to sound the war

conches in defiance and to feel the thrill of anticipated battle with the Āsuric forces of *pravritti*. But, suddenly, in a flash of insight which comes while the Soul is poised inactive between the two opposing tendencies, Arjuna realises for the first time all that is involved in the struggle. Relations, friends of his childhood and revered teachers are also entangled amongst his enemies and he realises that his own heart's blood is, as it were, arrayed against him. During the long ages of slumber the soul has contracted all sorts of relationships and has submitted to the guidance of various ideals and only now is it realised that all these relationships must be destroyed and all these ideals, ideals that have often seemed the very goal of life, must be ruthlessly sacrificed on the battlefield since they are now seen to be leagued with the out-going forces of *pravritti* and to be opposing the destined triumph of the Soul.

Up till now the individual has been content to live within the narrow circle of race and family and, bounded by the ties of kinship, he has felt that it was enough if he fulfilled the duties that he owed to his society and nation, if he attempted to live according to the ideals of his gurus, the religious and ethical systems in which, by birth, he has found himself. But societies and races are temporary while the Soul is eternal and, in the end, can rest on no support but Itself. The simple creed of "my country, right or wrong" lies in ruins, destroyed

by conflicting loyalties and the ideals which had uplifted him in earlier days are powerless to guide him any longer as they are seen to be mere mental constructions, inadequate to the needs of the Soul.

Nor is the conflict to which the Soul is called merely one with outer ties, established institutions and recognised standards of conduct and belief. In the inner world, too, he is faced with the same situation. Arrayed against him he finds the army of his desires. Not merely those desires that are conventionally considered "evil" but many others besides, the desire for "harmless" enjoyment, the desire to shine in society surrounded by friends and the desire to lead a secure and comfortable life. All these and many more have taken the field against the Soul under the leadership of the various ideals that have been harnessed to their service. The call of the blood, the prestige of habit and established custom, the ideologies which have sufficed in the past are all arrayed against him and perhaps the most bitter fact of all is the knowledge that the glittering ideals of patriotism, of family affection and of devotion to his religion have also "eaten the food of the Kauravas" and, though they served as guides and teachers in the past, are, like Bhishma and Drona, in arms against the Soul and must be slain.

This is the situation with which every aspirant is faced and through which sooner or later, all have to pass. Small wonder is it

that Arjuna is overcome with utter dejection and that his bow slips from his nerveless hand as he sinks down overcome by an intolerable sadness, a sadness that is the inevitable experience of those who seek the Path. What will be the worth of victory if "those for whose sake we desire kingdom, enjoyments and pleasures" must first lie dead on the field? If all desire is renounced will not the whole of life become an empty waste, a vast desert in the midst of which the victorious Soul will sit enthroned in desolation, exercising a vain and empty rule? For what purpose are we called to such a sacrifice and, in the end, how shall we benefit by it? "Better to eat beggar's crusts in the world than to partake of such blood-besprinkled feasts." Better, that is, to enjoy what simple enjoyments can be had than to set out on this perilous path, a path to an as yet quite inconceivable goal and of which the only certain thing is that it leads over the dead bodies of all that we hold dear in life.

Moreover, a further doubt arises in the heart. "In the destruction of the family the immemorial traditions perish and in the perishing of traditions lawlessness overcomes the whole community." Will not the destruction of all these desires and, above all, of these ideals cause great confusion in the world? Society depends on the existence of the normal desires of its members and is bound up with the one-sidedness of current ideologies. Can it be right to

disturb in the name of the Soul's progress to an unknown Goal an equilibrium which has at least stood the test of time, and will not the aspirant, by his renunciation of desire, unfit himself to participate in the everyday life of the world, to share in the joys and sorrows of his fellow beings?

Such, at least, are the doubts which present themselves in the heart, some of them well-founded, others ill, but all alike having their real though unacknowledged source in the feeling of gloom which invades the heart at the prospect of a life in which all desire for self will have to be renounced and utterly slain.

Nor, at this stage, is the darkness lit by any ray of light, and, although the Divine Teacher is standing beside the Soul, not yet has His Voice been heard. Brought by its past evolution to the field of conflict, poised, as it were, upon the very edge of battle, the Soul loses heart and sinks back terrified at the desolate outlook, an outlook in which victory seems as cheerless as defeat.

The real source of this desolation is, as has been said, the prospect of a life in which all desire and ambition will be dead. We are so used to a life in which all action has its roots in desire that we can conceive of no other and sadly ask what would be the value of such existence. Not yet has the Soul learnt that, having Krishna, it has all; that it is not for their own sakes that parents, wives and children are dear "but for the sake of the Atman."

Nevertheless, this experience of the "vishāda" or sorrow is a very necessary one as we may see from the fact that the Buddha, too, devoted the first of His four Āryan Truths to an exposition of the essential sorrow of life.

The Voice of Krishna can be heard only in silence and, as long as the heart is filled with the clamour of desire, the silver tones of the Voice cannot be heard. It is only when the outer world becomes utterly dark that the Ray of the Divine Star can be seen by us for, although It shines eternally, yet it is only when the glaring sunlight of so-called life is eclipsed that we can at first perceive It.

Later, that Star will shine with such a Light that "if the splendour of a thousand suns were to blaze out together in the sky, that might resemble the glory of that Mahātma," and not all earth's tumult will be able to deafen us to the majestic rhythm of that Voice,

that Voice that reverberates throughout the Eternities as the tides of Being thunder upon the beaches of the worlds.

But the time for those glories is not yet. At first the Light is but a dim Star twinkling faintly within and the Voice is but the sound of a nightingale "chanting a song of parting to its mate." Therefore it is that before the bright Path of the Sun can be trodden, the aspirant must enter the valley of gloom, must close his eyes and ears to the light and laughter of life and must realise in sorrow that all that he is and all that he has is nothing before he can see and know in joy that within his heart is the All.

"Casting away his bows and arrows, Arjuna sank down on the chariot, his mind overborne by grief" and thus, in dejection and sorrow, closes the first chapter of the *Gita* and the first stage of the Path.

SRI KRISHNA PREM

Be still, my heart, and listen,
For sweet and yet acute
I hear the wistful music
Of Khristna and his flute.
Across the cool, blue evenings,
Throughout the burning days,
Persuasive and beguiling,
He plays and plays and plays.

In linked and liquid sequence,
The plaintive notes dissolve
Divinely tender secrets
That none but he can solve.
O Khristna, I am coming,
I can no more delay.
My heart has flown to join thee,
How shall my footsteps stay?

—LAURENCE HOPE

REINCARNATION IN THE WEST

THE NEED FOR BELIEF

[**John Gould Fletcher's** interest in mysticism was kindled through a long study of William Blake. In this article he comments upon a remark of "Cratylus"* who wrote on "The Concept of Immortality as an Issue for Modern Philosophy." Mr. Fletcher examines the subject more in the light of Church Christianity than in that of modern philosophy. "Cratylus" also wrote :—"There is surely no reason to-day, at a time when philosophers of repute can propound theories of negation whose ultimate implications they often seem to realise imperfectly, why others whose radical faith in the spirituality of the universe remains should not deal frankly with the general idea of what is known as palingenesis."—EDS.]

"Behind this conception of rebirth the wisdom of the East is enthroned, and Western philosophy can only disregard it to its own detriment."

So wrote "Cratylus"* in **THE ARYAN PATH** for August 1931. And having been myself a student of both Eastern and Western philosophies, it is unquestioned by me that these words are substantially correct. But the reason why Western religious philosophy has disregarded for so long and continues to disregard the plain teaching of the Oriental sages that each individual life-span, each "soul," is not a terminal separate creation but the product of a chain of cause and effect that stretches far back into the past and far forward into the future—the reason why Western philosophy ignores such teaching as this, deserves frankly to be stated.

In the first place, apart altogether from the dogmatic interpretations made by various churches, at the root of Christianity itself lies

the concept that we are each in some way unique, each a "son of God," each an inheritor of the Kingdom of Heaven. One can find this concept embedded in all the sayings of the Man who, in His earthly ministry, was known as Jesus of Nazareth. It is embedded in such a sublime passage, for example, as the opening of the Lord's Prayer, "Our Father, Who art in Heaven." "Our Father"—of whom we are each the unique heir, the separate and individual creation—"Who art in Heaven," that is to say, on high caring for us, pouring forth blessings on us, bestowing upon us not only this pitifully brief life-span, but an immortal hereafter! Such a viewpoint surely stands opposed to the Oriental teaching, which is, that each life-span is the temporary product of a chain of causation, a re-embodiment of personal and impersonal *karma*, and so doomed to go on through the cycle of rebirth till there is finally attained the blissful release of Nirvana!

* "Cratylus" is the pen-name of a distinguished English scholar who also wrote in our issue of June 1930 on "Greek Philosophy as an Antidote to Materialism."—EDS.

But—and I humbly ask the question—are these two conceptions really so diametrically opposed? How many thoughtful Christians have really asked themselves the question whether they are entitled by their own actions carried through the brief life-span allotted to them, of sharing in the immortal glory of God? Whether we define that glory, as the Roman church would have us define it, as a Judgment Seat bestowing on us Heaven, Purgatory or Hell, or leave the revealment of God's glory purposely indefinite, as do many modern Protestant sects, the situation remains the same. If, after death here on earth, we are to be held responsible throughout eternity, for what we failed to achieve here in a single life, would not most of us prefer to ask that we be given another opportunity to live here, to return in some way to this planet, and to work out some further portion of that responsibility through yet another birth? I do not think there can be any doubt of what the answer would be—nor of the fact that no Christian sect, so far as I know, has faced up to the difficulty of asking its followers to believe in a Judgment Day which cannot be, in reality, a fair Judgment, since the "souls" who have to endure it, have neither known the time nor acquired the experience necessary to release them from its penalties.

On the other hand, a reasoned belief in reincarnation need not interfere with the Christian conception of the uniqueness of the soul. I can remain unique, wheth-

er I may have happened to have lived many millions of times before, or whether I may have to live many millions of times hereafter. The fact that I cannot positively say what previous existences I have gone through—though I may surmise how near I am now to the boundless Nirvanic state of self-redemption—does not make any essential difference to my unique situation. That the destiny involved in countless rebirths is put into my hands again to control, to make perfect, to overcome, is surely sufficient. It may well be, and indeed it is most reasonable to suppose, that there is a water of Lethe washing away the personal accidents of memory, after each death, just as there is a water of baptism which we must reassume after each rebirth. In short, there is nothing whatever in the theory of reincarnation which fundamentally conflicts with the central truth of Christianity; it only conflicts with the dogmatic and theological definitions which the churches have striven to make out of Christianity.

So much for the main objection which Western religious philosophy might bring against the essentially Aryan doctrine of rebirth. There is, however, a secondary objection of less weight. It is generally assumed that the reason why the reincarnation belief took such strong hold on India and the Far East generally is in some way due to Oriental indifference and to Oriental fatalism.

Now I have never visited India or the Orient; but I cannot

believe that the Oriental is more disposed to fatalism than the Occidental, or that man in the tropics is in any way less man than man in northern latitudes. If the belief in reincarnation is responsible for the fatalistic inertia of India, Ceylon, Burma, Tibet, China and Japan, then the belief in salvation through Christ alone is no less responsible for the slums, prostitution, greed, nationalistic warfares and moral hypocrisies of England, France, Germany, Italy and Americas. Viewing the Western world as it is, and its failure to achieve the "Kingdom of Heaven" which Jesus of Nazareth promised to it as an ideal to strive after, it is small wonder that many of the finest spirits of our age should reject Christianity with contempt. The Oriental belief in rebirth makes it possible for each individual to do something towards his own redemption. The Christian belief that each is the possessor of an unique, God-given "soul" has only led the West to the very brink of such disaster as never has been seen since Rome fell before the Barbarian hosts—a disaster in which all the values of higher civilisation are now openly and frankly threatened. It seems to me, truly, that here too, the East may have the better of the argument.

There is, however, apart altogether from whether East or West is right or is wrong, a final argument on behalf of reincarnation that, to me, seems to clinch the matter. I am, in so far as I

exist here at this moment, the product of forces released and guided through the formative years of childhood by my father and my mother. My character is compounded out of theirs, as I now must admit, and therefore it is a destiny transmitted through them that I am at present working upon. But they, in their turn, were each formed by their parents, and I have only to go back fifteen generations (say 350 years) to find that my ancestors then amounted to the number of ninety-six thousand, three hundred and sixty-eight persons; and if I go back five generations further, say five hundred years, I will find that I am literally the descendant of more than two million people! So at the time when Columbus discovered America, no less than two millions of Europeans conspired together to form this lump of sentient matter that is myself.

What do these facts imply? They imply, unless we rashly assume that nothing whatever has been achieved by all the generations of mankind that have emerged from the past, that the wisdom and the knowledge and the love I may now possess is a transmittance, a something made for me by the past, and a something that I must now pass on to the future. Or, as the Orientals would put it, it is a *karma* which has attached itself to me personally for this lifetime, and may still attach itself to me for further lifetimes. Now in the human body, mine or yours, there are three great centres of activity.

There is the centre of the head, receptive of impressions, through seeing, hearing, tasting, smelling; and constructive of thought based on those impressions, and also on knowledge whether transmitted or acquired. There is the centre of the breast, in which the blood is pumped back and forth through the heart; the lungs revivify the body with fresh air: this is the centre of the ingoing and outgoing activity common to us all. Finally there is the centre of the digestive and sex organs: assimilative and recreative of life on the animal plane, destructive and constructive simultaneously on the spiritual level. Now what can I do with this body except to direct and control the lower centres from the higher, in accordance with the knowledge and wisdom I have already gained from my rebirths through my own ancestry in the past? The Vedantists long ago discovered a method whereby even the animal nature could be wholly taken up on to the spiritual plane of intellectual activity, and this method necessarily completes and fulfils that twofold Oriental teaching which says, first of all, "Thou art *That*"—and second, "*That* which is this life must be transcended." Thus through the *karma* already laid on me by the past,

together with the knowledge that the centuries have already given (and the East more than the West) of how to transcend this *karma*, I too may through striving for self-transcendence attain the path, I too may find my feet set on the way that leads to Nirvana.

If then, as "Cratylus" has said, Western philosophy disregards the wisdom of the East, it not only disregards it to its detriment but it does not actually desire any wisdom at all. For there is no wisdom nor glory, nor truth, anywhere but in man—and the Oriental is man, even as the Occidental. There is no knowledge that is external to us, nothing to which something within us does not respond; or as William Blake said: "All the deities reside in the human breast." Thus whether we think of life as composed of the triad Brahma, Vishnu, and Shiva, or of the trinity Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, the meaning of life is the same, and the same effort must be made to ascend from the lower to the higher. There are those—and I believe their numbers are increasing—who can read the *Bhagavad-Gita* as they read the *Bible*, and can recognize, that though the names of divinities may shift and vanish, only *one revelation* has been given to all.

JOHN GOULD FLETCHER

HUMAN WIFE AND SNAKE GODDESS

A BENGALI MYTH

[**Ramananda Chatterjee**, an Indian patriot and the talented editor of *Modern Review* writes especially for the benefit of our occidental readers, the story of Behulā—the wife who conquered death by love and fate by exertion.

As the introduction points out the Dragon and Snake Myths are universal and have come down to us from most ancient times. A very exhaustive treatment of the subject is to be found in H. P. Blavatsky's *Secret Doctrine* ; especially we may refer to Vol. I. pp. 403-411, on "Tree, Serpent and Crocodile worship," Vol. II. pp. 202-26, on "Edens, Serpents and Dragons," and p. 354, on "Serpents and Dragons under different Symbolisms."—Eds.]

The cult of the serpent is common to all religions. It takes many forms—worship of a single serpent or of a species, of a serpent embodying a spirit or a deity, of a real or an imaginary serpent as represented in an image, of a serpent associated with a divinity (a principal god or one of many gods) or of a purely mythical snake.

There is a distinction between the worship of the animal itself and its worship as the embodiment of a god or a spirit. Sometimes a god shows himself as a serpent, or the reptile is the symbol or attendant of a god and is often seen as the guardian of a shrine or a temple.

While the cult of the serpent is to be found in some age or other in all parts of the world, it is of special importance in India. It is not more widely distributed or developed in so many varied and interesting forms elsewhere. India is the only country in the world where all the known species of living snakes exist. Their abundant distribution and the serious loss of life caused by them every year afford an adequate explanation of the fear with which they are regarded and the respect and worship paid to them.

In Bengal, the worship of the goddess Manasā or Visha-bari ("remover of venom") is very prominent. If it is neglected by any family, some member is sure to die of snake-bite. While Manasā may be worshipped

every day, the special day reserved in Bengal for her worship is the last of Śrāban, which came this year on the 17th of August according to Bengali Almanac. Usually she is worshipped by placing an earthen pot marked with vermilion under a tree, with clay images or snakes arranged round it and a *tri-sula* (or trident) driven into the ground. Sometimes a kind of cactus named after her is taken as her emblem. Sometimes she is believed to dwell in a *pīpal* tree. In places where snakes abound a special shrine or a separate room is dedicated to the goddess. On the day set apart her image of clay is worshipped—principally by the Bāgdīs of Central and Western Bengal, as also by the Bāuris and Māls of the same regions.

According to the statement of the Bāgdīs, Manasā is their favourite deity. Her image is represented with four arms, with a cobra in each hand, and crowned by a tiara of snakes. After the worship her image is taken in procession and finally consigned to a river or a tank. In my native town Bankura, Western Bengal, during boyhood my playmates and I enjoyed the songs about the snake-goddess sung by her devotees ; this occasion is enlivened by *tableaux vivant* or by clay figures either caricaturing or seriously representing events of the year and persons connected with them, carried on the shoulders of men or on bullock carts through the streets.

In Bengal the principal myth of the snake-goddess centres round Behulā, its heroine. There are many poetic versions of the story. More than two dozen have been printed. As in other countries of the world and in other parts of India, so in Bengal there have been rivalries and conflicts of cults. The Manasā myth is reminiscent of such a conflict between the cult of the great god Shiva and that of the snake-goddess Manasā. The following story tells how an *entente cordiale* was arrived at between the two.

Manasā, the Snake-goddess, wished to enjoy the devotion and worship of mankind. But the great god Shiva ordained that until Chānd, the richest merchant of Champak-nagar, worshipped her, she would never receive the recognition of mankind.

Now Chānd was a devotee of Shiva and had no reverence to spare for anyone else. He was prosperous and powerful, had a devoted wife, Sanakā by name, and a large family.

Sanakā observed that some of her neighbours had attained great prosperity by worshipping Manasā, so she too arranged for a similar worship, but dared not take her husband into her confidence. Chānd happened to hear of it, was enraged and used his stout stick of hintāl on the image of the goddess, and scattered the offerings. The cry of the terrified Sanakā filled the house, but Chānd paid no attention.

The rage of the goddess knew no bounds. She determined to

revenge the insult and to break the pride of the insolent merchant.

She called forth her evil messengers, the venomous snakes, and despatched them to destroy the sons of Chānd. But Chānd defeated her purpose again and again. He and his friend Dhanvantari knew a charm for bringing back the dead to life; no sooner did his six sons die of snake-bite, than they were brought back to life.

Manasā took away Chānd's power of reviving the dead by a clever ruse, then killed Dhanvantari. Chānd was helpless. One by one his six sons were killed. The bereaved mother and the young widows implored the merchant to acknowledge the power of the irate goddess and make peace with her. But Chānd only struck the earth with his stout hintāl stick and vowed that he would never offer worship to the one-eyed one (Manasā had only one eye, the other being blind). He performed worship of Shiva on a magnificent scale, to show his contempt for Manasā and her vengeful persecutions.

But the lamentations of his wife and his widowed daughters became too much for him. He planned a voyage with his merchant vessels. He filled thirteen ships with rich merchandise and set sail for distant countries. He sailed many rivers and seas and touched at many ports. He amassed a large fortune before beginning his return voyage. The machination of Manasā produced a furious storm and the thirteen vessels went down with all their crew and cargo.

Only Chānd was left alive floating and drifting. Finding him in such an extremity, the vengeful Manasā made a large flowering lotus plant, sacred to her, float on the sea before his eyes. Chānd was tempted to clutch at it, but remembering that the lotus was sacred to her, shrank back in abhorrence. Still Manasā would not allow him to die. If he died before worshipping her, she would not be recognized by men as a goddess, for thus Shiva had ordained. After a desperate struggle he came to land. He was entirely destitute. On foot he wandered tattered and dishevelled and at long last reached home.

Another son had been born to him in the meantime, a very beautiful boy, Lakhindar. As he grew older, his bright face was a little solace to Sanakā's ravaged heart that still palpitated with fear. Chānd had not made peace with the angry goddess and her ire might be directed against this boy the sole stay of her declining years. She implored her husband to propitiate the goddess but she met only stern refusals.

Lakhindar was not only handsome but his manners charmed all. The time came when Sanakā desired a beautiful daughter-in-law. But Chānd was afraid. Might not festivities rouse again the vengeance of the goddess?

Unable to bear the importunity of his wife Chānd consulted an astrologer. His heart turned cold at what he heard. Lakhindar was destined to die of snake-bite on the wedding night.

Chānd kept the dread secret to himself. He had not the heart to shatter poor Sanakā's dream of happiness. But he planned frustration of the coming revenge. Fate there was but there was also human prowess and sometimes it proved the stronger. He would so arrange that the wicked agents of Manasā should be unable to work her fell design. Thus determined he sent his family priest Janārdan to look for a bride.

Janārdan saw many girls, and finally chose Behulā, the daughter of Sai, a rich merchant of Nichhani-nagar. Behulā had fine character and exquisite beauty. People took her for a celestial nymph. She was highly accomplished. Especially was she famous as a dancer.

On hearing from Janārdan, Chānd started for Nichhani-nagar carrying rich presents for the future bride.

He was cordially received by Sai. He saw Behulā and was amazed at her beauty. He tested her and found her to be a girl far above the ordinary. The match was settled, the wedding day fixed, and Chānd returned to Champak-nagar.

Sanakā's joy knew no bounds. She began her preparations. Chānd had his own to make. He ordered a house of iron to be built on the top of a hill. There should not be a single hole in the walls. Chānd intended it for the newly married pair on the wedding night. Thus he would cheat Manasā.

The goddess began to feel anxious. It would never do to be defeated by the proud and insolent

merchant. Unless Chānd was brought to his knees, Manasā would never be revered as a goddess by mankind. So, now through threats and then promises of favour she prevailed upon the builder to leave a very small hole in a wall, but to fill it with charcoal dust. The man first refused but eventually yielded through fear.

The marriage of Lakhindar and Behulā was solemnised with great pomp. They loved each other from the first and it was a deep and immortal love.

After the ceremony, Chānd told Behulā's father of the terrible secret. With tears in their eyes and a great fear in their hearts, the parents of Behulā bade her farewell, as she started for her husband's home.

The pair were led into the iron house. All doors were closed. Peacocks and mongooses were let loose on all sides, medicinal herbs were strewn all around and snake-charmers and exorcists were present in large numbers, to watch the snakes. Chānd himself kept guard with his staff of hintāl.

Manasā held a council of war in her celestial abode. She urged the snakes to kill Lakhindar but they were afraid to face the dangers that lay on the way to the iron house. At last Banka Rāj, a venomous snake, volunteered.

Behulā was keeping watch by the side of her sleeping husband. She knew that fate had ordained her widowhood on this very night. But she was determined to fight against this great calamity with

all the powers of her soul.

The hours passed. Suddenly Behulā started. A sense of impending calamity descended on her. She looked around. A snake entered the room. She was terror-stricken but did not give way. With a pair of gold pincers, she made Banka Rāj her captive.

Thrice did Manasā send her messengers of death to be thrice foiled by the watchful bride. Dawn was fast approaching. The bridegroom must be killed before sunrise. So Manasā worked a spell on poor Behulā and the bride was overpowered by sleep. Then Kali, the deadly asp, entered the bridal chamber and stung Lakhindar on his little toe.

He cried out : " I am stung, I am stung. Rise Behulā, and see. I am dying. "

Behulā rose to find fate's decree fulfilled. Her husband was dying. His body was blue with the deadly venom. She clasped him in her arms and called him, again and yet again. After a few minutes he expired. Behulā wept and moaned but no sound could penetrate through the iron walls of the chamber. She remained alone with her beloved, a widow on her wedding night.

Chānd rushed up to the chamber with the first streak of dawn. A sound of moaning pierced his ears. He entered with trembling heart to find his son dead on his marriage bed.

Chānd disappeared. No one knew where.

People who die of snakebite are not cremated. They are put into

a river. As the relatives of Chānd were making preparations to take the body to the riverside, Behulā requested them to build a raft and place the body on it, dressed in its wedding robes. They did.

As they lowered the raft to the river, Behulā mounted it, sitting with her dead husband's head on her lap. Nobody had ever seen the like before. Nobody had ever heard of the living accompanying the dead on the great journey. Everyone implored her to desist. Death was universal. Human beings had to submit. What use fighting against fate? Even Sanakā came to the water's edge and implored Behulā to return. But the young wife was adamant. She and Lakhindar had become one through life and death; she must follow him. If the merciful gods granted her the life of her husband, then only would she return amongst them.

The raft floated slowly downstream. People crowded both banks to see a living wife following her dead husband. The raft reached Nichhani-nagar, her father's home. Her aged parents weeping ran to see her and to dissuade her from this mad venture. All in vain. She and Lakhindar must remain together in death or life.

The raft left all familiar places and travelled to unknown coasts. Many dangers befell, many temptations assailed, but her courage and faith remained unshaken. The body began to decompose; only the bones were left; but to her it was the same. Wherever she saw shrines of Manasā, she

prayed for her dead husband's life. The gods rendered her help. Even Manasā began to relent.

The river broadened. The raft reached the ocean. At last it touched a strange shore. Behulā had passed earth's boundary and come to the land of the gods. Here she saw a woman washing clothes. This was Netā, the washerwoman of the gods. She had a little child with her, who gave her much trouble. She killed the child in the presence of the horrified Behulā and went on calmly with her work. In the evening, she sprinkled water over the child's body and it came to life.

Behulā knew her quest to be at an end. She had found one who could bring the dead to life again. She watched and waited for Netā the next day and fell at her feet. She implored her with tears in her eyes to restore her husband to life.

Netā was a friend of Manasā. She knew Behulā's story. She took pity on the poor girl, and led her to the court of Indra.

Behulā stood before the assembled gods and told her sad tale. The gods listened to her story but instead of answering her prayers they requested her to dance before them. What a strange request to make of a sorrow-stricken widow! What else could she do but carry out their behest? So Behulā danced. It was wonderful to behold. Even the gods had not witnessed anything more pure or more exquisite. They wept. They asked Manasā to give back to Lakhindar his life.

Manasā also told her tale. If Chānd agreed to worship her, she was ready to give back everything.

Behulā promised that she would plead with her father-in-law. Not only Lakhindar but all his brothers also would come to life again. They returned to Champak-nagar full of hope.

Chānd was finally persuaded to worship Manasā, partly by the importunities of his wife, sons and daughters-in-law and partly through the behest of Shiva, who ordered him to cast off his pride and submit to the will of the gods.

Thus peace was made between the mortal and divine combatants. Behulā's name rang through the country as the most chaste and devoted wife of the race of mortals.

Rabindranath Tagore has called the story of Behulā "the village epic of Bengal, which has sprung from the heart of our people and has lived in oral traditions and folk-lore, sung and performed by the local operatic troupes of this province." Some fifty-seven years ago, I witnessed as a boy a performance of the story of Behulā in Balarampur, my maternal uncle's village in Bankura. It was held after nightfall by torchlight under the spreading branches of a banyan tree. I was so charmed with the music and by the dancing of the boy dressed as Behulā that next day I went to make friends with him! Everyone who has read this village epic in all its details or seen it performed will agree with the poet: "It gives us the picture of the ideal wife, her heroic sacrifice and continues the atmosphere of home life in its humble majesty, touching simple hearts with the beauty and depth of its sentiments."

RAMANANDA CHATTERJEE

If one would have a complete idea of the prestige which the serpent enjoys to our own day, one ought to study the matter in India and learn all that is believed about, and still attributed to, the *Nagas* (Cobras) in that country; one should also visit the Africans of Whydah, the Voodoos of Port-au-Prince and Jamaica, the Nagals of Mexico, and the Pa, or men-serpents of China, etc. But why wonder that the serpent is "adored" and at the same time cursed, since we know that from the beginning it was a symbol?

There is a notable difference *esoterically* between the words Sarpa and Naga, though they are both used indiscriminately. Sarpa (serpent) is from the root *Sṛiṣ*, *serpo* to creep; and they are called "Ahi," from *Ha*, to abandon. "The sarpa was produced from Brahmā's hair, which, owing to his fright at beholding the Yakshas, whom he had created horrible to behold, fell off from the head, each hair becoming a serpent. They are called Sarpa from their creeping and *Ahi* because they had deserted the head" (Wilson). But the *Nagas*, their serpent's tail notwithstanding, do not creep, but manage to walk, run and fight in the allegories.

—H. P. BLAVATSKY, *The Secret Doctrine* II. 209, 181-82.

NEW BOOKS AND OLD

THE STRUCTURE OF HINDU SOCIETY*

[**Hugh Ross Williamson**, the son of a Nonconformist minister, was intended for the church and has never lost his interest in theology. He is known chiefly as a playwright and an historian. His most recent play, produced in London this year, is a morality drama, "The Seven Deadly Virtues," and he is now at work on a philosophical play dealing with the Resurrection, entitled, "On the Third Day." As an historian, his period—on which he is a recognised authority—is the religious struggle of seventeenth century England.]

It is difficult always to contemplate calmly the spectacle of organised religion, for the history of the West is written in terms of its atrocities. Its most famous achievement, the crucifixion of Jesus, was a prelude to that more subtle *coup d'état* by which it appropriated his name and taught generations of the ignorant that the Christian church was founded on him instead of on Caiaphas and Pilate, his murderers.

For centuries devout souls have been troubled by the impassable gulf between the individualistic religion of Christ and the ecclesiastical organization of Christianity; nor is this surprising, since the antithesis of personal and official religion is one of the major problems of every creed. What is surprising is the general slowness to realise that any church is not a religious but a political institution whose function is to ensure, by means of supernatural threats, a social regimentation which material power alone could never enforce.

Its officers, the priests, drawn

from the ranks of those unable to cope with the exigencies of everyday life, are ideally suited for the purpose. Not only do they gain personal peace by masking their inferiority under a pretension to supranormal powers but, by segregating themselves, they perform a public service—in the sense that a priesthood or ministry acts as an admirable sewer for draining off the defeatist vitality from a state. Their docile followers are composed of men and women who, neither spiritual enough to understand that religion must be a personal matter, nor honest enough to have the courage of their materialistic convictions, imagine that they can compound with God for the service of Mammon. The result, not unnaturally, is that the Christian church, at least, has always been identified with reaction, tyranny and corruption; that it has been the consistent enemy of progress and the foe of learning; that it has stoned the prophets with monotonous regularity; and that it has committed all its infamies not only with a clear conscience but with

* *Evolution of Hindu Moral Ideals.* By **SIR P. S. SIVASWAMY AIYER**, K.C.S.I., C.I.E., LL.D. (Calcutta University, Calcutta. Rs. 2. 8 as.)

an earnest enthusiasm, convinced that it is acting from the highest motives for the highest ends.

Yet, since its prestige—and therefore its power—depends on its proclamation of a reasonably high moral code, it has been forced to adapt itself to improving conditions. Thomas Aquinas' teaching that one of the major pleasures of salvation is the privilege of watching the tortures of the damned is not stressed to-day by the most ardent of Thomists. Even High Anglican parsons, who revel in the comminatory nonsense of the Athanasian Creed, are beginning to look askance at the more blood-thirsty details of desert marauding appointed to be read in churches as Old Testament lessons. But every effort to reinterpret dogma so as to bring it into line with contemporary ethical standards meets with frenzied resistance alike from priests and laymen—from the priesthood because it naturally fears anything which might lead to a rational examination of sacerdotal claims; from the laity because, having bargained for its salvation, it resents any suggestion of fallibility in the agreement.

Consequently the vast majority of Christians—all Catholic and most Protestants—are committed to a belief in the verbal inspiration of the Bible (known in these latter days as "fundamentalism") which logically makes it necessary for salvation to believe in the historicity of Balaam's ass and Jonah's whale and various cruder anthropomorphic myths; while in Hinduism, the Sanātānists, taking their

stand on the immutability of the principles of the Dharma Śāstra, have provided a similar orthodox and reactionary movement.

It is this far-reaching problem which Sir Sivaswamy Aiyer has taken as the subject of his Kamala Lectures. He has set out to show, as against the Sanātānists, that, "as a matter of fact, the rules of the Dharma Śāstras and the Hindu ethical ideals have undergone changes from time to time in accordance with the exigencies of the time." He has also been influenced in his choice of thesis by the recent attacks "made by Christian writers on the principles of Hinduism with the object of showing that the ethical and social progress of India has been retarded by the essential principles of Hinduism."

It may be said at once that he is brilliantly successful. With erudition and careful documentation, Sir Sivaswamy examines the changing attitude of Hinduism towards women, caste, justice, the reciprocal duties of rulers and ruled, sacrifice, penance, and, above all, the doctrine of Karma, noting the modifications and developments which, as men's ethical conceptions have grown finer, have taken place within the strict letter of the law. The vindication of Hinduism as against Christianity is sufficiently pungent, though there may be some doubt as to its necessity. For no educated Occidental—unless he be a professional Christian with a vested interest in falsifying the issue—believes for one moment in the superiority of Chris-

tianity to Hinduism as a religious *system*. And for the "popular" reader who may have been deceived by such rubbish as "Mother India," there is—for instance—Norman Douglas's retort, "How about Europe?"

If any criticism can be directed towards Sir Sivaswamy's analysis, it does not concern the lucid competence with which he has proved his thesis; it touches, rather, his occasional failure to distinguish between organised and personal religion, especially with regard to the complicated case of Christianity. "Hinduism," he writes, "was especially concerned with the preservation of the social structure and it enforced conformity in matters of external conduct, but not in matters of opinion or doctrine." Consequently "it is the glory of Hinduism that it has never interfered with or discouraged freedom of thought, speculation or opinion, has never persecuted people for heresy and has never placed a ban upon freedom of discussion." There is no need to do more than mention the appalling record of Christianity on these counts.

But, in point of fact, the matter is not quite so simple as that. "The two institutions upon which the whole structure of civilised society has been based are family and property," writes Sir Sivaswamy. Hinduism, as an organised religion, is their bulwark. So is organized Christianity, the child of the Roman state and the Jewish church. But, paradoxically, this religion adopted, as its figurehead, the revolutionary individualist

whom it crucified and has had to spend the rest of its career in trying to reconcile the irreconcilable. Occasionally, as a matter of fact, it has met with quite undeserved success—as when it proved simultaneously the immoral, unscrupulous politician, Pope Innocent III and the Christ-like mendicant, Francis of Assisi—but, in general, the unnatural combination has produced results as odd as they are lamentable.

It is not surprising that non-Christians should find understanding of it difficult. In a recent number of *THE ARYAN PATH*, Dr. Bharatan Kumarappa called attention to the curious discrepancy between the lives of Christian missionaries in India and the life and teaching of Jesus. But such a discrepancy would never be noticed by an orthodox Christian who would find it odd only if there were any resemblance. Sir Sivaswamy Aiyer is undoubtedly right when he says: "If the ideal is so high that it cannot possibly be attained by anyone or is practically departed from by most members of the community, it cannot be treated as an accepted rule or standard. The maxim 'whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also' may safely be assigned to the category of impracticable ideals." But this applies only to the system of organised Christianity; it does not touch in the least the personal religion of Jesus, on whose followers it is still binding. And it is binding, not because it is a "maxim" of a wise saint, but

because, in their opinion, it is a command of God Himself.

This, again, is a point on which if one may say so without impertinence, Sir Sivaswamy—in common with many Christian writers—is not altogether clear: "Hinduism," he writes, "represents not merely a set of beliefs, but also a definite social organisation. There is perhaps not more difficulty in defining Hindus or Hinduism than there is in defining Christians or Christianity. There are numberless sects among Christians differing from each other in doctrine and practice, and even among the votaries of any particular sect all of them do not subscribe to all the articles of faith of that sect or conform to all its practices. Nevertheless we are able to form some idea of Christianity as a whole."

Such a definition of Christianity—official or personal—is somewhat misleading. To the modernist, Sir Sivaswamy rightly says: "the personality of Christ is held to be a fountain of righteousness and spiritual life." But the modernist is not a Christian in the sense that the term has been used for nineteen centuries; his curious compromises are of no more account than the eccentricities of the numerous, but negligible sects, which are nothing but modern forms of ancient heresies. The distinguishing mark of Catholic Christianity—Roman, Eastern Orthodox and Anglican—is not in the least that Jesus is "a fountain of righteousness." It is, quite simply, that he is God. Christian-

ity, stands on that one doctrine of the Incarnation, which the sects and the modernists alike deny. "Whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also," is thus much more than a counsel of perfection; it is a Divine command, reinforced by a Divine example. When Jesus stood before Caiaphas and Pilate, the world did not see a great spiritual mystic on trial before material authority; it saw church and state on trial before the Eternal and Supreme God.

This is not the place to consider the implications of such a belief. It is mentioned only to suggest the point where Christianity differs essentially from Hinduism; also why it became a persecuting religion. For organized Christianity transferred the divine sanction from the personal code of life to the elaborate social system of the church; it kept the belief that made martyrs but used it to make inquisitors by harnessing it in the service of that very system of church and state which brought about the Crucifixion.

And the future? The religion of Christ remains yet to be tried, and many who crave for a social order to match their personal unselfishness, see some sort of fulfilment in Communism. "The cult of Bolshevism," as Sir Sivaswamy says, "has, in spite of many repellent features, evoked a wonderful spirit of self-sacrifice and enthusiasm from its adherents." That self-sacrifice and enthusiasm are possible only because the movement is in essence

religious, and, though one may doubt whether the spirit of personal religion will be able to survive in any system, Communism is certainly a far nearer approximation to the teaching of Jesus than its somewhat hysterical opponent, organized Christianity.

The impact of Communism on Hinduism is in a different category. Its attack on the family and on property—which, of course, Jesus also attacked—menace the very foundations of its creed. Sir Siva-swamy admits that “enormous changes in our moral conceptions are sure to be brought about by changes in the social and economic order.” The precise nature of those changes, it is yet too early to predict but whatever they may be, one will agree with the author that “we should look for guidance in the true spirit of the Hindu

religion and philosophy.” He closes his lectures by a quotation from Washburn Hopkins’s *Ethics of India*:—

It is well for the Hindu to be able to think: This is our spiritual and ethical heritage; here is the word of our own Saint, who says “bless them that curse you”; of our own sage, who declares that “the Vedas do not purify an immoral man”; here is the injunction, taught us long ago, to define a nobleman as one who is noble of soul; here is the statement that God is a spirit devoid of all evil and that righteousness is divine; here is the commandment to pity the unfortunate and to seek, not condescendingly but sympathetically, to do good to all.

The follower of Christ speaks in a tone almost identical—and those precepts, which both alike acknowledge, are unchanged by passing events and political systems—because they are unchangeable.

HUGH ROSS WILLIAMSON

A Buddhist Bibliography. Compiled by ARTHUR C. MARCH (The Buddhist Lodge, London.)

This is a very useful compilation by the editor of *Buddhism in England*. We are promised that a supplement will be issued in May of each year. It will be an aid to many students of Buddhism and we congratulate our friends of the Buddhist Lodge on their achievement.

This Lodge is rendering excellent service to the Cause of Buddhism in

the West. Of all oriental religions Buddhism is most suitable for the western mind, if it requires a formal religion. The presentation of its philosophy and psychology must be free from the taint of materialistic aspects which have been imposed upon Buddhism. It does not teach absence of the individual soul or its annihilation; again Nirvana is a state of existence, not non-existence. The Buddhist Lodge is careful in presenting these ideals and we wish its mission the success it deserves.

W.

NO NEW WORLD YET*

[Geoffrey West regards his *Calling All Countries: A Post-War Credo* as "my first, in any sense, individual book—it marks anyway my orientation of myself." This review throws more light on that *Credo*. Examining U. S. A. problems as world problems he offers the remedy: "A total life (not merely a 'religion' locked away in a water-tight compartment) in which the idea of brotherhood *actively* replaces that of the 'survival of the fittest'."—Eds.]

It is a phenomenon perhaps inevitably attached to growth towards comparative maturity that the most widely various aspects of the world about one should seem progressively to acquire not only deepening but ever more coherent and related significance. The nightmare of wilful chaos turns to a vision of a whole (it may be no less dreadful) in which the parts are truly seen *as* parts and take to themselves new meaning as such. The most diverse books, for example, picked at random, are seen to bear upon a single process, and become sometimes the more important thereby than in themselves. The present trio* are not a good example of the extremer workings of such a case, for they have all at a glance a common American reference, yet America, few will dispute, is an almost infinite subject, and these three books are very different in kind—one a purely personal reminiscence of the general conditions of life, social and individual, in a Delaware town forty years ago; the next, three series of reproductions of frescoes by a modern artist; the third an

excursion into the sphere of pure economic analysis. Any one of them is well worth reading by itself and for its own sole sake, yet—to return to the beginning—when set in conjunction they have definite mutual relevance, not only each reinforcing the effect of the others but almost creating between them a new and profounder knowledge not to be isolated in any one.

Both Canby's and Rivera's book are in their differing ways artworks, and it is in setting them side by side that we may most swiftly sense what may be called the joint-subject of the three, which manifests itself as a striking change of feeling. Not possibly so much between Canby and Rivera as individuals, but between the worlds they portray, and still more the dominant psychologies of those worlds. Canby sums this up in his title—"The Age of Confidence"—exemplifying it in chapter after chapter of his account of semi-industrial Wilmington in the days of his youth, of a seemingly static middle-class society in which the old more rigid Quaker traditions might be fading but social

* *The Age of Confidence: Life in the Nineties*. By HENRY SEIDEL CANBY (Constable & Co., Ltd., London. 7s. 6d.)

Portrait of America. By DIEGO RIVERA, with an Explanatory Text by BERTRAM D. WOLFE (George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., London. 12s. 6d.)

The Decline of American Capitalism. By LEWIS COREY (John Lane, The Bodley Head, London. 15s.)

distinctions were still absolutely assured, and in which the home stood the steady centre about which every other aspect of life unswervingly rotated. A sense of confidence conditioned everything—views on education, religion, art, sex and marriage, the morality (or lack of it) of business and politics, the set relations between parents and children. Canby does not idealize his world. He recognizes frankly its lack of culture, of any true activity of either spiritual or ethical conviction, of fundamental questioning of anything whatsoever. The confidence was, he can see now, based upon illusion. Yet even so, he asserts on almost the last page of this absolutely charming as well as valuable record, "like most illusions it had many of the benefits of a fact," giving to daily life qualities of rhythm, organic unity, serenity, a "real content" in the present and "a complacent yet enviable and sometimes splendid trust in the future."

There we touch the essence of the change. To turn from Canby's calm, nostalgic pages to the brutal awareness of Rivera's typical drawings is like a blow in the face—a blow, though, that but brings one back to acknowledged reality. That is the point. Rivera's harsh but magnificently powerful designs would have been impossible, a nightmare only, in Canby's world; the remote idealizing art of the "Nineties" would have rejected them as the ultimate ugliness. Today they come simply native to our modern air; the perceptive eye

cannot fail to find in them a vigorous if grim and bitter truth. It is not easy to render their essentially pictorial effect in words, but above all it is one which carries one out of the drawing-room into the factory, the market-place, the battlefield social as well as military, into contact with the real forces veritably making and breaking the modern world. There is romanticism nowhere, an intense realism everywhere. The faces of the workers are workers' faces, and the faces of the soldiers are gas-masks. The machine is shown in all its power—its power for good or evil, life or death. And when history is depicted, as in the remarkable series of nineteen panels covering three hundred years of American development, it is in terms not merely of picturesque personalities but of the authentic productive and exploiting forces. It is this insistence upon the real and fundamental, much more than any particular standpoint Rivera may hold, which marks him as contemporary. He questions everything, in his very style of drawing. He does not deny the fact of ugliness, even as he incorporates it in a total vision positive and dynamic. He shows conflict as the essence, the increasingly destructive essence, of our existing civilization. He demands that we be complacent about nothing.

And we are not, we cannot be, we realize as we turn the pages and recognize their inherent truth of feeling. There has been in these last decades an absolute change of mood. The Age of Confidence has

utterly gone; ours is an age rather of Doubt and, too often, Fear. What has created this change, brought it about? Rivera and his "explanatory" collaborator Bertram Wolfe will give us their Marxist account, but it is to Corey that we turn for a more detailed and detached and abstract analysis of its causes. The clue is to be found immediately in his title: "The Decline of . . . Capitalism." Yes, the adjective may be omitted. Throughout this article the assertion of universal relevance has been implicit. The change has been identical in Europe. It has been practically world-wide. We are all in the same boat. Corey's analysis is in purely American terms and figures, but the evolution and devolution he describes is in its outline applicable everywhere, or at least everywhere where Western—that is, capitalist—economics are dominant. It appears, though, in his chosen field, with a special clarity. America has always been, in a certain sense, the capitalist world's laboratory. First settled as it was almost in the birth-hour of capitalism, capitalism was there born free when everywhere else it inherited the chains of earlier feudal forms of society. The American Revolution marked the final rejection of feudalism; the Civil War was the decisive victory of the capitalist way of life over the challenge of a pre-capitalist slave economy; and thenceforward America has been *nakedly* capitalist as no other country. Enormous internal development delayed there the common

European quest for foreign markets, but since the War of 1914-18 America has become as imperialist as any. It may be said to-day that what is *obviously* true of America is *basically* true of every other capitalist country.

To read Corey, therefore, is to understand not only the change which has taken place from Canby's America to Rivera's, but the identical change which has taken place the world over in greater or lesser degree. He brings innumerable arguments and still more innumerable statistics to demonstrate the outstanding fact that while fifty, forty, even thirty years ago capitalism was still a developing force to-day it has passed its climacteric and can move forward only to increasing decay and disaster. It was originally a liberating force, and under its impulse the world has experienced the greatest material enrichment known to history. But the simple conditions of sustained profit-making demand inexorably an ever-expanding market, an ultimate impossibility upon what is, materially at least, a finite sphere. In Canby's blind illusory Age of Confidence people, content in their well-being to stop short of a truly penetrating analysis, saw no reason why their "progress" should not go on for ever. Yet even then the world was almost entirely shared out, and the War brought no release but rather further constriction through accelerated industrial development, a vast increase of production-power in relation to available markets.

There were depressions before the War, but always some new absorbent area could be opened to bring relief. Now there is none, and the result is unprecedented depression that does not and cannot lift save locally, and—ever-intensifying national rivalries evidenced in the actuality of ever increasing armaments. Capitalism is in the last resort self-strangling, and we have since the War reached the phase wherein breathing grows difficult and the convulsions of the dreadful process can only become plainer and plainer. The Age of Confidence, as Canby draws it, will never return; the necessity lies upon us, these three books seem to say with a single voice, to move forward to something wholly new, if we would find our way to confidence and serenity again.

Forward!—but whither and how? Both Corey and Rivera would speak to us of socialization, of communism, not perhaps to be attained without shedding of “the blood of tyrants.” Yet for the latter at least most of those who read these present pages will scarcely be prepared. Nevertheless it does seem that a system wherein the purpose of production is not profit-making but consumption, and the means not competition but co-operation is no less economically necessary than morally desirable. A total life (not merely a “religion” locked away in a water-tight compartment) in which the idea of brotherhood *actively* replaces that of “the survival of the fittest” is essential not

only ethically and spiritually but plainly and simply to salve world-civilization from the plunge into the depths which seem to confront it. No truly religious person need regret the compulsion which is laid upon us; if the spirit cannot triumph what use for the further pilgrimage of the flesh towards desolation? Still, when we do indeed turn to the world about us, scan it in the large, what can be our hope? The world brawls everywhere: the demons of hate and bitterness seemed never so free and powerful. What use to talk of brotherhood in a wilderness of fascism, race-persecution and re-armament?

Yet these, we must remember, are the very symptoms of the disease we would cure. Hate springs above all from fear, fear from insecurity—how many of us are not apt to be, in a shaking world, their victims? It is useless to scan life in the large, where most of us can never touch it. Let us rather see it in its detail, in the hearts and minds of those we know, above all of ourselves. In 1848 that great American, Emerson, was visiting London. It was a year for Europe of civil fighting, bloodshed and unrest. He wrote in his journal:—

People here expect a revolution. There will be no revolution, none that deserves to be called so. There may be a scramble for money. But as all the people we see want the things we now have, and not better things, it is very certain that they will, under whatever change of forms, keep the old system. *When I see changed men, I shall look for a changed world.*

The words touch the root of the matter, and can scarcely be too often repeated. Most religious, most honest, persons do in their heart of hearts want a changed world, economic, political, social. In these three books, taken together, they will find the statement of its need. Yet however objective

the need the means remain the same—"changed men." Unless we can achieve that in ourselves we have not made a beginning. While if we do achieve it in ourselves it is likely that we shall have less concern, or at any rate less selfish concern, for the end!

GEOFFREY WEST

PATRIOTISMS: MORE THAN ONE KIND*

[Clifford Bax is a cosmopolitan because he is a lover of the Beautiful. He sees patriotism as an evolving quality and the present world-problems as a clash of patriotisms.—EDS.]

The editor of this book has assembled essays upon patriotism from twenty-one contributors. His own "editorial" is a jeremiad in which, without attempting to support his thesis, he tearfully compares the present age with some period, existent only in his fancy, when "each state was able to see good in its neighbour; to appreciate if not concur in its national aims; and to subscribe to the same ideals, albeit in differing forms." He proceeds to lament that there is not now "that international appreciation of the art and music of other countries that there once was, an appreciation which was not without effect upon international politics." My studies in history do not enable me to recognise this Golden Age. On the contrary, they lead me to suppose that a foreigner in any country to-day will fare better than he would have fared at any period in the past. It is high time for our

intellectuals to appreciate the age in which they are living: but they will not do so. They cannot be happy unless they are in a small minority.

The religious contributors, with one exception, confine themselves to platitudes of which many are "remainder biscuits." Bishop Welldon seems still to be offering moral exhortation to the young men of Harrow School: and from a Jesuit we expect subtler thinking and better English than we find in an essay which Father Martindale must, presumably, have dictated when he was fatigued. Miss Royden, on the other hand, writes well and talks sense. She says:—

Internationalism is not so dangerous [as patriotism], and therefore cannot do so much harm; for the same reason it cannot do much good It teaches a man to think but not to feel A man may be, or think himself to be, thoroughly convinced that he ought to love all countries alike, but such an attitude of mind is

* *What is Patriotism?* Edited by N. P. MACDONALD (Thornton Butterworth, London, 7s. 6d.)

highly intellectual and because it defies one of the deepest instincts of our nature, it remains without effect upon our conduct. Patriotism, on the other hand, is always dangerous because it is always moving to action.

Mr. Joad and Lord Allen of Hurtwood, the socialistic contributors to this symposium, might profit if they could absorb the wisdom of Miss Royden's essay.

All these writers are conscious that patriotism is a word which is under a heavy cloud. It is under a cloud, in England, because we associate it with jingoism and national aggression. We associate the word with empire-builders, with such men as Clive, Nelson and Rhodes, men who regarded all foreigners as "lesser breeds without the Law." Few of these contributors realise that this old form of patriotism was, in its day, one of the highest emotions of which people were capable: because it led them to live, and often to die, for something which transcended their personal interests. This fourth-form conception of patriotism exists to-day in many countries. It remained with us, in England, until half-way through the Great War; and if we could return to the London society of Palmerstone's time we should be disgusted—most of us—by the crudity of our countrymen. The world does not realise that within fifty years the British temperament has profoundly changed: nor does it perceive that this change is due, above all, to the emancipation of our women. The influence of women, exercised "every day and

in every way," has substituted for the hearty practical-joker of the "Eighties" a very much more sensitive type of Englishman. Germans, who seem still to be at the schoolboy stage, may once more imagine that we are effete. They, of all peoples, ought to appreciate the parallel of the Athenians and the Spartans.

The general burden of these essays is the expression of a hope that the old imperialistic patriotism may give way to a patriotism which shall excite the patriot's country to contribute more than other countries to the welfare of mankind. This, when addressed to English readers, is preaching to the converted. The fancy that unscrupulous devils control our affairs is a specimen of Bloomsbury childishness. The effective majority of persons in the British Empire, the United States and the Scandinavian countries has outgrown the war stage; just as at different times people outgrew the hallowed idea of slavery and the notion that a man's "honour" could only be vindicated by a duel. Indeed, the Rev. Costley-White quotes the remark of a foreigner—"You English are the only idealists." Yes, and it is because we are idealists that we are so often charged with hypocrisy. It is easy not to be hypocritical if you are not attempting to live up to an ideal.

Nurse Cavell—who, by contemporary standards, was rightly executed—announced a new epoch when she said: "I know now that patriotism is not enough; one

must love all men and hate none." She was, of course, right; but our hasty internationalists cannot realise that it is foolish to leave your front-door unbarred because you have no desire to become a burglar. Local patriotism can exist together with a wider allegiance. Two hundred years ago England and Scotland were enemies. A war between the two countries is now unthinkable; but in 1735 no man would have dared to prophecy so much. In less than two hundred years—by reason of radio, of aviation and of inter-marriage—war between any two countries of Europe may have become equally unimaginable: for remember, the world is now

changing faster than at any other time in history. Many contributors to this book are aware of the extreme peril which aviation has brought. Few of them perceive that air-flight may prove to be the salvation of the world.

The patriot of the future, as several of these writers recognise, will hope that his country may excel all others in whatsoever is honourable to mankind. To think, talk or write as though the greater part of the world had outgrown the old conception of patriotism is not only to be foolish but also to do a disservice to our country or our empire. The school-bully will never be reformed by fair words alone.

CLIFFORD BAX

INDUSTRIALISM AND MYSTICISM*

[G. R. Malkani, Managing Editor of *The Philosophical Quarterly* and head of the Indian Institute of Philosophy at Amalner, examines the strictures of the great French Philosopher on Hindu Mysticism and his view on God, and shows how both of them are non-convincing.—EDS.]

The author of *Creative Evolution* takes a further step. Here he examines the sources of morality and of religion. One source of moral obligation he finds in our relations to society. On the surface of life, we resemble other men, and are "united to them by a discipline which creates between them and us a relation of interdependence." Thus moral obligation arises from the pressure which society exerts on the individual, the pressure of custom and convention.

The second source of morality is aspiration. The life of another individual somehow affects us; it has the effect of an appeal. We aspire to be

like him, and act like him. He stands before us as a unique personality, above the level of all other men, a standing personal inspiration. While social pressure is naturally impersonal and is "closer to those natural forces which we call habit or even instinct," aspiration is "the more powerful according as it is more obviously aroused in us by definite persons, and the more it apparently triumphs over nature."

The same argument is carried over in the sphere of religion. There is a static religion and there is a dynamic religion. Religion in general is defined as a defensive reaction of nature against a discouragement whose source

* *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion*. By HENRI BERGSON (Macmillan & Co., Ltd., Lon. 10s.)

is to be found in intelligence. We are discouraged by the inevitability of death and by the depressing margin of failure in all our efforts of life. There is thus possible for all beings endowed with intelligence, and therefore with reflection and prevision, a certain slackening of attachment to life which is not possible to beings endowed with mere instinct. Further, intelligence tends towards selfishness and anti-socialism. Religion is a defensive reaction against this dissolvent power of intelligence. It has thus a biological value. Natural religion Bergson identifies with the myth-making function. This latter fashions out gods or even forces which retain the property of not being purely mechanical, and of complying with our wishes, of bending to our will. We thus have natural religion and magic.

As dynamic morality replaces love of family, love of clan and love of country by love of humanity, so dynamic religion or mysticism replaces worship of different personifications of natural forces, clan-deities and tribal gods by worship of the source of all life which is personified in the idea of Love. God is Love.

The ultimate end of mysticism is the establishment of a contact, consequently of a partial coincidence, with the creative effort of which life is the manifestation. This effort is of God, if not God himself.

He compares Hindoo mysticism, with the mysticism of Christian saints. Hindoo mysticism, according to him, arises in pessimism and inaction. Complete mysticism is action.

It was industrialism, it was our Western civilisation which liberated the mysticism of a Ramakrishna or a Vivekananda. This burning, active mysticism could never have been kindled in the days when the Hindoo felt he was crushed by nature and when no human intervention was of any avail.

Mysticism in India, he thinks, was thwarted by material conditions or by too narrow an intellectual frame.

It will naturally be asked, what is true and complete mysticism? Bergson thinks that true mysticism does not consist in mere ecstasy

though the soul may become, in thought and feeling, absorbed in God, something of it remains outside; that something is the will. Its life then is not yet divine. The will itself has to find its way back to God. Till it has done this, the soul finds itself alone and sometimes desolate. It is when our will becomes the will of God, and God acts through us, that the union is total and therefore final. The visions are then left behind: the divinity could not manifest itself from without to a soul henceforth replete with its essence.

Bergson is an optimist. The ground for optimism, according to him, is twofold. Firstly, humanity finds life, on the whole, good, since it clings to it. And secondly, there is an unmixed joy, lying beyond pleasure and pain, which is the final state of the mystic soul. This naturally raises the question of pain, and of the compatibility of pain with a God of Love. Bergson's answer is that pain is not willed by God. The whole (content of life) as indivisible alone is willed by God. We naturally ask then why the whole is not different so that pain has no place in it? Bergson argues that this does not reflect on God's omnipotence. By "omni" or "everything" we may mean the sum-total of the real or we may mean the totality of the possible. In the former sense, God is omnipotent. In the latter sense, "everything" is a pseudo-idea like the idea of "nothing." It is therefore illegitimate. We learn of the nature of God not from the idea of God, but from the mystics who have known God. They mean by omnipotence an energy to which no limit can be assigned, and a power of creating and loving which surpasses all imagination.

It is evident that this answer is only a make-shift. Either there is really no pain, or we must assume that God who created all the good things of life also created pain. But was it worth his while to have created pain? Is pain a good thing? If it is not, how can an essentially good God

create it? Is there not a contradiction here in our notion of God?

Bergson is a philosopher of life. While there is much that is original and instructive in what he says, his views lack the definiteness and the clearness of the true metaphysician. He somehow identifies the creative effort of life with an original divine emotion or Love. We do not see any connection between the two ideas which seem to us to be as far apart as nature and spirit.

Again, God may be pure Love; but there is no analogy by which we can understand how this pure Love can bring into being individuals who love and can be loved. We can only understand love that is directed to what already exists. We do not understand love that creates its own object.

Bergson's views on the relation of mysticism and mechanism are far from being correct. He says:—

Man will only rise above earthly things if a powerful equipment supplies him with the requisite fulcrum. He must use matter as a support if he wants to get away from matter. In other words, the mystical summons up the mechanical

Now man has without doubt a body as well as a soul. And since he has a body, he cannot completely ignore it. But should we therefore go in for industrialism? We see no reason. There are dangers in that direction. The only advantage of a powerful equipment is the ease with which we can produce articles for human use and the saving which we make thereby of human labour. But if this is not to lead to multiplication of human wants and the production of articles of luxury, it can only lead to work for the few and idleness for the many. Is it not more conducive to the spiritual health of a society, if every-one has work to do and just enough for the satisfaction of the simplest needs of his body? Handicraft has from this point

of view a far higher spiritual value than mechanisation in its modern form. Bergson's idea in this connection that it is Western industrialism which has rendered possible the mysticism of a Ramakrishna appears to us to be ridiculous. Ramakrishna does not herald a new form of mysticism in Hindoo religion. This mysticism is as old as Hindooism itself. The real requirement for mysticism is a true hunger of the soul. A pessimistic view of things is not wholly incompatible with this. If kept within proper limits, it is a powerful incentive to it. That mysticism must indeed be skin-deep that does not take note of the awful realities of life, its pain, its suffering, and finally death.

We agree with Bergson that in complete mysticism, the will, no less than thought and feeling, must find its way back to Deity. We think however, that this can only be achieved, when we have risen to a spiritual perception of things. If we have seen God and felt God, if He is a reality to us, we can hold our will back from Him no longer. Ecstasy may cover many forms of emotion. It may be pure sentimentalism or subjectivism. But that has no spiritual value. Hindooism has never commended it. But if by ecstasy we mean a supernormal perception or a higher form of intuition in which we find our self to be one with the self of the universe or God, there can be no part of our being such as the will that can hold itself outside. Bergson is a voluntarist, and can only see reality in the outward manifestations of will. The Hindoo rates spiritual perception above everything else.

The book is interesting as is everything from the pen of this well-known thinker. But naturally we do not see eye to eye with him on some of the fundamental points of his main thesis.

G. R. MALKANI

Coleridge and S. T. C. By STEPHEN POTTER (Jonathan Cape, 8s. 6d.)

Mr. Potter is a clever and amusing portrayer of character: but this book from beginning to end is imbued with the spirit of reverence for its subject, a deliberate assent to the greatness of Coleridge. I mention this at once because it is the most accurate way of saying that this important book belongs to the latest and finest development in biography. Biographers to-day, having learnt what our few great psychologists have to tell us, now see that while exposing the weaknesses of great men they are not therefore called upon to despise them. This may not sound a very tremendous advance after all these years. But there is more in it than that. Until very recently it has been thought an essential thing to possess a "strong character." It has been overlooked that strength has its drawbacks, while weakness opens up opportunities for spiritual advance. Havelock Ellis has often shown that "weakness is the very hall-mark of genius"; for it provides the point of least resistance in human nature through which the force of Nature may enter the human world. Moreover, as Keats insisted in those letters in which he spoke of the poetic character, the man of hard, determined character has little chance of spiritual development.

If we bear these things in mind we shall be in a better position to accept great men without wishing they might have been different in various particulars. We shall not wish that Coleridge had had some of William Cobbett's "guts" and Cobbett some of Coleridge's

imagination. We shall realise that Cobbett was able to perform his own magnificent task to perfection because he was "a strong character"; but for the same reason could never hope to see with the spiritual eye, to gather the fruits of humility, and to look into the streets of heaven. We shall realise that Coleridge was able to shed the light of a supreme vision upon philosophical problems because he was so un-determined a character that Life could use and inspire him. We shall see that his faults were the defects of his virtues: that had he been less horribly effusive he should not have possessed such marvellous sensibilities; had he not been such an extremist in self-abnegation he might have lacked the supreme gift of humility; had he been more practical he could never have been so genuinely unworldly.

In order to make this clear Mr. Potter has analysed the poet from two separate standpoints—Coleridge and S. T. C. By so doing he enables us to gaze upon Coleridge's faults impassionately and without detraction from the great Coleridge whom they clothed. This procedure is undoubtedly attended by grave dangers; but provided that the book is handled by unflippant readers, it will be found justified because in dealing with this extremely human man no other method has ever been able to throw so much light, from so many angles, upon him. If the "de-bunking" school has led by slow degrees to this realistic but reverent approach to the great, it is an agreeable sign of the times.

J. S. COLLIS

The Frustration of Science. Foreword by FREDERICK SODDY (George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., London.)

This work contains a foreword and seven essays each dealing with a special department of scientific research and attempting with more or less success to show how much more quickly Science might progress were

it not for lack of funds on the one hand, and on the other, the counteracting influence of the human failings and prejudices of the non-scientific mass of mankind. In the present state of the world, the authors complain—and there will be general agreement with them—the dedication of so vast an amount of scientific research to the

purposes of war is a hindrance to progress; but when it is suggested that we might obtain larger returns from agriculture by abolishing—"liquidating"—the great and socially valuable class of independent farmers and peasant cultivators, many of us may think that the advantage would be paid for at too high a price.

In a paper on "The Invention of Sterility" Dr. Enid Charles deals with population problems and quotes figures to show that the birthrate among all the highly civilised Western peoples has dropped to such an extent that given a continuance of existing conditions, the European nations will decline in numbers to vanishing point in a very few centuries. No doubt, as Dr. Charles points out, economic causes have much to do with this decline: but there are also moral and psychological sides to it. More children involve less luxury for the parents; and in a materialist age when ethics are no longer reinforced by the sanction of even the crudest spiritual convictions, duty will naturally play second fiddle to pleasure. To restore the balance we need, not

only drastic economic and political reforms, but also a great moral and spiritual revival. This most vital point, however, is largely ignored by Sir Daniel Hall and his colleagues, whose outlook is frankly external and materialist. They appear to think that, given what Prof. Blackett calls "complete Socialism," science would advance triumphantly without any of its present frustrations; and under its fostering care, mankind would rapidly become healthier, wealthier and happier. In effect, the book is a pronouncement in favour of the economic materialism of Marx and against the great anti-Marxian movement of Fascism.

With the exception, however, of Prof. Blackett's contribution, which is purely political and the occasional political references of some of his colleagues, *The Frustration of Science* may be commended as containing a large amount of extremely useful and interesting information as to the present position of scientific research, from which the discriminating reader will be able to draw his own conclusions.

R. A. V. M

Spiridonova. By I. STEINBERG, Commissar for Justice in the First Soviet Cabinet (Methuen, London. 12s. 6d.)

Compared with the fate of Spiridonova's peers in Nazi Germany, one is inclined to find her exile to the Ural Mountains quite a benevolent action towards such a doughty opponent!

Once oppressed Spiridonova returns to her former position of power and becomes oppressor in turn. What is true in an individual's life is also true in that of a nation or a race. The lesson is clear: political mass movements do not produce permanent results to the benefit of mankind. The masses of Russia freed from the Czar find themselves regimented under the equally iron-handed Soviet. Political murder, even though such assassination be undertaken with high motives and as an act of personal self-sacrifice bears out evil fruit.

Spiridonova, Russian Terrorist, assassin at 21, prisoner, exile, successful and powerful political leader, opponent of the Bolsheviks, and again an exile—this is a tragic and an unhappy career. The brotherhood of mankind is a fact and fortunately it is not necessary that we should all go through the same experiences. Her life is therefore of value to each one of us. In the very tragedy of this uncompleted life, the opportunity of learning its lessons remains. The very power of self-sacrifice, of the will to live and strive for that which one believes to be right and true, though meeting with present frustration will give birth some time to clear perception of what is true as a means to transform the prison-house of earth into a temple worthy for free-souls.

B. T.

Anna Berger. By George Godwin (Jarrolds, London. 7s. 6d.)

Peekover. By J. D. Beresford (William Heinemann, Ltd., London. 7s. 6d.)

Here are two novels founded on occult themes. The first deals with the little understood phenomenon of stigmata; the second with the lapse of memory, a phenomenon equally puzzling to modern scientists. Both the stories are founded upon actual case-records: Mr. Godwin wrote in *THE ARYAN PATH* for April, 1934 about Teresa Neumann, at the time the much-talked of stigmatist of Kounersreath; Mr. Beresford makes good use of *I Lost My Memory* reviewed in *THE ARYAN PATH* for November, 1932.

In the first Mr. Godwin presents both the theological and scientific points of view on stigmata; Father Schumann, the Roman Catholic padre, tries to win over to his blind belief in divinely inspired miracle the doctor who is versed in up-to-date psychological and psycho-analytical theories; of course the priest fails. The Roman church, because of its dogmatic traditions, must trace stigmata to either the grace of god or the machination of the devil, and so the modern scientist deservedly wins. Mr. Godwin uncovers well the tactics of the Roman church face to face with the stigmatist and also shows what science thinks of the phenomenon. But for all that, the scientific explanations are really not convincing. The final word is—"science has not yet found out."

As there are no miracles and as Mr. Godwin's doctor and modern science are not able to enlighten us, let us see what occult science has to offer? Looking upon stigmata, of St. Francis or any body else, as a result of a disease of the imagination, Occultism puts stigmata in the same group of abnormal phenomena as birth-marks. Occult science, while rejecting the supernatural, recognises the formidable potency of human will and imagination, exercised consciously or otherwise. Stigmata are an outcome of this potency of the mind over the body.

Even in normal individuals, the power of imagination unconsciously exercised by such violent emotions as intense grief or fear, has been known to actually turn the hair white over night, derange and even kill the body. What knife or acid are to the material body, that will and imagination can become to what is known as the astral body, effects upon which will ultimately manifest in the physical.

Gilbert Peckover, an ordinary individual, continually snubbed and despised by his wife and only son, bore things with outer meekness and inward rebellion until one evening, he walked out of the house "in a state of great mental disturbance, and forgot all that had happened to him in the past sixteen years. That little lapse did not affect his intelligence or his business capacity. He was as sane as he had ever been." After some adventurous months of happiness, he is arrested for bigamy (committed unknowingly). Placed before the magistrate, he cannot remember anything whatever that has elapsed since he left his house on that fateful night, six months ago. Later on, under medical guidance and care, he recalls the whole chain of events.

Explaining the phenomena, the doctor frankly admits:—

We psychologists know precious little, as yet, about the human mind and spirit.... You see, my friend, we really have no idea as to what part the actual physical brain plays in the human economy. Nevertheless, a few of us are becoming continually more certain that the brain is not a recording or a motivating mechanism, but just an immensely complicated apparatus for the transmission of sensations, emotions, and memories.

Such is also the teaching of occult science which states:—

There are cells in our brain that receive and convey sensations and impressions, but this once done, their mission is accomplished. These cells of the supposed "organ of memory" are the *receivers* and *conveyers* of all the pictures and impressions of the past, not their *retainers*.... When it is said that one has lost his memory, or that it is weakened, it is only a *façon de parler*; it is our memory cells alone that are enfeebled or destroyed.

(*Memory in the Dying*, H. P. Blavatsky, U. L. T. Pamphlet No. 25.)

What, then, is the real seat of memory? Says Madame Blavatsky:—

Memory—the despair of the materialist, the enigma of the psychologist, the sphinx of science—is to the student of old philosophies merely a name to express that power which man unconsciously exerts, and shares with many of the inferior animals—to look with inner sight into the astral light, and there behold the images of past sensations and incidents. Instead of searching the cerebral ganglia for “micrographs of the living and the dead, of scenes that we have visited, of incidents in which we have borne a part,” they went to the vast repository where the records of every man’s life as well as every pulsation of the visible cosmos are stored up for all Eternity! (*Isis Unveiled* I. 178-9)

A Pageant of Asia: A Study of Three Civilizations. By KENNETH SAUNDERS (Milford, Oxford University Press. 21s.)

The book is well named. For a pageant fills the eye with its moving groups that crowd the history of an age into a brief hour’s space. To be sure, strict accuracy may often yield first place to popular notions, while time and space allow for outline treatment only; so with this book—a pageant for the mind—of India, China and Japan, compressing religion, science, philosophy, art, social custom and political history into some 430 pages, with, in addition, about 50 plates of photographs. This includes extracts from the various writers and the first thought is one of admiration for the labour of the work. Next the reaction of the average reader in the West, for whom the book is apparently prepared would perhaps be one of shame that, even with some pretensions to culture, he should know so little of these civilizations, these personages, these philosophies paged in swift succession before his eyes.

If he is wise he will not stop at that, but will use the book as a stepping stone to deeper comprehension. From the mind pageant he must find his way to the soul understanding. He will be well advised not to pay over-

To really understand Stigmata, Remembrance and Loss of Memory, and numerous other psychic and abnormal phenomena one must know about the powers and functions of that which is known as the Astral Body. Writes H. P. Blavatsky in *The Secret Doctrine* (II. 149):—

The whole issue of the quarrel between the profane and the esoteric sciences depends upon the belief in, and demonstration of, an astral body within the physical, the former independent of the latter.

N. K. K.

much attention to the—admittedly tentative—chronology given, nor to the various popular notions taken over as a legacy from the Orientalists of the last century—such notions as the conception of the Vedas as naive productions of infant humanity, or the idea that the allegories of all three countries were mainly nature and fertility cults. Again, though the standard naturally varies, the translated extracts do not always let through the spirit of the original. The rendition, not by Mr. Saunders, of the *Bhagavad-Gita* into a jog-trot nursery rhythm that kills the strength and much of the meaning of the poem is a case in point. Nevertheless, if the reader will start with the general sympathy shown by the author for the subject and will add to it the basis by which he can correct any errors and can see the causal relationship of each phase of these civilizations, he will gain something of value.

Let the reader use the data scattered through the pages of *The Secret Doctrine* of H. P. Blavatsky as a commentary and guide by which to read this book. The pageant will then be seen to be not merely an interesting kaleidoscopic sequence, but, as it were, a living organic growth. This will mean double work for him, but it will be worth it.

W. E. W.

Dhammapada. (1) Translated from the original Pali by S. W. WIJATILAKE (G. A. Natesan & Co, Madras.) (2) Text in Devanagari with English translation by Prof. N. K. BHAGWAT (The Buddha Society, Bombay.)

The *Dhammapada*, or "Way (Religion, or Word) of Truth" is the standard book of moral proverbs (*logia*) of the Buddhists in all countries. This collection of verses (over 400) is culled from the Buddhist Canon as well as from similar secular literature and represents the teaching of a religion far wider than is denoted by "Buddhist" in the specific sense of the word. It coincides more or less with what in India is called the religion of the Aryans, or of the "Santah," i.e. the Noble (minded) or the Good. Many of the verses recur in Hindu ethical literature, e.g., in the *Hitopadesa* and *Manu*. It is significant that the Buddhists themselves are in the Pali Canon designated as Aryans.

As the anthology is in its essence ethical, its sections do not bear sectarian or dogmatic labels, but are grouped under headings either indicating the virtues praised or vices condemned in that particular portion, or representing similes referring to the "pure in heart" as flowers etc. Being non-sectarian, even the two sections entitled *Buddhavagga* and *Brahmana-vagga* are not specifically "Buddhist," but while the first one speaks of the "awakened ones" in a general way as the "Buddhas," the latter designates as Brahmins those who are "true god-like men" who live an unselfish life in this world of unrest, hatred and pride. And thus it is not surprising that the Brahmana receives the epithet of Buddha (v. 298).

On account of its variety and universality of out-look on life and life's goal the *Dhammapada* has since the days of its compilation (perhaps the second or early first century B. C.) been a great favourite among Bud-

dhists and similar-minded communities. Proof of this is the multitude of translations of it into various languages and its edition in different alphabets. Anyone achieving the latter deserves credit for spreading the knowledge of the noble Indian dialect called Pali, and anyone who undertakes a translation renders a service to the dissemination of the true Aryan culture among those whose language is not akin to Pali.

Prof. Bhagwat with his edition has thus acquired a double merit. In his preface he voices the happy thought that "the *Dhammapada* deserves to be as popular as the *Gītā*." The *Gītā* has long since found a place in the minds (and sporadically the hearts) of the European people, but the *Dhammapada* is not yet as popular as it deserves to be. The unstable ethics (which cannot be divorced from true politics) of the West is sorely in need of a stabilisation infinitely more vital than that of currency and exchange.

In this sense we also welcome the translation of the *Dhammapada* by S. W. Wijatilake. His English, like that of Prof. Bhagwat's, is lucid and true to the sense of the original. Here we must bear in mind that the *Dhammapada* is difficult to translate: it is by no means an easy textbook (to give it as a "set book" at our University Intermediate examinations I consider as unwise) on account of the conciseness in the expression of deep philosophical thoughts, the technical terms for which cannot be squared in any foreign language. The *Dhammapada* moreover contains like the *Gītā* many very subtle allusions and plays upon words, such as in the very word of the title "pada" (which occurs again in a pun at v. 180). Under these circumstances both translators will be readily pardoned for little inaccuracies and occasional heaviness of diction. The two little books are handy and can be procured at very low cost.

W. STEDE

Religious Thought in France in the Nineteenth Century. By SPARROW SIMPSON (George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., London. 5s.)

The author—a Canon of the Church of England—does not make of his book an extensive work or a thorough criticism of the religious thought of France during the nineteenth century, nor does he attempt it. Its very size—180 small pages—would prevent this, but the result is an excellent popular hand-book.

After having described positivism—a kind of religious excrescence, created by Auguste Comte in the middle of the last century—the author devotes a few brief pages to the spiritualistic and theistic school or rather schools which flourished at the time. Then come four long chapters on dogmatic protestantism and modern protestantism, on the conceptions of the Divinity of Christ and of Redemption.

The catholic critique grew side by side with the protestant critique and the modernistic movement began to weaken the infallible authority and the dogmas of the church. The history of the changes which were taking place in the very bosom of the church and of the struggle of the papal authority against this by means of encyclical letters and excommunications is a fascinating one. The new tendency was to follow out its course to the bitter end, until the coming generations doubted the very fundamental bases of religious feelings—witness the well-known book of Guyau: *L'Irreligion de l'Avenir*, which counterbalances the last of Bergson's works, *Less Deux Sources de la Morale et de la Religion*, an ardent and moving defence of spirituality.

To return once more to the fold of catholicism, symbolised in the first half of the century by the great figure of Lacordaire, and then by a brilliant constellation of exegetists and preachers. One of the later chapters is

devoted to that remarkable phenomenon which, towards the end of the nineteenth century, brought about a considerable number of celebrated conversions among well-known writers; these writers, however, were more disgusted by the aridness of determinism than smitten by the ideal of mortification; they were attracted more by the æsthetics of the catholic ritual than by its formidable dogmas. Canon Simpson criticises these conversions, and rightly too. He feels that a conversion which is not based on the fundamental tenets of a religion is silly and absurd. But in general he abstains with strict impartiality from judging either the opinions that he describes or their champions and defenders. He is doing the work of an historian and he wishes to remain only an historian. Even so would it spell bias to give a few broad conclusions in a study which is so deeply interesting to human thought? Canon Simpson in each chapter plunges abruptly into the history of the movement he is going to describe, and the chapter ends with the last statement of fact. There is nowhere a general synthesis, never an attempt to view the movement as a whole, nor is there ever a clear link between the various parts of the book. This, in our opinion is regrettable omission.

This treatment, however, lends a great swiftness to the book, and gives a sense of ease, surprising when we think of the abstract ideas with which it deals. Canon Simpson's style is clear. He has the peculiar gift of making the "dramas of conscience" live; the various stages in their break with authority; their struggle with opposing ideas. Thanks to this volume there is not a reader who may not be initiated easily into the dramatic episodes of the eternal religious adventure.

CLAUDINE CHONEZ

[Translated from French.]

ENDS AND SAYINGS

“ — — — — — ends of verse
And sayings of philosophers ”

HUDBRAS.

An excellent example of how spiritual ideas and pure practices degenerate into religious beliefs and undesirable ceremonials is to be found in “Pirism (Corrupted Sufism),” an article by Professor Syed Muzaffar-ud-din Nadvi in the July *Islamic Culture* (Hyderabad, Deccan).

Islam has two sides—external and internal, and the two sides are inter-dependent. The early Sufis to all intents and purposes, made no difference between the esoteric and exoteric sides of the religion. The degeneration of Sufism began when the Muslims of the later times separated the two halves of the Faith. Another innovation . . . was the institution of separate bodies under various chiefs. . . . In India, Muslim Saints came in touch with Pandits and Sadhus Sufism, the essence of all that is pure and holy, was dethroned by Pirism, the Devil of all the Devils. . . . Tomb-worship and Urs ceremonies were introduced. Offering sweets, showering flowers, kneeling down before tombs, praying for the favour of a child from or through the inmates of tombs are some of the many innovations that have crept into Muslim Society. The corrupted Pirs of India were further influenced by the priestly system of Christianity. Priests both Catholic and Protestant, regard themselves as above the general run of Christians. They reserve to themselves certain privileges. They undertake to plead the cause of their followers before God in the next world. I do not think that this self-aggrandising spirit of the priests is warranted by

the Christian religion. Anyhow this spirit, suiting as it did the degenerated Pirs, was accepted by them, and propagated as an article of Faith among their illiterate disciples. The above is no exaggerated charge against present-day Pirism. The similarity between the so-called spiritual ceremonies of Pirs and Pandits is so remarkable that a number of Hindus are found visiting Darghas. The early Sufis generally retained the democratic spirit of Islam intact; but the Pirs have crushed and butchered it. . . . A large section of the Muslim community in India is ensnared by the self-styled Pirs, and so long as this state of affairs continues, there can be no hope for the emancipation of the Muslims in India.

We have quoted at length this indictment, as righteous as it is vigorous. The writer refers to some Hindus having gone to the Darghas; we have known some Parsis to do the same; again we know of Muslims, Hindus and Parsis who make offerings at the Romish altars. The priest—padre or pir, mobed or purohit—cannot be consistently faithful to his own profession and also be a friend of pure religion and spiritual life. The esoteric side of Islam is to be found in pure Sufism on which subject we have published several important essays from time to time. One of the chief difficulties in the study of Sufism, as in that of other old world mysticisms, is the language of

allegory, of metaphor and of personification in which they abound. But we fully agree with the conclusion of the Professor that Muslims in India will not be emancipated if "this state of affairs continues." And that holds equally true for every priest-ridden community without exception.

The practical difficulty which the religious reformer has to guard against in purifying his faith is that he shall not proselytize the orthodox into atheism. We have known many who in giving up the superstitions of religion hug to their bosoms those of science! The only eternally doomed are the mentally lazy—those who will not enquire and study but desire only to believe.

Then there is the widely prevailing notion that adequate knowledge about Soul and Spirit, pre-natal and post-mortem conditions of the human being, and so on, is not available. The records left behind by the long line of Mystics and Sages in every land and era possess truths which are verifiable; but they are looked upon as childish superstitions or vague speculations. A study of religious myths and mystical philosophy will reveal that we are not altogether devoid of reliable knowledge which would kill sectarianism in religion and produce a broadening

influence in favour of the Universal Religion of Life.

Talking of priests—it is but rarely that we have an opportunity of commending the advice of one of that group. But here is one. The high-priest of the Parsis of the Deccan, Sardar Dastur Noshirvan is reported by *Jam-e-Jamshed* (Bombay) as saying:—

Are the gates of heaven to open for a man who goes on committing sins and goes on employing priests to perform ceremonies because he possesses wealth? Certainly not. You have to gain the blessings of heaven by your own good thoughts, good words and good deeds.

This is a true spiritual doctrine. But the high-priest also claims that the privilege of advising and helping the laity belongs to the priest-class. Why? Cannot any Parsi—the community claims to be well-educated—determine for himself in what his own moral goodness lies? And how many Parsi *mobeds* and *dasturs* are there of pure life, clean habits, and sufficient insight who can discharge such a duty as Dastur Noshervan speaks of? The priests themselves need self-effort to secure spiritual salvation; they have to free themselves from the sins of greed for lucre and ignorance of Soul-Science. Dastur Noshervan's advice quoted above is needed by the priest-class as much as by the laity.

EUROS



Point out the "Way"—however dimly,
lost among the host—as does the evening
star to those who tread their path in darkness.
—*The Voice of the Silence*

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FROM GUILT TO PUNISHMENT

An old reprobate even though warned by his doctor is unable to resist the temptations of the flesh. The wine of arrogance is in his head; the gold of greed is in his pocket; his blood is stirred by the din of possessive passion as he marches to the house of the harlot, and sells his Soul to the devil of selfishness.

Such is the picture that political Europe presents and she has imitators all over the world. Once on a downward grade it is most difficult to take advantage of any opportunity that circumstances present toward an upward movement. Though the peoples of the world have been through the ghastly experience of war and its terrible sufferings they do not seem to have learnt its lessons. Greed, hatred, fear and passion were the roots of the last War. They were not recognized in 1914, for over them was drawn the veil of Maya—nationalistic patri-

otism, the cause of culture, defence of the god-given soil, the good of the world. Those were the deceiving slogans of the day. They were not recognized later at Versailles, for then the ever-changing Maya had assumed still other hues: of future peace, of homes for heroes, of a world ever safe for democracy. Even when digging the foundation for the League of Nations the roots of the giant tree were stealthily nurtured. Laws of Economics and Politics were considered, but Moral Principles appeared merely as figures of speech in the orations of representatives of the high contracting parties. Brotherhood of all humanity, sacrifice of the strong nation for the good of the weak, respectful consideration for age-old civilizations, or for the rights of savage-races—those were not practical enough propositions. Absence of such moral principles is responsible for the League's numerous failures and the weak-

ness of its position despite a few minor successes and much good work. To-day once more greed, hatred, fear and passion are to the fore, in Eastern Asia, on the Mediterranean, in North-East Africa. Once again we hear bombastic talk of civilizing the uncivilized—a web of words hiding greed and lust for power. For sixteen years the secret forces of fear against enmity, of hurt pride against victorious strength; for sixteen years silent preparation to meet the greedy foe, or to overtake the unprepared poor; for sixteen years a proletarian exploitation to match imperialistic exploitation, and a fascistic autocracy to rival communistic autocracy. It has veritably been a rake's progress, and now that progress is fast approaching its nemesis which

Just though mysterious, leads us on unerring
Through ways unmark'd from guilt to punishment.

What is the way out for this civilization?

We have selected four recent pronouncements, each of which is important and they are significant and also typical.

Mr. H. G. Wells after studying for a second time the New Deal of President Roosevelt has returned to his home somewhat dubious about the success of that experiment in the U. S. A. His study has confirmed his pessimism over the safety of our civilization. In an article to the *New York Foreign Affairs* on "Civilization on Trial," after surveying the international situation he says:—

Unless men can get outside their national limitations, and unless they

can tackle economic and financial and monetary problems with something bigger than their national equipment, I think it is not a question of centuries but of decades before we see our civilization going down. The way will not be for the present time. The problem is to make it successful... If humanity fails, it will fail for the lack of organized mental effort and for no other reason.

This is excellent but what is the remedy put forward? Mr. Wells has "no panacea to offer." But he does proffer his solution:—

Is it not possible for the English-speaking communities to begin getting together upon the answers to some of the financial riddles, the economic riddles and the political riddles that paralyze us?

Instancing the co-operation between the U. S. A. and Canada against smuggling he says:—

Suppose some one saw the opportunity for this sort of thing on a larger scale. Suppose some one saw the possibility of having the United States fleet in the Pacific and the British fleet in the Atlantic, instead of having a British fleet in the Pacific and the American fleet in the Pacific, and a British fleet in the Atlantic and an American fleet in the Atlantic. Is it impossible? What makes it impossible? What divergence of purpose stands in the way?

The English-speaking community to impose peace upon the World! "What divergence of purpose stands in the way?" Financial, economic and political riddles apparently cause the divergence; but trace them all to a moral root, and we shall find that national pride and ambition, lust and greed are there. Moreover, even though generous, fair and

chivalrous principles of conduct were adopted by the U. S. A. and the British Commonwealth towards each other in the cause of unity, there still remains the rest of the world. Partial Brotherhoods like half-truths, are dangerous; the world as a whole could not breathe an air of peace and security. Rivalries of non-English speaking peoples would beget an organism to match "that English-danger." The idea, however attractive it may sound, is lined with risk; similarly a comity of White Nations against the Coloured Races would prove not only dangerous but futile in the extreme. Mechanical progress has made the world a compact whole; any project which does not take that *whole* into fair and just account is bound to fail. At the present stage, encumbered with their respective commitments, and with the League of Nations breathing at Geneva, neither the U. S. A. nor Britain is morally free to move in the direction suggested by Mr. Wells.

The second pronouncement is, simply expressed—let the League function in all its strength. If the League is impotent in grave crises the fault must be laid to the principal members of the League. This is the view very forcefully brought out by Mr. Vernon Bartlett. Writing in his July *World* on "European Hope or African Hell," he says:—

The dispute between Italy and Abyssinia will compel us to face a test of our honesty and courage far more severe than that presented to us by Japan when she occupied Manchuria

in 1931. Probably most people do not even now realise how manifold and disastrous have been the results of our failure to pass the Manchurian test. Until we are ruled, in international as in civil life, by a moral code which assures justice in spite of inclination, our own and other countries will be haunted by the constant fear of war. This doctrine that, in international affairs, a powerful nation must be allowed to conquer a weak one merely by reason of its superior power is so immoral that one should be ashamed to be a national of a state that accepted it. Moral principles must be the same, whether they are applied to individuals or to nations.

The remedy then is that the most influential members who practically guide the destinies of the League should remain true to their vows and commitments. They must begin, late though it is, to live in terms of true moral principles. As in the case of an individual who has resolved to turn a new leaf and to live aright and nobly, the past sins and misdemeanours of these great Powers will stand in their way. The finger of just criticism will be pointed at them, as it was recently by Italy at Great Britain; but as Mr. Bartlett shows the great Powers must nevertheless continue their efforts to act righteously. This will involve a purging and a purification of themselves; and in their own spheres of action, where they are free and unhampered, they must do so.

But is this true of the great Powers? Are their hands clean—not from the dirt of old sins, but from present-day greed and injustice? If the great Powers

failed in the Manchurian crisis, as Mr. Bartlett points out, it was because they were not guided by moral principles which work for the good of the world, but by self-interests.

The next pronouncement is from Sir Norman Angell, a man who has served Peace and Justice and whose views deserve respectful consideration. He also wants Great Britain to rise to her moral height and face Italy because of her own plighted word :—

Of course it is horrible and cruel to think that in certain extremely unlikely contingencies we might kill perfectly innocent Italian workers. It is horrible and cruel to take a forger or a murderer from his wife and children for half a lifetime and expose them, innocent though they be, to moral and material miseries. But no choice, presented by the complex problems of human society, ever is, as between a course which is completely fair and painless and one which is entirely evil. It is a moral certainty that in the end we should kill far more by not applying the Covenant than by letting Italy now know that in the event of her going to war with Abyssinia we shall take steps to secure the application of Articles 10, 12, 15, 16 and 20 of that Treaty of which we and she alike are signatories.

This is taken from the "Foreign Affairs Supplement" of the well-edited *Time and Tide*. With his usual insight and sense of justice Sir Norman adds :—

And of course our action should not be merely repressive. Italy, like other populous States, needs means of economic expansion. They are certainly not going to be realized by military adventure in Africa, by the creation of African nationalisms which can only

end by adding to the dangers the face every nation having interests in Africa. The only means by which States in the economic position of Italy can in the long run solve the problem of "space" is by the establishment of a code of economic rights for all nations, a code of which the League must be the instrument. Abyssinia is prepared to accept technical help through the League in the Emperor's policy of modernization and development; and in that work and its results Italy would get her share. Far from it being true that a League of Nations is just the means by which the "saturated" powers resist the claims of the "unsatisfied," the economic internationalism of which the League should be the instrument is the only means by which the "unsatisfied" may find means of outlet that others will not resist. But the prelude to that positive and constructive work must be the assurance of defence by collective action.

Such a plan could succeed, but who will guide the nations "to live up to the ideals for which we declare we fought the last war?" Men like Mr. Bartlett and Sir Norman are not in power.

And that brings us to the fourth pronouncement :—

I believe that if there is to be any enduring peace, international measures must also be taken to improve the conditions of the masses. Prosperity for the entire body of humanity must take the place of hunger and oppression. The citizen of the world must be educated away from jealousy and greed and hate.

Mustapha Kemal spoke these words. The Ghazi who a few years ago taught a lesson to arrogant Europe and who has established his fame for valour and patriotism has more recently earned for himself, by arduous and

devoted service to his people, the title of Ataturk—the Father of the Turks. *The Hindu* of Madras (10th July) has reprinted an interview given by Kemal Ataturk to an Egyptian newspaper from which the above is an extract. Speaking of leaders he says:—

Some insincere leaders, who do not foresee the seriousness of war, have made themselves factors of aggression. Apparently they have deceived their nations by misrepresentations and abuse of nationalism and tradition. In order to avoid chaos in these critical hours the time has come for the masses to make their own decisions and place the responsibility of leadership in the hands of conscientious persons of excellent character and high morals, and this should be done as soon as possible.

But the masses, even when well educated lack wisdom to practise the moral principles which are known to them. Narrow nationalism in different forms has become the religion of people all over the world.

Out of his experience the great educator of some fourteen millions tells us that “the citizen of the world must be educated away from jealousy and greed and hate”—in other words, a purely moral and unsectarian education of the adult masses is the need of the hour. Neither the religious priests, nor the nationalistic politicians will respond to this need. To-day there is not a single cosmopolitan institution, strong and influential enough, to impress the idea and ideal of true Internationalism on the minds of the world. The League of

Nations is primarily a political body in which nationalistic Powers play their games and leave the League when it does not suit them. And yet it has within its constitution the potency to move the world in a righteous course.

As we do not believe in fatalism and as our Esoteric Philosophy teaches us to turn every power of evil to some good, we hold that it is never too late to abandon the wrong path and to adopt high, moral principles of life, individual or corporate. That Esoteric Philosophy teaches—

Nor would the ways of Karma be inscrutable were men to work in union and harmony, instead of disunion and strife. For our ignorance of those ways—which one portion of mankind calls the ways of Providence, dark and intricate; while another sees in them the action of blind Fatalism; and a third, simple chance, with neither gods nor devils to guide them—would surely disappear, if we would but attribute all these to their correct cause. With right knowledge, or at any rate with a confident conviction that our neighbours will no more work to hurt us than we would think of harming them, the two-thirds of the World's evil would vanish into thin air. Were no man to hurt his brother, Karma-Nemesis would have neither cause to work for, nor weapons to act through. . . . We stand bewildered before the mystery of our own making and the riddles of life that *we will not* solve, and then accuse the great Sphinx of devouring us. Begin acting from *within*, instead of ever following impulses from *without*. . . . The only palliative to the evils of life is union and harmony—a Brotherhood IN ACTU, and *altruism* not simply in name.

THE SONG OF THE HIGHER LIFE

I. THE GENERAL SETTING

[Below we publish the first of a series of essays founded on the great textbook of Practical Occultism, the *Bhagavad-Gita*. Each of these will discuss a title of one of the eighteen chapters of the Song Celestial. The writer calls them "Notes on the Chapter Titles of the Gita"—but they are more than notes. They bring a practical message born of study and experience.]

Sri Krishna Prem is the name taken in the old traditional manner prevailing in India by a young English gentleman when he resolved to enter the Path of Vairagya, renouncing his all, including the name given to him at birth. He took his tripos at Cambridge in Mental and Moral Sciences and is a deep student of Indian philosophy. Away from the world but serving it with faith he lives in the Himālayas, and is esteemed highly for his sincerity, earnestness and devotion.—EDS.]

Before starting to discuss the *Gita* itself it will be desirable to say a few words about its setting, namely, the events recorded in the *Mahābhārata* which serve as the framework of the *Gita*. I am quite aware that many western scholars consider that the *Gita* was not a part of the original *Mahābhārata* but as most of them have yet to show any real understanding of either, I do not propose to discuss their views and will simply point out with Telang that the *Gita* has been introduced into its setting in a perfectly harmonious manner and, further, that a consideration of the events related in the *Mahābhārata* can easily shed considerable light upon the inner meaning of the *Gita*.

For the sake of western readers I will very briefly recount those events.

The Divinely born Arjuna with his four brothers was brought up with his cousins, the Kauravas, at the court of the latter's father

Dhritarāshtra, the king who, though disqualified by his blindness, had seized and held the throne. Not content with seizing the throne, the old king did not even hold the balance evenly between his sons and their cousins, the Pāṇdavas, but constantly favoured the former. Hostility soon developed between the two parties and, after a brief attempt to divide the realm between them, the Pāṇdavas were defeated at dice by trickery and made to wander for twelve long years in exile followed by a thirteenth year in which their very whereabouts had to remain unknown. At the conclusion of this period the well-meaning but weak king found it impossible to persuade his headstrong and evil minded son Duryodhana to restore to the Pāṇdavas their share of the kingdom and in spite of fruitless attempts to bring about a reconciliation by Sañjaya, Dhritarāshtra's charioteer, by Bhishma, his wise

counsellor, and even by the Lord Krishna Himself, war could not be averted and the rival hosts faced each other on the field of Kurukshetra. It is at this point that the *Gita* comes in.

Without going into the question as to whether all the incidents of the *Mahābhārata* have a symbolic significance and whether it is possible to trace a consistent symbolism all through the vast epic, it must be clear to all who have eyes that there is an inner significance behind the events thus inadequately summarised. There is no need to ask the question whether the author of the *Mahābhārata* had such a symbolism consciously in his mind. Many, perhaps most, great works of art are filled with symbolism that is often quite unplanned by the conscious minds of their creators and sometimes this symbolism is truer and more profound from the fact of its having descended from a region beyond the realm of conscious thinking. It embodies, not the head-knowledge but the soul-knowledge of the artist. If it were not so then we should have to concur in Plato's rejection of art as being but the shadow of a shadow.

Porphyry, the great Neoplatonist mystic, successfully demonstrated what a wealth of symbolism existed in the epics of Homer. It is true that most modern scholars reject all such interpretations as a mere reading into the texts of meanings that were never intended by the author but such a view is entirely

superficial and is based on an utter ignorance of the nature of great art which is always symbolic because it takes its birth in a realm whose only utterance is in symbol. If this is true of such a poem as the *Odyssey*, far more is it true of the *Mahābhārata*, a poem in which all the culture, all the aspirations and all the traditions of an entire race found expression. Symbolism is, in fact, like beauty itself: either you see it or you do not. And if it is seen then it is as irrelevant to enquire whether it was consciously intended by the author as it is to ask whether the beauty was consciously intended by him. It exists.

The skeleton interpretation which I shall indicate does not base itself (except in one point) upon the authority of scriptural texts nor does it depend for its validity on anyone's ability to fit every event in the poem into the framework of this scheme. That may or may not be possible and in any case is outside the scope of these notes. Whatever value it may have for any reader will depend entirely on the light that it may succeed in throwing on the teachings of the *Gita* for him. I may also add that no claim is made that these thoughts are original. Anyone who considers that they belong to him is welcome to take possession of them.

In the first place we should notice that, though not the eldest, the chief of the Pāṇḍava brothers is Arjuna. He it was who won Draupadi at the *Swayamvara*,* and

* It was a custom in ancient India for princesses and daughters of kshatriyas to elect their husbands at a public assembly of suitors (called *Swayamvara*) held for that purpose.—EDS.

it was he alone whom she really loved and he who was the hero of the greatest exploits. Yudhishtira may excel in dharma and Bhima in feats of strength but it is on Arjuna's heroic prowess that the Pāṇdavas depend and it was Arjuna who went to Kailāsa to get the magic weapons from Mahādeva Himself. It is Arjuna, again, who is the special friend of Sri Krishna and the latter confirms this view when, in the tenth chapter of the *Gita*, he proclaims Arjuna and not Yudhishtira as the chief of the Pāṇdavas (*Pāṇḍavānām Dhananjaya*).

In the *Srimat-Bhāgawata* it is Arjuna who goes with Krishna to the abode of the Purushottama and is addressed by the latter as a second Krishna (*ityādishtau bhagawata tau krishnau parameshthinā*) and, returning to the *Mahābhārata*, it is Arjuna who is seen in heaven with Krishna, "those two foremost of all beings," by Yudhishtira on the latter's arrival there.

Arjuna and Krishna, the inseparable friends, are in fact well known to represent Nara and Nārāyana, the human soul and the Divine Soul, jivātma and Paramātma. They are the two birds that are described in the Upanishad, the two birds, eternal friends, seated upon the same tree, the body, of whom one, the human soul, eats the fruits while the other, the Paramātma, is a silent witness. It is true that the terms Nara and Nārāyana are explained by a reference to the story of a dual incarnation of Deity in the form of

two Rishis, Nara and Nārāyana, who performed tapasya and are believed to be still so doing, in the Himālayas. But this story is itself symbolic. The word "rishi" means a seer and in fact the only seer is the Ātman.¹ "That which sees through the eye but whom the eye sees not: That is Ātman." So says the Upanishad and this story of the two Rishis is a symbol of the dual soul, human and Divine incarnated in one body. It is significant that the very name of the place in which the two Rishis perform their austerities is Badri, the name of a tree bearing sweet fruits, thus bringing us back again to the Upanishadic birds who are seated on a tree which likewise bears sweet fruits (*swādu pip-palam*).

The significance of Arjuna and Krishna having thus been indicated, we must next enquire into that of his brothers and cousins. We shall see that in the sixteenth chapter of the *Gita*, Sri Krishna makes a division between two great tendencies or movements in creation which He terms the Daivi or Divine, and the Asuric or demonic. It is these two tendencies that are symbolised by Arjuna's brothers and by the hostile Kauravas respectively. Detailed treatment of these two forces will come in its proper place; it will be sufficient here to observe that the Asuric and Daivi creations, popularly identified with vices and virtues respectively, in reality signify the "outgoing" and "ingoin" forces elsewhere called "pravritti" and "nivritti," the forces which

tend to enmesh the soul deeper and deeper in matter and those which help and accompany it on its return journey to Spirit. It is evident that the popular identification of them with the vices and virtues is but a rough approximation to their true meaning and one on a much lower plane of thought than that of the *Gita*.

It should be further noted that the Kauravas and the Pāṇdavas are cousins. There is none of the ultimate dualism that has marred so much of Christian thought, no God and Devil standing as ultimate irreconcilables. The Daivi and Asuric forces both spring from the same Supreme Source and in the end, both return to It.

It is not necessary to go into the question of the significance of the individual Pāṇdavas (except of course Arjuna who has already been dealt with) or Kauravas. The only other figures we shall discuss are Dhritarāshtra, the blind old king, and Sañjaya, his charioteer. These two are of some importance as they figure directly in the *Gita*.

The teachings of the *Gita* are spoken by Krishna who is acting as the charioteer of Arjuna; they are overheard by Sañjaya as a result of the blessing of Vyāsa, the author of the Scriptures and who signifies the power of inspiration, and they are repeated to Dhritarāshtra. This is the framework in which the teachings of the *Gita*

are set. Who are these persons and what is the significance of the two charioteers?

Krishna, we have seen is the Divine Soul who imparts the life-giving Wisdom to the individual soul. The metaphor of the Charioteer is one that occurs in the Upanishads and also in the Dialogues of Plato. In the Upanishads the individual soul is described as the rider in the chariot of the body while "buddhi" (a mental faculty that we shall have to discuss later) is the charioteer. In the *Gita*, however, the use to which the metaphor is put is slightly different. True, the individual soul in the form of Arjuna is still the rider in the chariot but the Charioteer is, as we have seen, the Divine Self in the person of Krishna.*

Dhritarāshtra, on the other hand, represents the empirical ego, the lower and transient personality which, blinded by egoism and foolish infatuation, wields a nominal sway over the kingdom of the body which it has unjustly seized, the word Dhritarāshtra meaning one who has seized the kingdom. Although he arrogates to himself the title of King, yet his rule over the kingdom is a merely nominal one for the real power lies with his Asuric sons just as the human personality which so proudly says "I" is the sport of a continual succession of involuntary desires and passions which are the real

* The difference between the *Gita* and the Upanishad in this matter is only apparent but it is not convenient to discuss the significance of it here though, to prevent misunderstanding, I should add that the human soul or *jivātmā* referred to is the *angushtha-mātra puruṣa* or "person of the size of the thumb" which, divested of symbolism, is the Light of the One Ātman as reflected in the upādhi or vehicle of *Manas* (see Shwetāshwatara Upanishad 5.8). It is this that is the *dhi*, the ego which passes from life to life.

rulers of the body it calls its own.

Saṅjaya, the charioteer and adviser of the blind king, is the link between the higher and lower minds. The mind has a dual status in Hindu Philosophy. "The mind is said to be two-fold, the pure and the impure; impure by union with desire, and pure, completely free from desire." (*Maitri Upanishad* 6. 34) The impure mind is Dhritarāshtra, the empirical ego controlled by desire (Duryodhana), while the pure mind is Arjuna, the individual soul, or rather the *upadhi* of that soul as indicated in the previous foot-note. Saṅjaya is thus the link between the two. This link which in some teachings is termed *antahkarana* (though usually that word is used in a different sense) is, at least in one sense, the conscience, the mediator by which the Voice of the Higher is heard by the lower. Thus Saṅjaya though, anchored in service to Dhritarāshtra, yet reaches out to a faith in Krishna and constantly counsels his master to abandon his weak egoism and submit himself to the latter. It is thus Saṅjaya who, when aided by the inspiration derived from Vyāsa is able to "overhear" the dialogue between Krishna and Arjuna and so to form a link between the inner knowledge of the soul and the dark ignorance of the ego-centred personality.

It may also be said that there is a correspondence between these four characters and the four states of consciousness taught by Hindu philosophy, the

jagrata, swapna, sushupti and turiya usually translated, more by way of analogy than of identity, as the waking, dreaming, deep sleep and ecstatic states.

We are now in a position to return to the outline sketch of the events that have led up to the delivery of the *Gita*. The Soul, leaving behind its Divine ancestry, becomes attached to a personality and lives amidst the conflicting forces that make up this world. The conflict, at first latent as the Daivi and Asuric forces are not clearly differentiated, gradually increases in strength. Attempts at partition of their respective spheres of influence having failed, as indeed they must fail since all is one unity and action and reaction must necessarily take place, the Soul and its associates are deceived by the illusions of the Asuric or downward-tending forces and are condemned to long wanderings in the wilderness. During this period, a period which in reality extends through long ages, the Soul wanders about from birth to birth performing actions and reaping their fruits. Reduced to powerlessness as it is, it yet slowly gathers wisdom as a result of its manifold experiences and, though exposed to countless hardships and perils, it is yet saved from utter disaster by the unseen power of its Lord, the Divine Soul. Experience, wisdom and also powers are gained, for it is during this period that Arjuna gains his magical weapons that are later to be of such immense value to him. The Asuric forces rule the world un-

checked and at length the thirteenth year arrives, the year of *ajñāta wāsa* in which the very existence of the Soul and its brothers has to remain unknown.

It is the darkest hour, the hour before the dawn and the Soul, reduced to performing the tasks of a servant is lost to sight altogether. The forces of materialism seem triumphant and the very existence of the Soul becomes a matter of doubt or even denial.

But not for ever can the Soul be thus buried in darkness. The allotted period draws to its close and the Soul emerges from its obscurity with all its flashing powers. Significantly enough, the first event is a battle in defence of the right, the battle fought on behalf of king Virāta, in which the Soul, though still disguised, displays its prowess and puts to flight the Powers of the Dark. So decisive indeed is the Soul's intervention that none can stand against it. All are aware of the rising star and all foresee the terrible conflict that must now occur.

But the Soul seeks no autocratic power for itself. It is for its brothers, the dispossessed Daivi Sarga, that it is prepared to fight

and, even for them, it claims no undivided sway. Knowing, as it does, that the Asuric forces are as much a part of the cosmic play as are the Daivi ones, it proposes only a just division of the kingdom but this the Powers of the Dark will not grant.

Bhishma, the aged counsellor, the symbol of established Law and Order and Social tradition, foreseeing the disastrous conflict, pleads for peace and reconciliation as does Sañjaya, the mind. Sri Krishna Himself sets forth in persuasive words the advantages of harmonious peace but all is of no avail. Duryodhana refuses to listen and the old King professes himself powerless to control his headstrong sons. War is inevitable. The conflict of the Daivi and the Āsuric can no longer be averted and the rival hosts face each other on the field of Kurukshetra.

It is at this fateful moment that the *Gita* commences. The opposing hosts are drawn up in battle array and the long expected conflict is about to commence.

Dhritarāshtra says:—"In the Holy Field of Kurukshetra what did they do, O Sañjaya, my sons and the Pāṇdavas, gathered together eager for battle?"

SRI KRISHNA PREM

THE FIELD OF SCIENCE

WANTED — SYNTHESISERS NOT SPECIALISTS

[The following article may be described as an indictment of men and methods of Science. "A **Curator**" is a European University "specialist" with wide American experience.—Eds.]

The disease of our civilization is lack of unity and co-ordination. Within a single nation classes are un-co-ordinated; nations are un-co-ordinated on a single continent; and continents are un-co-ordinated threatening a world-war. Lack of unity is the order of the day. That very disease has overtaken modern science: branches of science are no more on a single tree; they have fallen apart, thanks to the axes of the specialists. Unless a change takes place the cause of knowledge will suffer, its real progress be arrested.

Self-interest begets hypocrisy; politicians talk of brotherhood and prepare for war; scientists talk of knowledge having no frontiers, while specialists set limits to their frontiers; men of science compete among themselves, sell their knowledge in open market to the highest bidder, and in secrecy use it to serve the cause of war. Just as the task of real idealists is hampered by politicians, economists and bankers, so in the field of knowledge the task of the real seekers and servers of truth suffers through ambitious exploiters, pseudo-researchers and even posers. A single attendance at one of the congresses of men of science strikingly reveals how there is lack of co-ordination of knowledge while

specialists and pseudo-specialists read lengthy jargon.

The moral outlook of the men of science is a problem in itself; it affects the very advancement of knowledge. Fancies overpower facts, theories take the place of truths, and moral and ethical principles are not even taken into account. The curse of egotism, of separateness, is poisoning human relations, and competition and rivalry are corrupting the world of intellect.

The sin of separateness is working havoc as dangerously in pure and applied science as in other fields. It has become necessary, in the pursuit of knowledge, to demonstrate clearly, that one's opinion or one's explanation differs from that of one's co-workers so as to avoid the stamp of inferiority upon oneself. This is the only way to insure a successful career, or even a simple living. The scientific value of a man is appraised mainly on the basis of his "originality," and little account is taken of his character, provided he does not transgress the letter of the law. No one will deny that in a certain sense each man is, and must be, "original," inasmuch as "each man is a law unto himself." But the world is still a long way from realizing the spiritual aspect

of this law. What do we mean when we speak of "originality?" Do we not encourage the immoral tendency in man to use his own powers and faculties at the expense of others and for personal benefit?

The whole trend of our western civilization is to encourage, nay, to force a man who is obliged to earn a living in the field of science to pose as different and separate from his neighbour. He must, if possible, appear to be of greater value, as having opened up new lines of thought, having created new problems to solve, etc.; in short, he must cause talk and receive the *imprimatur* of an original thinker, an original investigator, an original something.

For this publicity is the means. This is why our world is glutted with an overwhelming mass of printed matter dealing with speculations on almost every known subject. This flood has risen so high that it threatens to drown all activity. The current literature on any specific topic is so enormous that the yearly output is more than any man could digest, even supposing he devoted himself to the task with assiduity.

This mad rush to publicise one's "originality" has two results:

The first is specialization. We are not condemning division of labour in the intellectual field, particularly in applied science. Quite the contrary. There is need for it, but the touch with the living centre of which each radius is but a special expression should not be lost. We cannot but condemn the

specialization which transforms a man, into one "who knows more and more about less and less"; Then there is the other aspect in the words of Professor Bennett of Yale University:—

The specialist sees the criminal hormone and not the offender, the intelligent quotient not the child, the tonsil not the patient, the metre not the poem.

This kind of specialization results from a desire to be "original." It furnishes pleasing occupation for minds which are not great, and what is worse, provides them with an opportunity to influence current thought in a manner which in many cases is far from harmless. Our crying need at present is for deep, all-embracing minds—synthesisers, not specialists. Synthesisers and not specialists will be able to cure the ignorance of our men of learning.

The second: these speculations are published as facts, and that in itself militates against the very foundation-principles of modern science. The spirit of competition leads to unceasing activity and leaves no time to properly check, test and verify the accumulating material. Such a situation can but threaten the entire scientific structure. Each man is so immersed in his own little sub-department, that he finds no time to even consider its relation to the whole. There may be sad awakenings in the near future in consequence of this.

The field of scientific knowledge may be compared to a circle with an ever-expanding circumference. The duty of science is to continual-

ly forward this expansion; but it must be an all-round expansion, not a lop-sided one. Is this the existing situation?

And what about the aims of scientists? Some members of our profession declare that they do not care as long as it gives them an opportunity to make a living. Such men are at least honest; though they are of little value to the cause of real progress. Others state that their aim is to discover truth; but among them are those who deceive themselves, their real motive being personal ambition. And the method of us all? We depend on the sensorium to contact the realities which lie behind. The banishment of religion from the field of research has been beneficial; but absence of philosophy has been detrimental and has contributed to the non-co-ordination of the various branches of science. By present methods we can formulate sub-laws of Nature, but what is behind must remain a secret. To contact the noumenal

Law behind the phenomenal effects with sense instruments is as profitable a pursuit as to determine a man's honesty by the use of a magnifying glass. Our method is one of chasing beautiful butterflies—methodless.

Physical science has been proceeding in a desultory fashion. The result is lop-sided. Observations, speculations and theories have accumulated. A period of reflection seems more than due. Shifting of evidence has become an imperative necessity; co-ordinating of facts can follow the rejection of mere theories, views and opinions. I submit that established facts are submerged in the heap of theories which when co-ordinated would redound to the glory of modern science. The rejection of fancies and co-ordination of facts will remove an obstacle from the ways of science; but where are the leaders who will chase the money-changers out of the temple of science?

A CURATOR

In the above article a man of science recognizes that philosophy possesses the power to co-ordinate different branches of science. Perhaps the writer had in mind the words of Herbert Spencer in *First Principles*: "Knowledge of the lowest kind is *ununified* knowledge; Science is *partially unified* knowledge; Philosophy is *completely unified* knowledge." But can we really say that modern philosophy offers completely unified knowledge?

The preceding article directly points out the flaws of science; the following indirectly reveals how weak is the position of modern philosophy.—EDS.

PHILOSOPHY

"A REVITALIZING REFUGE"

[Dr. Michael Kaye is the author of *Human Welfare—The Social and Educational Essentials*. His contribution is a defence of philosophy and in these days when among all branches of knowledge, science is receiving greatest attention it does become necessary to champion the cause of Fair Philosophy. According to Plato "those who are able to grasp the eternal and the immutable" are philosophers, lovers of wisdom. And the objects of their devotion? They "set their affections on that which in each case really exists." To-day the superficial attracts, and to feel a thrill is to live; so even a little study of true philosophy may prove a boon and a blessing. But what is true philosophy?—a luxury of the mind, which it is now, or a necessity of the Soul whose very existence is doubted and questioned?—Eds.]

Philosophy has natural roots; it does not make its questions; it finds them. It is not an artificial product of the academy; it is not a matter of arbitrary definition; it springs from reflections which are commonplace. How did the world commence? And how will it end? But did it commence, and will it end? And is it infinite or bounded? But is it in space at all; may not space be for the mind which thinks it, and mind itself be the world? Yet further, may there not be many worlds? And in any case, how can the world or the worlds, be known? And even if the possibility of such knowledge be granted, how will it help us to know what to do, and will it fortify in us the salutary conviction that what we cherish most will certainly be ours?

These are questions which the more thoughtful of men ask spontaneously. Faced with tremendous beauty—of ocean or landscape—we wonder as to the beauty of the world. In our moments of love and achievement we rebel

at the notion that these things may not last. And if we would enjoy the world in a vision, and think it without self-contradiction, we demand as our right that reality should be comprehensible and rational. What, then, of the ugliness and cruelty with which for some of us the world seems so lavish? These qualities, also, we may impute as what is most characteristic and essential to the world as a whole, and, as to ourselves, we may, like Job, curse the day that we were born. But also, we may distinguish between appearance and reality; and having indulged in self-pity as the mere puppets of universal power, we may proceed to wonder whether precisely this power is not the profoundest reality of ourselves.

It is from such questions and surmises as these—which are put in all simplicity by even the more thoughtful of adolescents—that philosophy derives, and which, if it is to remain itself, philosophy in its advancing subtlety needs constantly to remember. For philosophy

is not in its essence mere analysis—however persistent, penetrating, and many-sided; it is dependent on, but is not identical with, logic, linguistic, and epistemology; its originative and abiding aim is definitely by thought to reveal the world; its heart and soul is metaphysics.

But though philosophy may arise in the market place, it is seldom allowed to remain and flourish there. For the most part, philosophical questions are merely felt. But even if their articulation is explicit and clear, they are generally swept away by the succession of our daily cares. For ordinarily we are held in grip by the noise and colour of our perceptions, and are pushed on by our inner appetites. We have to earn our living; we have to maintain our families; we cannot afford to become neglectful of our hurried routine. And then we would eat and drink and be merry, prattle and travel and luxuriate in our self-magnified self-assertions. We want above all to *live*—by which it is generally meant to live sensationally: and for material enjoyment there is generally required material struggle. No wonder, then, that there should be little time left for philosophy.

Moreover, even if we be determined to persist with our philosophical questions till they shall have obtained a definite answer, we may still acquiesce in a solution which is not itself philosophical. For we may achieve conviction through what we see in a flash, intuitively. Or we may feel the

answer in our blood. Or we may accept without challenge whatsoever is stated by what we compulsively or gladly acknowledge as dogmatic authority. In any case, whether because we are impatient with thought as something slow, laborious, inconclusive, and futile, or because we fear thought as a paralysing solvent, it is exceptional that we should require explicitly intellectual solutions as indispensable to our ordinary life and satisfaction.

Thus, its common origin notwithstanding, philosophy in its fullest flight we may expect to be esoteric. The questions which start it off are sufficiently familiar, and commonly spontaneous; but its intellectual methods of attempting to resolve these questions, these to the popular view are alien, tedious, and unpalatable. Of course, the philosopher is not a thinker merely; he requires feeling, imagination, intuitive leaps and insights, for his greatness. This, which has been urged by Bertrand Russell in his *Mysticism and Logic*, is evident among such giants as Plato, Spinoza, Bradley, McTaggart and Whitehead. But it is also evident from these writers that the philosopher is a thinker primarily—nor is this contradicted by the actual argumentation even of Bergson, notwithstanding that for the final discovery of reality he would have argument yield to intuition, philosophy give place to mysticism. Thus we may quarrel with much of modern philosophical analysis for sometimes seeming to forget its ultimate metaphysical

purpose; but we must always remember that Plato speaks of philosophy as Dialectic, and that Spinoza sets out his philosophy as though it were a chain of propositions and proofs in geometry. Whatever, then, a man's anxiety to reach to the heart of things, unless he is passionately an intellectual he cannot be a philosopher. Could man see the world all at once, he might rightly regard philosophy as superfluous. But as man is not capable of an instantaneous synopsis he needs philosophy. If he is to obtain any universal insight which shall be satisfactory to his nature as a whole, it is the assumption of philosophy that, whatever else he needs to do, he must proceed patiently and consecutively by way of an ever self-accumulating synthesis of analytical references and inferences.

Is the value of philosophy limited to those who are philosophical from the first? Is it inadvisable to attempt the development of philosophic desire in the multitudes who are originally indifferent and even hostile to it? It might clearly be biologically and socially dangerous to stimulate desire beyond capacity. Nevertheless, that the masses should be encouraged to love and pursue philosophy to the degree that it is actually within their power, might appear generally advantageous.

For while a science has an interest in reality which is partial, and often a scientist seems devoted to rigorous and exact thought, and to a scrupulous regard for the

available evidence, only in the field of his special research, there is unquestionably the allegiance of philosophy to truth universal. Hence there is such a thing as a philosophic mind, which, applicable to each detail of experience, may function as a supreme control both for private aspiration and activity, and in the diversities and difficulties of social intercourse.

Yet aware that the attainment of truth is difficult, the philosopher acquires, and seeks to spread, the attitude of tolerance. Because certain beliefs, even though not demonstrably true, yet seem indubitably to "work"—to help man to control the world and himself, and to obtain health and happiness—the philosopher, though careful to avoid the pragmatist's error of identifying the "useful" with the "true," still considers it fitting to treat the doubtful, and even the apparently absurd, with varying degrees of respect. Therefore he will not oppose "fanaticism" which is productive and beneficent, for he appreciates how faith is a drive to action, and that he himself has no certain truth to put in its place. Yet precisely the rarity and even the impossibility of certain truth he will employ as a challenge to all such fanaticism as is selfish, destructive, and inimical. To the latter, it is the philosopher himself who will exclaim: "There are more things in heaven and earth, than are dreamt of in your philosophy." Wherefore the philosophic devotion to difficult truth, far from depressing and paralysing

action, should rather help it to fructify in an atmosphere of forbearance and peace by spreading that tolerance which is born of intellectual bafflement.

But further, the popular conception of the philosopher as stoically acquiescent is not mistaken utterly. For as he concentrates his reflection on the nature of the entirety of the world, it is to be expected that he should lose much of his primitive concern with the welfare of his own particularity. Nor is it simply that, as a philosophic pluralist, he may, like the scientist and the artist, gain through the "purest objectivity" a pacifying obliviousness of the subjective. It is that he can enhance his subjectivity, and may even discover it as in a manner immortal, according as he discern with Spinoza its inseparability from the permanent reality of the whole. Thus in this way also philosophy may fortify action now by promoting a certain poise in the face of crisis. And the philosopher may retain this derivative stability even though he should think it immodest to venture further, and to presume with Plato that Reality, being not merely inevitable, but inevitable perfection, has the power to invest its thinkers with a degree of its own nobility.

Finally, like the creation and contemplation of beauty, and the beneficence of morality, philosophy is an activity good in itself; not different in this respect from the scientific quest, it can yield a large satisfaction not merely by its instrumentality, nor yet only by its achievements, but as a pursuit which is a way of life. Emphatically, then, philosophy may not purchase any "escape from reality" by obfuscation and delusion, by any such harmony, simplicity, and neatness as are merely æsthetic and soporific, and an insult to the demand for comprehensiveness. Yet it is not to be disloyal intellectually to quit the storm in order to observe it; the spectator of the whole may possess more of the truth than the player of a part. And it is thus that philosophy, by the quality of its ratiocination, as also by the grandeur of its postulated objective, may function, compatibly with its fundamental principle, as a revitalising refuge from what is mean, petty and odious.

But if philosophy can do so much, we may not merely regret the difficulty, even for the most zealous of its devotees, of being philosophical unswervingly; we may with reason desire its cultivation by as many as possible.

MICHAEL KAYE

In the above article the writer emphasises mind-process as necessary for the pursuit of philosophy. But now measure the strength of a just attack upon Reason which follows.—EDS.

THE FACULTY OF REASON

“A STAFF BUT NOT A SIGN POST”

{ J. D. Beresford delivers a reasoned attack on the faculty so highly prized—Reason. Both in modern science and in modern philosophy mind is regarded as man's highest faculty. In the western world mysticism is not a definite system following which a man may prove to himself that human consciousness has layers which transcend the reasoning faculty. In books on Asiatic Psychology both theory and practice of *Yoga* are outlined, and one of the primary lessons imparted is that the mind is the slayer of the real, that the disciple shall slay the slayer. *The Voice of the Silence* from which Mr. Beresford quotes is one of those books and—most reliable.—EDS.]

The intellectual world of to-day can still be ranged in the two broad philosophical categories of materialism and idealism. The first group is less militant than it once was. The fervent agnostics of the second half of the nineteenth century, the men who had discovered with an effect of immense relief that all religion was nothing more than formalised superstition and that God was a myth, have few important successors at the present time. H. G. Wells still seeking to inculcate those admirable principles of his for the betterment of social conditions, continues to imply that mankind need hope for no heaven other than that he may make for himself on this earth. Mr. Julian Huxley influenced by his study of that most materialistic of sciences, biology, is inclined to air his agnosticism on occasion. But unless we can count Bertrand Russell as an active opponent of inspired religion, there is no other name in this group that can rank with those that seemed to be fighting a winning battle for materialism a generation ago.

On the other side, however, there is, among our finest scientific intellects, none who is prepared to champion openly the case for the spiritual origin and destiny of mankind. Sir Arthur Eddington is unquestionably on that side. In his last book, *New Pathways in Science*, he says boldly: “I assert that the nature of all reality is spiritual, not material nor a dualism of matter and spirit.” But his study is mathematical physics and he is not concerned to enter into a philosophical defence of his position. We may infer from various evidence that the general tendency of modern science is towards an idealistic theory of the universe, a theory that would have found few supporters in the Royal Society—and even then for entirely different reasons—forty years ago. But we are apparently still far from the time, when a spiritual conception of the universe will be accepted as the basis of all scientific teaching.

The truth is that most of our great thinkers in this connection have been and still are careless of what they may regard as a ques-

tion of no present importance. They have been fascinated by the endless mysteries of the material world and found that the attempt to solve any one of them has provided more than sufficient occupation for a lifetime. The study of science means specialisation, and those who specialise become too confined by their concentration upon one aspect of material phenomena, to be capable of the synthesis necessary to seek a single cause behind all effects. Wherefore the representative scientific mind almost always becomes completely materialistic or unthinkingly adopts a provisional idealism as some kind of working hypothesis.

This problem has been much in my mind lately because I have been constantly thinking of the part that reason plays in the human complex. I came to that by the realisation that in the strange phenomena presented by what we call "spiritual healing" the intellect is a persistent bar to the performance of anything in the nature of a "miracle." (I use the familiar but misrepresentative phraseology to save an unnecessary digression.) From that I came inevitably to the broader consideration that occupied Immanuel Kant's logical mind more than a century and a half ago; and it seems to me that, in the light of the new knowledge that has come to us in the course of those years, a re-statement of the main principle may be of value at a time when the whole trend of thought is towards a spiritual explanation

of the universe.

The question we have to consider is the function of reason, and we may approach it in the first place from a psychological standpoint, taking an instance from the subject of a post-hypnotic suggestion. A common experiment in this relation is to command a subject in deep hypnotic trance to say some word, perform some action or it may be give the answer to an arithmetical sum, at a certain time, it may be twenty-four hours or more, after the return to his or her normal condition. This experiment has been successfully performed so often that it is accepted as one of the proved phenomena of hypnotic suggestion. But the only interesting aspect of it from our present point of view is that the subject, having obeyed the apparently irrational command of the subconscious will always, if questioned, invent a specious excuse for the sudden interjection of a startling irrelevancy. Thus, to make the instance clear, a woman having been given an arithmetical sum to do while in deep trance was ordered to return the answer to it at her next meeting with the hypnotist, the following day. This she did, greeting him at his entrance by saying "Five," the correct answer. When asked why she had given him such a strange greeting, she instantly replied that she had been thinking of her family and that they had been five in number.

Now we may find in this example a model of the general function of the reasoning faculty in man.

What we observe is that the intelligence has a highly developed capacity first to accept suggestions rising from the subconscious and subsequently to rationalise them, that is to account for them in terms of its own intellectual knowledge. We witness the same process in the child, who attempts to justify a false statement or the account of an imaginative experience affirmed to be a real happening, by some ingenious though generally unacceptable invention. We see it, also, in the experience of dreams, when we accept as fact what is by the standards of waking life, the most absurd improbability, and then continue the dream-story on that basis. Also, it must be remembered that the same process forms the foundation of logic. To construct a syllogism we have to take a major and a minor premise and the reasoning power cannot be exercised in relation to the syllogism until the premises have been stated.' In short, to summarise this aspect of the problem, the reasoning function is of its very nature a secondary process and the direction taken by it, whether towards idealism or realism, is always influenced by the material upon which it is exercised.

Our next step is to consider whence this material is derived. There can be but two sources for the premises upon which we base our philosophy, one objective and the other subjective, and as has already been intimated the scientist accepts the former only as a safe guide to knowledge. He takes

as his premise the phenomena of the objective world, and arguing from effect to cause, seeks first to infer and then to enunciate various natural laws, or in other words to demonstrate that like causes will invariably produce like effects. Thus the laws of Newton, as modified now by Einstein's theory of Relativity, will enable the astronomer to foretell with a remarkable degree of accuracy the movements of the planets during, say, the next hundred years.

Now achievements such as the one cited once encouraged the scientist's hope that in the course of time, every natural law would be understood and the riddle of the universe successfully solved possibly on some bio-chemical hypothesis that would cover the intensely puzzling factors of life, consciousness and free-will. That expectation, however, is far more remote at the present time than it was at the end of the last century. The further science has penetrated, and in some directions it has gone exceedingly deep, the more evident it has become that *there remain always various puzzling exceptions to natural law, which cannot be covered by the general theory*. Indeed, in mathematical physics it has been found necessary to abandon the theory of any absolute relation between cause and effect and substitute the principle of probability.

Wherefore, returning to the main argument, we are justified in stating that any philosophy based solely on objective premises, that is to say upon the result of observation and experiment conducted in

relation to material phenomena, cannot be valid unless it is able to embrace all those phenomena in their entirety. The biologist can never claim to have solved the riddle of the universe unless his conclusions embrace the findings of the physicist, and *vice versa*; or to revert to our logical terms, the argument from observation and experiment cannot pretend to give an explanation of the universal unless it is based on premises that cover every aspect of the universe by the demonstration of laws sufficient to account for all the phenomena.

What, then, of the other, the subjective source that provides material for the exercise of this secondary function of reason? In the first place, however unacceptable the fact may be to the realist, this subjective source is solely responsible for his philosophy. That and that alone accounts for his tendency to select certain premises from the universal content, and to reject, or even become blind to all those other premises that are incompatible with them. It represents his natural bias in this or that direction, the fundamental basis of his character, and will determine in nearly every case his personal solution of the riddle of the universe. And should the realist admit this but claim that this inherent disposition of his is due to an adventitious arrangement of brain-cells, he will thereby establish the truth of my main contention that the reason is a fallible, untrustworthy instrument. For how shall a man hope to find

truth by the exercise of his intelligence if its single instrument, the reason, is dependent for its working on the suggestions, provided by a particular arrangement of what the physiologist would describe as "the pyramidal cells of the supra-granular cortex?"

I have now reached the critical stage of a purely logical argument at which I seem to have thrown doubt upon the very method I have employed. I have in fact employed reason in order to prove that reason is untrustworthy. But I can plead justification, for this is not truly a paradox. What I have said has been adduced not to discredit either the power or the uses of the intellect. The reasoning faculty has reached a stage of very high development in man, and is an invaluable guide to material life. *All that I claim in my attack upon reason is that it must always fail to give a true account of the universe so long as it is confined to the premises provided by objective presentation.* Reason provides an admirable staff, but it cannot be used, also, as a signpost. As we read in *The Voice of the Silence*: "Even ignorance is better than Head-learning with no Soul-wisdom to illuminate and guide it."

It may seem to readers of THE ARYAN PATH, that I have gone a long way round in order to arrive at a conclusion which they have already accepted. But it may be well to remember now and again, how many fine intellects there are in the world to-day which cannot approach any discussion on the nature of the first cause, except

by the employment of their own method. Wherefore it has been borne in upon me, more and more of recent years that if any answer is to be found to the materialists, it must be given in their own language and the battle fought upon their own ground. In this article, I have been handicapped by the need for condensation. There are many points upon which I have been unable to touch. But speaking as one who in the first instance has come to the beliefs I now hold, chiefly by the exercise of thought and contemplation, I know for certain that mind's in-

tellectual conviction must precede the search for Soul Wisdom. How that is to be found when the seat of reason is discovered to be not a throne but a footstool, is clearly indicated in a further quotation from *The Voice of the Silence*, a quotation that might have served me for a text :—

Shun ignorance, and likewise shun illusion. Avert thy face from world deceptions : mistrust thy senses ; they are false. But within thy body—the shrine of thy sensations—seek in the Impersonal for the "Eternal Man" ; and having sought him out, look inward : thou art Buddha.

J. D. BERESFORD

Only those who realise how far Intuition soars above the tardy processes of ratiocinative thought can form the faintest conception of that absolute Wisdom which transcends the ideas of Time and Space. Mind, as we know it, is resolvable into states of consciousness, of varying duration, intensity, complexity, etc.—all, in the ultimate, resting on sensation, which is again Maya. Sensation, again, necessarily postulates limitation.

H. P. BLAVATSKY, *The Secret Doctrine* I, pp. 1–2.

ANCIENT AND HONOURABLE INDIA

[The mystical and philosophical achievements of hoary India are very well-known. It is not equally well-known, however, that Hindus of antiquity built social and political structures of a very high order. The following two articles point to these achievements.

Dr. Radhakumud Mookerji, the famous historian gives a bird's-eye view of the wonderful accomplishments of the ancient Hindus. Supplementing it a second article shows how they grappled with a problem which puzzles in our age—the relation between capital and labour. It is written by **S. V. Viswanatha M. A.** whose contribution on "The Citizen and the State—The Indian View," appeared in our March issue.—EDS.]

I.—A GLIMPSE INTO EARLY CIVILIZATION

Recent archæological discoveries tend towards the conclusion that after all India may have been the very cradle of the human race and of its culture. The earliest civilization was the product of rivers like the Nile, the Euphrates, or the Tigris to which are now to be added the Indus, the Jamuna and the Ganges. The antiquities unearthed at Harappa, Mohenjo-daro and other sites show that India also had developed a civilisation as early as Egyptian, Proto-Elamite or Sumerian. The recent finds at Buxar, at depths of more than 50 ft. indicate that this civilisation might have originated in the valley of the Ganges.

India is supposed by many students of Biological Evolution to have been the cradle of the race itself. According to the geologist Borell, "Man and the Himalayas arose simultaneously towards the end of the Miocene Period, over a million years ago."

India's earliest civilisation is

best seen in the remains found at Mohenjo-daro and Harappa. Its age is determined by the fact that definitely Indian objects are found in the *earliest* strata at Elamite, Mesopotamia and Iraq sites, e.g., seals bearing the Indus script and the Indian humped bull. Seals bearing the figures of the Indian animals, elephant and rhinoceros, which were foreign to Babylon are found at Babylonian sites in layers which are definitely dated as they bear inscriptions of an Akkad King of about 2500 B. C. Such objects, however, are found at Mohenjo-daro in some of its later layers. The Indus civilisation may thus safely be dated from about 4000 B. C.*

What were the achievements of this civilisation? Its materials included stone, copper, and bronze, but not iron. It is thus chalcolithic, following the two stone Ages, Palæolithic and Neolithic. But its makers were pioneers and very advanced in other matters. They

* Our reader's attention may be drawn to an article by Professor S. Venkateswara in *THE ARYAN PATH* for April 1931 on "Vedic Chronology—A Case for 11,000 B. C."—EDS.

were the first builders of an urban civilisation, the first in the world in town-planning, sanitary engineering, (by construction of open and covered drains), in architecture in stone and burnt brick as a measure of protection against floods to which the city was exposed. They were also pioneers in several industries. They grew the first wheat and the first barley. They were the first to spin and weave in both wool and cotton. The cotton they used 5000 years back is judged to be the ancestor of modern Indian cotton with its typical convoluted structure. They used the first cart in the world. Their glazed Indus pottery is considered to be the earliest in the world. They developed a method of writing. They carried on trade with distant countries. Their gold came from Kolar and Anantapur; copper and tin from Persia; yellow stone from Jaisalmir; green stone from Doddabetta in the Nilgiris; lapis lazuli from Badakshan, turquoise from Khorasan and jadeite from Turkestan and Tibet. They made jewellery and ornaments out of precious stones and metals. They domesticated animals like the cow, camel or elephant and hunted down wild animals like the tiger, rhino or boar, which were the denizens of forests then flourishing in Sindh, for Sindh was then well-watered.

But the civilisation was not merely material. It was marked by progress in thought. It achieved real Art in the modelling of forms of both animals and man.

It produced in bronze, figures of dancing girls which appeal to modern taste. It produced the first figure of a Yogi in meditation, with his eyes fixed on the tip of the nose. It also evolved the figures of deities, like the primeval Mother-Goddess, Siva, Sakti; of trees (anticipating the Bodhi-Tree, Tree of Knowledge) and of the animals worshipped as the Vahanas or vehicles of the deities. In these we find the roots of later popular Hinduism, as in *Yoga* the link with higher Hinduism. *Yoga* in fact is the one supreme characteristic of Hinduism in all its periods from the Vedic downwards and in all its phases and forms, Brahmanical, Buddhist and Jain.

Racially, the builders of this civilisation are supposed by anthropologists to have been a mixed people of Mediterraneans (dolichocephalic, long-headed) and Armenoids (brachycephalic, broad-headed), immigrants from the west, who built up the earliest civilisation in Mesopotamia, spoke Dravidian, and used a pictographic script.

This vast and advanced non-Aryan civilisation was confronted by the Aryans who were the real makers of India and her history. Their national work, the *Rigveda*, is the earliest book of humanity. It tells of the non-Aryan and his civilisation in words which may be read in stone, brick and mortar at Harappa and Mohenjo-daro. The Aryan in the *Rigveda* refers to his non-Aryan brethren with respect. He tells of their architecture, and forts, and pillars of stone, and of free alliance with the Aryans in

the conflicts of the times. The Battle of the Ten Kings (Dāśarāja) against Sudās was a battle in which the Aryan fought shoulder to shoulder with the non-Aryan in a common cause. Some scholars have gone so far as to hold that the differences between the Aryan and the non-Aryan in the *Rigveda* are merely cultural. But the *Rigveda* has passages describing the non-Aryan as *anāsa*, "snub-nosed," *Krishṇa-garbha*, "of black brood" and *mridhravak*, "of strange speech" (a non-Aryan tongue) and such descriptions recall the proto-Australoids forming the original elements in the Indian population.

The Aryan civilisation gradually spread all over India, practically assimilating the non-Aryan civilisation or absorbing its chief features. Its social system, its elasticity and comprehensiveness did not exclude the non-Aryan for whom it found a place.

Its pristine features are revealed in Vedic Literature made up of the four Vedic Saṁhitas, Brāhmaṇas, Upanishads, and Āraṇyakas, and later, in the Sūtra, and Śāstra or Smṛiti works.

In one word, it may be designated as Varṇāśrama-Dharma, the system based on division of society into four castes, and of life into four stages. The four castes are those of Brāhmaṇa, Kshatriya, Vaiśya, and Sūdra with defined functions. Normally, the Brāhmaṇa is the custodian of the community's culture, its spiritual wealth and interests, the Kshatriya of its defence, the Vaiśya of its material wealth or economic interest, and

the Sūdra of its requirements in personal service. The four stages of life are those of the Student, the Householder, the Mendicant, and the Hermit, in a process of progressive self-realisation by which Life can conquer Death.

These divisions mark only the externals of the system, but not its inner content which is free of restrictions. Social life and organisation must rest upon some sort of division and distribution of functions. But all are equal in the Kingdom of the spirit.

Thus the Upanishads admit Satya-Kāma Jābāla to the highest knowledge, irrespective of his caste, and in spite of his uncertain parentage, simply on the ground of merit. They are equally decisive in condemning the religion that is confined merely to rituals and sacrifice, and branding even the Vedas as inferior knowledge, *aparā vidyā*, as distinguished from the *parā vidyā*, the highest knowledge, which is the knowledge of the Ātman as the sole and ultimate Reality. The way to this highest knowledge which is dismissed in the West as the unknown and unknowable is discovered in the Vedas to lie through *tapas*, a course of mortification of the flesh so that its suggestion may not disturb meditation on the Atman or the Absolute. This course of *tapas* or penance is a course of regulated asceticism which beginning in *brahmacharya* or studentship is carried on into the householder's state until it ends in renunciation of the world in the last two stations of life. The best

exponent of this system is Rishi Yājñavalkya who explains to his royal pupil, Janaka of Videha, that to attain Brahman, one must be free from Desire.

Knowing this, the people of old did not wish for offspring. What shall we do with offspring, they said, we who have this self and this world of Brahman? The Atman is That which is without and above hunger and thirst, sorrow and passion, decay and death. Realizing that Ātman, Brāhmaṇas conquer the desire for progeny, for wealth and possessions, and even for heaven, and embrace the life of renunciation as homeless mendicants, subsisting by the strength which the knowledge of Atman alone gives; then they devote themselves to contemplation till they are ultimately merged in the Brahman. (*Bṛihad. Upanishad.*)

This is the true and typical note running through Hinduism in all its developments through the ages, in its different sects and schools. While Vedism or Brahmanical religion expects renunciation in the last two stages of life as the natural fruit of discipline undergone in the first 'two stages, Buddhism or Jainism is a call to renunciation irrespective of stages of life, and admits recruits from all its conditions and classes, the ascetic order not being the creation or innovation of either. Each only brings an addition to the number of ascetic brotherhoods already flourishing in the country.

The new thought was spreading through appropriate educational methods and agencies, the residential schools in the homes of the teachers, bands of scholars traveling and teaching (*charakas*) through the country, scholastic dis-

putations at noted centres of learning, and conferences of philosophers invited by Kings to their courts. We see in the Brāhmaṇas and Upanishads how the country was throbbing with an intense intellectual life and spiritual fervour infecting even the Kings. Some of these Kings were not merely the patrons of learning but its best devotees and exponents. Such were King Janaka of Videha, Ajātasatru of Kāśi, Pravāhana Jaivali of Pañchāla, and Āśvapati of far-off Kaikeya, who were themselves renowned not as Kings but as philosophers and founders of new doctrines, counting even Brahmins as their pupils though normally the Brahmins as a class were the representatives of learning under the leadership of scholars like Yājñavalkya, or the Aruṇi, Uddalaka and Śvetaketu.

Let us now turn to the secular aspects and achievements of the Aryans in conquering, colonising, and civilizing the country. The Vedic hymns that were sung on the banks of the Kubha (Kabul), Krumu (Kurram), Gomati (Gomal) or Suvāsty (Swut) were soon heard on the banks of the five rivers of the Punjab and beyond, on the banks of the Śutudru (Sutlej), Yamunā and Gaṅgā. Rigvedic civilization first won for itself the land of seven rivers (*sapta-sindhavah*) and was led by the five principal peoples (*pañcha-janāḥ*) known as Anus, Druhyus, Pūrus, Turvaśas and Bharatas. But its nucleus rather lay in the holy land, the land of the Bharatas called Brahmarshideśa between the Sarasvati and Drishad-

vatī. Much of the *Rigveda*, was composed in this region and bears its local colouring, describing its natural features of cloud and rain, thunder and lightening; just as a part of it, dwelling on the beauties of dawn (*ushas*), must have been composed in the western drier regions of the Punjab where those twilight beauties are best seen.

Later, Vedic Literature reveals a greatly extended Aryan territory up to Eastern India, with some new states and peoples like Kuru-Pañchāla, Kosala, Kāśī, and Videha, and also Magadha and Aṅga not fully Aryanised. It was this large Aryan world which was the physical background of the culture of the Brāhmaṇas and Upanishads, of which the chief centres and exponents have been already noticed.

An appropriate polity was also taking shape under the inspiration of this culture. The King was the nominal sovereign, the real sovereign was *Dharma* which was enforced by the King as its *Danda*. Dharma ruled the King in the person of his preceptor. Thus Vasiṣṭha and Viśvamitra, though Brahmins were the real political leaders of the country. The King was further bound at coronation by appropriate oaths of loyalty to Dharma, to Law and Constitution.

Vedic kingship was further limited by the popular Assemblies called *Sabha* and *Samiti*, "the twin creations of Prajāpati," implying that society and democracy were born together in India. India was thus the first country in the world

to conceive of democracy and voice its demands. The *Rigveda* and *Ātharvaveda* contain prayers for eloquence in debate to influence the Assembly. They also tell of Kings deposed and reinstated.

Vedic civilisation was also built on an economic basis, on progress in pasture, agriculture, handicrafts, and trade. The domesticated animals included kine, horses, sheep, goats, asses and dogs. The water for irrigation was drawn out of wells in buckets (*kośa*) tied to leather strings (*varat-rā*), pulled round a stone pulley (*aśma-chakra*) or supplied from lakes (*hrada*) and canals (*kulyā*). The water was led off into broad channels (*sūrmī-sushirā*). The grains grown included rice (*vr̥hi*), barley (*yavah*), sessamum (*tila*), beans (*māsha*), maize (*godhūma*), lentils (*masūra*) and the like.

As regards handicrafts, there were the carpenter (*takshan*), blacksmith (*karmāra*), and goldsmith (*hiraṇya-kāra*). The weaver (*vāya*) worked with his loom (*veman*), shuttle (*tasara*), warp (*otu*) and woof (*tantu*).

Trade comprised barter and perhaps money-economy too. Ten cows are quoted as price for an image of Indra (*Rigveda*, IV. 24, 10). There is also mention of a gift of 100 *nishkas* and 100 studs; and of 1/2th and 1/4th being paid either as interest or part of the principal. (*Ib.* I. 126, 2; VIII, 47, 17)

The dress of the times included a garment, an undergarment (*nuvi*) and an overgarment (*adhivasa*). Dress woven of wool (*urnā*) was also used. The ornaments were of

gold and comprised *karnaśobhana* (ear-ring), *nishka* (necklace) and *rukma* (garland).

The *Rigveda* mentions musical instruments like the drum, *dundubhi* (I. 28, 5), lute, *karkāri* (II, 43, 3), lyre or harp, *viṇa*, with its 7 notes, recognised and distinguished (X. 32, 4), as also the flute, *nādi* (X, 135, 7).

Later Vedic literature gives evidence of expanding economic life. The *Vājasaneyi Samhitā* (XI-XVIII) tells of the construction of a fire-altar with 10,800 bricks and shaped like a large bird with outspread wings. There are references to *nāvaja* (boatman, *Śat.*

Br. II. 3,3,5), ferryman (*śambi* in *Av.* IX, 2,6), rudders (*nau-maṇḍa* in *Śat. Br.* II. 3,3,15), oars (*aritrā*) and a ship of 100 oars (*śatāritra* in *Vaj.* XXXI. 7) used for sea-voyages.

The progress in civilisation is also indicated in the extended use of metals like gold (*hiranya*), bronze (*ayas*), swarthy Iron (*śyāma*), copper (*loha*), lead (*śisa*) and tin (*trāpu*) (*Vaj.* XVIII, 13). *Ayas* undefined in the *Rigveda* is now differentiated as *śyāma-ayas* to indicate iron (*Av.* XI. 3,1. 7; IX, 5,4), *lohita-ayas* (*Ib.* XI. 3,1,7) or *lohāyas* (*Śat. Br.* V. 4,1,2) and red *ayas* or copper.

RADHA KUMUD MOOKERJI

II.—INDIAN IDEAS ON THE RELATION OF LABOUR TO CAPITAL

In all ages labour, skilled and unskilled, organised or unorganised, has been a necessary agent for the production of wealth. In ancient India, there was not much scope for capital and organised labour, agriculture being the main stay of the population, as it continues to be even to-day. But the importance of the part played by labour in national economy and the problems arising out of the relationship between employer and employed were recognised, and one finds wisdom in the old saying: "for the labourer a discerning master is rare, as for the employer is a faithful, intelligent and truthful servant."

THE EMPLOYER (BHARTĀ, SVĀMI)

The characteristics of a good master were mentioned as courtesy, liberality and kindness—especially when the labourer confessed a fault—the faculty to discern right from wrong and the ability to recognise the workman's worth. (*Hitopadeśa*, II. 57: III. 104) A discerning employer should not change frequently the labourers in his service, but encourage and treat with kindness such of them as were well-trained and experienced in their occupations, and not terminate their services unless it were for very grave faults. (*Hit.* II. 57, 130) The employer would alienate his servants by payment

of low wages (*hinabhrti*), by harsh words and insults and by severity of punishment. (*Sukraniti*, II. 415 f.) Only a bad master would indulge in unreasonably overworking his men, raising in them hopes not to be fulfilled, withholding their wages or keeping them in arrears. (*Hit.* II. 58; *Suk.* II. 396—*Bhrtiropa*, *Bhrtivilambana*) Labour is perishable; the worker is inseparable from his work; he spends his life for his living, at the same time wearing himself out with his work. (*Hit.* 24) It is not right therefore, that he should go without adequate recompense. (*Hit.* IV. 12) Classified in accordance with this standard, employers were grouped into three classes kind, cruel, and just. A kind master is indulgent to his labourers: he is cruel who construes even their virtues as faults: and is just who deals with them judiciously. (*Hit.* II. 59f.)

THE LABOURER (*Bhrtiya*, *Bhrtaka*)

The qualities necessary in the labourer were given as special aptitude, capacity or skill in work, faithfulness, cheerfulness, uprightness and general contentment. (*Hit.* II. 63, 73: III. 105) Labourers were also divided into three classes in accordance with their qualifications—the best (*sreshththa*), those of average ability (*sama*) and the worst (*hina*): or quick (*sighra*), ordinary (*madhya*) and dull (*manda*). The first class cared rather for fame: the second for both wealth and fame; while the last wanted only wealth. (*Sukra* I! 417) An inactive labourer was

paid less than his comrade of average activity, and the latter less than his more quick friend. (*Suk.* II. 403)

THEIR RELATION—CONTRACTS. (*Parimita*)

The relation of employer and employed was generally fixed by contract, and wages were paid as agreed upon. (*Suk.* II. 392: *Kautilya*, 185) Only a bad workman would ask for wages in the course of his work and it was only a bad master who would not pay his labourer wages due for work done. (*Hit.* II. 30) Yājñavalkya went to the extent of condemning all engagements of workmen not previously based on agreement. (II. 197) The contract was of three kinds—depending on the time taken, the work accomplished or on both. (*Suk.* II. 393ff.) If the employer refused to allow the workmen to finish their work as agreed upon they were to be paid their wages in entirety, i. e., for the unfinished portion of the work also. (*Vishnu* V. 153f.) The labourer should neither leave any portion of his work undone, nor carry away with him anything from his place of work without permission of his master. (*Kaut.* 185 *Narada* VI. 5) If he neglected the work or put it off purposely without sufficient cause, he was to be fined and detained until the work was finished and the loss incurred by the employer was to be made good by extra work. (*Kaut.* 184). Yājñavalkya was apparently more severe in cases of breach of contract. (II. 196)

WAGES (*Vetana*, *Bhrti*)

The amount paid as wages

depended on the contract, the nature, quality and quantity of the work, the main factors being the skill of the labourer and the work turned out, besides other considerations of time and place. (*Śuk* II. 400f: *Kaut.* 185 for example) In cases where the wages were not previously fixed Kautilya suggested that it should depend on the nature of the work, the time taken, the efficiency of the labourer and the general custom. (183f.) Thus the same wage-earner might not get the same amount at all times; labour in one place could not demand the same wage as in another; and one workman might not get as much as his comrade engaged in the same occupation. Wages were considered high if they, besides supplying the labourer food and clothing adequately, allowed him a comfortable living; ordinary, when he was given only the indispensable necessities for himself and his dependents; and low if the wage maintained only one. (*Śuk.* II. 396f.) Low wages were condemned, as it was recognised that the labourer should get at least the minimum with which he could bring up a family and meet his "compulsory charges." (*avaśyaposhyavarga*—*Śuk.* II. 399) Yājñavalkya said: a little more than the fixed wage should be paid to the worker, if he could show a larger output. (II. 198)

WORKING HOURS; LEAVE AND PENSION RULES.

Regarding the hours of work it seemed to have been accepted that during the day the labourers could

be detained by the employer for only 9 hours (3 yāmas), and the maximum period for which a workman could be kept at his work, day and night was not to exceed 12 hours, 3 hours respite during the day for the discharge of his domestic duties (*grha-kṛtyārtha*) and 9 hours rest at night being the minimum to be allowed. (*Śuk.* II, 404 f.) The workmen were in addition let off occasionally on days of festival (*utsava*), and the necessary performance of *śrāddha* ceremony. (*Śuk.* II. 405). If they fell sick (*ārta*) they were to be allowed a week's leave at a time on full pay (*Suk.* II. 407) not to exceed a fortnight in the year. (*Śuk* II. 449) To workmen suffering long from sickness, the employer was advised to pay gratis three-fourths of the stipulated wages for the period of three months, provided they had served for five years, but for not more than six months in any case. (*Śuk.* II. 406f.) If for any unforeseen cause the work could not be completed by the labourer within the allotted time, he was to be allowed a week's grace; beyond that no extension was to be given, and the work had to be finished even if it entailed the calling in of outsiders for assistance at the expense of the labourer himself. (*Kaut.* 185) Workmen of exceptional ability were to be given in addition one-eighth of their wages as bonus every year and allowed a remission of an eighth part of the usual period of work. (*Śuk.* II. 412) The employer was also advised to keep with him in safe

custody a sixth or fourth of the servants' wages and to pay off half the amount or the whole of it as required, in two or three years. (II. 414) This resembles our modern Provident Fund Scheme. At retirement, after 40 years of approved service, the labourer received half his wages as pension for life (*Śuk.* II. 410),

which was to be extended to the members of his family in case he were incapable but well-behaved. (*Śuk.* II. 411) These rules appear to be much in advance of the age in which they were laid down, and show much in common with modern economic ideas on the problem of Labour and Capital.

S. V. VISWANATHA

A SOLAR STOVE

"Hitch your wagon to a star" is a phrase that may soon lose its connotation of the impractical, since the "harnessing" of sunbeams has become a popular occupation among American scientists. Experiments under way at the Smithsonian Institute and the General Electric Laboratories are transforming sunlight into electricity. An impressive task—considering the fact that every square-yard of sunlit Earth constantly receives the equivalent of a horsepower in the vibrations of the solar rays.

Dr. Charles G. Abbot has been working on the problem for years, and has now exhibited a solar furnace which can generate temperatures in excess of 400 degrees Fahrenheit (found quite sufficient to generate steam for power pur-

poses). His latest heat collector is a solar stove, now in use at Mount Wilson, California. "Last summer," reports Dr. Abbot, "we baked bread, boiled eggs, roasted meat, canned fruit, and did most of the family cooking for the greater part of the season with heat from the Sun. The oven is insulated and will hold considerable heat over night and even into a cloudy day, so that it was possible to bake bread night or day for weeks at a time." Thus far, solar rays have been harnessed and utilized successfully for a wide range of purposes—the most notable of which include cooking, heating and pumping water, drying fruits and vegetables for winter storage, running motors and generating steam to drive dynamos.

M—R. W.

FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE

INTEGRATION OF THE PRESENT CONFLICT

[In his biographical studies as in his autobiography *A Modern Prelude*, **Hugh I'A. Fausset** reiteratingly shows how life-failure results from disunity and disorganization among the different constituents of man; he also points out the necessity for man to integrate himself.

The process of becoming whole, or as Mr. Fausset points out unifying mind and heart, depends on a correct comprehension of the dual nature of the human mind. In Zoroastrian Esotericism we come across Akem-Mano, the Evil-Mind and Vohu-Mano, the Good-Mind; in Brahmanical Esotericism we have Kama-Manas, the Passionate Mind and Buddhi-Manas, the Compassionate Mind. Says *The Voice of the Silence*: "To live and reap experience, the mind needs breadth and depth and points to draw it towards the Diamond Soul. Seek not those points in Maya's realm; but soar beyond illusions, search the eternal and the changeless SAT, mistrusting fancy's false suggestions."—EDS.]

It is a truism that in the West to-day men are caught in such a net of facts and opinions that effective action or decisive living has become more and more difficult. There is, of course, no lack of activity of a kind. But this activity corresponds very closely to the kind of knowledge which abounds. At a glance both seem very much alive. A visitor from some more restful planet, dropping suddenly into one of our large towns or even on to one of our by-pass roads, could certainly not accuse us of physical indolence; nor after contemplating the books, that pour weekly from the printing press, our periodicals and daily papers, and the programmes of the B. B. C. could he condemn us for mental sloth. And yet if he were a man of spiritual perception, he could not but be bewildered and then depressed by the small proportion of real meaning in so much movement of body and mind. And

one does not need to be a stranger from another sphere to feel at times that modern life, whether it rush by in a flood of traffic or of fiction, of argument or of advertising, is indeed

a tale
Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury,
Signifying nothing.

Yet Life is never such a tale. It always signifies something. And I am not of those who see in modern life merely a whirlpool in which eventually civilisation will drown. Probably there was never an age in which the din of the transitory and the trivial sounded more incessantly. But there can have been few in which the hunger for vital knowledge was more prevalent or the disposition to be impartial in the supplying or the pursuit of it. These are virtues no less for being conditioned by a basic defect. And though I wish here to emphasise the necessity of faith, I might as truly say that I

wish to emphasise the necessity of knowledge. For the most pressing need and problem of to-day is to reconcile faith and knowledge, which is something quite different from effecting a spurious compromise between them, such as Organised Religion has attempted. An uneasy compromise between knowledge and faith is ultimately more devitalising than an honest divorce. But a divorce has deadly consequences too, and the distracted face of the modern world declares them. How did this divorce come about? The state of inward division in the primitive man is an elementary expression of that which has culminated in the fevered self-conflict of the civilised man. It is so elementary an expression that many who have been stricken with the "strange disease of modern life"* have failed altogether to see the germs of their disease far back in human history and have tried to cure it by returning to its primitive source. But the difference between the primitive and

the civilised man is only one of degree. The former has just set his foot upon the path of self-consciousness; the latter has reached a point on it when he must either by a willing or a forced death of the personal self break through to the plane of pure being and the new consciousness such being brings.

In the primitive man faith and knowledge are still almost one in instinct. But the identity between them even on this level is not complete. He has separated in however small a degree from the organic Nature to which the trees and beasts wholly belong. And although primitive man is, like the child, still overruled as a creature by the creative rhythm of life so that his knowledge, however limited in range, is rooted in vital perception, he has become just conscious enough to begin to interpret and direct his instincts, and even occasionally to give them a perversely personal twist. His animal faith, therefore, is no longer perfect. The possibility of

* Esoteric philosophy offers a different explanation: the Birth of Self-consciousness is a psychological and not a physiological process, i. e., human self-consciousness did not evolve out of animal consciousness. That Birth of the Human Soul or Self-consciousness made the fundamental difference between savage races and civilized races, between whom the difference is not merely of degree as the modern man is apt to think. Again, our Esoteric Philosophy would say to our esteemed contributor that "the strange disease of modern life" is not common to the primitive savage and the modern man; it becomes so when the civilized-sick go to the healthy-savage and try to educate him just as a trainer educates the animal to act like man. That disease is due to mistakes made by our "direct ancestors" the civilized men of a very remote period whose knowledge outran their moral perceptions and produced a loss of balance i. e., a division in their make up. Many of those "direct ancestors" are living in us to-day. Esoteric Science also teaches how integration can take place in the make up of the modern man. All this may not prove palatable to modern theorists; but there are a few who may desire to know the truth wherever it may come from. To them we would point to H. P. Blavatsky's *Secret Doctrine*, especially the second volume.—EDS.

error has arisen in him with the faculty of free-will and hence this conflict between unconscious faith and conscious knowledge which has been and is being fought out almost to the death in the modern civilised man. For in civilisation we see man learning to think for and of himself. And this thinking is a kind of death. Slowly but surely it saps the power of instinctive living and that unconscious faith which expresses the elementary will to life.

There is, however, a stage in this process when the instinctive will to life in man is still powerful—but he exploits it cunningly for his own advantage. In doing so, however, he merely accelerates the process of his self-destruction. In perverting the will to life to personal ends, he becomes ever more conscious of division within and without. His self-awareness grows increasingly acute, but it is the awareness of a thinking unit divorced from a living whole and the knowledge which the unit accumulates with a fever of acquisitiveness is, like the possessions it multiplies, disorganic, and tends to become so materialised as to lose all meaning. For the more exclusively conscious a man becomes of the material aspect of life, the further removed he is from its inner reality. In the unity of true understanding the subject and the object become one; the outward form of things is transfigured and dissolved in a recognition of its inner meaning. But to the divided man every object stands out in hard, in-

hospitable relief, because he is separated from it. He can manipulate such objects, organising and exploiting them for his own ends, and he can even study impartially and with more and more refinement their physical make-up. But the gulf between him and them remains. And so their real meaning, of which their material form is only a potentially luminous envelope, eludes him, as does the real meaning of himself.

Although there are countless intermediate stages between that of primitive instinct in which self-consciousness has hardly begun and the civilised rationality in which it has become a deathly disease, beneath them all is the fissure ever widening between faith and knowledge, thought and being.

Such, very briefly and summarily, is the psychological pattern of man's evolution in consciousness, whether viewed in the macrocosm of human history or in the microcosm of certain individual lives. It is possible to conceive an evolution from pure unconsciousness to pure consciousness which would be an organic unfolding, altogether devoid of the stress and waste of conflict. But on this planet for many thousand years at least division has been a condition of growth; the power of conscious thought has emerged only by shattering the unity of instinctive being. Partial knowledge has been acquired at the inevitable cost of unconscious faith. And now we are faced with the crisis when beneath the pale cast of thought the old organic

life of the natural man has wilted and died, while the new life of the spiritual man has yet in humanity at large to be born. Behind and within the process of self-conscious thinking which Western man has exemplified with ever-increasing intensity for the last three hundred years has been the will to personal life. Behind and within the pure consciousness of a to-morrow, near or remote, must be the will to selfless being. Only so can the half-knowledge of science as it is to-day and the half-faith of contemporary religion be transcended in the living truth which will make men free. A glance at the relations of official science and religion in the West to-day may help to show how inevitable it is that the reintegration of knowledge in faith and of faith in knowledge which is vital to civilisation will spring, and indeed is already springing, from new roots whether in the individual or in the social body. For the organic cannot be grafted on to the disorganic. It must grow up from a new centre and depth in life until at last in its ripe strength it consumes the sickly tissues of the disorganic and transforms the whole body into radiant health. And so will it be with our disorganic science and religion of to-day. For although the one seems very much alive and the other conventionally moribund, both lack a creative centre. Yet the divorce from Religion which Science proclaimed in the last century was necessary to both and merely registered on the social surface of life the break in the uni-

ty of human experience, which originated in the first doubt man entertained concerning an instinctive impulse and the first question he asked of the unseen powers to which before he had implicitly submitted. And during the last fifty years, despite all the bland pronouncements of eminent ecclesiastics that religion and science were no longer in conflict, there has been and could be no real approach to reunion. Natural Science has greatly increased the knowledge it derives from external sense-perception and its mode of thought has come to permeate our modern mechanical civilisation. But while man has concentrated his attention on the world of the physical senses with really remarkable results in material, industrial and technical efficiency, his inner life has almost atrophied. For the constant stimulus from the external senses upon which the thought of natural science has depended, could not but deaden the life of the soul, which needs to be nourished by finer kinds of contemplation, by a communion with super-sensual reality, and a continual effort to express that reality within the limits of the actual. This culture and concentration of the inner life, this quickening of the soul-life in the midst of the sense-life, has always been the concern of Religion. And the churches profess, of course, sincerely enough their concern for it to-day, but ineffectively. Over the majority of men and women who consciously or unconsciously, critically or uncritically, appreciate the impartial methods of science,

they exercise no influence at all. And this is primarily, I am convinced, because dogmatic church-Christianity is not disinterested.*

The churches, in fact, are impotent because they fear to abandon the claims to special privilege in their Saviour and themselves, which the spirit of truth rejects. But if organised Christianity shrinks from that fearless abandonment of self and its vested interests without which it can possess neither faith nor knowledge in their fulness, the partial knowledge, which has been so widely acquired through the methods of science and so effectively applied to the surface of life, has certainly proved a very inadequate substitute for that unquestioning faith which in times past sustained and inwardly unified the life of man, though it lacked the complex external organisation it can boast to-day. But the mass of men and women who have grown up with little conception of truth beyond that popularised by natural science are fundamentally impotent too. The incessant movement of body and mind betrays the fact of this spiritual impotence no less than the kindly exhortations of Anglican clerics on the wireless or the aridly autocratic tones of their Roman Catholic rivals.

How then are men to throw off spiritual impotence? How are they to discover a knowledge which is not disabling and a faith which is not a blindness? They will certainly not do so by trying to return to the physically primi-

tive or by any combination of autocracy and servitude, arrogance and ignorance, such as we see prevalent in parts of Europe to-day and which proclaims an inner defeat no less than the defeatism from which it is a convulsive reaction. Not in strident reaction, but in reintegration, basic and progressive, is to be found the new life which we need.

The conflict in Western man between faith and knowledge, being and self, has culminated to-day in a state of spiritual impotence. In other words the rhythm of man's being has gone awry. When an individual is conforming truly to the will of life, all that he does is a harmonious expression of what he is. His acts, however humble, have meaning. They communicate his particular quality within the general order, which of course is quite different from advertising his personality in defiance of that order.

And if we look more closely into the nature of this action-in-being and being-in-action, we shall find that spontaneity is combined in it with an underlying constancy, that such a man acts with inspired rightness on the circumference because he rests upon a creative centre in himself, so that acting he yet does not act, while even his apparent inaction is really an act of grace. This conception of action within inaction will of course be familiar to all students of the *Gita*. But it is worth

And the same may be said of every organized religion without a single exception.—EDS.

re-stating because it is so particularly relevant to the condition of Western man to-day in whom faith and knowledge have become divorced. His condition presents an exact contrast with that of the integrated man whom I have just described. Most of his actions, in which, of course, I include his words, express very little of his real self. There is more movement in them than meaning, and those which are distinctly his own are apt to suggest self-display rather than self-fulfilment. Similarly he expends much energy recklessly, but rather as if driven on by some demon than as one in whom the free play of life is harmoniously governed and directed from within.

Such are some of the more obvious symptoms of the dislocated rhythm of modern life. Man lacks a compass and the more wilfully he hastens this way and that, the further he is from his true course. He has forgotten that creative freedom is the experience only of those who submit perfectly to creative law and that defiance of this law results in the bondage of Samsāra, of delusive desire and the distracted mind.

The split between faith and knowledge has been necessary to human evolution. For Man must grow up and in doing so transform his faith in the crucible of self-consciousness from an instinct into an intuition. Unfortunately in doing so he has lost the integrity of a creature without acquiring that of a creator. Divided by himself he has become the slave

of partial knowledge and by this knowledge he has multiplied objects and opinions which deepen his discord and through which he dissipates his being. But since we can see how this has come about, we can at least suggest how it may be remedied. To quote from the *Maitri Upanishad*,—

The mind, in truth, is for mankind
The means of bondage and release :
For bondage, if to objects bound ;
From objects free—that's called release !

The mind at present is for Western man chiefly a means of bondage. Yet only through this exclusive and tyrannical assertion of the rational faculty might the mind become, as never before except in rare individuals, the means of release. It has already refused to be bound to the unreal objects of organised religion which deaden the spirit, by deifying the word, and it will, I believe, refuse eventually to be bound to the unreal objects of a machine-age. But before this can happen Man will have to feel so strongly the necessity of becoming the organic being of which the machine is a soulless caricature that he will cast down the idol of mental egoism in himself. The modern machine in its shining efficiency is the necessary product of the mind of man working in isolation from the heart, conscious, therefore, of only the grosser forces and forms of matter, and impelled chiefly by the lust to master and exploit them. Such a product has its uses. But Man cannot know how to use it until he has ceased to be enslaved in himself by the uncentred mind which

manufactured it. Only an organism can live in freedom amidst mechanism. And the mind of Man will not become organic by any superficial adjustment, such as the mechanic can apply to a machine. An organism must grow. And it is in the evolution of a true from a partial self-hood that the mind will cease to be a means of bondage, and become the eye of the Spirit that is whole. To quote again from the *Maitri Upanishad*,—

So long the mind should be confined,
Till in the heart it meets its end.
That is both knowledge and release !
All else is but a string of words !

I have not space left to explore the depth of meaning contained in these lines, but the solution of the problem of the living relationship of faith and knowledge is to be found in them.

To-day, despite appearances to the contrary, most of us know too little to act truly, while we lack the faith requisite for growth in real knowledge. But the belief we need is not assent to certain doctrines. Real faith, as Wesley said, is not "an opinion nor any number of opinions put together, be they ever so true. It is the vision of the Soul, that power by which Spiritual things are apprehended."^{*} But if faith is the power, a transformed and illuminated reason is the faculty, by which spiritual things are apprehended. And each is necessary to the other. In true being such faith and such reason are indistinguishably one,

even as the mind that in the heart meets its end. For the meeting place of mind and heart is the Creative Self, the Atman which is at one with Brahman. In reality the conflict is between whole being and half-being, between the integrated and the divided consciousness. We need more faith that we may have more knowledge, and more knowledge that we may have more faith, until the impulses of science and of religion, working to-day in sickly official separation, meet, not in any spurious external alliance, but in the organic harmony of that spiritual perception which comes inevitably to liberated men and women.

And even if it remains for a spiritualised race of the future thus to reconcile faith and knowledge in real being, we can at least begin to discard the unreal antitheses that interested professions have set up between them. We can, for example, dismiss from our minds the idea that real faith necessitates intellectual assent to either some formulated creed or to some hypothesis of science. Each of these represents a mental definition of experience, and as such is at best only relatively real. The creed may be a more comprehensive and profound definition than the scientific hypothesis. But it, too, is partial and the more dangerously partial for claiming to contain the whole and final truth. No definition and so no dogma can

^{*}Esoteric Philosophy defines faith as "a quality endowed with a most potent creative power." But faith is not blind-belief, nor does it require grace from without for its awakening, but it does need the will-power from within; without will it is like a wind-mill without wind—barren of results.—EDS.

represent more than a skeleton of experience and in some degree it is always a distorted one. The more men become conscious of these arbitrary distortions, the less can they clothe the skeleton with the flesh of a living meaning. So it is to-day with the exclusive dogmas of the Christian churches. They are the twisted bones of a skeleton which life refuses any longer to clothe with meaning. And faith, conceived truly as creative inspiration, has no concern with them. We see its true nature far less in those who insist that we should believe that Jesus of Nazareth was "very God of very God" than in the faith of a grain of mustard seed or of a fledgling tipped from its nest and finding its wings. For faith in its essence transcends any intellectual assent to doctrine or even conscious statement of belief. It is surrender to the creative will within and beyond the self and as such is one with love. The love that casteth out fear is identical with the faith that casteth out doubt. They are the key by which the individual enters into the greater life and resolves the false tension of egoism.

When faith has become an implicit state of being, it can give reasons for itself, since it *is* the very reason of Being. But until this has happened, all intellectual argument for or against faith is of little profit since it is merely the play (serious or frivolous) of the partial self-hood and impedes the growth of organic being. The apparently insoluble problems will either be solved or perceived

to be unreal as the mind itself becomes an integrated faculty. "Christian" in *The Pilgrim's Progress*, it will be remembered, had faith enough to advance in spite of the lions which he saw barring his way. It was only when he had advanced in faith that he saw they were chained.

And such faith, which is at once courage, selflessness, and a venture of the imagination, is always the condition of true knowledge. For without it we cannot awaken the reality in ourselves by which we can divine the reality outside ourselves. To be in a state of faith is to be so profoundly in tune with life and light as to dissolve death and darkness both in oneself and in one's surroundings, and thus to unveil the truth. It is a state which in this age is particularly hard to grow into. For the upspringing of real faith in the soul involves not merely an abandonment of delusive mental and physical activities but a readiness to enter upon and persist in a fundamentally new way of life. To live in faith is to realise at ever deeper levels that harmony which transcends the divided faculties of thought and feeling. The rhythm of the world will only cease to be strained and fevered when it has recovered this central harmony, not by denying the one-sided knowledge of the present to return to the one-sided creeds of the past, but by growing towards that future when knowledge and faith are identified in the creative insight of the whole man.

HUGH P. FAUSSET

NEW BOOKS AND OLD

BUDDHA AND BUDDHISM*

[Dr. Kalidas Nag shows how the Great Buddha continued the age-long task of reform which always tries to purify the corruption in religious and philosophical thought.—Eds.]

Founders of religion, especially in ancient days, found little time or inclination to record, in writing, their thoughts and realisations. Of Zarathustra we have a few hymns; the entire Zend-Avesta is not accepted to be his personal composition. Lao-tze and Confucius similarly left us legacies of their sparkling thoughts shining through the ill-assorted texts of Taoism and Confucianism; but helped as we are by the admirable Chinese sense of precision, it is difficult, as ever, to disentangle the *authentic* from the *apocryphal*. Their great Indian contemporaries in the field of spiritual reformation were Vardhamāna Mahāvīr, the founder of Jainism and Gotama Buddha, the preacher of the first world-religion, Buddhism. There is little doubt that some of their fundamental doctrines and sayings are preserved substantially through the Canonical texts composed centuries after them. But we cannot forget that there is a world of difference between a direct *revelation* and its indirect *recording*, maybe by contemporaries or immediate successors. The Seers are, mostly

speaking, sayers; but their sayings are often pegs for later speculations, now amplifying then distorting the original statements. Lots of discrepancies have thus been detected among the writings of the Evangelists each professing to record *verbatim* the words and parables of Jesus. So, in the history of Buddhism, we find various attitudes: naive acceptance, scepticism and critical reconstruction, in the handling of legends and histories, canons and doctrines.

One of the foremost thinkers of the world as he is the Buddha did not condescend to be an author. He was a teacher and preacher *par excellence*. He addressed his audience in *Prākṛit*, the living speech of common men and women, and not in the scholastic *Sanskrit*. But as there were no stenographers ready at hand, his *prose* addresses must have been "constituted" texts giving as faithful a summary as possible under the circumstances. His *poetic* utterances however were more easily and faithfully retained and transmitted, especially because a good deal of the *Subhāsitavali* or Good Sayings were metrical forms

* *Iti-Vuttaka or Sayings of Buddha*. Trans. by Justin Hartley Moore (Columbia University Press, New York \$ 2.50.)

Early Buddhist Scriptures. Edited and translated by Edward J. Thomas, (Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co., Ltd., London. 10s. 6d.)

of our ancestral wisdom, freely distributed by the veteran mass educator, amidst his longer prose sermons.

This problem of capital importance came to be discussed by Mr. Justin H. Moore when he set himself the task of giving the English translation of the *Ili-Vuttaka*, the Logia or Sayings of Buddha, in the Indo-Iranian series of the Columbia University. By that time the Pali Text Society of London had published over forty-six Buddhist texts in fifty-nine volumes, in the course of the twenty-five years of its fruitful career under the direction of the late Professor T. W. Rhys Davids. His magnificent *Pali-English Dictionary* (completed in 1925 after his death by Dr. W. Stede) however, was not available to Mr. Moore who had to depend largely on Childer's *Pali Dictionary* (London 1875) "inadequate and faulty" as he found it. But a gifted and versatile philologist, Mr. Moore checked his translation, duly consulting the French and German versions or editions. He was alert in noticing that the *Chinese* translation of *Ili-Vuttaka* by Hiuen Tsang was much shorter than the canonical *Pali* version. So additions and alterations have evidently been going on, even after the seventh century A. D., when the Chinese pilgrim visited India. The prose portions, as rightly observed by Mr. Moore, were but veiled later commentaries to the metrical sayings of the Master. The prose is dry and scholastic,

the verses rich with life and which appear, word for word, sometimes in the *Dhammapada*, another book supposed to have been pronounced by the Buddha.

Against the Vājapeya, the *Āśva-medha* or Human sacrifices of the Vedic age, Buddha nobly affirmed :

He that killeth not, and causeth not to kill
Who doth not injure and who causeth not to injure
Hath the friendship of all creatures,
There is no wrath at him for any cause.

In words like these we touch the very speech of the Master and feel the life-breath of his great religion which conquered the heart of millions, developing the first spiritual fraternity composed of many races and diverse cultural traditions.

If evil comes to frustrate good and the harmful try to injure the harmless, the cheering words of the Master should be remembered :

Who so should think to pollute
The ocean by a jar of poison,
He could not pollute it by that
For the sea is greater than the jar.

Subdued yet profound compassion is expressed in a highly poetic passage :

Even as one standing on a mountain top
May see rocks and mankind on every side,
Just so the well-known Sumedha,
Having ascended the Highest Dharma, like a palace
Casting his glance on every side, looketh down
with grief departed,
On Mankind immersed in grief, and overcome by
Birth and Old Age.

Here we catch a glimpse of the great *Avalokiteswara* who will conquer the heart of Asia from Gāndhāra to Japan, from Central Asia to Indonesia.

The idea of immortality is supposed to be in "absolute contradiction with the usual Buddhist doctrine" says Mr. Moore. But we find clear reference to the

same in the following words of Buddha:—

These three, teachers of gods and men
Givers of radiance, speaking forth the Law,
Unclose the door of Immortality,
They release many from the Bond.

Thus the concepts were there, only the terms were changing with Buddhism which came to purify and not to destroy the old Brahmanical culture and ethics. So we are going to revise a great many of our opinions about early Buddhism supposed to care only for individual salvation and (paradoxically enough) taking *nirvāṇa* to be a synonym for annihilation. New Buddhist texts that are being discovered every year, especially of the Northern Mahāyāna schools, have forced us to change our attitude to the Pali Canons of the Southern Hinayana, as demonstrated admirably by Prof. Sylvain Lévi of Paris. It is opportune therefore that the scholarly translation of the *Iti-Vuttaka* has been reprinted after a quarter of a century.

We are faced to-day with the problem not simply of interpreting particular doctrines of isolated schools but that of correlating Buddhist thought with the main currents of ancient Hindu religion and Brahmanical philosophy. This work has been admirably done by Dr. Edward J. Thomas of Cambridge, in his *Early Buddhist Scriptures*. He has already made a name, publishing *The Life of Buddha* and *History of Buddhist Thought*, winnowing with rare courage and patience the Buddhist Commentaries, "700 times more in bulk to that of the Bible." In his *Early*

Buddhist Scriptures he shows a fine catholicity of outlook and a rare sense of documentation. His brilliant compilation of Buddhist texts on "Other Schools" brings home to us, the truth that to follow adequately the Buddhist scriptures we must remember the background of Pre-Buddhist thought for over a millennium from the Vedas to the sermons of Buddha. The Brahmanical disciplines of *Tri-vidyā* appear as *tevijjā*; gods like Indra, Soma, Varuna, Yama, Brahmā, Prajāpati, Iśāna; sages like Vasistha, Visvāmitra, Vāmadeva, Angirasa, Bhāradvāja, Kāśyapa, Bhrigu; and schools like those of Bahvracas (*Rigveda*), Adhvarju, Taittirīya, Chāndogya, Yoga etc. were well known to Buddha. His discourse on the Brahmajāla Sūtra further strengthens the conviction that Buddhism should not be treated as if opening with a *tabula rasa*: rather it should be examined and interpreted with constant reference to non-Buddhist schools and their texts or doctrines. Of the divisions classifying the bulk of the Buddhist texts, the metaphysical division *Abhidhamma* is rightly considered to be a later growth as Buddha was far too practical to care for abstract discussions. But the *Sūtra* and the *Vinaya* Pitakas faithfully preserve the ancient Brahmanical tradition where we find the scholastic groups of Dharma, Artha and Kāma developing their sūtra texts. So we find that the *Artha-sāstra* opens with the *Vinaya* section which concerns royal disci-

pline just as the Buddhist Vinaya devotes itself to monastic discipline. So the Brahmanical concept of Ātman (soul) is opposed by anātman (non-soul), ānanda (joy) by dukkha (sorrow), immortality by cessation, maintaining however the old theories of Karma and Re-incarnation. The Brahmanical schools developed *tri-varga* into *chaturvarga* adding Moksha or liberation which may be equated with Nirvāna or release for it is not a negative but a positive notion. Very appropriately therefore has Dr. Thomas quoted as the motto of his book the profound saying of Buddha (*Vinaya* II. 239) :—

Just as the great ocean, O monks, has one taste, the taste of salt, even so O monks, this Doctrine and Discipline has one taste, the taste of release.

Dr. Thomas has proved conclusively that Buddha did not contradict everything coming from his predecessors.* His fourfold classification of Karma is the same as we find in Vyasa's commentary on the *Yoga-sutras* (IV. 7). So in his going out in search of release, he is following the path of the great Yajñavalkya of the Upanishads. He quotes approvingly the conclusions of his elder contemporary Nataputra Mahāvīra who made the basic aim of Jainism to be "the destruction of pain through the destruction of Karma."

Buddhist books were properties as well as product of the monastic order developing later on; and naturally the "Disciples' Career"

occupies the largest place in the book as also in the canons. But the Master himself was in close touch with the majority of the lay devotees, men and women. Hence his paternal "Counsels to the Laymen" are full of wisdom and enlightened tolerance. He appears as a firm believer in family purity especially safeguarding the honour of womanhood. That may explain why he hesitated to permit women to leave their families and join the Order as nuns, which fact has, however, been explained with the characteristic male bias of later monastic compilers. Buddha undoubtedly inspired some of the noblest types of Indian womanhood :—Mahāprajāpatī, Ambapālī, Soma and other nuns. Soma crushed the arguments of Māra the wicked who was trying to discourage her :—

The woman's state, what matters it?
To one whose mind is well composed
In whom knowledge is arising.

Noble self-assertion of Indian womanhood justifying her right to emancipation on equal footing with men as we find in Soma's spiritual sister Maitreyī of the Upanishadic age: that is how the Master could reclaim the talented courtesan like Ambapālī just as he did in the case of King Ajātasatru the parricide.

The biographical fragments of the Master have been collected and studied by Dr. Thomas with rare sympathy and insight. His outline drawing of the Buddha's portrait is superb. The Buddha is

* The reader's attention may be drawn to "The Line of Buddhas" by Professor N. K. Jagvat, published in *THE ARYAN PATH* for May 1932.—Eds.

not a mere legend or metaphysical reconstruction but a real historical character whom we can see and touch. His great advantage over other religious pioneers lies in this that he takes his stand firmly on his *human* qualities without the least super-human pretensions. And yet by sheer human will and discipline of human life, he soared

to great heights. He devoted the very last days and hours of his life to the edification and pacification of millions of tortured fellow beings degraded by Ignorance. He is undoubtedly the greatest personality in Indian history and one of the few towering figures in the history of the world.

KALIDAS NAG

CHRISTIANITY AND HINDUISM *

[T. R. Venkatarama Sastri, C.I.E., is a keen student of religious thought. He has made his mark as a brilliant lawyer and is highly respected for his sober political views.—EDS.]

The author of this book belongs to one continent, the reviewer to another. The distance between the two is the distance between India and America, between Hinduism and Christianity. The writer is a Christian. The reviewer is a Hindu. The Hindu has no desire to disturb the convinced Christian out of his Christianity, though the Christian author would be pleased were the Hindu reviewer to change his creed as a result of his book.

Very few of us bring free minds to the inquiry of the deeper problems of religion. We are committed to ideas from birth, for the country and the race to which we belong have each a long history and a definite line of evolution. We have our families and the surroundings in which we are born and bred, as well as our individual mental, moral and spiritual tendencies. The author is not a sceptic; he accepts approaches to religion which no sceptic would accept. He accepts revelation. He accepts faith as sufficient in itself and as justified by the universality of religious ideas. Mr. More has a predetermined conclusion and one sees from the first that the

opposite view is intended to be overthrown.

To name but one point in illustration: the sceptic of the author's imagination is startled to discover that religions are based on a single principle and are agreed in imagining certain powers behind phenomena, swayed by prayers, sacrifices and symbolic rites. The reviewer does not know of any sceptics startled by it. They maintain that religions are all superstructures built on foundations of superstition.

The Hindu Religious Philosophy considers Revelation to be the only sound basis for Religion; reasoning is an aid to the perception of what is Revealed. The author's aim may be to establish a similar premise for Christianity. Even a person with no predisposition to theistic belief and disposed to be critical, will find, so Mr. More infers, more difficulties in the way of disbelief than of belief.

The author divides his subject into eight chapters. The first is headed "Rationalism and Faith" and deals directly with the question, appealing to the sceptic to play fair and rec-

* *The Sceptical Approach to Religion*.—By P. E. MORIS (Princeton University Press, Princeton.)

ognize the weakness of his own case in the realm of reason. The fifth Chapter is entitled "The Illusions of Reason" and is intended to show how fallible reason itself may be and how other guides than this may well be accepted in spheres beyond the direct reach of reason. The intermediate three chapters are devoted to the exposition of Greek thought as represented by Socrates and Plato, and the emergence of Teleology in the evolution of Plato's mind as indicated in his last books. These chapters are not quite relevant to the author's task if viewed simply as the presentation of a sceptic's view; or is it the author's intention to show how one who does not approach the problem from the standpoint of religion comes near to the Christian view of Teleology?

The last three chapters elucidate the evolution of Hebrew religious thought and its natural culmination in Christianity (though it was rejected by the bulk of the Jewish people) with its message of hope to the world. This presentation is natural for a European Christian writer. Europe traces the ancestry of its culture and religion to Greece and Judæa. To Europe, Greece was the beginning of things worthwhile. In recent times there has been a growing recognition that Greek ideas themselves have a past which might touch the history of thought in other countries, but the view is still largely held, that there is nothing valuable that has come from the days before Greece. As for Hebrew thought, the Old Testament and the New form the very texture of Christianity and its message of hope.

Being interested in parallel phenomena in a country which has explored every avenue, every nook and every corner of religious thought, the reviewer would like to draw attention to certain aspects presented.

The author denies verbal inspiration to the Bible, and postulates the evolution of religious ideas in the Old Testament. Indian orthodoxy will con-

cede neither of these points in the case of their own scriptures. It may be of interest to professors of other religions to know that it is the conviction of orthodoxy in India that if once the verbal inspiration of the scriptures were yielded as unsustainable, there would be an end to the case for Revelation. This seems logical and correct. For if the Bible presented as the words of Jehovah were considered the work of a human author of fallible memory and maybe faulty recollection, argument on that basis becomes futile.

May it be that the argument for Revelation through the Bible is on ultimate analysis only an argument on the spiritual experience of the race as embodied in the Bible, and that its validity rests on the converging testimony of the people as a whole? Where all scriptures agree, there we have that converging testimony. The author does use converging testimony as argument. It used to be the view that all other religions were superstition and "mine" the one true religion. We have now reached the recognition that in all religions there is a core of truth.

Hinduism does not accept in theory the progressive evolution of religious ideas. It favours the static view; but by elaborate and subtly devised rules of exegesis silences inconvenient texts without seeming to attack their inspired character. It has also another doctrine that the scripture is valid and final only in supersensual matters. In the domain of reason it is to be set aside if contrary to reason. On the other hand, Christianity has every reason to accept progressive evolution in the Old Testament, for it is the outcome of Judaism and the claim of Christianity is based on that evolution culminating in the Incarnation.

Mr. More stresses the doctrine of free-will in man, his power to choose and his responsibility ensuing upon that choice. The purposiveness in man, he claims, suggests intelligence and purposiveness throughout the

Universe. Many have claimed to see a new factor in evolution with the advent of man. Man is not moved by mere natural impulse as animals are; he looks at and within himself, philosophises, draws conclusions as to himself and his place in the Universe, and uses language for embodying and integrating thought. "The Forest Book" of *Black Yajur Veda* says:—

Whoso realises the Tree of Life
As having its roots *Above*
And its spreading branches here *Below*
Not for an instant can that person believe
That Death can lay hands on him.

In stating the very claim of Man to immortality, the *Āranyaka* posits the human faculty as coming from, and being kin to the Divine and on that very fact maintains his immunity from death and destruction.

All this may appeal to some minds—minds already disposed to faith. But can the recognition of Free Will be usefully pressed into service? The controversy between Free Will and Necessity is uncertain in its appeal. "All theory is against it and all experience for it" is a statement that engenders not certainty but doubt. Even convinced believers in Free Will are obliged to say:

Our wills are ours we know not how
Our wills are ours to make them thine.

God's over-riding purpose and man's independent will seem to go ill together. If facts of observation take you one way and a sense of direct experience another, certain knowledge will not follow, but only doubt and perplexity. Many eminent thinkers have accepted Necessity and dismissed freedom of will as a delusion of the human mind. There are others, though few, who have resolved the seeming conflict to their own satisfaction and claimed that Necessity is true but it is not necessarily destructive of moral responsibility. If the test of a doctrine is in the character of the lives lived under its sway, it will be difficult to condemn Necessity as the parent of evil. There are good and even holy men among

Necessitarians as the author himself recognises. Those who feel that they would have no inducement to ethical conduct if they believed in the doctrine of Necessity can only speak for themselves.

The author condemns all forms of monistic or pantheistic religion or philosophy. He declaims against the bastard philosophies of Spinoza and Kant. But living in a country where religious thought has strongly flowed along monistic and pantheistic lines and watched its effects on the lives of religious men, the reviewer is unable to say that belief in a personal god as an article of faith is essential to good life. He is aware that to many it may be and only the other day he was told by an honoured and intellectual friend that for him it was essential. For influencing life and conduct something that makes for righteousness is as efficacious as a personal god.

In these high twilight regions where thought and feeling are interfused and ideas and images do not correspond to anything in the familiar world, there is little assurance of any definite conclusion, it would seem that to wrangle over these abstractions were to show a lack of recognition that there are many approaches to Ultimate Truth which no one of us, limited as we are by finite minds, can know in all its fullness.

In the author's opinion, superstition slowly ascends to the dignity of religion and theistic faith. At some point of development it fails everywhere. Even the Hebrews whose evolution of theism he concedes to be perfect and straight, were about to fail. Then came the Incarnation. Christianity with its dualism of God and Nature, he maintains, is the one and only true way of interpreting and grasping the Universe. And God can only be a personal god.

May one ask what is a personal god? Has he a form? Has he a place of residence as in all popular religions? We are told that he is Immanent, he

is everywhere and in the human heart. What does all this mean—to the believer—to the sceptic? The word *personal* in a "personal god" must have a meaning all its own, unlike anything that one understands by it in our concrete world. On the other hand we have *Brahman* in the Hindu philosophy. IT has no qualities. IT can only be described by negation of all that can be known or thought of. So IT is indescribable. Human mind and words are unable to grasp IT. Yet IT is Sat, Chit, Ananda (Existence, Intelligence and Bliss). The impersonal does not seem to be so impersonal, so unknown or so unknowable as it is represented. Yet the personal god and the impersonal Brahman seem alike beyond the power of

man fully to seize by his mere intellect.

There is a stage in the discussion of these abstruse questions where it would be wisdom to understand another's point of view and leave it there without proceeding to deliver judgment as to its worth in comparison with our own. The differences in the mode of realising the Ultimate Truth arise from the complexity and the varying types of the human mind. Those who are truly concerned with life and conduct will find no need to wrangle over these differences. Unfortunately, most books dealing with religion are not so interested in life and conduct as in the establishment of the superiority of one religion over all others.

T. R. VENKATARAMA SASTRI

Shallows and Deepes. By ARCHIBALD WEIR, M. A. (Basil Blackwell, Oxford 8s. 6d.)

Responding with proper precautions, to the call that readers should not expect to be entertained with second-hand ideas, and approaching Mr. Weir's volume with adequate preparedness to wrestle with his "stiff" style as I have had opportunity to do with Sanskrit classics of stiffer style, I find that the main thesis of this work is spiritual progress of mankind from monadic existence to realization of Universal Self through suffering from a feverish passion for the prizes, and temptations of worldly life. This has also been the goal proclaimed by religious teachers and system builders all the world over since the dawn of rational reflection. His comments on "Pelf," "Usury," "Entities," etc., found in Book 1, entitled "Understate-ments," are pungent and emphasize the *evanescence* of life and of its precious possessions. In the course of the second Book, "Deepes Beneath Consciousness," Archibald Weir has eluci-

dated the significance to mankind of three fundamental and basic truths. (1) Intimations of Immortality and Universal Self emanate like effulgent fulgurations as Leibnitz put it, from the Realm of the Unconscious. (p. 140) (2) Self is a trust and its "fiduciary" character supplies the needed spiritual guarantee of "service to manhood." (3) Realization of and homage to Universal Self is the goal of life. In Archibald Weir's picturesque phraseology, progress consists in advancement from animal to human, from human to "authentic manhood" or human-authentic.

Students of Indian Darsanas will find many a second-hand idea (in the sense of perfectly familiar stock-in-trade of philosophers) in this volume, but, it should be pointed out that philosophical discussions *must* deal with familiar and second-hand notions. Philosophy is not the design of a locomotive where novelty is witnessed and experienced with the strides of time. It must deal with basic concepts familiar and second-hand. "Brahma-

jigyasa" or "Vedanta-vichara" is "Siddha-vastu-vishaya," i.e., philosophic quest deals with settled, familiar concepts. Perhaps Mr. Weir has clothed old, familiar concepts in new phraseology which lapses frequently into the familiar style which he hates. For instance, when he writes: "Self is always part of *our being*, and agent of *our higher consciousness*. In the process of *consciousness* being reinforced from *unconsciousness*, there is a *pivot* where consciousness receives... and the pivot is the *self*" (pp. 119-20). "The deepest zone beneath consciousness, therefore, is the source of authentic manhood." (p. 140. Italics mine) Or again, when he asserts that "Self Universal is a sort of unity" (that a la Hegelian synthesis grips together continuity and discontinuity, i.e. thesis and anti-thesis) and that it "includes soul" which is "an activity, not an entity," (pp. 148-49) there is no doubt he sinks by the weight of conventional terminology." When the mind of his reader or reviewer is required to jump from "Self Universal" to "Soul," from "Soul" to "function of consciousness the All," it is as often entertaining as instructive.

That speculation must sooner or later be translated into experience if philosophy is worth its salt is undoubtedly the most important lesson taught

by Mr. Weir in his concluding chapter. As the Vedantins put it, speculation rational (Brahma-jigyasa) must fulfil itself into Realisation-emotional-cum-volitional. (Brahma-sakshatkara) Realisation of the Universal Life or Self is the harmonious blend of the tripartite of cognition, emotion, and conation.

But what is the practical programme outlined by Mr. Weir to enable humans to reach authentic manhood? Just social-service, Red-cross work, League-secretariat, intellectual co-operation *et hoc*? Does he believe in any programme of psycho-physical purification and control of mind like the one compulsorily enjoined by Yoga on all aspirants? If not, how is one to share in Self Universal? Does he after all give up the game as he practically seems to by maintaining that "a share in Self Universal is a *secret that cannot be taught and cannot be criticized*?" (p. 211—The Italics mine) What is the philosophic value of such a *secret*? *Cui Bono*? But neither this persistent query nor the comments made above will affect the general excellence and fascinatingly stimulating manner which Mr. Archibald Weir has played in his part as metaphysical mariner indicating to us the deeps and shallows of the Ocean of Philosophy.

R. NAGA RAJA SARMA

Sri Aurobindo and the Future of Mankind. By A. C. DAS, with a Foreword by Sir S. Radhakrishnan (University of Calcutta, Calcutta.)

This little book of 130 pages is a competent study of the leading ideas of the well-known Indian philosopher and yogi, Sri Aurobindo. It is peculiarly welcome since the writings of this remarkable thinker, which have appeared for the most part in the pages of a monthly magazine, *The Arya*, have never been easily accessible to the Western reader.

The fact is the more regrettable as his work is of obvious importance at this present epoch when the need for intellectual co-operation between Asia and Europe is being so acutely felt. For in Aurobindo we meet with a speculative mind in which the balance between the oriental and the occidental components in the philosophical equation is maintained with exceptional justice and subtlety. He will neither be seduced by the materialism of the West nor by the extreme idealism of the East:—

The safety of Europe has to be sought in the recognition of the spiritual aim of human existence; otherwise she will be crushed by the weight of her own unilluminated knowledge and soulless organization. The safety of Asia lies in the recognition of the material mould and mental condition in which that aim has to be worked out; otherwise she will sink deeper into the slough of despond, of a mental and physical incompetence to deal with the facts of life, and the shocks of a rapidly changing movement.

It is evident from the whole tone of the book that his philosophical affinities are more with the school of Ramanuja than with that of Sankara. The world of manifestation is not an unqualified illusion; but a realm which has to be transformed by the divine life which is everlastingly active within it. This is not to say that he has an absolutely equal appreciation of the two factors which have thus to be equilibrated. Inevitably and rightly there is an Eastern emphasis. As with almost all Oriental thinkers his centre of gravity, so to speak, is in the Unmanifested. It is from within the sphere of the Undifferentiated that he seeks to reconcile content and form. There is about his mind a characteristically airy quality. Scrupulous as he is in giving matter its due, we cannot but feel that he does not *know* its dark mystical significance in the same way as does such a typically Western figure as, say, Jacob Boehme.

The full meaning of the fact of incarnation in all its sombre weight and depth still lies beyond his power of penetration. He is racially incapable of that complete submission to matter which is at the same time the strength and weakness of the West.

Yet with all this his grasp of the problem remains masterly. This finds expression in his convincing analysis of the shortcomings of such philosophers of change as Bergson and Alexander, in his treatment of the relation between reason and intuition, and in particular in his conception of the limitations of the classical systems of *yoga*. His own "integral yoga" strikes one as being as philosophically as it is psychologically sound.

Finally Aurobindo is not only a clear, but also an individual and a forceful thinker. His exceptional sensitiveness to the limited and finite has made for a power of pregnant utterance which is a welcome relief after the suave and featureless monotony which so often mitigates the charm of the Oriental's mental processes. The Westerner feels at home with him at once.

It is to be hoped that his work will soon be made more widely known in Europe, as it certainly deserves to be.

LAWRENCE HYDE

Clashing Tides of Colour. By LOTHROP STODDARD (Charles Scribner's Sons, London. 10s. 6d.)

The author aims at setting forth briefly and pointedly the racial and cultural conflicts which underlie the present disorder in world affairs. Consequently he has refrained from considering the economic forces which have brought about conflicts between nations, a treatment of which, however important, would have carried him too far afield.

Many readers will remember Mr. Stoddard's earlier work entitled *The Rising Tide of Colour against White Supremacy*. The book, written soon after the War, was filled with the fear that the fast awakening Orient would overwhelm and finally destroy "white" civilisation which was disrupting and falling into chaos. Since then, events have happened proving disorder and disunion to be not merely peculiar to Europe but also to characterise Asia and Africa. The author accordingly while still obsessed with the fear that

"white" supremacy may be lost finds solace in this book in reviewing the disintegration and confusion which characterise the "coloured" races as well.

The book falls naturally into three parts—the first dealing with the conflicts and antagonisms now existing amongst the "whites," the second amongst the peoples of Asia, and the third amongst the peoples of Africa. In this way it covers practically the whole world in its survey, dealing as it does with Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, North and South America, Japan, China, India, Persia, Afghanistan, Turkey, Arabia and Africa. This constitutes both the merit and demerit of the book, for while it gives within the pages of one volume a bird's eye view of the problems arising from racial and cultural conflicts throughout the world, its treatment is apt to appear meagre to those well-versed in these matters. Not more than a handful of specialists may be expected to know the essentials which underlie conflicts in every part of the world. Mr. Stoddard's book will therefore be welcomed by all those who, not having sufficient time or inclination to make an intensive study of conditions existing in various countries, desire nevertheless to gain a general idea of the problems confronting the nations of the world. One wishes however that Mr. Stoddard had a greater capacity to understand cultures other than the one to which he belongs. He betrays throughout a narrowness and intolerance which prevent him from presenting dispassionately and truly the problems facing one nation as against another, especially when one of the conflicting

nations happens to belong to the "white" race. The way out of the chaos and conflict in which the world is fast sinking is certainly not through any one race, however important in its own eyes, seeking exclusive domination over all others, as the aggressive and youthful West intoxicated by its growing powers during the last two or three centuries seems foolishly to think, but by the policy of mutual sympathy and toleration which the more mature civilisations of the Orient such as India and China have always followed. This is a lesson which the West, now absorbed in making machines and money and in the process ruthlessly trampling down other races, may be expected to learn after a gradual refining and civilising of its spirit. Judging from Mr. Stoddard's book, the West has a long way yet to go before this lesson is learnt; for he advocates that the "white" races of the world should join hands together to form a "white" comity to gain supremacy if possible over the rest of the world.

The author has a vivid, graphic style which makes the book read like a novel. He writes clearly and in every case presents events in historical perspective so that the book does not require of the reader any special previous knowledge, and will be easily intelligible to all. Provided sufficient allowance is made for the author's bias towards "white" civilisation and the resultant distortion of facts connected with his analysis of conditions in the Orient, the book will be found to be of value, especially as it deals in a masterly way with problems with which every intelligent citizen of to-day will desire to be acquainted.

BHARATAN KUMARAPPA

Valmiki Ramayana. Condensed Text with Translation by P. P. S. SASTRI (G. A. Natesan & Co. Madras, Re. 1, 4 As.)

It was sad for Voltaire that the *Ezor Vedam*—about which in his *Essai sur les Moeurs et l'Esprit des Nations*, he had exerted such gleeful anti-clerical praise—should reveal itself, afterwards, to be the fabrication of a Jesuit missionary. But the whole process, since that time, of the gradual introduction of Sanskrit literature into Europe, does not seem to have been very much happier. The Greeks knew something of Indian culture; the Arabs brought Indian medical science to Spain; Bhartrihari was done into Dutch, round about 1650; an English translation of the *Bhagavad-Gita* dates back to 1785; and there has been no break, since then in the line of distinguished Orientalists. The fact remains, none the less, that Indian literature has still not worked its way into the nervure of our own tradition: we are still mere Tourists in the East. And this unwholesome state of things seems due, more than anything else, to the fact that no translator of genius has yet appeared, to give us any one of the great monuments of the Indian spirit in its original strength and freshness.

The *Mahabharata* and the *Ramayana* are two such monuments, and neither of them has yet had anything like adequate treatment in any of the European languages. The *Mahabharata*, as I indicated in the March issue of these pages, is seven or eight times as long as the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* put together: a vast conglomerate work, in which episodes of great beauty and moral teachings of great fervour are woven into the texture of a legendary epic cycle, the work of a people rather than of particular poets. The *Ramayana*, on the other hand, is more or less the work of a single poet, Valmiki; it is rather less than a quarter the length of the *Mahabharata*, containing fewer episodes and far less

moralistic digression; and, though apparently earlier in date it is much more homogeneous and much more sophisticated in style. It belongs to the category of *Kavya*, or artificial epic, in contrast to the *Itihasa*, the legendary epic: a distinction reminiscent of the Western distinction between *Logos* and *Logopeia*.

The main story—of which Prof. Sastri's condensation preserves most of the essentials—tells of the incarnation of Vishnu in the four sons of King Dasaratha; the heroic youth of Rama, the eldest of these, and his marriage with the lovely and virtuous Sita; the evil scheming of Kaikeyi, by which Rama is banished for fourteen years, in favour of his brother, Bharata; the nobility of Bharata, who sets Rama's sandals upon the throne and rules justly as their minister; Rama's destruction of the forest giants; the capture of Sita by Ravana, their leader; the pursuit, in league with Hanuman, lord of the monkeys, who makes a bridge across the sea, over which Rama leads his army; the test of Sita by fire and the inauguration, under Rama, of the millennium. Intermixed with this are some excellent episodes: the descent of the Ganges from Heaven to purify the remains of Sagara's 60,000 sons; the contest in asceticism of Vasishtha and Vishvamitra; the first utterance by Valmiki of the *sloka* metre, drawn from him in lamentation for a loving pair of birds. And there is much incidental showing of the patriarchal morality of the post-Vedic age: Rama assures his grieving mother that "even if a woman has never bowed to the gods . . . she attains the highest heaven in serving her husband."

The *Ramayana*, in fact, is a work of immense historical interest, as well as of great beauty and power; and any attempt at an English translation must be welcomed. Unfortunately, however, the praise which must be given to Prof. Sastri's intention cannot be extended to his achievement. That

his translation is a work of considerable scholarship and votively literal cannot be doubted ; but it betrays no feeling whatever for the English language, and its confusions of grand and colloquial manners sometimes produce quite ludicrous effects, as when, "Contemplating that sound, beside herself with anger, and kicking up a terrible

dust, Tataka marched against Rama and Lakshmana, making a terrific yell," or as when Sita asks, "O Rama, why do you make a sure statement of which the levity is obvious?"—The kind of blemishes which are found disastrously often in works of Anglo-Indian scholarship.

RAYNER HEPPENSTALL

Buddhist Readings—(Part One.) Compiled by BEATRICE LANE SUZUKI, M.A., (Hirano Shoten, Kyoto, Japan.)

"May those who open this little book take as much pleasure in reading it as the compiler has had in making these brief selections of Buddhist readings." Thus ends the Preface by the author who is a Western lady, wife of the Japanese scholar Dr. Suzuki, an outstanding authority on Mahayana Buddhism.

The book is written primarily for young people and will fill a great need. Educational institutions all over the world are full of the contradictory tendencies of scientific materialism and orthodox sacerdotalism. An unsectarian spiritual philosophy is the need of the hour and Buddhism being the least corrupted of all religions offers a good field for gathering material ; these pieces will prove useful and helpful to all human beings irrespective of caste or creed. "Be ye lamps unto yourselves,"—"Hatred ceaseth not by hatred but by love,"—such an appeal made both to the mind and the heart of the young, will develop early in life the dual virtue of self-reliance and interdependence, and thus awaken in them that enlightened compassion which was so grandly embodied in Lord Buddha. This small book is simply written and though meant for students its "selections may be profit-

ably read by many others." Those who wish to live in the world and yet not be of the world will find here a whole list of ethical and moral instructions to be practised in daily life—while the ascetic can read with profit the strict discipline enforced in the Zen Monastery. The life stories of Buddhist saints viewed in the light of reincarnation give us a beautiful picture of heart devotion brought over from previous births. The synthesizing nature of true philosophy is equally brought out for the "teachings of Buddhism are at the basis of art, literature, social life and moral ideals," and the "great Buddhists were not only men of religion but of art and of practical life."

Among the selected pieces there are some which deal with the doctrines of the Mahayana school. Those who are not familiar with this school of Buddhism will find them an excellent introduction.

The book brings a hopeful message : it shows how Westernised Japan is slowly awakening from its spiritual sleep through the revival of Buddhism, signs of which are evident. The people there as elsewhere want short cuts to happiness and enlightenment and to save them from false teachers and pseudo-teachings the philosophy of Gautama in its pristine purity needs to be promulgated. This little book serves that purpose.

F. K. K.

Untouchable. By MULK RAJ ANAND, with a Preface by E. M. Forster (Wishart Books, Ltd., London, 7s. 6d.)

Mr. Anand's novel is of peculiar interest: it is the first novel to come out of India dealing directly and honestly with social conditions. In *Untouchable* the lowest, most unfortunate and hitherto inarticulate strata of Hindu society has found a voice. And to say this is not to belittle the great work that is being carried forward by Mr. Gandhi. To stand up for the religious recognition of the sweeper-caste in a country whose orthodoxy condemns sixty million people to the status of pariahs is the work of a spiritual leader; but to seek to interpret the mind of an individual sweeper as he goes about his loathsome business throughout the whole of an Indian day is something that could have been done only by a poet.

Again and again as one reads *Untouchable* one is astonished at the delicacy and charm with which the author has handled his extremely difficult material. It would have been easy to shock the complacent with a bald account of the business of a latrine-cleaner and, although this would have been in line with the prevailing taste for "realism," it is doubtful whether it would have had very much effect beyond laying the author open to the charge of prudence. Only a skilful writer could have made Bakha, the sweeper-boy, into a real and lovable person and aroused pity and indignation rather than loathing for all the horrible circumstances of his life. And this is all the more remarkable in the case of Mr. Anand who, as a member of the Kshatriya caste, would in the ordinary course of events have scrupulously preserved himself from the least intimacy, let alone sympathy, for such a creature. As a child, much to the horror of his parents, Anand played with the sweeper-children. Now, much to their horror again, he has made the hero of his novel a sweeper-boy. But surely this is an example of that pervasive human sympathy trans-

cending caste-pride and prejudice such as is inculcated by the noblest wisdom of India. To profess religious beliefs and exalted motives on the one hand and yet to give them the lie in one's daily practice by denying a large section of the community the right even to the common decencies of social intercourse and citizenship on the other, is a contradiction that must one day not only bring about the downfall of a society so constituted, but must discredit religion itself. To exalt one's own "purity" at the expense of one's fellow-men, and particularly men who do useful and necessary work for the community, is not, to say the least of it, an attitude that one would expect from the inheritors of the spiritual wisdom of thousands of years.

The taboo of which the outcastes of India are the victims had its origin, it is to be supposed, in hygiene. But to-day when science and technical knowledge has placed at our disposal efficient means for doing away with much of the more unpleasant work of the world, there would seem to be no valid reason why this antiquated taboo should continue to dominate the minds of millions. As Mr. Anand suggests at the end of his book, in regard to the sweepers the whole matter could be cleared up by the introduction of so simple and obvious a thing as a proper drainage and flush system. In medieval times untouchability might have had some shadow of justification; in the world of to-day it is unthinkable. And the fact that it is a religious as well as an hygienic problem is all the more reason why the whole thing should be tackled in a humane and decent spirit of comradeship although unfortunately that is the very reason why it is not treated in this way.

I am well aware that there is no excuse for an Englishman to adopt a virtuous attitude in this matter when Britain has done nothing to relieve the condition of the Indian masses, and that it may be considered presumption on his part to take exception to the

religious practices of a people so different from his own countrymen. But there is a sphere in which these matters can be discussed that cuts right through national and racial differences—the common humanity and brotherhood which we all share and which as the world progresses towards a more humane and just social order will come more and more uppermost in men's minds. It is to this sphere that Mr. Anand's novel belongs and it is this which makes it a portent.

I cannot conclude without drawing attention to the beautiful and moving

simplicity with which the tale of Bakha is related, and the skill with which the operations of an extremely sensitive, yet child-like, nature such as Bakha's is rendered. Not only does Mr. Anand's book manage to convey the human charm and essential holiness of one of the world's humblest creatures without the least trace of self-consciousness or condescension but by the skill of its almost imperceptible recreation of the social life, scenes and prevailing atmosphere of India it attains an universal significance.

PHILIP HENDERSON

Practical Ethics. By the Rt. Hon. Sir HERBERT SAMUEL (Thornton Butterworth Ltd., London. The Home University Library Series. 2s. 6d.)

Social Judgment. By Professor GRAHAM WALLAS. Edited by MAY WALLAS (George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London. 5s.)

Losing Religion to Find It. By ERICA LINDSAY (J. M. Dent & Sons, Ltd., London. 6s.)

Return to Philosophy. By C. E. M. JOAD (Faber and Faber Ltd., London. 7s. 6d.)

For long it was assumed that man's essential nature was represented by the intellect only. However, he has faculties other than reason. So any philosophy that gives undue prominence to intellect is bound to be unsatisfactory. Intellect may be coextensive with other constituents, but this does not mean that they are merely its forms. Hence the distrust of those systems based upon consideration of man's intellect alone.

This distrust is showing itself in many ways, one of which is found in the advice to be more practical than theoretical. The work of the Rt. Hon. Sir Herbert Samuel, *Practical Ethics*, belongs to this class. The author shuns any attempt to define the Good, because he says it is a "fictional abstraction" and both moral philosophers and

theologians have failed in its definition (p. 20). There are only "different things generally agreed to be good" (p. 21). The test of right and wrong is not in the conception of a theoretical "Good," not even in the motive, but the "total consequences of the act—direct and indirect, immediate and remote, to the agent and to the others" (p. 23). In this criterion, then, both egoism and altruism are represented. And "Society" does not exist on its own right. "The idea that 'Society' or 'State' is a reality, and is entitled to unlimited devotion for its own sake, is merely the product of the imagination of the metaphysicians running loose in a vacuum, and has no true relation to the actual life of men living in communities" (p. 54). The moral code comes only "out of mutual interaction of self-interest and social interest" (p. 55). In deciding between determinism and free will the author gives preference to the former. Of course, "what a man does depends upon what he wills." But "what he wills depends upon what he is." And "what he is depends upon these prior causes, infinite in number" (p. 66).

The author rejects intuition, conscience, instinct, the theory of "Natural Rights," the principle of evolution, and the custom of the community, as furnishing us with a moral criterion. The chapters on "The Nation and the

World" and "Conscious Evolution" are of special value. In the former it is said that every nation has duties to other nations, and Hegel's view that the "State is the absolute power on earth" and "is its own end and object" is refuted. In the chapter on "Conscious Evolution" it is pointed out that up to the stage of man, evolution is unconscious, and the species concerned do not contribute to it deliberately, but in the human kingdom the contribution is conscious and deliberate.

Sir Hebert Samuel shuns walking speculative distances. But if we begin to think and treat ethics as a science, we cannot stop arbitrarily at a point saying that it is enough for our practical purposes. Otherwise, any list of injunctions and prohibitions would constitute ethics. Is not "Society" or "State" in some sense a reality? If determinism is accepted, how can we hold man responsible for his actions? Similarly, if there is no common conception of the Good, how can one pass judgment on another's action?

Professor Graham Wallas' *Social Judgment*, expresses its discontent with intellectualism in a different way. The book is a posthumous publication and was originally intended to form the first part of a larger volume. The author aims to show that in our social judgment emotion plays an important part. It is a mistake therefore of the classical economists that they have neglected this emotional aspect (p. 106). And the spirit that guided them was the spirit of the "new philosophy" of Copernicus and Galileo with its stress upon experimental method, which is inapplicable to the study of social sciences. Christian religion also has separated value from reasoning, and produced thereby a distorted picture of human personality and the universe.

Erica Lindsay in her *Losing Religion to Find It*, tries to reconcile many contradictions of philosophy and religion by distinguishing between intellect and intuition. Freedom and the infinite are experienced through intuition,

and law and the finite through intellect (p. 65). It is only this distinction that will settle the controversy between free-will and determinism. Similarly the question of prayer and grace lifting us above the world of cause and effect can be answered only by the recognition of intuition. So also the reconciliation in the Gospels of the kinship of Heaven and Home, of Time and Timelessness, of Inner and Outer, etc., can be effected only through its recognition. And it is only thus that the significance of the Sacrament can be understood. What we see before us, the idol, the baptismal water, etc., are but symbols, appearances of realities experienced through imagination and sympathy (pp. 227-230). The authoress has developed an important idea which offers a solution to many complex problems. But her phrase "freedom within law" does not satisfy us; we prefer "law within freedom." We accept that intuition is basal, and intellect is founded on intuition.

In some cases the distrust in intellect has resulted in the advocacy of sense life. Aldous Huxley's cult of life and "low-browism," Lawrence's cult of the primitive and the "divine abdomen," and Dr. Richards' preaching on the satisfaction of the "appetencies," are some relevant examples. Most of these disparage philosophy itself. Mr. C. E. M. Joad's *Return to Philosophy* acts as a timely check to the spread of such views. Mr. Joad defends reason, not of course in the Hegelian sense of the identity of the real and the rational, but in the sense that we cannot dispense with reasoning and philosophising. Any criticism of philosophy is always met by a *tu quoque*. Life is not valuable in itself, because "it is life that produces cruelty, torture, malice, treachery, and rape" (p. 78). A calculated restraint of impulse is necessary, and for this calculation reason is needed. Mr. Joad advocates enlightened hedonism (p. 181); yet he accepts Truth, Goodness, and Beauty as absolute values, to which he adds Happiness. He defines rational

man "as one who allows himself to be influenced by considerations which are not immediately relevant" (p. 189). But it is only one with philosophic training who can be so influenced; hence the use of philosophy. It lifts us above the departmentalism of the sciences and teaches us to look at things in their individuality. Mr. Joad recognises levels of consciousness. What the artist sees we cannot see. From ordinary knowledge to the vision of beauty there is a jump or leap of mind (p. 96). From there to the vision of mystics also we have to postulate such a jump. "These jumps are in the nature of integrations" (p. 259). When the jump to value is made, logic is transcended (p. 234) and insight attained. Philosophy enables us to develop that insight. Did the modern statesmen possess it, militant nationalism would not be advocated, and the fear of another war would not have arisen. One of the main functions of philosophy is correlation. It enables men to synthesize, quickening their intuitive insight into the real nature of things. "A little philosophy will assist men to connect and, in helping connection, will help also the civilization that is so dangerously menaced by its lack" (p. 274).

Mr. Joad has admirably defended reason, philosophy, and the absoluteness of values. But our difficulty is to understand how he can, consistently with their absoluteness, advocate the theory of enlightened hedonism. It may be that the pursuit of these values brings enlightened pleasure. But the good is not the pleasure, rather the values pursued for their own sake. Besides, is there anything in the nature of things to guarantee that the pursuit of Truth will not conflict with that of Beauty or of Goodness? If there is nothing, it would be of no use to ask man to strive for them as the ultimate aim of his life. On the other hand, if there is something, we do not see any reason why the values should

not be in the end identical. And if Mr. Joad acknowledges their ultimate identity, it will not be long before he throws his lot with the Absolutists. He may not agree with them in every detail. He may even advocate an Absolutism of his own. He may differentiate between mind and matter. But matter like everything else is an interpretation. The material object is an object of a particular level of consciousness, just as the beautiful object is an object of another level. And this recognition in no way conflicts with the advocacy of Absolutism. His theory of jumps in apprehension reminds us of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Mind*, and, we hope, may offer a clue to many vexed problems concerning the nature of conscious life.

According to the Hindu view, every science incident to our conscious life, must fully recognise its complex nature. Our life is not merely practical, but also emotional, intellectual, and intuitive. And the complicated problems to which it gives rise can be solved only by giving every aspect its proper place. Intuition is foundational, and in it man feels his oneness with reality. So any development of intuitive insight will be certainly a step towards truth. Sir Herbert Samuel leaves us with a sense of discontent, because he lays more emphasis on practical convenience. We may even ask the question whether there are ethics which are merely practical ethics. Professor Wallas as well as Erica Lindsay seems to err, according to us, by not distinguishing between emotion and intuition. The two are not identical. Intuition is the integrality of our conscious life, and so the matrix of emotion, intellect, and our practical life. However, the growing recognition in the West of the deeper reaches of our consciousness will eventually lead, we may hope, to the formulation of a view of life which will be acceptable both to the East and the West.

THE LAND OF PSYCHE AND OF NOUS

The medium Margery : her dentist's thumb-prints ; Mr. F. Bligh Bond acts ; A Division in the American S. P. R.—Spiritist versus Psychical Researcher—Can a Christian be a Spiritist ?—The Archbishop of York denounces Spiritism—A New Religion from Etheria—H. G. Wells and Immortality : The best in Individualism and Collectivism is no answer.

The long-enduring Boston, U.S.A., embroilment over the "Margery" mediumship has had an unforeseen development, nothing less than a sorry feud between Mrs. Crandon's chief defenders on the authenticity of so-called "Walter" thumb-prints. The complete story of the dispute is now available in chronological form. On July 30th, 1926, the medium visited her dentist called Kerwin in the depositions—and obtained, for unexplained reasons, "impressions of his own thumbs in Kerr wax." At a later hour on this date "Walter" thumb-prints were produced for the first time at a "Margery" séance.* In December, 1929, the English S. P. R. lent its séance-room to Dr. and Mrs. Crandon for "Margery" demonstrations, and at one of the sittings "Walter" produced "two impressions of his right thumb," one of which he presented to Dr. Woolley, then Hon. Research Officer, and the other to Mr. Harry Price. The first of these was placed in a card-board box and kept in a locked cabinet, "the only key of which was in Dr. Woolley's custody."† He resigned in 1931, when the cabinet came under the control of Miss Newton.

In 1932, Mr. E. E. Dudley—then Research Officer of the Boston S. P. R.—also obtained thumb-prints from Kerwin, and became convinced in this manner that certain impressions, published as those of "Walter," derived from the same pair of thumbs. In December, 1932, Prof. Harold Cummins, of Tulane University, Louisiana, "a recognised authority on dermatoglyphics,"‡ was invited by Mr. Thorogood of the American S.P.R. to report whether two sets of prints were identical. Their origin was not explained, and he was unconnected with the "Margery" mediumship. He affirmed identity—that is to say, between the thumb-prints of "Walter" and the dentist Kerwin. In August, 1934, Prof. Cummins, being in England, desired to inspect the S. P. R. impressions of 1929 and any others available. On August 1, at the Society's rooms, he saw (1) the Woolley example and the specimen presented to Mr. Harry Price; (2) two examples provided for the purpose by Lord Charles Hope, same being the gift of "Walter"; (3) an impression brought by Mr. Stanley de Brath, the property of the British College of Psychic Science. Prof. Cummins

* Boston Society for Psychic Research, *Bulletin* XVIII.

† S. P. R. *Proceedings*, Vol., XLIII, p. 16.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 17.

has published the results of his examination of these objects and also of "three tablets in the possession of Prof. F.C.S. Schiller," which were examined at the latter's home in Surrey, and in his presence, on August 5th.* The results follow in summary form: (1) The Price and Woolley tablets of 1929 are identical with the Kerwin right thumb. (2) The Hope tablets are typical Kerwin prints, but one of them has a second impression which is defaced and could not be analysed critically. (3) The de Brath tablet is a Kerwin print on the obverse side, but is so framed that the reverse surface of the wax could not be examined. (4) All the Schiller tablets carry impressions of the Kerwin right thumb, but two of them have also the imprint of a child's digit. Prof. Cummins points out in his "Summary" that the identity thus established cannot be explained away on the theory propounded by Mr. Thorogood† in respect of other alleged identities, namely, that Mr. Dudley had "inadvertently or wilfully" substituted Kerwin prints in place of the séance productions,‡ for the very plain reason that the accused person in question neither attended the London sittings nor has ever seen the impressions there produced. It is added that "the prints speak for themselves," offering "a simple concrete issue and one that cannot be evaded or

obscured by fatuous argument."

The scene now changes from London to New York. Prior to Jan., 1934, Mr. F. Bligh Bond, Editor of the *Journal* issued by the American S. P. R., learned from a private source that the English Society was about to publish an "expert" communication of a damaging kind on the "Walter" finger-prints, dealing with specimens that had not passed through Mr. Dudley's hands. He wrote on Jan. 1st to the President of the American body and asked for free scope to deal with the alleged facts, acknowledging them as such in the event of their substantiation. The President replied that in his Committee's opinion any adverse criticism could be dealt with when the charges were published, should necessity arise. The question stood over till May, when Mr. Bond, in the *Journal* for that month, produced the essential portions of Prof. Cummins' examination, "pursuant to an influentially signed request on the part of Voting Members of the A. S. P. R."§ The President and Committee replied by a Supplement to the May issue, pointing out (1) that a standing resolution of the board of Trustees required the Editor of the *Journal* to submit "all material proposed to be published for approval by the Executive Committee and Officers of the Society"; (2) that, following an exchange of letters, "Mr. Bond was verbally instructed

* *Ibid.*, pp. 18-23

† See the *Proceedings* of the American S. P. R. Vol. XXII, devoted to the problem of the prints and maintaining their authenticity.

‡ English S. P. R. *Proceedings* pp. 22, 23.

§ American S. P. R. *Journal*, pp. 130-134

that no material whatever relating to the "Margery" mediumship should be produced in the *Journal* without first being authorised by the Executive Committee of the Board."* It was put on record also that a Special Meeting of the Board of Trustees was held on May 11th, and Mr. Bond was removed unanimously from his editorial position. The correspondence followed in the Supplement, including the signed request addressed to the Editor by the Voting Members mentioned. They are seven in number, two of whom are living representatives of the late Prof. Hyslop, a former and most important President of the American Society. Unquestionably the course adopted by Mr. Bond placed the Board in an intolerable position, and his dismissal was inevitable. On the other hand, he himself is not less certainly warranted when he affirms that Mr. E. E. Dudley stands completely vindicated by the Report of Prof. Cummins. The Board, however, has been at pains to register that Mr. Bond's comments "are repudiated in whole and in each and every part." Its promised "complete discussion" of the Cummins Report is likely to accentuate further the *parti pris* which has characterised the American Society throughout its dealings with the "Walter" fingerprints. It may be added that, according to later news,† very strong efforts are being made

within the American S. P. R. to secure the reinstatement of Mr. Bligh Bond. There is also talk of a new Psychical Society, with a new official organ under his editorship.

It takes all sorts and conditions of people to make up the so-called movement of Modern Spiritism, even when the survey is confined to Great Britain, with a few of its colonies and dependencies. Side by side with the tireless courting of churches and church officials there are rather unexpected evidences of counter-views and actions. For example, a Spiritualists' National Union has been debating a question of excluding or including certain classes in its ranks. It is open only to "real Spiritualists," not to mere Psychical Researchers and still less to inquirers, while a considerable section of believers would bar Christian Spiritualists, because they are not "real" within the meaning of the dubious term, as understood by the Union. Whether the problem has been solved we do not pretend to know: it is enough that the question has been raised.‡ On the other hand, a recent "Order of the Preparation for the Communion of Souls" has been founded apparently by Church of England clergymen, an Archdeacon included, "to initiate a plan of co-operation between the churches and Spiritualism." The kind of churches does not

* *Journal*, Vol. XXIX, p. 153.

† *Light*, June 27, 1935, p. 409. *Ibid* July 4, p. 425.

‡ *Ibid.*, April 18, p. 250; April 25, pp. 264, 266, 267.

§ *Ibid.*, June 6, p. 355; June 20, p. 393; June 27, pp. 406, 409.

happen to be specified. It may be noted, however, that even the Anglican persuasion, in the person of the Archbishop of York, a not unauthorised spokesman, has depreciated the importance of survival (immortality included) from the standpoint of Christian Religion and declares that it is an undesirable subject of investigation.* The reason, as it happens, is not far to seek, the survival made evident by Spiritism—if the dead indeed return under its auspices—knowing nothing of Trinitarian Doctrine, Vicarious Atonement, Redemption by Blood, the Theological Heaven and Hell, or the Blessed Vision; what becomes of “the life everlasting,” promised to the faithful by the Apostles’ Creed, it might be indelicate to ask at York. The recurring subject of the Churches and Spiritism could be dismissed at this point for the time being, were it not for a voice of revelation from within the Spiritistic fold. It appears that Mr. J. Arthur Findlay, who some time since wrote on “the Edge of the Etheric” and on a certain “Rock of Truth”—which is by no means identified with the time honoured “Rock of Ages, cleft for me”—has contemplated last of all the “Unfolding Universe,” and has clarified not only his views of the Hereafter but delineated “the structure of a new religion.”† It is designed to supersede Christianity and has friends in “Etheria” behind it. For all we foresee

to the contrary the dwellers in that dubious region—explained with the help of diagrams in Mr. Findlay’s pages—may father an official religion and church of the Unseen on believers—perhaps with Etheric rites and ceremonies. It is to be hoped indeed that they will and that it may be adopted widely, even at the risk of Mr. Findlay being Sovereign Pontiff, Great Archimandrite, or what not. Our recompense will be to cease from hearing about the identity of Christianity and Modern Spiritism, and seeing incense offered to the last clerical convert.

According to Mr. H. G. Wells, “the distressful pettiness and mortality of the individual life” must be exchanged for “subordination to the group” by those who would find something denominated “salvation,” not otherwise specified in the dogmatic statement. It is likely to be expounded in the context; but this would mean re-reading Mr. Wells, a task which some of us would not undertake lightly in these days. A recent essayist suggests that the injunction implies “submission to an abstracted Overmind or a sort of Racial Man.” Obviously, however, this is a mental figure, and the true implication would be bondage to a caucus at the head of the group.‡ The discussion leads on through fields of dubious speculation, “the

* *The Hibbert Journal*, July 1935, p. 586.

† *Light*, March 28, pp. 196, 197.

‡ *The Hibbert Journal*, July, p. 587. See “Individualism and Self-Transcendence” by the Rev. Leslie J. Belton, M. Sc.

modern apocalyptic of Spiritualism," its hither hereafter, the evidences of "multiple personality," telepathic communication, and so forth, to "the probable existence of a psychic field common to and interlinking human individuals," a "disinsulated" super-individual mind, that "comprehends all lesser minds." These and the rest of them are held to constitute "important factors" in one of the major tasks of contemporary thinkers, namely, to work out a synthesis embracing "the best in individualism"—said to be "breaking up"—and "the best in collectivism," which is trying to take its place. But it is laid down that the latter must be "purged of its disregard for personal values." Contemporary thinkers may be left to the task before them, and we shall see when the time comes whether their synthesis will remain written on paper, like More's "Utopia" and Bacon's "New Atlantis." Meanwhile, we would like to dissuade the essayist from his rather tacit assumption that schemes and dreams like these

have any part in the "self-transcendence" of the Mystics, whether in East or West. What has the "individual life" of Mr. Wells to do with the Self-knowing-Spirit, the holy Spirit of Man? That is the Divinity within us, which belongs to the Divine in the universe and is never in separation therefrom. What is that which the seeker for Eternal Life is called to transcend or overcome? It is the false self, the so-called finite self, the self in the day of small things, immersed therein and circumscribed thereby. There are little handbooks already in the world, and many of them, which have told us from time immemorial how this self may be cast out and how life may be led in the Divine within us. Heaven help, if it will and they wish, the amiable "contemporary thinkers" who are or may be about to propound their synthesis. Let them leave us to our own task, which one of the elect has called "the Practice of the Presence of God." It leads where no "collectivism," purged or unpurged, has ever designed to walk.

A. E. WAITE

ENDS AND SAYINGS

"..... ends of verse
And sayings of philosophers."

—HUDIBRAS

It is but natural that our review department should receive a very large number of books which deal with the subject of mind-control and culture of concentration. Almost all of them are handed over to one who is a student of the subject, possessing knowledge of "schools" and "gurus" whose influence is widely spread in the West as well as in India. For some months we have been waiting for reviews of several volumes forwarded to "Occultus"; he now writes to us:—

My heart is disinclined to knock these publications, objectionable as they are. To begin with, to name them is to take a risk; there are very many who suffer from the itch of practising meditation and such will not be warned. But my heart is also disinclined for it is anxious to protect the writers and compilers of these books who have rushed into print without any thought of karmic responsibility entailed in the writing of these volumes. Therefore all I can manage for publication is a general note and it is my request not to name names.

We print the note, with which we are in full agreement. In our civilization authors and publishers do not consider the gravity of their acts. The general belief is that it is up to the reader to weigh the contents of any volume and judge for himself, which is true. But Karma-Nemesis does not

absolve the writer or the publisher of any book from the reactions, good or bad, produced by it on the readers' mind and character. Books which set forth and recommend actual physio-psychological practices are fraught with danger to the health and the sanity of the ordinary reader. Morality and ethics are not taken into account by modern scientists in undertaking research, in formulating theories or in offering knowledge; their example is followed by psycho-analysts and others. And as free-lance journalism is a regular trade and the number of pot-boilers is steadily on the increase the danger to the reading-public is also growing. What "Occultus" says about books on meditation also applies to numerous volumes on other topics. Here is the note:—

Dozens of volumes are published every season to supply a demand which is growing. The failure of religions and the absence of reliable scientific knowledge have sent millions a-searching after some healing method for their wandering, sick and agitated minds. Response is made by the quack and the faddist who think they have a panacea; by the charlatan who hopes to make money, or to obtain an influential position, or to secure a band of disciples; by the sincere well-wisher of his fellows who thinks he has hit upon a remedy; by the earnest individual who sits down to make a plan for others to practise; by the psychic who

has visions not understood by himself, or who fancies he has visions and is obsessed by the notion that he has a message for the world; the half-baked mystic and pseudo-occultist who is nothing more than a poseur; the sincere but misguided experimentalist who puts forward the results of his "researches"; and so we might go on. Such volumes contain truth and falsehood, harmless and dangerous practices, sane as well as questionable principles of moral conduct and, when a reader actually takes to practice, nervous breakdown, mental aberration and moral collapse too often follow. Western "psychologists" are as popular in India as self-styled "yogis" are in the West.

Here I have over a dozen recent publications. They are prepared by individuals whose sincerity of motive need not be questioned and whose desire to benefit their fellow men must win our appreciation. Moreover, the labour bestowed on some is commendable, as is also the courage displayed in others against catch-phrases and shibboleths. But what more can be said in their favour? I could quote from every one of them suggestions, recommendations, points of view and formulated practices which are faulty, or dangerous, or both. Mixed with the salt of truth, the dishes may look inviting, but—! "But who are you to pass judgment?" it might well be asked. Not attempting to formulate an exposition on the subject based on fancy or even on personal experiment and experience, but only seeking an answer from the Records of Sages as to what real meditation implies, I do not feel that I am passing judgment on these and such writings, but am only seeking to evaluate them in the light of ancient esoteric philosophy. Moreover, it is well known that grave dangers attend the practitioner who follows even a correct method of

meditation (and some in the volumes under notice are correct) without the guidance and supervision of a real Guru. Such at least is the prevailing view in the Eastern Seats of Learning.

What do real Sages of the Orient advise? What answer do they make to the beginner who asks: Is the practice of concentration good and necessary? This—

"Genuine concentration and meditation, *conscious and cautious* upon one's Lower Self in the light of the Inner Divine Man and the Paramitas (virtues recorded in the Buddhistic Discipline) is an excellent thing. But to 'sit for yoga' with only a superficial and often distorted knowledge of the real practice is almost invariably fatal; for ten to one the student will either develop mediumistic powers in himself or lose time and get disgusted both with practice and theory. Before one rushes into such a dangerous experiment and seeks to go beyond a minute examination of one's Lower Self and its walk in life, he would do well to learn at least the difference between the two aspects of Magic, the White or Divine and the Black or Devilish and assure himself that by 'sitting for yoga,' with no experience, as well as with no guide to show him the dangers, he does not daily and hourly cross the boundaries of the Divine and fall into the Satanic. Nevertheless, the way to learn the difference is very easy: one has only to remember that no esoteric truths entirely unveiled will ever be given in public print, in book or magazine; nor would any one proclaiming himself or herself in possession of or efficient to teach them be a reliable teacher though the person would feign to whisper the secrets of the hidden science."

In the above any earnest Soul has all that he needs to know for real progress. When that first step is taken the way will open.



Point out the "Way"—however dimly,
and lost among the host—as does the evening
star to those who tread their path in darkness.

—*The Voice of the Silence*

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WHAT SHALL WE DO WITH LIFE?

Below we print extracts from the stenographic report of a lecture given at Amsterdam on Sunday the 4th of August 1935; space forbids the full reprint and so only the opening and the closing portions are given:—

Twenty-one years ago to-day the great war of our civilization began. Politicians and economists may trace the causes of that war in their own way. Historians may chronicle the events and the incidents which led up to it, and show us its meaning and import from their own point of view. Philosophers and scientists may interpret the purpose of that war from their own standpoint. Some of these explanations and interpretations may prove true, others far-fetched, others misleading, and others false. One thing, however, all will have to agree upon: that war did not produce the expected

results. Politicians, statesmen and economists have not produced the world which was promised—the world safe for democracy. Even to-day, after the tragic experiences of twenty-one years, everybody is talking about a new war and the destruction of our civilization. In the midst of this chaos, the man in his office, the woman in her home, the youth at college, can only speak with surety of one thing. The most powerful and universal and patent lesson of the war is there for any and every one to note and to proclaim. Financial tangles may be explained away by economists in their own way but we know one thing—the currency fluctuations of one country affect the financial status of every city in the world. The social chaos which resulted from the war is not only to be found in areas where blood flowed, but all over the world. The political after-effects of the war encircle the

globe from Tokyo to Angora and from Angora to Los Angeles. Nature has given the unmistakable message that she recognizes neither the so-called victor nor the so-called vanquished. Overruling mere human devices, human calculations and human values, Nature has revealed that humanity is one and indivisible, and that what affects for weal or woe one portion of the race, however small, affects all. A single murder in Serajevo produced millions of murders; that one murder may or may not have been the real precipitant of the war, but its message is there. The strange and the tragic thing for us ordinary men and women to note is that the great message of Mother Nature that humanity is one and indivisible is not heeded by most people, is ignored by leaders who call themselves practical. Influential leaders everywhere deplore that war should come, and forthwith prepare in a dozen ways to wage war!

Now, if the lessons of history are scanned it is clear that such conditions as prevail to-day lead to the collapse of a civilization. Not only do we get that lesson from the fall of the Roman civilization, but of other civilizations also. The ancient Hindu philosophers taught that the Law of Cycles operates everywhere in Nature and throughout human history. That which the Greeks called *Kuklos* the Hindus called *Chakra*—the circle or wheel of evolution which revolves continuously and while revolving ascends or rises, thus forming a spiral.

Civilizations rise and fall to rise again. There is a time process in human evolution which the ancients knew of: there are ages of iron and copper and silver and gold spoken of; these are but another version of the old Hindu teaching of the Yugas, also four in number. Human civilizations rise and fall encompassing cycles, large and small, golden with the radiance of truth during Satya-Yuga, and hard as iron with the selfishness of the dark Kali-Yuga. But besides a time process there is a space-process. There are times and cycles when the rise and fall of culture and of civilization are confined to a small area, e.g. the Greek civilization; at other times to large areas like the rise and subsidence of the Egyptian culture and civilization; and again at other times the whole world is affected—just as at the present moment. Just as there are cycles of long or short duration connected with civilizations, so are there small or vast geographical areas connected with civilization. Our European concept of human history is very circumscribed; most people date the birth of civilization with the Greeks, even though efficient archæologists discover the glories of anterior eras. Indian Puranic philosophy has preserved in form of myths and folklore the wonderful story of humanities, not thousands but millions of years old. . . .

The rise and fall of civilizations are but the means and the channels through which humanity evolves and progresses. We need not worry about the collapse of our own

particular civilization in Europe; more exalted cultures built civilizations mightier than ours; they went and here we are. So also this civilization of ours may go but we ourselves will survive to build other civilizations. Our future capacity to create new cultures is being acquired by us now; as long as we learn the lessons which Nature has to teach we are doing the right thing. We have, however, one great duty to our own civilization; like a doctor who fights death in his patient we should do all we possibly can to fight the death of the civilization to which we belong; it is sick; nay, its condition is critical; but it is not yet dead; and ours is the task to see what can be done. And the first principle to learn and to apply is not to depend on our so-called leaders; priests and politicians have failed; popes never saved the Souls of people in the past, nor will dictators save the Souls of people in the present. Each one has to become his own saviour, and by saving his own Soul he will not only perceive how to save the Souls of others, but will actually help to save them.

And that is our first answer to what shall we do with our life? Take the direction of that life in our own hands. Let each one of us say—"Away with popes and priests, away with dictators and leaders; let us seek the light of wisdom for ourselves; let us develop the strength of a noble character, so that the Light of the Spirit within us may shine forth for the benefit of all." Now, please

remember that it is easy to say—away with popes and dictators, away with priests and leaders; it is not easy to seek the light within, not easy to find it; not easy to let it shine forth. People often throw away one religion only to embrace another; they leave the church and enter the fold of science—but only to believe. Giving up the dogmas of religion they accept the dogmas of science! Where then shall we find truth? How shall we seek it? What shall we do?

When we survey the field of knowledge from the most ancient cycles we come upon certain truths, embodied, shall we say epitomized, now in one form, now in another, but which truths are ever and always the same and identical. Take the message which comes from the architectural remains of old civilizations. The Pyramids of Egypt and of Central and South Americas; the Angkor-Vat in Cambodia; the caves and temples of ancient India; these all bring a message, not only of the vast knowledge which their builders possessed, but also knowledge about human progress, the meaning and purpose of human life. These architectural remains are symbols, spiritual symbols, for in the old days architecture had its sacred and esoteric side. Again we get a similar symbolic message from the archaeological discoveries; we have not learnt everything when we have admired the beauty of the finds. Every urn, every piece of jewellery, tells its own tale, and that is not always the story of ordinary life. Then

we have records, papyri of Egypt, tiles of Assyria, palm-leaf MSS. of India. All these indicate, *directly*, knowledge which the ancients possessed. When we compare the old-world knowledge in China or in Peru, we find that there is a remarkable similarity of ideas and instructions. It is striking, is it not, that Pyramid structures are to be found in Egypt and also in the Americas? But much more remarkable and striking is the similarity of views and teachings in the ancient records. *Tot-Teh King* of China and the *Bhagavad-Gita* of India teach the same truths. The description of hell and of heaven in Hindu books is similar to that which we find in the Egyptian *Book of the Dead*, and so on in numerous instances. Not in the ever changing and conflicting knowledge of modern men, but in the Wisdom of the Ancients can we find light and guidance and help.

So that is the second thing we should do. When we have discarded the personal authority of popes and of dictators, we should seek the Light of Truth from the Sages of the ancient world, the creators of mental and moral and spiritual Pyramids, veritable light-houses which give signals to us to quit the stormy ocean of modern civilization and come to the haven of peace, to the harbour of Soul-culture.

Time is pressing, so let me give you the *Gita* prescription in "tabloid form," to use a slang phrase. The *Gita* says :—

(1) Do not perform actions which are evil.

(2) Duty is that which is necessary for you to do.

(3) Do not run away from duties because they are unpleasant, any more than invent duties because they seem pleasant.

(4) Do not undertake the duties of another for that is dangerous.

(5) In discharging duties, that is, in performing necessary actions, do not worry about, do not be concerned with, do not take into account, the results and the fruits of action or duty. Do that which has to be done without looking for reward.

In personal life or in national life these should become our guiding principles. . . .

All Great Teachers have given the same truths age after age in every land and country. Theosophy is that Ageless Wisdom of Krishna and Buddha and Jesus, and in answering the question—What shall we do with our life, we must seek advice and guidance from Them. These Master Minds, these Perfected Hearts, are Living Souls and by dwelling upon the truths They taught we come near to Them who embody those truths. They are Lords of Light who guide us in our darkness, Lords of Duty who reveal in Their Sacrifice the Path of Duty for us to walk. May Their Light and Their Sacrifice enable us to awaken the slumbering Soul within ourselves so that we too may discharge our duty, looking upon the World as the Field of Duty.

TOWARD UNDERSTANDING INDIA

[Professor George P. Conger of the University of Minnesota (U.S.A.) is the author of a remarkable volume, *The World of Epitomizations: A Study of the Philosophy of the Sciences*, reviewed in our pages for August 1932. His appreciation of India is deep and his advice to Indians very sound: "More and more clearly, it seems to be a mistake to attempt to Westernize India."—EDS.]

Last year I had the privilege of spending eight months in India, studying the philosophies and religions of that country and learning as much as I could about its life. Perhaps it may be of some value if, as one who is not much more than a beginner, I set down a few elementary points which seem to me to mark the way of understanding. They represent choices rather than discoveries, but in a situation obscured by so many conflicting interpretations, a wise choice of points of approach is of great importance.

The first point is geographical. In this respect, India is, in rather striking fashion, comparable to Europe. If we take Asia and Europe together as the continent of Eurasia, Europe is a peninsula at its western end, and India is a peninsula at its southern end. Each peninsula is a subcontinent, with a mixture of races, languages, governments, and religions. Each peninsula has records and remains of ancient cultures, among them in each case one culture which extended over the boundary lines of many present-day divisions and is still widely influential. The influence of that which we may call Sanskrit culture in India is certainly comparable with that of its

cognate Latin, or Greek and Latin, culture in Europe; it would be a profound and richly rewarding study to pursue this comparison in detail. Each of the two peninsulas affords a home to more than one of the world's principal religions, although the Muslims in Europe are less important in their peninsula than are the Indian Muslims in theirs. Consciousness of racial and political unity and community, if not actually further advanced in India than in Europe, is at any rate a more living ideal.

My second point concerns morals and social conditions. If we of America would understand India, we need to remind ourselves pointedly of the obvious fact that every social system has its evils as well as its excellences. It scarcely befits an American to expose or deplore the evils of India, unless he thinks also of gangland in Chicago, the divorce merry-go-round at Reno, the false glamour of Hollywood, the long story of injustice to the Negro, and the growing bitterness of American economic conflicts. A just comparison of evils of India and America is hindered by a characteristic almost ingrained in each of the two peoples. The Indian, coming from the East, is naturally sensitive to the finer

things of life, and sensitive to any failure to achieve them and to any criticism because of such failure. On the other hand, the American, coming from the West, is temperamentally less sensitive, and has often been reared to regard the essential soundness, and even the superiority, of his own civilization as beyond question. Each man in this respect needs to meet the other halfway.

It is disagreeable to think of the third point, but since none of us is to blame for it, and since sometimes it seems to lurk in the background of some awkward situations, it is better to drag it out into the light. If we of America would understand India, we must get rid not merely of the notion—this is not so difficult—but also of any lingering attitudes which here and there accompany the notion—that differences of skin pigmentation give any man cultural or spiritual prestige as compared with any other man. In the present unworthy state of the world, both within and outside India, economic, social, and political prestige is often correlated with differences of colour; one great thing which India can teach the West is the hollowness and wickedness of such distinctions. When I think of the things which really do matter in life, my heart is filled with love and reverence for the great souls, the dear friends whom I came to know in India.

Once more, if we of America would understand India, we must get away from missionary situations and missionary problems.

This is not denying that if we wish to *help* India, the missionary point of view may be valuable; still less is it denying that there are in India many missionaries who understand Indian life with real insight and appreciation. With all this granted, I think it is of primary importance that if we wish to understand India, we should learn about it from the Indians themselves. With contacts and possibilities of contacts multiplying every day, this is becoming easier all the time. As the adherents of all the great religions come to know one another better, they find that each of the great religions has all the great ideas (and also, alas, most of the small ideas!) of the others. The differences between the great religions are differences of emphasis, and their function when they meet is that each shall help to bring out the best in the others. The Hindu's practice of the presence of God, the Muslim's flaming sense of brotherhood, the Buddhist's composed self-control, the Christian's self-sacrificing service—all these are needed in the ideal man. As the great religions meet more often and more understandingly, we must expect that there will be modifications in them and adjustments between them. There will always be border-line cases of marked attraction and conversion; converts ought to be like valence electrons, bonds between the nuclei to which they belong.

This leads to mention of another point, in which I depart somewhat from widely accepted views.

I doubt if "the man in the street" in India is any more religious, or any better example of his religion, than is the man in the street in America. Practically any man in any street in either country can, if asked, state some of the essentials of his ancestral faith, and, if his conduct is examined, will be found to exemplify some of its principles. The Indian sometimes seems more religious to us, when the difference is that he is merely more Oriental. The lines of religious differences can easily be overdrawn with respect to any country; I think it is clear that they are actually sharper in India than in America, although America's treatment of the Negro, if not of the Jew, would have to be reckoned into any fair comparison. A marked difference between the religious thinking of the Indians and the Americans is that the impact of the newer scientific discoveries has been felt more sharply in America, and has led to widespread and influential liberal movements. In India, it looks as if the problems of science and religion had not arisen, but this is in part due to the fact that Hinduism is on the whole more flexible and has more quiet absorptive power than orthodox Protestant Christianity.

Almost as controversial as problems of religion are problems of politics. If we of America would understand India, we must think of the presence of Britain in India as of long standing. The British started their work in India before the days of the League of Nations

and the Lytton Report, and when the international conscience was much below even its present low level. Only the most extreme partisan, I think, can deny that England has afforded India substantial and lasting benefits. But beneath all the detail of current questions and controversies, one great basic fact or set of facts seems to be fundamental and unshakable: England and India are basically and naturally incommensurable. The English liberals themselves see this. It is as it might have been if the island empire off the *east* coast of Eurasia had for the past three centuries dominated the *western* peninsula—as if Japan had dominated Europe. Japan might have conferred great benefits upon Europe. It might have given the European Babel a common language, and might even have prevented the "first European war," or the recent racial conflicts in Germany. But in spite of all these things the hard fact would remain that Japan is of the East and Europe is of the West. More and more clearly, it seems to be a mistake to attempt to Westernise India.

Finally, if we would understand India, we must think of India as increasingly helping herself out of her own difficulties. Notable achievements are beginning to show—witness the brilliant administration of affairs in some of the native states, the developing solidarity and sense of brotherhood within, if not as yet altogether between, various communal groups, and the work of the beloved Gandhiji in

the villages. Everyone sees that there are still formidable obstacles. We of America cannot yet see how India can help herself effectively so long as the caste system is allowed to stifle ability or cramp a person's choice of occupation, nor how agriculture can hope to prosper without sterner measures against animal pests. But the heartening fact in the whole situation is the number of Indians who, in their own ways if not in ours, are devoting themselves with utter consecration to the problems of their people.

In the course of some passing to and fro in the world, I have become rather accustomed to scenes of embarkation. When we left India, our departing steamer sailed out of Bombay harbour just at midday. The passengers were the usually mixed group of all sorts and conditions of men. Most of those near

me had one thing at least in common; they obeyed promptly the call to the luncheon table, which came just as we were getting under way.

It occurred to me that as I was now leaving India, in a few moments the shores of that land which had been so rich for me would be out of sight in the mist; so I made my way to the deck, to look again at the fast receding city. As I stepped out I saw something which I think I have never seen in leaving any other country. A dozen or a score of European passengers stood one by one, as if each had come by himself, without reference to the others. Each gazing at the shore, was standing quietly and seriously, somewhat as a worshipper might stand in a temple.

Homage and love and gratitude to India!

GEORGE P. CONGER

In the above article a philosopher shows how a foreigner can understand the real India of culture and refers in passing to its relation to the Occidental culture which came with British Rule.

The following article emphasises the fact that a free India would have derived all the benefits of Western civilization without injury to its own soul, which an alien domination inevitably produces.

The link between these points of view brings a message to modern Indians—the indigenous hoary culture of India is a reality and in accepting foreign ideas and machines they must consult and act upon the voice of that culture.—EDS.

BRITISH RULE IN THE BALANCE

[**H. N. Brailsford**, the well known British Socialist, has studied India on the spot, visiting villages and contacting Indian publicists as well as official administrators. He is the author of *Adventures in Prose*; *Shelley, Godwin and Their Circle* and *Olives of Endless Age*.—EDS.]

Once again, without the consent of Indian opinion, the Imperial Parliament has imposed a constitution on the Peninsula. What, one is tempted to ask, is the justification for this right that one people assumes to dispose of another against its will? When one cannot in such cases claim consent, there is only one possible plea that might succeed at the bar of history. One may argue that on the balance British rule has in fact brought gains and benefits to the people of India that could have come to them in no other way. Let us agree that the question of motive is irrelevant. That in the early days the conquest was merely predatory; some sublimation there doubtless was, as one generation followed another, and to-day, while considerations of economic interest and prestige are still prominent, the Imperial race has persuaded itself that while its exercise of power may be advantageous to itself, it is also for the good of India. Nine Englishmen in ten hold this comfortable belief with complete sincerity. It is bound up with another. Englishmen have the conviction that most of those who have gone out from their island as governors, judges, civil-servants and soldiers, generation after generation, were as honourable and well-meaning as

they were competent. Their first loyalty may have been to their own nation, but certainly they had the good of India at heart. They laboured honestly, devotedly, and with trained intelligence. Their works are visible to every traveller—peace, order, honest law-courts, roads, railways, engineering feats, a solvent exchequer, schools, hospitals, co-operative banks. That is the evidence. It satisfies the conscience of the average Englishman, nor is he disturbed when facts seem to show that the majority of Indians desire that direct British rule should cease. To him such a state of mind is merely incredible. He doubts that fact, but if events compel him to believe in it, he falls back on a revised version of his fundamental belief. British rule, he will say, was an inestimable gain to India in the past: the time, however, may come in the vague future when it ought to merge gradually and cautiously into self-government.

Let us agree to pay our tribute sincerely to the good intentions of British administrators. One may question the fruits of Imperialism without indicting human nature. The problem before us is to examine this general English belief that a great balance of good has come to India from foreign rule.

The chief difficulty in approaching this question is to separate the undoubted gains that have come to India from close contact with Western civilisation, from the consequences of the exercise of sovereignty over India by a Western Power. Indian readers who think with Mr. Gandhi must pardon me, if I assume without argument (since space is limited) the reality of these intellectual and material benefits. India has gained immeasurably from familiarity with European thought alike in the realms of sociology and natural science. She has gained no less from European medicine and technology, and while I should be the first to argue that Europe has not yet learned how to draw from machinery its latent blessings of leisure and wealth for all, I am an impenitent Westerner who counts as gain the annihilation of distance and the raising of the standard of life that power-machinery makes possible. Everything here was brought by English hands—everything from the printing-press to the wireless. The new thinking, the scientific attitude, came equally through the English language. That is indisputable and Englishmen may justly feel proud that it fell to them to carry these gains to India. They had, however, no necessary connection with conquest or sovereignty. If no European soldier, British or French, had ever landed with arms on India's coasts, it is certain that all those benefits would, none the less, have arrived, would, none the less, have penetrated the whole Pen-

insula. It is probable that they might have come rather more slowly. It is possible that in the early period they might have encountered resistance from Indian conservatism. It is conceivable that they might have been welcomed whole-heartedly only after some internal upheaval, some struggle between the innovators and the men of the old regime, such as Japan and China experienced. None the less, they would have come, and made their way irresistibly, as they have done in other Asiatic States that have preserved their independence. Japan in less than half the time has carried this process of adaptation very much further than India. Even China has railways, motor-roads and a flying mail service, together with textile mills, urban slums and the sweating system. What is rather more remarkable, she has her modern universities and schools, in which through the English language her youth is made at home in Western thought. She is developing a public health service that in some provinces at least promises to be appreciably in advance of anything that India possesses. All this she has acquired, partly with Western aid, partly by her own efforts, in spite of the protracted period of political confusion and civil strife through which she is still passing, and in spite of the aggression she has endured at the hands of better-armed Powers. The parallel is instructive. India, if she had escaped European conquest, would doubtless have passed through a

long period of confusion and misery, before some new Indian Power or Powers—here perhaps the Sikhs and there the Mahrattas—had built a solid political structure on the ruins of the Mogul Empire. Modern science and industry would have penetrated slowly, but no reasonable being will deny that Indians would, sooner or later, have drawn from the West what they needed, as the people of Japan, China, Siam and even Persia and Afghanistan have done, or are doing. One might add to these Russia, which lay in the eighteenth century almost as far outside the circle of Western civilization as these Asiatic States. It seems, then, that India could have derived from the West the major part of the benefits she has received, without the episode of conquest.

To this argument the Imperialist has a possible answer. "Was it no gain, then, to be spared the period of confusion, misery and internecine strife, which the coming of the British abridged? The other Asiatic States in question are by comparison homogeneous. Are you sure that the profound communal division in Indian society could ever have been healed? But your view of Western civilization is superficial. One cannot import it in crates with motor-car parts. It is something organic. It demands a new social organisation, the scientific mind, the engineer's outlook: nay, one may say that it demands a new system of law, even a new morality, that will train men to work in teams. Railways and

electric power are comparatively useless without a political structure of the Western type. The great service of England to India was that she brought this political fabric and with it the reign of law. Anyone can learn to drive a tractor or a locomotive, but generations must pass before a nation thinks its way into *Blackstone's Commentaries* and the *Wealth of Nations*. The case of China is rather less simple than you assume. The Chinese learn readily enough to lay rails and drive locomotives, but their railways are soon bankrupt, because the management is riddled with despotism and graft. The Chinese make first-rate medical doctors, but they lack the first social requisite of civilisation; they have no honest and impartial courts of law."

This is, at first sight, an impressive and plausible answer, but the reader who examines it closely will perceive that it idealises out of all recognition the process of conquest. The last thing that the conquerors thought of doing was to stimulate the growth of an organic political structure congenial to the new civilisation. On the contrary, they imposed their own rigid bureaucratic system, which has remained alien and external. Four generations elapsed before they risked the first cautious attempt to initiate Indians into the art of government, with the Morley-Minto reforms. If we must speak of railways, the Chinese at least are learning (with some bad failures) the art of management, whereas even to-day Indians are

wholly excluded from executive control. Plainly the system of education was not devised to give Indians this "Engineer's outlook." It was not based on science: it was literary and philological, and was designed to train clerks for the ill-paid, routine work of commerce and administration. It left the masses untouched, and to this day has failed to make any impression whatever on the minds of the villagers. This was a singular way of imparting to India the blessings of European civilisation. The urban workers come to the machines unable to read a dial-plate. The peasants, after a century of Western enlightenment, do not know the first rudiments of the chemistry of the soil. A hundred years have gone by, and this vaunted science has changed literally nothing in the mental outlook, or the physical environment of the average Indian, who is the villager. He thinks in terms of miracles: of hygiene he knows nothing: he uses no machines: he works with the tools and concepts that served his fathers for thousands of years before the British came.

What in fact the conquerors availed not at all was to acclimatise the new civilisation: they were content to sell its products. Exploiting India as their market, they deliberately destroyed her fine handicrafts. Decade by decade, as their railways penetrated the interior, carrying the cheap output of their machinery, they robbed the potter, the smith and the weaver of his livelihood, and drove him to gain a bare subsist-

ence from the soil. As this process went on, the area of the average holding diminished; the average agricultural worker was less fully employed, and to-day a vast potential labour force crowds the village unused and burdens the hungry soil, representing the most colossal waste of human energy existent on this earth. "The British," the reader may say, "are not to blame. This has happened everywhere: it is the inevitable result of the machine age." No it is not: nor has it happened everywhere. On the contrary, when machinery in England ruined the handicraftsmen, their children found work in the mills. They were not driven on to the overcrowded soil. In Europe, moreover, with the sedulous assistance of governments, the mechanisation of agriculture was parallel with the mechanisation of industry.

It is then not a fact that conquest and foreign sovereignty quickened the process of adaptation. They delayed it. The policy of free imports postponed the growth of an Indian industrial system till the latter end of the nineteenth century. Every free, national government in the world had, through the greater part of that century, used all its resources of policy to foster and protect the productive capacities of its population. Only after the Great War, and then only on a small scale, was policy turned in India to this end. The shock of the new way of life, the shattering revolutionary impact of the new power-machinery fell on a people power-

less to adapt itself, or to use policy to modify its own social structure. It could not react. It could not choose. It could not, as a self-moved community, assimilate or reject. An inexperienced national government facing the merchants, teachers and capitalists of this approaching civilisation would doubtless have made many mistakes, as the Chinese did. But never would it have thought of India as the passive market of the West. That India has been governed for a century and a half by an alien government which started from this conception of her place among the nations is the root explanation of her present poverty. All the rest—the drain of pensions, the annual tribute to the foreign investor, the high cost of a white administration—is incidental, however important it may be.

This is the material side of the conquest. On this view alone it is probable that India has received, as the passive subject of the process, grave and lasting injuries from the impact of Western civili-

sation that outbalance the benefits. But conquest and alien rule brought also in their train psychological mischiefs that are no less real because they are difficult to measure. The will of this people was paralysed. It lost all sense that it was responsible for its own destiny. Europeans marvel at the "fatalism" of Asiatics, forgetting that they have usurped over this Peninsula the role of Providence. No people in this situation could escape apathy and humiliation. These effects have been enhanced by the bad manners of conquerors (though doubtless there were exceptions among them) who were at pains to claim for their white skins some innate superiority. This arrogance of colour, backed by a real superiority in arms, inflicted on the conquered a deep moral injury. No gain in order, no immunity from war, no courts however incorruptible can outweigh the wrong of a relationship that lames a people's will, insults its self-respect and dooms it to passivity.

H. N. BRAILSFORD

ASPECTS OF MODERN ARAB CULTURE

[**Ameen Rihani** was born in Syria later becoming an American citizen and was educated in the West. In 1922 he negotiated a treaty on behalf of the King of Hedjaz with the rulers of Yemen and Asir, and in the same year acted as observer at the treaty negotiations between King Ibn Saoud of Central Arabia and representatives of Iraq and Great Britain. He has lectured in Syria, in England and in America. He is an author and a poet equally conversant in English as in Arabic. He deplores the gospel of trade that has supplanted ethics in the modern world and attributes to "commercial consciousness" the restlessness and dissatisfaction of the day: "We are all drifting away from the path of vision. We no longer find joy, as did the ancients, in pure thought." He is the author of *The Chant of Mystics, Around the Coasts of Arabia, The Path of Vision* and many other volumes on Arabia which are notable, some written in English others in Arabic. He views the world living on the slopes of the mountains of Lebanon.—EDS.]

At no time in the history of Syria, even of Arabia, have the forces of Western imperialism and Western culture been equally driven by the motive power of economy and utilitarianism. They may connote, on the one hand, certain ideals, and on the other certain worthy aspirations; but in their present stress and toil they are devoid of the higher things of the mind and the soul. The Europeans want as much as they can get out of the people of this land, or in some instances through them, and the Arabs want as much as they can get of European culture or, to be more exact, of technical and organizational knowledge to be able to resist and overcome European domination and control. There is nothing in the present striving, it must be admitted, of the higher purpose of life. We all want happiness, and more happiness, without giving a thought to the higher national ideal, the liberal nationalism, which should

make us and others better.

And the struggle is increasing day by day in intensity and egomania. The Europeans have thus come to the end of their superiority and are fast approaching the abyss; the Arabs, who seem to be still floundering, are nevertheless making a new start, turning a new leaf in their history: but the question is how much will they have attained of what is wholesome and solid and enduring of this Western culture, when Western civilization will have completely collapsed? Will they have achieved enough of the best to make themselves *and others* better? The technical sciences, at least, should be preserved,—should be salvaged. And the Arabs can do some of the salvaging for the world.

In a conversation the writer once had with H. G. Wells on the subject, the British author advised that the Arabs, all the Orientals in fact, should make hay while the sun shines. And the sun—of

our present economy—will not continue, in Mr. Wells's opinion, to shine very long. Get as much as you can, therefore, and as quick as you can, before European civilization goes to pieces.

But it is difficult to say, even if the Arabs follow the advice of Mr. Wells, how much will crystallize of their achievements and how much will be swept away by a recrudescence, along with a quickening culture, of a haggard religious spirit, a spirit of intolerance, a spiritual sterility. No; an Islamic revival with some of its historical and traditional implications, is not, and cannot be, an unmixed blessing.

It should be noted, however, that the Arab is not unlike other orientals, particularly of Central Asia, in certain aspects of his religious spirit. He is, when at peace with himself and the world, pious, contemplative, gentle, honest, and just. But he is not at peace to-day—neither with himself nor with the world. There is conflict within him as a Muslim, conflict within him as a nationalist, conflict between him and other nationalists, moderate or extreme, and conflict between them all as a nascent nation and Western imperialism. What these conflicts will eventually produce, it is not easy to say. Arabia might be headed the way of Japan, or the way of post-war Turkey, or even the way of India. On the other hand, she might be destined to play a distinct part of her own; she might combine in her national consciousness the best, or the best

and the worst, of East and West. It is difficult to envisage the outcome, without assuming the roll of prophecy.

But it is easier and safer to prophesy about the universe than about nations. The unknown factors in national, political currents, are seldom revealed or rarely if ever rightly surmised. The governments of the world, even in these days of so-called open diplomacy, are not so foolish or so wicked as to always show their hands. No government really and sincerely plays an open game to the end. It might also be said that no nation tries to fathom, or is able to fathom the depths of its own being. There are always certain forces formulating or brewing; and when they are purely political, it is very difficult, indeed, to foresee the fatal day. A sudden outbreak will surprise and grieve the most astute and the most callous of men.

In their social aspects, however, the hidden forces may be approximately determined. Certain tendencies, considering alone their volume and strength, may be trusted, as it were, to continue, may be expected also to develop consistently to a culminating, a crystallizing point.

In the Near East of post-war time the two strongest and most pervading tendencies are cultural, as I have remarked, and national. For there is in Turkey and Iran, as in Arabia, a revival of native culture and an affirmation of national solidarity. The two are apparently inseparable. And they seem to arise from two

contradictory attitudes of mind ; namely, a break with or an appeal to the past. But in reality there is no contradiction. The break with the past is in the form ; the appeal to the past is in the spirit.

More dominant and more permanent than the conquest of Arab arms in the past was the conquest of Arab culture ; and the inherent spirit of that culture is not only being revived, but is also being nourished to-day with the culture of other nations without any thought to results. Here we must turn to the pre-war past to determine the cultural forces that have acquired a certain permanency and are steadily penetrating into the life of the Arabs everywhere, even in the Peninsula.

France was the first to sow in the Near East, (principally through its missionary schools, strange to say,) the seeds of what is in the main a revolutionary political philosophy, as well as those of the Gallic manner in thought and expression. This sowing took root in Egypt, following the disastrous campaign of Napoleon at the dawn of the nineteenth century, and in Syria, about fifty years later. But the Frenchifying process of education, which was dominant before the World-War, has since lapsed into a utilitarian or commercial manner. The political situation, as well as the world's economic crisis, is responsible for the change.

England followed France with what may be termed a Darwinian-Spencerian invasion. For since the British occupation of Egypt, fifty years ago, the spirit of the

Victorian scientists, through fragmentary translations at first, has made a deep impress on the minds of educated Muslims, is in fact influencing Arab thought and becoming a vital factor in modern Arab culture. But this influence is not confined to the scientists of that era ; for the leaders of the modern school of literature read Shakespeare and Shelley and quote Matthew Arnold and Carlyle, even as their predecessors quoted Rousseau and Voltaire and read Victor Hugo and Racine.

In more recent times, without political occupation or purpose, the country has experienced a third invasion from the West, an invasion that began with considerable force about a quarter of a century ago and is more revolutionary than either of the two that preceded it, because of its direct, immediate and practical significance. Little or nothing of the academic is connected with it nor does it involve the abstract and theoretical. It is the invasion of American democracy that is affecting the political, the social and the intellectual life of the people, as well as the spirit and form of native culture. The agencies of this invasion are many. Besides the channels of trade, the modern means of communication, and the system, howsoever crude, of advertising Americanisms of all kinds, we have a chain of American schools long established in Syria and Egypt, in Bahrain and Kuwait, and more recently in Iraq ; add to this newspapers and magazines published in the two Americas and circulated in our mother country.

But more practical, though not more enlightened, than the educator and the publicist, is the Syrian immigrant, Christian or Muslim, who returns to his native land. He is a missionary of Americanism with all its cocksureness and spunk; and he preaches it by example. Indeed, he attempts to live it, and often amusingly fails; for in the life of every people there is that which is not exportable, just as there is that which is hard to resist even in foreign lands. How, for instance, can Orientals tolerate American brusqueness, American Barnumism, American food? How can we, on the other hand, fail to appreciate and emulate the solid virtues of the American, chief among which are his enthusiasms, his humanitarian impulses, and his practical idealism.

From America also, after the great war, came the voice of her chief spokesman for democracy to startle, to enlighten, to confuse—to add to the world's unrest. But it was a magic voice, and the magic of it has not yet lost its potency. It was a voice to shake the fetters of the oppressed peoples everywhere and give them a new slogan—self-determination. Woodrow Wilson will be remembered in Arabia for his message of freedom and for his inability to make that message a political reality. But he was like all the prophets: all he had to give was a living fire of words. And people took up arms in their defence and support; they would make them a living truth, and they would make them build

independent states and kingdoms. The fire of revolution, in Egypt, in Syria, in Iraq, coruscated with Wilson's words of fire; in Palestine also there were flashes of chronic revolt; and in Najd and the Hijaz, as in Turkey and Iran, self-determination was crowned with the triumph of arms.

But where the revolution did not succeed, in Syria, another voice was heard, a voice to succor, if not also to uplift, a voice whose magic power is even greater than that of Woodrow Wilson's. But this voice is neither American nor European; it is Oriental, coming out of the very heart of the Orient. *Indeed, Gandhi's gospel of non-resistance has come to the aid of Wilson's gospel of self-determination.*

In this part of Arabia, and now and then in Palestine and in Egypt, the small still voice of Gandhiji is honoured in word and in deed. If his spiritual fervour, his piety and self-sacrifice, his fasts, his prayers, his silences do not find as many examples as spokesmen, his national devotion, at least, is a beacon and his national struggle has the clarion note of command. Even the guilds of the merchants, the lawyers, the chauffeurs, the printers hear the call; and like the nationalists themselves, all resort to the Gandhi principle of peaceful protest against the simulacrum of a native government and the wanton exploitations of a colonizing power.

Thus, peaceful demonstrations in defence of the rights of the people, is fast becoming—I had

almost said an article of the national faith. But this would not be exact; for while it is true that this inspiration from the heart of the Orient, from India, is as vital as any of the foreign elements that are being grafted upon the time-honoured culture of the Arabs, it must also in truth be said that it does not go very deep. It is not, in other words, born of conviction,—it is not the outcome of spiritual devotion and training. What then is it? I must hark back to the opening words of this article—I must say that it is, in the mass, utilitarian.

But can it be expected of people, who are brought up on the principle of force in the business of life, whose conquest of arms has so often resounded in the world, East and West — can it be expected that they develop of a sudden a positive spiritual power of conquest, resistance and control? If they have not to-day the weapon they best understand with which to battle against the foreign oppressor, they will yet learn to use that weapon, which is characterised as the cheapest, the cleanest and the most effective—the weapon of non-resistance. Here is utilitarianism with a vengeance. But might not a principle in practice become habit? And might not habit change or modify, in the process of time, a national or a racial characteristic?

The Arabs in the past, by virtue of their geographical position and the triumph of their arms, were a link between two worlds. They were more than that. In the past they carried from East to West the torch of Hellenic culture: they were on the whole a humanizing and civilizing power. Now their geographical position remains the same, their aptitudes and ambitions much the same, though as a conquering race they have fallen on evil days. But might we not say on *better* days, we who no longer glory in the conquest of arms?

And considering the tendencies of the present and the potentialities of the future, might we not ask the question: Are the Arabs destined to make, sans wars of conquest, another great contribution to the advancement of mankind? Can their own native culture, which is more complicated and set—more weighted with the formalism of conduct and dogma and thought—than it was in the early days of Islam, be made sufficiently malleable and receptive, sufficiently assimilative and inclusive to absorb the best of the culture of the West with all its radical and revolutionary implications? Can it attain, in other words, the highest level of eclectic merit and refinement and truth? Time alone can give authentic answers to these questions.

AMEEN RIHANI

MAYA AND THE STATUS OF THE UNIVERSE IN "THE SECRET DOCTRINE"

[K. R. Srinivasiengar, M. A., wrote in our May issue on "Brahman in Indian Philosophy and *The Secret Doctrine*."—EDS.]

If *Brahman* be the sole reality, what about the world of ordinary experience of concrete objects and persons? Adwaita distinguishes between three kinds of reality: (1) *pāramārthika*, the highest reality, *Brahman*; (2) *vyāvaharika*, conventional reality ascribable to things of practical life and experience; (3) *pratibhāsika*, the reality belonging to illusions and hallucinations arising within practical life itself. The world of experience is assigned a *vyāvaharika* status which means that while from the standpoint of the highest absolute Reality it is not real, it nevertheless is not unreal in the sense in which an *aloka* object, a hare's horn or a barren woman's son, is untrue. The world is empirically real. It is an appearance and that appearance is real only in relation to a percipient or conscious subject. The world is thus neither real (metaphysically), nor unreal (empirically), but simply indescribable, *anirvaçaniyam*. It is *māyā*.

Nevertheless, the conception of *adhyāsa* or *adhyātropa*, which is so pivotal in Adwaita, will not allow a strict Adwaitin to concede to the world anything but the status of an illusion. If the world of diversity superimposed upon the undifferented and non-rela-

tional Brahman, as a serpent is superimposed on a rope, then such a world can possess no more reality than the illusory serpent. It is not surprising, therefore, that the distinction of *vyāvaharika* from *pratibhāsika* ultimately turns out to be a distinction without difference—a distinction depending not upon the essential nature of the two but upon their respective practical importance for life. *Avidyā* or *māyā* not only conceals reality (*āvaraṇa śakti*), but also *perverts* it so as to present in its place a diversified world (*vikṣepa śakti*). Any attempt which makes *māyā* objective so that despite *Brahman's* integrity, it persists and makes *Brahman* appear as the world, may save the theory from subjectivism and illusionism, but only at the cost of inflicting the wound of duality on the very heart of *Brahman*; unless an organic unity is admitted which the system does not admit.

It has always seemed to me that H. P. Blavatsky's *Secret Doctrine*, in spite of characterising the world as *māyā* or illusion, lays more emphasis on its positive reality than on its unreality. For (1) it calls a finite object *māyā* more on account of its transience than because of its inherently self-contradictory nature (2) it emphasises the rela-

tivity of existence as due solely to the individual's degree of spiritual development or to the state of his consciousness; (3) it says nothing about *māyā* "covering up" or "distorting" reality. Let quotations from the immortal work bear out these contentions.

The Universe is called, with everything in it, *MAYA*, because all is *temporary* therein, from the *ephemeral* life of a fire-fly to that of the Sun. Compared to the eternal immutability of the ONE, and the changelessness of that Principle, the Universe, with its *evanescent ever-changing* forms, must be necessarily, in the mind of a philosopher, no better than a will-o'-the-wisp. Yet, the Universe is real enough to the conscious beings in it, which are as unreal as it is itself. (S. D. I. 274)*

Again :—

Esoteric philosophy, teaching an *objective* Idealism—though it regards the objective Universe and all in it as *Maya*, *temporary* illusion—draws a practical distinction between collective *illusion*, *Mahamaya*, from the purely metaphysical stand-point, and the objective relations in it between various conscious *Egos* so long as this illusion lasts. (S. D. I. 631)*

In these passages the world is said to be illusory mainly because it is evanescent but there is no suggestion in them that *māyā* *hides* reality, much less that it *distorts* it. Again :—

Maya or illusion is an element which enters into all finite things, for every thing that exists has only a relative, not an absolute, reality, since the appearance which the hidden noumenon assumes for any observer depends upon his power of cognition. To the untrained eye of the savage, a painting is at first an unmeaning confusion of

streaks and daubs of colour, while an educated eye sees instantly a face or a landscape..... All things are relatively real, for the cogniser is also a reflection and the things cognised are therefore as real to him as himself.... *Whatever plane our consciousness may be acting in, both we and the things belonging to that plane are, for the time being, our only realities.** (S. D. I. 39-40; see also *Ibid* I, 295-96)

Comment is superfluous. The struggles and strivings of finite creatures on a certain plane appear to be illusory not to themselves but to beings on a higher plane of consciousness, but this does not invalidate the existence of the creatures themselves or their aspirations in the scheme of the universe as a whole. Nay, Mme. Blavatsky goes much further :—

...Matter existing apart from perception is a mere abstraction...As the modern Idealists would say, the co-operation of Subject and Object results in the Sense-object or phenomenon. *But this does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that it is the same on all other planes*; that the co-operation of the two [Cosmic Substance and Cosmic Ideation] on the planes of their septenary differentiation results in a septenary aggregate of phenomena which are likewise non-existent *per se*, though concrete realities for the Entities of whose experience they form a part... *It would be an error to say, or even conceive such a thing.* From the stand-point of the highest metaphysics, the whole Universe, gods included, is an illusion [Māyā]; but the illusion of him who is in himself an illusion *differs on every plane of consciousness*; and we have no more right to dogmatise about the possible nature of the perceptive faculties of an Ego on, say, the sixth plane, than we have to identify our

* Italics mine.—K. R. S.

perceptions with, or make them a standard for, those of an ant, in its mode of consciousness. (S. D. I. 329)*

In this passage the author suggests that things on other planes of existence may *not* put on the *phenomenal* character which they assume for our consciousness on *this* plane, that in fact the higher and higher we ascend in the scale of development, the more and more will things appear to us in their true colours. *Māyā* then, on its subjective side, is only a name for our finiteness and imperfection of apprehension. The universe itself is not self-discrepant, not a *mere* shadow or illusion, a *vivarta* or appearance, much less a distortion or perversion. No doubt *Mayā* has also an objective side, but objectively it is nothing more than "an element which enters into all finite things" (I. 39)—the finitising or individuating principle—"the illusive appearance of the marshalling of events and actions on this Earth" which "changes, varying with nations and places," (I. 638) according to their degree of development, of course. In short it is the innate Power—the "Adi-Sakti"—of *Mulaprakriti* or *Brahman* and, as such, the cause of human *Mayā* (S. D. I. 10.)

Everywhere *The Secret Doctrine* is more anxious to maintain the reality than to stress the illusoriness of the world. Tired probably of repeating the same thing again and again, Mme. Blavatsky

answers a last question on the subject :—

Is the *Jiva* a myth, as science says, or is it not? ask some Theosophists... What is matter? Is the matter of our present objective consciousness anything but our SENSATIONS?...To all such arguments Occultism answers: True, in *reality* matter is not independent of, or existent outside, our perceptions. Man is an *illusion*: granted. But the existence and actuality of other, still more illusive, but not less *actual*, entities than we are, is not a claim which is lessened, but rather strengthened by this doctrine of Vedantic and even Kantian Idealism. (S. D. I. 603)

What particular variety of that idealism does *The Secret Doctrine* represent? While Vedantic Idealism is generally known as Absolute Idealism, Esotericism teaches an *Objective* Idealism according to which :—

The Universe was evolved out of its ideal plan, upheld through Eternity in the unconsciousness of...Parabrahm (S. D. I. 281).

Everything that *is*, *was*, and *will be* eternally IS, even the countless forms, which are finite and perishable only in their objective, not in their *ideal* Form. They existed as Ideas, in the Eternity, and, when they pass away, will exist as reflections (S. D. I. 282.)

Occultism teaches that no form can be given to anything, either by nature or by man, whose ideal type does not already exist on the subjective plane. More than this; that no such form or shape can possibly enter man's consciousness, or evolve in his imagination, which does not exist in prototype, at least as an approximation. (S. D. I. 282 footnote.)†

* For a similar conception of Vedantic doctrine see the article on "The Doctrine of Words as the Doctrine of Ideas" in *Philosophical Quarterly*, July 1932.

† Vide Śāṅkara Bhāṣya on *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, II. iv. 9 and *Chhāndogya* VIII. v. 4 for a similar interpretation of Reality.

That is, our ideas are *ectypes* of Divine Ideas. The universe we may say, is empirically unreal, but *transcendentally* or ideally real. All finite things continue to exist in their ideal forms in the bosom of the Infinite. The Absolute then is not a negation but a fulfilment of the finite; as Bradley thinks, differences are not superseded but reconciled in the ALL.

It is from this standpoint that Esotericism suggests a triple classification of reality different from that of Advaita.

Three distinct representations of the Universe in its three distinct aspects are impressed upon our thoughts by the esoteric philosophy: The PRE-EXISTING (evolved from) the EVER-EXISTING; and the PHENOMENAL—the world of illusion ... The last is but the symbol, in its concrete expression, of the first *ideal* two. (S. D. I 278)

Here we have reality graded into what we may call the Eternally Real (*nitya sattā*, in which existence and non-existence are identical) the Subsistent-Real (*jāti* or *Akriti-sāttā*, the realm of essences or universals); and the Existent-Real (*vidyamāna sattā*)—surely a more philosophical conception of degrees of reality than the usual division into transcendental, phenomenal and illusory!*

Next, what is the relation between the Universe and *Brahman*? Advaita holds that the relationship of cause and effect subsists between the two only empirically while metaphysically viewed the effect is unreal, *i.e.*, non-different from the cause. That is, evolution,

real change, *pariṇāma*, finds its explanation in appearance of change, *vivarta*. Causality is only a matter of words (*vācārambhaṇam*). But it is possible to be more just to philosophy and to facts of experience by saying that *Brahman* in reality *expresses* itself in the phenomenal order (immanent) conception, *Kāryya-Brahman natura naturata*) while at the same time it transcends it (transcendental-conception, *Kāraṇa-Brahman, natura naturans*). The so-called appearance would then be equally real with *Brahman* though it would not be equally eternal in that it might pass into a temporary state of quiescence during *Mahapralaya* (reality, existence and eternity are not identical concepts). The cause and effect would be identical in *being* though different in *appearance*. *Brahman* expresses itself in the world neither in part nor as a whole—a misleading issue—but just as, to use Plotinus's similes, an infinite spring expresses itself in the stream which flows from it without exhausting its infinite source, or the sun expresses himself in the light that radiates from him without loss to himself.

Such a view would make *Brahman* pre-eminently the material (*upādāna*) cause of the world though the efficient (*nimitta*) cause may be sought elsewhere. This is just the position which *The Secret Doctrine* adopts.

If, in the Vedānta and Nyāya, *nimitta* is the efficient cause, as contrasted with *upādāna*, the material cause, (and in the Sāṅkhya, *pradhāna*

* Italics mine.—K.R.S.

implies the functions of both) in the Esoteric philosophy....none but the *upādāna* can be speculated upon. (S. D. I. 55)

Which means that *Brahman* is *really* the *material* cause of the Universe. And well it can be, for Mulaprakriti in Esotericism is not as it is in Adwaita, an illusion; it is one with *Brahman*, (S. D. I. 62; 273) and it is Mulaprakriti that undergoes real transformation resulting in the evolution of the universe. That the world is a real expression of *Brahman* is admitted by Mme. Blavatsky in the following words:—

The summation of the Stanzas in

Book I. showed the genesis of Gods and men taking rise in, and from, one and the same Point, which is the One Universal, Immutable, Eternal and absolute UNITY. In its primary *manifested* aspect we have seen it become: (1) in the sphere of objectivity and Physics, Primordial Substance and Force... (2) in the world of Metaphysics, the SPIRIT OF THE UNIVERSE, or Cosmic Ideation..... (S. D. II. 24)

Putting it more metaphysically she writes:—

At the Commencement of a great Manvantara, Parabrahm *manifests* as Mulaprakriti and then as the Logos (S. D. II. 24).²

K. R. SRINIVASIENGAR

The profoundest and most transcendental speculations of the ancient metaphysicians of India and other countries, are all based on that great Buddhist and Brahmanical principle underlying the whole of their religious metaphysics—*illusion* of the senses. Everything that is finite is illusion, all that which is eternal and infinite is reality. Form, color, that which we hear and feel, or see with our mortal eyes, exists only so far as it can be conveyed to each of us through our senses. The universe for a man born blind does not exist in either form or color, but it exists in its *privation* (in the Aristotelian sense), and is a reality for the spiritual senses of the blind man. We all live under the powerful dominion of phantasy. Alone the highest and invisible *originals* emanated from the thought of the Unknown are real and permanent beings, forms, and ideas; on earth, we see but their reflections; more or less correct, and ever dependent on the physical and mental organization of the person who beholds them.—H. P. BLAVATSKY, *Isis Unveiled*, Vol. II, 157–8.

THE PROBLEM OF INACTION

[Hugh I'A. Fausset writes on the problem of inaction in action which every mystic and occultist has to face. Its solution is to be found in books like the *Bhagvad-Gita* and *The Voice of the Silence*. In the latter text it is said :—

If thou art taught that sin is born of action and bliss of absolute inaction, then tell them that they err. Non-permanence of human action ; deliverance of mind from thralldom by the cessation of sin and faults, are not for "Deva Egos." Thus saith the "Doctrine of the Heart".

Both action and inaction may find room in thee ; thy body agitated, thy mind tranquil, thy soul as limpid as a mountain lake.

So kindly acts and thou shalt reap their fruition. Inaction in a deed of mercy becomes an action in a deadly sin.

Shalt thou abstain from action ? Not so shall gain thy soul her freedom. To reach Nirvana one must reach Self-Knowledge, and Self-Knowledge is of loving deeds the child.]

One of the problems which is soon likely to test anyone who has begun to tread the interior path is that of inaction. And like all spiritual problems it is presented from within and arises out of certain inward changes which are a condition of growth. The mystic *lives* his problems in a far more intimate sense than the man of the world, so that the problem of inaction is for him in simple truth a matter of life and death. It reflects a conflict which it is the mystic's life-work to resolve.

The antithesis of action and inaction, as we know it in our fallen state, is like all the opposites we conceive, an unreal one. It is a distorted reflection of the divinely dual rhythm of the Universe wherein the inflow and outflow of energy are but two modes of an eternal unity, so that the power which goes forth into light is infused with peace, and the peace which abides in darkness is instinct with power.

It is this rhythm which the mystic is in truth striving to recover. And if and when he recovers it the problem of the degree of action and inaction which his condition demands will no longer trouble him. For every act of his will then possess the virtue of inaction, every motion be charged with meaning, and whether he goes forth in power or withdraws into the stillness, he will be at home, creatively and imperturbably, in the One.

But this is to look forward to the end of the path. At its beginning the mystic is far from possessing such integrity. He can neither act nor refrain from action with that simple fullness of truth which makes action and inaction modes of each other and consecrates both with the touch of divine being. Yet he has to choose from day to day and hour to hour which mode he will cultivate. The needs of every soul in this as in other matters must differ. But it is

probably safe to say, at least of Westerners, that the first need of the majority who would enter into the new life, is to refrain actively from action. Yet even when the need is most urgently felt, it is very hard to accept. For to do things or to get them done, is everywhere recognised as a merit often with little regard to the quality of the act. And this is very understandable. It springs from an unconscious awareness of the virtue of what the Italian philosopher, Gentile, has called "the Will as Pure Act." The divine life is the eternal expression of this Will, which is subject in the manifested universe to a dual rhythm of its own creation, but which acts as purely in the negative phase of this rhythm as in the positive. Happiness can only come in conformity with this active Will, as is testified alike by the pains of indecision and the relief which decisive action of any kind will bring. But the fact that even a vicious act may be deeply gratifying and seem appallingly necessary at the moment proves at once how essential to life is action and how far the unregenerate human will is from the divinely pure act of the Creator.

Of this discrepancy the mystic has become increasingly conscious. For him therefore, the problem of action and inaction presents no simple alternative. He has discovered that apparent action may mask a spiritual incapacity and that seeming inaction may be the most real and necessary action. This awakening to the inner rhy-

thm which he has violated may come to him in a sudden vision in which reality possesses him and opens for one desolating moment his spiritual eyes. Or it may be born gradually of the consuming pain which self-willed action inflicts upon a sensitive soul. In either case it is a direct seeing by the Soul of the self, a sight so humbling in its revelation of the self's falsity, that for a time, short or long, it may almost kill the power to act.

And, indeed, the old power and pressure of action must die, if the new is to be born. The world of generation is divided by this death from the world of regeneration. In the world of generation man lives by the power of primal instincts, which have become in different degrees perverted. The mystic is exceptionally conscious of that perversion. And he is equally conscious that it cannot be cured by any return to instinctive innocence. That way back is closed. If he is ever to receive life abundantly again and express its harmony he must break through the closed circle of biological necessity into the pure freedom which is also the divine order, of Creative Being.

The mystic who has entered the path knows this. He has broken with the old order and embraced the new. But however deeply he may have dedicated his will to the Light, he is not transformed in a moment. He has yet to become the being of which he has conceived the saving truth and to grow the body of finer and purer texture which that new being

requires to clothe itself in and in which the Creative light may shine with a constant radiance.

And meanwhile he must endure the desert which lies between the two worlds, the world of perverted instinct from which he has turned and the world of spiritual intuition towards which he toils. He knows that new world by prevision, but he has not yet become a native of it. The old sense channels are closed or closing, the new spiritual channels are opening, but they are as yet tenuous or half-formed. And this inevitably causes the mystic distress and exposes him to misunderstanding or condemnation. For he has lost the power of love on the level of impure emotion and sensation without having yet regained it in any fullness on the pure imaginative level.

All the trials of his life, inward and outward, are reflections of this "half-wayness," through which he can only pass by an ever deeper dedication of his being to the will of the All-Being, never doubting that in its good time the Creative Spirit will fulfil its perfect work within him and he will be changed. But premature action of a wrong kind, towards which he is constantly tempted, can only delay or arrest the delicate processes of this organic transformation. At bottom such action betrays rather a want of faith than of knowledge. For the mystic knows, even while he is indulging in it, that he is violating the deep rhythm of truth into which he would grow. He knows and he suffers. But ingrained habits are not easily thrown off,

however desirous a man may be to "sing a new song unto the Lord." That is why some mystics have even taken and kept a vow of complete silence for a lengthy period. Few of us are in a position to do that, and the constant testing which human intercourse affords is perhaps a more valuable discipline, if we are strong enough to meet the test and can build up our strength by regular hours of withdrawal for meditation and devotion.

Each one of us can alone know to what extent we are free to go forth in action. It depends on the stage of spiritual growth which we have reached. The mystic is learning to live a new life and there is no act, however apparently trivial, which may not retard or foster this transformation. Doubtless every act inspired by love is necessarily right. But the statement is not as helpful in practice as it might seem. For the mystic has to learn to love. And until he can love with a love which is a pure giving and a pure receiving, he may be required to still the feelings which well up within him because they flow along the old false channels and he lacks as yet the power to direct them into or maintain them in the new.

And it is the same with thought. The mystic's thought has to become a pure and total act of being. His head, like his heart, has to be subdued to the rhythm in which both are in perfect accord. And that can only happen if he has the courage to wait for the knowledge which is love to possess his Soul

and for the love which is knowledge to build it.

To maintain such devoted inaction against all the fret and clutch of egotism is hard, however sensitive a mystic may have become to the untruth of his acts. And he can expect little support or understanding from those about him, who at best are likely to regard his condition as a psychological problem, at worst as a culpable form of self-absorption. Nor can he explain its spiritual significance to them. For the mystic soon learns as part of his discipline, that it is impossible to communicate the meaning of any spiritual state save to those who have gone or are ripe to go the same way.

But if the incomprehension of others intensifies his sense of isolation, it is his own doubts which are his greatest affliction. The voices that question or chide or seek to rouse from without only strengthen the voice of his own uncertainty. And the Western mystic is likely to be far more tried by such uncertainty than the Eastern. For the strength and weakness of the West is action with attachment. The Westerner will condone the errors of a passionate will far more readily than the inertia of a dispassionate mind. He appreciates the warmth of energy so much that he will sacrifice to it the purer rays of truth. He recoils from the teaching and temper of the East because he feels a want in it of this eager, personal warmth. And his recoil is justified in so far as Eastern detachment has been merely an aversion of false

attachment, a loveless withdrawal from the stream of life into mental abstraction.

But the noblest saints and sages of the East were not in reality thus selfishly detached. If they withdrew from the turbid stream of life in which the sense and emotion-bound man fought and floundered, it was only to enter the same stream where it had become a deep river of being, with their wills tempered in full consciousness to its serene creative rhythm. The Westerner who finds the serenity of such men too cool and impersonal is himself too hot and personal. The fire of love may be in his heart, but the light of liberation has not yet filled his soul. And so there is an element of bondage to emotion and prejudice in the personal force which he exerts, though it be on behalf of others.

This is apparent, at times fanatically apparent, even in some of the greatest Christian Mystics from Augustine to Eckhart, and disproves the claim, recently supported by M. Bergson, that the only complete mysticism is theirs. For the love in action which is the complete expression of the Spiritual life is completely disinterested. The secret of this divinely personal-impersonal love has doubtless been possessed in its fullness on earth by only a few Masters. But the East in its rejection of interested action has understood the conditions governing it at least as truly as the West in its impatience with characterless detachment.

And this impatience inevitably intensifies the doubts and difficul-

ties which assail the Western mystic in the early stages of his probation-ship. True inaction, he knows, demands more real action to sustain it than all the false activities of the world. But to maintain this stillness within, not only in the hours of meditation but as he moves about the world, demands a continuous effort of recollection. The mystic in the monastery lived withdrawn and under a rule that fortified at every turn the powers and peace of the inner life. The modern mystic has no such support. He may, indeed, even in the West be able to join a brotherhood in which guidance is given and in which he can co-operate with others in mystical work. But for the most part he has to keep faith with the unseen alone and amid many distractions and temptations.

Very soon, however, if he can maintain the inner stillness against the unredeemed impulses of his nature and all the forces which would suck him back into false activity, he will find that the pull, against which he has to brace himself, is weakening. His new being with its lucid faculties has begun to unfold, his old self with its restless appetites to pass away. The transformation is, of course, slow and in some of its phases deathly. For the perverted senses have to die. All who travel along the path of regeneration must in different degrees pass through the state which, in its two phases, St. John of the Cross described as the night of sense and the night of the Spirit. And these nights

are hard to bear because they are utterly negative. In the first of them all the vital zest which the mystic experienced in however perverted a form, as he strove and exulted and suffered in the world of generation, is withdrawn. In the second all the tender "bright shoots of everlastingness" which quickened his being when he first entered the world of regeneration seem also nipped by an untimely frost. For a period, short or long, he is desolated by a feeling that there is no meaning and no nourishment in the abysmal emptiness of life. Then above all is it that he must endure to the end if he is to be saved. And his salvation is sure. The very deathliness of his state is a proof of the radiant purpose of life. The darkness he experiences proclaims the dazzling light which he is not yet strong enough to see. But even in the night he may be given glimpses of this light which reveal so much of ecstatic meaning in the texture of life that all previous vision seems by contrast to have been like the sliding of clouded water over the surface of a stone. And as the light grows with his power to receive it, the rapture of it will no longer overwhelm him, as it did in these first glimpses. For life can be meaningless through being too full of meaning for our faculties to grasp. And akin to the mystic's experience, in the night of sense, of a life that is without form and savour, is his sense in the Dawn of new being that it is so infinitely charged

with meaning that no finite form can contain it. It is as if he had entered a tide "too full for sound and foam," as Tennyson described the tide of death.

When that which drew from out the
boundless deep
Turns again home.

And in very truth he has entered the tide of death which is the tide of life. We are all prodigals until we set our feet on the path of return to our spiritual home. But as the mystic treads in quietness that path of return, he changes. He has turned his face to the Divine Sun and all that was veiled before by the shadow of self is revealed in the light of truth. All that seemed positive before is seen now to have been negative; all

that seemed negative then is known now to have been a condition of growth into the truly positive. And little by little as the Divine Sun clothes him with a body of light, kindred to Itself, he begins to see the depths of people and things which before were opaque and into realms that were veiled. No longer is he overwhelmed by the meaning or the meaninglessness of life. No longer need he refrain from action because his acts are impure. Whether in word or in deed, by the direct contacts of touch or glance or the silent voice speaking in love he expresses the inaction which is the divine counterpart of action. He is possessed by the peace which sanctifies power, by the Eternity through which Time is redeemed.

HUGH I'A. FAUSSET

FRIENDSHIP

There was one whom I thought to be my friend, and I spoke to him concerning a thought that I had had and that was very real to me. "Quite so," he said, "quite true. You are right." And I knew that what I had said was as nothing to him, and I looked upon him as a child whom I loved, but not as a friend.

I spoke to another, whom I thought truly a friend, for we had spent long hours together and knew the oneness of inquiring minds. He answered slowly. "Your point is well made. But let us consider every aspect of the problem." And I turned away sadly, knowing that for that of which I had spoken there was no need of logic's

verification. How could he, not knowing that, be a friend, though I admired and respected him?

And once I stood in a group of men, of whom one I considered my enemy, for through the prejudice of our minds we were opposed in every effort in which we engaged. So we spoke in the group of this and that, and because my heart was very full, I said that which I had said to those others. And the faces of some showed doubt, and the faces of others bewilderment, but in the face of my enemy was understanding and compassion. And our eyes met and we smiled, "Yes," said my friend, nodding, "I know."

P. S.

RELIGIOUS POLICY IN INDIA

II. BRITISH RULE AND INDIGENOUS MOVEMENTS

[This is the second instalment of V. R. Ramachandra Dikshitar's interesting series. In the first, published last month, he wrote about the policy pursued by the East India Company administrators and its results.—EDS.]

"Firmly relying ourselves on the truth of Christianity, and acknowledging with gratitude the solace of religion, We disclaim alike the right and the desire to impose Our convictions on any of Our subjects. We declare it to be Our royal will and pleasure that none be in any wise favoured, none molested or disquieted, by reason of their religious faith or observances, but that all shall alike enjoy the equal and impartial protection of the law; and We do strictly charge and enjoin all those who may be in authority under Us that they abstain from all interference with the religious beliefs or worship of any of Our subjects on pain of Our highest displeasure.

"And it is Our further will that, so far as may be, Our subjects, of whatever race or creed, be freely and impartially admitted to office in Our service, the duties of which they may be qualified by their education, ability and integrity only to discharge.

"We know, and respect, the feelings of attachment with which the natives of India regard the lands inherited by them from their ancestors, and We desire to protect them in all rights connected therewith, subject to the equitable demands of the State; and We will that generally, in framing and administering the law, due regard be paid to the ancient rights, usages and customs of India."

This solemn declaration on the part of the great Queen Victoria appeased the ruffled feelings of 1857 and satisfied the aspirations of Indians always intensely devoted to their religious and social traditions and usages. Proofs of the

cordial loyalty of the people to the Throne were given when the Prince of Wales, afterwards King Edward VII, toured India in 1875-6; and again when the King-Emperor and His Consort visited India in December 1911 and celebrated their accession to the throne by holding the coronation Durbar at Delhi. The important announcement of Queen Victoria guaranteeing the non-interference of Government in all matters of religion received a solemn re-affirmation at the hands of Edward VII in the proclamation issued in 1908. This message of goodwill assured the peoples once again of full freedom in the profession of their respective religions. It was delivered by the Viceroy on the fiftieth anniversary of Queen Victoria's Proclamation (see Countess Minto's *India Under Minto and Morley*, p. 226).

Here we must sketch a brief outline of the trend of religious movements in India after it passed under the authority of the Crown. From 1858 to 1885 when the Indian National Congress was born, the country enjoyed an era of unprecedentedly peaceful administration as a single integrated unit. This period, however, marked an important epoch in the development of the Brahma Samaj move-

ment in Bengal. Founded by Ram Mohun Rai in 1828 it languished after his death in England in 1830. Devendranath Tagore assumed organized control in 1841 and in 1850 introduced a radical reform which shocked the orthodox—he and his followers denied the infallibility of the Vedas. In 1857 the admission of Keshab Chandra Sen, belonging to the Vaidya caste marked a further stage in the history of this progressive religious movement. Since the birth of this Samaj it had been customary that only Brahmans could be acharyas or ministers. But in 1862 Devendra ordained Keshab and invested him with the title of acharya. The conservative members objecting to innovations prevailed upon Devendra who was of a deeply devotional temperament. The crux of the problem really turned upon the wearing of the sacred thread by the officiating acharyas. In 1864 Devendra permitted upacharyas with sacred threads on to officiate. In 1865 Keshab demanded the disuse of the thread and he and his party definitely withdrew. This split led to the existence of two Samajas. In 1872 however Devendra retired from active participation in the affairs of the Samaja, then known as Adi Samaja and his son Dvijendra took his place. During these years Keshab engaged himself in social and religious reform, but in countenancing the marriage of his daughter at an early age to the rich ruler of Kuch Behar failed to live up to his preachment. With his death in 1884 activity of his Samaj practi-

cally ceased. The same fate overtook the Adi Samaj. Though the Samaj exerted some influence on religious opinion and social reform in India, its followers were not great in number. It made no appeal to the mass mind for the pioneers of the movement had attempted to create an Indian religion which "would be loyal both to Christ and to Hinduism." This could not be (*Ency. of Religion and Ethics* Vol. 2, pp. 813-824).

In the last quarter of the nineteenth century what we may call the Hindu Renaissance took place and with it the birth of nationalism. In 1866 Swami Dayananda Saraswati began his attack on the Christianity of the Missionaries who seemed to be growing in power. In 1875 he founded the Arya Samaj in Bombay. Two years later he visited Delhi and was invited to the Punjab. The doctrine on which this movement was based was to the effect that the Vedas are revealed books and the embodiment of true knowledge and that God is the primary cause of all knowledge. The movement hearkened back to the simple Vedic religion of old. Its curious feature being the rejection of traditional and orthodox interpretations of the Vedic texts. Swami Dayanand substituted his own interpretation, which the late Max Müller characterised as "most incredible." This did not commend itself to the general public which looked upon the traditional interpretation as the only correct one. Swami Dayanand further inaugurated the Cow Protection Association in 1882

having the Punjab as his headquarters.

Coming into contact with towering personalities like Madame H. P. Blavatsky and Col. Olcott of the Theosophical Society, he was willing to effect a united organisation of both Arya Samaja and the Theosophical Society. This lasted only three years from 1878 to 1881. Swamiji died in 1883.

Like the Brahma Samaja it became a provincial movement confined largely to the Punjab and, to some extent, to the United Provinces. But unlike the Brahma the Arya Samaja can count a good number among its adherents even to-day. Since the death of the founder, the movement has split in two sections—the non-vegetarian and the vegetarian. Both have been devoting their attention to educational work. They maintain the Dayananda Anglo-Vedic College, Lahore, and the Gurukula at Hardwar.

There was still another movement of this period to which a passing mention has been already made. This was what we may term the original Theosophical Movement founded in New York by H. P. Blavatsky and her colleagues Col. H. S. Olcott and W. Q. Judge. The first two were sent to India as a committee by the Theosophical Society. Its temporary union with Arya Samaja movement we have already noticed. Like the Arya Samaj, it began purely as a moral and spiritual movement which later became religious and political. Madame Blavatsky and Col. Olcott were not mere propa-

gandists of Hinduism but were friends of all oriental religions, and both, especially Col. Olcott, laboured for Buddhism and inaugurated a fine progressive movement in Ceylon. There is a very important pronouncement by these two leading Theosophists against mixing Theosophy and Politics :—

The tenacious observance by the Founders of our Society of the principle of absolute neutrality, on its behalf, in all questions which lie outside the limits of its declared "objects," ought to have obviated the necessity to say that there is a natural and perpetual divorce between Theosophy and Politics. Upon an hundred platforms I have announced this fact and in every other practicable way, public and private, it has been affirmed and reiterated. Before we came to India, the word Politics had never been pronounced in connection with our names; for the idea was too absurd to be even entertained, much less expressed. But in this country, affairs are in such an exceptional state, that every foreigner, of whatsoever nationality, comes under Police surveillance, more or less; and it was natural that we should be looked after until the real purpose of our Society's movements had been thoroughly well shown by the developments of time. That end was reached in due course; and in the year 1880, the Government of India, after an examination of our papers and other evidence, became convinced of our political neutrality and issued all the necessary orders to relieve us from further annoying surveillance. * * * That our members, and others whom it interests, may make no mistake as to the society's attitude as regards Politics, I take this occasion to say that our Rules, and traditional policy alike, prohibit every officer and fellow of the Society, AS SUCH, to meddle with political questions in the slightest degree, and to compromise the Society by saying that it has,

AS SUCH, any opinion upon those or any other questions. * * * * (*Supplement to the Theosophist*, Vol. IV, July 1883).

They left politics severely alone lest it might imperil their work that was prospering in various parts of the world. The character of the Theosophical Movement underwent a change soon after the departure of H. P. Blavatsky from India in 1885.

It was about this time that the split in the Brahma Samaj occurred in Bengal, and a more orthodox Hindu religious revival began under the influence of Swami Ramakrishna Paramahansa. This expanded widely through the untiring energy of Swami Vivekananda, and is now rendering splendid service in helping the poor.

Side by side with this new birth of the Hindu religion, there was a revival of the Tantric cult based on the worship of Sakti as Mother Goddess. Again the late B. G. Tilak who, in the ultimate analysis, was more a political than a religious leader, undertook the championship of Hindu orthodoxy in the Dekhan by opposing the Age of Consent Bill.

This was not all. A new turn was given to the original Theosophical Movement in 1893-4 when the late Mrs. Annie Besant came on the scene. She instituted a widespread propaganda on the greatness of Hindu culture and civilisation throughout the Indian empire. She favoured Hinduism and orthodoxy on the one hand and nationalism and political democracy on the other—thus going

contrary to the original programme of Mme. Blavatsky. Under her leadership what was a cosmopolitan spiritual movement became a nationalistic religious one.

This religious enthusiasm was short-lived. The political awakening had a deadening effect on it. But the fruit of these new impulses and forces has been to help the formation in recent years of a number of sectarian and caste associations organised chiefly for political objects. They have been incessantly active in addressing the Government about their grievances and getting their status improved. The educated Hindu to-day finds himself in the midst of two worlds one of science and economics, the other of religion and philosophy. He is growing more and more unmindful of the latter and increasingly conscious of the former. Messrs. Thompson and Garrat who have studied this particular aspect of the Indian problem in their joint work *The Rise and Fulfilment of British Rule in India* conclude :—

Both Hinduism and Islam seem to be on the eve of drastic reconstruction and those who continue to believe in an 'unchanging East' are destined to a shock as great as when Russia swung to the extreme of secularism. (p. 651)

Despite greatly altered conditions and a changed outlook, it cannot be doubted that orthodox Hinduism remains a force in the country. Whenever a cry of "Religion in danger" is raised the orthodox Hindus and Mussalmans organise themselves with fervour and vigour. This is what happened

with regard to the Temple Entry Bill, still green in our memories. This bill led to the Sanatanist organisations throughout all India and to the Journals for promoting their cause. Some Indians regard this revivalism as retrograde in character; time alone will show whether the steps taken have been in the right direction. In the meantime the Sanatanists have condemned the White Paper for lack of statutory safeguards

against the possibility of interference by the State in religious and religio-social and socio-religious matters. They look forward with fervent hope to the Government of His Imperial Majesty George V to provide adequate safeguards in this behalf. More and more, religious and social problems are entering the field of politics and legislation. To that we must now turn.

V. R. R. DIKSHITAR

A NOTE ON THE ABOVE

Our esteemed contributor refers to the original Theosophical Movement of Madame H. P. Blavatsky which lost its spiritual inspiration and genuine catholicity after her departure from India in 1885. THE ARYAN PATH and cognate activities represent a serious and sincere attempt to resuscitate the Theosophical Movement energized by the Original Impulse given it through

H. P. Blavatsky. Between the teachings of Theosophy given by her and those which pass under that name there is a difference in kind, as vast as that between day and night. Interested readers are referred to the forthcoming November issue of *The Theosophical Movement* where this subject is discussed at some length.

THE SONG OF THE HIGHER LIFE

III. THE UNCHANGING ONE AND THE MANY

[Below we publish the third of a series of essays founded on the great text-book of Practical Occultism, the *Bhagavad-Gita*. Each of these will discuss a title of one of the eighteen chapters of the Song Celestial. The writer calls them "Notes on the Chapter Titles of the Gita"—but they are more than notes. They bring a practical message born of study and experience. This particular study is on the second chapter entitled, Sankhya-yoga.]

Sri Krishna Prem is the name taken in the old traditional manner prevailing in India by a young English gentleman when he resolved to enter the Path of Vairagya, renouncing his all, including the name given to him at birth. He took his tripos at Cambridge in Mental and Moral Sciences and is a deep student of Indian philosophy. Away from the world but serving it with faith he lives in the Himālayas, and is esteemed highly for his sincerity, earnestness and devotion.—EDS.]

"If Emancipation means dissociation from all objects of pleasurable enjoyment for what reason would men cherish a desire for action? What do we gain by knowledge and what lose by ignorance?" These words of King Janaka to the Sankhya teacher Panchashikha may serve as an introduction to the present chapter as they well describe the mood of Arjuna as the discourse opens.

Surrounded by desolation on all sides, the Soul has no alternative but to turn within Itself and seek there the Divine Teacher.* Whenever else it looks it sees nothing but bitter emptiness and even the appeal to a manly fortitude fails of its effect for, when all one's world is in ruins, manliness seems a mere posturing in the void. In utter

despair the Soul turns within to the Divine Krishna and, weighed down by wretchedness (*kārpānyadosha*)—a wretchedness in which self-pity plays a prominent part, cries out "I am Thy disciple; teach me, I am Thy suppliant."

But not yet is the Soul really ready to abandon itself at the feet of the Teacher. True self-giving will only be possible later, for we see that, there at the very feet of the Teacher to whom he has just proclaimed his submission, Arjuna refuses to abandon his dejection and cries out bitterly "*na yotsya*," "I will not fight."

Profoundly significant are these words for they express the very fault we are always committing. The disciple appeals for teaching to the Guru,† either to the Divine

* Compare Bertrand Russell's *Free Man's Worship*. His appeal for a Promethean defiance of the universe "based on the firm rock of unyielding despair," however thrilling it may be to the armchair agnostic, will scarcely nerve any one who is actually in the abyss and, for all his sincerity, his glowing rhetoric rings false.

† The "great Master" is the term used by Lanoos or Chelas to indicate one's "HIGHER SELF." It is the equivalent of *Avalokitesvara*, and the same as *Adi-Budha* with the Buddhist Occultists, *ATMAN* the "Self" (the Higher Self) with the Brahmans, and *CHRISTOS* with the ancient Gnostics: says *The Voice of the Silence* :—EDS.

Lord within or to His embodiment in human form, and professes his willingness to serve Him utterly. But, spoken or unspoken, there always remains a reservation. "Lord, I am Thine and will do Thy bidding but ask not of me one thing for that I cannot do. I will not fight!" This is why the appeal to the Teacher seems so often to bring no result and why many lose faith in His presence, feeling that, were He really there, they would assuredly hear His Voice.

But the impossible is not demanded and, slowly, if only there is patient perseverance, a new and Divine Knowledge is felt obscurely stealing into the Soul and lighting up dimly the darkness within. For the true Knowledge is to be found within the Self; that which is merely derived from books or hearsay is no real knowledge. Outer teaching may be effective in helping to give clear expression to what is at first only dimly intuited but it can form no substitute for the latter and the work of any real Teacher is only to bring to birth that which already exists within, as has been well expressed by Browning in his poem on Paracelsus :—

Truth lies within ourselves ;
It takes no rise from outward
Things, what'er you may believe.
There is an inmost centre in us all
Where Truth abides in fulness,

The first and easiest stage in the manifestation of this inner knowledge takes the form of a perception that this "too, too solid world" of names and forms is but a passing phantom show which

veils from sight the true and unchanging Eternal Reality which is for ever unmanifest. "The unreal hath no being; the Real never ceaseth to be." An echo of the same truth is found in Shelley's beautiful lines :—

The One remains, the Many change and pass ;
Heaven's light forever shines, Earth's shadows fly
Life, like a dome of many coloured glass,
Stains the white radiance of Eternity.

With this perception comes a realisation that this Unchanging One, the Unmanifested in which all beings have their true selves, is indestructible. "Weapons cannot cleave It nor fire burn It, nor can any compass the destruction of that Imperishable One." This is no piece of theological dogma to be taken as an article of blind belief. It is a truth that becomes transparently clear to the disciple even at this stage and a calm descends upon the Soul as it realises that neither can any slay nor is any slain. Forms and personalities come and go inevitably but That which lies behind them all can neither come nor go for It forever is.

Moreover, since all forms are the same in kind, whether they be forms of flesh and blood or forms of conduct and belief, the Soul learns not to grieve over the passing away of familiar social forms and cherished religious creeds for it sees that the Truth behind them all, the truth which gave birth to them, is the same for ever and neither comes into being at the birth of a new religion nor perishes with its decay. "What room then for lamentation" since all form

is transient and *must* pass away, while all that is Real is eternal and perishes not throughout the ages.

Therefore, having perceived, if only dimly, that the Marvellous One is also the Dweller in the bodies of all, the Soul is exhorted to cease from vain lamentations over the disappearance of what is transitory by nature and to stand up and fight, fulfilling the duties that lie before it.

This knowledge is what is referred to in the *Gita* as the wisdom of the *Sāṅkhya* but it should not be confused with the brilliant but purely scholastic version that is to be found in the much later *Sāṅkhya Karikā*. Partial accounts of the older *Sāṅkhya* are to be found in the Shānti Parva of the *Mahābhārata* and suffice to make it clear that, while the later system was a frank dualism, the original teaching was monistic. The latter set out to explain the world as an evolution in a graded series of manifestations proceeding from one eternal Reality, referred to as "That" or the *Avyakta*, the Unmanifested. The duality between *prakṛiti* and *Purusha* that forms the centre of the later system is here transcended since both are but aspects of the *Avyakta* and are ultimately absorbed in It.

Thus we see that essentially the *Sāṅkhya* was a body of teachings designed to give a coherent intellectual expression to the intuition of the Unchanging One that arises at the proper time in the Soul of the disciple when stimulated into activity by the words of the Teacher.

It is, as Shankara rightly maintains, a system of *Jñāna Yoga*, of yoga by knowledge, and, like all such partial systems, it suffers from a certain one-sidedness that Krishna makes it His business to correct. At the time when the *Gita* was spoken (as indeed now) there were several such yogas in existence and we shall find that the first six chapters of the *Gita* (or rather chapters two to six), contain exposition of the Path according to their various teaching and also corrections of their deficiencies.

In this chapter we are taken along the path of the Sāṅkhyan knowledge because the first cry of the Soul when it awakens to a dim perception of the Eternal is for a coherent scheme of principles by which it may explain to itself its new knowledge. But there is a danger, too, in the demand for a detailed explanation, a danger, that the original intuitive perception may be swamped by the clear-cut intellectual expression, a danger, too, that mere knowledge, divorced from the love and activity that are the other aspects of the Path, may be considered as the whole.

Many must have had the experience of seeing the flashing intuitions of the One *Ātman* which come from a reading of the Upanishads fade and grow pale as the reader seeks to fix them by the help of even such a writer as Shankara who made those intuitions the very corner stones of his philosophy. The Soul flees just at the very moment when we

seem to hold its gleaming splendour in our hands and all we are left with is one more dead butterfly to add to our mouldering collection.

Therefore the disciple has ever to keep in mind the fact that the clear intellectual grasp that he craves for, and may to some extent gain by the study of the "Sāṅkhyan wisdom," is but a substitute, a symbol of the true knowledge which alone can bear the Soul upward on swift and flashing wings.

It is here that the one-sidedness of the pure *Sāṅkhya* comes in. In proportion as the inner vision fades, the disciple endeavours to recapture its fleeing spirit and to galvanise it into life once more by a violent effort. Separating himself more and more from the world of action and emotion, he withdraws into a realm of abstractions and, bending upon them the whole power of his psychic energy, he often succeeds in imparting a kind of life to them at the cost of an ever sterner and more forcible warping of his nature. This "life," however, shows by its very lack of balance that it is not the authentic life of the Soul. Only in perfect poise and harmony can the Soul blossom and not by any such forced and unnatural straining will the disciple reach the true Goal. Origen's act of self-castration did not enable him to attain that state that Hindu tradition terms "*brahmacharya*," and rigid isolation in a mountain cave will not bring about that inner detachment from the passing show of

things which is the soil in which alone the flower of true Wisdom can grow.

The battle of life must be won and not run away from and so, after a repetition of the injunction to gird himself for the fray (II. 38), the disciple is instructed in the all-important *buddhi yoga* which is necessary to supplement the static analytic technique of the pure *Sāṅkhya*. The latter attempts to gain its goal of *Kaivalya* by a forced isolation from the whole of the manifested universe which, even if at all practicable, can only result in a strained and unnatural attainment. The true Path aims at a detachment from the lower manifestations by a progressive union with the higher and is as different from the former method as is the natural blooming of a flower from the forced opening of the bud.

What is therefore emphasised is the *buddhi yoga*, the *union* with the *buddhi* as a preliminary step to the utterly transcendent state of the goal. The *manas* or mind must cease to be, as heretofore, united to the senses, but must become *buddhi-yukta*, or united to that which is higher than itself, if the Path is to be really trodden and not merely talked about. And at this point it is necessary to say a few words about the nature of *buddhi*.

ON BUDDHI

Nowhere does the purely intellectual nature of the *later Sāṅkhya* come out more clearly than in its account of the nature of *buddhi*, which it treats as simply one of

the intellectual faculties, the faculty by which the mind comes to a decision after a period of doubt and hesitation. True it is that the *buddhi* is the faculty that gives determined knowledge, (*nischayātmikā buddhi*) but the knowledge that it gives is no mere collection of intellectual propositions but a living knowledge better styled intuition. In the *Kathopanishad*, *buddhī* is termed the *jñana atman* and it is at once the knowledge of the *Atman* and the faculty by which that knowledge is attained. Symbolically it is the yellow cloth that is worn by Krishna and its particular significance for the disciple lies in the fact that it is beyond the limitations of individuality.

On the level of the *manas* the Light of the One *Atman* is split up into a number of separate individualities each standing on its own uniqueness. The *buddhi*, however, is non-individual, being the same for all. Hence the enormous importance of the *buddhi yoga* for this union, when achieved, brings about a liberation from the "knots of the heart," the fetters which had bound the Soul within the prison of separate individuality. Only when this union with the super-individual *buddhi* has been achieved will it be possible for the Soul to "escape from the tangle of delusions" and to "stand immovable," unshaken alike by the pleasures and pains of life and by the conflicting and partial views of reality that are all that can be achieved by the unaided *manas*. (verses 52-53.)

Only he who is thus established in the *prajñā* (a synonym for *buddhi*), will be able to make the final leap to the *anāmayaṃ padam*, the Sorrowless State (verse 51), with any hope of success, and, in order to attain this *buddhi yoga*, the method recommended is skill in action, *karmasu-kaushalam*, the maintenance of a balanced attitude, the same in failure as in success. The disciple is to keep his mind perfectly indifferent to the results of his actions while yet, in a spirit of utter detachment, performing such acts as are his duty.

This is the method of the *karma yoga* whose theoretical basis will be gone into in the next chapter of which it forms the specific subject. In this context it is enough to point out that its purpose is to gain control of the desire-prompted impulses of the senses and to harmonise the mind so as to render it possible for the latter to unite with the *buddhi* and enable the Divine knowledge to blossom forth. It is only through the *buddhi* that this knowledge can shine freely; below that level it is obstructed and broken up by the play of the separated individualities and it is only when they are united with what is beyond them that the unifying Divine Wisdom can become manifest and the fetters of duality begin to fall away.

It is easy to say "unite the mind with the *buddhi*," but usually such words have but little meaning for the disciple since he has yet had no experience of the *buddhi* and knows not what it really is. More-

over, the mind remains obstinately separate and will not suffer itself to be united with anything. Hence the supreme importance of supplementing the theoretic technique of the *Sankhya* by a practice designed to harmonise and control the mind in action. The mind must, to some extent at least, be purified by the practice of selfless action and at least partially liberated from the thralldom of attachments so that it may cease to assert its unique view-point at every moment.

Then, as the wind of desire subsides, the disciple will feel a luminous peace and wisdom reflected in his heart like the images of the eternal stars reflected in the depths of a lake, and he will have gained a preliminary perception of the actual nature of *buddhi* that will be a thousand times more useful to him than all the descriptions of the books.

For the first time will the command to unite the *manas* with the *buddhi* begin to have a meaning for him and only now will he be able to address himself to the task with any hope of success. Far overhead, Its blazing Light as yet a mere pinpoint to his vision, burns the Star of the Supreme *Atman*, the Goal of all his efforts. Dimly It shines in the darkness

and seems to flicker as Its rays pierce the unsteady middle air, but, once seen, It can never be forgotten and, offering himself to It in utter devotion and worship (verse 61) the disciple must press on straining his vision to the utmost to pierce through what to him are the darkly throbbing abysses of non-being though to the fully awakened eye of the Seer they are a radiant pleroma of Light, the "Light that shines beyond the broken lamps," the glorious sunshine of the Eternal Day.

*Esha Brāhmī Sthitih Partha
nainām prāpya vimuhyati.*

"This is the Brahmic State, O Arjuna, which having attained, one is deceived no more," and though, as yet, the disciple has but a distant glimpse of that Farther Shore, and though the shadows will again and again return blotting out the Light from his eyes, yet will its memory remain with him for ever for he has "reached the stream" and the promise of final Salvation has been uttered.

*Sthitwa' syāmantakāle 'pi
brāhmanirvāntmricchati.*

"Whoever, even at the final hour is established therein attains the Supreme Nirvāṇa."

SRI KRISHNA PREM

NEW BOOKS AND OLD

TAYLOR—THE PLATONIST

15th May 1758—1st November 1835

[John Middleton Murry's article is a striking appreciation of the influence of Thomas Taylor whom H. P. Blavatsky described as "the most intuitional of all the translators of Greek fragments" (S. D. I. 425). In her earlier work *Isis Unveiled* (I. 284) she writes: "One of the very few commentators on old Greek and Latin authors, who have given their just dues to the ancients for their mental development, is Thomas Taylor." Here is a critical estimate of the value of his translation of Plato's works:—

"We will recur to the untiring labors of that honest and brave defender of the ancient faith, Thomas Taylor, and his works. However much dogmatic Greek scholarship may have found to say against his "mistranslations," his memory must be dear to every true Platonist, who seeks rather to learn the inner thought of the great philosopher than enjoy the mere external mechanism of his writings. Better classical translators may have rendered us, in more correct phraseology, Plato's *words*, but Taylor shows us Plato's *meaning*, and this is more than can be said of Zeller, Jowett, and their predecessors. Yet, as writes Professor A. Wilder, "Taylor's works have met with favor at the hands of men capable of profound and recondite thinking; and it must be conceded, that he was endowed with a superior qualification—that of an intuitive perception of the interior meaning of the subjects which he considered. Others may have known more Greek, but he knew more Plato.

"Taylor devoted his whole useful life to the search for such old manuscripts as would enable him to have his own speculations concerning several obscure rites in the Mysteries corroborated by writers who had been initiated themselves."—*Isis Unveiled*, II. 108-109.]

Thomas Taylor, "the Platonist," died one hundred years ago at the age of seventy-seven, after a lifetime spent in the prodigious and disinterested labour of translating the whole works of Plato and the Neo-Platonists. It would have been difficult to choose a less sympathetic critic to commemorate him than the author of the notice in "The Dictionary of National Biography," who was a famous leader of the Rationalist movement in England; but even he is constrained to do homage to Taylor's heroic work. "With an ardour which neither neglect nor contempt could damp," he says, "he plodded laboriously on until he had achieved a work never so much as contemplated in its entirety by any of his predecessors." The contempt was real; he was exhibited to derision by Benjamin Disraeli as the charlatan "modern Pletho" in *The Amenities of Literature*: nevertheless, he found good friends. Thomas Love Peacock, Romney and Flaxman—through whom Taylor undoubtedly in-

fluenced William Blake—were his intimates; the Duke of Norfolk bought the whole of the edition of his great translation of Plato. A tradesman admirer settled upon him an annuity of £100 a year—worth four times as much to-day—that he might be free from the drudgery of hack-work. And still more remarkable, when he visited Oxford in 1802, he was honourably and enthusiastically welcomed there.

That was one of the occasions when Oxford rose to the height of her best tradition, as “the home of lost causes.” For at that time Thomas Taylor was fighting, practically single-handed, against the deadening tradition of interpreting Plato as a pure logician. From the moment when, as a young man, he had begun to grapple with Plato’s Theory of Ideas, he had seen that the true and natural exegesis of Plato was to be found in the Neo-Platonists. No doubt Neo-Platonism was a development of Platonism, as every creative interpretation of a profoundly religious philosophy is bound to be. The real question was whether Plato’s insights should be compressed into a rationalist straight-jacket, and his Ideas reduced to the status of mere logical “universals,” or whether the element of mysticism which is all-pervading in his philosophy should be treated with understanding and reverence. That is to say, it was a recurrence of the undying struggle between the letter and the spirit. “The letter killeth; the spirit maketh

alive.” Taylor had no doubt where the continuity of the life-giving operation of the spirit of Plato was to be found—in the Neo-Platonists. He conceived of Plato and the Neo-Platonists, from Plotinus to Proclus, as forming one living body, or *corpus*, of philosophic, religious and mystical thought; and he made it his life’s work so to present it to the world.

That Taylor’s attitude was essentially the true one, I have little doubt. Although his standards of historical criticism were such that they led him to many disputable judgments in matters of detail—he was, for instance, convinced of the historical personality of Orpheus, and persuaded that this historical person was the author of the Orphic Hymns—he was on firm ground in insisting, as he did, on the essential continuity of the Greek religious *gnosis*, and in seeking its most splendid manifestation in the “philosophic” unity of Plato and the Neo-Platonists. By that unity, its significance and potentiality, Taylor chose to stand or fall. Judged by the narrow, lifeless, rationalistic, and irreligious Christian orthodoxy of his day, Taylor was a “pagan” revivalist. That condemnation was inevitable at a time when Christianity in England was hopelessly secularised, and when the popular religious instinct had to find satisfaction in Methodism, and the educated in Unitarianism. Taylor was finding sustenance in a religious attitude which had all but perished from the Western world. What that attitude was

may be described in the words of Adolf Harnack :—

Judged from the standpoint of pure science, or the empirical investigation of the universe, Greek philosophy passed its meridian in Plato and Aristotle, declined in the post-Aristotelian systems and set in the darkness of Neo-Platonism. But from the religious and moral point of view it must be affirmed that the ethical mood which Neo-Platonism endeavoured to create and maintain is the highest and purest ever reached by antiquity.

It is, if anything, an understatement; for the ethical mood of Neo-Platonism derived its sustenance from religious experience. The four great raptures of Plotinus, which came to the master while Porphyry was his disciple, are as authentic as any recorded experiences of this kind. Nor were they casual or fortuitous, but the culmination of as severe a process of intellectual and emotional "self-annihilation" as any school of mystical religion has discovered. Mystical religion was at the heart of Neo-Platonism; and since it was a mysticism of a singular purity, it produced in its adherents an attitude of beautiful tolerance. That is, of course, the unequivocal "note" of a pure mysticism. The true mystic knows, by experience, that the One with which he has communion cannot be directly expressed or described. It follows that all religious dogma or ritual is, at best, an approximation to religious truth—either a series of metaphors addressed to the imagination through the intellect, or a series of symbols addressed to the imagination through the

emotions and the senses. One may dispute how far this doctrine is actually to be found in Plato; but that it is in essential accord with the spirit of his work is indisputable. It is certainly no accident that the revelation of the nature of the after-life and the Divine justice in Plato's *Republic* is granted not to a Greek, but to Er, the Armenian. One need not lay stress on the Egyptian, or the Pythagorean influence on Plato. Universality is of the very essence of his religious teaching.

In developing it into a universal theosophy, the Neo-Platonists were fulfilling the intention of their great Master, in accordance with the needs of a new age. In the Roman world, Greece was no longer a tiny island of illumination, set in a sea of barbarism, but the intellectual and religious centre of a cosmopolitan civilization—a vortex of "varieties of religious experience." To the Neo-Platonist, Christianity was but one of many new religions, profound and valuable, but destroying its own claim to profundity and value by its exclusiveness and intolerance. Of the three Christian doctrines which Neo-Platonism rejected—the Incarnation, the Resurrection of the Flesh, and the creation of the World in time—it is notable that the latter two at least have been completely abandoned by modern Christianity, while the Incarnation itself is to-day widely interpreted in a fashion to which Neo-Platonism would have taken no objection. Complete incarnation of the One they held to be inconceivable and

monstrous; a more or less complete manifestation of the One was not merely possible, but a fact of history, on which their own religion was based.

What it comes to is this: that as a whole the Neo-Platonists were far in advance of the Christianity which opposed them. Further, when Christianity had conquered Neo-Platonism, it had to adopt from its temporally defeated enemy the substance of the doctrines which it repudiated. Immediately after the philosophic schools had been closed by Justinian, the Neo-Platonist works of "Dionysius the Areopagite" became an authoritative treatise of mystical theology in the Christian church. "Dionysius the Areopagite" is called "the pseudo-Dionysius" to-day, because it is now safe to deny that he was "the disciple of the Apostles." The intellectual structure of Christian mysticism has been safely built upon his teaching. Such was the curious means by which Neo-Platonism was absorbed into the Christian church. Without that influence, Christianity would probably have sunk to the level of a barbarous superstition.

Such are the grim methods of history. Neo-Platonist theosophy was too enlightened for its age. The Neo-Platonists "contemplated a restoration of all the religions of antiquity by allowing each to retain its traditional form, and at the same time making each a vehicle for the religious attitude and the religious truth which lay beyond all local manifestation,

while every form of ritual was to become a stepping-stone to a high morality worthy of mankind." For the mass of people that ideal was too lofty. Even the Christian theologians, like Origen, who were nobly responsive to Neo-Platonic thought, soon fell under the anathema of a Western church which was mainly concerned to put a Christian veneer on the crude superstitions of a pagan populace. Yet it is to be noted that, just as Neo-Platonism supplied the intellectual fabric of the mystical theology of the medieval church, so the one Western theologian whose influence in the Christian church has been durable—St. Augustine—was the only one who had come directly under the influence of Neo-Platonist teaching. And it is from his account of the influence it had upon him in his *Confessions* that we see clearly why Neo-Platonism was beaten in the struggle with Christianity. It appealed only to an *élite*; it had no means to attract those without the speculative faculty. It had no Founder, no Saviour. In this sense, it did not satisfy the religious need of the age. It was not, and it could not be, a popular religion; and the least inspiring chapter in the history of Neo-Platonism is the brief period when it tried to compete with Christianity as a popular religion, and made common cause with all that was hostile to Christianity. By this temporary alliance with religious witchcraft Neo-Platonism was degraded, and it was only when the victorious Christian church had absorbed all

these impurities into itself that Neo-Platonism could re-emerge in a final purity.

Such is the background against which Thomas Taylor's lifelong effort to familiarise his countrymen with the great body of Neo-Platonist teaching has to be estimated. It was undertaken, as we have said, at a moment when the religious life of Christianity in England was at a nadir. Mysticism was derided as mere "enthusiasm." The very word "enthusiasm" which has since become harmless, conveyed a sneer of contempt. The Church of England had sunk to being the property of the landed interest. Such religious zeal as there was, was practically confined to the Nonconformists of various sects, without ceremonial dignity or intellectual tradition, except in the case of the old Independents and their Unitarian derivatives. Paley's *Evidences* was the highest achievement of Christian apologetic. Nor was it until Coleridge's insecure and fluctuating soul had led him to a final peace with Christian orthodoxy that a new life was breathed into the dry bones of Christianity in England. What Coleridge himself owed to Taylor is difficult to measure; but one is safe in saying that it was far more than Coleridge even acknowledged. And I suspect that if the influences could be fairly traced it would be discovered that, through Taylor and Coleridge, Neo-Platonism contributed much to the revival of Anglican Christianity in the nineteenth century; and that there was a rep-

etition, on a smaller scale, of the theological and mystical revivification from Platonic sources which had come to the medieval church more than a thousand years before.

Of Taylor's influence on William Blake there is no doubt: and, though it is difficult, in the case of permanent religious truths, to distinguish between what is discovered by the individual for himself and what is derivative, it seems to me probable that Blake learned through Taylor of the emphatic assertion of Iamblichus that the seat of evil is in the Will. That profound truth was to become central to Blake's own doctrine at an early stage in his development. To suggest that Blake received it through Taylor from Iamblichus is not to diminish Blake's originality. Truths of this kind can only be received when they come as a corroboration of one's own experience. So, also, it is no diminution of Keats' own insight to suggest that the "theosophical" conclusion of his famous letter on the Vale of Soul-Making was in the nature of a sudden corroboration from his own experience of speculations with which he had become acquainted through Taylor. Again, there is no mistaking the fact that the religious and philosophical language of that letter is Neo-Platonist, and it is difficult to suggest whence it could have reached Keats if not from Taylor.

Inevitably, Taylor's influence, being professedly esoteric, was of a kind difficult to estimate precisely. *It has been wisely said that Theology is the only ungrateful*

science, because she crushes her builders with the stones they helped to pile. Every sectarian religion holds as an article of faith that what is universal in its teaching is particular; and therefore it is bound, by the law of its own nature, to repudiate its debt to the religious teachers who have been concerned with the religion that is beyond all forms. Yet to these its debts have always been enormous; to them every sectarian religion was what it possesses of the vital truth which differentiates it from a mere superstition. It is on the heights alone that mutual understanding and mutual love between religions is a reality. "All Religions are

One," said Blake. Whether or not Taylor influenced him towards that realisation, it was to the promulgation of that truth that Taylor devoted his life-work. It consisted in making familiar to those prepared to receive it the great body of Greek religious thought which was first systematised by Plato. Taylor was the first, and perhaps the last, to restore Plato to his true setting, and to understand him, not as an isolated and obsolete philosopher, but as the creative inheritor of a perennial wisdom which was in due time inherited by other creative religious spirits, through whom the stream flowed on.

J. MIDDLETON MURRY

ARISTOCRATS AS SOCIAL SERVANTS

[Lawrence Hyde is the author of *The Learned Knife, An Essay of Science and Human Values*, *The Prospects of Humanism* and other works.—EDS.]

Victorian London only took serious interest in the East End when a cholera epidemic threatened to spread westwards. Otherwise there remained, unbridged, a chasm which divided a self-satisfied, self-absorbed and acquisitive society from one of degraded and neglected outcasts. The two worlds existed in geographic propinquity, mutually hostile and impenetrable.

Inevitably a spiritual crisis was precipitated. A group of idealistic souls became conscious of the enormity of the situation and a Movement came into being which in the course of half a century was destined to spread over the whole world. In its first phase it was naturally extremely romantic; an expedition into Darkest England was scarcely less hazardous and heroic than one

into Darkest Africa. But the pioneers—young men from the universities who were impelled to throw away the privileges of their class in order to work, not merely for, but as and with, the poor—duly appeared; and some of them, like the splendid personality after whom the Settlement was named, lost their lives in the undertaking. There were immense difficulties, but they were surmounted by the patience, determination and love of the institution's first warden, Samuel Barnett, "the pale clergyman from Whitechapel" whom Clemenceau regarded as one of the three greatest men whom he had met in England.

From the outset the character of the Movement was determined by three important factors, all of which

* *Toynbee Hall: Fifty years of Social Progress*. By J. A. R. Pimlott (J. M. Dent and Sons, Ltd., London, 2s. 6d.)

give it great significance for the world of to-day. Firstly, it was really democratic—any suggestion of condescension or patronage towards the humble and unfortunate was earnestly, and apparently very successfully, avoided from the beginning. Secondly, its aim was constructive rather than merely palliative—the object being not to relieve, but to transform the lot of the poor. Thirdly, missionary was subordinated to secular enterprise; social reform was decisively disassociated from all forms of orthodox evangelistic activity. Hence the way remained open for co-operation, on the humanistic plane, between believers of all creeds and denominations.

The myriad undertakings which developed organically out of this sacrificial domiciliation in Whitechapel are chronicled in Mr. Pimlott's able pages. They form an impressive record of the outworkings of an initial act of heroic faith. The note struck by Tonybee Hall is so central that inevitably all the world over, residential settlements should be coming into being in the tradition which it inaugurated. And they are typical modern institutions, since they express an attitude towards the social problem which is at once concrete, humanitarian and free from sectarian bias.

Obviously the movement will be confronted in the future with novel and difficult problems. Thus in the field of education the tendency at present is to extend to the poor the privileges of a culture in which the more imaginative amongst the educated themselves are beginning to lose confidence. And there remains the inescapable problem of religion. Clearly the secularization of social reform is a salutary measure. But it is appropriate only to a transitional epoch. For the religious thinker the only real guarantee of control over the world of

manifestation is a secure anchorage in the Unseen. The pioneers drew their inspiration from a definite type of religious belief. But it is of an order which the modern man finds increasingly difficult to accept. Yet without a proper transcendental basis it is doubtful if he can accomplish anything really enduring in this, or any other, field. All impulse of reform that is aroused by looking outwards upon a disordered world must, if the religious philosopher is correct, ultimately falter and fail; for the condition of success is a firm grip upon that great Mystical Fact which can alone give one's work a justification and a meaning: All radical inspiration is from the Within.

Further, there is the important question of unity. Men and women can surely never be organically unified by a common external aim, however idealistic. True efficacy lies in the corporate acceptance of a dynamic faith in an invisible, spiritual source of power. It is not sufficient to be unified at the periphery alone. There is no real potency in work which is accomplished by the "sinking" of differences, leaving the surface smooth, but the depths disturbed. A miscellaneous collection of idealists may effectively achieve some purely external aim, but it will require something more basic and organic to bring about the Kingdom of Heaven on Earth.

No one who reads through this stimulating volume can fail to recognise that a magnificent work is being achieved by men and women of great courage and idealism. But he who is convinced of the dynamic power of conscious and definite religious faith and practice must remain persuaded that the movement cannot prosper indefinitely unless its outward works become rooted in the one Invisible and Eternal foundation.

LAWRENCE HYDE

INDIA AND THE RELATIVITY OF THE PAST

[Dr. Kalidas Nag, Editor of *India and the World*, has raised in this article some important points on which *Isis Unveiled* and *The Secret Doctrine*, the two monumental works of Madame H. P. Blavatsky, have thrown revealing searchlight. We have space for only a brief quotation:—

“ A conclusive opinion is furnished by too many scholars to doubt the fact that India was the *Alma-Mater*, not only of the civilization, arts, and sciences, but also of all the great religions of antiquity ; Judaism, and hence Christianity, included. Herder places the cradle of humanity in India, and shows Moses as a clever and relatively *modern* compiler of the ancient Brahmanical traditions.”—*Isis Unveiled*, II, 30.]

Even in this age of Futurism in art and of Movies in amusement, the past continues to enthuse a limited number of persons in every country. The past may be immediate or remote. In measuring that past, we find different scales of computation: the scale of history, of pre-history and of cosmic or geological formations. In the first two categories we find Man as the conscious or unconscious record-keeper while in the last, Nature, the great mother of men and things, is the only recorder.

Mr. Orton in his learned book, *Links with the Past Ages*,* opines that the Iranian plateau was the cradle of the human race. The old Stone age or Palæolithic epoch of human history has been traced from 20,000 B. C. to 8,000 B. C. when the Neolithic or the New Stone age began. This epic sweep has been the subject of Mr. Orton's survey which is as fascinating as it is tantalizing. We cannot expect the survival of any written document of those ages. Our only possible sources of information or speculation are *artifacts* and *articulations* of the Palæolithic Man. Their handiworks were necessarily very few but their dead and living speeches are great mines exploited for prehistoric reconstructions. Treating the archæological data rather summarily, Mr. Orton develops his technique of comparative linguistics. He has utilized the latest speculations about the Sumerian and the Brahui, the Dravidian and the Aryan languages

attempting a coherent story of linguistic and ethnic evolution of mankind. He accepts rather naïvely some of the wild speculations of Waddell in his *Makers of Civilization in Race and History*. But in his treatment of Pre-Dravidian, Dravidian, Pre-Aryan and Aryan problems Mr. Orton shows a commendable care for authenticated details and a sanity of outlook which make his survey as fascinating and convincing as it is possible under the inevitable limitations of that inquest. Both the Mesopotamian and the Indus Valley finds seem to indicate the Iranian plateau as the possible common ground for developments and therefore the convergence of arguments adduced by Mr. Orton will add a new meaning to many workers in the field of Western Asiatic archæology. What the Egyptians were to Prof. Elliot Smith, the *Iranians* were to Mr. Orton as pioneers in the diffusion of culture. Only he seems to have ignored a good deal of the Indian discussions along that line previous to the publication of his book.

We refer in this connection to *Pre-historic India* (1924-1927) by Dr. Panchanan Mitra (Calcutta University) and *Pre-historic India*, Vol. I (1929) by Prof. V. Ranga-charya of the Presidency College, Madras, which should be in the hands of every student aspiring to follow the trends of Pre-history with reference to India and the Middle East.

* *Links with the Past Ages*. By E. F. Orton (W. Heffer and Sons, Ltd., Cambridge. 21s.)

As early as 1883 Mr. Cockburn discovered examples of Palæolithic art in India in the form of cave paintings in the Kaimur ranges. So in 1910 Mr. Anderson discovered similar paintings at Singanpur near Raigarh (C. P.) which were compared with the primitive paintings at Cogul in Spain and also with the patterns on "cross-line pottery" of Egypt. Between 1901-16 Mr. Bruce Foote published his *Catalogue of Pre-historic Antiquities in the Government Museum, Madras*, and his *Indian Pre-historic and Proto-historic Antiquities*. In 1917 Mr. J. C. Brown published his *Raisonné Catalogue of the Calcutta Museum Antiquities*. As early as 1873 Harappa was explored by Cunningham who commented on the seal with the bull-image while the pre-historic site of Nal (Baluchistan) was explored in 1904-5 showing the extension of the Indus Valley culture towards the West. It was not however, until the keen eye of the late Mr. Rakhal Das Banerji had in 1922 shown the definitely *pre-historic character* of his finds of Mohenjo-Daro and that Dayaram Sahni and Dikshit, Vats and other able officers of the Archaeological Department had, in 1923-24 brought strong corroborations of Banerji's thesis, that Sir John Marshall took up seriously the task of exploring the Indus Valley. He was followed (1925-26) by Mr. Hargreave and by Sir Aurel Stein in 1927, exploring Baluchistan and Seistan; and soon it fell to the lot of another young Indian archæologist Mr. N. G. Majumdar of the Indian Museum, to spot even earlier sites in Sind recently described in his important monograph which enables us to discern three stages in the evolution: the Pre-Indus, Early Indus and Late Indus types of culture ranging from circa 3000 B. C. to 2500 B. C.

The important task of cataloging and classifying the valuable finds was

entrusted to a veteran archæologist, Earnest Mackay, already experienced in field work in Mesopotamia. His general survey of the *Indus Civilization** is as authoritative as it is interesting. He boldly refuses to call it *chaleolithic* for the use of stone tools was extremely rare, having been almost entirely replaced by copper and bronze implements. The starting point of the Neolithic Age was 8000 B. C. while that of the Indus Civilization, so far as the excavator's spade has determined, was 3000 B. C. Far from being primitive and nomadic, it was then in a developed, peaceful, nay, somewhat "decadent" state already! Nothing definite as yet can be said about the origin or the lines of migration of the Indus people, only that they are provisionally supposed to have a common ancestry with the Proto-Elamites and the Sumerians of Babylonia. We have to wait for the decipherment of the script on the seals and amulets as well as for the thorough exploration of other pre-historic sites of "Dravidian India" which was supposed by Prof. Hall (1913), to have colonized Babylonia leaving traces of its migration in the Brahui language in Baluchistan. The invasion of the nomadic Baluchis and the floods of the Indus probably led to the ruin and desertion of the Indus Valley. But if and when these Pre-Dravidian people crossed the path of the Aryan invaders, who are supposed to have entered India from the North-West (circa 2000-1500 B. C.) is not yet settled. There were contacts, direct or indirect, for we find legacies of those people in the later Aryo-Dravidian myths and cults, arts and religions: tree and animal worship, use of phallic symbols, worship of the Mother Goddess and of the Proto-Siva (Lord of the Animals), yogic poses, etc., probably existing in India from time immemorial; and the Indus people, if they were invaders, merely assimilated them like their

* *The Indus Civilization*. By ERNEST MACKAY (Lovat Dickson and Thompson, Ltd. London. 6s.)

Aryan successors. But they show a few definite traits in common with their Western contemporaries: the horned human deity, man-bull, etc., occur also in Sumerian mythology which might be traced to some common source; the bearing of animals in religious procession reminds us of the custom in ancient Egypt; the demi-god fighting two lions found in very early Egyptian and Sumerian art is transformed into an Indus god struggling with two tigers, for lions were probably unknown to Indus people. Ritual dancing with nude figures suggests that as in ancient Egypt the dancers appeared without clothing on certain occasions. Some of the beads in necklaces exactly resemble those found in Babylonia, Egypt and Troy, while the sacred dove motifs in pottery remind us of Cretan religion. The jadeite beads could have come from Burma or Tibet while turquoise (very rare) shows that the people had extensive foreign relations, though most of the stones could be obtained in India, Afghanistan and Baluchistan. Etched carnelians prove contact with the age of the Royal Tombs of Ur excavated by Dr. Woolley; carved anklets remind us of the figures in the fresco at Knossos (Crete); black paint for the eyes, rouge in cockle shells, face paints and other cosmetics remind us of Egypt, Chaldea, ancient Greece and China.

At the lowest levels of Mohenjo-Daro (3000-2800 B. C.) copper and bronze have been found; so they used to get tin from Bombay or Burma, Bihar or Orissa showing the wide range of their commercial exploitations. The casting of Bronze by the *Cire perdue* process was as well known to them as to the Egyptians or Sumerians. The system as well as the shape of weights reminds us of Egypt, Sumer and Elam indicating the line of their commercial relations. Cotton relics prove the world recognition of the value of Sind cotton in those days. Reed-boats of the Egyptian type and ships (coastal and ocean-going) appear

in designs and types of Indus pottery as attested by Gordon Child in his *Most Ancient East*, are valuable additions to the history of old world ceramics. Boxes of steatite, cylindrical seals, etc., appear to prove importation of works of foreign craftsmen, just as Indian seals in Mesopotamia have proved the establishment of Indian trade that way. Indus glazed pottery antedates that of Egypt, Sumer, or Elam; some monkeys in faience and vitreous paste resemble Chinese works. The craftsmanship of the Indus people was very high as seen by the charming beads and the seal amulets with carved animals and inscriptions. Recently, Mr. N. G. Majumdar has discovered polychrome pottery at Amri, a site about 80 miles south of Mohenjo-Daro. The Nal pottery seems to have been used solely for burial purposes like the early painted pottery of Susa in Persia. Among the minor objects the bead necklace especially tends to link up Indus Valley with Egypt, Crete, and Greece of the third millennium B. C. The mat-patterns on vessels remind us of those unearthed at Tell Asmar, Kish and Susa. All these prove not mere occasional contacts but regular, cultural and commercial exchange between the Egyptians, the Babylonians and the Indians who were accustomed to sea-traffic.

This triangular collaboration (if not contest) in the development of the culture of mankind in the third millennium B. C. is one of the startling chapters of Ancient History. Then follows an unexpected revolution in Egypt—the proclamation of the monotheistic Sun-Aten cult by Akhnaton (1409-1369 B. C.) which synchronizes with the penetration of the Aryan-Mitanni princesses as queens of Egypt; and the mention of the Indo-Iranian gods Mitra, Varuna, Indra, Nāsātya etc. in the Boghaz-Keui inscription (1400-1300 B. C.) of Hittite Cappadocia, proclaim, as it were, the triumphant march of the Aryans over Western Asia right up to Iran and India. The father and grandfather of Akhnaton

married Asiatic princesses and Thutmoses III in course of his long reign of 54 years brought Asia very near to Egypt, recognising his "brother of Babylon" and his "royal cousin of Mitanni." That through the infusion of new blood the facial type of Egyptian kings changed profoundly from the heavy-jawed short nose type of Thothmes I, to the delicate aquiline features and pointed chin of Thothmes IV, is attested by Prof. John Pendlebury in his brilliant book *Tell-el-Amarna*. He goes further and says that with the foreign blood came foreign ideas. In the light of the above we find Mr. Orton's remarks significant:—

The points of resemblance between the Zoroastrian worship of Ahura Mazda and the Aten worship introduced in Egypt by Akhnaton are too marked to be merely the result of coincidence. The Aten or Sun-Disk represented a Sole Supreme God, whose rays stretched down to the earth for the benefit and well-being of the human race. The virtue of Truth was insisted upon and the lie was denounced.

But this Indo-Iranian cult had to be abandoned owing to the pressure of the polytheistic priests of the Theban Amon. So Akhnaton's son Tutan Katen 1378–60 B. C. had to change his name to Tutan-Khamon in 1367 B. C. and when he died in 1360 B. C. we find the whole improvised capital of Tell-el-Amarna deserted and the king buried in Thebes with traditional rituals.

This brilliant though ephemeral experiment in Tell-el-Amarna* by Amenhotep IV, or Akhnaton (1409–1369 B. C.) has been narrated with rare insight and illuminating documentation by Prof. Pendlebury. He admits that "internationalism had been creeping into religion as into material life for years." He repudiates any Syrian or Semitic origin for the movement; for there was no feeling that God would reward good or punish evil and there was no sense of sin or right or wrong. The Amarna age was, according to him, "absolutely unmoral." He admits

however that "Truth was a fetish with Akhnaton" who, "always speaks of living in truth but it was not the truth of Darius the Persian." Sixth century B. C. ethics of Darius must have been somewhat different from those of the 14th century of Akhnaton and the possibility of Iranian-Aryan influence remains open which may throw a new light on the diffusion of the Heliolithic religion up to Egypt in the second millennium B.C. As Director of the Egypt Exploration Society's excavations at Tell-el-Amarna, Prof. Pendlebury has given us a model handbook to the antiquities, the public buildings, the private houses, mural paintings, arts and crafts etc. Frequent incidents of foreign influence are significant: a Syrian soldier marrying an Egyptian wife; stepped places for ablution and a place for prayer suggested Semitic cults according to Petrie; The house of a Mycenaean Greek showing a square pier as in Crete and Mycenæ. Minoan art objects and potteries imported into Egypt infused an individualistic element as opposed to the universalistic character of older Egyptian art. Hence realism, nudism, feminism and so many other *isms* shocking to traditional Egyptian taste which repudiated Akhnaton so soon after his death! About 1500 B. C. the Minoan thalassocracy collapsed; the Aryan-Achæan Greeks and their Mycenaean and Rhodian *confreres* took over the Minoan monopoly in the Mediterranean and inaugurated the Heroic Age (1500–1000 B. C.) of Greece immortalized by Homer.

It is very significant that in Asia that age also synchronized with the sublime assertion of Indo-Iranian religion and ethics manifested through the elaborate compilations of the Vedic and Avestan literature in India and Iran which are indispensable to-day in the study of Indo-European thoughts and languages.

KALIDAS NAG

* *Tell El-Amarna*, By JOHN PENDLEBURY, (Lovat Dickson and Thompson Ltd., London. 6s.)

The Mahabharata: An Ethnological Study. By G. J. HELD (Uitgever-smaatschappij, Amsterdam, Holland.)

If G. J. Held had maintained his thesis argumentatively that the ethnological approach to a study of the *Mahabharata* made with a view to determining the social and tribal customs and manners of the people whose life is reflected in its pages is just *one of the many critical approaches* available to modern scholars and researchers, I would not have had any quarrel with him. Notwithstanding the disclaimer that he is not "intending to demonstrate" his "own method as the only certain and infallible course of critical investigation," (p. 35) he has adopted the extreme of glorifying the ethnological interpretation at the expense of the philological, historical, and synthetic ones. (1) An ethnological determination of the form of human society represented in the Epic, and (2) certain critical reflections on the Epic proper have been the objectives of G. J. Held. The "Introduction" deals with a survey of the critical literature touching *Mahabharata*. Discussing social organization in the first chapter, myth, ritual and cosmic evolution in the second, Krishna and Arjuna in the third, Rudra and club organization in the fourth, and gambling in the fifth, G. J. Held records his concluding reflections on the Epic in the "Final Chapter."

(1) Ancient Indian society mirrored in the *Mahabharata* must be viewed as a gigantic potlatch society. (2) The *Mahabharata* war was between two parties gripped by phratry-relation. (3) The Kauravas practised deceit in the game of dice. (4) The Pandavas practised deceit in war. (5) Krishna was a trickster. These are some of the select samples of the concluding critical reflections of G. J. Held which may delight his fellow-researchers like A. Berridale Keith who was pleased to assign Krishna the "status of a demon of vegetation." (p. 166)

I feel sure that between a demon of vegetation and a demon of modern re-

search investigator, there is indeed little to choose, but, assuming for the purpose of argument that ancient Indian society reflected in the *Mahabharata* represents the genetic stage of potlatch, is the ethnological conclusion an end in itself? That cannot be. The sacred texts of all nations must be deemed valuable only in so far as the didactic elements embodied in them contribute to enrichment of ethical life. In the absence of this contribution which on any norm of critical judgment must be admitted to be more significant and striking than ethnological contributions, texts like *Mahabharata* should be deemed *pro tanto* valueless. When in the year of grace 1935, one finds Captain Fanelli challenging Major Attlee for a duel because the latter made some comments in the House of Commons on the Italo-Abyssinian dispute, the ethnological discovery that the *Mahabharata*-society had developed along potlatch lines with pre-eminence attached to gambling will leave one practically cold.

Look at this picture and that. *Mahabharata* is a "Nirnayaka-sastra." It systematizes the teachings of the Upanishads. It is the didactic element that predominates the entire epic. Its style is tortuous and twisted. (1) "Tribhasha" (three species of linguistic turns) (2) "Shata-reeti" (a century of shades of suggestions and suggestive style) and (3) *Sapta-vyatyasa* (the seven swings) should be mastered by one anxious to undertake a critical study of the *Mahabharata*. There is nothing touching the four cardinal objectives of man's endeavour (Purusharthas) on which practical and philosophic counsel is not offered in the *Mahabharata*. If in common with the rest of humanity, the *Mahabharata*-society once passed through the potlatch stage in the onward march of phylogenetic progress, and if this conclusion is now proclaimed on the basis of ethnological data collected by plodding researchers, how will all that information, doubtless precious, enable one to regulate his conduct in relation

to his fellowmen and to the Cosmic Censor and enrich his ethical and spiritual life? Through ethnological spectacles, I am afraid, one is able to get only a distorted view of the *Mahabharata*. Let me not be misunderstood. The ethnological approach has its own limited function to fulfil. That approach will have no use for those who take up study of the *Mahabharata* ex-

pecting mature counsel regarding enrichment of ethical life. I have ignored many a typographical error bearing in mind difficulties of printing Sanskrit in a foreign country. I unhesitatingly admit however, that G. J. Held has followed up his ethnological examination of *Mahabharata* elaborately and enthusiastically.

R. NAGA RAJA SARMA

Human Personality and Its Survival of Bodily Death. By F. W. H. MYERS. Edited and abridged by S. B. and L. H. M. (Longmans, Green and Co., London. 3s. 6d.)

When Myers wrote his famous *Human Personality and its Survival of Bodily Death*, of which this volume is an abridgment, he set out with the deliberate object of laying the foundation of a scientific investigation of what in modern parlance is called "Spiritualist phenomena." Accepting the fact in his own experience that phenomena did take place but rejecting the explanation that they were due to "spirits" of the dead, he was one of the chief founders in 1882, of the Psychological Research Society. His views, tentative and speculative, and his painstaking investigations were first published in two volumes in 1903, some time after his death. The value of the book lies in the data supplied on the basis of his actual observations.

He rigidly eschews theological and metaphysical notions in his considerations of the phenomena. The self is considered by Myers as a "co-ordination oscillating between two extremes at each of which it ceases to exist—the extremes are absolute unity and absolute incoherence." Myers thinks that the evidence he has been able to accumulate while substantiating the reality of the spiritual world and the survival of the self after bodily death does not entirely warrant the assumptions of a certain school of spiritists who attribute all super-normal phenom-

ena to the activities of the spirit of the dead.

This concentration on such a narrow interpretation is denounced by Myers. On the strength of his investigation and observation he concludes that there is communication between the dead and the living through the agency of the medium. On the same basis he explains trance, sleep, genius, phantasmas of the dead, and the disintegration of personality.

Myers' central position is that spiritistic phenomena are susceptible of scientific analysis and study; that abnormal phenomena give evidence of a limitless unexplored field which could yield vast, new and valuable knowledge. He goes so far as to assert that in consequence of an accumulation of well-tested evidence all reasonable men will a century hence cease to look upon the resurrection of Christ as a pious myth. The recognition of the continuous uniformity of cosmic law will make the alleged queer-ness or uniqueness of any incident its almost inevitable refutation. Notwithstanding the deceptions and frauds we do receive genuine manifestations confirming the claims of Christianity. Says Myers: "if our friends, men like ourselves, can return to tell us of love and hope, a mightier spirit may well have used the eternal laws with a more commanding power." In this reverent belief Myers makes a curious compromise with Christianity.

Madame Blavatsky discussing spiritism in her *Key to Theosophy*, in a

most rationalistic way denies the immortality of the personal self and repudiates the explanation usually offered by the professing spiritists. She denies that there is any communication between the living and the dead of the kind the spiritists believe in and describes spiritism as a kind of "*transcendental materialism*." Proceeding she affirms her own knowledge in a radically different "*spiritual spiritualism*" which takes due account of all abnormal phenomena which are explained by her especially in her book, *Isis Unveiled*.

Below we give the teaching of the Esoteric Philosophy culled from H. P. Blavatsky's *Key to Theosophy* (pp. 234; 119-20):—

"'Spirit' is a word of manifold and wide significance. I really do not know what Spiritualists mean by the term; but what we understand them to claim is that the physical phenomena are produced by the reincarnating *Ego*, the *Spiritual* and immortal 'individuality.' And this hypothesis we entirely reject. The Conscious *Individuality* of the disembodied *cannot materialize*, nor can it return from its own mental Devachanic sphere to the plane of terrestrial objectivity.

"The *Kama-rupic phantom*, remaining bereft of its informing thinking principle, the higher *Manas*, and the lower aspect of the latter, the animal intelligence, no longer receiving light from the higher mind, and no longer having a physical brain to work through, collapses . . . falls into the state of the frog when certain portions of its brain are taken out by the vivisector. It can think no more, even on the lowest animal plane. Henceforth it is no longer even the lower *Manas*, since this 'lower' is nothing without the

'higher.' It is this nonentity which we find materializing in Séance rooms with Mediums . . . A true non-entity, however, only as to reasoning or cogitating powers, still an *Entity*, however astral and fluidic, as shown in certain cases when, having been magnetically and unconsciously drawn toward a medium, it is revived for a time and lives in him by *proxy*, so to speak. This 'spook,' or the *Kama-rupa*, may be compared with the *jelly-fish* which has an ethereal gelatinous appearance so long as it is in its own element, or water (the *medium's specific AURA*), but which, no sooner is it thrown out of it, than it dissolves in the hand or on the sand, especially in sunlight. In the medium's *Aura*, it lives a kind of vicarious life and reasons and speaks either through the medium's brain or those of other persons present."

Those interested in the subject will be well advised to go to the *Key to Theosophy* in which a very full treatment of the subject is to be found.

The utter triviality and the boring commonplaceness of the content of the so called communications between the living and the dead even apart from the many evidences of fraud by designing persons to cheat the credulous are enough to make spiritist explanation look like much cry and little wool. The Theosophic explanation offered by Madame Blavatsky presents fewer difficulties and is exempt from the above general criticism levelled against the spiritist position. An ultra-rationalist might still regard that Blavatsky's explanation is not entirely adequate and conclusive. Alternative explanations even half as satisfactory as Blavatsky's are not however easy to give. That I freely confess.

P. NAGARAJA RAO

The Ethics of Power. By PHILIP LEON (George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., London. 10s. 6d.)

The book of Philip Leon, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Leicester is rather remarkable in its originality and in the unyielding quality of its thought.

The general theme is quite simple: moral evil consists entirely in a desire to dominate, in an egocentric thirst which consumes man and which so-called "modern" ethics use, often unconsciously, as a basis for their scale of values.

Philip Leon's moral standard is expressed by an estimate of life, in which evil is more common, more striking, and more easy to attain than good. The good cannot be explained: "It itself is the light by which we must explain everything else." A description of a way of living—directly opposed to those other ways from which he tries to deter us—is sufficient to give us an exact picture and a practical view of the good.

In this "vast folly" which is the general view of life for the great majority of human beings, everything can be grouped under the double scourge of egoism and egotism. The first is static, that is based on realities and has as a means of expression the innumerable desires of the human being—*appetition*. The second is dynamic, that is a motive with no other end than non-existence—it is rightly called vanity. It aims only at the exaltation of the self—*ambition*.

The whole book is made up of the crossing and re-crossing of these themes, a three-phased study of egotism, egoism and true ethics, and of their innumerable entanglements in the complex web of human nature. Both in its plan and in its development the book is strikingly free and severe. There is no "clew of Ariadne" to guide other than the moving intricacy of the moral fact. But in each paragraph there is a mathematical precision in the defining and the sequence of syllogism. Philip Leon reveals in

numerous passages a strong Platonic culture, but he has also undoubtedly been influenced by the Aristotelian *Categories* and the whole system of the scholastics. However—and this is strange—the excessive stress the author puts upon the formal frames of thought never leads him into airy, speculative reasoning, or even into simply too abstract reasoning. "The formal treatment of ethics can never be divorced from its material treatment."

A treatise of ethics should consist of the sum of experiences and should never depart from the concrete. It should not aim further than a comparison between the different types of existence and of character. Thus, in a vivid style, borrowing from the most common every day psychology, Philip Leon fills out the details of his system.

His conclusion is that the world is a circus of lunatics where the idea of values and supremacy has corrupted even altruism and is at the basis of all feelings including those reputed the most ethical, such as mother-love and heroism.

Although quite independent of religion and free-thought, the author's conclusions are in favour of an ethical system practically identical to that of Christianity, one based on universal love and directly opposed to the moral principles we see incarnated in the present day Nazi movement.

We shall not follow Mr. Leon throughout his severe criticism of all the "values." By taking from man the desire for nobility and heroism, and of certain of the nobler ambitions one would no doubt rid him of his egotism, which is their hidden source; why worry, then, if we deprive him at the same time of an important part of his grandeur and if we diminish human nature by taking from it one of its essential elements!

But we hasten to say that it is not necessary to follow Mr. Leon in all his conclusions, in order to be interested in his detailed analysis of human

instincts and their manifestations. He presents a vast field of documentation and of references picked from literature and life. His cold but lucid analysis of human motives is so cruelly

subtle that the professional psychologist or the "amateur of souls" will profit greatly by reading his book.

CLAUDINE CHONEZ

[Translated from the French.]

The Communist Answer to the World's Needs. By JULIUS F. HECKER, PH. D. (Chapman and Hall, Ltd., London. 8s. 6d.)

In these dialogues an attempt is made to represent an analysis of the world's maladies as seen by different schools of thought, and also of the methods by which they would seek to cure them. The centre of interest is the Communist doctrine, and the exposition of the rival schools is arranged so as to expose their ineffectiveness and bring out the superiority of the Communist position. The form is simple. Socratov, the Communist Admirable Crichton, listens patiently to the views of others, and in a few light touches indicates with relentless logic where their weakness lies. His knowledge of current economic literature and even of newspapers is something amazing. Armed as he is with ready references, and conscious as he is of effortless superiority over his rivals, it is easy for him to show the shallowness of the Douglas scheme of credit, the exaggeration of the claims of the Technocrats, the insidious implications of the "New Deal," and the arrogance of the pretensions of Fascism.

His own analysis of the needs of the world is brief and to the point. What the world needs is economic security, social security, or peace with one's neighbours, and freedom for self-expression of the group as well as the individual. Only Communism can give the world what it wants; for, beyond economic planning, industrialisation of

Russia and such other immediate objectives, lies the real purpose of humanity, which is "the planning, the selection and the all-sided training as well as the preservation of man." The Communists propose to create "an environment which will produce a human species in which the instincts of the beast will disappear and the spiritual and social qualities will become dominant." Capitalist society is actuated by low incentives, but under Communism the old incentives "will be revaluated and the new social stimuli come into play for which Western society has now no field of action."

This is the fundamental position of the Communist: Insistence on a transvaluation of man's incentives; and extension of the right of self-expression from the few to all. A large part of the volume is taken up with more topical, if less fundamental, issues, like the attitude of Communism to some of the current political problems. Socratov repudiates any design on the part of Communism to disturb world peace, and expresses the eagerness of the Soviet Government to be on friendly terms with the U. S. A. In the Pacific, the destined theatre of the coming struggle between Imperialist powers, the U. S. S. R. wants neither territory nor markets, but as a realist power is compelled to prepare for war. Thus Communism comes to terms with the realities of the situation. Whether the Communist answer meets the needs of the world or not, the world cannot afford to ignore Communism in the realm of thought—obviously in the realm of action either.

N. S. SUBBA RAO

Psychics and Mediums: A Manual and Bibliography for Students. By GERTRUDE OGDEN TUBBY, B. S., former Secretary of the American Society For Psychical Research (Marshall Jones Company, Boston. \$2.00)

This interesting book is the outcome of several years of personal experimentation with psychics and mediums. The author herself is psychically afflicted as personal experiences related herein indicate.

The phenomena are divided into two groups—subjective and objective—all of them being classified and defined. Other items are rules for conducting a scientific séance, and for the development of mediumship and psychism.

Miss Tubby states that "psychic endowments are as natural.....as an ear for music and other artistic gifts"; therefore such faculties, including mediumship, should be developed by use, for these, like other talents, add to human happiness and service. (pp. 11-16.) If that be so, how account for the physical, mental and moral ruin of the best known and most "powerful" mediums, including the founders of modern Spiritism, the Fox Sisters? Is there a record of any medium who became a better character through his mediumship? There is a truly dreadful list of those who have been made worse by their efforts. True it is that "lofty desire and aspiration" act as a "protective wall" (pp. 59-61) in psychism as in all else. But the will is discarded, the reason inverted, the moral nature ignored, by most mediums—a state which can but open the way to regions and intelligences below, not above, human consciousness. "Angel guides" and "spirit controls" often incite to fraud, as many mediums have themselves admitted.

The only benefit that Spiritism has conferred, at tremendous cost, is the demonstration of the existence of other states of matter and of other conditions of consciousness, to in-

vestigate which the Society for Psychical Research was formed. Yet after half a century of painstaking research by many brilliant and eminent scientists the debatable phenomena of 1882 remain almost as debatable to-day. This need not have been, for psychical science was not born in the nineteenth century. It is the oldest of sciences, and has had its students and experts in every age and race. In that wonderful storehouse of information, H. P. Blavatsky's *Isis Unveiled*, will be found the principles of natural processes involved in the several phenomena which the S. P. R. has recorded but not explained. Miss Tubby's reference to H. P. Blavatsky shows a lack of insight and grasp of the very fundamentals of psychic science, and ignorance of its adepts on the one hand and its victims and failures on the other. Again she couples the name of Mrs. Besant with that of Madame Blavatsky, which is understandable, but which also shows that Miss Tubby is speculating and is writing without a basis of knowledge or historical evidence. A comparative study of the books of Madame Blavatsky and Mrs. Besant will show to Miss Tubby that there is a difference of day and night between them. Altogether Miss Tubby suffers from lack of sound knowledge and like most spiritists and dabblers in the psychic cannot distinguish between psychism and spirituality, between the passive medium and the Wise Adept. The former is but a slave of the lower influences of the dark side of Nature while the Adept actively controls himself and all inferior potencies. Miss Tubby's dictum notwithstanding, there is a science, a philosophy and an art of Magic which can be learnt in theory and in practice, of which knowledge the West knows next to nothing but which alone offers the Key to the mystery of the invisible. Madame Blavatsky was herself an Adept in that beneficent knowledge.

Modern Mystics. By SIR FRANCIS YOUNGHUSBAND (John Murray, London. 10s. 6d.)

Mysticism, Sir Francis explains, "is experiencing the whole universe as one; and mystical experience is one of the approaches to the middle of the universe—an approach which is availed of by that class of people who strive to make the lot of humanity better." He aims to show that it is therefore superior to scientific reasoning for it enables the seeker after truth to transcend the faculty of reason and place himself *en rapport* with Truth itself. The mystic sees and feels himself part of the Whole and senses the interdependence and interrelationship of the universe, whereas the scientist deals with it in fragments.

Though this approach, pursued by all true sages and seers, is the recognized one of the East, it cannot be confined to "limit of creed or race." It may be an inborn gift or it may be the result of years of rigorous discipline. The author's selection of modern mystics in illustration of his point is poorly

made. He could better have given preference to those whose experiences are less likely to be confused with self-delusion and hallucination. Baha-ullah, for example, was never a mystic of the highest order, but rather a passive victim of his own creations.

The most interesting and really vital parts of the book are contained in the first and last chapters where the author discusses dispassionately what mystic experience really is and what its possibilities are. By the charm of his clear style Sir Francis succeeds in imparting to the sympathetic reader the glow of his own enthusiasm, but we fear it may fail to carry conviction to the sceptic or persuade him to give mysticism a fair trial. Nor is it likely to appeal to the scientific mind and offer it any assurance that mysticism is something diametrically opposed to self-delusion and that it is not "the hallucinatory imaginings of a highly emotional nature"; nor will the psychoanalyst be induced to change or even modify his conclusion that "mysticism is a neurosis."

M. Y. G.

Fools Like Me. By PAUL MARCHE (Houghton and Scott-Snell Ltd., London. 7s.6d.)

The glorious horrors of war! This cutting satire fortunately is not feeble. Whether it will do practical good to the cause it champions is another matter. Europe, numbed by the war has not fully recovered her fine sensitiveness. No impartial reader can fail to be impressed with the truth of the pictures drawn, but, as Paul Marche himself shows, most people do their thinking by proxy, and seldom if ever stop to reason out their beliefs or opinions. Yet there are brave minds like Lyn Boyd, a conscientious objector and hero of the story, and others in the making, and the volume will awaken or strengthen them. People are apt to attribute pacifist sentiments to cowardice, but it takes a "brave man

indeed to directly oppose the pet opinions of the crowd," and often such men are more courageous than the docile soldier or the dressed-up sergeant and general. The story contains a scathing portrait of "the little God seated in the Big Chair in the Big Room in the Big Palace." The author is also to be congratulated for attacking the attitude of the churches. War is unchristian and in 1914 the churches could have created a tremendous anti-war force but almost all of them actually induced people to carnage, and thus proved their futility and failure. It is but human to believe *our* country in the right, especially when we are led away by the propaganda of the "little gods." The story brings out the weakness of such claims—no belligerent country is ever wholly in the right. Women also will find here

an appeal arousing them to a more real sense of duty. Not wrongly does the book deem them among the culprits of war, but says that they can become saviours of men. No permanent solution to the menace of war is possible till men and women learn to look upon outside events as but reflections of their inner natures. War on the out-

side will never cease until we conquer the foe within. If we would all begin self-study and determine thus what makes us say "fools like me" in this or that, here and again there, we should not only find peace within ourselves but should establish it in our surroundings, whether they were circumscribed or vast.

F. K. K.

Thus Spoke Guru Nanak. Compiled by Sir JOGENDRA SINGH (Milford, Oxford University Press. 3s.)

Words are used to express thoughts but can as easily veil them. This book shows both aspects and sets the reader a twofold problem, the first one rather of curiosity, the second of vital importance. One must speculate upon what meaning the translator has in mind by the phrases he uses: "the Power of God's Name," "Love for God," "Salvation," and others of the mystic's vocabulary, for otherwise it is almost impossible to decide.

But it is far more important that the reader should see the meaning of the Guru. For books, as well as human beings, are like mirrors in which men see reflected for the most part their own images. Therefore it seems inevitable that those who read these fragments with sectarian conceptions will perceive but one facet, and that imperfectly if they cannot relate it to the whole. Since the book is intended, as the foreword implies, for Western readers, to whom Guru Nanak is unfortunately little more than a name, it would have been helpful to have had some information about the circumstances of the teaching, and the reasons for the particular form taken. Every expression of religion differs according to the time and

the people among whom it takes shape though the basic truths of all are ever the same. That fundamental identity stands out clearly from these teachings when rightly understood, if, for example, the passionate tones of the mystical metaphors are not mistaken for devotion to a personal creator, but linked with such a passage as:—

He who filleth all space, O Nanak, Him I carry in
my heart.
His light filleth the three worlds,
In every being is present the unapproachable and
the endless one and the true.

The Western reader may gain one very practical teaching from this book, a precept too often considered as mere luxuriance of metaphor and simile. It is the attitude of mind that perceives in every act and in every object of material existence a symbol of spiritual life.

Make continence thy furnace, Resignation thy
goldsmith,
Understanding thy anvil, Divine knowledge thy
tools.
The fear of God thy bellows. Austerities thy fire.
Divine love thy crucible. And melt the self therein.
In such a mint true union is attained.

A passage such as this might appear to a materialistic, superficial thinker as an ingenious, perhaps a forced analogy, but the method it typifies will indeed give a new scale of value to life. To study these sayings in the light of universal truths and to follow the example shown of heart devotion, is to find value in this volume that cannot be assessed.

W. E. W.

The Divine Pymander of Hermes Trismegistus. Trans. by the Editors of the Shrine of Wisdom (London. 3s.).

To students of mystic philosophy this compilation will be welcome. It is made up of extracts which "are the result of a comparison of three English translations."

Pymander means "Shepherd of men"—the Teacher, Illuminator and Guide of all mankind. These teachings are the result of a Divine Vision in which the Pymander reveals to Hermes the Reality back of manifestation. The basis of this revelation is set forth thus: "Expand thyself into the immeasurable greatness passing beyond all body, and transcending Time, enter Eternity. Thus shalt thou know God." Attempts have been made to designate the teachings of Hermes as monotheistic, but the Pymander, as other Hermetic writings, teaches pure pantheism. All throughout the book we find that true Impersonal, Universal concept of Deity in spite of the pronoun "He"

so persistently used. Deity, whether described in its transcendental aspect as the "unmanifested" or in its "immanent aspect as the "most-manifest" is poles apart from a personal god. The material aspect of the Universe is described as a reflection of the spiritual, and man is said to be superior to the gods and is the Lord of the Universe because he has Nous—a truth not very generally accepted. There is a very interesting chapter on Regeneration, the resurrection of the human Soul.

The Pymander has been ranked high in the list of religious literature, and "the early Church Fathers accepted the Trismegistic writings as being both ancient and authoritative, sometimes utilising them to support Christian doctrines." To the student of comparative religions it offers a great aid. It is an authentic textbook of true philosophy, and contains the main principles of the Hermetic teachings.

F. K. K.

Alexander of Asia. By PRINCESS MARTHE BIBESCO, Trans. by ENID BAGNOLD (William Heinemann Ltd., London.)

Princess Bibesco, in the romantic enthusiasm of her eighteen years, has written a story of Alexander seeing her hero through the legends of Persian and Syrian tradition related by Firdausi, Jami, Abdul Salem of Kashmir and others. The reader in search of a true design of Alexander's life will find small satisfaction despite the poetry of the volume. He will shut the book with a feeling of having been cheated though he may feel the influence of the artist's creative fantasy.

Princess Bibesco begs her son, to whom the book is dedicated, "to love tales, for they sleep in the roots of human inheritance" and to "live not for life's sake, but to be happy." In these two phrases the temper of the book may be found. Wooing the god of happiness, she is carried away from the realities of life to ephemeral

fancies. She does not think that better than love of tales is the love of life, the story of the experiences and evolution of the human soul. Tales are useful only as they convey ideas which are true, hold up ideals which energize, or reveal beauty which inspires. And real happiness is not woven out of gossamerlike fancy but out of the sterner stuff of suffering and experience.

Alexander has long been a subject of romance to which Princess Bibesco now contributes her version: Alexander was pre-destined to be perfect in his achievements; he won Babylon by prayer; he killed Porus on his entry into India; he "knelt" (!) in prayer with the Indians in the temple; he received instructions from Babylonian and other Sages on the prolongation of his joys; he discovered the Brahmins were but seekers of another kind of *human* happiness; etc., etc.

The world to-day needs romance of

a different kind: happiness is recognized to be a will-o'-the-wisp and the thoughtful do not look upon life as a purposeless adventure merely to be enjoyed, but rather as having a definite objective. Life is to be moulded out of pain and misery which yield faculty and power when experienced and utilized.

Face to face with tragedy everywhere around us imagination needs to be used for creating romance that inspires and explains the mysteries of soul-success or failure. Who will give us the romance of that archetypal

soul and its descents on earth among which the incarnation of Alexander is but a single episode; Alexander, the son of Olympias, priestess versed in the art of black-magic; Alexander offspring of a violent love, born under the mysteries of initiation in the cult which his mother served; Alexander who worshipped Homerians and loved Pindar and founded Alexandria; but who spread carnage and destruction during the short life that ended at the mystic age of thirty-three?

SUZETTE TOWNSEND

Essay on the Foundation of Cognition. By C. LAMBEK. Trans. by AGNETE KHORTSEN (Williams and Norgate, London.)

This book, originally written in Danish, deals with some of the fundamental problems of epistemology. The method of approach is not purely logical or epistemological. Physical, physiological, psychological, biological and even ethical considerations are introduced to throw light on epistemological issues. In this the author approaches the synthetic standpoint of the Hindus who are not content with mere abstract analytical considerations or mere *part* views of things but always insist on, regarding a problem in all possible relations and thus gaining a *whole* view of the matter.

The standpoint of the writer is that of voluntaristic pragmatism. He thinks that the aim of cognition is the control of future experiences, and "the guarantee of truth we must seek in those processes which we call the realisation of our plans" (p. 10). The real world we believe in is not directly given in knowledge, but is largely a construction of thought in fulfilment of the aim of cognition. According to the author, "not the least particle of knowledge regarding real coherence can be obtained solely by means of experience and logical reasoning" (p. 25). It is on the basis of several postulates of identity that we

can pass from knowledge to reality. One such postulate is the principle of identical source of impressions, which means that certain sense impressions in spite of their differences originate from the same factor of interaction. We thus postulate a standing object as the ground of changing impressions. These postulates cannot be deduced from experience nor proved by logical reasoning. Still "we maintain the postulates because the motive of cognition cannot in any other way be advanced and fulfilled" (p. 27). In other words, we posit a real world to fulfil the needs of our practical life. This seems to imply what certain schools of Indian Philosophy seek to maintain by saying that the world does not exist for pure knowledge or that it is a product of ignorance (*avidyā*) or desire (*vāsanā*). But although the author speaks of "the continuing Me" in several places, he does not seem to realise fully the importance of the self as the foundation of knowledge which, however, is a cardinal doctrine with almost all schools of orthodox philosophy in India. Nevertheless we cannot deny the high philosophical value of the author's contribution, its originality and deep penetration. Despite a certain lack of lucidity in spots, which may well be due to translation, the book is sure to interest all serious students.

R. DAS

CORRESPONDENCE

AN EXPLANATION

May I be permitted to make a few remarks through your columns, on your footnote to the review on Mr. John Foulds' book, *Music To-day*, which appeared in your July issue? I have been coupled with Mr. Foulds in your criticism, but I am not deserving of it, since I am in entire and absolute agreement with you. I disagree with the major portion of the "occult" teaching as expressed in *Music To-day* for the same reason that you do: it is smirched with pseudo-theosophy, and is often misleading and distorted. I have, however, not at any time "drunk deep" at the "muddy waters of pseudo-theosophy," as you suggest. As a young woman I was much attracted to Annie Besant and others but when I tried to read and study their books, *I could not*. I have never read through one of their books even once. I had to go on alone, or with the help of *The Voice of the Silence*, the *Bhagavad-Gita* and other such books. I was a rebel in "good Theosophic" circles, and I left the Theosophical Society some twenty years ago.

I have great reverence for H. P. Blavatsky, whose works I have, however, studied but little, as I wanted "in justice to pure Theosophy, genuine occultism and true mysticism"—to use your words—to *go to the source alone*.

All this about myself, since, in his postscript to *Music To-day* Mr. Foulds cites me as his teacher, and you, whilst excusing him on the ground of "aspirations," condemn me as the "pseudo-theosophic and distorted" source of his teaching. The teacher is however not responsible for the vagaries of the pupil! *Music To-day* was written without my knowledge, but as my name has appeared and I

am held responsible for the most important part of it, I ask you in fairness to publish this letter.

*Holta,
Palampur
Punjab.* }

MAUD MACCARTHY

CONTEMPORARY INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

Dr. N. R. Sarma's criticism of my article on Contemporary Indian Philosophy has come to hand rather late. His criticism is composed of two parts: (1) useful supplements and (2) irrelevant invectives—a mixture of gold and vitriol. I am thankful to him for the first and not sorry for the second, because anybody having a nodding acquaintance with his writings knows that if one wants the first, one cannot have it without the second. He is a rose in spite of his thorns!

He wishes me to explain and show cause etc. I shall not waste this precious space by submitting a defence nor vainly imitate him by counter insinuations and invectives. But rather let me plead guilty and pray for mercy (following the same principle of *Yamevaisha* etc. quoted by him). The article in question, let me confess straightaway, is incomplete, being the summary of a paper: "The Main Currents of Contemporary Indian Philosophy," written for the Philosophical Congress and necessarily very brief. I may further confess that in making the article brief I omitted many things and that in so doing I was guided by my "likes and dislikes," and thus mentioned in praise works which I judged to be the more valuable.

Let me confess still further that being on a low rung of philosophical discipline I have my heroes and "idols." It was not a question there-

fore, of "distributing patronage," but rather of paying respect and doing homage. Some of these "idols" have happily attained world-wide reputation, which I cannot hope to increase by advertisement nor may Dr. Sarma hope to whittle down.

I am only sorry that so much brilliance should be wasted on the criticism of a poor performance. Dr. Sarma, I sincerely hope, will use it in writing an exhaustive article or rather a book, which will benefit us all. He may profitably mention there also the valuable works of Professors Wadia (*Ethics of Feminism*), P. B. Adhikari (Papers Read at the Philosophical Congress), A. C. Mukherji (*Self, Thought and Reality*), S. K. Maitra (*Hindu Ethics*), Kokilashwar Shastri (*Introduction to Advaita Philosophy*), S K. Das (*Towards a Systematic Study of Vedanta*), P. N. Mukherji (*Sri Gopal Basu Mallik Lectures*), M. M. Lakshman Shastri (*Commentaries on Sanskrit Works*) and many others—which Dr. Sarma has failed to mention due neither to ignorance nor any mysterious prejudice, but, I hope, to selective judgment which however he should not monopolise, but share fairly with his friends—and then the quarrel will be over. *Pax Vobis!*

Patna

D. M. DATTA

REJOINDER TO THE ABOVE

I feel somewhat puzzled and even embarrassed, unable to decide in what terms I am to thank Dr. Datta for his flowery description of me as a "rose in spite of his thorns"; seeing that such a description would be better appreciated by a metaphysical blue-stocking of "world-wide reputation" than by a prosaic and matter-of-fact critic like my humble self, determined to call a spade a spade.

I should like to answer *two* points in Dr. Datta's reply. (1) It is indeed too late in the day to threaten humble folk or to stifle legitimate criticism with the adumbration of the "world-wide reputation . . . happily attained" by some of the "idols" of Dr. Datta; as in these decadent days of India's cultural evolution—when it is considered an astonishing attainment to stay at Oxford counting verbs and nouns in the *Rig-Veda*—those who have eyes to see should be fairly able to visualise the inner and the outer histories of "world-wide reputations," reference to which made by Dr. Datta involves such a palpable *argumentum ad hominem* as to need no refutation at all. I readily admit it is *absolutely impossible* to "whittle down" the "world-wide reputation" of his "idols" even an iota by any criticism made by human or even superhuman agency, but is that any reason why one should not protest against "Indian Misrepresentations of Indian Philosophy" in the interest of *Tattva Jignyāsa* (quest after philosophical truth)? Dr. Datta is quite welcome to pay his respects and homage to any "idol" he has a fancy for, but he cannot surely compel others to do so. (2) Dr. Datta hopes I may write a book. I am sorry. Contemporary markets are terribly inundated as it is by books and papers on Indian Philosophy, translations, expositions, *et hoc*, and a new volume released by me, would mean a cosmic calamity! Let the Augean Stables be cleaned first. Let misrepresentations of Indian philosophy be avoided and repudiated. Let me read and assimilate the *new Philosophy* synthesizing European and Indian Thought which according to Dr. Datta his "idols" have given to the world. Then it will be time enough to think of writing a book.

Let me conclude: *Pax in Bello* as *Brahma-Jignyasa* is preëminently a philosophic fight!

Madras

R. NAGA RAJA SARMA

ENDS AND SAYINGS

“————— ends of verse
And sayings of philosophers.”

HUDIBRAS.

At last the Oriental fire-walk has been performed in England under test conditions and in the presence of eminent scientists, who, unless they denied the evidence of their senses, had to admit it as a fact. The performer was Kuda Bux, a Kashmir Muslim of twenty-nine years. The experiment was planned by Mr. Harry Price. Heralded in advance in *The Listener* for August 7th, the fire-walk is thus described :—

The surface heat of the glowing embers in a trench about 12 feet long, 6 feet wide and 8 inches deep was 800 degrees Fahrenheit when Kuda Bux fulfilled his claim. Precautions had been taken against advance chemical preparation of his feet. The Kashmiri walked through the inferno without even raising the temperature of his feet. Encouraged by his example, two barefooted Englishmen attempted to duplicate his performance but it is reported that both took only a couple of steps before they jumped off, their feet considerably scorched and burned.

What is the net result of the performance? A few more scientists, no doubt, are convinced of the possibility of the fire-walk, but how much have they learned of its rationale?

In *Isis Unveiled*, in which Madame H. P. Blavatsky presented the fundamental propositions of the Oriental psychology, two ways of acquiring invulnerability to fire are indicated :—

1. An oil extracted from asbestos, when rubbed into the body,

leaves no stain or mark but enables the person so rubbed to step uninjured into the hottest fire. The secret of its virtues, however, remains with certain lamas and Hindu adepts, who, we may be sure, do not exploit it for profit or to intrigue the curious. (Vol. I, p. 504)

2. The agency of nature elementals is invoked, unconsciously in the case of mediums and séance visitors on whom a temporary invulnerability is conferred; but deliberately and with knowledge by members of races among whom the rules of sorcery have been handed down for generations. (Vol. I, pp. 445-6; 588)

The explanation vouchsafed by Kuda Bux can hardly enlighten the investigators—that it is “all a matter of faith... Faith can make you do anything.” The two Englishmen who burned their feet had faith, too, or they would hardly have ventured on the embers. *The Hindu* (Madras) states that “Scientists are as baffled as ever to explain the mystery of Oriental fire-walking in terms of Western science.” It can never be so explained. How long will it be before their chronic bafflement in the face of countless psychical phenomena will drive Western scientists to turn to serious study of the science of psychology as developed and handed down for countless ages in the East?

ÆUML

Point out the "Way"—however dimly,
and lost among the host—as does the evening
star to those who tread their path in darkness.

—*The Voice of the Silence*

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Æ

In the passing of George William Russell (Æ) on the 17th of July, 1935, the world lost not only a poet with a genuine spiritual message but also a painter, a patriot and a practical mystic. He worked for the unity and autonomy of his beloved country, its repudiation of the meretricious and the tawdry in modern civilization and the revival of Ireland's ancient culture.

Æ was a dynamic character, a worker of tireless energy, but he told James Stephens, who wrote of his passing in *The Observer* for the 21st of July, "that he was not originally robust physically or intellectually, nor of a fundamentally decided character, nor of an especially psychic nature. That he made himself over from very little by a gradually increasing interest in and application of the thought and methods of the Vedanta. He held that to meditate on the ideas of the *Bhagavad-Gita* and to practise the psychological discipline

systematised by Patanjali must astonishingly energise any person, and that these ideas and this discipline had transformed him from a shy, self-doubting youth to the cheerful, courageous personage he certainly became."

The energy of the man was thus poured out in many channels, but all of his activities flowed from the perennial spring of his spiritual vitality. It was contact with the genuine Theosophy of the ancient East, of which he learned through Madame H. P. Blavatsky, that released and sustained that fountain of energy. Like an undercurrent, crystal and clear, his conviction of the realities of the Spirit runs through all of his work.

Most of the voluminous press notices on the death of Æ referred to his early contact with Theosophy. Some, however, said and most implied that that contact represented but a stage in his development, a stage later transcended.

The tone of some papers was apologetic for this phase of Æ's life. Referring editorially to his early volume, *Homeward Songs*, *The New York Times* of July 19th remarked:—

Though these early lyrics appeared in a theosophical magazine, he thoroughly despised the cant and humbug and abracadabra that so long poisoned the word "theosophy."

Undeniably "cant and humbug and abracadabra" have flourished under the name of Theosophy, but the Editor of *The New York Times* seems ignorant of the very existence of genuine Theosophy, which differs from pseudo-theosophy as day from night.

It is to place on record the facts of the unbroken relationship of Æ to the genuine Theosophy from which he drew his inspiration from his first contact with it until his death, that we publish the following article by his friend, Captain P. G. Bowen.

In an unpublished letter in our hands, written the 17th of October, 1922, Æ couples a condemnation of the Theosophical Society, "which seems to me now in some moods to be a nursery of the Black Art," with words of appreciation of

"that great and wise man, William Q. Judge whose very memory seems to have been forgotten by present day Theosophists. I think he was a true adept in that sacred lore and I have never found in those who came after H. P. B. and Judge the same knowledge, wisdom and inner light."

The same letter continues: "The Theosophical Movement has overflowed from the Theosophical Society and I think better work can be done by Theosophists in working in other movements and imparting to them a spiritual tendency. I have tried to do this in the economic and cultural movements I have been connected with in Ireland. But I retain membership of a little mystical group here which works on the lines of the old T. S. before it became the home of psychism and dogma. I have watched with interest so far as I could the economic and spiritual movements in India, a country which I regard as a kind of spiritual fatherland and whose influence on the thought of the world must, I think, grow greater because in no literature is there such a reservoir of divine truth as in the Indian."

Æ AND THEOSOPHY

The death of George William Russell, better known to the public and even to his friends by his pen-name, "Æ," has deprived the world of the most outstanding example of a practical Theosophist

known since the passing of W. Q. Judge. His life was a perfect answer to the criticism so often urged against Theosophy, that however beautiful the ideals it teaches they cannot be realised or

applied, and that he who clings to them must remain an unpractical dreamer. Far beyond the average devoted Theosophist Æ was a Mystic, yet this did not prevent him from winning world-wide recognition as an economist and statesman; on the contrary it helped towards this achievement, for it gave him a sure knowledge of universal laws which he applied to the solution of many problems which perplex the world.

Doubtless he will become the subject of biographies which may attempt, more or less successfully, to appraise him as a man of letters, or a man of affairs; but his true life history can be written only by a Theosophist who knew the real man, and shared his ideals. I who write make no pretence to be such an one, for, apart from some casual contacts forty years ago, when I was a mere youth, and he a young man beginning to achieve recognition as a writer, I knew him only during the last few years of his life. Yet though our earthly friendship was brief it was very real and deep, not, I felt, and he insisted, a new growth, but one with roots extending into a remote past. He therefore confided in me very fully concerning his attitude towards, and relationship to, Theosophy, and of those prominent, and gave me many illuminating details of the early history of the movement, and of those prominent in it from out of his own extensive first-hand knowledge. From this material I select the following items as likely to interest readers of the THE ARYAN PATH and

perhaps be of some help to the Cause of true Theosophy.

The Dublin Lodge, T. S., was founded by Charles Johnston in 1886. Æ was not one of its foundation members, but was introduced into it a year or two after its establishment by his friend and fellow poet, W. B. Yeats. Although, according to himself, at this time a diffident and inarticulate youth, Æ assimilated Theosophy with almost miraculous speed, just as though it were "a familiar lesson temporarily forgotten, but now recalled with fuller understanding." Within a week he was taking part in discussions with old students, and giving lectures on his new-old studies.

His grounding in Theosophy was received from W. Q. J.'s articles in the *Path*, and H. P. B.'s in *Lucifer*. Through them he was led to the *Bhagavad-Gita*, and other Eastern classics. Then came the great series by H. P. B.: *The Secret Doctrine*, *The Voice of the Silence* and *The Key to Theosophy*. Having (to quote his own words) "bathed in these I marvelled what I could have done to merit birth in an age wherein such wisdom was on offer to all who could beg, borrow, or steal a copy of those works." He added: "If a man stole my *S. D.* because he valued its contents I should commend him and feel I was serving humanity by doing so."

Æ's direct contacts with H. P. B. were few, and not intimate, achieved through the good offices of Charles Johnston and Mrs. Johnston, whose aunt H. P. B. was. Of his impressions of H. P. B.

he would say little: "I was too immature—too small, and she too remote—a Cosmos in an ailing woman's body." It was through her message that he knew her, as she would have the world know her.

Æ never tired of expatiating upon the "miracle of *The Secret Doctrine*." Once I was present when an acquaintance, a prominent member of a leading Theosophical organisation, urged the claims of a certain modern book to be a preferable substitute for the *S. D.*, containing extended teachings. He smiled gently—he was gentle and tolerant to all and "suffered fools gladly"—and said: "Man, I would recommend your author to study the *S. D.* seven hours a day, from now until 1975 and if he has dug out the last of the wisdom hidden within it, by then, I will hail him as the next Messenger."

When W. Q. Judge visited Dublin in 1892, Æ had his first meeting with the man whose writings had already impressed him as illuminated teachings. I quote from a letter, his own account of the occasion:—

" 'I suppose you expect me to talk,' W. Q. J. said, and began to speak in a quiet conversational way. Before a minute had gone I became convinced that he was addressing his remarks to me exclusively. More than that he was answering my unspoken questions, and unravelling problems that had long perplexed me. When he stopped I was overcome with compunction that I should have thus monopo-

lised his attention; but on mentioning my feelings to others I found to my amazement that almost all had felt exactly as I had."

To Æ, and to practically all the members of the Dublin Lodge, W. Q. J. became a spiritual Hero. Without a dissentient voice being raised, the Lodge followed him at the time of the deplorable "split". At his untimely death a few years later Æ penned a tribute in *The Irish Theosophist* which deserves quoting *in extenso* as showing how a great man and a great Theosophist appreciated a great Teacher:—

It is with no feeling of sadness that I think of this withdrawal. He would not have wished that. But with a faltering hand I try to express one of many incommunicable thoughts about the hero who has departed. Long before I met him; before even written words of his had been read, his name like an incantation stirred and summoned forth some secret spiritual impulse in my heart. It was no surface tie that bound us to him. No one ever tried less than he to gain from men that adherence which comes from impressive manner. I hardly thought what he was while he spoke but on departing I found that my heart, wiser than my brain, had given itself away to him; an inner exaltation lasting for months witnessed his power. It was in that memorable convention in London two years ago that I first glimpsed his real greatness. As he sat there quietly, one among many, not speaking a word, I was overcome by a sense of spiritual dilation, of unconquerable will about him, and that one figure with the grey head became all the room to me. Shall I not say the truth I think? Here was a hero out of the remote, antique, giant ages come among us; wearing but on the surface the vesture of our little

day. We too came out of that past, but in forgetfulness; he with memory and power soon regained. To him and to one other we owe an unspeakable gratitude for faith and hope and knowledge born again. We may say now, using words of his early years: "Even in hell I lift up my eyes to those who are beyond me and do not deny them." Ah, hero, we know you would have stayed with us if it were possible: but fires have been kindled that shall not soon fade, fires that shall be bright when you again return. I feel no sadness, knowing that there are no farewells in the True: to whomsoever has touched on that real being there is comradeship with all the great and wise of time. That he will return again we need not doubt. His ideals were those which are attained only by the Saviours and Deliverers of nations. When or where he may appear I know not, but I foresee the coming when our need invokes him. Light of the future æons, I hail, I hail to thee!"

Æ himself drew my attention to this tribute, assuring me that thirty-five years of thought and study had served but to show with greater and greater clearness that "W. Q. J. was one of the great revealers of all time."

After the death of Judge, Æ found himself less happy in his membership of the T. S., until, upon its merging into the Universal Brotherhood under Katherine Tingley, he felt compelled to resign. He was convinced, he declared, and events have amply justified the conviction, that with the passing of W. Q. J. the cycle ended, and the "flood of spiritual Light which had filled the world since 1875 faded into deeper and deeper twilight." The various leaders and teachers that emerged "show-

ed nothing of the Divine Fire so evident in H. P. B. and W. Q. J.: they were not even minor stars such as we all might be, and should be; but merely waning moons."

But he remembered H. P. B.'s injunction to "keep the link unbroken," and to this end gathered round him a few earnest seekers under the name of *The Hermetic Society*. Led by him this group met weekly, with very few breaks, down to 1933, when, on leaving Ireland on business which, in fact, prevented him from ever again resuming permanent residence there, he delegated his leadership to myself. By this time we had had many intimate conversations, and had achieved a perfect understanding. The idea of uniting the Theosophical Lodge which I represented with the *Hermetic Society* was discussed and mutually agreed to. Opposition on the part of some of the older members of both bodies prevented it from materialising, however, and a compromise was effected by the formation of the body now known as *The Druid Lodge* linked with the *Hermetic Society* for study purposes, though nominally distinct organisations. Æ hoped that when he again resumed residence in Ireland both bodies would formally unite. He did not live to see it, but it is likely to come about in the near future.

An early letter which he wrote me concerning the *Hermetic Society* is extraordinarily interesting and significant. Space does not permit me to quote it in full, but the

following passages are particularly germane to the present article.

Speaking of present-day Theosophical organisations he says :—

H.P.B. indicated that there would be a new Teacher in the latter end of the present century ; and the main thing is to keep a familiarity with her teaching as widely spread as possible until the new Messenger appears. I am convinced that once the Messenger appears all the real Mystics will gather round him, just as an atom of pure crystal flung into a bath where the elements are in solution will start the process of crystallisation.

Of the *Hermetic Society* he says :—

Sometimes it had a large membership and sometimes a small. It waxed and waned and waxed again, and I felt inwardly satisfied that they all more or less passed through a bath of Theosophical ideas. I had no private doctrine, nothing but H.P.B., W.Q.J., the *Bhagavad-Gita*, *Upanishads*, *Patanjali*, and one or two other scriptures. I did my best to keep to the study H.P.B. and W.Q.J. initiated. . . . I could get little or nothing out of Annie Besant and Mrs. K. Tingley. . . . neither seemed to me to have surety and wisdom of deep knowledge. My own writing is trivial, and its only merit is that it was written in a spiritual atmosphere generated by a study of H.P.B. and the sacred books.

It would be a blind soul who could study Æ's writings and call them " trivial." He did not, except in his numerous articles in *The Irish Theosophist*, which ought to be collected in a volume, write of Theosophy under that name, yet he never wrote a line of poetry or of prose that does not breathe the spirit of true Theosophy. His *Candle of Vision*, a work greatly neglected by students to their loss,

deals wholly with the Inner Life. Its great value lies in the fact that it was written by a Theosophist who besides being a natural seer was also a practical observer who subjected his visions to minute analysis, and claimed no sort of infallibility.

Few, if any, among the followers of H.P.B. have made Theosophy a more living power in their lives than Æ did ; nor was there one more charitable to the weaknesses of others. The ideal of a Universal Brotherhood of men was the ruling spirit in his life, and he worked for it in his own way, caring nothing how others worked if they worked wholeheartedly for the same ideal. His attitude was one which makes easy membership in the average Theosophical Society impossible to its possessor ; for societies are apt to make loyalty, to their own private ways and doctrines and leaders, the King of all Virtues, and to regard with tacit, if not outspoken, disapproval those who are loyal only to Truth. Mr. Frank O'Connor, the Irish author who delivered the graveside oration at the funeral of Æ struck a true note when he put the words of the wise old Eastern poet into the mouth of his departed friend :—

He saw the lightning in the East, and longed for the East. Had it been in the West he would have longed for the West. But I seeking only the Lightning and its Glory care nothing for the quarters of the earth.

MAN AND HIS FELLOW ANIMALS

[In the following article **Edmund B. d'Auvergne**, author of *Human Livestock*, which was reviewed in THE ARYAN PATH for April, 1934, rightly blames the church for much of the callousness towards animal suffering, in the West.

The Aphorisms of the Tibetan Karma-pa Sect quote the reply to a disciple who asked his Master why animal suffering had so greatly increased. "Lay not nature under the accusation of this unparalleled injustice. . . . It is the unwelcome advent of the Peling (Christian foreigner), whose three fierce gods refused to provide for the protection of the weak and *little ones* (animals), that is answerable for the ceaseless and heart-rending sufferings of our dumb companions." Hunting and fishing are fashionable amusements to-day, while reeking shambles and vivisection laboratories further challenge our claims to civilization.

As men gradually develop compassion the problem of treatment of animals will solve itself, but meanwhile the poor brutes should be protected. Legislation may help to some extent but of even more lasting effect will be showing the intimate relationship of man with the universe. The ancients taught that every being possesses consciousness. The divinity that comes to full expression in the Perfected Man exists as a potentiality in the lower kingdoms. Every form is an expression of the One Life. The realization of this unity is the self-compelling basis of right action. A sin against one is seen as a sin against all, an act of cruelty injuring not only its victim but all beings, including its perpetrator, who receives besides the direct painful repercussion of his act. Man is higher than an animal because he has self-consciousness and the responsibility that goes with it. *Noblesse oblige*.

Ahimsa (harmlessness) cannot be carried to fantastic extremes—breathing and eating destroy forms of life—but we should destroy no more and no higher forms of life than necessity requires. And we can certainly abstain from cruelty. Man must be "at peace with the beasts of the field," to use Job's phrase, to make possible a general era of fertility and peace. We bid god-speed to every agency that combats cruelty.—EDS.]

Men seldom judge correctly the relative importance of the things passing under their own eyes. We are apt to estimate the effect of the explosion by the noise it makes. But the loud avalanche often does no more than change the face of a cliff, while the river slowly and silently broadening its channel may change the destinies of a nation. The eighteenth century at this distance of time is rightly remembered for the declaration of the rights of man. The nineteenth century,

usually regarded by us who live so close to it, as pre-eminently the age of scientific discovery and of world industrialization, may appear to posterity chiefly remarkable in Europe, at all events, by the assertion of the rights of woman and by the admission of nonhuman animals to a measure of protection by human society.

This year in England we have celebrated, very modestly, the foundation, one hundred years ago, of what is now called the Royal

Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals. That event coincided roughly with the passing of the first British Act of Parliament for the protection of animals—a measure which was all but overwhelmed in the House of Commons by a torrent of ridicule. Preoccupied with projects of electoral reform the vast majority of the public looked on the new law as an idle concession to a trivial sentiment. To-day, in many countries, the parliamentary vote appears an idle privilege hardly worth discussion; whereas, before the nineteenth century was ended, there was scarcely a single country in Europe which had not extended some scanty measure of protection to its brute population. In the year 1894, a clause requiring all animals to be stunned before being slaughtered was deemed worthy of inclusion in the Swiss Federal Constitution. The voice of humanity made itself heard even above the raucous shouting of the party politician—in 1929, there appeared in the manifesto of the Labour Party a promise of wider consideration for the creatures who could never be constituents. The promise, *en passant*, was not kept. A bill to raise England in this respect to the level of Switzerland was defeated in the Commons, largely owing to the exertions of Mr. Macquisten, a Scottish member, and of the Rev. Gordon Lang, a Labour M. P. In Germany, on the contrary, what is called humane slaughter was made com-

pulsory by Adolf Hitler immediately upon his accession to power. Much has been done by the Nazi Government to restrict vivisection and to discourage blood sports. Notwithstanding, the press and public, uninterested in moral issues, are blind to the deep significance of this changing attitude of the law. Few perceive that bird and beast have ceased to be things and that civilization has abrogated the powers conferred on Noah.

Man, it was remarked by a wise friend of the writer, seldom knows what he does or why he does. Whence comes this developing tenderness for creatures, which the Hebrew Bible says are to be for us as the green herb beneath our feet? "Kindness to animals" to-day is vaguely but universally applauded in all but a few Latin countries. Even the Scottish member just mentioned, while opposing an act of elementary humanity towards sheep and cattle, protested amid the laughter of the House that he was fond of animals. The charge of cruelty to a beast is hotly resented by Englishmen of all classes. This kindness is not taught by the old and most authoritative of the Christian churches. Rome positively affirms that the lower animals have no rights, any more than plants and stones and that the man who delights in their torment sins only venially.* In Spain, not many years ago, efforts to train children in habits of kindness to animals were frowned on

* Addis and Arnold, *The Catholic Dictionary*.

by the Cardinal Archbishop of Toledo as savouring of heresy. This doctrine is not likely to be expounded from Roman Catholic pulpits north of the Pyrenees. The scholastics' argument that creatures cannot have rights because they have no duties rings hollow in the ears of civilized man. Morality is not necessarily contractual, nor based on a system of give and take. It is the expression of the divine in man.

This kindness to animals, which our grandfathers approved as an amiable habit to be inculcated in children, is the inevitable extension of that concern for others which is not only the basis of morality but morality itself. For thousands of years, pity was confined to the members of one's own community. The Romans, indifferent to the sufferings of their slaves, held it sweet and glorious to die for the Republic. But there were already thinkers who asked why sympathy should be confined to the citizen. Terence proclaimed the humanity of the slave. In Galilee, Jesus preached the brotherhood of man without distinction of race. Plutarch, going further, condemned the killing of animals for food and blamed the man who would sell when it was no longer useful the horse or ox that had worked for him. The swelling stream of pity was frozen by the narrow religion of the stepfathers of the Christian church. There was no virtue, it was held, in love for one's fellows, still less for the brutes that perished. But beneath the glacier, the stream trickled. The ice has

cracked. Soon it will be universally realized that the only bounds of pity are the bounds of suffering itself. What would be said of the man who declared he was moved only by the suffering of his fellow townsmen?

The practical man scoffs. The pseudo-scientist speaks of the battle for life. Kill or be killed, he maintains, is the law of being. To trust only our eyes, he would seem to be right. But our vision may guide us more surely than our eyesight. This is an age, pre-eminently, of lofty aspiration. We will the good if we cannot achieve it. Already the will to peace among men, to end wars between nations, is a force with which statesmen have to reckon. There was a moment when the abolition of Negro slavery appeared utterly beyond the power of states to compass. Human conscience proved stronger than the fact. Our children may find a path to the goal towards which we can only turn our eyes and hands in longing.

Cold comfort this, perhaps, to those whose hearts are wrung by the agonies of speechless beasts. But we can at least prepare the way. Existence depends on a compromise between the will to live and the will to let others live. I hold it as certain that for vast multitudes in our generation, animal food is a necessity if not for actual existence, at least for the maintenance of many of our finer faculties. The mere taking of life, I do not regard as necessarily evil. Every creature must die, and it is

actually possible to assure the beast we slay for food an easier death than he would meet with at the hands of nature. The first duty of the humanitarian should be to insist on the use of the humane killer in the slaughter houses of all the world, for every kind of beast and bird. This law, at this limited stage of our development, at least we may formulate with precision—kill not without absolute necessity (the relief of the victim's own pain being a necessity) and inflict no pain. Let us flesh eaters bind ourselves by such a bond as Portia forced on Shylock. Let us answer the schoolmen's argument by executing the contracts into which we have implicitly entered with the animals that serve us. Even the learned compilers of *The Catholic Dictionary* should be at pains to deny that if we exhaust the strength of a horse or ox in our service, we owe it some return. Yet the Christian farmer unhesitatingly ships off the horse which may have supported him and his family, to be stabbed to death and cut up for cats' meat at some foreign port. The capitals of Europe are adorned by the monuments of glorious warriors mounted on prancing steeds. It would be instructive to enquire the fate of the

steeds which carried these valiant men to victory...(Here let it be said that a protest against the traffic in worn-out horses has been registered by a class of men not generally suspected of being interested in ethical questions—the English jockeys). The dog and the cat slink starving along the streets of many cities. What protection does the law extend to them? Whose business is this? But if you take an animal from out of its natural environment, surely, Mr. Moralist, you automatically incur responsibility for its subsequent fate? I suggest such a qualification of the ecclesiastical ruling before stated. I propose it as the basis of a world-wide animals' charter.

The beasts of the field rend and tear each other. What shall be done with them? How impose on them the truce of God? Few, very few animals, are cruel for cruelty's sake. Ours it must be to restore order in chaos. The task is a heavy one, the problem to our limited intellects here and there insoluble. Yet such is man's mission and he must go forward with it. Not by the mere pursuit of knowledge nor by the conquest of matter, but by the enforcement of the Peace of Eden will Man attain to the Godhead.

EDMUND B. d'Auvergne

TRUTH AND FREEDOM IN RELIGION

CREEDAL CHRISTIANITY AND THE LIBERAL CHURCHES

[Because the liberal churches are claimed to be free from priestly pretensions and sectarian aims, the Reverend Leslie J. Belton, B. A., M. Sc., Editor of *The Inquirer* and a distinguished Unitarian, claims that they should be exempt from the condemnation of organized religions in our editorial of June, 1935. We are opposed neither to religion itself, which is a way of life based upon inner conviction—essentially a matter for individual practice—nor to organization *per se*, as, for example, for study of the world's great scriptures and for free and fearless search for the truth as to the ultimate essence of things and the laws governing their activities. Religious organization, however, is an anomaly and tends inevitably towards crystallization of concepts and reliance upon priestly authority. The best of religious organizations appeals to the emotions rather than to the mind, judges the man more or less by the churchman and exhibits a fatal tendency to take the part for the whole, to evade for its tenets the tests it applies to other faiths and to shift the emphasis from individual feeling and conduct to ritualistic performances. We believe that the sum of human misery will never be diminished until the day when the better portion of humanity destroys in the name of truth, morality and universal charity, the altars of all its false gods.—Eds.]

THE ARYAN PATH for June contained an editorial entitled "Religions and Religion" in the course of which the question was asked: "Is there a necessity for any organized separate religion to persist as a competitor of other creeds in any part of the globe?" In answer to this question the writer maintained that while "Religion is necessary for the well-being of man" and is "perhaps the most pressing need of our civilization," the existing organized religions have failed to meet this need; "organized religion," he said, "*whatever its name*, narrows the mind, engenders blind belief and fanaticism and divides man from man" (*italics mine*).

The writer of the present article has no wish to champion the cause of sacerdotalism; he shares to the full the conviction that dogmatic

creeds (whatever their justification or significance in the past) are in effect "intellectual extinguishers" which in the interest of Religion, should be cast aside or relegated to an ecclesiastical museum. That the Christian churches, with some exceptions, still regard the creeds of antiquity as repositories of the faith that was "once and for all delivered unto the saints" is sufficient evidence that institutionalized religion has become a drag upon the intellect of man. The fact that the historic creeds (in the Church of England provision is made for their regular public recitation) are still recognised as embodying the essential, unchallengeable doctrines of the Christian faith, and the opposition which any attempt at revision immediately arouses, are signs of the rigid traditionalism and reli-

ance upon external authority which still characterize the churches in spite of a century of critical scholarship and research. Because sacerdotal religion destroys self-reliance and compels submission to an imposed doctrinal "scheme," it strikes at the very roots of personal religion: it exalts an institution over the conscience of man and restricts the exercise of reason within limits prescribed by the doctrines it proposes in all their purity to maintain. Christian sacerdotalism vests with peculiar authority a priestly caste whose succession, it is alleged, can be traced back to the Apostle Peter; and so exhaustive are its presumptive rights that it condemns to outer darkness the unregenerate—all those whose spirit it cannot suborn.

The case against the semi-magical rites and doctrinal infallibilities of sacerdotalism is, for many of us, one with the case against irrationalism and intellectual inebriety in every form. The cause of Religion is best served, we believe, not by those who claim to possess an infallible body of truth (whether they be Catholic Institutionalists or Protestant Fundamentalists) but by those who maintain an attitude of philosophic calm in the midst of the ceaseless agitation of competing sects. For such people Religion is a way of life, an adventure in experience, a pilgrimage; they heed the prophet rather than the priest and they have little interest in proselytism; they believe rather with Thomas à Kempis that "He

to whom the Eternal Word speaketh is set free from many opinions."

Creedal religion is everywhere on trial to-day and the claims of the churches to an exclusive revelation are increasingly assailed, and not by sceptics alone. Among the critics are people who, though they oppose traditional Christianity, would have no hesitation in claiming the Christian name. Some range themselves with the critics because they have their own bread to bake, their own peculiar brand of "revelation" to fling into the market of opinions. But many people (their entire *Weltanschauung*, be it remembered, is indelibly coloured by the Christian dye) are genuinely seeking a purified Christianity, which shall be free alike from creedal fetters and priestly claims. Their call is for an adventurous Christianity that shall exalt the conscience and reason of Man and lay under contribution the best thought of modern seers and of the teachers of every age. Moreover, those to whom this "new," ideal Christianity appeals are making a discovery, and the inspiration of this discovery both strengthens their opposition to traditional Christianity and gathers their loyalty into a new focus. Christians are re-discovering Jesus of Nazareth. That perhaps at first glance may not appear very startling; for even orthodox Christians after the manner of the "heretic" Renan have their pictures of the historic Jesus painted in imaginative colours on the sparse canvas of the historical

records. But what is startling is the way in which even humble members of the churches are coming to realize how great is the gulf separating Jesus of Nazareth from the church he is assumed to have founded.

The Religion of Jesus and the Christianity of the churches are not the same thing; in some respects they are utterly dissimilar and opposed, so opposed that if Jesus were to return to earth he would be denied the right of membership in his own church. That is the discovery which many churchgoers are making to-day. The Christian church—for all its current insistence on what is called the social gospel—has condoned manifest evils in the past (such as slavery); it has persecuted the heretic and stoned the prophet; the church has reared upon the teaching of Jesus a conglomerate mass of material which in the course of time has fused and hardened into systematized Christianity—into the Christianity which in England as late as the year 1934 re-affirmed the Creed of Nicaea (A.D. 325) as the test of Christian fellowship.* This decision was lamented by many individual Christians, even within the Church of England, as a retrograde step, but apologists are ready to defend it. There are able and redoubtable defenders of the Christian Faith for whom Christianity is essentially a syncretistic religion only to be fully understood and appraised in terms

of historical development. For such thinkers the divergence between the Religion of Jesus and traditional Christianity is not a matter of surpassing importance: Christianity, they suggest, is what it has become. (Clearly, much depends upon what is meant by the term "Christianity"; it can be used in such diverse ways.) But enquiring minds are now discovering that this argument from "historical development" can be used for specious ends, that it can be made to accredit any departure of the church, no matter how foreign to the spirit of Jesus whom they profess to follow.

Significant in this connection is a lecture recently delivered and since published, under the title "Christianity as a New Religion," by Dr. Percy Dearmer, Canon of Westminster. "The scientific spirit," says Dr. Dearmer, "has through the long labour of many scholars enabled us to discover the Jesus of history in a way undreamt of a hundred years ago." Dearmer acknowledges the divergence of Paul's theology from the teachings of Jesus, and he notes the harmful results of treating the sacred writings as "oracles dictated by God." He summarizes the Religion of Jesus under four headings: (1) The Kingdom of Heaven; (2) The Fatherhood of God; (3) The Brotherhood of Man; (4) Eternal Life. These, he tells us, represent the sum and substance of the Message of Jesus, and *this* is Chris-

* At the Convocation of York on June 7th, 1934, following the controversy arising out of two invitations to Unitarians to preach, one at a statutory, the other at a non-statutory service in Liverpool Cathedral.

tianity—a new Religion !

How Canon Dearmer reconciles his interpretation of Christianity with his position as a dignitary of the Church of England is a question that lies not within my province to ask. He is not alone among Anglican scholars in seeking to reform the church from within ; some of them, indeed, are pressing, though with scant success, for a revision of the church's creeds. It is worth asking, however, whether the present trend in certain quarters towards an affirmation of the Religion of Jesus in contradistinction to the Christianity of the churches (foreshadowed in the Liberal Christianity of nineteenth century scholars like Harnack and others), with all the difficulties such a *volle face* involves, is likely to lead to any weakening of sacerdotal Christianity or, on the positive side, to a new understanding of non-creedal Religion unhampered by sanctified dogmas and the sacramental system. The signs are not propitious. Though the churches of almost all denominations are being influenced by Modernist reassessments of Christian doctrine ; though within Protestantism only a few numerically negligible groups have failed to come to terms with the theory of organic evolution, about which such vigorous battles of speech and pen were waged fifty years ago ; though the findings of critical scholarship (especially in regard to the textual criticism of the New Testament) are slowly permeating the churches and influencing pulpit utterance,

there exist in my belief no grounds for assuming the near approach of a second Reformation. The leaven is slowly working but institutional Christianity remains firmly entrenched—and this despite the churches' undoubted loss of hold over the masses, evidenced in the decline of attendance at services of public worship. On the other hand, there are signs of a new and encouraging readiness, even within the churches, to treat the non-Christian religions, with more sympathy and justice than was once the case, and the disparaging term "heathen" is rarely on the lips even of missionaries. But along with this gain (due largely to the comparative study of religions initiated in the last century) there goes an implicit assumption that "Revelation" finds its absolute completion in Jesus, the Son of God, and in the church which bears witness on earth to the truth he embodies and reveals. This assumption, it is obvious, gravely hampers the efforts of those who, in England as elsewhere, are now trying to promote interreligious fellowship, for such efforts become of little avail if one religion adopts an attitude of superiority toward all the rest. Christians of the "liberal" school are practically alone, within organized Christianity, in their readiness to meet adherents of other religions on a basis of spiritual equality, and there are exceptions even among them. Thus a few words about Liberal Christianity may conclude this brief conspectus of some of the

major trends in the religious thought of England to-day.

The avowedly "liberal" churches, in virtue of their free (i. e., non-creedal) basis, are in a position to accept without danger of internal dissension the accredited results of modern scholarship and research. These churches are "liberal" in that they express the heterodox and progressive mind of Christianity; they are "free" in that they exact from their members subscription to no formula of faith.

At this point I venture to ask, reverting to the quotation with which this article began, whether, if "Religion illumines the mind, unfolds intuition, and unites man to man" (THE ARYAN PATH, June, 1935), it is true to the facts to say that every organized religion, *whatever its name*, "narrows the mind, engenders blind belief and fanaticism and divides man from man"? The Brahmo Samaj is in its organization diffuse and weak, but the Samaj is not without beneficent influence; and charity bids us assume on good grounds, that, in the spirit of Ram Mohun Roy and Keshub Chunder Sen, its present adherents have sufficient intellectual courage to seek and sift the Truth wherever it is to be found. Likewise in England and America, in scattered religious societies and notably in the Unitarian churches ("liberal" tendencies are likewise evident among Congregationalists and Quakers), there are large-hearted men and women who in fealty to Truth, reject the pretensions of sacer-

dotal Christianity and the doctrinal creeds of the church; men and women to whom fanaticism is anathema, whose sole aim it is to unite mankind on the broad basis of a religion that shall be enlightened and free.

Institutional religion is so often the enemy of Religion—an opiate for the people. So much is readily granted; a molten faith becomes "moulded" according to rigid patterns and the moulds in which it hardens are handed down from generation to generation as a precious heritage, intact and unimpaired. That is the root condemnation of institutional religion. It ignores the hunger of the soul. But if there exist religious societies which still retain, rightly or wrongly, the time-honoured name of *ecclesia*, whose witness and message are fortified—as needs must be in modern life—by some degree of organization; and if, furthermore, these churches are free from priestly pretensions and sectarian aims, surely it is generous and just to allow them a place in the Spiritual Sun. Such churches exist and they are loosely associated in the International Association for Liberal Christianity and Religious Freedom with headquarters at Utrecht, in Holland. Though in comparison with the orthodox churches of Christendom their numbers are few and their organization weak, they are exerting in diverse ways and with varying local emphasis, an influence for truth and freedom in religion of which the world is sadly in need.

LESLIE J. BELTON

RELIGIOUS POLICY IN INDIA

III. SOCIAL REFORM AND LEGISLATION

[This is the last instalment of V. R. Ramachandra Dikshitar's series. Last month he wrote about the influence of indigenous movements on the religious and social life of the people. The work of the constructive social reformer in India has been very difficult and in that connection we draw our readers' attention to a very interesting survey by its Editor in *The Indian Social Reformer* of 7th September last, entitled, "Forty-five Years." He rightly mentions that "the strength of social reform was never that of numbers and material resources. It was the strength of ideas." Great causes have always been moved by ideas.]

It has been urged with increasing vigour that it is the duty of the Indian Government to purge society of its inherent weaknesses and obvious evils. It is contended that social legislation initiated by Government is highly desirable and even necessary. This view, which is generally promoted by Indian social reformers, has raised a storm of protest from the Sanatanist (orthodox) sections of the Hindu community, who have begun to assert themselves and have been gaining rapid strength. Recent trends in Indian politics which are the outcome of impact with Western culture and education have developed a new outlook on our religious and social life; the old citadels of orthodoxy and conservatism are being vigorously attacked. The weakness of this movement is that no alternative scheme of social life has been chalked out. The most thoughtful are not prepared to see India become fully Westernized as the glaring defects of Occidental society are fully visible.

Social reform or social legislation can be used in a restricted as well as broad sense. In its restricted

sense social legislation comprehends the measures intended to subvert such age-long practices and institutions of Indian society as are deemed to be vicious and opposed to national growth. No lover of Hindu culture will accede to such drastic changes as have been put forward by too enthusiastic reformers being brought about by the machinery of legislation. Hasty changes in any ordinary scheme of life are fraught with danger, and they would be worse applied to the realm of socio-religious institutions. We do not stand to gain if we thrust reforms by means of legislative measures on an unwilling people and an equally unwilling Government. Behind a bill there may be many motives. One important section of public opinion asserted that the recent Temple Entry Bill had really a political origin. It may or may not have had. One ought to study the pros and cons of a measure before it is put on the legislative anvil.

There is again the other side of the question, viz., whether a heterogeneous legislature constituted as it is to-day of representatives of

many different religions and creeds is a competent body to legislate measures of a socio-religious character, affecting the personal laws or social usages of another community. Sir P. S. Sivaswami Ayyar, the veteran Liberal leader of South India, who discusses this in his Preface to the Kamala Lectures, holds that if legislation is much in advance of public opinion, it is bound to fail.

We shall examine in the light of these observations one or two social institutions which are often the targets of promoters of social freedom. Well-meaning social reformers want to abolish entirely the structure of caste. If we carefully analyse the history and services of this institution of religious and social life we can better discern its value. The Government of India under the Crown has not interfered with caste or religion but at the same time does not recognise caste in secular affairs. For administration of law and justice, for admission into educational institutions and for employment in public service the Government of India observes no distinction of caste or creed. Again, no distinction is noted in transport service such as buses or railways. The healthy aspect of this nonrecognition of caste in secular affairs has greatly contributed toward breaking its rigidity and promoting social integration of different communities.

It is a mere notion that abolition of caste, the warp and woof of Hindu society, would lead to a permanent and broad-based national

unity. Unity does not mean uniformity but the harmonious interdependence of different classes and sections of society. In the words of Auguste Comte, the great French Positivist, the spirit of caste is a mere extension of the family spirit. It is true that we must aim at progress in all directions, but, as Sir Henry Cotton remarked, it is rash to sacrifice an admirable and valuable institution for any "Moloch of progress."

That caste is not incompatible with democracy has been proven by the research of scholars who show that popular assemblies representative of different sections of the people flourished for centuries in ancient India. Prof. Rhys Davids in his *Buddhist India* pointed to the existence of a republican form of government in the epoch of the Buddha. No one can deny that the social fabric of the Buddha's country consisted of castes and asramas. On the evidence of Panini and Katyayana, K. P. Jayaswal, the eminent lawyer and historian of Patna, shows that "a Hindu republic had Brahman members, Kshatriya members and other castes, i.e., the personnel of the Sanghas was not composed of one caste or tribe." (*Hindu Polity*, pp. 34-35.)

In my *Hindu Administrative Institutions* (Madras University, 1929) I have shown that there were representative institutions known by the names of Paura and Jana-pada (Nagara and Nadu in Tamil literature and inscriptions). It is said in the *Mahabharata* that an assembly consisting of thirty-nine

members represented the interests of various castes in the country. There were four Brahmans, eight Kshatriyas, twenty-one Vaisyas, three Sudras and one Suta. (Santi Parva, Ch. 85, 7-11) The wealthy community of the Vaisyas who naturally contributed a substantial revenue to the State had a larger representation in the assembly. Even in the cabinet, which consisted of only seven or eight, the law-giver Manu fixes four Brahmans, three Sudras and one Suta. (See the Commentary on VII. 54) Thus we cannot fail to notice the democratic character of ancient Hindu political institutions.

Students of the Chola history will recall similar popular assemblies during the medieval period of South Indian history. It is not surprising, therefore, that British statesmanship has not interfered with the institutions of caste. It is highly commendable that when such a bill is introduced by a member of the Legislature, Government circulates it broadcast and elicits public opinion, before acting on it. Sometimes the Government warns the member to think twice before seeking to wipe out in a day a custom of centuries. When a measure of socio-religious nature comes up, the Government usually remains neutral, in some cases opposes it as having no basis in moral conviction and rarely, if ever, votes for it at all. It may be that social reconstruction is necessary. But there remains the plain duty of Government to handle the situation delicately. It is a serious work and we should not be carried

away with momentary enthusiasm. It must be realised that Indian national unity, if it is to be successful, must be achieved through group unity. Herein alone lies the genius of India.

Social legislation is a broad term and comprehends factory legislation, abolition of slave traffic, and other humanitarian measures rooted in ethical fundamentals. Some of these measures were put in force during the last days of the Company's Government, and were acquiesced in by the intelligent section of the population who were keenly alive to the necessity of removing gross and inhuman customs and practices. One such measure was the abolition of Suttee. Bentinck, who made this practice illegal, was strongly supported by the Indian intelligentsia of Calcutta. But it did not become universally illegal until 1857. It was given to Wellesley to treat as a penal offence the dedication of children to the sacred waters of Sanjor Point and the exposure of the old and infirm on the banks of the Ganges. Another practice that was not directly connected with any form of religion but still passed under its cover was that of Thuggee; this was a form of highway robbery in the name of Kali. These disturbers of peace were curbed largely through the vigilant efforts of men like Sir William Sleeman. It was Dalhousie who fought courageously the evil of infanticide by designating it murder. Another humanitarian measure of Dalhousie's was the legalisation of remarriage of

widows by an Act of 1856, though this has remained very much a dead letter even to the present day.

From 1858 down to now the harmonious co-operation of the three great world religions, Hinduism, Islam and Christianity has led the educated Hindu to test every religious usage in the light of reason and humanity. Thus viewed, infant marriage and untouchability are looked upon as outrages and an increasingly strong and enlightened public opinion is brought to bear on these problems. Even the orthodox feel the paralysing effect of premature maternity of girl wives. In 1891 the Government enacted the Age of Consent Bill making consummation of marriage for a girl before the age of twelve a criminal offence. In 1925 a statute was passed declaring the age of consent for married and unmarried girls as thirteen and fourteen respectively. This minimised to some extent the evils attached to the Devadasi institution and now the Sarda Act has penalised all marriage of girls under fourteen. In 1923 the extension of civil marriage without loss of rights to the Hindu, Sikh, Jain and Buddhist was recognised by the Special Marriage (Amendment) Act. The right of adoption was however not allowed in these cases.

Similarly the question of the untouchables has been engaging the best minds of India and in the

cause of their moral and material elevation, all castes and communities are alike interested. Their economic status and low standard of life have evoked fellow feeling from other religionists. There is no lack of sympathy on the part of Government, which ameliorates their condition by admitting them to State-aided and managed schools and by throwing open to them all public roads, wells, and rest houses. Much more still remains to be done and it is hoped that the factor of time will work toward the destined goal.

To recapitulate: we can see the persistent continuity of the Government's endeavour to eradicate gross social abuses with courage and resolution. But where Government feels that a certain institution or usage is of an intensely religious character and cherished by the people, and that any interference with it would retard rather than aid the progressive welfare of the community at large, it guarantees its protection from any undue violation. The upholding of social obligations by the Government of India from its early days demonstrates beyond doubt its anxiety to maintain peace and order, and that it shares the majority view that religious and social reform, in order to be effective, must come from within as a spontaneous and natural growth, and not be forced from without.

V. R. R. DIKSHITAR

A WESTERN FALLACY CONCERNING PEACE

[Merton S. Yewdale traces the root of war to human lust and hatred. He argues that war is absence of Spirit and can only be abolished when men labour for the expression of the Presence of Spirit.—Eds.]

The great Powers of the West are again preparing for armed conflict; and it is all too clear that the next major war will be not only more devastating than the last, but more merciless and more inhuman. It is as though there never had been a World War, as though the League of Nations and the World Court did not exist. Only the Peace organizations continue to have faith in the League and the Court as instruments to preserve peace.

When the League of Nations and the World Court were formed, the modern world was led to believe that they were new devices to prevent war. In reality, the idea behind them is nearly five hundred years old. In 1462, the King of Bohemia planned a federation of Christian nations, together with an international parliament to discuss matters of common interest, and a tribunal, supported by an international military force, to hear and settle disputes between the various nations. Yet there were only twenty-five years of the sixteenth century, and but twenty years of the seventeenth century, during which there were no major military operations; and since that time warfare has been almost constant in the Western world.

Such distinguished men as Henry IV of France, William Penn, Leibnitz, Turgot, Bentham, Kant,

Victor Hugo, Cobden, Garibaldi and the late Czar Nicholas variously devised peace plans, which included international congresses, armed tribunals, international trade agreements, reduction of military and naval armaments, laws and usages of war on land and sea, and extension of the scope of international law. They all failed to bring lasting peace. The two Hague Tribunals failed. The Briand-Kellogg Peace Pacts have also failed. The only new feature in the modern peace movement is the greatly increasing numbers of men who declare that they will not go to war, even in defence of their own country.

There is hope in this widespread proclamation, because it is a courageous affirmation of peace, and not merely a weak rejection of war. But there is not much hope from such things as investigation into the causes of war, ratio of armaments, and taking the profits out of war; for these are negative and presuppose the inevitability of war. All the academic study of the causes of war must lead to but one conclusion: that the fundamental cause of war is covetousness—a spiritual disease that infects a single man in a nation or a group of men, who in turn communicate it to the entire people by means of propaganda. That a spiritual disease can be cured by man-

made remedies, and that war resulting from that disease can be averted by man-made organizations, such as Leagues of Nations and World Courts, is the great fallacy of the Western world.

If we examine the inner structure and inner working of man, we shall see not only how covetousness begins, but why it is the real root of war. Man, in living true to his spiritual destiny between heaven and earth, is not a piece of pottery into which the rich forces of Life enter, to be kept there and sealed up forever as personal possessions. On the contrary, man is a cosmic medium, who receives those riches and gives them back to Life purified and moulded to earthly form, by the Universal Spirit which runs through him. Flowing through his heart, it enriches his life emotionally, which he in turn pours out upon his fellow men in generosity, compassion, and deeds of goodness. Flowing through his mind, it illuminates his life spiritually, which he devotes to his fellow beings to obtain justice for them and to enable them to have a fuller understanding of their relation to themselves and to the Universal Spirit.

Thus when man is filled with the Universal Spirit, which runs through him like a stream of pure water, his heart and mind are kept clear and healthy, and the expression of his life is in accord with heaven: he desires that every man shall have a share of earth and the necessary things of life; and he asks that every man shall

have full freedom of thought and belief. Such is the Way of Heaven, and of peace.

But man is not always satisfied with the Way of Heaven; and in his conceit he thinks he can dispense with heaven and proceed by his own power. Accordingly, he begins to assert himself—to infuse his will into his own heart and mind, thus at first retarding and finally completely preventing the flow of the Universal Spirit into him. No longer is he compassionate and just, but avaricious and autocratic. For when a man's heart is filled with himself, his desire is to acquire the material possessions of other men. When a man's mind is filled with himself, his desire is to impose his ideas and beliefs on other men. To desire to take the possessions of others and to dominate and command their minds, is covetousness. In the personal life of man, it is egotism; in national life, it is despotism; in international life, it is imperialism. Covetousness is the Way of Man—and of war.

Piling up riches is the result of covetousness, in which there is no lasting satisfaction—only an increase of the covetous desire. Said the Psalmist: "He heapeth up riches, and cannot tell who shall gather them." When a man has something of worldly value, he gets no spiritual joy of it until he has given some of it away. The covetous man or nation gives nothing away—only takes. When the stronger takes from the weaker, there can be but one ending—war. Likewise, when the stronger im-

poses its will upon the weaker, there is also war.

The history of the Western world is a record of groups of peoples, nervous, restless, aggressive; ever plundering and proselytising each other; ever seeking by war to establish a unanimity of ideas, beliefs, doctrines, and customs—fatuously believing that unanimity by autocracy brings peace, and never learning that Heavenly, not earthly, unanimity is the basis of peace. For it is through the Universal Spirit that man gains inner peace; and when all men are at peace within themselves, they are also at peace among themselves.

From the time of the Christian era, the Western nations have been almost continually embroiled in war, with the result that they have come to regard war as positive and peace as negative; war as the work of strong, courageous men, and peace as the work of weak, timid men; war as the regular thing in life and peace as merely the interval during which nations recover from the previous war and prepare for the next. For the chief aim of the people who came West was to gain homes for themselves by driving out those who stood in their way. When finally they all had settled homes and had built up their commercial organizations, they then began to fight for each other's markets; and so they have continued to this day.

The Western nations were cradled by war, they lived by war, and the peoples of to-day have inherit-

ed the war spirit of nineteen centuries. It matters not that Ancient Egypt, Babylonia, Assyria, Chaldea, Persia, Macedonia, Greece and Rome, lived and died by war; the Western nations still continue to war against each other, and with ever-increasing ferocity.

For the first fourteen hundred years and more of the Christian era, practically no effort was made to halt war. In the last five hundred years, many efforts have been made—and they have all come to nothing. The significant fact is, that they have all been man-made; that is, men, by means of human reason, have tried to devise a plan of human relations that would banish war—an earthly thing, and automatically bring about lasting peace—a heavenly thing.

So far it has been ineffectual, and it always will be, because the progression is in the wrong direction. You cannot make earthly plans to gain spiritual things. On the contrary, you must first receive the spiritual things, and then the things of earth will right themselves. Unspiritual men can make war by themselves, because war is the absence of spirit. But they cannot make peace by themselves, because peace is the presence of spirit. Nothing is clearer than that no purely human arrangements will ever prevent war, and that there never will be a permanent peace until every man gains more knowledge, not of the earthly relations of men, but of his own relation to the world of spirit—the Universal Spirit. Peace

begins with man's relation to the Universal Spirit; not with his relation to his fellow men. For as soon as man is in harmony with the Universal Spirit, he will thereby be in harmony with every other man; and as the Universal Spirit is peace, so will man be at peace with his fellows.

The way to the Universal Spirit is open to every person. Yet the Universal Spirit, with its great rewards, is not to be gained by going out after it. Man goes out towards the earth; but he must wait for the Universal Spirit to come to him—and he must be worthy of it. Therein lies man's relationship to the Universal Spirit and to earth. Man, as the medium standing between Heaven and earth, receives the illumination from the Universal Spirit, which guides him in his life among his fellow men and among the things of Nature. When man has attained this, he has achieved a spiritual equilibrium, which not only brings him into the right relationship with heaven and earth, but gives him a pure spirituality that raises him above race, color, religious, philosophic and political doctrine, caste, or any other human distinction or limitation.

It enables him to live at peace among all kinds and conditions of people, without feeling that he must try to convert them to his individual way of life; for the higher spiritual harmony dissolves all earthly differences. It causes him to look upon earth, with its

material resources, as something to be developed for the sustenance and delight of man, and not something to be plundered for selfish aims—personal power and profit. It permits him to understand that earth is something entrusted to him of which he is a custodian, and that his stewardship is to be judged by the helpful and unselfish use he has made of earth's riches.

When men stand in this right relationship to Heaven and to earth, they have attained ease—and ease is peace. When this relationship is upset by men becoming detached from the Universal Spirit and selfishly drawn towards earth to exploit it for personal advantage, then there is no longer ease, but dis-ease—and dis-ease is war. The dislocation of the spiritual equilibrium is the cause of war—and war is therefore a spiritual disease.

It is by contemplation and meditation upon the Universal Spirit that man prepares himself to receive its light. It is not an aggressive, forward movement toward the Universal Spirit, dictated by human reason, but a spiritual patience in which man waits in quiet confidence for illumination and guidance which will surely come. This patience is faith dynamic. When men have surrendered and opened themselves to the incoming of the Universal Spirit, not only there will be perpetual peace on earth, but even the idea of war will be forever banished from the minds of men.

MERTON S. YEWDALE

ANTIQUITY OF THE HINDU ZODIAC

[S. V. Viswanatha, M. A., here makes a valuable contribution to the study of the Hindu Zodiac.—EDS.]

Astronomy is the oldest of sciences. The celestial orbs could not escape notice and were objects of observation from time immemorial. It is impossible to adduce wholly adequate historical proof of the relative antiquity of the system as observed and utilized by the various prehistoric nations, though it seems clear that the science could not have originated with the Greeks, as generally supposed, but must date from several millennia before them.

I

Volney proved in his *Ruins of Empire* (1790, p. 360) that as Aries was in its fifteenth degree in 1447 B. C., the first degree of Libra could not have coincided with the vernal equinox later than 15,194 years, B.C., so the Greek Zodiac cannot be older to-day than 17,129 years. Dr. Schlegel in his *Uranographie Chinoise* assigned to the Chinese astronomical sphere an antiquity of 18,000 years.

The historian of astronomy finds references to the Zodiac in the Book of Job, which speaks of the making of Arcturus, Orion and the Pleiades (*Ash, Kesil* and *Cimah*) and the chambers of the South (IX. 9), and of Mazzaroth—the (*Twelve Signs XXXVIII 32*). As the *Book of Job* is claimed to have preceded Homer and Hesiod by at least a thousand years, this Arabian authority should silence

the claim that the Zodiac was borrowed by the Arabs from Greece. And if the Zodiac was known in the days of Job, how could the civilized and philosophical Hindus have been ignorant of it?

After an elaborate examination of the materials available, the famous French astronomer, Bailly, declared that the Hindu astronomical systems are by far the oldest and that from them the Egyptians, Greeks, Romans and even the Jews derived their knowledge. Bailly proved that the Hindu tradition of the conjunction of the planets at the beginning of Kali Yuga in February, 3102 B. C., was based on actual observation, as it coincides with the evidence of modern astronomical tables.

Another famous French *savant*, Erard-Mollien, arrived at the conclusion that everything proves that these Zodiacal figures have been transmitted to the Greeks by the Chaldees, who got them from the Brahmans. (*Recueil de l'Académie des Inscriptions*, 1853).

The above represents part of the evidence assembled by Madame H. P. Blavatsky in her *Secret Doctrine* against the alleged priority of the Greek Zodiac.

II

A westward movement of Indian culture is getting to be fairly recognized. To mention a few of

the many pieces of evidence in support of this* :—

The westerly migration of Vedic religion and mythology is indicated in a few passages of the *Rig-Veda* which refer to Indra and Nasatya having fled to far-off lands (VI. 41. 1; VIII. 4. 2; VII. 20. 22), and corroborated by the names of Hindu deities met with, for example, in the Boghaz Keui inscription—Indra, Varuna, Mitra and Nāsatya. The Akkadian prayers to the Sun and Fire appear to be exact reproductions of Vedic passages (*Rig-Veda*, II. 6; III. 59. 19).

O Sun, thou hast stepped forth from the background of heaven, thou hast pushed back the bolt of the brilliant sky; above the land thou hast raised thy head. O Sun, thou hast covered the immeasurable space of heaven and countries.

Thou who drivest away the evil Markim (cf. Vedic *Marka*), who furthest the well-being of life, who strikest the breast of the Wicked with terror, Fire, the destroyer of foes, dread weapon, that drivest away pestilence.

That the Akkads, who were far earlier than the Chaldeans, derived some of their ideas from the Vedic Aryans appears beyond doubt. And *The Secret Doctrine* points out that the names of the Akkadian months were derived from the names of the signs of the Zodiac. (I. 649) Is it unreasonable to suppose that in this Akkadian borrowing the astronomical ideas of the Hindus should have been included?

The *Encyclopædia Britannica* (Vol. II, s. v. "Astronomy") has this :—

The theory of the ecliptic does not appear to have been perfected until after 539 B.C. . . . The researches of Bouche, Leclercq, Cumont and Boll have enabled us to fix with a considerable degree of definiteness the middle of the fourth century B. C. as the period when Babylonian astrology began *its triumphal march to the west* (Italics mine), invading the domain of Greek and Roman culture, [though] in the hands of the Greeks and of the later Egyptians astrology and astronomy were carried far beyond the limits attained by the Babylonians.

The following extract from *Isis Unveiled* (I. 576) appears to be of interest in this context :—

It is strongly contested that the Akkad tribes of Chaldea, Babylonia, and Assyria were in any way cognate with the Brahmans, of Hindustan; . . . They were simply emigrants on their way to Asia Minor from India, the cradle of humanity [and] a tribe of the earliest Hindus.

Even Max Müller was constrained to say (*India—What Can It Teach Us?* p. 130) In regard to Vedic astronomy :—

We may sum up without fear of serious contradiction that no case has been made out in favour of the foreign origin of the elementary astronomical notions of the Hindus as found or pre-supposed in the Vedic hymns.

III

A distinction is generally made, though it does not appear well-founded, between the lunar and solar Zodiacs, the former based on the *nakshatras* in the path of the Moon and the latter on an artificial division of the ecliptic into twelve parts, based on equinoxes, solstices and precession. It is also held that the early Hindu astronomers were acquainted only with the asteris-

* Vide my *Racial Synthesis in Hindu Culture*—Introduction.

mal Zodiac, while the Babylonian Zodiac was solar.

In the *Taittiriya Brāhmana* (I. 5. 2) it is stated that the *Krittikas* (Pleiades) were the first of the *Deva-nakshatras*, that is, those situated in the northern portion of the heavens with reference to the ecliptic, as against the *Yama-nakshatras* which were assigned to the southern half. Why were the *Krittikas* given the first place in the age of the Brāhmanas? It may be, this constellation should have been observed to mark the vernal equinox, on the analogy of the *Āsvinyādi* reckoning which came to be recognized later. A passage of the *Kauṣītaki Brāhmana* (XIX. 3) speaks of the winter solstice coinciding with *Magha Amāvāsyā*. The *Maitrāyaṇī Upanishad* (VI. 14) states distinctly enough: "The sun turns south from the Maghās." In the *Satapatha Brāhmana* (II. 1. 3) we have the fact noted that *vasanta*, *grishma* and *varshā* are the three seasons of *Uttara-ayana* and *śarad*, *hemanta*, *śiśir* of the *Dakshina-ayana*. The (*Taittiriya Brāhmana* (III. 10. 4) also mentions the characteristic feature of the two *ayanas* as lengthening of the night in the one (*Dakshina*) and that of day in the other (*Uttara*). Though this may not accord with the course of the seasons as understood generally, there is clear indication that the Brāhmanas knew of the equinoxes and solstices.

The solar year of 360 days, called "the twelve-spoked" was well known in the periods of the *Rig Veda* (I. 164. 11) and the *Atharva Veda* (IV. 35. 4). The *samvatsara*

satra, perhaps the oldest known form of "sacrifice," lasted for a year of 360 days. In the *Śatapatha Brāhmana* (XI. 6. 3. 8) we read: "There are twelve suns, for there are twelve months," each month representing the Sun in one of his twelve aspects and all with different names symbolical of the twelve signs of the Zodiac.

The planets played a prominent part in Indian literature and popular belief at least from the time of the *Taittiriya Aranyaka*, which contains the *Nava-graha-mantra* used in the worship of the Sun, *Sūrya-namaskāra*.

Next, to mention one or two of the important references to the solar Zodiac in the *Ramayana* and the *Mahābhārata*, Śrī Rāma was born on the ninth day (*navami*) of *Chaitra* (lunar month) when five (planets) were in exaltation (*uchcha*) in the house of Cancer (*Karkata lagna*). Bharata was born in the asterism *Pushya* in Pisces (*Mina-lagna*) and Lakshmana in *Āślesha* when the Sun had arisen in the Crab (Cancer *Kulira*). (*Bala Kanda*, 19) In the *Vana Parva* of the *Mahābhārata* we read: "The *Kṛta Yuga* began when the Sun, Moon, Jupiter and *Tishya* (*Pushya*) were in one and the same house of the Zodiac (*rāśi*)." Unless these and similar passages are interpolations, as some have claimed, they establish that the Hindus, at least from the age of the Brāhmanas, were aware of the signs and phenomena of the solar Zodiac. Such references were not more numerous because the *Nakshatra* Zodiac was more important on

ritualistic considerations; Vedic sacrifices depended on the course of the Moon rather than of the Sun; and the Brāhmanas were concerned more with these than with "judicial astrology" which is decidedly of a later growth and "represents the most significant contribution of the Greeks to astrology." (*Encyclopædia Britannica*, *op. cit.*)

IV.

The animals symbolising the signs of the Zodiac were Indian or Egyptian and not Greek. Sheep (Mesha) are referred to in the earliest Vedic texts. "They were verily produced from Agni." (*Atharva Veda*, IV. 14. 1) Indra himself is frequently called the "Ram" in the *Rig Veda*. He is *Mesha-vrshana*, as Agni is *Mesha-vāhana*. *Vrshabha*, the humped bull of India (*Nandi*—the temple bull) is peculiarly Indian, the *kakut* (hump) being referred to in the texts. Agni is described in one passage as a "bellowing bull" (*vrshabho roraviti*). The humped bull is met with on seals discovered from the site of prehistoric Harappa in the Indus Valley. The lion (*Sinha*) is a wild animal of the tropics. The lion and its roar are referred to in *Atharva Veda* (V 21.1 ff.; VIII. 7.15 and IV. 36.6). Elsewhere we have: "A tiger verily is he; he is a lion and a bull." (VIII. 5.12) As regards the amphibious creature *Makara*, wrongly translated "Crocodile," I would

invite attention to the significance of the term, widely in use in India, as pointed out in my article in *THE ARYAN PATH* for December, 1934. It figures also in Egyptian mythology. "The land of the Aryas" is defined as "the tract where the black antelope roams about freely." The scorpion figures in Hindu and Egyptian symbolism and rituals. Its venom is referred to in *Atharva Veda* (VII. 56. 5). A passage of the *Rig Veda* states: "The scorpion's venom hath no strength. Scorpion, thy venom is but weak." (I.191.16)

Dr. Beer asserts that "Greek communication is obvious" in the "Two Faces," Gemini, and the "Lion's Tail," Leo. But the concept of *Mithuna* is as old as Indian cosmogony and Leo or the Lion is as old as the Island of Ceylon.

This article barely touches the fringe of a vast subject. We shall close it with a pregnant observation from *The Secret Doctrine* (I. 667-8) :—

"From John Bentley down to Burgess' "Surya-Siddhanta," not one astronomer has been fair enough to the most learned people of Antiquity. However distorted and misunderstood the Hindu Symbology, no Occultist can fail to do it justice once that he knows something of the Secret Sciences; nor will he turn away from their metaphysical and mystical interpretation of the Zodiac, even though the whole Pleiades of Royal Astronomical Societies rise in arms against their mathematical rendering of it. The descent and re-ascent of the Monad or Soul cannot be disconnected from the Zodiacal signs.

S. V. VISWANATHA

THE SONG OF THE HIGHER LIFE

IV. THE SECRET OF ACTION AND THE CONQUEST OF DESIRE

[Below we publish the fourth of a series of essays founded on the great text-book of Practical Occultism, the *Bhagavad-Gita*. Each of these will discuss a title of one of the eighteen chapters of the Song Celestial. The writer calls them "Notes on the Chapter Titles of the Gita"—but they are more than notes. They bring a practical message born of study and experience. This particular study is on the third chapter entitled, Karma-yoga.

Sri Krishna Prem is the name taken in the old traditional manner prevailing in India by a young English gentleman when he resolved to enter the Path of Vairagya, renouncing his all, including the name given to him at birth. He took his tripos at Cambridge in Mental and Moral Sciences and is a deep student of Indian philosophy. Away from the world but serving it with faith he lives in the Himālayas, and is esteemed highly for his sincerity, earnestness and devotion.—EDS.]

The third chapter commences with the disciple in doubt. "If it be thought by Thee that knowledge is superior to action why dost Thou, O Krishna, urge me to this terrible deed?" The Teacher has praised the wisdom of the *Sāṅkhya*s but has then urged the necessity of action, the thing which, above all, was shunned by the followers of the *Sāṅkhya*. Lastly, He brought the discourse round once more to the praise of knowledge and described a state in which action would, at best, appear an irrelevance. Small wonder that the disciple is confused and begs to be taught clearly the one way to the Goal.

Nevertheless, the teaching is not confused; it is only that the disciple, in demanding a clear-cut intellectual presentation which shall be decisive and final, is looking for something which cannot be given. The method of a true Teacher is

not to overwhelm the mind by demanding assent to an intellectual scheme clearly formulated once and for all. Such an assent, even if given, is entirely useless as it does not lift the disciple above the level of the manas, the thinking mind. He aims, rather, by setting forth apparently conflicting but actually complementary aspects of Truth, at forcing the disciple to transcend the ordinary levels of thinking by having recourse to the higher intuitive knowledge of the *buddhi* and thus bringing to birth in his soul a new and synthetic knowledge which shall be built into his very being.

If this is not sufficiently realised the reader is apt to make the mistake of thinking that the thought of the *Gita* is actually confused or of picking out that aspect that most appeals to him and ignoring the rest. But the *Gita* is neither a confused eclecticism nor a one-

sided sectarianism. It aims at setting forth the Yoga or Path to the Goal as a coherent whole but, in so doing, it is inevitable that the mind, which loves to pursue one train of thought to its logical conclusion regardless of others, should be brought up sharply from time to time and made to grasp the other sides as well.

In answer to the disciple's query the Teacher states that since the beginning of time there have been two main types of aspirants corresponding to the duality that pervades the manifested world. Modern psychology speaks of introverts, or those whose natural tendency is to occupy themselves with the subjective, and extraverts, or those whose natural flow of energy is directed towards the outer world. Corresponding to these we have the yoga of knowledge practised by the *Sāṅkhyas* and the yoga of action of the *karmayogis*. Urged on by the lack of balance in their own natures, one-sided exponents always attempt to show that one of these is the chief teaching and the other only subsidiary. But the duality in the universe is not ultimate. In the end all is resolved into the unitary *Atman* and therefore no one-sided view can be the whole truth,

The doctrine of the *karma yogis* starts from the plain fact that a cessation from all action is simply impossible. Even a forcible abstention from the more obvious outer actions will leave the mental actions quite unchecked and, in fact, more riotous because of the enforced outer inactivity. Psy-

chologically it is certain that excessive and long continued introversion will have disastrous results upon the psychic health and as Jung, I think, puts it, the attempt to escape from all entangling outer relationships will result in an eventual domination of the ego by relationships of a neurotic and inferior type. "Not by mere cessation of activity shall the Soul rise to the state of actionlessness" and therefore, since action is a necessity, we must make an effort to come to grips with it and prevent it from exerting its fatal binding power on us.

For the great objection to action as ordinarily performed lies in its connection with results. We are bound by the results of our actions and must experience the consequences whether pleasant or painful. This so-called law of *karma* is apt to strike the Western mind as mere unverified dogma or, at best, as a philosophical speculation. In fact, however, it is nothing of the kind but a fact of nature which may be experienced by any one for himself. Even on the ordinary levels of experience it is obvious that our destinies are largely shaped by our characters and they, in turn, by the sum total of our past thoughts and particularly those which have crystallised in action. The man who thinks cruel thoughts usually proceeds to cruel deeds and thus, becoming an object of fear and hatred to others, is at least extremely liable to meet with cruelty in his turn. Ordinary everyday experience can perhaps not take us

much farther than this probability but ordinary experience is not the final arbiter in these matters and he who advances on the inner path, the Path of Knowledge, becomes immediately aware that it is no mere probability with which we are concerned but a perfect and unerring law,

By which the slayer's knife did stab himself ;
The unjust judge hath lost his own defender.

In the world of mechanics it finds expression in Newton's famous law that action and reaction are equal and opposite. The world of life is no less a unity than the world of matter, all lives being interlocked in one vast whole. It follows that any act, nay, any thought, sets up a tension in the whole which, however delayed may be the response, with utter inevitability brings about an "equal and opposite" reaction. I repeat that this is no mere intellectual speculation fitting only into the structure of some Oriental philosophy but is a profound truth of experience which may, like other natural laws, be disregarded only at one's peril. The same perception, quite divorced from "Hindu Philosophy" found expression in Christ's flashing words: "They that take the sword shall perish by the sword."

Thus, if action is inevitable, it is none the less a source of bondage and, by tying the soul to its own position, whether good or bad, in the scheme of things, prevents that self-transcendence in union with the All that constitutes the Goal.

The method proposed by the *karma yogis* was that of scrupulous

performance of the prescribed code of ritual actions which, according to Hindu custom, filled a Brahman's life and regulated his conduct down to the minutest detail. At the same time the *yogi* was to perform these actions without any desire for the fruit in the shape of worldly prosperity and heavenly bliss that the scriptures promised as the result of such actions. In this way they hoped to avoid the *impasse* created by the inevitability of action and its no less certain binding power. They rightly perceived that the binding power came not from the action itself but from the desire with which it was performed and therefore taught that if the latter could be eliminated the poison fangs of the acts would then be removed.

The righteous who eat the remains of the sacrificial offerings are freed from all sin but those who merely prepare food for their own sakes verily eat sin.

This doctrine literally understood, like the detachment of the *Sankhyas*, is not enough in itself. Taken literally and by itself, it fails because it reduces the vigorous creative life of action to a dead round of sterile ceremonies and smothers the spirit under a tedious formalism quite inapplicable to the ordinary actions of life. For them, action was but a necessary evil, inescapable while embodied, and they achieved peace only by making a desert, escaping desire by stifling it under tedium. To them, as to the typical follower of the pure *Sankhya*, this rich and wondrous life must have been no better than a ghastly mistake which would better

never have occurred.

This mean and ignoble view of action is by no means that of Sri Krishna. In a few rapid words He sketches the *yajña chakra*, the great Cycle of Sacrifice that forms the manifested Cosmos, and shows how action is rooted in the Imperishable. Forth into all quarters of space streams in sacrifice the life-blood of the Supreme *Purusha*. But for that sustaining life the worlds would "fall into ruin" and ceaselessly does the Supreme pour Itself forth in action for the welfare of all. Round and round circles this One Life through all beings in the worlds as It weaves unweariedly the pattern of the universe and none can claim a proud independence of his brothers. The knowledge of the world that comes to us so easily to-day we owe to countless thinkers and discoverers of the past and we cannot walk down the street of a town without treading on the bowed backs of the nameless toilers of dim bygone ages. Our intellects owe their every possibility of thought to those who strove to grasp new conceptions long ago and even our eyes are what they are only as a result of long and painful struggles of which no record now remains. No record, that is, but the *debt* inscribed in the imperishable characters of the book of *Karma*, a debt that claims our actions in return and from which not the proudest *yogi* in a Himalayan cave is free, though he may choose to ignore it. "He who on earth doth not follow the Wheel thus revolving, sinful of life and rejoicing in the sense, he,

O Arjuna, liveth in vain."

Thus action is seen to be not only a mere physical necessity of those who are embodied. It is also a moral necessity, since out of sacrificial action spring the worlds and by sacrifice are they maintained in their ceaseless whirling around and in the Central Sun.

It is important to realise, however, and that is why the instruction in the *Sinkhyā* wisdom preceded the teaching about action, that without knowledge of the *Ātman* the sacrificial action is not possible in the true sense. Until the One Self, or at least Its forthshining Light is known, the abandonment of all desire for the fruits of action is in no way really feasible and remains but a matter of grand words. The Light of the *Ātman* must be known to some extent at least and, just in proportion as It is known, not as a matter of theoretic philosophy but as a vivid reality present in every moment of experience, will the disciple be able to discard any wish for the fruits of his actions. Rather will it be seen that the desire for fruits is an utter irrelevance which will fall away of itself though *only for as long as the disciple is thus centred in the Light*.

When at last, after long and persistent struggles, this centring of life in the *Ātman* is permanently established, when the disciple rejoices in the *Ātman* and is content with the *Ātman*, there will remain nothing further to be accomplished for himself and "no object of his will depend on any being."

Nevertheless, in thus escaping from "private" action, he has but united himself with the Divine and Cosmic Action and of him it will be said, as of Krishna Himself, that, though there is nothing in the three worlds that is unattained by him, yet he mingles in action unweariedly for the sake of the welfare of all. Note the word "unwearied." The Sacrificial Action in a union to which the disciple aspires, is no tiresome carrying out of dull and spiritless acts such as are too often called up in our minds by the words sacrifice and duty. We saw how at the beginning of the Path, the disciple was filled with despair at the thought of the joyless life which awaited him when all the desires which made life seem worth living should be slain. But this is an illusion which has to be dispelled. "As the ignorant act out of attachment to action, so should the wise act without attachment desiring the welfare of the world." The glow which accompanies the desire-prompted actions of the worldly, the enthusiasm and zest of youth and the tireless energy of the ambitious must all be preserved and transmuted into something higher and not allowed to drain away into desert sands. The true *vairāgi* is not a dull, dried up, "holy" person of the type that has made the very name of religion a thing of nausea to so many of us, but a tireless fountain of joyful and inspired life based on the eternal *ānanda* of the Brahman which overflows into creation out of Its own inherent fulness.

This then is the charter of action, the fact that the whole Cosmos is established on sacrifice; not on mere formal acts of ceremonial offering but on that of which these were but the outward symbol, the Great Sacrifice of which we read in the Vedas in which the One *Purusha* was offered in the fires of the worlds and His limbs scattered like those of Osiris to all the quarters of space. This is the Sacrifice which the disciple is called to co-operate in. But, though he acts ceaselessly, yet is he not bound by *karma* for his grounding in the *Sankhyan* wisdom has taught him that actions are performed by the modifications of *prakṛiti* alone. His bodies, gross and subtle, act and the unwise are entangled in the acts, but he who has mastered the lesson of the previous chapter has learnt to see that the *Ātman*, the True Self, is for ever but the detached Witness, serene and impartial. Actions can no more bind Him than weapons can pierce Him and, clinging firmly to this knowledge in his heart, offering his actions to Krishna as the symbol of the Great Sacrifice, free from the fetters of selfish hope and fear, he engages with zest in the great battle against evil and sorrow, the evil of his own lower nature and the sorrow of his brothers.

For let none think that the battle is won at the first triumph and blare of the trumpets. The knowledge that has been given must be practised and built into the heart by constant struggle. Again and again must the battle be fought

and he who, shutting with subtle sophisms his eyes to the imperfections still existing in his lower nature and his ears to the cry for help that sounds pitifully from suffering humanity, seeks to rest on his laurels, is unworthy of the Wisdom he has received and is doomed to fall, however proudly he may carry things off for the time.

Doubts will assuredly come tormenting the heart with the suggestion that the struggle is useless.

All things are vain and vain the knowledge of
their vanity ;
Rise and go hence, there is no better way
Than patient scorn, nor any help for man,
Nor any staying of his whirling wheel.

All beings follow their own natures. The *Ātman* is the impartial Witness of all ; good and evil are but empty words and the fight against the latter is in vain. What shall restraint avail since actions flow inevitably from the workings of Nature and the Soul is but the passive witness of the phantom show ?

But these deceiving half-truths must be conquered. It is true the play of Nature follows fixed laws and that effect follows cause with unerring accuracy. Deeply embedded in the Cosmos is the power of attraction and repulsion by which all things move and change. From chemical elements with their "affinities" to men with their loves and hates, all are bound by this power within the iron Circle of Necessity, all, that is, save he who has conquered desire and acts from a sense of duty (*swadharma*) alone. As long as the disciple

does certain acts because he likes them and abstains from certain others because he dislikes them, so long must he whirl helplessly upon the Wheel ; for, though he may be of a "virtuous" disposition, and so perform but "virtuous" acts, yet is he none the less the victim of his own nature.

But the *Ātman*, the One Self, is for ever free in Its own being ; Its apparent bondage comes only from the self-identification with Its lower vehicles, the mirrors in which Its Light is reflected. The higher the disciple climbs up the Ladder of the Soul, the more the inherent freedom of the *Ātman* will shine forth and dominate the play of Nature instead of blindly suffering it.

He who acts from the dictates of the *manas* is freer than he who acts from those of the senses, and freer still is he whose *manas* is united with the *buddhi* and suffused by its Light, the Light of the glorious Flame Beyond. Therefore, instead of allowing himself to be guided by the likes and dislikes of the senses, the disciple must constantly strive, by acting from a sense of duty alone, to rise to higher and ever higher levels of his being. Bound as he is by his nature at any given level, yet is he free with the inherent freedom of the *Ātman* to choose whether he will act from his lower nature or from his higher. True the "higher" will ever recede as he climbs and what is "higher" now will become "lower" in time ; but at each stage his freedom will increase until he reaches the Un-

reachable and all desire is dead in that blazing Unity, slain like a moth at the threshold by the touch of the frosty air without.

Thus understanding Him (the *Ātman*) as higher than the *buddhi*, restraining the lower self by the *Ātman*, slay thou, O Mighty armed, the enemy in the form of desire, difficult to be overcome.

Let the disciple dwell on this concluding verse, for in its few words is contained the secret that has baffled so many ascetics and philosophers, the secret of the conquest of desire. True, it is a

secret that cannot be imparted in words, one which must be experienced in the heart; but he who has even partially understood the meaning of the words "restraining the lower self by the *Ātman*," may know for certain that his foot is on the ladder and that if he will resolutely put his knowledge into practice his further progress is assured and neither gods nor men can hinder his ultimate attainment of the Goal.

SRI KRISHNA PREM

THE TREADMILL OF THOUGHT

How many men are running, squirrels in a cage, upon the wheel of thought! The door stands open wide into a larger air, a wider view, but men love their accustomed ways of thinking; they prefer to run upon the treadmill of familiar notions, of orthodox opinions and beliefs. Whether the doctrines held be those of religion or science, if they are blindly adopted and as blindly followed, they are no better than the squirrel's wheel, upon which, round and round, the poor beast travels without arriving anywhere but at the point he started from.

A treadmill breaks down the morale of brutes. Who has not seen one set to turn a piece of farm machinery and on it a horse

dispiritedly plodding to keep his place upon the wheel his own exertion turns. He has learned that hardest galloping on that treadmill will merely turn his hateful wheel the faster, and so he shuffles dully on. How is he different from those who give their blind allegiance to a creed, except that his performance does generate a little power?

How foolish those who fear to dare the free and open space of thought! Some even who essay it scurry back to mount the wheel again, though with its zest for them forever lost. In power of thought each man has his passport to the truth. How can he willingly remain a prisoner to blind belief?

E. H.

THE INSTRUMENT OF HUMILITY

[The English author and critic, J. S. Collis, rightly emphasizes the importance of teachableness, but between such genuine humility and "the ability to surrender oneself entirely to another's influence" there is a great gulf. To forget oneself in devotion to a worthy cause is noble; but to surrender oneself without reservations to the influence of any man who has not transcended every human weakness is to court disaster. Passivity is fraught with danger and unquestioning self-surrender cannot be safely given to any in the public world to-day.—Eds.]

The "Doctrine of the Eye" is for the crowd; the "Doctrine of the Heart" for the elect.

The first repeat in pride: "Behold, I know"; the last, they who in humbleness have garnered, low confess: "Thus have I heard."

—*The Voice of the Silence.*

"Many are humiliated" said St. Bernard, "but few are humble." He might have added that few are humble because many are afraid of being humiliated. Nothing is gained by humiliation, while much is lost. History has taught us again and again what happens when one nation or one set of nations humiliates another. And when one individual is humiliated by another—then also, if the wound is deep, the result is revenge. There is undoubtedly a real fear of being humble lest we be humiliated.

But is there any point in being humble itself? There is, provided we understand what field it is, in which we want to make it operate. We must not allow the word to dwell in the vague and amiable regions of a general principle. In so far as life is an art, general principles must always be senseless. Humility as a general principle is the most futile of all. There is no good in being humble during a physical fight, nor any-

where in the sphere of play. Actually when we come to think it out we find that there is only a limited number of fields in which the instrument can be used. I say instrument, for unless it is a tool we can have no use for it—as an abstraction (however well-sounding) it is only an annoyance.

There are two occasions when it is called for: in our dealings with other people, and in our mental-spiritual advance. Those are the chief fields.

It ought to be our counsel of perfection in our dealings with other people. "He was so humble that he never humiliated anyone"—I can think of no finer epitaph. Doubtless there are some over whose graves it should have been inscribed—men not perhaps known to the world yet nevertheless belonging to her greatest sons. I make no pretence of preaching here from personal success: the most I can say is that there are certain words by Goethe never very far from my mind. "No advance in understanding is possible without reverence for that which is above us, for that which is on our level, and for that which is beneath us." I cannot think of a better definition of humility than

those words. How much they would mean in the ordinary daily life of the world if carried out, we have all sufficient imagination to guess. That word "reverence" carries me to the second field in which humility is a splendid tool. It is the field with which I am chiefly concerned in this article—mental-spiritual advance.

To possess the capacity to reverence certain other persons, to place them in a higher category than oneself, is an essential in mental and spiritual advance. Everyone does not possess this gift. But most do—in terms of hero-worship. The man who in his youth is unable to hero-worship is (more than any music-hater) really only fit for treasons, stratagems, and spoils. Our capacity to esteem certain men we know to be holders of a wonderful knowledge, a spiritual key, a vision that we do not possess ourselves, is of greater value than at first seems likely. For thus we are *set in motion*. If the man who is thus influencing us is really a great man or a great thinker, so much the better; but even if he is not it scarcely matters vitally for our looking upwards alone has served us, making us forget to be argumentatively and egotistically on our guard.

To be able to surrender oneself entirely to another's influence is the essence of humility; that is why humility is so rare. For such personal surrender goes against the grain. This is exactly where pride—which is indeed from Lucifer, since it separates us from the

Divine—trips up the average man. He is afraid of being thought a fool. He is afraid to be thought lacking in vision. He feels that he must "keep his end up." Hence, instead of surrendering himself to the guide, continually asking questions, allowing his Error to call forth Truth, letting silence frame unuttered answers while he questions, he argues and debates! The difference between the man who is capable of inner progress and the man who is not, is that the former unconsciously (I'm afraid it has to be unconscious) realises the immense positivity in receptiveness. It is precisely the man who is ready to eschew the argumentative mind who eventually has a mind worth arguing with. It is the man who does not care whether he be regarded as a weak character who at last comes to possess a character worth calling strong. It is the man who does not mind whether he is original or not who in the end appears thoroughly original.

For what we are talking of here is the *magic of fecundation*. Rebirth is, we must not forget, a question of birth. A child has to be born. And somehow or other there has to be fecundation. We are here discussing one facet of the problem of rebirth, conversion: that facet is the rôle humility plays when the individual meets the man who can influence him. But, it may be urged, why write as if any and every given person is in the least likely to meet another who will fecundate him in this particular way? Why pretend that in the

West (for which you are speaking) there are *gurus* to be found, when you know that there are only parsons ?

The answer is that the man who has the capacity to advance inwardly is bound to meet the right person at the right time just as he reads the right book at the right moment. I do not refer only to men of outstanding genius, who are thus fecundated—Whitman by Emerson, Carpenter by Whitman, Havelock Ellis by James Hinton, Carlyle by Goethe, and so on. I refer to the less exalted person who has the capacity to advance spiritually. For with that capacity goes another—the power to sense that someone else possesses the key we want. That man will appear in the guise of either teacher or friend. And that is the man we should hero-worship for a time. The capacity to see a hero who is not yet famous, is perhaps rare ; but those who possess it will be likely to possess too the active humility, the receptiveness, the power of complete self-surrender that is so necessary.

It is not a question of imitating another but of abandoning oneself to the influence of another's essence ; the outcome of which is personal rebirth. Instead of leading to stupid imitation this humble path is the shortest way to originality. "Let no one be afraid that he should lose himself by this self-surrender," writes Keyserling in his *Creative Understanding*. "A man who surrenders himself naturally appears influenced for a time. But sooner

or later what has been received by him is transferred by him into his original and personal property, or sets his personal in motion, an effect never produced when one's thoughts are primarily bent on argument, for the simple reason that one's personal was, then, never involved at all. For the question with this personal is not of something pre-existent but of something to be created, of one's own spiritual child. "

It is not a question of being prepared to lose your soul or your Self once, but to lose them many times, to be prepared to renounce again and yet again the whole of what you are, not to contend with others for what you are but to care only what you can become in time—that is the definition of humility that we should do well to embrace.

What is written here is not necessarily applicable throughout the whole of any given life—it is less so after the age of maturity. The age to cultivate humility is between twenty and thirty—during those years in which all is won or all is lost, those militant years when marriage, parties, games, clothes, food, pub-crawling, vanity, should be temporarily subordinated in favour of the quest. The one question that I ask myself as I gaze into the countenance of the young man between twenty and thirty who has decided to conquer and to save the world (meaning himself) is—Has he the receptivity of Humility ? The answer is not always in the affirmative.

J. S. COLLIS

NEW BOOKS AND OLD

THE DEAD IN ANCIENT EGYPT*

This brochure of 44 pages is an annotated reprint of the Frazer Lecture, delivered by Mr. A. H. Gardiner at Cambridge in the current year. His subject, he tells us, was suggested by a conversation with Sir James Frazer when he contended that the fear of the dead, which Sir James believed to have been almost universally prevalent in early times, was not to be found in Ancient Egypt. Mr. Gardiner subsequently came to the conclusion that he had stated his case "over-categorically," and he now attempts to summarise briefly the evidence bearing on the attitude of the Ancient Egyptians to the dead and to define his mature deductions from it.

As far as his quoted evidence goes, Mr. Gardiner may be justified in supposing that the Egyptians—or some of them—held very naive, not to say childish, beliefs about the after-death life. They thought, he tells us, that their post-mortem well-being depended on the preservation of the mummified physical body and on funerary rites and offerings, for which the most elaborate preparations were made during life and endowments established by those who could afford to do so. Mr. Gardiner concludes that the Egyptians feared death, but did not fear the dead as such, though some dead persons, as some living, might be inimical and to be dreaded. It is only rarely, he points out, that a tomb is discovered in Egypt which was not opened and stripped of its rich furnishings in ancient times: and people who were afraid of the dead would not have dared to make a practice of violating their graves.

In their efforts to reconstruct the religious thought of Ancient Egypt from

the fragmentary records available, writers on the subject are too apt to assume that, because their civilisation is very remote from us in time, the Ancient Egyptians were necessarily a "primitive" people whose religious symbolism must be interpreted in the light of the beliefs and practices of the "primitives" of the present or immediate past. But, if we may judge the unknown by the analogy of the known, we have some justification for thinking that in Egypt, as in Greece, India and China, while the mass of the people were given to understanding the myths and allegories of the national religion literally or superstitiously, there was a wiser minority who interpreted them as symbols of mystical and philosophical truth. Among the moderns too, if we leave out of account the minorities everywhere who dissent for various reasons from the national religions, we find that the interpretation of the symbolism of those religions by their avowed adherents ranges from the loftiest down to the crudest as the minds of those adherents are cultivated or the reverse.

Plato, who was a man of extraordinary mental power and master of all the learning of his day, showed by his reference to the Egyptian priesthood that he regarded their knowledge as more mature and more profound than that of the Greeks. He would scarcely have paid such deference to men whose beliefs concerning the great problems of life and death were no more than on a par with those of the popular superstitions of his own people.

We could wish that Mr. Gardiner had seen his way to touch on the evidence, such as the Heart-Weighing ritual in the *Book of the Dead*, which

**The Attitude of the Ancient Egyptians to Death and the Dead.* By ALAN H. GARDINER, D. LITT., F. B. A. (The University Press, Cambridge.)

goes to show that even the popular religion of Ancient Egypt had its higher side and taught that a man's post-mortem condition was determined by actions in the present life.

Mr. Gardiner tells us:—

The names of dead persons in inscriptions of the Eighteenth Dynasty are frequently followed by the epithet *wahem ānekh*, "living again," more literally "repeating life."

He explains this as pointing to belief in a vague sort of spooklike post-mortem existence in which the unfortunate shade was liable to all the vicissitudes of the earth life, though apparently without any of its advantages. But is it not admissible to read these "living again" inscriptions as implying belief in reincarnation, a doctrine in which so many of our predecessors and contemporaries have found a master-key to some of the knottiest problems of life?

We owe a great debt to Egyptologists for the enormous mass of data relating to Ancient Egypt which their industry, skill and learning have brought to light; but even now our information about the Nilotic civilisation during the unknown number of millenniums through which it flourished is but fragmentary and one-sided. The science of the Egyptians is virtually unknown to us except by inference

from the material works based upon it; their writings on history, philosophy, and mathematics have all perished. The extent of our knowledge of matters Egyptian is so remarkable that we are apt to forget the vastly greater area of our ignorance. A preponderant proportion of the data of Egyptology takes the form of funerary rituals, tombs of various types, tomb furniture, paintings and inscriptions—a fact which might tempt us to fancy that our information about Egyptian beliefs as to death and the dead was complete enough to justify us in at least tentatively reconstructing them. But, if we may venture to imagine a parallel case, would the archaeologists of 10,000 A. D. be able to form a just estimate of the philosophical and religious theories of present-day Englishmen as to death and the future life, supposing our libraries had been destroyed except for a copy or two of the Church of England Burial Service, an illustrated account of the ceremonies of the Requiem Mass, and a few odd volumes of the Spiritualist periodical, *Light*; while the only other pertinent data available were the ruins of Stonehenge, Westminster Abbey and St. Paul's, the remains of a number of solidly built family vaults and a vast collection of inscribed tombstones?

R. A. V. M.

On Dreams. By WILLIAM ARCHER. Edited by THEODORE BESTERMAN (Methuen and Co., Ltd., London. 7s. 6d.)

Here are dreams from a ten years' record noted down at the time of awakening, and with them are presented certain conclusions mainly opposed to those of Freud and other writers. Some are good, as the repudiation of the theory that *all* dreams represent the fulfilment of a wish, drawn from a subconscious agglomerate of unavowable desires, and draped, so to say, with fig leaves by a dramatizing agency, the "Censor." Other conclusions of the eminent theatrical critic,

however, especially those connected with the time-rate of dreams and with the, to him, incredible life-panorama flashing before the brain just before death, merely show that his mind was not trained in metaphysics. The recurrence in many of the dreams of numerous variants of a particular image, and still more so, the two "outstanding dreams" with their atmosphere of solemn elevation and awe, suggest that something more is required as an explanation than is given, though mention is made of the dream mind which can take hold of a subject and "work things out in

obedience to principles and tendencies which may form the subject of rational and I believe very fruitful study." That state Mr. Archer considered as preceded by a chaotic condition intermediary between it and the waking state, a condition like a whirlpool of irrelevant driftwood of long-stored memories, any of which may be flung into the content of a dream thereby confusing the meaning. This comes very near to the Eastern teaching of the passing of the consciousness from *jagrat* (the waking state) through *svapna* (chaotic dream) to *sushupti* (deep sleep, the plane of the Ego, or Soul) and thence back through *svapna* to *jagrat*. The idea is also approached that some dreams are purely physiological, others psychic, the two "outstanding dreams" being of a different, let us say, more spiritual nature, but there is nothing to indicate that these and their subdivisions correlate with the various aspects or principles of man's nature.

All of this demonstrates the fact that the methods of Occult Science, employing both deduction and induction, are the most effective and the least wasteful of time and energy. Much more could be achieved by any dream-recorder who studied the general axioms given by Occult Science—as hypotheses at first—and proceeded by deduction from these universals to the particulars of his own and other men's experience. Then the induction from the particulars to the universals would be used to test if they supported the axioms given. Such a sound intellectual comprehension gives the right basis for practical application.

To take one example, ancient sciences all postulate what is now best known as the "Astral Light," "an imponderable tenuous medium which interpenetrates the entire globe, and in which all the acts and thoughts

of every man are impressed to be afterwards reflected again." The existence of this will help to explain dreams proper, the dozing dreams, the hypnagogic visions and phrases "from the blue" as well as some spiritualistic phenomena, rightly suspected by Mr. Archer as akin to the type of chaotic dream consciousness, though other factors play a part. An important point is that these involuntary astral impressions come "the moment the regulative faculty is off its guard, the moment, so to speak, that reason begins to nod." In other words, they crowd into the mind whenever it falls into a passive condition, a state whose culmination is found in the medium, with as little power left of control as the dreamer in the midst of his maelstrom. Day-dreams and dozing are not healthy indulgences.

But all this relates only to the lower nature and a quotation from one of the outstanding dreams mentioned may serve to balance the review.

The joy resulted from the discovery... of some secret which appeared to solve the riddle of existence and removed the drawbacks and imperfections of life. The discovery was not an invention, but rather a realization, which seemed to lie close at hand, yet to have been hitherto overlooked.

The curious feature of the dream was the extreme emotional elevation accompanying it, and the reiterated assertion in the dream that it was *not* a dream, but a glorious reality, victoriously manifesting itself on every hand.

And perhaps—who knows?—the dream may have been prophetic. For though miracles do not happen, the power of the inspired Thought, uttering itself in the magic Word, is almost limitless; and what should forbid us to conceive that one day a Word might be spoken which should cause the burden, not of sin, but of stupidity, to drop from the shoulders of mankind?

That "Word," the Knowledge that gives the answer to life, is for ever being spoken. It needs only the ears that can hear it.

W. E. W.

I and Me; A Study of the Self.
By E. GRAHAM HOWE (Faber & Faber, Ltd., London. 7s. 6d.)

Scientific thought, after describing a long trajectory in the void comes back to the starting point; the scientist to-day finds himself repeating what *The Voice of the Silence* led the Initiate long ago to exclaim, "In order to become the KNOWER of ALL SELF" it is still imperative to be, in the first instance, "the knower of SELF": that is the crucial human issue at all times.

This, in substance, is the implication of Dr. Graham Howe's study. It has to be admitted that Dr. Howe is not, and does not even claim to be, an original thinker. But to say this is not to detract at all from the value of what he has to communicate. In so far as his point of view is symptomatic of the undercurrents of enlightened opinion in the West outside the ranks of professional philosophers, it possesses an undeniable significance and interest. His position, broadly speaking, is characteristic of a large body of intelligent people in Europe to-day who, although they have lost faith in the institutions of religion, are still religious and genuinely desirous of finding a faith which would not be something separate from life, but be "a way of life." As a human being he is, obviously, weary with all species of "idolatry," however glamorous, which tend to pervert truths into insufferable dogmas. Having gone through scientific discipline, he is painfully conscious of the limitations of scientific approach, which, if it is to come anywhere near a comprehensive understanding of reality, must enlarge its horizon and include within its orbit "both Psychology and Metaphysics, all the phenomena of life; even the childish foolishness of sentiments and sentimentalities, as well as the urgent longings of pious hopes and visionary dreams." Finally, as a practising psychologist in intimate touch with the shipwrecks and frustrations of life, he finds no comfort in the self-complacent

optimism of orthodox psychoanalysts for whom the whole problem of living reduces itself to a mechanical categorisation and adjustment of complexes and inhibitions. The actual issue, he insists, is at once far more intricate and direct: it involves facing the immediate problem of self-integration.

But it is pertinent to ask how, if at all, can this integration be realised in actuality? Dr. Howe argues that an honest self-analysis ultimately enables us not only to understand the nature of Self as such but to discover what is historically known as the "Middle Way." Here, however, it must be made perfectly clear that he is not using the term "analysis" strictly in the signification of accepted canons. With him "analysis" is not synonymous with subdivision. In fact, the process does not necessarily involve reduction of things to their components; rather, it implies an apprehension of the "relationship" existing between the part and the whole. The application of this specialised and, in the last resort, mystical technique of analysis leads Dr. Howe to a discovery of the underlying duality of Self. This condition is not an isolated incident peculiar to human experience, but pervades the whole structure of the Universe in manifestation, expressing itself in an infinitude of phenomenal relationships, e.g., I and Me, Subject and Object, Male and Female etc. This dualism, however, is not to be interpreted as suggesting some fundamental element of conflict at the root of things. On the contrary, it represents that eternal co-existence of antitheses which is a prerequisite of harmony, and without which synthesis would be inconceivable. Dr. Howe tries to convey this supreme paradox of life through the ideographic metaphor of a circle, or a wheel, and builds up an elaborate symbolism round that image, which, though confusing at times, nevertheless remains highly ingenious to the end.

The Idea of Salvation in the World's Religions. By J. W. PARKER, M. A. (Macmillan and Co., Ltd., London. 6s.)

A comparative study of religions, undertaken with an open mind and in a spirit of unbiased enquiry, invariably demonstrates that great cosmic and ethical concepts are not the exclusive monopoly of any single creed, but the common property of all great Scriptures of the world. Such an enlightened conviction becomes a potent factor in promoting mutual sympathy and understanding between East and West.

Unfortunately this book can be commended neither for facts based upon actual historical research, nor for impartiality. The author starts with "the belief, openly avowed, that the Christian claim is true" (p. 3), namely, that Christ alone can save. While paying lip homage to the value of logic, he himself turns numerous intellectual somersaults.

The great Eastern religions including the Greek, together with the lower culture of savagery, are classed as "experience at a level below that of Christianity." The latter's superiority consists in the doctrines of a Personal God, Original Sin, and Vicarious Atonement. Except for Christ, "none before or since has been without sin." Forgiveness can be obtained only by the Grace of God* through faith in Jesus, the intermediary. Such views can only be entertained by one who worships the dead-letter of Biblical texts.

For this personal god notion, Judaism and Islam are favoured above Buddhism and Hinduism, both of which have been deplorably misunderstood.† "Though the *Dhammapada* is one of the world's treasures of moral thought," (p. 187), it is stated to be lacking in the incentive to active service of humanity: "the Buddhist monk aims at doing nothing at all, and may well

end in complete vacancy of mind and character." History refutes both these charges.

The doctrine of Karma is also condemned because it, with Transmigration "has equally hindered the emergence of moral ideals." (p. 182) Yet it was taught by every great Teacher, Jesus included—vicarious atonement having been evolved long after Christ's own time—and reincarnation is not foreign to the teachings of Jesus, though anathematised by the Church.

Making all due allowance for the unavoidable handicaps to which the author points in his Preface—his lack of first-hand acquaintance with any religion other than that found in England and his "scholarship of a rural parish priest"—the conviction is unescapable that his study would have been more fruitful if he had brought to it an open mind. He modestly hopes that mistakes made by workers like himself in the field of comparative study of religions will help towards kindling a wider interest in the study. Alas! that very hope bears the imprint of his bias; it concludes: "so that it may become of greater usefulness to all who are seeking in the Faith of Christ the satisfaction of their spiritual need." We fear his book will have the opposite effect to stimulating genuine interest in different faiths. It naturally will find most of its readers in Christian lands, and it can only entrench them the more firmly, however unwarrantably, in their conviction of the superiority of their own views.

India does not need missionaries as the author believes. The popular Western ideas of Crucifixion, Resurrection etc. are gross materialisations compared with the lofty and even sublime ideals presented in Indian Philosophy. Every rite in Christianity is a pagan

* Deity is described as an "eternal Being," "beyond and above His Creation as well as immanent in it."

† The deeply philosophical doctrines of Nirvana and Maya have been grossly misrepresented, Hatha Yogic practices confused with the Raja Yoga of Patanjali and Hinduism condemned as morally deficient, being monistic instead of theistic.

inheritance. The miracle-worker and the unique Saviour being no historical figure, the "faith in a certain Person, Jesus Christ" (p. 219) is doomed. True Salvation does exist however, for "Christ, the true esoteric saviour, is no man, but the divine principle in every human being. He who strives to resur-

rect the Spirit crucified in him by his own terrestrial passions, and buried deep in the sepulchre of his sinful flesh ; he who has the strength to roll back the stone of matter from the door of his own inner sanctuary, he has the spirit of the risen Christ in him."

N. K. K.

The Substance of Adam. By SERGIUS GORTAN ANCONA (Rider and Co., Ltd., London. 18s.)

This book is heralded as "A complete system of cosmogony founded on the Kabbala." It is a well-known fact that the Jewish Kabbalah has suffered strange disfigurements at the hands of Western occultists and Christian mystics. An author whom his publishers hail as "a seer and a prophet" as well as "a Christian Kabbalist" may be expected to take still further liberties with the already mutilated system, and the expectation has been fulfilled. When the reader encounters such amazing statements as that Rama was a Celt by race, a Druid, who decided to leave the continent of Europe and turn to the Orient with his message, where he conquered India "changing his name from Rama into Lama (Lamb)...to indicate the peacefulness of his purposes," he must feel that the so-called seer is very much to the fore and the interpreter of the Jewish Kabbalah quite in the background.

The clarity of style is not helped by such obscure expressions as "animics," "imploration" and "abysm," which, moreover, help to link it with the

large class of pseudo-occult literature to which, in spite of certain redeeming features, we cannot avoid feeling that it belongs. Many of the statements may be in fact based upon the Jewish Kabbalah, especially those which are comparable with the teachings of the Vedas, which represent one source of the former, but the romance of Rama has shaken our faith in all of the allegedly historical facts which are unfamiliar and appear to rest upon the author's *ipse dixit*. At best, they are interesting if true.

The writer's sectarian bias appears in his statement in the Preface that *The Substance of Adam* "is based on the western tradition of thought. Its purpose is to show how this tradition alone, superior to all others, has in itself the power to satisfy the reason and direct us to a supreme liberation." We are far from sharing the publishers' ambitious, not to say presumptuous, expectation that this book "will prove a new Secret Doctrine for the West." It is emphatically not worthy of mention in the same breath with Madame Blavatsky's monumental study under that title.

J. A.

Where Is Thy Sting ? By R. KNIGHT (Author-Partner Press, Ltd., London. 5s.)

This book is addressed "To those about to die." It aims to remove the painful sting from the majority who fear death, for both "Churchman and Atheist agree in shrinking from the fatal hour, in spite of the confidence possessed by the one and the stoicism

of the other." A sense of uncertainty is always fearful—such ignorance creates both terror and pain.

Avoiding the mistake of viewing discarnate life "exclusively from the religious standpoint" the author throws the light of Science on after-death states. Breaking away from popular notions of the hereafter his thinking is free and independent.

Orthodox dogmas and blind belief are condemned and an inquiry into the subject is invited; a meaningless life ending in annihilation is also rejected.

Without successive lives on earth, death would mean the end of our cherished hopes. The opening chapter of the book, devoted to Reincarnation, gives the true teaching of life as a school where the Soul periodically incarnates to learn.

A good attempt is made to prove the invisible—primarily the existence of the Soul; following which states after death are briefly examined. To some extent such proofs are helpful but not final in convincing others of man's immortality. That conviction, each one using the evidence provided must gain for himself.

Sleep and dreams are compared to death and after—a fitting analogy in many respects. It is also truly stated that each one, actively albeit unknowingly, is now and here preparing his life after death.

From his exposition of the subject we gather that the author is familiar with the teachings of Theosophy; and also, unfortunately, with those of pseudo-theosophy.

On the whole, however, our author's exposition will not arrest the attention nor comfort the heart of the man in the street. To those who examine its propositions from the logical viewpoint, this book will prove attractive, but it is doubtful whether it really gives consolation "To those about to die."

DAENA

CORRESPONDENCE

In the July issue of THE ARYAN PATH there is an article on "Punishment and Personality" by the Rev. Gordon Lang. As we know this gentleman to be a strong opponent of the Humane Slaughtering of Animals we would be

interested to know how he reconciles this attitude with the humanitarian principles expressed in THE ARYAN PATH article.

London.

E. M. H.

THE LAND OF PSYCHE AND OF NOUS

Churchmen oppose Spiritism—Other churchmen Favour it—The "New Way" of a Confused Dreamer—Favousia—Consensus Philosophorum.

The Bishop of London, Dr. Winnington Ingram, affirmed some time since (1) that on a subject like Immortality, all of us should be "big enough to state our own views" and (2) to "respect the opinions of others who may have arrived at the same belief by quite another road."* It came about, however, that in the Spring of the present year a deceased clergyman, giving the name of Davids and claiming high ecclesiastical position, was alleged to have delivered a message to a certain "direct voice" medium. The imagination of the audience went to work thereon, and the communication was duly fathered on Dr. Davidson, late Archbishop of Canterbury. There is little need to add that the resulting garbled story circulated far and wide; and is supposed—rightly or wrongly—to have reached Dr. Ingram. In any case he has attacked Spiritism (1) as "a waste of time for the living," mediumistic phenomena being "a telepathic interpretation of the minds of the sitters." In view of these supposed facts, the Bishop has forbidden his clergy to dabble in "communication with the dead" or take part in "psychic research."† Sir Oliver Lodge is disposed to regard the matter with

serious regret and has even suggested that the unwarranted introduction of Archbishop Davidson's name has "thrown the subject back and undone a generation of effort."‡ Some of us will venture to question this, notwithstanding the fact that the Bishop of Winchester has also entered the lists, asserting that Spiritism is "dangerous to the mental and spiritual health of the ordinary person"; that its materialisations are largely "a story of the exposure of false claims"; that its oral and written communications "can often be accounted for by the working of the unconscious mind"; that they are "pious and sentimental platitudes," usually "on a lower plane than the utterances of any good and intelligent man who is still living."** All this is as old as the hills and has never deterred anyone who is drawn otherwise to research. It is to be noted, moreover, that Dr. Ingram "admits that he has no personal experience,"† and his sacerdotal peer is most probably in like case.

The so-called "Order of the Preparation for the Communion of Souls," founded by clergymen to encourage co-operation between

* See Dr. Ingram's Introduction to *Life after Death*, edited by Sir James Marchant, K.B.E., and dealing with Christian eschatology in the light of psychical phenomena.

† *Light*, July 18, 1935, p. 450.

‡ *Ibid.*, July 25, p. 467.

** *Light*, August 8, p. 506.

† *Ibid.*, p. 503.

the churches and Spiritism—as explained on a previous occasion—is likely to survive episcopal prohibitions and perhaps even its own ill-devised title. The Rev. Mr. Tweedale—with a few others like him—will continue to testify from pulpit and platform, in books and journals, till at long last it will be found that there are no co-operating churches, after all the efforts. The Bishops will also have realised that the voice of the Anglican Prelacy is not like that of the Roman Pontiff, beyond all contradiction within his own province. The debates had by no means ended when the psychic journals were fortunately diverted into other channels by the misdeeds and exposure of a “flower medium,” caught in a flagrant act and yet finding a few of the elect to defend her cause. So also the Margery circle seems to have abandoned fingerprints in favour of messages from the late Conan Doyle, whose indiscriminate methods did so much in their day to depreciate a serious subject. He is engaged now in producing supernatural signatures through the Boston psychic; but under the auspices of a certain Mr. Button, as President of the American S. P. R., they are the sorriest exhibition produced in its recent annals by the Land of Psyche.*

Is there a “new way,” possible and perhaps practicable in religi-

ous education? Is it likely also, supposing that it be tried seriously, to prove a “living way”? A recent essayist, the Rev. S. Udney, believes that there is and proffers it for consideration, but unfortunately in hectic terms.† He explains that it is the way of “Symbolism,” and is hence compelled to confess immediately that it is not only “the oldest in the world” but is that which the Latin-writing mystics of the West have expounded from time immemorial as the shewing forth of *invisibilia per visibilia*. He cites also St. Paul, who has told us that things unseen are understood in the light of those that are made. Mr. Udney will know undoubtedly of other voices, up and down the Christian centuries, which have contributed their golden intimations, a perennial witness without to a world that lies within. They range from pseudo-Dionysius to Bernard and Eckhart, from Ruysbroeck onward even to those modern days when Saint-Martin testified amidst the orgy of the French Revolution, and that great watchman of a later dawn, who is Emerson, proclaimed peace and unity to the developing American States. He, and the rest of them, spoke of living Symbols, of the grace of fuller life behind them, of sacramental signs and their inward grand moralities. It cannot be said that any of them appealed to children. Mr. Udney, however, thinks that the vegetable kingdom, from seed-time to harvest,

* “Sir Arthur Conan Doyle and the Margery Circle,” by William H. Button. See *Journal of the A.S.P.R.*, August, 1935, pp. 119-224.

† *The Contemporary Review*, s. v. “Symbolism: The New and Living Way in Religious Education,” October, 1935, pp. 455-461.

holds up a glass in Nature to the "actual transformation of one order of life into another," while the church calendar exhibits an analogical and "ever-expanding process in the spiritual world". To put the proposition quite roughly and crudely, it is this analogy which should be made known in the church schools—not to speak of "all schools throughout all lands"—by teachers who are "after the spirit" and "not after the letter." There is no need to point out that a strange and problematical rectification of the calendar must take place before it can set forth in logical sequence the growth of the Christ-Life in the given individual, from the pre-Advent Seed-time to Ascension Day, and not leave the balance of the year hopelessly in the lurch. It is patent otherwise on the surface that elementary and secondary schools are no more meant for the training of St. Johns of the Cross and St. Catherines of Sienna than Eton or Harrow or Winchester, or—for that matter—what are called the church schools. It is enough to ask where are those teachers "after the spirit" which the scheme postulates, where are they likely to be trained, where are the preceptors to instruct and examine, and where in fine the school-boards who would know what Mr. Udney happens to be talking about? If we remember rightly, he used to expound in other days and places the unfathomable mystery of identity between Shakespeare and Francis Bacon,

not to mention excursions in other worlds of myth beyond all common ken. He was dreaming then, and it seems to us that he is dreaming still.

For Mr. M. Channing-Pearce* the significance of the Sermon on the Mount is not to be separated from the significance of the Mount of Calvary. We must be prepared to recognise that "the Christology and the Christian ethic are one and indivisible." If the first is untenable, the second must pass therewith. But "an imminent Parousia," or Coming of the Kingdom, "dominated the mind and shaped the doctrine and ethic of the early Church," and this proved an illusion. We may search the eschatology and contrive, with Dr. Schweitzer, to liberate it from temporal limitations and make it valid for all time;† we may satisfy ourselves that such a "spiritual insight" did actually underpin the material faith; but the one remained implicit, while the other ruled. It taught believers to take no thought for a morrow which they would not see; to lay up no treasures on an "evanescent" earth; to cease from resisting evil, because evil was about to end; and to hate that worldly life which would forfeit the life to come. But the Parousia did not take place, "and we no longer expect it." What is therefore the present position? The answer is, that unless "the fundamental eschatology

* *The Hibbert Journal*, October, 1935, pp. 45-56.

† *The Mysticism of St. Paul*, p. 380, quoted by Mr. Channing-Pearce.

of another life " is still tenable in some other and yet real sense, " the Christian ethic, no less than the Christian Creed " is nullified. In their place are offered us " the religion and ethics of this life," the religions of humanity, the fertility-faiths, the "incontrovertible psychology of the natural soul," the counter ethics with which those of Christianity are at war for ever. For those whom these cannot satisfy the vital question arises whether that other and yet real sense in which the eschatology of another life may be found and held either is discoverable now or has perhaps been with us from the beginning. Mr. Channing-Pearce has nothing to say hereon ; but he could have given an authentic answer on the authority of a cloud of witnesses, the Mystics of the Christian centuries. The Parousia was imminent for them ; for them the Kingdom came, in the one way which was promised by the Christian Master of the Way, though our essayist forgets about it. He said, unto those who had ears, that the Kingdom of Heaven is within.

The Rev. Dr. E. N. Merrington proposes a far-reaching question whether there is a *consensus philosophorum*, actual or possible, expressed or implied. There is apparently a *consensus gentium*, a " common or universal agreement regarding certain accepted notions," as—for example—that " the world of perceived objects seems to have

a reality of its own independently of our perception of it."* It does not signify at the moment that these perceptions are having their validity challenged in the foremost schools of thought, for—this notwithstanding—Dr. Merrington tends to hold that such " common consent of universal experience " may be postulated as "the basis of all our science and philosophy " so far as " materials " are concerned. However this may be, we are invited to look back upon the past and note successive attempts at transcending " the various philosophies " for their co-ordination in a larger system, a Philosophy of Philosophies, at once critical and constructive, and implying of necessity a hypothetical *consensus philosophorum*. Passing over an affirmed motive for unification which was "present in the work of Philo, Plotinus and the Neo-Platonists generally"; passing also the institution of relationship between Greek philosophers and Old Testament teachings, we are brought to those long-enduring centuries when the church imposed an unailing *consensus* between philosophy and dogmatic religion. A day came when these chains were cast off and reason rose up against faith. New sects and schools appeared, with their rival views on "the rational and the true." Kant in due course deprived the world of such easy sense of security, which at the same time carried no marks of *consensus*, nor is it to be thought that he and his "ultimate function" supplied the

* *The Contemporary Review*, Sept., 1935, pp. 325—334.

want. It remained—we are assured—for Hegel to put forth “the most stupendous effort ever made in...the organisation of the history of philosophy” by declaring—or was it proving?—that the world is Spirit. Prof. Hocking* has called his achievement “a world-view of vast empirical and historical richness without eclecticism.” An eclectic scheme was supplied by Victor Cousin, for whom the Schools of Idealism, Empiricism, Scepticism and Mysticism are “not false but unfinished,” and out of that which is authentic in all it is possible to produce “a complete philosophy.” So far as this survey has proceeded, we have not encountered the most shadowy *consensus philosophorum*, nor does it emerge in Dr. Merrington’s later considerations of Auguste Comte, of Renouvier and Rudolph Eucken, and of those who are still with us, like Croce, Gentile and Prof. A. N. Whitehead, not to speak of debaters whose records appear in “Proceedings” of the Aristotelian Society. Dr. Merring-

ton’s own conclusion admits by implication that no consensus has been discovered as yet, but that it remains possible. We may let it stand at this. What of its finality, supposing that it were found at last? From time immemorial the Latin Church has testified that *consensus omnium sanctorum sensus est Spiritus Sancti*. A sense of finality comes with faith therein: for others the dictum means only that those who gave us the doctrines approved by Rome were taught by the Spirit of God. We sigh and turn aside. And then as it may be, we hear perchance that choir of voices which, up and down the ages, has testified in many tongues: *Est una sola rēs*. It is not the voice of a dogma, nor of faith in a claim accepted; it belongs to a doctrine of experience. And we remember that there is now and has been from grey antiquity a *consensus omnium viatorum* who have followed the Path of Unity and found the One therein.

A. E. WAITE

* “Types of Philosophy,” pp. 433-4, quoted by Dr. Merrington.

ENDS AND SAYINGS

“.....ends of verse
And sayings of philosophers.”

Another volume of **THE ARYAN PATH** comes to a close with this issue. It is an open secret that its promoters sacrifice very heavily, not only in keeping it alive but also in enhancing its usefulness and deepening its influence. Not a few have enquired about the real purpose of this sacrifice. There is no mystery about it and we shall summarize that purpose here :—

(a) **THE ARYAN PATH** desires to awaken a genuine interest in spiritual culture, which is above racial, religious and geographical divisions and which possesses the power to unite the best minds who are seeking to better the conditions of human life by right education.

(b) It aims at drawing the attention of the modern man to the beauty and strength of ancient culture—especially the attention of the Occidental to Eastern culture. It also warns Asia, and especially India, while not overlooking the power and virtue of certain Western institutions, to avoid adopting such modes of life and thought as the West itself is fast discarding.

(c) **THE ARYAN PATH** advocates self-improvement and soul-development as the right method of human service ; recognizing the place of social propaganda and political legislation in fighting poverty, selfishness and ignorance, it yet emphasises, as even more important, the way of spiritual living by the individual, not for his own salvation but as a means to the right service of human brotherhood.

(d) It fights the pseudo and sham modes of “spiritual” living advocated by irresponsible people—*e. g.* spiritistic mediums, psychics, clairvoyants, astrol-

ogers, Western “occultists” and Eastern “swamis” and their like. It does this by presenting sane and straightforward teachings, and by offering different but complementary points of view. It encourages the study of spiritual problems but the rejection of every blind belief, whether of religion, of science or of politics.

(e) Having found the ancient and immemorial Aryan Theosophy to be a reliable body of knowledge, **THE ARYAN PATH** takes every opportunity to put forward the teachings of that Philosophy. The words “Aryan” and “Theosophy” are used in their pristine pure sense : Aryan means noble and has nothing to do, for example, with the ignoble ideas or actions of the German Nazis ; similarly Theosophy is Divine Wisdom-Religion (Bodhi-Dharma) or the Esoteric Science (Gupta-Vidya), known among the Neo-Platonists by that very name, Theosophia, and among the early Christians as Gnosis ; it has naught to do with what passes in our midst as theosophy with its own species of apostolic succession, of spiritism etc.

The teachings of pure Theosophy are to be found in the profoundly philosophical writings of H. P. Blavatsky, whose real students in our vast world are only a few, though their number is now increasing as a result of the labours of those few and of **THE ARYAN PATH** during the last six years.

Our civilization badly needs the message of **THE ARYAN PATH** and we need the support of our readers and contributors, many of whom have been generous in the past ; and we confidently look to them for making our seventh volume a rich success.

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